Globalisation, Regionalisation
and the History of International Relations

The Formation of the Images of the Peoples
and the History of International Relations

2000
The scientific sessions on *Globalisation, Regionalisation and the History of International Relations* and on *The Formation of the Images of the Peoples and the History of International Relations* were decided and shaped by the Bureau and by the Secretariat of the Commission in 1999-2000.

The preparation of the scientific sessions is by a committee co-ordinated by Brunello Vigezzi and with the contribute of:

- Joan Beaumont
- Maria Benzoni
- Alfredo Canavero
- Wolfgang Döpke
- Adam Ferguson
- Robert Frank
- Chihiro Hosoya
- Lawrence Kaplan
- Jukka Nevakivi
- Silvia Pizzetti
- Mario Rapoport
- Giovanni Scirocco
- Pompiliu Teodor

The editorial staff is composed by

- Barbara Baldi, Laura Brazzo
- and Lucio Valent
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Preliminary Note

Last year, the Bureau of the Commission on History of International Relations (look p. 9) singled out *Globalization, Regionalization and the History of International Relations* as the subject of the Oslo first scientific session by a broad majority

The paper, which had been enclosed to the invitation for all the members to participate to the session, has outlined viable purposes for the meeting (look p. 12): it has suggested to relate the analysis of globalization’s and regionalization’s different sides - with their relationships - to the reassessment of a historical course that might be quite far-reaching in the past.

Different members of the Bureau and the Secretariat have cooperated by developing first paper’s suggestions, by proposing subjects of study, by keeping in touch suitably with members and other interested scholars who have been invited on the way to take part to the initiative.

Plenty of replies have been received, as can be seen from this collection of abstracts, which we are delivering to foster the following stages of our work.

Drawing on the attitude and rules of the Commission, the basic purpose of the session goes on to be that Bureau’s and Secretariat’s members, associates and joining scholars could ponder and confront each other on so relevant subjects. This sheds light also on the difference of proposals and on the overall character the research has taken so far.

We also propose at the end a sorting-out by areas and topics that is only tentative: it is not to stick to the letter. Some papers in different areas deal a lot with subjects pertaining to the second part. On the contrary, some papers on topics take into remarkable consideration areas’ subjects.

Nonetheless, two-part division, plus a special session on Latin America, goes on to be useful: a first, sketchy overview is permitted, which may be conducive to the discussion and the reassessment we will have at Oslo.
Some Information about the Commission of History of International Relations

The Commission of History of International Relations was established in Milan in October 1981 on the initiative of a group of scholars from various countries. In the same year the International Committee of Historical Sciences (I.C.H.S.) recognised it as an “internal” body devoted to foster and enhance the widest scientific collaboration among historians of ‘international life’, understood in its widest meaning.

The Commission, which is open to all the interested historians on an “individual membership” basis, according to its Statute has "the purpose... to develop the studies on the history of international relations, by several means:

a) organising periodical meetings among its members;

b) aiding the spread of scientific information concerning this domain of history;

c) publishing scientific documents useful for historical research in this field;

d) any other activity which may appear to be useful to widen the works of the Commission.

The Institutions active in this field of studies may get membership in the Commission, but without voting rights. They may propose individuals for membership.

The Commission is co-ordinated by a Bureau, and assisted by a Secretariat which has its seat in Milan, as stated by statute, at the Centre for the Studies on Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.

In August 1997 the Commission was accepted as "associate” body of the ICHS with right to vote in General Assembly of that world organisation.

Since 1981 Commission has approved and supported the programmes of many International Congress that have been later enacted with the cooperation of Universities and Institutions from countries all over the world.

From 1981 up to 1999 congresses have taken place in Perugia, Tübingen, Helsinki, Bochum, Cluj, Moscow, Brasilia, Rome, Buenos Aires, and Tokio and they have been devoted to:

- **The History and Methodology of International Relations** (Perugia-Spoleto-Trevi, Italy, 20-23 September 1989) organized with the University of Perugia
- **Minor Powers/Majors Powers in the History of International Relations** (Tübingen, Germany, 11-13 April 1991) organized with the Eberhard-Karls-Universität
- **The History of Neutrality** (Helsinki, Finland, 9-12 September 1992) organized with the Finnish Historical Society and the University of Helsinki
- **East-West Relations: Confrontation and Détente 1945-1989** (Bochum, Germany, 22-25 September 1993) organized with the University of Bochum
- **The History of International Relations in East and Central Europe: Study Traditions and Research Perspectives** (Cluj-Napoca, Romania, 20-24 October 1993) organized with the Institute of Central-European History, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca.
- **World War I and the XX Century** (Moscow, Russia, 24-26 May, 1994) organized with the Russian Association of the WWI History and the Institute of Universal History of the Russian Academy of Sciences
- **State and Nation in the History of International Relations of American Countries** (Brasilia, Brazil, 31 August -2 September 1994) with
- **The Historical Archives of the Great International Organisations: Conditions, Problems and Perspectives. International Seminar of Studies** (Rome, Italy, September 27-28, 1996), organized with Consiglio Internazionale degli Archivi (ICA) and Conferenza Internazionale della Tavola Rotonda degli Archivi (CITRA) Direzione generale degli archivi di Stato (General Management of the Italian State Archives), Giunta centrale per gli studi storici (Italian Central Council for the
Historical Studies), Istituto Nazionale di Storia Moderna e Contemporanea (National Institute for the Modern and Contemporary History).

- The Origins of the World Wars of the XX Century. Comparative Analysis (Moscow, Russia, 15-16 October 1996) organized with the National Committee of Russian Historians, the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Association of the First World War Historians and the Association of the Second World War.

- The Lessons of Yalta (Cluj-Napoca, Romania, May, 1997) organized with the Institute of Central-European History, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca.

- Integration Processes and Regional Blocs in the History of International Economic, Politico-strategic and Cultural Relations (Buenos Aires, Argentina, 10-12 September 1997) organized with the Argentine Association of the History of International Relations and the Universities of Buenos Aires and Cordoba.

- Political Interactions between Asia and Europe in the Twentieth Century (Tokyo, Japan, 10-12 September 1998) organized with the University of Tsukuba and the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.

- Archives and History of International Organizations (Rome, Italy, 29-31 October 1998) organized with Giunta Centrale per gli Studi Storici, Ufficio Centrale per i Beni Archivistici and Consiglio Internazionale degli Archivi (ICA)

The Commission on the occasion of the International Congresses of Historical Sciences, promossi dall'ICHS (Stuttgart (1985), Madrid (1990), Montreal (1995)) ha tenuto its General Assemblies che hanno comportato l’organizzazione di specifiche sessioni scientifiche dedicate a:

- What’s History of International Relations? (Stuttgart, Germany, 29-30 August 1985, 16th International Congress of Historical Sciences)

- Permanent Diplomacy in the XX Century (Stuttgart,)

- Great and Small Powers in Modern and Contemporary Ages (Stuttgart)

- Les archives des organisations internationales. Le point de vue de l'historien et du chercheur (Madrid, Spain, 30-31 August 1990, 17th International Congress of Historical Sciences)

- International Relations in the Pacific Area from the 18th Century to the Present. Colonisation, Decolonisation and Cultural Encounters (Montreal, Canada, 1-2 September 1995, 18th International Congress of Historical Sciences)

- Multiculturalism and History of International Relations from 18th Century up to the Present (Montreal, Canada)

In order to foster the widest spreading of information and to favour a closer relationship with its members, the Secretariat of the Commission publishes a Newsletter, 10 issues of which have come out by now.

All the information on the Commission its activities, issued publications and join-in procedure can be obtained by getting on to:

Commission of History of International Relations
Via Festa del Perdono 7 – 20122 Milano – Italy
Tel. 0039-0258304553
Fax.0039-0258306808
E-Mail: chir@unimi.it
Web Site: http://users.unimi.it/~polestra/centro

*****
The General Assembly of the CHIR, hold in Montreal (Canada) in September 1995, has elected as members of its Bureau for the years 1995-2000:

Joan BEAUMONT (Deakin University, Victoria, AUSTRALIA), Amado L. CERVO (Universidade de Brasilia, BRAZIL), Alexandr CHOUBARIAN (Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, RUSSIA), Michael L. DOCKRILL (King's College, University of London, UNITED KINGDOM), Manuel ESPADAS BURGOS (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid, SPAIN), Robert FRANK (Université de Paris-Sorbonne, FRANCE), Chihiro HOSOYA (International University of Japan, Tokio, JAPAN), Lawrence S. KAPLAN (Kent State University, Ohio, USA), Jukka NEVAKIVI (University of Helsinki, FINLAND), Jürgen OSTERHAMMEL (FernUniversität Hagen, GERMANY), Mario D. RAPOPORT (Universidad de Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA), Pierre SAVARD (University of Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA), Pompiliu TEODOR (University of Cluj-Napoca, RUMANIA), Brunello VIGEZZI (University of Milan, ITALY)

For the same five-year period the Bureau appointed Brunello VIGEZZI as President, Manuel ESPADAS BURGOS as Secretary General, Robert FRANK as Secretary Treasurer, and Amado Luiz CERVO and Pompiliu TEODOR as Vice-Presidents.

A Secretariat - co-ordinated by Alfredo CANAVERO and Silvia PIZZETTI - assists the Commission in its activities.

The General Assembly of the CHIR in Montreal has nominated Donald C. WATT (London School of Economics) and René GIRAULT (Université de Paris-Sorbonne) as Honorary Presidents of the Commission.

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The next General Assembly of our Commission will be held in Oslo on Friday 11th and Saturday 12th August 2000 within the framework of the International Congress of Historical Sciences with the following agenda:

Friday Morning, August 11, 2000
- Presentation of a report about activities carried out;
- Presentation of the balance sheet (1996-2000)
- General presentation of the two scientific sessions about:
  - *Globalisation, Regionalisation and the History of International Relations* (Call for papers in English and French, Enclosure 3)
  - *The Formation of the Images of Peoples from the 18th Century to the Present Day and the History of International Relations* (Call for papers in English and French, Enclosure 4)

Friday Afternoon, August 11- Saturday Morning, August 12, 2000
- Separate sessions on the two scientific themes. Discussion of the papers presented

Saturday Afternoon, August 12, 2000
- Presentation of the results of the scientific sessions
- Discussion of the programme 2000-2005;
- Social fee;
- Voting of possible changes in the Articles of the Statute;
- Election of a new Bureau according to the Statute
Session Aims – Introductory Remarks

It is a very widespread notion that in recent times the world has been going through an ever more marked process of “globalisation”. At the same time, it has been observed, there is a parallel - more or less marked – movement towards “regionalisation”: “regions” in this context are to be seen either as internal divisions within existing states, or as larger areas than present states, extended on a more or less continental scale.

Studies on these topics are now legion, provoking an extraordinary variety of interpretations, discussions and controversies which in turn have given rise to ever more new studies.

These studies have emphasised how the process of “globalisation” involves a range of different spheres: from the economic to the political and social ones, but also including communications and institutions as well as cultural and religious issues. What is the substance and what are the manifestations of “globalisation” on these different levels? What is the thread that connects these various aspects? And what, in each of the various situations, is the real relationship that holds between “globalisation” and “regionalisation”?

“Globalisation” and “regionalisation”, according to comments various scholars made, are phenomena that form part of an historical process which they shape and enliven in their own turn. What possible link is there between, on the one hand, “globalisation” and “regionalisation”, and on the other, the history of the relations between states and, more broadly, the history of international relations?

While these studies have often emphasised the startling novelty of recent processes of “globalisation” and “regionalisation”, they have, however, also increasingly drawn attention to the importance of a longer-term perspective. Only with such a long-term perspective does it seem possible to provide an in-depth explanation of the character and impact of these new changes.

The very terms “globalisation” and “regionalisation” need to be examined more closely. Attention needs to be paid to when they are used and when not, to their meaning and to the use of other more or less similar terms. It would be interesting to consider from this point of view, for example, the age of modern “discoveries” and what some people see as the first “globalisation” and “regionalisation” of the world; aspects of the “industrial revolution”; the periods of imperialism and decolonialisation; the two World Wars; the Cold War; the end of the Cold War and so on.
Papers

in author’s alphabetical order
The End of the Century and the End of Employment. East-West: A Reality

The following report shows the analysis of the labour reality, which affects immediately the actual world. In order to fulfil this analysis, it is important to have a retrospective view over the 80s and 90s in the Japanese business world, such as the business evolution and an accompanying problem with it, namely the unemployment. The European reality is explored according to answers that have been given by the UE to the labour problem and also the undertaking projects as unemployment alternatives. Even, the existence of new technologies and the opening of national economies show the way towards a global economy. That is to say, the double phenomenon of Globalization – with its direct corollary, that is the conformation of regional blocks- and the Third Industrial Revolution – with the technological developments that are connected to telecommunication and computer science- which engender an increasing unemployment in combination with liberalism.

This interaction impoverishes considerable masses, even in the most successful countries. According to what has been previously set-out, in the following report consists of three parts as follows:

1. towards a new concept of employment;
2. end of the century and end of employment;
3. graphics and statistics.

The transformation of the old concept of employment is analyzed in the first part. Such concept entails the controller principle of human life, which nowadays is being gradually and systematically removed from the production process because sophisticated communication and information technologies are progressively being applied to a wide variety of jobs.

This process is not strange to business and labour re-organization.

This happens because the unemployment and subemployment indexes increase every day in North America, Europe and Japan, arising an increasing technologic unemployment, in as much as transnational corporations have productive methods that are based on the most up to date technologies; this causing that million of workers not to be able to contend with the new automation production systems. Multicorrective team work, the employees’ tuition in different skills to reduce and simplify production ,distribution and administrative processes constitute a reality, according to what has been mentioned before.

After having appraised analysing the Taylorist and the Fordist systems as labour processes, able to transform the world, they are slowly falling through, because of the lack of possibilities in order to increase productivity. Team work in module or isle are appearing all of them as substitutes of assembly chains.

It’s obvious that the Japanese pattern is in an all-out spreading and that an information society, which is almost short of employment is dawning, is third Industrial Revolution the third and last stage of a change in the economic paradigms? Cybernetics, for instance: robots, computers with advanced software are invading the last available human spheres namely the realm of the mind.

In the second part, the end of the century and its correlation with the end of employment are analysed, either in the case of the East (such as Japan) or the West (such as the European Community).
In the case of Japan, not only the Japanese business management is studied but also the internal and external pressures: material satisfaction against spiritual wealth and free time or protectionism, which damages Japan, against moving the production abroad. There is also a tendency to change in the organising structure of the Japanese company, that is to say the evolution towards a new Japanese business system. We can say that the Japanese business management will face awkward problems, especially in the administration of human resources next century. So, the concept of life-long employment is typical example: retirement in advance, removing of over employment, subcontracting, subsidiaries, the beginning of compulsory training programmes.

