Marked by the deep crisis of various spheres of social development the last decade of the Russian history has provided a great impetus on the intellectual activity which started up not just a search for finding the approaches and methods of the crisis overcoming but the understanding of the causes that engendered such its depth and unexpected character. Moreover, because of the peculiarity of the Russian intellectual culture the latter (investigation of causes) always dominates over the former (the articulation of the optimum model for further positive development). This approach turned out to be very popular among the representatives of the Russian historiography while explanation of the causes (reasons) of the crisis condition meant to criticise (to fault-find) the Soviet historiographical tradition. In sum, many articles of the decade established quiet simple interpretative pattern of the twentieth century historiography development, comprising of three steps: the Soviet historiography - its crisis or decay and, finally, its collapse. This pattern, if taken for granted, evidences that historiographically the twentieth century in Russia begins with the events of 1917-1920 and finishes in the late eighties or early nineties.

Such a regard may be envisioned as very fruitful, but many crucial problems remain unsolved, namely the intellectual fundamentals and pre-conditions of forming the Soviet historiographical tradition, the nature of the relationships between the Soviet tradition and the prior one, the inner dynamics, the composition of forces within the Soviet academic historiography, the pre-requisites of its crisis. The most important question, which is to regard the Soviet historiographical process as a phenomenon, has not being solved yet. The above makes me to take the liberty to postulate that the depicted pattern contains more hidden inner contradictions and turning points than those usually articulated as significant for the development of historical scholarship, a number of obvious splits and sharp changes in the political set-up and revolution. This premise can be taken as permissible because a professional historiographer is always to take into account and to observe two essentially different and conflicting tendencies of historical knowing that produce a great impact on the creating and functioning of historiographical notions, assumptions and concepts of science.
The first tendency derives from the presumption that the essence of historical knowledge, being the most conservative one, includes the myriad of archaic and mythological elements which normally undergo the process of the intellectual reformulation by some set of rational methods and devices. Though reformulated, they do not fade out, not being surpassed completely. And these are the periods of crises and cultural shifts that reveal everything irrational quite evidently, making the rational intellectual level to obey to the archaic elements. I can call these elements “the historiographical constants”.

Another tendency is limited by any new generation’s sustainable intention to rewrite history, making it their ‘own’, while not accepting completely the stencils and traditions peculiar to the core of actually distinguished professional corporation and the whole society, even not trying to be tolerant to them. From this perspective, historiographically, the twentieth century in Russia has being mould in the similar conditions and on the same historiographical ground that could be seen in the Western Europe. It could be extremely hard to find any evidence that contemporary historiographical studies object or ignore the point that in the late nineteenth to early twentieth century historical knowledge and professional historical science found themselves in the state of a deep intellectual crisis. Intellectuals found such a crisis not only in the Russian historical knowing and science but in the Western one as well. To be true, though the assessment was the same, it indicated essentially different interpretations of the main causes that had engendered that crisis. Here I shall mention only those which are valuable from historiographical angle.

First, the conditions of the historical science, its context, changed radically, thus posing the new set of questions to be answered. But very often the previous historiographical experience was not helpful for the social sciences which faced such an astonishing phenomenon as "the masses" which was problematic to be explained through the well-studied and experienced phenomena of ‘classes’, ‘estate’, ‘state’, ‘society’. The dynamics of social life became more intensive thus changing the perception of Time. Second, the radical hitches in the natural sciences increased uncertainty about such basic notions as ‘law’, ‘conformity with a law of history’ as they were taken since the spread of the professional historiography. Third, rationalism (as it existed at the beginning of the nineteenth century), was strongly re-discredited, and an inclination to study the irrational fundamentals (or origins) of historical and social spheres.

All these reasons, even taken in brief, evidence for my assumption that the historiographical project of the nineteenth century as an attempt to represent historical knowledge as a basis to solve some global social problems was totally exhausted. The intellectuals' respond to these shifts was a search for new theoretical and methodological essentials in order to articulate the radically new project that could belong to the twentieth century. Thus the Russian historiographical space also suffered as hard deformations as the Western one did. The classical inquiries of Basil Klutchevsky and Sergey Soloviev were no more regarded as up-to-date responds to the
challenges of Time. It was no accident that B. Klutchevsky many times pointed himself out as a nineteenth century man.

These Time challenges formed two counter-lateral historiographical processes. The first one changes the priority of pure inquiry the dominating of historical knowing theory to the uncertainty if it is possible either to penetrate into the essence of historical processes and its events or to find the laws of historical development gripped the professional historians. They also were uncertain if after doing so it was possible to offer the genuine interpretation of what is historical. Another challenge contradicts the first one, saying that an attempt to give up a theoretical investigation as such is beneficial, and makes a great deal of historians to concentrate upon collecting some evidences from historical process. The similar tendencies seem to be characteristic to the development of the European historiography at the beginning of the twentieth century.

In fact, it was the process of posing and solving the problems of theory and methodology, which was dominating the historiographical process. Any empirical historian was to keep a keen eye on the intellectual efforts of his colleagues in the domain of historical science. This process became the framework for some totally new fundamentals able to lead the historical investigations to a new level of humanitarian knowledge. First of all, I shall mention those of an outstanding influence to the further destiny of the Russian historical science and, to some extend, to the European and world-wide historiographical processes. The European fame was gained by methodological inquiries and solutions made by Alexander Lappo-Danilevsky, who probably was the most typical exponent of the Russian traditional intellectual culture. He combined both its regulations to be limited by the aim to work hard for “the cultural growth of a personality and people” and willingness to find a new methodological basis in order to propose a precise type of intellectual activity in history. Essentially, his studies marked the boundaries and further possibilities of cultural approach to history that regards “the historical ‘whole’ or mankind’s history” as a subject matter of historical science, and the closely connected tried including ‘world unit of culture’ – ‘human animatedness’ – ‘a source as a cultural phenomenon’ as a spring to achieve the intellectual targets. This notion served as a basic construction in a well-known historical trend gathering such chief historians as Sigizmund Valk, Alexey Presnyakov and Olga Medouschevska who, being its contemporary leader, pointed its essence as “a cultural science as a target, a source study as a method”.