The Japanese demographical transition will be relevant, because at the beginning of the XXI century, Japan will have more old people than today, which will be dangerous for the financial structures of the country. It will arise a threat to the national interest that is the creation of wealth, which implies private savings, money to be given to Japanese manufacturers with low rate of interest and also the costs advantages which are obtained with respect to rivals from abroad.

Nevertheless, there is a countermeasure by an old population, which is the technological progress in the production growing and the intensification of robot revolution in Japan. According to Paul Kennedy, we can say that the robot revolution increases more where labour costs are high, and where there is a stock of workers, that shows a deep demographical deceleration.

To sum up, slaves from abroad assembly plants (with low labour costs) are exceeded by automation at home.

That is why, the unemployment reality of the Japanese labour world turns on “re-engineering” processes, that remove all kind of jobs in a greater number.

According to what has been explained, there is a model of management, that is known as the just-in-time production: Toyotism. Japanese manufacturers have combined new rational production techniques, by using sophisticated information systems that are based on new technologies; this means the future factory: automation productive substructure plus a fewer number of workers. This factory has a relevant stress profile and shorter stints per days.

In the West, especially in the European Community, a comparative opinion is made regarding the labour problem and the importance of the European model of social welfare, that has been able to keep social peace in the last decades. This factor is one of the most important element in the integration process, although there are some pressures to reduce social expenses, which are imposed by the world rivalry. Such pressures have increased since a time of considerable increase of unemployment and also of the oldness’ rate of population. These factors imply important efforts, especially in the public budgets.

We have also analyzed how does the Community fight against unemployment. After analyzing community plans, the importance of the European Bank of Investments and its credit loans for substructure projects, as well as the importance of the European Fund of Investment is apparent. These institutions gives some help to companies, which ask for credits. The Cohesion Fund is also important to provide means of transport and environmental projects.

Employment policies are considered for 1998 and 1999, showing four basic elements to take into account: 1) To improve employment, 2) To develop enterprise attitude, 3) To encourage the company and employees’s aclimatisation and 4) To reinforce same-opportunity policy.

The E.U. has interests in developing some programmes to create new jobs, as well as education policies are studied in order to provide the same opportunities to men and women.

Graphs and statistics are included in the third part, which are about employment and unemployment in Japan and in the European Community as follows: rate of women and men activity from 15 to 64 years old in the U.E., women and men unemployment rate from 15 to 64 years old, women and men part-time job, full-time job in the U.E. and Japan, the annual growing rate in certain labour categories of some countries 1981-1996 transition to older groups in Japanese population, chart explaining the unemployment rate in the developed countries of the world and a chart indicating the growing rate of employment in the areas mentioned above.
Globalisation and Regionalisation

The superimposition of partial concepts on phenomena to general concepts on general phenomena has always been the cause (or effect) of the reality’s ideological manipulation. Historians such as Fernand Braudel and economists like Karl Marx and Karl Polanyi provide copious study material about these phenomena with their researches into “market”, “capitalism” and “development”.

This situation has again taken place in recent times due to the superimposition of the partial concept on the phenomenon of globalisation to the general concept on the phenomenon of internationalisation and by reducing to it partial phenomenon such as universalisation and regionalisation.

By this method, opposing phenomena such as globalisation and regionalisation are considered equal or, in some cases, the second is considered a lower stage of development than the first.

A recent but equally diverting and mystifying perspective is the one which places real phenomena such as globalisation, universalisation and regionalisation on the same level with virtual phenomena such as the “Global Village” or the “Network Society”.

This can be overcome by a more careful analysis which starts from the theoretical ground of the “meso-region” and “world-economy”, and from the study of the “authors” and “actors” that characterise the phenomena of globalisation, universalisation and regional integration. This will be able to restore the correct balance between real and virtual in the present knowledge.

It is the opinion of the author that globalisation represents the new form of capitalist accumulation in the 21st century, which is qualitatively different from all previous stages. Universalisation expresses trends and movements of resistance to such new forms, and regional integration is the political alternative to it.

Globalisation leaves aside market economies, dismantles national states and institutions, clones production systems by the rupture of any relation between “culture and production systems”, and, finally, it de-territorialises the basic existence of the communities.

The construction of process of regional integration rooted in the “meso-region” dimension appears to be the best alternative to globalisation and the adequate answer to the new demands on internationalisation in the 21st century.
In Austrian foreign policy since 1918, regionalization above the state level has been a recurrent, almost constant phenomenon though adopting different forms. There may be doubts whether the idea of a union with Germany (Anschluss), predominant in the first period of Austria’s existence as a little state, fits well in the concept of regionalization. However, this is certainly true for the concurring ideas of Mitteleuropa, of a Danubian federation, of Paneurope and other forms of more or less regionalized European co-operation. After its reestablishment at the end of World War II, selected traditional and new concepts of regionalization played a major role again, including the different forms of "European" co-operation in the OEEC, the Council of Europe, the ECSC and EEC, the failed Great Free Trade Area, the EFTA, and the CSCE.

From their origins, Austrian regionalization tendencies can be analysed as variables of two main identity problems: Austria's national and international identities. "Left over" from the Habsburg Monarchy, the new state was not nation. National allegiance went to Germany, supra-national allegiance went to the region formerly included in the Empire of Austria and its Hungarian counterpart. Small and weak, the new state didn’t accept its international identity either. Regionalization tendencies in Austrian foreign policy took therefore a "post-imperial" mark. While to a certain extent, this "post-imperial" dimension holds on until our days, nation building in little Austria has been a success since its reestablishment in 1945 and the end of Allied occupation in 1955. Finally, regionalization took on more common functions. Among other things, it has been Austria’s answer to globalization when preparing to join the European Union in the late 1980s.

As a paradox, regionalization by joining the EU brought also about a sort of de-globalization in Austrian foreign policy as from the 1960s on, especially in the Kreisky era, it had largely concentrated on the United Nations. This out of deception from "Europe", already then the politically and economically most relevant form of regionalization above the state level. Globalization then was a sort of alternative to regionalization.

However, globalization of Austria’s foreign policy had had a second reason as well: regionalization beneath the state level. In fact, the problem of South Tyrol had a great impact on internal policy and was one of the driving forces behind Austria’s active UN policy on a global scale (including Africa and the Middle East). As a largely federalized state, Austria's foreign policy had and has to take strongly into account the regional interests of its provinces. The early years of the First Republic had sown examples of tentative foreign policy emancipation of individual provinces (notably Tyrol and Salzburg) with disintegrating implications for the state. Some seventy years later, when negotiating Austria’s adhesion to the European Union, the federal government had to strike a deal with the provinces which gave them a further bearing in certain domains of foreign policy.

In recent years, Austria has therefore become another example for the well known process in which regionalization – in both senses of the term, above and beneath the state level – is a twin of globalization. The history of the decades before, however, shows many particularities due to Austria’s long-lasting difficulties in coming to term with its existence as a separate, little state.
Globalisation’ and ‘regionalisation’ — or as it is more commonly called in Australia, ‘regionalism’ — are familiar expressions. But they are words which have had changing meanings for successive generations and which are still contested subjects today. It would be possible to devote this whole paper, or a book, to definitions. Suffice to say that globalisation is the logical culmination, at the end of the 20th century, to that century’s advances: in freeing trade and investment; in breaking down distance by revolutionising the speed of communication; in spreading supra-national values such as universal human rights; and in building international and regional institutions to consolidate these achievements (for along with globalisation has gone fragmentation). In some senses, these qualities of globalisation are also conducive to regionalism. Australia’s historical experience indeed has been that its engagement with its region — and indeed its definition of “region” — has been always been mediated through its concern with global issues and forces, be they strategic, political, economic or racial. In many instances Australia has found a tension between the regional and global which it has managed with difficulty.

Australia has long been exposed to globalisation, if we can call “imperialism” a form of this (and imperialism has many of the qualities listed above). Settled as a British colony in 1788, Australia formed an integral part of the global economic, political and defence system of the British empire until the latter half of the 20th century. But obviously this was “globalisation” of a limited form. Consistent with the nature of imperialism, the orientation of the Australian colonies was narrowly towards the imperial metropolis, not towards the external world, with whom contacts were mediated by London. Australian values, its educational system and its political institutions were derived from those of Britain. (Even when, from the 1920s on, the dominant globalising culture of the 20th century, the United States, began to make its impact felt through film and popular culture, Britain remained emotionally and culturally “home”). Until the latter half of the 20th century Australia’s immigrants also were drawn almost exclusively from Britain. For many than a century after white settlement there was only an embryonic sense of “Australian” nationalism. Local loyalties, that is loyalty to one’s colony or state — be it Victoria, New South Wales or South Australia — were strong, but identification beyond the local was global and vertical: from Melbourne, Sydney or Adelaide to London, rather than horizontal, across colonial or regional boundaries.

This imperial orientation meant that, although Australians were long conscious of their need to engage with the region in which their continent was located, they felt an uneasy and often fearful contradiction. They were a predominantly European people located on the edge of Asia. This tension between their “history” and their “geography” formed one of the recurring themes of Australia’s history of foreign relations.

The “region” has meant many things to Australians in the past century. When it first entered Australian consciousness in the last quarter of the 19th century, the “region” was the southwest Pacific, those widely scattered islands from New Guinea to Fiji, which are currently manifesting political instability as ethnically divided micro-states. The Australian colonies’ interest in this region sprang from a mixture of economic opportunism, Christian missionary zeal and strategic concerns. This was a region of dimensions in which Australia, even with its minute population, could exercise a mini-imperialism itself. There was grandiose talk in the colonies in the 1880s about a Monroe doctrine for the Pacific and Australia’s manifest destiny in the Southwest Pacific.1

But, for all its regional assertiveness, this mini-imperialism was constructed with the paradigm of the wider British Empire. When Australians thought of external threats in their region, for example, they feared imperial powers that were in competition with the Britain — France, Germany, Russia and even the United States. The logic of this mindset was that the only security for Australia rested within a global imperial defence network. Australians also saw their role in the region to be, in part, agents of the British empire. As Roger Thompson has said:

the distinctive Australian imperialistic interest in Pacific islands was linked to a wider attachment to ‘the great and glorious empire on which the sun never sets’ ... Australian imperialism in the Pacific was not a symptom of an Australian nationalism separate from the imperial connection... Even one of the most chauvinistic advocates of an Australian empire in the Pacific, the Age, declared that its achievement was ‘a mission to perform in the name of the great English race in these southern seas."

The framing of Australia's regionalism within a global imperialism inevitably created some tensions. Britain's global imperatives were not necessarily synonymous with Australia's regional concerns. For example, in 1884 Britain acquiesced in Germany's taking control of the north-eastern section of Papua, much to the chagrin of the Queensland colonial government which had earlier occupied the territory. Two decades later, in keeping with the Anglo-French entente dictated by the European alliance system, Britain formed a condominium with France in the New Hebrides (now Vanuatu).

But whatever the frustrations with the way in which the global strategic imperatives of empire predominated at the expense of Australia's regionalism, Australians had no doubt where they were aligned in terms of race. As the above quote from the Age illustrates, Australians gloried in the “crimson thread of kinship” that linked them across the globe to the United Kingdom. The influx of Chinese labourers into the Australian colonies during the gold rushes of the 1850s had generated a violent backlash, resulting in racially exclusive immigration policies. The subsequent importation of Pacific island labourers to work on Queensland sugar cane plantations further inflamed the fears of racial contamination and the undercutting of the high wage rates of white Australian labourers. It is notable that the first piece of legislation passed by the new federal Australian government in 1901 was an act that enshrined the ‘White Australia Policy’. For the next six decades, through administrative procedures associated with this act, Australian maintained the racial “purity” of its immigrant intake. Asians were systematically excluded, a fact which naturally proved to be a source of resentment on the part of many nations in the Asia-Pacific region and an enduring obstacle in the 20th century, to Australia's engagement with the region.

With the turn of the 20th century, the definition of Australia's “region” shifted and widened to include not simply the Southwest Pacific but North Asia. (South and Southeast Asia, being largely under European imperial control, were seen as non-threatening until the post-1945 decolonisation.) The emergence of Japan as a new industrial and military power in the late 19th century inspired a mixed reaction in Australia. Some saw the commercial opportunities of Japan as an export market; but others were preoccupied with the potential of a trading relationship with Japan to erode the White Australia Policy. To this was added, in the first decade of the 20th century, a strategic anxiety. In the aftermath of Japan's naval victory over Russia in 1905, apocalyptic popular literature in Australia predicted the invasion of Australia by Japan and the defiling of the racial purity of the Australian nation. The invasion-scare literature, so important in fanning popular fears of Germany in late Victoria and Edwardian Britain, took a different but equally strident form in Australia.


3 Thompson, Australian Imperialism, p.105.

4 ibid., ch. 6.

5 ibid., ch. 10.

6 The phrase was coined by the colonial politician, (Sir) Henry Parkes.

7 David Walker, Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia, 1850-1939 (University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, Queensland, 1999), chs. 6, 8.
Japan’s emergence again highlighted for Australians the tension between the global and the regional. The new ‘enemy’ in the Asian region was in fact the imperial mother’s ally. Britain, in an effort to address its global naval over-stretch resulting from Anglo-German naval arms race, negotiated the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. Despite considerable Australian misgivings, this was renewed in 1911.

But, with the outbreak of the First World War, it was confirmed that imperial loyalty remained by far the more dominant identification. Although it can be argued that there were regional interests at stake in the war of 1914-18 — that, for example, Australia’s security would have been adversely affected by a German victory in Europe — in the crisis of August 1914 Australian unthinkingly responded to the British cause. Constitutionally, Britain’s declaration of war committed Australia to the conflict, but Australians’ enthusiasm for the British cause went far beyond tokenism: 20 000 Australian troops had volunteered within the first weeks of the war. In the next four years, despite the fact that military conscription proved to be a profoundly divisive issue domestically, Australian supplied some 330 000 troops for overseas service, from a population of less than 5 million. Of these over 58 000 died.

A much quoted poem of May 1915, written by a member of one of Victoria’s leading private (non-government) schools, is indicative of this emotional identification with Britain:

The bugles of England were blowing o’er the sea
As they had called a thousand years, calling now to me;
They woke me from the dreaming in the dawning of the day,
The bugles of England — and how could I stay?

In a way that superficially seems paradoxical, Australia’s involvement in the British imperial war effort in 1914-18, in fact, triggered an explosion of national sentiment. The role of Australians in the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, and later on the Western front, generated the Anzac legend, a semi—mythical celebration of the unique qualities of the Australian soldier (or digger) that, even in the early 21st century, plays a central role in the Australian national political culture. Yet, the paradox of Australian nationalism is explicable when it is realised that it was a dual nationalism, constructed within the wider imperial loyalty. As one of Australia’s prime ministers in the years immediately prior to 1914, Alfred Deakin said, Australians saw themselves as “independent, Australian Britons”. Each element of the trilogy was of equal importance. The Australian Army was called the Australian Imperial Force. Simultaneous loyalty to Britain and Australia became the dominant discourse of Australian nationalism in the war and inter-war years — though there were dissenting voice, most notably among Australia’s sizeable Irish-Catholic population.

While the war of 1914-18 affirmed Australia’s identification with the global and imperial, the tension of this position with regional concerns remained. One old element of this tension, admittedly, was eliminated. In September 1914 Australia occupied German New Guinea, an occupation which was confirmed when it acquired a League of Nations mandate over the territory in 1919. But, to balance this strategic gain in the region, Japan remained an ally of Britain. Moreover, Japan used the turmoil in Europe to consolidate its position in China and elsewhere in Asia. The same system of League of Nations mandates that benefited Australia in New Guinea entrenched Japanese presence in the Caroline and Marshall Islands north of the equator. And while Australian clumsy attempts at the Paris Peace conference of 1919 to quarantine its immigration policy from the Japanese, by opposing the racial equality clause in the League charter, were successful, the cost was continued affront to Japanese sensibilities.

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10 J. D. Burns, ‘For England’, originally published in Scotch Collegian (Melbourne), vol. 12, no 1, May 1915, p. 43.
The years between the wars were in many ways the locust years for Australia’s adjustment to the changes in the global and regional order. The country turned inwards, and under an almost unbroken period of conservative federal rule, the old dependence on imperial Britain continued. In contrast with other British Dominions, such as Canada and Eire, that pushed to gain greater autonomy in international affairs, Australia clung to the past. It continued to rely on Britain for the conduct of its relations with countries within and outside the British Empire/Commonwealth. Not until 1940 did Australia establish its first independent diplomatic missions overseas (in Washington, and, significantly, Tokyo). Predictably in the inter-war years Asia impacted little on Australian consciousness, except as a threat, and, in the case of Japan, as a trading partner. The dominant external cultural influence, other than Britain, was the United States, or more precisely Hollywood. In the classic Marxist model of empire, the Australian inter-war economy was geared to providing raw materials to satisfy British industrial needs. Australia remained integrated into the British sterling bloc and in the 1930s, in the grip of the Depression, embraced policies of imperial preference, which actually damaged its growing trade with Japan and the United States.

In the strategic realm, meanwhile, Australia continued its faith in British imperial defence. In view of its own unwillingness, or inability, to fund significant defence spending in the Depression years, Australia saw in the global power of Britain its only means of countering any regional threat. As the Japanese menace grew from 1932 on, the British naval base at Singapore became the keystone of Australian regional defence. So intent were they on ensuring that the British strategic presence in Asia remained credible, that Australian governments emerged as strong advocates of appeasement in Europe. They proactively encouraged Britain to seek a diplomatic rapprochment with Nazi Germany in 1937-38.

Few if any, in Australia, were prepared to read the signs of Britain’s global overcommitment that was manifest to British military planners themselves from 1935 on. Hence, when European war again broke out in 1939, Australia responded in a way strongly reminiscent of 1914: an almost automatic declaration of war on the side of Britain (even though the constitutional position now gave Australia the option of refraining from commitment); an early promise of military, naval and air support for an imperial global strategy; and in early 1940, a dispatch of Australian troops (the 2nd Australian Imperial Force) to the Middle East, that hub of British global communications.

But there was a difference from 1914. In 1939 it was feared, even by the deeply Anglophile Robert Menzies, that the global commitment might jeopardise, rather than guarantee, regional security. The menace posed by Japan was a source of profound unease to the Australian government; and the commitment of Australian forces to the conflict outside the region was only undertaken when London gave assurances (as it proved, of little value) that Japan would not pursue a more expansionist policy. Australian strategic policy was in fact bankrupt, because if the insurance policy of imperial defence was to prove void, Australia had no regional security alternative to fall back on.

In the event, of course, Britain proved unable to meet its global commitments after the fall of France and the entry of Italy and Japan into the war in 1940-41. In the aftermath of the catastrophe in Malaya, Singapore and Southeast Asia in early 1942, it was clear that the Australian assumption that a global security network was the most effective means of ensuring regional security was questionable at best.

But, deliverance from the Japanese came through the agency of another global power, the United States. Australian defence policy immediately after the Second World War therefore continued to see global and regional security as inextricably linked. For a short period in the early 1950s the Australian government of Menzies, fearing a new global conflict, this time in the context of the emerging Cold War, was tempted to commit Australian troops, at Britain’s suggestion, to the Middle East, (for what would have been the third time in the century). But by the mid 1950s, the focus of Australian planners had turned, this time permanently, to their region.  

Again the meaning of the “region” had shifted. Japan remained detested, given the fact that some 8000 Australians had died in Japanese prisoner-of-war and internnee camps during the Second World War and that the threat of invasion in 1942 had been real, but its demilitarisation had neutralised it as a military threat. But the forces of decolonisation unleashed by the war of 1941-45 created a new and, for Australia, often threatening challenge in the Southeast Asian region. 

The Australian response to this challenge was multifaceted. Four decades later it was fashionable in Australian Labor circles to claim that Australia only “discovered” Asia in the 1980s and 1990s under prime ministers Bob Hawke and Paul Keating, but in fact in the 1940s and 1950s, the reorientation to the realities of change in the region was substantial. Under the Labor foreign minister Dr H.V. Evatt and his conservative successor R.G. Casey (the latter of whom saw Asia a more than a stopover en route to London), new elements emerged in the Australian regionalism. Evatt supported independence for Indonesia in the last 1940s — and relations with Indonesia have remained a priority of Australian foreign policy ever since. In 1950 Australia played a leading role in the inception of the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and South East Asia. This was in some ways a self-conscious attempt at Australian image-building at home and in Asia, where it was promoted as a corrective to the negative images generated White Australia Policy. But Australian contributions to Asia under the Colombo Plan included capital aid, commodity aid, and technical assistance. The latter, which provided Asian countries with the services of experts, and offered Asians training and education opportunities in Australia, exposed the insular Australian population to students who countered the profoundly negative stereotypes of Asia. 

The 1950s also saw the beginning of what proved over the next four decades to be a transformation of Australian trade patterns away from Britain and Europe to Asia. Just prior to the Second World War exports to the UK accounted for 55 per cent of total Australian exports. Even in 1950, as Britain struggled to recover from the economic impoverishment of the Second World War, the figure was 39 per cent. But during 1946-55 Japan’s share of Australian exports rose to 5.2 per cent, a trend which continued as that country’s share of exports rose to 13.7 percent for 1956-65 and to 26.1 per cent for 1966-75.  

Despite the wartime legacy of distrust, Japan replaced the UK as Australia’s principal export market in 1967. This was possible because Australian foreign policy still maintained a clear, if artificial, distinction between political and economic international policies. This distinction also allowed Australia to maintain trade in wheat with Communist China, even while that country was demonised as the aggressive and destabilising force in regional politics. Yet, for all the changes, the old attitudes towards the region reasserted themselves in security policy. Increasingly in the late 1950s and 1960s defence issues came to dominate Australian regional engagement, to the point that one commentator has called the years 1945-72 as the period of “Fear of Asia”. The battlefield was Southeast Asia, particularly Malaya and Vietnam, where Australian troops were deployed from 1950 and 1962 respectively. But in Australian imagination the threat was global.

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Working, as they historically had, within a framework which viewed regional developments through a global lens, Australians attributed conflict in the decolonising countries of Southeast Asia not to nationalism but to an international crusade of infiltration and conquest by communism, orchestrated by China. Even after the Sino-Soviet split made notion of monolithic communism anachronistic, the conflict in Southeast Asia was constructed as a manifestation of Cold War global politics.

Australia’s military response to this challenge was also constructed within the global paradigm. In 1951 Australia had pursued and won a strategic alliance with the United States, ANZUS. This alliance, which significantly excluded Britain, became the keystone of Australian security policy for the remainder of the century. It was enhanced some four years later by the avowedly anti-communist South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO). In the subsequent decade Australian policy was focussed on ensuring that the United States retained a strong military presence in the Asian region. The conviction that only global US power, comparable to that which Britain had offered prior to its withdrawal east of Suez in the 1960s, could underpin Australia’s regional security led to Australia’s commitment to the Vietnam War. While “showing the flag” alongside the US, Australia also sheltered under the US nuclear umbrella, permitting bases that were essential to US satellite and tracking systems to be established in the remote regions of central and northern Australia. The 1960s also saw a growing US investment in the Australian economy, which met the now common reaction to economic globalisation: that is, a somewhat hysterical concern about the loss of economic sovereignty.

Defeat in Vietnam of course wrought massive changes in the US attitude towards the region. Faced with the Guam doctrine and US humiliation in Southeast Asia, Australia was forced to rethink its defence policies, to some degree outside the traditional parameters of great power alliances. Greater self-reliance became the leitmotif of Australian defence policy, although intelligence and equipment links with the United States remained strong and the US alliance continued to provide the context for defence planning. But within the broader foreign policy framework the notion of threat became far less dominant. In 1972, with the coming to power of a Labor government the realpolitik conception of global politics that had dominated Australian thinking over a 23-year period of conservative rule was replaced with a more liberal internationalist analysis of the international order. The new prime minister, Gough Whitlam moved quickly to recognise communist China, and in a foreign policy statement made only days after coming to office set a new tone by declaring that:

The general direction of my thinking is towards a more independent Australian stance in international affairs, an Australia which will be less militarily oriented and not open to suggestions of racism, an Australia which will enjoy a growing standing as a distinctive, tolerant, co-operative and well-regarded nation, not only in Asian and Pacific region but in the world at large.

But for the new tone in Whitlam’s foreign policy, which quickly became mainstream and bipartisan, at the level of Australian federal politics, the return to power of the conservatives in late 1975 saw a reversion to the threat mentality of the past. The “second Cold War” of the late 1970s and early 1980s was anticipated by the Fraser government’s concern about the growing presence of the Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean. Global bipolarity again dominated Australian regional thinking. In a remarkable, but fortunately abortive, initiative of 1976, Fraser even suggested to the Chinese government that it...
might align with Australia and the United States against the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{26} It was not until \textit{glasnost} and the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, that Australian regional security thinking was freed from the bipolar paradigm.

In many ways the reconceptualisation of regional security that occurred at the end of the Cold War had lagged behind other developments that were already drawing Australia into the Asia Pacific region in a much more complex way. As already mentioned, Australia’s engagement with Asia had been constrained for much of its history by its racially exclusive immigration policies. The significant increase in immigration in the immediate post-1945 period had done little to alter this, since the catchment area from which “suitable” immigrants were drawn extended only as far as the southern Mediterranean. (It is symptomatic of the degree to which perceptions of regional threat governed even this process that the catchcry for immigration policy immediately after the Second World War was “populate or perish”.) However, from the 1960s the White Australia Policy progressively began to be dismantled, with the administrative regulations that had restricted Asian immigration being repealed in 1966. The impact on the ethnic mix of Australian population remained comparatively limited until the flow of Vietnamese boat people in the 1970s led Australia to open its door to significant numbers of Asian refugees. Australia purportedly took one of the highest rates of Vietnamese refugees per head of population. How much this reflected a growing openness to a cultural globalisation and how much it represented a national bad conscience about the outcome of the Vietnam war is of course debatable. But the changing immigration patterns had — and will continue to have — a major impact on the ethnic mix of the Australian population. The proportion of immigrants from Asian countries rose from about 5 per cent in the early 1970s to 25 per cent in the early 1980s to 50 per cent in the early 1990s. (The proportion from Britain declined from 40 per cent to 20 per cent to 12 percent over the same periods). By 1990 the Asian-born population in Australia had grown to about 4 per cent of total population — still not huge but a significant shift from the past and one that will continue with family-reunion immigrant intakes.\textsuperscript{27} The familial links that for so long tied Australian culturally and emotionally to the British Empire are now being replicated in Asia. Simultaneously Asia has become far more accessible in the last two decades as a tourist destination for an increasingly mobile Australian population.

Even more significant than the cultural shifts that followed changing immigration patterns in the 1980s and 1990s has been the transformation of Australia’s economic alignment. By the 1995 the once dominant role of the UK in Australian trade had shrunk to the marginal — 3.8 per cent of Australian exports.\textsuperscript{28} The gap was filled not only by Japan, but by the emerging “tigers” of North Asia — South Korea, and the three Chinas: China itself, Taiwan and Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{29} In the 1980s Australia confronted a new “region”, a Northeast Asia that was wider than Japan and which was in the economic ascendant. In a major report, commissioned by the Australian government, in 1989 it was recognised that North East Asia was on the path to becoming the dominant region in the world economy.\textsuperscript{30} Australia had no choice to link its own economy into this dynamic region and win a greater share of Asian expanding markets.

Over the past fifteen years Australia has moved consistently and often painfully to meet this economic challenge. In order to become regionally competitive Australia has restructured its economy along the

\textsuperscript{26} For a critical insider’s account see Alan Renouf, \textit{The Frightened Country} (Macmillan, Melbourne, 1979), pp.478-79.

\textsuperscript{27} Michele Langfield, ‘Bridging the Cultural Divide: Movements of People Between Australia and Asia’ in McGillivray and Smith, \textit{Australia and Asia}, pp. 33-34.

\textsuperscript{28} McGillivray, ‘Australia’s Economic Ties’, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{29} By the mid 1990s Northeast Asia had achieved clear prominence in Australian exports: Japan accounting for some 24 per cent; South Korea, Taiwan and China and Hong Kong, 20 per cent (up from 10 per cent in 1975-85). Exports to Southeast Asia were also rising steadily, though the crisis of the mid 1990s brought some check to this.

now familiar pattern of financial deregulation, the floating of the currency, the removal of protection for local industry through the dismantling of tariff walls, microeconomic reform and so.