Paul Milukov, B. Klutchevsky's disciple and antagonist, by the force of his intellectual and political influence became a notable person within the conditions of a global political schism. He aimed both to reveal impetuses that could promote the unity and singularity of historical process and new standing points to its treating and interpretation. In his works, Milukov was essentially contradicting the old positivist tradition that persuaded a historian to see only united “conformities with the law of history”. His challenging perspective was that different sides of
social and historical life obey to the impact of contradicting conformities, influencing the historical evolution rather chaotically, than determining it precisely. At the same time he paid a great attention to the economical factor organising historical process, and to settlement process to be absolutely unique in its influence on the Russian one. The problems of cross-cultural dialogue and well-developed theory of 'historical borrowing' became the standing points of cultural and historical interactions of various civilisations and cultures. These theoretical conceptions lead to an offensive consequence that the Russian history was 'extremely primitive' and 'totally unique'. The Russian intellectuals, annoyed by the statement, cannot but start faultfinding, while forgetting Milukov's original perspective on historical evolution.

A desire to obtain a new quality in historical process understanding and interpretation propelled a wide circle of historians to imply sociological and psychological methods in the traditional historical study. Pitirim Sorokin's notions that had appeared as a result of a critical look on sociological theories of progress and his deductions concerning the substance of social statics and dynamics created important premises to Nikolay Rozhkov's historiographical experiences. He enriched the perception of economic basis of historical process with a theory of psychological types changing. Simultaneously these attempts contributed to make comparative historical method a dominant one in a historical study. The World War I was an incentive to start historical and psychological investigations of the essence and causes of War as such and to start studies revealing the characteristic features of the Russian people's psychological existence that formed its military behaviour on in the wartime.

The intellectual life of these years also was enriched by the set of Marxist theoretical and methodological ideas and various attempts to interpret them. The intellectuals' devotion to Marxism can not be explained only by a certain sort of fashion that pushed a lot of Russian intellectuals to think about national history and philosophy of history in general in terms of Marxism. Even the Marxist theory itself proved to keep out precise Regulations landmarks in social sciences and thus was very attractive while the positivist cognitive principles seemed to be discredited. Thus Georgy Plekhanov's historiographical achievements and notions should not to be omitted, though the destiny of his scientific heritage in the Soviet Times was disgusting. Rather hard critics of positivism articulated by him presumed to not only of the idealistic constructions in philosophy and theory of history, but the popular theories of multi-lateralism and economic determinism as well. Plekhanov differed greatly from many champions and critics of Marxism. While adjusting the development of productive forces to be the main term of historical philosophy and appealing to the young researchers to base their knowledge on this statement, he simultaneously agreed that political, cultural and, moreover, psychological processes could be explained in terms of the state and level of productive forces only indirectly. But this 'indirect' dependence, from G. Plekhanov's view-point, is not to be ignored or objected. Otherwise, instead of the united and bounded historical process we shall face just its
incompatible and irreconcilable particles, while economics and psychology proved to be two sides of one process.

The multiple interpretations and the great bulk of methodical versions of historical science, as they appeared in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, in general were creating a good circumstance to the native historiography to transit to a new quality of historical knowing. But this possible perspective was not achieved at least if meaning the Western quality of a new historical science. I shall point out some crucial impetuses within this non-transition.

First of all, evidently the political coup d'état in October, 1917, was a hard contribution to a change (or a distortion) of the Russian intellectual sphere. The Bolsheviks' political power, using both ideological devices and direct forth, artificially pointed out Marxism as the only true and the only possible theoretical and methodological fundamental for the development of the 'Soviet' sort of knowledge and 'Soviet' science in general among all the variety of modes of thinking. The sharp critics of Marxism as the essence of the Russian Sciences, growing rapidly in the second half of eighties to the early nineties, was the main obstacle to a sort of critics to observe and to understand some significant conditions of the "transition" towards Marxism. The densest reasoning they have been articulating concerns the type of Marxism (True, Leninist, Stalinist etc.) that was being fixed during the transition. From my perspective, Marxism as soon as being fixed was placed out of the frameworks of intellectual competition and was not implicated into the intellectual life naturally. This was a circumstance that produced a long-term effect on the development of humanitarian and scientific knowledge in Russia. It made stable the unique the situation when the intellectual initiative could be held only by those who "is fixing" Marxism (the political power-to-be) and when the scientific corporation’s appeal to its ideological decisions to serve as intellectual ones was quite natural. Moreover, the political decisions were used as a proof of a certain intellectual position. From the other hand, the new intellectual generation was nourished by the strict rule that disciplined not to promote many new ideas but to comment upon political texts.

Such a mode of 'turning Marxist' proved to be so efficient not only because of all the levers that were accumulated into the power-to-be, but because of the rooted tradition to regard any knowledge as 'alive-knowledge (zhivoznanije) which could immediately and directly contribute to any practical question as well. Within this Russian sort of knowledge 'Word' has always been identified with 'Action', claiming to be assessed (and then either rewarded or punished) as an action. For historical science such a transformation turned out to be the most morbid one for the early twentieth century historians found themselves totally involved into debate on social problems, trying to work out the political remedy to solve the contemporary problems having taken Past as a main ingredient of this medicine. When the Bolsheviks gained the political power, the exponents of a professional historical corporations conceived it as a personal tragedy of a scientist because he (she) had not predicted a social cataclysm. This self-reflection prepared a
schism within the professional historical corporation based not just on the political and ideological but intellectual reasons as well.

The gist of the schism can be characterised as a divergency of opinions and attitudes towards the previous cultural experience and heritage. The fact that the old-fashioned Russian culture was being eliminating with no expectation to be restored was understood almost by anyone by the basing of the twenties. The first group of historians did their best to preserve the prior tradition, the other one applied its own. The schism constituted the specific phenomenon of the Russian historical literature. One part was formed by emigrants (inner and outer) and another one constituted the Soviet historiography.

In the making of Soviet historical science a vital stimulus was provided by the new power's ambiguous attitude toward the targets and perspectives of historical education and the needs in historical knowledge. On the one hand, having proclaimed a resolute rupture with Past (intellectually) an impossibility to turn back (politically), the power could not but incline to discredit it, to eliminate even the reminiscences of Past. Historical science and historical education was transformed into the dangerous domain of knowledge that could keep out (directly or indirectly) the masses' social memory, support interest to Past. Not occasionally the first circle of the Soviet Decrees was regulating the attitude to Past, namely they were concerned with historical monuments and emblems to be destroyed, and to be replaced by a new revolutionary symbolics, and the numerous reforms of the educational system showed clearly the desire to remove historical disciplines by the social ones (though their subject matter was not defined scientifically adequate).