Of course these changes have not been simply regional in impetus. They are a response to the forces of globalisation which have necessitated economies throughout the globe to confront the need for trade liberalisation. But for Australia, this experience of globalisation has been mediated through the regional economic sphere. For example, for years Australia has been concerned about the emergence of regional trading blocs, such the European Union, and NAFTA, which might — and in the case of the EU, have — left Australia on the margins. But with the conclusion of the long-drawn out Uruguay Round, Australia's energies turned to creating forums for trade liberalisation in the Asia Pacific region. Australia was one of the driving forces behind the creation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation in 1989. Later it initiated Heads of State and Government meetings in APEC to give its agenda broader political context. As Gary Smith has said:

'The Asia of the late 1990s had been transformed in the Australian official imagination from the source of threat and danger to the foundation of [Australia's] economic prosperity.'

There is considerable debate within Australia as to whether this economic realignment has been matched by a comparable political, cultural and imaginative engagement with the region. At the level of government and the intellectual elite, there is considerable evidence that it has. The Labor governments of 1983-96 were committed to integrating Australia into Asian regional forums, such as ASEAN. (Australia had become ASEAN's first dialogue partner in 1974.) The Labor Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans was proactive in promoting the conception of an Asian forum for dialogue on security and cooperation, similar to the Conference in Security and Cooperation in Europe. This was partially realised with the creation in 1994 of the ASEAN Regional Forum that Australia promoted in the face of initial US objections, which preferred a hub-and-spokes system of regional security. To quote Gary Smith again:

The contrast [of the ARF] with SEATO was profound. SEATO was organised from outside Asia by the USA and Britain as an element in a global anti-Communist containment strategy. The ARF was a multilateral security forum firmly based in a long standing Southeast Asian regional association, but its membership was extended outward to include dialogue partners in other parts of Asia, Australia, the USA and Europe. 31

Under Labor also the rhetoric of Australian engagement with Asia became fulsome and visionary: Australia was variously described as being “part of Asia”, and having “an Asian destiny” or “enmeshment with Asia”. 32

Similarly Australian intellectuals embarked a new identification with Asia that went far beyond economic necessity. To quote a leading historian of Australian-Asian relations, David Walker:

Economic ties certainly played their part in drawing Australia closer to Asia, but so too did the beckoning call of a new century and the discovery of new futures. Asia presented itself as a new future, just as Europe, and Britain, in particular, became identified with an immobile past. 33

But the more excessive enthusiasm and fanciful hyperbole about Australia's engagement with Asia need to be qualified by acknowledgement of a number of contrary trends. The first is the resistance on the part of certain Asian elites to Australia's self-definition. The notion that Australia can shed its “history” and be part of Asia has been rejected most vociferously by the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed who has a personal and political animus against the country that dates back decades. While Australia has sought to promote broadly multilateral regional institutions such as APEC, which extend the “region” to include the western littoral states of the Pacific as well as Asia,


33 ‘Cultural Change and the Response to Asia: 1945 to the Present’ in McGillivray and Smith, Australia and Asia, p. 25.
Malaysia has proposed more narrowly “Asian” forums, such as the East Asian Economic Caucus. Australia has no place in these — at least in Mahatir’s perceptions.  

The second source of opposition to the notion of an Australian Asian “destiny” has come from within Australia itself. The 1990s have provided ample evidence of the potential of globalisation to heighten the sense of the local. The resurgence of ethnicity at the sub-state level in regions of the world such as the former Yugoslavia and Indonesia, and the passionate opposition to the impact of trade liberalisation on local economies manifested at recent meeting of the World Trade Organisation, are two clear manifestations of this. In Australia this backlash, already evident in the early 1990s, took the form of a populist anti-immigration, and anti-Asian, movement that enjoyed surprising electoral success from 1996. Led by Pauline Hanson, the One Nation party gave a voice to that section of the Australian population who thought “their country was being lost to Asia abroad and given up to the Aborigines at home”. Although Hanson in fact enjoyed comparatively short lived success, her popularity was indicative of the reservations many Australians had about the elite’s agenda for integration into Asia. It was symptomatic also of the disaffection within the Australian rural sector about the impact of economic globalisation and economic rationalism on the Australian economy, on international prices for Australian primary commodities, and on the provision of rural services.

Finally, in the last two years particularly Australia’s engagement with the region has stumbled on the issue of shared political values. The meanings of the word “globalisation” have widened in recent years to extend well beyond economic integration to notions of an international civil society. The sharing of values is an integral part of such a vision. For Australians, however, the possibility of shared values, at least above the level of third sector organizations, has proved a major stumbling bloc in their engagement with Asia. Under Labor particularly Australia sought to find an accommodation between its Western understanding of human rights — that is, political and individual rights with a supposedly universalistic application — and “Asian values” — that elevate the collective and emphasise social and economic rights. The conservative government of John Howard, which came to power in 1996, was far less sanguine on this question than Keating; and the tension in Australia’s position became irreconcilable in 1999 when Indonesia attempted to crush the move to self-determination in East Timor. Having acquiesced and indeed endorsed Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor in 1975, Australia found itself no longer able in the late 1990s to ignore the violation of human rights in that territory. It spearheaded the international move to ensure that the East Timorese vote for independence was respected, and provided troops to ensure this. As a consequence Australia now finds the bilateral relationship which is most critical importance to its Asian engagement — that with Indonesia — under severe strain.

Timor put paid to the assertion of the current Prime Minister in 1996 that “closer engagement with Asia [does not] require reinventing Australia’s identity or abandoning the values and traditions which define Australians society”. And in the current foreign policy pronouncements about the region in Australia there is evident uneasiness. The Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said in April that there were two forms of Asian regionalism — and a role for Australia in only one. He spoke approvingly about “practical regionalism” as found in economic and political multilateral forums. But he deemed Australia to be excluded from “cultural regionalism, built upon common ties of history, of mutual cultural identity … emotional links”. It is not clear what Downer is referring to as economic regionalism or just what he understands the concept to involve. He said that “this kind of regionalism exists in many parts of the world”. But it seems that he excluded the European Union, for he later told the press that he did not expect the EU model to be replicated in Asia.

It was later put about that the text of Downer’s speech was in the nature of of-the-cuff remarks, but he has since emphasised two points: regionalism should not be the be-all and end-all of Australian foreign policy, and the global nature of Australia’s interests and the special historical ties with the US (not, it should be noted, the United Kingdom). But having lifted a corner Downer has dropped the veil over

37 Quoted from the first ever White Paper on Foreign and Trade Policy, in 1997, In the National Interest. This identified the two major trends in the world situation for the next fifteen years, as globalisation and high growth in Asia.
whether Australia will have to choose between globalisation and Asian regionalism and the tension between these two elements, which has been so continuous a theme in Australia’s history, appears certain to continue.
Nel corso di queste note mi occuperò delle linee politiche e culturali dei movimenti politici ortodossi attivi nel mercato politico israeliano. Tralascierò quelli presenti nelle diaspora ebraiche, per i quali va svolto una riflessione distinta e specifica area per area, all’interno della quale ricomprendere: flussi migratori, analisi delle caratteristiche socio-culturali dei gruppi componenti, connessione con le culture politiche locali.

1
Nel corso dell’ultimo decennio la sfera delle religioni ha occupato di nuovo la scena pubblica, non solo nella dimensione dei grandi eventi di massa, ma anche in quella della violenza. Connesso con questa partita il fatto che la sfera del religioso si sia connotata come sistema ideologico-politico, segnando la fine del processo di secolarizzazione. Sotto questa veste, la religione non sarebbe dotata solo di un linguaggio politico ma includerebbe la sfera del “politico” [Kurtz 1995].

Non è la prima volta che questo tema torna nel corsoi del’900. Il confronto e spesso la sovrapposizione tra politica e religione sono stati temi su cui si sono misurati politologi e filosofi della politica. La questione della religione politica ha rappresentato tradizionalmente una chiave di lettura che è stata accolta con molta cautela da chi si ha indagato i fenomeni politici non solo sul piano delle grandi scenografie teoretiche, ma ha cercato di connettere esperienze storica con concretezza, con criteri interpretativi afferenti alle storia culturale, all’antropologia politica ma anche alle forme storiche attraverso le quali si è prodotta identità nazionale.


2
Il fondamentalismo in ambito ebraico è il presupposto e contemporaneamente, il risultato di una lettura etnica, prima ancora che teologica della propria identità. Da questo punto di vista presenta dei tratti anti-moderni, o per esser più precisi una fisionomia di contrapposizione alla globalizzazione [Horowitz 1991].

Ma detto ciò, dobbiamo anche osservare che il radicalismo religioso non è una rivincita della tradizione contro la modernità, né il recupero di un codice scritto. Esso si presenta come la decisione di aderire a una civiltà. Più precisamente il radicalismo religioso è la forma attraverso la quale si produce una riscrittura etnica della cittadinanza di un gruppo umano - e dunque si decretano le norme di appartenenza e di esclusione - utilizzando un alfabeto teologico.

Da questo punto di vista, per esempio l’assassinio di Rabin nel novembre 1995 assume una doppia veste: da una parte esso si manifesta come riproposizione del tirannicidio, ovvero come processo di liberazione da un “despota che minacciava” la salvezza del popolo, dall’altra quell’assassinio diviene possibile perché avviene come esito di una precedente de-umanizzazione e derubricazione dalla comunità dell’individuo e dell’ebrao Rabin [Zerubavel 1998, pp. 177-178]. Ovvero come esteriorizzazione
del male riversandolo all’esterno al fine di un ricompattamento interno [Fromm 1961, p. 22], ma anche come confronto sanguinoso all’interno di un gruppo comunitario [Simmel 1908, pp. 269-272].

Ma con ciò una parte significativa, a mio parere, di ciò che includiamo nell’ambito della questione del rifiuto della globalizzazione, chiede di essere analizzata non come replica a una minaccia esterna, ma come cultura politica che ha come per progetto il controllo totalitario della società politica all’interno della quale si agisce.

La questione del fondamentalismo, in altre parole, è una dimensione attraverso la quale si produce - simulata o reale - guerra civile. Anzi per esser più precisi è la forma attuale della guerra civile nel contesto ebraico: tanto all’interno di Israele che fuori di Israele - nelle diasorie ebraiche [Bidussa 1993 e 2000].

All’origine del meccanismo dei radicalismi religiosi in ambito ebraico sta una spiegazione di tipo complottardo della storia: quella per cui l’attore culturale alternativo o opposto presente all’interno della società ebraica [per il concetto di società ebraica vedi Trigano 1992], costituisce non solo il proprio avversario, ma il rappresentante di un progetto il cui fine è la distruzione stessa del gruppo e del suo patrimonio culturale.

Questo modello esplicativo può apparire non determinato perché riconducibile a tutte le forme di fondamentalismo afferenti a qualsiasi sistema di fede. In parte è così. Ma c’è un aspetto essenziale che rende specifico il caso ebraico oggi: ed è la possibilità dello sviluppo di un paradigma radical-religioso di questo tipo anche in assenza di un terreno del contendere rappresentato dalla forma Stato. E ciò perché il dato costitutivo della cittadinanza culturale-teologica nel mondo ebraico non è espressa da un sistema gerarchico, ma nasce sul terreno stesso del rapporto diretto e senza mediazione col testo.

Quel meccanismo che secondo Eisenstadt rende possibile la costruzione del modello societario dell’Yishuv palestinese prima e poi della società politica israeliana di prima generazione, ovvero ciò che denomina “anarchia politica di principio” [Eisenstadt 1954 e 1988] è anche quello stesso principio che pone in essere le forme del radicalismo religioso ebraico odierno.

In alcuni casi con delle linee di continuità con quel parametro, in altri operando delle vere e proprie cesure. Tuttavia continuità e cesure si intrecciano e non sono rigidamente separabili.

3


In questo senso il modello di cittadinanza culturale proposta dal sionismo e dalla cultura ebraico-israeliana è vicino al modello ameicano [Sollors 1986], pur con tutte le sue incertezze. Nel doppio senso: di meccanismo che tenta di fondare un modello culturale unico, e di lasciare spazi per la manifestazione
delle differenze. Ma al tempo stesso di non fuoriuscire mai dal proprio alveo, e dunque, in conclusione, di aver dato luogo a una cultura nazionale che vive di un codice storico dei “padri fondatori” e, ma anche di un costante rimescolamento delle carte prodotto dalla spinte di subculture che si muovono e si presentano come controculture. [Regev 2000]

4

Che cosa le caratterizza? Un doppio registro: teologico e politologico.

Su quello teologico le agenzie politiche del radicalismo religioso hanno seguito due ipotesi diverse:
da una parte la formazione di un ceto sapienziale fortemente ideologizzato spesso in contrasto con i ceti sapienziali stabilizzati del rabbinato. È questa l’area culturale che ruota intorno al Gush Emunim (GE), alla comunità dei coloni che ha costruito e dato vita a partire dalla metà degli anni’70 a propri centri di formazione, formato nuovi ceti sapienziali e gruppi di azione politica fortemente acculturati, e che si propongono come altra élite politica. È questa la dimensione di un movimento di neovanguardie politiche che scardina il modello classico della società per ordini (quale ce l’ha descritta e teorizzata Dumézil [1958]) e si propone come società compatta in cui le tre figure canoniche del guerriero del sacerdote e del contadino sono condensate in una sola figura fisica.

Dall’altra, invece, il mondo dei ceti urbanizzati che hanno seguito i processi canonizzati di acculturazione ebraica. In altre parole un modello di trasmissione del sapere e di costruzione dei ceti sapienziali che mantiene inalterate le gerarchie, non discute i livelli di sapere, ma che invece, forma una nuova leva di attivisti e di agenti sul territorio. È la dimensione del neopopulismo delle grandi concentrazioni urbane, un’area politica oggi in forte espansione e espressa nella forza politica maggiormente in crescita sul mercato elettorale israeliano, ovvero Shas.

5

L’esperienza politica di GE nonché i tratti salienti della sua cultura teologica sono stati più volte al centro dell’analisi dei ricercatori sociali fin dal sorgere del movimento e non vi torneremo dettagliatamente in questa sede. (Per una sintesi si rinvia a: [Guolo 1997]).