From the other hand, the power's attitude to Past was not so straightforward. Considerably seized the political power, the Bolsheviks had neither sustainable support among the people, nor the developed tradition of governing. Moreover, living abroad for years and working as political journalists, they were badly prepared to a difficult task to justify their right to rule. Not only the masses, but the Party members were to be convinced in two "Truths". The first one was that all the previous world's and Russian national development logically evolved in the revolutionary change of the 1917 (and that events of the year represented a socialistic revolution, not just a mere political coup d'état) though within the Party by the beginning of the twenties the term "October overturn" was being circulated more widely than the definition of "Socialistic Revolution". Secondly, it had to be demonstrated that exactly Bolshevik triumph was not occasional, raised neither political weakness of their antagonist, nor by the fatal set of occasions, but a display of some objective, inevitable and non-evaporatable "conformities to the law of history". To demonstrate it leaving side the turn to historical past was impossible.

Even the social and political needs were conductive to the special "care" of historical science that power could not escape but organising some specific communistic educational and scientific foundations, such as Socialistic Academy. The Red Faculty Institute, Communistic
University, historical departments and divisions, underlining by establishing them that historical education should be lifted to "a certain high" 20.

While analyzing the processes of conception of the Russian Soviet historical science (especially in the 1st half of twenties) another essentially important supposition articulated by Leon Trotsky is not to be omitted21. Pondering over the substance of cultural tasks of the socialistic revolution, he directly argued for their gist to be derived from the moment peculiar features which were connected with the need to discipline the new generation of people in a strictly functional way, making them to be warriors, soldiers of the world revolution. Naturally, to embody this type of a personality they had to learn some basics of knowledge and culture, but only to the degree and level which could support their sustainable wish and inclination to be personally involved into the struggle for "the world revolution's sake". To implement the revolutionary motto "and we shall all die like one for the sake of this" they were to be disciplined by the feeling of hatred and abhorrence towards the world around them and by the strongly-belief that one's personal life or death are incomparable with the interests and dreams of world revolution. Not only such a radical as Trotsky but even more tolerant Lenin undoubtedly denied the intelligentsia's proposal to mutual reconciliation (at least within the country), which came soon after the Civil War. The power consciously oriented itself towards the feeding and supporting the class conflicts to revenge or punishing all the victims of the revolution.

These principles of the social education could be implicated only under the condition of the historical science and historical education appeal to senses, to irrational sphere of mind, remaking the Past on the basis of beliefs and hatred. Thus all the twenties were mostly spent to create the new image of historical science and to prepare the new staff of those professionals who seemed to be adequate to new demands. Both within the professional corporation and within the public opinion the belief in historical science as the major part of ideological struggle and one of historians as the warriors the ideological border. The Soviet science had turned into the state of War long before the World War II began.

Despite the major underpinnings about goals of historical science were not highlighted to the wanted degree, to fulfill them ment first to solve many crucial problems of theory and methodology. Even Marxism though proclaimed to represent the fundamentals of the Soviet social sciences was not a theory to give a precise answer what did it mean to be a Marxist historian and to resolute all the problems as in the mode of Marxism. The popular and spread motto "Marxism in science, Leninism in practice" complicated this perplexed situation. This motto expressed the notion of Lenin mostly as a practitioner juxtaposed by Marx and Plekhanov as theorists.

Moreover, among the Soviet political elite various perspectives on the phenomenons of were combined altogether: (Practically all of Lenin's rivals, who occupied an independent place in the political performance, namely L.Trotsky, G. Zinovev, L. Kamenev, N. Bukharin, I.
Stalin, articulated contradicting readings of .) Then not by chance 1923-1934 faced a new set of works, which were desired to produce a good attempt to answer the question what was and what did it mean to be a Marxist in the social science domain22 . Despite all the mistakes and faults, these works were helpful in solving a whole series of problems, and the mode of this resolution greatly impacted the Soviet intellectual tradition. To note the main I must underline their significant role in erecting the tasic of the peculiar genre, proved to remain the chief sort of historical writing in the USSR. Authors also proved the essential links between Leninism and historical science, presuming Leninism to be packed full by historicism and, from the other hand, ascertaining that there was no perception (conception) of historical problematics beyond Lenin’s assessment and his evaluation. A myriad of the Soviet historians dedicated their scientific life do expand this research topic (I. Mintz, I. Gorodetsky, M Perov, N. Jakovlev, V. Ivanov, B. Mogilnitsky, G. Alexeeva, N. Prijmak, A. Shevelev, I Tchigrinsky, N. Maslov etc.). Another notable achievement was such an expansion of the problematics of Lenin’s that it became logically correct to point out his contribution into any historical topic23 as one of an outstanding quality.

The task to reconstruct Lenin’s biography was placed on he highest state level. Every hour of his life and activity was to be displayed out as his body in Mausoleum was. This enormous work evolved into the preparing, editing and publishing that really was gorgeous by the scale and fruitless by the outcomes. Simultaneously, the twenties should be considered as the period that shaped the principal line of the Leninist historical heritage as study of revolutionary movement history and October Revolution24. A special place was reserved to explain the question of the peculiarity of Lenin’s methodology, within which three major aspects were being investigated. First, Lenin’s use of Marx and Engels’ works, his experience in the self-reference, the criticism of antagonists. The above problems of Lenin’s experience became a helpful lever in understanding of the Marxist method in history. Its gist can be described as a well-developed skill to pick up and to comment the appropriate quotations from the classical works, to argue with the ideological opponents, to use Lenin’s evaluations as the principle argument in debates. That is why the Soviet historiography gave birth to such a term as , that included the works of the Marxism-Leninism classics, the CPSU document, the party and state leaders’ essays.

Another objective formulated by the scientific literature of the twenties comprised of investigating and interpretation of the Russian revolutionary tradition. This intellectual task should obey to the primordial intention to deduce the inevitable nature of Revolution’s triumph and, from the other hand, to convince all free-minded persons in the qualitative superiority of the Bolshevik movement over all the rest social and democratic parties and trends. This approach implied G. Plekhanov and activity through checking up and analyzing all of their and in activity and thus exaggerating Lenin and the Bolsheviks’ contribution to the progress of Russian Marxism25. Followed by a set of debates on who were the predecessors of the revolutionary social democracy in Russia, this approach assisted greatly to make for the Lenin scheme of the
independence movement in Russia, including its three genial steps: those of the nobility, of the 
raznochintsy, of the working-class. It was operating this scheme that propelled the development of 
Militsa Netchkina's historiographical skill as one of the foundations of the Soviet scientific 
literature 26.

Placing the historiography of the revolutionary tradition in the centre of historical 
process had deep after-effects and was fraught for the development of the Russian 
historiography. The rest of historical researches was regarded as derivative from the mentioned 
above, and the mode of doing them should strictly correspond to the questions posed within it 
and the inner logic of its (revolutionary tradition) study. Even investigating such a priority topic 
as the study of the economic bases of feudalism and capitalism, meant to reconcile the expected 
scientific results with the notions of the revolutionary process characteristic features. Discussions 
on Petroushevsky's book was the typical example for the 20-ies when the author was imposed 
by a penalty of devastating critique for he had overstepped custom of the class straggle theory 27.

Later, a strong hostility was raised by I. Pantin, E. Plimak and V. Khoros' book arguing that the 
maturity of capitalism in Russia (they invented a theory of) had nothing to do with the ripeness 
of pre-conditions for the socialist revolution in Russia 28. Objecting to this argument (the point 
that the statement of the capitalism does not coincide the idea of pre-conditions of the 
Revolution) became the key reasoning against in the Russian historiography 29.

The constructing of the approaches to the study of the October Revolution added the 
second clue to the Russian history (together with the historical Leniniana) and achieved certain 
significance in historiography. For the historians of the Revolution the most difficult task was to 
justify its revolutionary character as its singularity for its implementation was different from the 
constructed idealistic scheme. The -thesis proposed by D. Doubrovsky, S. Piontkovsky, and V. 
Astrov seemed to be logically correct pointing out at the same time its socialistic objectives and 
perspectives and its gentry driving forces 30. Even M. Pokrovsky's discourse contained a theory 
of as a fundamental argument, which calmed the density of the socialistic features in 
characterizing the revolutionary process 31. Probably could have been overcome easily but for 
historians had not mostly concentrated upon strictly the historical problems of Revolution. 
However by the by they were trying to criticize the bourgeois conceptions of the Revolution 
arguing at the same time against R. Vipper's notion of the end of Culture 32, being possible by 
means of this Revolution, Oustrijalov's ideas explaining the evolutionary mutation of the 
revolutionary potentialities 33, and N. Rozhkov's conclusions concerning the non-socialistic 
character of the October events 34. By the second half of the twenties historical corporation was 
sunk into the political by nature debates with L. Trotsky, fighting against his assumption of two 
revolution nhiefs 35. However perplexed, the historiographical situation lead to a definition of the 
role of the October Revolution as the main event during the twentieth century strictly in this 
decade. This decade also clarified the first rank of problems to be studied (the pre-conditions of 
the Revolution, the main driving forces, the power-gaining modes, the Bolshevik Party's role in
the event). This clarification however was combined with the peculiar sort of investigation that imminently included the sharp opponents struggling with the non-Marxist essence of their constructions.

The leading field of historical science relatively fast evolved into the RCP(B), CPSU history. This process cropped up as a normal sequel of the ideological and intellectual conditions both. To adjust in contestable effect produced by the Bolsheviks on history and to present it as the irrefutable helped the Bolsheviks leaders to enroot their political power intellectually and to ascertain that no more party is able to win or ever will do so in Russia. The Bolsheviks' political culture essentially excluded any chance either to transmit or to transform the political regime. Simultaneously armed with the notion of the Marxist theory intellectual monopoly, the ruling Party made its experience to serve as an intellectual source to develop and enrich the Marxist theory. They were still keeping a hope that knowledge if prepared and organized properly could be a disciplining and educating power. Typically this naive belief in the possibilities of "historical party" knowledge survived safe till the beginning of the 80's, when the Perestroika leaders - Michael Gorbachev, Alexander Yakovlev, Egor Ligatchev - initiated the movement for the new type of manuals, textbooks and readers in CPSU history, aiming to restore the rocked authority of their Party.

The globalism of these objectives was conductive to the real struggle to gain rights to interpret the Bolsheviks' history. The first attempts to develop the educational editions and researches suddenly raised sharp polemics and showed the Party's need in certain type of knowledge, excluding any chance to give different readings of their own history. How evidences had to be selected, what personalities the list of actors should contain, how to assess any event, - any intellectual effort had to be scrutinized by the severe eye of many communist censors. But the most cherished desire was to get rid of the social-democratic period, underlining the qualitative divergencies that positively marked only the Bolshevik movement. Among the historiographical subject matter of the period the study of the revolutionary movement in the actual country-side also found its significance. This guiding line can be evaluated as extremely crucial because the revolution's political destiny and its further perspectives layed in the power of the peasants' attitude to the Revolution. From the other hand, the main scientific problems posed by the Soviet historiography dealt (more or less) with the peasants' history in the Tsarist Russia. The major thesis to be proved by historical science was shaped by a strong inclination to reason that the "old country-side" is objectively dead, that peasantry as a class had exhausted itself long ago and the future of the agriculture would depend only on the collectivization politics.

Stratification of the peasantry in these studies exampled the social death of a village phenomenon, former husbandry splinter was identified both with the conclusion of the non-efficiency demonstrated by farmers' labour, and the notion of village not longer being reproducing itself. A special attention was paid to unmasking the counter-revolutionary
essence of the activity regarded as a main hindrance to make village socialistic. This conception armed the vividly implemented politics of undoing the peasantry with the adequate theoretical presumptions saying that the imbecile country life could be evaporated only by the socialistic modernization if ever. Within the main stream of these presumptions, enforced by direct contribution of Maxim Gorky’s pathological hatred to village, no history of village was thought worth writing besides the one studying the everyday life and destructive impulses in the Russian village, written by the social psychologists and ethnographers. As formed in the twenties the historiographical tradition both predicted and shaped the Soviet historical science substance while implicating it as a natural particle of the Bolsheviks great social project. That, no doubt, lifted the historical corporation’s self-estimation, but, from the other hand, if ruined, this project would equally destroy the new sort of historical science.

The thirties for many Soviet historians were opened by the Stalin’s letter "On Some Historical Questions of Bolshevism", published by the magazine "Proletarian Revolution". They used the letter to mark the borderline between the decade twenties (which was perceived as a period of relatively open and free disputes) and the decade of thirties (named as a period of strict ideological predomination and of simplified Stalinist schemes). As a matter of fact the letter said new neither in ideology, nor in intellectual domain. The things explained there had been widely discussed before and the society proved to be prepared to accept them. A number of persons though differently minded, occupying different places in the political hierarchy and intellectual might, proclaimed to establish an intellectual regime of an undisputed conformity with Party’s ideas and opinions. (It was the spring of 1929 when M. Pokrovsky, for instance, announced that "the period of a peaceful cohabitation is overcome". It was the summer of 1929 when Vyatcheslav Molotov declared the year of 1930 to be the last year reconciling with old specialists. It was the November of 1930 when M. Gorky shouted that the enemy still resists it should be annihilated. It was the beginning of 1931 when the decision to concentrate all the theoretical forces in order to elaborate the socialism constructing problems was adopted, which propelled editing and publishing "The Civil War History" and "Factories and Plants History"). Stalin’s marvellous quality had nothing to do with some new ideas formulation, but comprised of a skill to frame and to limit the well developed and widespread feelings of society by the clear formulations made in the party slogans and decisions. That is why very often all his efforts found their basis and he had been regarded as an embodiment of people’s desires and expectations. Thus the decade of thirties turned out to be not the period of a radical split, but the logical consequence and natural end of those historiographical processes that had been mould by the previous decade.