In sintesi li possiamo individuare i seguenti tratti caratteristici.
a) Il GE non si configura come un gruppo teologico chiuso né con una rigidità di genere (a lungo il ruolo di leadership organizzativa è stato occupato da una donna).
b) I leader carismatici del movimento provengono dalla stessa scuola e dalla stessa provenienza di area culturale.
c) La Yeshiva di formazione si distingue dagli altri centri di studio teologico ed esegetico perché non divide il sapere tra studio delle fonti bibliche e formazione professionale (spesso orientata verso settori dell’informatica, della comunicazione elettronica, della tecnologia avanzata o della agronomia industriale) [Don Yehiya 1984 e 1987]
d) Tutti hanno militato nello stesso movimento giovanile sionista.[Demant 1988, p. 41]
e) la maggior parte del quadro militante proviene dal mondo statunitense e dall’esperienza dei movimenti collettivi degli anni’60-’70. [Waxmann 1984-85; Feher 1992, pp., 61-62]

Il modello di GE, tuttavia, pur essendo il fenomeno più nuovo dal punto di vista organizzativo, rientra in un preciso ciclo politico, quello del rifiuto o della sostituzione del ceto politico storico dei “padri fondatori” fossero essi di area lavoro o di area conservatrice.

In un qualche modo il GE, come tutti i movimenti di carattere religioso [su cui vedi Greilsammer 1991] attivi nel mercato politico israeliano tra Yishuv e post-1948, hanno il progetto di essere il ceto politico alternativo all’establishment presente.

L’esperienza politica di Shas, invece, si sviluppa secondo un diverso impianto e anche con una strategia politica alk quanto originale.
Tutte le maggiori tradizioni religiose includono proprie giustificazioni della violenza [Ferguson 1977]. Shas nell’ambito delle agenzie politiche ebraiche a fisionomia religiosa costituisce una parziale eccezione. Non per questo, tuttavia, la sua politica risulta flessibile o negoziabile.

Possiamo considerare Shas un tipo di realtà il cui elettorato ha uno smaccato carattere etnico, comunque fortemente localizzato (l’area degli ebrei sefarditi, ovvero degli ebrei provenienti dal bacino di madrelingua araba). Il successo elettorale di Shas, tuttavia, non è un fatto automatico. Shas polarizza il voto sefardita in una congiuntura specifica e in seguito a due assi di politiche di intervento:

1) l’organizzazione di una rete societaria attenta ai servizi, ad un social-state informale e di territorio lontano o comunque sostitutivo al social-state indifferenziato secondo il modello laburista. Un social-state attento ai servizi alla famiglia, ma in particolare rivolto alla sfera dell’educazione e dell’assistenza culturale e ricreativa all’infanzia.

2) Tale organizzazione si costruisce a partire dalla crisi del social State laburista, ma non si traduce in un voto di protesta, bensì in una richiesta di ricontrattazione della propria centralità all’interno dello Stato e delle sue politiche scolastiche, educative, assistenziali, formative a partire dalla propria condizione di sottogruppo [Iannaccone 1992]. Al tempo stesso Shas si propone come la struttura di collegamento tra il bisogno della società civile e uno Stato che si auspicava sempre più impersonale e non “regolatore”. In questo senso Shas rientra nella fisionomia cultural-politica di tutti i fondamentalismi, indifferentemente dal sistema di fede di riferimento [Fields 1991, p. 185].

In altre parole: se il meccanismo di stratificazione sociale del lavoro corrisponde a delle chiavi di tipo socio-culturale, ragion per cui la divisione del lavoro e la stratificazione sociale di una data società complessa sono l’equivalente della stratificazione dei gruppi etnici e culturali che la compongono [Hetcher 1978], la azione di Shas è quella di ricontrattare questa gerarchia. Ma ciò non in nome di un astratto principio di eguaglianza, ma proprio per riformulare il principio generale del modello culturale originario. Ma per far questo occorreva riformulare il principio costituente dell’identità nazionale. Dentro il modello culturale ebraico-israeliano significativamente il mondo ashkenazita (ovvero quello di provenienza centro est-europeo) non si è mai definito come comunità. E ciò per un motivo semplice: perché ha definito se stesso come gruppo fondatore. Il modello integrativo nello Stato, in altre parole passava attraverso l’adesione al sistema simbolico e valoriale dei padri fondatori e dunque era il sistema ashkenazita a prevalere. Il concetto di comunità o Edot (quello che nel linguaggio europeo d’Ancien régime si chiama “la nazione”) si applica, invece, agli altri gruppi di immigrazione ebraica (per cui si parla di Edot sefardite e, al loro interno di Edah irakena, yemenita, libica, turca, magrebin, ecc.). Ma questo fatto che ha dato luogo per molto tempo a una protesta di tipo etnico, è stato percepito come una procedura separatista, particolarista. Perché divenisse o acquistasse un carattere nazionale era necessario che il principio stesso dell’identità nazionale subisse una metamorfosi e dunque fosse rilanciato un tratto distintivo della nazione israeliana. Questo tratto non consisteva più nell’ideale pionieristico, ma nella rivalutazione di un tratto che era in rotta di collisione con il modello culturale dei padri fondatori, capace di discuterne la legittimità, senza creare una spaccatura di tipo etnico. Anzi trovando un codice che al tempo stesso fosse distintivo del gruppo etnico e non negoziabile. La valorizzazione del dato religioso, in questo caso pur avvenendo con sistemi di acculturazione di tipo tradizionale, acquista caratteri propri di radicalismo politico, perché il codice teologico non è fondativo dell’agire politico, ma costituisce la rete valoriale della cittadinanza e dunque sancisce l’inclusione o l’espulsione dal gruppo [Peled 1998, p. 720].

In altri termini il processo di azione rappresentato dalla attività di Shas, nonché dal tipo di consenso ottenuto, corrisponde al diagramma del ciclo della mobilitazione sociale descritto e teorizzato da Gino Germani: dapprima integrazione, poi disintegrazione e, infine, reintegrazione [Germani 1975 pp. 28-29]. Questo processo, tuttavia, presenta dinamiche specifiche. Da un parte esso avviene attraverso fenomeni di contromobilizzazione. Ovvero, secondo le categorie introdotte da Germani [ivi, 38], come momento in cui il processo di disintegrazione non è solo la rottura- la critica - del modello culturale di cittadinanza valevole in precedenza, ma anche la proposizione di un nuovo modello di cittadinanza culturale che...
chiede non di essere integrato col precedente, bensì di sostituirlo. Per conseguire questo risultato, Shas propone un processo di costante mobilitazione, ovvero secondo un modello proprio dei populismi latino-americani, attraverso un regime di mobilitazione. Questo aspetto, peraltro, proprio perché fondato su un elemento normativo comportamentale e non su un dichiarato programma politico (ovvero senza che si produca un’idea di Stato), ha il vantaggio di non contemplare l’istanza della smobilitazione. L’intervento nell’ambito della politica si qualifica, in altri termini, come mobilitazione per la protezione sociale a fronte di una politica generalista vissuta come lesiva di una cultura ebraica proposta e articolata come “cultura di genere”.


7

Le comunità di fede spesso preservano le loro credenze religiose in narrazioni contraddittorie collegate sul piano astratto dalla struttura delle storie stesse [Kurtz 1979]. Il mondo viene creato due volte in ogni cultura: la prima volta, sul piano materiale, il mondo si concretizza. In seguito viene ricreato attraverso le storie sacre o la mitologia.

E’ il problema del rinnovamento del covenant nella società ebraica tra XX e XXI secolo. Ad esso si può giungere per vare vie. Per esempio attraverso una riscrittura del mito politico di partenza, ed è il percorso culturale proposto dalla nuova storiografia israeliana [Bidussa 1999]. Oppure attraverso la riaffermazione del dato religioso.

Ma questo secondo percorso non è mai stato estraneo nel mondo ebraico ed è stato attivo fin dall’inizio nella società ebraica, prima nell’Yishuv e poi nello Stato di Israele [Don Yehiya-Liebman 1983]. Ciò che oggi si manifesta non è la ricomparsa dell’attore religioso nello scenario, ma la domanda non più di essere parte del codice, ma di scrivere l’intero reticolo culturale. La strategia di Shas è certamente quella più funzionale a questo fine.

Non è solo la crisi del processo di secolarizzazione, come pure correttamente è stato sottolineato [Casanova 1994], ma anche la candidatura del dizionario teologico a definire i confini tra pubblico e provato, fra società civile e Stato, tra cittadinanza/appartenenza e estraneità. In breve tra dentro e fuori. Più isticamente tra Bene e Male.

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OMC: règles multilatérales stables et non-discriminatoires?
Perspectives pour la libéralisation du secteur agricole

Is a More Globalized Church Bound To Be Less Universal?  
The 20th Century Internationalization of the Roman Curia.

During the 20th century Italian members of the Roman Curia, understood as the complex of departments and bodies that assist the Roman pontiff in the exercise of his supreme pastoral duty on behalf of the good and service of the universal and particular churches\(^1\), have been dwindling away, in spite of their traditional preponderance up to the half of the century. Whether, at the beginning, internationalisation of the Curia concerned the Europeans, since Paul VI’s tenure American, Asian and African presence has increased remarkably.

Beyond any doubt, the Second Vatican Council gave momentum to a process that had just begun since some time. Nationalist hatreds, which brought about both the First and the Second World War, determined the Holy See to underscore catholic universalism and brotherhood among peoples much more. Pondering on these issues had been just lead off since Benedict XV. In the missionary activity-concerned encyclic \textit{Maximum illud} of November 30th, 1919 the pontiff blamed priests not able to go beyond their national belongings (“he is a messenger of Christ, not of his fatherland\(^2\)) and that cherished their counties interests. Benedict XV condemned radically even Certain missions magazines, which are widespread recently, where striving to enlarge the Kingdom of God seems less urgent than the wish to expand their own country influence\(^3\).

“False nationalism” had to be excluded from the diffusion of Catholicism because it was entailing setbacks and disagreements only. The comment to the encyclic in “La Civiltà Cattolica” said:

\begin{quote}
History teaches us how ruinous this national attitude has ever been, sometimes passing on the clergy and religious orders themselves to sow the evil seeds of sharp rivalries, competitions and disagreements\(^4\).
\end{quote}

The concern of the pope, who at the same time had been urging the foundation of a native clergy, not lower-rated but equal to the European one, was crystal-clear. Nobody was to think that Christian religion is solely a certain nation religion, by joining it somebody is going to submit himself to a foreign country, so forgoing his nationality\(^5\).

Pious XI also, standing the Twenties and the Thirties aggressive nationalisms, did underscored the power of the Catholic Church universality and its essential unrelation with nationalism.

Men who address the Divine Majesty in their prayers – Pious XI wrote in 1932 – can not foster nationalistic imperialism that worships each people as its own God\(^6\).

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Pastor bonum} apostolic constitution (June 28\textsuperscript{th}, 1988), Normae generales, art. I, in \textit{Enchiridion Vaticanum}, 11, EDB, Bologna 1991, p. 527.

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Maximum illud}, in \textit{Enchiridion della Chiesa missionaria}, I, Chiesa cattollca romana e attività missionaria, EDB, Bologna 1997, p. 163.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{ibidem}, p. 161.


\textsuperscript{5} \textit{Maximum illud}, p. 161.

\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Caritate Christi compulsi}, May 3\textsuperscript{rd} 1932, no. 11.
\end{flushleft}
Already in his first encyclic *Ubi arcano* (December 23rd, 1922), pope Ratti had condemned overweening nationalism (*immoderatum nationis amorem*), that “forgets all the peoples to be brothers in the great human family, that even other nations are entitled to live and to flourish”\(^7\).

Thereupon, on one hand, Pious XI averred vehemently his reprobation about Communism by the *Divini Redemptoris*, on the other he condemned Nazism, which worshipped race “with idolatrous veneration” (*Mit brennender Sorge*), as in 1926 he had done about *Action Francaise*, which wanted to submit religion to nationalism\(^8\).

Yet the condemnation of nationalism and ever-present call to the Catholic Church universality did not entail a greater international presence in the Roman Curia, rather a stauncher missionary expansion. In this perspective, he himself wanted to consecrate the first six Chinese bishops at Rome in 1926. It was a very meaningful action: founding a native, not missionary, church in a great Asian country stressed universality of the Catholic Church and its striving to be “less European”\(^9\).

Nevertheless Pious XI did not want to forswear the centuries-old tradition of Italian preponderance in the Curia and Sacred College. When he died, Italian cardinals were 35 out of a total amount of 62 (56.4%). Since 1523, namely the death of Adrian VI, there has been a foreign pope no more. During the 19th century, apart from Gregory XVI, all popes were born in Papal States and the Curia personnel also came from there. After the end of temporal power, the split between Italian State and the Catholic Church caused the Italians in the Curia to be not well disposed to patriotic calls, undoubtedly, however, less concerned about their country interests.

The clergy and bishops of other countries constituted a different case. The higher and lower clergy submission to the will of the civil power was absolutely not rare and it was fostered by ancient state privileges as regards appointments of bishops and, sometimes, parsons themselves. Even when patriotism did not overcome universal tension, intervention with a view to forcing refractors to line up was permitted by means of ecclesiastical policy. It is a well-known episode the veto the Krakow archbishop was forced to oppose to the election of Mariano Rampolla del Tindaro in the 1904 conclave, at the behest of Austrian emperor who asserted the former Secretary of State of Leo XIII was too much pro-French. It should be paid attention to the missionary policy of France and other countries, so tightly intertwined with national interest. In short, an Italian or Roman personnel for the Curia was likely to warrant better the necessary Holy See neutrality and fair-mindedness among the different countries. The young diplomat Harold Tittmann reported this widespread opinion of the Roman spheres to the Secretary of State Byrnes at the half of 1945:

> Administration on the part of officials of the same nationality, each other familiar with their way of working, should likely be more efficient than that is rendered by an international organisation where psychological barriers of nationality are to be overcome, especially when the activity is sensible and complex as often as ecclesiastical matters are. If this is true – the argument goes on – the Italians will be the best equipped among western civilised countries’ citizens to rule over the Church with fair-mindedness, because of their long-lasting non-nationalistic tradition (at the Vatican, Fascist Era is appraised as an ephemeral event in the history of a people that can not structurally “think in terms of nation”)\(^10\).

In fact, at the end of the Second World War mostly the Italians made the head of the Catholic Church. 26 cardinals out of 39 (66.6%) were born in Italy, at the Secretariat of State and the Sacred Congregations there was a broad Italian majority. The need of a stronger international opening of the Curia was felt by some of the officers nearer to the pope, like Monsignor Montini\(^11\), and by Pious XII

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\(^7\) *Ubi arcano*, no. 12.


himself who came to believe it was the right time to act. Universality of the Catholic Church should be perceived also through a greater internationalisation of the Curia and, in particular, of Cardinal College. Already in December 1945, announcing the incoming consistory, Pious XII stressed new cardinals would be chosen in order to represent “the greatest possible amount of peoples and races”, with a view to offering “a lively image of the universality of the Church\textsuperscript{12}”. Rome was so appearing as the see of a truly universal religion, effectively \textit{Caput mundi}.