The thirties were lucky to finalise the transmission of the Marxist scheme of historical process to all Russian history. First Boris Grekov took an advantage to apply it while studying the Russian medieval period. He raised the interesting problem that after the primitive communal system was decayed the Slavonic tribes transited (like their German neighbours) to the
feudalism. Some time later these efforts were accomplished by S. Bakhrushin, M. Tikhomirov, L. Tcherepnin's researches. It should not to be omitted that "the Marxist reading" of the Russian history was a natural highway to resurrect the values of State and to prove by some new arguments that the Slavonic state appeared as a result of an internal evolution, thereby objecting to the "corrupted" Norman theory which was a corner-stone for the Russian prerevolution historians.

Evidently, the return to the values of State in the Russian history prepared a solid base and gave a free street to criticize one of the most eminent historian of the previous decade, M. Pokrovsky by name. To understand his phenomenon is extremely important for the comprehension of the Soviet historical science conception that had spread a vast layer of scientific literature, and going on debates upon his contribution. M. Pokrovsky, being a historian, historiographer and the Soviet science organizer, assisted greatly to establishing such peculiar features of the Soviet Historical Science as the obeying to the social problems, implication the science into the enslaving of researchers and citizens' minds, to the disrespect of the other view-points and perspectives, which opposed the official ones. He also produced a set of conceptual theories which became tools in the historical study. All these achievements helped him to produce a new type of historical work and to influence a new generation of intellectuals for whom the achievement mentioned above became the natural embodiment of the Marxist approach to history.

During his vivid and dense activity as a researcher he had to change and to correct his perspective very often. Nevertheless Pokrovsky's understanding of the "transition to socialism" period, especially putting a special attention to the roles of state and power within this process by the beginning of the thirties was no more convenient to Stalin and his champions. Probably, the most eminent factor was that the Soviet society finally did found its own history to study which they were to be separated from it psychologically they were neither to take part in it, nor to remember personally those who conquered and submissed the power. By the second half of the thirties historians unexpectedly to themselves transformed into an intellectual corporation that was repressed by the power. All the means of repression were used. Historians were charged with counter-revolutionary activity, links with Trotsky's teaching, spying for the secret services of other countries, dragging the alien world-out-looks. This slaughter-house forced historians to recognize some problems to be closed for the scientific enquiry, the Party's activity to be out of criticism, the head articles in the leading newspapers to be viewed as the main theoretical and methodological reference-point. Moreover, the art of repression was mostly defined by the authorities wishing "to tie" by blood as much participants as possible.

Engaging the entire historical corporation into the ideological battles, the Party obtained that moral criteria became lower or distorted and the scientific arguments were dismissed through elements informing authorities about the colleagues. Creating the internal slavery of
historians might have been the main conquests of the Party guiding and directing historical science. To strive for those objectives by the repression only would be unlikely to succeed but for the task of offering the "positive stencil" for a historical study that could stay for a certain standard for historian’s craft. The state institutions regularly granted some historians by the Stalin award for the complete and maximum implementation of the Marxist scheme and the ideological loyalty, expressed clearly enough. This task was also obtained by giving the academic titles only under the auspices of the controlling Party, and at the same time the Party chiefs directly interfered into the process of editing the historical textbooks. Still the main historiographical event of the period appeared after "The RCP History. A Brief Course" was edited and published, being headed by Stalin personally.

The historiographical significance of this text was shaped not by new stresses and accents tackling in the most debated questions, for example, those of defining the time when the Party of a new type was built. It was important because it could be used to show how "the dialectical method" should be used for the description historical events, how to select the sources for the study, how to give a normative character to the data on events and persons. It was the theoretical and methodological level of the given textbook that defined the peculiarity and the image of the Russia historical science for a long while.

Strengthening the attention to the questions of "the own history" could not but influence greatly the approaches to historical problems of the non-Soviet period of country's development. USSR's participation into the World War II and the burden of fighting against fascism gave birth to the sequels to some re-arrangements of how to take the road to Past. First, the image of czarist Russia suffered the most serious changes. Even in 1943-1944 the historical corporation and Central Committee Secretaries had joint consultations, dedicated to some new approaches to the past, expected to be established. Since then, they insisted that Russia should be apprehended by the world as historically the most progressive country. It was proved that Russia played the key positive role in Europe's turmoil. They argued that it had stopped the reactionary influence of German and Swedish feudal societies, it had saved Europe from the Tatar and Mongol flood, it had put strict limits to the aggression of the Great Port and abolished the Balkan peoples; it had crushed Napoleon's army, it had made the crucial contribution to destroy Germany and the imperialistic claims of the Entente and, finally, it had saved the world from fascism. Of course, from their perspective, the state if backward and detached from the world's progress could not be equal to the tasks being done by that moment. That is why historians faced the problem how to change the historical image of Russia and Slavonic area radically. Not just the professional historical corporation but the exponents of literature and cinema were involved into the process. Josef Stalin personally observed its progress by awarding or punishing the authors. It was this decade when Peter the Great's image was waxed poetic about, becoming as popular as Basil Tchapaev was in popular culture.
Second, the notions of Russia's role in annexing the peoples from Caucuses, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia had undergone a great improvement. The classic formula, presenting Russia as "a jail of peoples", was being pushed to the margins, evolving into the new theory of "a less evil". It was thus presumed that peoples of these areas had no right to an independent development. Their only historical choice was either to be included into the Russian Empire or to be conquered by the most reactionary Turkish, Persian or British Empires. Having changed the accents in this way, the historians could not but turn a new leaf enforcing and spreading the myth about these peoples' voluntary entry into the state. Respectively, the attitude towards the national independence movement was revised. Mostly these movements were characterised as nationalistic and, certainly, bourgeois or gentry-like [???landlordly??].

Third, in this context the role of the Russian people in the national historical development was being singled out and kept apart from the others. Essentially, the rest of the peoples lost their qualities as historical subjects, becoming just the object of help, support and development given by the Russians. The main objective of the thirties to write the history of the USSR as a history of the peoples that inhabited its territory was not solved.