The speech of Pious XII was aimed to demonstrate the supranational essence of the Catholic Church. In as much it was mother of all the nations and peoples, the Church should not belong solely to a people and, at the same time, it should not be stranger in whatever place. “Hence the Church is supranational because it is a indivisible and universal whole\textsuperscript{13}”. The consequence of this logic was that demanding a “Church, which is almost captive and subject to one or another people, confined in the narrow bounds of nation” constituted a “sacrilegious attempt\textsuperscript{14}”. This was especially dangerous in a historical time of expansion of the catholic religion well beyond Europe.

In 1946 and 1953 consistories, Pious XII consecrated 56 cardinals, with 15 Italians only (25\%) out of them, just in order to “express manifestly the Church supranationality\textsuperscript{15}”. The main part of new cardinals had European origin (36, or 64.3\%); only six cardinals did not belong to the Old Continent\textsuperscript{16}, among them the first African one.

Under Pious XII the Italians not only lost absolute majority in Sacred College\textsuperscript{17}, but they also began to wane in the Curia structures. On the other hand, this was the logic consequence of the internationalisation of the Church, as Pious XII said.

Several regions of other continents have overcome missionary-form period of their ecclesiastical organisation since much time; they are ruled by theirs own hierarchy and offer the whole Church the spiritual and material blessings they merely received earlier\textsuperscript{18}.

Of course, it consisted in a very relative waning: preponderance went on firmly to be Italian, moreover internationalisation passed through a setback around the half of the Fifties\textsuperscript{19}. In fact, according to a study by the Jesuit Fiorello Cavalli, still in 1961 Italian overall presence in the Roman Curia amounted to 56.7\%, moreover with peaks of 77.8\% in the Secretariat of State, 74.2\% in the Sacred Congregation for Bishops, 70.9 in the one for the clergy and even 92.2\% in the Council for Church Public Affairs. Italian presence went on remarkably high at the head of departments and offices (11 out of 15\textsuperscript{20}). Parity between the Italians and the foreigners (108 to 105) was almost achieved in the Sacred Congregation for the Religions only thanks to the insertion of Opus Dei members and to religious orders internationalisation promoted by Pious XII\textsuperscript{21}. Internationalisation was at European personnel profit, that amounted to 32.2\% (the Italians excluded). Taking into consideration data on directional and executive functions instead of deliberative and consultative ones, the importance of the Italians looks

\textsuperscript{12} Pious XII \textit{Allocuzione natalizia}, December 24\textsuperscript{th} 1945, no. 8.
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibidem}, no. 9.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibidem}, no. 12.
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibidem}, no. 21.
\textsuperscript{17} Already after the February 18\textsuperscript{th}, 1946 concistory Italian cardinals were 28 (40\%) out of a total amount of 70.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibidem}, no. 17.
\textsuperscript{19} See A. RICCARDI \textit{Il potere del papa}, p. 48.
\textsuperscript{20} Data are taken from F. CAVALLI \textit{Sviluppo nell' internazionalizzazione della Curia romana}, in “La Civiltà Cattolica”, 1970, II, p. 558.
grater: they amounted to 79.4%, the Europeans to 16.1% and non-Europeans (almost all of them from the Unites States) to 4.5%22.

Under John XXIII traditional Italian prevalence in cardinal appointments was recovered. Out of 52 cardinals, 22 (42.3%) were Italian, while the Europeans and the non-Europeans were equal (15). Nevertheless it did not entail a return to the past but merely clinching situations Pious XII had let to stand over, as the appointment of bishops to traditionally cardinal sees like Milan. Besides, the main part of the Italians was appointed in the first concistory on December 15th, 1958 while in the following five ones almost 70% of the cardinal's hats were bestowed to the non-Italians.

Nevertheless it was the Council, as in other aspects of the Catholic Church, that gave ultimate momentum to the internationalisation of the curia and Sacred College. In two Council-issued decrees, Christus Dominus (October 28th, 1965) on “Pastoral duty of bishops23” and Ad gentes (December 7th, 1965) on “Missionary activity of the Church24”, it was asserted that composition of Vatican departments, in particular Propaganda Fide, ought to express better the universality of the Church through the presence of bishops and clergymen coming from its different regions.

Fending for the Curia reform by Pro comperto sane motu proprio (August 6th, 1967) and Regimini Ecclesiae universae apostolic constitution (August 15th, 1967)25, Paul VI looked through these needs also. As Assistant Secretary of State of Pious XII from 1939 to 1954, Montini had enjoyed a deep knowledge of the Roman Curia. Already in 1945 he upheld the need of universalisation on the part of the Curia cadres26 with Jacques Maritain, French ambassador to the Holy See. Thence he was the most suitable to reform the Church to the root by the insertion of world-wide-coming personnel. This concept was pointed out in the Regimini Ecclesiae universae constitution preamble along with other rationales of the reform, which did not remain dead letter. In 1970 the amount of the Italians in the Roman Curia diminished down to 37.8% from 56.7% in 196127. Therefore Italian-foreign ratio reversed in a decade, even considering the simultaneous increase of the Curia members from 1.322 to 2.260. Italian presence had dwindled proportionately in all departments, except from the Secretariat of State (with an increase from 77.8% to 79.8%) and the Sacred Congregation for Sacraments Regulation (from 54.6% to 57.7%). However, whether non-European component amounted to 21.1%, the Curia kept prevalent Eurocentrism on. The Americans and the Canadians were still enjoying prevalence among the non-Europeans, but remarkable groups of the Latin Americans, the Asians and even the Africans were arising. The appointment of Jean Villot, a Frenchman, at the head of the Secretariat of State in 1969 was especially meaningful. With no connection to the Curia and diplomacy (he was archbishop of Lion), Villot was asked to take over an office that had been traditionally bestowed to the Italians, with the exception of Raffaele Merry del Val in the early 20th century, who, however, attended studies and had his career at Rome, though he was of Spanish origin.

Internationalisation went on also in the Sacred College. Out of 144 cardinals consecrated by pope Montini, only 38 (26.3%) were Italian. Thereupon the Italians dwindled on the whole to less than one-third where they amounted even to 61% at the beginning of the century.

If internationalisation – Father Cavalli wrote in conclusion of his inquiry in 1970 – keeps on momentum during the incoming years, it will bring out a solution that was absolutely unexpected a decade ago28.

22 Ibidem, p. 559
23 Christus Dominus, no. 10.
24 Ad gentes, no. 29.
27 F. CAVALI Sviluppo nell'internazionalizzazione nella Curia romana, p. 558.
28 Ibidem, p. 564.
Actually, at the death of Paul VI in 1978 only nine Italians chaired a department of the Holy See against 15 non-Italian ones. The formers held on supremacy just in tribunals (Sacred Roman Rota and Apostolic Signatura) and diplomacy. Italian nuncios, under nuncios and apostolic representatives were still 72.9% of the whole²⁹.

Paul VI stout international opening sapped the power of some ecclesiastical groups in favour of papal initiative but it caused negative consequences too.

Paul VI – Andrea Riccardi noted – attained a purification of Vatican quarters from hidden and open connections, but he was binding machinery that had carried out selection, training and cohesion. Romanity and Italianness had established a common language, a general ecclesiastical culture and a working psychology. Legal education had carried out an important homogenising role³⁰.

New Vatican bureaucracy, which was made up of personnel of different origin, lacked a joining ground, though the common religious inspiration. It had been changing into an international organisation bureaucracy in some way, with the danger of overestimating geographic origin rather than specific responsibilities.

Not as the Roman Curia was opening to international relations - Riccardi noted also – as a new international administration was arising, at least is some of the Vatican sides³¹.

Internationalisation of Sacred College and the Roman Curia has gone on faster under John Paul II who has appointed 159 cardinals (and two ones in pectore as well), out of them only 37 were Italian. It ought to be considered that since 1970, as provided by Ingravescentem aetatem decree, over-eighty cardinals have not more been able to take part in the election of the pontiff. This has eroded more remarkably Italian influence in the electoral body of Sacred College: nowadays only 17 (16.2%) Cardinals Elector are Italian out of 100³². It ought to be noted also that Europe on the whole retains no more the absolute majority of Cardinals Elector: they have dwindled to 43 (17 Italians included). The Latin Americans are 18, the North American are 12 like the Africans, the Asians are 9 and 4 cardinals come from Oceania. Even the internationalisation of the Curia has gone on relentlessly. At the head of departments and core councils (Secretariat of State, nine Sacred Congregations and 11 Pontifical Councils) the Italians are only four today. They still keep absolute majority merely among apostolic nuncios³³.

It is worth making some final remarks on the process that caused Italian component not to be prevalent any more in the core bodies of the Catholic Church during the 20th century, so upsetting a centuries-old tradition. It is not necessary dwelling on the point that this process was not punitive-aimed against the Italians, otherwise it was brought about by the attempt to manifest universality of the Catholic Church also through a variegated presence of different nationalities in decision-making bodies. Internationalisation has undoubtedly worn down the assertion that the Roman Curia is a barrier between the pope and local churches. From this standpoint, on the contrary, nowadays the Curia works as a very useful tie in the heart-periphery relations of Catholicism³⁴.

On the other hand, the Catholic Church is not a federation of local churches that needs a proportional representation of all members in decision-making bodies. The Holy See is not an international organisation like the U.N.O. and its specialised agencies. It is not possible a comparison even to the World Council of Churches (C.O.E.) or the Conference of European Churches (K.E.K.) that gather Protestant, Anglican and Orthodox delegates. Even scrapping objections that consider as decisive the


³⁰ A. RICCARDI Il potere del papa, p. 290.


³² Over-eighty Italians are 20 out of a total amount of 47 (42.5%), “heritage of a outgone preminence”. G. CARDINALE La nuova Curia: meno italiana, meno universale in “LIMES”, 2000, no.1 P. 196.

³³ The chart is reported by G. CARDINALE La nuova Curia: meno italiana, meno universale, p. 197.

³⁴ See J.B. D’ONOFRIO Paul VI et le gouvernement centrale de l’Église, pp. 644-645.
influence of a twice-millenary tradition and the Providence’s design to have the see of Peter’s successor at Rome, doubts and uncertainties have been expressed by many observers about the proficiency of a personnel coming from different origins. Criticism increased when sometimes the need to represent a certain geographic area overruled candidate’s intrinsic qualities\textsuperscript{35}. Above all there is the risk of arising competition among national groups in the curia offices or departments. The Roman Curia – it was noted – is a means in service of the pontiff for the Church government, it should not be compelled to represent all “peoples and races” that accept the Catholic confession.

Roman Curia internationalisation seems to have been an ineluctable need, also because of the world expansion of Catholicism during the 20\textsuperscript{th} century; maybe time has come to reappraise this process to avoid that present “globalised” Church be less “universal” than the past centuries, when Italian element was overbearing in the Roman Curia and Sacred College.

Andrea Ciampani

University of Padova, Italy

Social Actors in History of International Relations: European Trade Unions from Internationalism to Global Society.

1. The decisive emergence of the process of profound socio-economic and political change, accompanied by the recognition of the interdependency between the increasingly complex and diversified society in the information and globalisation age, suggests to re-examine with renewed intensity the events of recent centuries, and enrich the tools and interpretative categories utilised.

In all likelihood, there must have been a situation not unlike the present one in the European scientific community during the decade following World War II insofar as the relationship between the evolution of certain socio-economic (and political) processes and the development of new sensibilities in the field of the history of international relations. In his sixth volume on the history of international relations in 1955, Pierre Renouvin underscored that studies on economic relations between states had just begun.\footnote{P. Renouvin, \textit{Histoire des relations internationales, Tome VI, Le XIX Siècle, De 1871 à 1914, L'Apogée de l'Europe}, Paris 1955.} Today, we might say that the subject of that study — the period of significant international capital movements and the period in which the United States and Japan challenged Europe’s centrality — contributed to the emergence of the importance of international dynamics in the history of international relations. But are we not perhaps precisely in this in debt to the pioneering work, research and studies which have now found resonance?

At the time, Renouvin pointed out that the profound changes in technology, economic life and social structures had to be understood in connection with development of political thinking (in its internal dynamics and in its creativity, capable of giving birth to institutions). Along with the history of collective psychology, of the image that each people had of the other, of the relationship between the masses and political ideas (nationalism, modernization, etc.), going beyond traditional diplomatic action, there was a study of the “relations économiques extérieures” of European governments, which were followed by yet other studies on the dynamics and economic actors.

In observing how, at the end of the nineteenth century, the “négociation des traités de commerce prend donc une place importante dans l'action diplomatique”\footnote{See for Italy E. Del Vecchio, \textit{La via italiana al protezionismo: le relazioni economiche internazionali dell'Italia, 1878-1888}, voll. I-V, Roma 1979-1980.} and has a direct effect on political relations, the French scholar emphasized that: “C'est donc là, dans les rapports entre les États, un facteur nouveau.”\footnote{Renouvin, \textit{Histoire des relations internationales} op. cit., p. 12.} It is difficult to escape the impression that the study “des relations économiques entre les grands États”, at that time “à peine commencée”, was able to discover that new factor without drawing from the special sensibilities of men who had become familiar with the clash between political models intrinsically linked to the option of opposed economic systems, to the clash between market economy and planned economy. To be for or against the capitalist system (albeit with a mixed economy) and the democratic regime of Western countries meant being for or against the Marshall Plan, for or against the European Common Market.

Of course, scholars had to face the dangers and difficulties of correctly identifying the sources and the temptation to go beyond the facts. Risks and suggestibility, however, did arise—and not only for historians—from the perception of their own contemporary political and economic vicissitudes. During the second half of the 1950s, during a cycle of conferences on economic policy in Buenos Aires, a famous exponent of the “Austrian school” recalled in his argument in favour of economic freedom against
Marxist tradition that “the greatest event in world history in the nineteenth century” which eliminated the position of advantage of the British was “the development [...] of foreign investments.” 39

At a distance just shy of fifty years, that period, which saw the emergence of new interpretations of the past, is itself a subject of history. At the same time, it does yield new historiographic traditions; thus, even in books which, in the historiography of international relations, focus on the politics of power and Italy, we find a chapter on *L'Italia e la nuova economia internazionale.* 40

It is therefore possible that the warnings of an historian about certain new dynamics are only appreciated later, when an incipient process, through subsequent events, finally makes the audience receptive to such approaches. Something of the sort happened in the history of social dynamics, which did not have in the history of international relations the kind of attention that was devoted to economic dynamics. Indeed, Renouvin himself at the time lamented such lack of studies «pour étudier enfin les rapports possible entre l’appartenance à un groupe social et le comportement à l’égard des questions de politique extérieure.» 41

Since then, one of the difficulties in examining such aspects consisted in the uncertainty surrounding the disciplinary subdivision of historical research: next to the discussion on the contents of social history, labour history, and the working class movement (at times the handmaiden of the history of socialist and communist political movements), we have witnessed over the past fifty years the predominance of historical-political research over studies of social organizations. More recently, with a loosening of the weave of exhaustive interpretations of reality in terms of politics, social dynamics have emerged next to the economic ones. But far from generating research in contrast with the necessary political syntheses, these studies can help prefigure a more detailed and complex framework of the historical process, contributing to its understanding.