Forth, the Soviet intellectuals started a new step to revise any intellectual effort in order to be adequate to Marxism, since then for the second time juxtaposed [????] to any other trend in the world thought. The real ideological campaign was organized in connection with debates on G. Alexandrov's textbook. Its forerunner, written by A. Zhdanov, the second man of influence in the Party, aimed to remind that science begins only with Marxism, the lack of which prevents any sort of scientific development. The same fundamental idea was behind sharp reproofs to Nickolas Rubinstein's textbook "The Russian Historiography" (published in 1941).

These shifts prepared the most disgusting ideological campaign - among all of them during the Soviet history - the one fighting against "cosmopolitanism". It proved once again that the USSR neither did respect the human right to be an independent researcher, nor did it observe the guarantee to be safe. Neither previously rendered great services to the Party (Isaac Mintz, Alexandra Pankratova), nor the world fame (Evgeny Kosminsky, Evgeny Tarle), nor merits (M. Rabinovitch, M. Luxembourg, G. Bauman) guaranteed the right to be active in the professional field. The accordance to the main distinguished ideological settings was once again underlined as a main criterion of the quality of historical studies. For fear of being not adequate to the official settings historians became more inner enslaved being able neither to pose, nor to solve some new questions, nor to provide an accurate reasoning.

The new leaf of the Russian historiography was turned when in connection with Joseph Stalin's death the political government of the USSR changed. Anyway, the notion of the middle fifties as a turning point in the Soviet historiography progressing was for a long while an indisputable one. To be true, we needed a certain period of time to realise and to perceive the twentieth Party Session to solve rather narrow political objectives in the interests of the limited
number if bureaucrat of the second rank. That is why the adopted decisions could not best self-contradict each other, forming rather the new sort a new quality of barriers than totally liberating the ideology and politics. The moderated term "thaw" turned out to give the most proper reflection on the shifts in historical science.

The point is that the twentieth CPSU Congress did not change the culture (mode) of historical time perception. Instead of justifying that the need to go further was stimulated by the changing world, it fixed the appeal to go back to the true "Leninism". Not occasionally the most profound intellectual investigation of "true" and "scientific" communism was promoted by the Moscow Methodological Circle's activity. The appeal to go back was able just to stir up new hack-writings, having its core in the resurrected Lenin's texts written more than fifty years earlier but still presented to be the latest and the only true achievement in sciences.

The only positive thing able to propel independence within professional reflections was the involuntary admission that even works of the Party's chiefs (Stalin's writings, for instance) may contain some theoretical shortcoming. But this intellectual effort was conducive to no intellectual breakdown, for none can be find in the historiographical researchers of the period that seemed at the first glance to embrace some new promising ideas. Here I shall describe some of such researches.

Of course, the study of "Mnogoukladnost" as a problem of the Russian economic history was undertaken by an eminent group of historians, including A. Sidorov, I. Gindin, L. Ivanov, K. Tarnovsky, P. Volobuev etc. Tracing the problems of industrial and agricultural development of Russia at the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century, they "stepped" closely to the question whether the economical pre-requisites of the Great October Revolution were mature. In fact, they were driven by a wish to find new arguments to reconcile the classical Soviet intellectual dichotomy of [1] the structural backwardness of capitalism in Russia during the czarist period and at the same time [2] the proletarian and socialistic nature of the Revolution. But even this well-tempered step was enough to arouse a dreadful suspicion both of the Party bosses and of the members of the professional historical corporation. Labelled "the new direction" these new intellectuals have said very little if we analyze their works historiographically. To prove this statement P. Volobuev's last research work gives good evidence. Being completely rehabilitated by Perestroika, he devoted all his intellectual energy during his last years to justify the point that Russia could not and should not go out of the frameworks of "the socialistic alternative".

As typical were the intellectual efforts presented by Michael Gefter who sought to invent and to use its ideas while analyzing historical process in Russia. The methodological seminar of 1965 held under the auspices of this scientist finished its activity by the scandal cropped up around the collection of proceedings, edited in the framework of the seminar. "Historical science and some problems of the contemporary area" (Moscow, 1969) played first
fiddle in some clue problems formulating. Gefter himself and his henchmen saw that the Stalinist ideas had not been surpassed, and to do so they tried to combine a new set of questions which should have been used while the core of Lenin's texts were analyzed. Moreover, they made some attempts to reveal what was common and what was unique in the development of Russia and Western Europe though still being overwhelmed by the power of traditional interpretation. The scientific seminar should be appreciated not for its intellectual fruitfulness but for its incentive to impel the independent professional search. Exactly this quality made Gefter's seminar outstanding among institutions of the profession. Alexander Nekritch's book "1941. June, 22" was greatly repressed in the society. The narrator, not posing the traditional concept of the Great Patriotic War under the question, hesitated only in respect to one point. This concerned the "unexpected" start of the war, thus indirectly charging the USSR's party and political government with the faults and shortcomings which had led to the difficult and morbid nature of the War during the first period.

Thus if analyzing even the works that seemed to prompt the social and political thought it can be absolutely clear that the Stalinist reading of the historical process as such and especially the USSR's one, turned out not to be interrupted. Only some elements of its reconciliation and modernization were found, but even they were not totally admitted by the Soviet public opinion. So, not astonishing, the only serious debate inside the Soviet historical theorists' team was the one that cropped up under the influence of the Italian historians who visited the USSR in 1968. A split occurred between A. Avrech and I. Gindin on the one hand and Leon Tcherepnin and Militza Netchkina on the other. Though opposing and challenging the Soviet understanding of the Stalinist theory, which had been officially claimed by I. Pospelov to be interrupted in 1962, the first two were neither able to transmit their doubts into the more wide public context, nor thought that to do so could be a clever idea.

At the end of sixties and the beginning of seventies the conception of "developed socialism" influenced on the progress of the historical science in USSR. Its main characteristics embodied in the resolution of the Communist Party's Central Committee about the sixtieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution brought the Soviet schools' attention to the new purposes. First of all it has become very important to study the socialist system in the Soviet Union as a new and more elevated type of the development of civilization58. In accordance to this there has been raised the question of revealing the features of maturity and preferences of the socialist way of life59. To answer this question meant to prove that the socialist system solved in a cardinal way the global problems of human society: national, economic, social, ecological once. So the historical process of the socialist system must be apprehended as development saved from any kind of inner contradictions.