Some scholars, therefore, have begun to work along the lines cited in the quote by Renouvin, adopting new approaches to the history of social classes, public opinion and collective actors. In the nineteenth century, research on the bourgeoisie as a social class, especially in Italy, had already generated some novel insights; and we can expect other new insights from recent trends in studying the aristocracy beginning from the post-war period, which had been neglected. In the twentieth century, however, we are faced with completely different scenarios. Historiography has begun to analyse the development not just of the new political and economic institutions (and how rich in ideas is the business history!), which tend to take on an autonomous role in international relations; it has begun to focus on the emergence of true collective actors, of social subjects such as trade unions.

Examined in a number of pioneering studies, the prospect of research on unions as a social force emerges as a “question” that is still largely unexplored. Traditional interpretations of history of unions, weakened by the “failing” of its communist approach, brings us back to an historical analysis of the associative nature of trade unions.

The break-up of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the predominance of free and democratic unionism in the union movement, organized by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), call for a rethinking of the strength of the social nature of the union movement.

We thus give a forceful nod to the “trade union hypothesis” in the history of the union movement — not as a history of the union itself (or history produced by militant unionists), but insofar as it takes into account the peculiar social nature and dynamics of the union movement in contemporary history. 42 And we reach the point of overturning the image of the union divide as an effect of the Cold War (still


common in political thinking) by proposing that various union cultures as part of the process of creating the Cold War itself.43

This acknowledgement of the social dynamics specific to the trade union movement is also favoured in the current awareness of the important role of non-political actors in national and international dynamics. We cannot ignore the important World Bank study, published in 1995, on the role of trade unions in world development. While it emphasized that «Free Trade Unions are a cornerstone of any effective system of industrial relations that seeks to balance the need for enterprises to remain competitive with the aspirations of workers for higher wages and better working conditions», it also noted that such free trade unions «have a non-economic role as well – same unions have contributed significantly to their countries’ political and social development.» 44

On the other hand, we cannot ignore the position taken by the ETUC in regards to the Maastricht Treaty of 7 February 1992, when this European union confederation contributed through a joint initiative with representatives of private and public entrepreneurs (resulting in the accords of 31 October 1991) to the formulation of the articles included in the Social Protocol —from which Britain opted out.45 Thereafter, the ETUC made an effort to publicly seek a number of amendments to what would become the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, in order to obtain recognition of the social parties as autonomous actors within a European social space. How far we have come in the “brief” timeframe of half a century since the allied powers accords of Potsdam, which, in July 1945, dictated the terms for the reform of the trade unions in the defeated Germany!

Moreover, the problem of attributing a special research sphere to the history of the trade union movement (studied in connection with the history of politics or economics rather than as social history)46 did not prevent German scholars from emphasizing the importance of social forces after World War II. Knowing the position of the Western German trade unions DGB on the Marshall Plan and the ECSC, we can understand the appreciation of the role of the social actors that recently led one historian to declare that in democratic nations and in the world market of the post-World War II period “inter-social relations preceded in time intergovernmental relations and shaped them”.47 In addition, it was noted that, in the particular process of recovery of sovereignty by the Federal Republic of Germany, when the lack of leadership resulted in concrete problems regarding employment policies and foreign policy, the “associations of interest” were the very ones often called upon to fill the void.48

Conversely, again in September 1991, a review of Italian historiography on European integration studies, under the heading of “economic aspects” could only point to a few worthwhile studies on a number of aspects of the Marshall Plan, some industrial circles, and emigration; «other relevant ‘actors’, in both political and economic fields, from the parties, to the Confindustria, to the union, have aroused only scant attention, while, on the contrary, the careful analysis, of their activities could shed new light

45 We echo here some of the considerations expressed in L'integrazione europea e la questione della rappresentanza sociale presented at the international conference Gli organi consultivi delle Comunità Europee, held in Florence on 29-30 October 1999.
48 W. Abelshauser, Dall'economia di guerra al miracolo economico, in La nascita di due repubbliche, op cit., p. 207.
on Italy’s involvement in the European integration process. Recently, however, after a few historical conferences sponsored by the Fondazione Pastore of Rome in 1990 and in 1994, the first in-depth scientific studies on the social forces in European dynamics were also undertaken in Italy. The thrust of these studies, introduced by historiography in the context of the broader process of European integration, no longer seems limited to adding new research paths to the traditional ones.

Rather, on the wave of extraordinary events, historians’ thinking seems to have also pressed on to reiterate the history of international trade unionism to seek paths capable of evidencing new interpretations of the history of international relations. If our time helps us recognize a new process, it is the task of historians to follow its slow unfolding.

2. In effect, the vaunted trade union subjectivity is mirrored, thanks among other things to its international dynamics, in the “young” history of post-war trade unionism, in which, beginning in 1950, we can see, in a general break with the past, the progress of democratic unionism toward greater emancipation from political parties and the thrust towards participation in a non-corporative socio-economic context.

To be sure, the trade union movement has changed in time and space since its inception in connection with the first industrial revolution, developing in various countries and political contexts, in market and planned economies, as well as in mixed economies. It has demonstrated a dynamism able to adapt to changes in the evolution of capitalism itself and in the representation of interests tied to it. By constituting itself as a permanent association, with its own means, such as contractual power to modify significant aspects of employment and the power to balance the social power of entrepreneurs, the trade union movement began to expand its sphere of action, coming into contact with civil and political institutions. In the various settings and countries, within different political regimes, the trade union movement grew in a cultural pluralism and organisational diversity.

During the period in which revolutionary bourgeois political ideals took hold, the ruling classes relegated union action to illegality before becoming somewhat tolerant. The *Le Chapelier* law of 1791 during the French Revolution prohibited the formation of professional associations because the state could only represent the individual interest of each person and the general interest of all. The British *Combinations Acts* at end of eighteenth century considered “illegal all professional organizations whose purpose was restraint of trade and thus prohibited all coalitions seeking wage increases, wage reductions or changes in working hours, and limitations on employers in their choice of employees, etc.”

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53 M. Romani, *Appunti sull’evoluzione del sindacato*, Roma 1981. We refer the reader to this classic, written in the early 1950s, both for its breadth of historical interpretation of international trade unionism and for the example it provides of the historical analysis that was possible in those years.
The time in which legal tolerance (marked in England by the abolition of restrictive laws in 1824 and 1825) and the implicit recognition of the social role of trade unions took place varied according to the level of industrialization and democratisation in the different countries. In these contexts we can see the efforts of the trade unions to have a greater attention in political dynamics and secure greater independence from the parties which, in the case of continental Europe, were born in the shadow of socialist aggregations; at the beginning of the new century the final constitution of the British Labour Party occurred at the same time as the proclamation in the Amiens Charter by French trade unionism.

It is not surprising, therefore, that we witnessed in those years an attempt on the part of the trade union movement at coordination between unions at the international level. Along with dissent in the workers’ movement (as in the case of Marx with regard to the reform objectives of the unions), at the time of the International Workers Association in London in 1864, there were also difficulties engendered by insurgent political and economic nationalism. In 1889, the same year the Second International was formed, the first international professional coordination between sectorial trade unions in some European countries was constituted, with the founding of an international federation of boot and shoe workers. In the years that followed, other international trade secretariats were formed: miners and metalworkers, typographers, and workers in the apparel and textile industries. But just in the brief period between 1901 and 1903, in the congresses in Copenhagen, Stuttgart and Dublin, there was an effort to found an International Trade Union Secretariat (ITUS) which, after the American AFL signed up in 1910, the year before the Great War could claim to be an International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU). The weakness, however, of such attempts was evidenced by the events that led to war: “the primacy of national trajectories in the emergence and evolvement of labour movements implies that international organisations in the labour movements played a secondary role.”

The different experiences of the two post-war periods were, as in other different aspects of economic, social and political history, significant transition periods for international trade unionism. After those periods, the dynamics of social actors can be identified and examined in a distinct manner even as regards the history of international relations. However, comparing the two post-war periods, we see a great overall dissimilarity in the action and in the awareness itself of the international presence of unions. The search for precise dates therefore seems to be a necessary premise for understanding the slowness of processes over a long period of time, the sudden acceleration, and the lag produced by events and human initiatives.

Certainly, the first phase, employed in launching the internationalisation of the trade union movement, ended in 1919. After that date, a new dynamism characterizes unions on the international scene. Not just because the IFTU was being reconstituted in Amsterdam, since 1921 in organisational competition with the Red International of Labour Unions (dissolved in 1943) and the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (today WCL). Rather, because, beginning at that time, we saw a generalized spread in industrialized countries of the centrality of the relationship between the trade union movement and the state in the period between the two world wars in the search for a collective “order,” following different paths, depending on geographical areas and development of economic systems.

The states, which had different goals and objectives depending on the orientation of their governments, considered unions a significant factor in dealing with the economic crisis and in controlling political instability. In the Soviet Union, the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production and the creation of factory councils wound up changing the nature of the workers’ union: while until 1929 it was part of the management triad, together with the party and the government, in every productive sector, the union was thereafter stripped of all independent decision-making power and action, and assigned the task of ensuring compliance with the organization of production in the planned system as a whole.


55 For the observations that follow, we refer the reader again to Romani, Appunti cit., passim.
In continental Europe, traditional doctrinal development was accompanied, after the great unionisation of workers in the post-war period, by new experiences and developments. Some of them presaged the union as an “institution” with rights juridically recognized by the state, to be realized in a corporative framework in which the union lost its nature as a “movement” and the liberties associated with it; others took up again the aim of substituting the state order with union order. Christian trade unionism developed on the belief that during the revolutionary events of the inter-war period it was possible to integrate the union in economic and political life.

All this gave the union new responsibilities, especially and above all, in countries with an Anglo-Saxon democratic system. The split in the United States between the CIO and the AFL was evidence of the divergences in the union leadership as to the role of unions in the new economic and political phase of the New Deal in connection with the National Labor Relations Act, which in 1935 put the unions, then growing organizationally, in a position of assuming greater responsibilities in relation to public authorities in the interest of the national community.

In Great Britain, the centrality that the Labour Party assumed in the political system led the trade unions to a re-examination of the different duties and actions of the political and the union spheres which eventually led them to recast their demands so as not to be restricted to sectorial interests. This re-examination probably evolved too slowly in light of the electoral verdict that gave the Labour government the great burden of responsibility of a great power such as Britain as it emerged victorious from the war.

The recognition of the national trade unions by governments, though subordinated to the primacy of the policy action of governments, involved them in international dynamics in ways that were wholly dissimilar to those of the past, as shown by the tripartite system of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and by the development of an increasingly intense season of “trade union diplomacy” as initiatives of national governments to guide international policymaking by using bodies of the trade union movement and labour dynamics as its means of action, thus shaping national foreign policy in a more effective manner.

These dynamics have been observed by historians, sometimes from different disciplines, generally without reaching the point of considering trade union action as an expression of social subjectivity sui generis—subjectivity which, at any rate, was struggling to emerge in the awareness of the unions themselves.

But when scholars looked more closely at the history of the Fifties, broadening the panorama of subjects and relations to be studied, they found themselves faced with interventions of the trade union movement that were alien to the “labour attaché” concept. The perception of the active role of the North American union in relation to the international action of the U.S. government - which at times reached the point, with evident strain, of attributing a sort of “foreign policy” to the union itself - allowed to emerge the new subjectivity of the trade union movement on the international scene.

This novelty begins to manifest itself in an evident manner beginning in 1949, at times being confused with or still overlapping “trade union diplomacy”. Here too, the failure of unity of the international union movement in the WFTU, which emerged in 1945 in the context of anti-fascist alliances, and the birth of the ICFTU in 1949, were not just a new feature of international unionism, that is, a different way for national unions to aggregate vis-à-vis the East-West world confrontation. They were undoubtedly that, too. But the phase that began in the early 1950s saw democratic trade unionism develop at the international level along a new solidarity path that continues to the present.

It seems to pose the question - solicited by the recognition of the pluralism within trade unionism and the participation in advisory committees of new bodies and institutes (international and supranational) - as to the possibility of realizing an international representation that would not be limited to brokering a compromise between the proposals of the individual national confederations. At the foundation of this process is the development of international relations of the individual union confederations, which form

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a relationship with the complex network of the international community along paths that are increasingly independent of the mediation of national governments.

Of significance in this context is what was occurring concerning the freedom of association of trade unions. It has been pointed out, mostly by legal scholars and sociologists, that the status of union associations on a global scale could have improved, among other things, through legislative action to ratify the two international conventions approved by the ILO conference in San Francisco on 17 June 1948 (No. 87, on union freedom and the protection of the right of trade unionism) and in Geneva on 8 June 1949 (No. 98 concerning the application of the right to organize and bargain collectively). In Italy, these conventions were finally implemented with Law No. 367 of 23 March 1958. 57 But in the meantime, the freedom of association had been affirmed in Italy by the loyalty of workers to their organizations, by the acceptance of union pluralism following the split of the unified CGIL (between 1948 and 1949) and by the action of the CISL (beginning in 1950) aimed at thwarting the implementation of the constitutional article that called for regulation of trade unions!

In the early 1950s, it was no longer the institution or political government that determined forms of social representation, but the latter tried to have a dialectical impact on policy decisions in the national economic and social spheres. This is what occurred in West Germany with the founding of the DGB in 1949, which, under the leadership of Böckler directly negotiated with Adenauer the law on Mitbestimmung regarding co-management of mining industries without parliamentary mediation, and secured an openly favourable position of the CECA in disagreement with the Socialdemocratic party. 58 All this came about at different times and in different countries involved in the industrialization processes, which saw the ubiquitous development of mixed economies in a capitalist system under democratic governments.

The historiographic position that views “trade unions as institutions and look[s] at their international links, policies, activities” 59 allows us adequately to see both the dynamic relationships between the main national unions and the international ones, such as the ICFTU and the WFTU, as well as the forms of their participation in intergovernmental and supranational co-operation bodies. Thus, the study of the international relations of organized labour which developed after 1950, and were at times original and at times subordinate but more frequently interdependent with those of other actors, helps enrich the analysis of international scenarios in contemporary history. And it is here that the history of the international trade union movement insert tout court into the history of international relations.