These aims led to real changes in the sphere of theory and methodology. First of all the question about the nature of contradictions as a base of any movement became the most actual
because scholars had to prove that there were some qualitative differences between the contradiction in the socialist and capitalist world. Second, there had been made some real corrections of the notion of the historical experience. There was an assumption than the main historical purpose was to study the so-called , which should be at hand and expanded in the practice of socialist institutions. Third, historians should make criticism of the bourgeois historiography more active. Especially this concerned the field of Soviet history. The criticism was organized by the idea that non-Marxist literature cannot understand and rightly interpret the content of socialist institutions. Even more than that, foreign scholars intentionally practice a certain misrepresentation of socialism. In this situation the most important theoretical problem, which was proposed to the historians, was to search for the chronological bounds of the period of developed socialism. In passing it must be pointed out that this question, which led to the failure of many publishing projects such as a history of the USSR in several volumes and of the Communist Party in countless volumes, has never got the full positive answer.

It is quite naturally that in these conditions there happens not just a kind of reconfiguration of the forces of historians in order to concentrate their researches on the problems of Modernity, but a real rise of the quantity of the collective works of many volumes. The taste for universalism and maximalism led to impoverishment of the creative potential of the intellectual practice in the field of history. The personal responsibility dissolved by the influence of the lack of political pluralism. These were golden times for the control of initiatives for historical works. Numerous scientific, methodological, coordinating councils compelled historians to go over the process agreement and assertion of the theme many times. The widely-known passion for the criticism of “bourgeois falsifiers” had received its own specific effect. The scholars who intended to destroy the Western point of view, had to become acquainted with new standpoints in the scientific field60. Although the attention was paid mostly to sovietologists, there appeared some works in which could be viewed new interpretations and a deep historical critical attitude.

The social and political events of the late eighties have shown the global failure of the social project, in the solution of which the historical science has proven its weakness. [????... of the Soviet social project. Historians has proved their inability to bring help for its solution.????] The essence of its crisis was not determined by the professionals, but corrective circumstances to solve the problem were raised on a larger scale. Several decades late the quality of the historical project began to change. The historical science was to become oriented neither in the positivistic nor in the socio-political sense. First, the necessity of this qualitative turning point could not be comprehended alone and more than that, secondly, the project could be realized just in the traditions of ponderous Russian historical culture. For a long time it seemed that the Soviet period signified destroying of the native intellectual tradition (its qualitative features). The scale of the necessary changes, which were interpreted as a crisis of historical science, has showed the
immanent characteristics of the historical culture, which even had some non-rationalistic, traditionalistic nature.

I would like to pay attention to some of the most important features of Russian historical culture, which were actually opened in the situation of the turn point (the end of 80 - beginning at 90-s). First of all it is a special type of attitude to the ‘past’. The past is being assimilated and comprehended not by overcoming but by finding out the boundaries of possible movement and transformation. That is why in any period of reforms the Russian intellectuals, since the times of Karamsin, argue not about future but about the past. Of prime consideration is an indefinite attitude to knowledge as to zhivoznanye where the formula is perceived as an adequately done puzzle. Historiographical tradition constructed before and supports nowadays a number of its own myths: "about the exclusive historical role of Russia", "about its exclusive spirituality" etc. Finally, of prime consideration is a deep internal symbolism of Russian historiography, where ‘conception’, ‘theory’ and ‘method’ turn into not so much a means of cognitive knowledge but into a ‘sign’ or ‘symbol’ arranging the intellectual space. Inevitably this leads to ‘worshipping’ such signs rather than using them in a real research practice.

It is only by natural reasons, therefore, that in the second half of the eighties intellectual initiative in solving the most acute problems of changing the quality of historical knowledge (or historical ideas) turned out to belong to historical publicist writings. Without making some of the topics, plots and characters of Russian history sacred it made a considerable contribution to rationalizing mythological elements in everyday and scientific consciousness. These were political journalists who spoke against the main symbols of faith in the Soviet society, directing their intellectual attacks not so far to clear up proofs of one or the other topic statements instead of investigating the nature of proofs. The writings of the publicists began to undermine the system of a monopoly to truth that was built up since decades. Now every individual was given the right to have his own opinion even if it had not been coordinated by anybody61.

Professional historians reacted to these social changes by a deep internal split in their understanding of the reasons for them and in defining the ways of getting ahead (which led to the crisis of Soviet historiography). There might have been two factors which united professional historians (Y. Polyakov, B. Mogilnitsky, A. Iskanderov, A. Gurevich, A. Fursov, etc.): understanding the nature of crisis as that of theory and methodology and perceiving the current changes as a threat to deprofessionalization of historical knowledge.

The historians’ positions in dealing with the explanation of the reasons for crisis were considerably divergent. For quite a long period of time dominant was an idea to come back to Marxism (Leninism) released from all Stalinist and Brezhnevist accretions (Y.A. Polyakov, G.D. Alexeyeva, I.D. Kovalchenko, etc.). Marxist method was declared insolvent and thus in crisis. A number of historians who accepted this fact tried to find alternatives for it using different versions of civilization approach interpretations (Ludmilla Semenikova, Igor Ionov, Alexander
Ahyezer). They intensified their aspiration to borrow the intellectual experiences of foreign historiography, especially the tradition of the “Annales” School at the time of its classic period (A. Ghurevich, Y. Besmertny, etc.). Even more radical positions were formulated by Yury Pivovarov and Andrey Fursov, who spoke for the revision of the entire Russian historiographical tradition, which had, always been exposed to strong influence from German intellectualism of the beginning of the nineteenth century. The factor mentioned above did not allow tackling key problems of national history adequately.

Theoretical discussions have become an inevitable attribute of the historiographical situation of the nineties in Russian historiography. However, they did not result in working out a united conception of any value; they were more likely to result in formulating a pluralistic interpretation of history which is accompanied by actualizing classical, non-classical and post-non-classical models of a research practice. This circumstance is considered by some historians of an older generation as an intellectual anomaly, as a consequence of the current crisis, but the people in their forties apprehend such a situation as quite natural and they try to fix it, making it closer with their own ideas of the criteria for scientific historical knowledge.

Beside theoretical discussions on the contents and perspectives of the professional historical science development in Russia, the historiographical situation of the nineties enables us to reveal a number of qualitatively new characteristics of the scientific studies in the field of history. I would like to call your attention to a considerable transformation of the research area, as well as to a new type of research problematization and actualization as reflected in a 5-volume collection of articles "Russia: the XX century" (edited by Yuri N. Afanasiev, Moscow, 1996-1998). It is also proved by the active work of historians, united in the "XX Century Research Association", which solve the same tasks, though not on the same grounds (H. Zubkova, H. Levina, A. Ushakov, S. Ackshut, O. Ghlevnuk etc.).

An important historiographical event was a list of works, devoted to the study of the historical consciousness genesis at various stages of Russian history. Of special interest, in this respect, is Mary Plukhanova’s book "Plots and Symbols of Russian Reign"; A.L. Yurghanov’s "The Categories of Russian Medieval Culture"; a series of Alexander Etkind’s studies. The most exciting event in the literature of the nineties might have become Vladimir Buldakonov’s "Red Strife: the Nature and Consequences of the Revolutionary Violence", which revealed new facts in the study of social upheavals at the beginning of the twentieth century.

It was a time information explosion, dealt with an active dissemination in the Russian historiography of ideas, conceptions and creative works from abroad, that could not but influence changes in culture and changes in the nature of a historiographical dialogue. A big amount of analytical literature has appeared, which analyses the development of historiography as an all-European process, including Russian historiography into it as an inseparable part. A new type of studies in this direction, opened by the research workers and authors from "Odysseus",...
was added by a series of brilliant works of such historiographers as Galina Zvereva, Lorina Repina, Vladislav Kravtsov, etc.

Their publications are extremely important for the further perspectives of Russian historical (and historiographical) development, as they must be to a great extent transforming the scientific language of historical studies, which is inadequately perceived by many historians. On the one hand, this factor allows us to hold a dialogue with a foreign historical science using adequate terms and notions, but, on the other, it mechanically transfers to Russian history the system of European generalizations embodied in a definite terminology, thus repeating N.M. Karamzin’s sad experience.

First, most part of the current century, Russian historical science was being functioning and solving and problems inside the social and historiographical project trying to untie global social problems. Second, during last hundred years it passed through at least three great breakdowns. The beginning of the century was an attempt to overcome classical positivist tradition. The twenties and the beginning of the thirties was the forming of the Soviet historiographical phenomenon when the positivist tradition returned and ensured its domination in its most radical Marxist forms. The second half of the eighties to the beginning of the nineties was the creation of alternative models of historical research. Third, through these changes and transformations the Soviet historiography continued preserving some elements immanently belonging to Russian historiographical culture. Fourth, continuing to preserve interest of historical knowledge and historical education in Russia this country seems not to give up any positive hope for a further possible enrichment of historical science in the twenty-first century.

6. Medushevskaya O.M. Op. cit. P. 57. For more details see Danilevsky I.N.,


Lebedev A.A. Trudno byt' bogom, ili o printsipakh, kotoriye u nas v krovi // Voprosy filosofii. 1991. 1 7 et al.
25. For more details see: Filippov R.V. Pionery marksizma v Rossii. 1883 -
26. See: Nechkina M.V. Pushkin i dekabristy // AN SSSR. 1937, 1 2-3;
27. See: Istorik-marksist. 1923. 1 2; Pod znamenem marksizma. 1928, 12 et
al.
29. See: Polikarpov V.V. "Novoye napravlenie" 50-kh – 70-kh gg.:
poslednyaya diskussiya sovetskikh istorikov // Sovetskaya istoriografiya...
P. 401-428.
30. See: Dubrovskiy S.M. Ocherki russkoy revolyutsii. M., 1923; Piotkovskiy
S.A. Oktiabrskaya revolyutsiya v Rossii: eyo predposylki i khod. M., 1923;
Astrov V. Rets. na kn.: Piotkovskiy S.A. Oktiabrskaya revolyutsiya v Rossii:
eyo predposylki i khod. M., 1923 // Bolshevik. 1924, 1 2 et al.
31. See: Pokrovskiy M.N. Ocherki po istorii revolyutsionogo dvizheniya v
32. See: Vipper R.Yu. Gibel' evropeiskoi kul'tury. M., 1918; Krugovorot
34. See: Rozhkov N.A. Russkaya istoriya v sravnitelno-istoricheskom
35. For more details see: Nosov A., Yusupov E. V.I. Lenin i nekotorye
voprosy istoricheskoj nauki. Tashkent, 1976, P. 193-225; Gorodetskiy E.N.
36. See: Nevskiy V.I. Ocherki po istorii Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi
partii (Bolshevikov). M., 1922; Shelavin K.N. Rabochiy klass i ego partiya.
M., 1923; Popov N.N. Ocherk istorii Rossiiskoi kommunisticheskoi partii
Bolshevikov. M., 1924; Yaroslavskiy Em. Kratkiye ocherki po istorii VKP(b).
M., 1926 et al.
37. See: Krizman L.N. Klassovoye rasslojenie v sovetskoi derevne. M., 1926;
Kretov F.D. Klassovoye rasslojenie v derevne. M., 1927; Khrachcheva A.I.
Gruppy i klassy v derevne. M., 1926 et al.
43. For more details see: Illeritskaya N.V. Stanovlenie sovetskoi istoricheskoi traditsii: nauka, ne obretshaya litsa // Sovetskaya istoriografiya.. P. 162-90.
44. For more details see: Chernobaev A.A. "Professor s pikoy", ili Tri zhizni istorika M.N. Pokrovskogo. M., 1992.
49. See: Maslov N.N. "Kratkiy kurs istorii VKP(b) - enziklopediya i ideologiya stalinizma i poststalinizma. 1938-1988 gg. // Sovetskaya istoriografiya.. P. 240-73.
50. See: Stenogramma sovechchaniya po voprosam istorii SSSR v TsK VKP(b) v 1944 godu // Voprosy istorii. 1996, 1 2-3, 4, 5-6, 7, 8-9.
51. See: Voprosy filosofii. 1947, 1 1, 2.
52. See: Kostyrchenko G.V. Kampaniya po bor'be s kosmopolitizmom v SSSR // Voprosy istorii. 1994, 1 8.
53. See: Istorigrafiya istorii SSSR. Sovetskiy period; Maslov N.N., Stepanov Z.V. O cherki istorii istochnikovedeniya i istorigrafiya istorii KPSS. L., 1974; Varshavchik M.A., Spirin L.M. O nauchnykh osnovakh izucheniya istorii KPSS. M., 1978; Zevelev A.I. Leninskaya kontseptsiya... et al.
56. See: Polikarpov V.V. "Novoye napravlenie" 50-kh – 70-kh gg.: poslednyaya diskussiya sovetskikh istorikov // Sovetskaya istoriografiya... P. 349-400.
61. For more details see: Logunov A.P. Krizis istoricheskoi nauki ili nauka v usloviyakh obchchestvennogo krizisa: otechestvennaya istorigrafiya vtoroi poloviny 80-kh – nachala 90-kg gg. // Sovetskaya istoriografiya... P. 447-87; Idem. Transformatsiya obraza otechestvennoi istoricheskoi nauki v seredine 90-kh gg. XX v. // Rossiya v novoye vremya: istorigrafiacheskii