3. The process begun in the 1950s has probably yet to reach full maturation, but the recent manifestations of globalisation and European integration are a testimony to the impossibility of negating the social subjectivity of the trade union movement which, evolving in connection with economic and social changes, tends to accomplish its progressive emancipation from political parties and seek greater participation in the formation of the socio-economic order in a democratic system to conjugate market development with social justice. In the final analysis, the formation of a new “union issue” seems to interact with the change in the very concept of citizenship and democracy.

3.1 The globalized market, something other than the traditional international market, is fraught with risks and crises involving public and private economic actors, who are looking for ways of reducing costs


and re-examining the effectiveness of rules and procedures. It demands a rethinking of the role and prospects of those who accede to them.\textsuperscript{60}

Global society, in fact, cannot be included in the “old theory of international trade, which only took nations into consideration”: everyone can see, for example, how today even enterprises “create and realize economic relations between countries” that “thus favour technology transfer and the spread of knowledge”.\textsuperscript{61} Even scholars of the history of international relations adjust their analytical tools—and, noting the solidity of “state sovereignty,” as weakened as it may be, see that in “our world several other identities now present themselves as international actors”.\textsuperscript{62} Thus, the rigorous work of reconstructing the diplomatic history and the need to link analysis of treaties to international policymaking are subject to new tensions in light of the quality and the role of complex reality. “Thus, if the history of diplomacy was based on worn conceptual foundations and insurmountable limitations on competence because delimited by the action of ruling groups uprooted from their socio-economic fabric and from the political context, we must broaden the definition in a more general way, assuming as the object of international history the ‘history of international relations,’ conceived as the history of the development of the international system in its various components”.\textsuperscript{63}

It is the process that led to the proposition of new subjects (which do not necessarily fit into an wholly normative or institutionalised international system) that should be the focus of the historian. Yet, it is on the actors and on the objectives of their actions that thinking often concentrates regarding the delimitation of the field of inquiry in international relations.

In this context, the development of the “free and independent” trade union movement, the broadening of its action and its role in co-operation with public powers is what spurs the search for a new role for social actors in seeking a shared “order,” a search in which political actors and the governments themselves are involved. This observation is of particular interest to those who — reflecting on the development of international relations, on the relationship between violence and politics in international reality — have reached the point of considering how “an acceptable system of international order” can be “rendered more realistic by the effort of the international community to redistribute wealth”.\textsuperscript{64} But co-operation itself does not appear to be indifferent to the debate on the level of analysis of international relations and on the proposal of “pluralism”. Moreover, without questioning the realist principle of the anarchic character of relations between nations, this attitude of the democratic trade union movement, which has a multiple identity (regional, national, transnational and international), lends support to those who would bring to light the interaction of actors and their mutual recognition in the formation of a structure of the international system.

On the level of development of events, whatever the nature of the current loss of the power to regulate by national governments (which are, at any rate, engaged in a search for new strategies) it is difficult to escape the impression that an overall rethinking of democratisation cannot be formulated without some sort of global responsibility\textsuperscript{65} on the part of the various actors and social organizations, among which a strong independent union movement is a candidate. We seem to be seeing this, as Ruggiero suggested when he headed the World Trade Organization, in the efforts to constitute a “new partnership” on an international scale to face together the new marginalisations. We can also see this in the initiative to

\begin{itemize}
  \item See the forward by F. Cerutti to the volume \textit{Gli occhi sul mondo}, op. cit., p. 14.
  \item The economic and political characters of such responsibility, Parsi notes, derive from the same “growing, and under more than one perspective without precedents, interdependence between economic and political and social aspects of events that for the sake of brevity are grouped under the name of globalization”; \textit{Interesse nazionale e globalizzazione}, op. cit., p. 148.
\end{itemize}
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hold a new World Summit for Social Development in June 2000 in Geneva, as special session of UN General Assembly, five years after the first “social summit” in Copenhagen. Finally, are the representatives of Governments that sign the final political declaration of session; but they need to have as partners relevant international organisations as well as actors of civil society. The ICFTU and the World Bank are among the players most committed to a meeting which would not appear as the outcome of a agenda between state subjects, but of the need to give life to a new network of actors in a globalised society. The president of the World Bank Group on September 1999 spoke in his address to the Board of Governors about building “Coalitions for Change”; coalition with private sector, civil society, religions, trade unions, and governments: ”We know that nations are no longer the sole masters of their destinies”. And ICFTU now return to claim, as “l’élément le plus organisé et structuré de la société civile”, to be included “dans un processus de consultation sur la réduction de la pauvreté.”

3.2 But if, in the context of the dynamics of globalisation, a change in the balance of power and resource networks is being studied by trade unions (a “Millennium Committee” to re-examine the structure of the international confederation was formed during the last ICFTU congress in April 2000), in the context of the processes of Europeanisation, the presence of different actors and social forces seem such as to raise new questions today regarding the significance of the course undertaken through economic and monetary union. Recent attention of scholars to the “work dimension,” associated with the inclusion of social policies in the Community sphere, is an incentive to re-examine the steps along the way to Europeanism in relation to the dynamics of economic-social actors and their relations with the Commission and with national governments, ending up with proposing again the question of the importance of the democratic deficit of the integration process.

At the same time, the link between the perception of needs of trade union representation and of the process of Community integration seems to be so unique as to have had an effect on the development of trade union representation in unions in Europe itself.

The question of social representation in the integration process is eloquently illustrated in the process that accompanied the founding of the ETUC and which goes well beyond the problem of a regulated system of industrial relations on the Community level. We should not forget that democratic unions, after participation in the Marshall Plan and the founding of the European Regional Organisation of the ICFTU, participated in the negotiations of the Schuman Plan in 1950, sending its own experts to the delegations of national governments of the Six Countries. In addition, they were included as representatives of the social forces in the formulation of the social issues of the CECA Treaty, obtaining along with Monnet the appointment of Paul Finet (up to that time president of the ICFTU) as vice president of the High Authority. Moreover, the European unions that were allowed to participate in the advisory committee of the European Coal and Steel Community had embraced not only the cause (which was very burdensome for workers unions) of economic unification of markets but that of political integration—so much so as to produce considerable friction with British unions, which were then in a position to have particular influence on international unionism along with U.S. unions.

The same level of union participation was not present at the constitution of the European Economic Community. The awareness of founding a “European social actor” that could play a significant role in the process undertaken after the second world war developed slowly and, in all likely, non-linearly, opposed by the action of governments bent on re-establishing the primacy of the political action of states. But the union movement found a special role again during a number of important events in European institutions:

- the debate on the merger of the executive branches of the three European Communities (between the signing of the treating on 8 April 1965 and its entry into force on 1 July 1967);
- the holding of a tripartite conference in April 1970 (proposed in July 1968 by European social forces) of the labour ministers of the six countries, the Commission, and representatives of European business and workers;

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- the drafting of the Werner report in October 1970, that presented the conclusions of the working group established at the Hague conference in December 1969.

At the end of one journey and the beginning of a new one, European trade unionism decided to develop a European union representation, binding together ever more closely the Free and Christian union organizations, to the point of founding the ETUC in 1973. Thereafter, even most of the post-communist union organizations joined in; and today membership includes unions, such as Solidarnosc, of states that asked to join the European Union.

Without the existence of this union confederation, one cannot even conceive of opening a dialogue between the European social parties of the 1980s, sought by the Delors Commission, which must be credited with a vital function in stimulating the social parties. The European trade union confederation aims to be a European social interlocutor and finds itself already at the junction of the European negotiating position (without which the so-called European employment pact could not be called such). But we should emphasize that, after the inclusion of the social protocol in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the ETUC seems to be a supporter of an effective exercise of the subsidiarity of civil society and of the social participation in a socio-economic change in which the dominance of the state seems both suffocating and inadequate.

Thus unions’ request, beginning in the 1950s, for recognition of their roles as legitimate interlocutors in pursuing common European economic objectives (claiming adequate representation in European institutions) developed into a challenge “to the very structure […] of the Treaties of Rome, which was not corrected with the Single European Act, nor corrected at Maastricht […], that the social aspect is secondary to the economic aspect”.67 And together European unions ask to have a voice in the modification of treaties, as they become in these new social dynamics, actors in the process of development at the local and international level, as well as potential supporters of the source of law at the Community level in realizing horizontal subsidiarity.

The echo of such changes in the social subject and the change of the international and European trade union movement also affects the history of international relations, the scholars of which are particularly aware of the events of our times, and is properly reflected in open debate in the scientific community. Other studies, probably using ever more refined interpretative instruments and a wealth of resources, will be able to examine in greater depth the international relations of social actors in the history of the twentieth century. Without a doubt, they will be in a position to verify or disprove the interpretation of processes that are undoubtedly considered of epochal import.

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NATO, UE after the Cold War

Introduction

Although by the logic of things, the end of the Cold War should have seen a return to peaceful institutions, and in particular the extension of the European Union to encompass the “common European house,” to use the phrase of Mikhail Gorbachev, the opposite effect was produced: a military alliance (NATO), which was the West’s defensive instrument during the Cold War, persisted in its existence and developed new roles outside the zone that was originally defined in the Washington Treaty of 1949 and which has never been amended in substance since. These roles include: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, crisis management, and outright military intervention for reasons related not to the common defense of Western Europe but to humanitarian ends (Bosnia, Kosovo). What is more, NATO came to be regarded, or regarded itself, as the instrument for the spread of democracy, and in the process moved its territorial domain to the east (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary).

Against all logic, the 1990’s saw the withering, or the extended delay, in the European Union’s avowed initial vocation of extending itself to all of Europe. Instead of “enlarging,” the EU chose “deepening.” In the same period, NATO chose enlargement, transforming itself into an expanding security community. As the decade of the 1990’s drew to a close, these two tendencies, that is, a deepening economic and monetary union in Western Europe, and an expanded “Atlantic” security community spreading into eastern Europe, came to fulfillment with the entry in force of the Euro on 1 January 1999 for a three-year transitional period, and the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO three months later, in March 1999.

These post-Cold War developments are events which should not be considered in isolation but rather in a dialectical relationship to each other -- though this assertion itself is a subject of debate among scholars and government officials; and such an assertion is contested more in Europe than in the United States.

On one level, the two processes are unrelated. EU expansion, as one French official has said, is a bottom-up exercise. There are criteria to be filled, starting at the micro level on up: questions such as whether the goods of a candidate country can be competitive with the borderless flow of goods from existing EU countries, and whether the banking and investment structures can be reconciled with those of the EU member countries. On this side of the argument, there is the theme that these two institutions, NATO and the EU, do not compare: enlargement of NATO only required a resolution at the NATO Summit in Washington in April 1999 that the three Eastern European nations be admitted, whereas the 12 current candidates for admission to the EU (which include the aforementioned three) must satisfy the acquis communautaires contained in some 60,000 pages of EU documents.

But in the larger political (and security) sense, the two institutions have a dialectical relationship in the effects they produce. Few can doubt that, had the European Union been more forthcoming toward prospective new members in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, the rush toward NATO enlargement would not have taken place in the same way, or at least with the same precipitation.

Put another way, if the countries of Central Europe had been given some encouragement early on about joining the European Union, if President Mitterrand, in his unfortunate “confederation” initiative at Prague in June 1991 had not told them that it might take “decades and decades” before they became members, the existential threat that they perceived as still coming from Russia might have been lessened in their eyes. They might have foreseen the “existential” protection that EU membership could provide as coming sooner rather than later. In that case, they might not have turned their attention and their efforts so intensively in the direction of NATO.
The issue of the comparison, or the relationship, between the two institutions of NATO and the EU has now, at the end of the 1990’s, become transformed. The EU has taken on for itself a role in defense and will eventually supplant the Western European Union (WEU). In this manner, the relationship between NATO and the EU -- these two organizations that inhabit the same city, Brussels, but scarcely spoke to each other over the past decades, has moved to the top of the agenda. It is no longer a question of whether NATO and the EU compare; henceforth they need to relate. They should coordinate their respective enlargements, and, because they are both now defense organizations, they need to coordinate their planning and force postures so as to avoid duplication of resources and efforts. Such coordination is complicated by the fact that eight members of NATO are not members of the EU, and five members of the EU are not members of NATO.68

In general, one can distinguish three broad phases in the dialectic of enlargement between NATO and the EU. The first was from the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 to the Brussels NATO Summit of January 1994; the second was from the Brussels NATO Summit to the Washington NATO Summit five years later in April 1999; and the third was from that latter moment through the Helsinki EU Summit in December 1999 to the present. All these phases took place against a background of regional conflicts involving the Western powers such as had not occurred since the American retreat from Vietnam in the early 1970’s.

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Phase One, 1989-1994

The events of 1989 in central and Eastern Europe left the principal western European allies, Britain and France not only unprepared for, but wary of, a change in the status quo. With memories of the two World Wars still ingrained in the collective conscience, neither country was ready to accept with equanimity a reunified and resurgent Germany. As the Cold War was ending and the Soviet Union breaking up, anchoring Germany to the West retained the primordial importance it had enjoyed since 1945. In this manner, deepening the European Union rather than enlarging it became the priority, culminating in the Treaty of Maastricht signed in February 1992, and with it the march toward the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Though the Euro, as it came ultimately to be known, predated in its conception the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was only at the end of 1989, during the European Council at Strasbourg, that the EMU process became engaged.

France, which had long considered itself the “keeper of the temple” of the EU, both as the instrument of a strategy of peace in Europe and as a means of keeping a leading voice in European affairs, had through the Maastricht process helped anchor Germany into the EMU. It had further managed to temper Germany’s ardor for an expansion of the EU into central Europe.

President Mitterrand’s call on December 31, 1989 for a confederation of Europe, and the abortive Prague conference of June 1991 to concretize the idea, came to be regarded by the former countries of the Soviet Bloc as a poor substitute for EU enlargement. It was additionally unacceptable to them because it excluded the U.S. and included the USSR. As these countries saw the prospect of their being denied entry into the EU space, they began pressing for entry into NATO. They became more insistent as Russian public opinion turned away from liberalism, as was evident in the Duma elections of December 1993 in which the ultranationalists showed unexpected strength.70

In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was little talk of expanding NATO. This having been said, it should be noted that the Atlantic Alliance, like the European Union, has proclaimed a pan-European vocation from the very onset of its existence. According to Article 10 of the original Washington Treaty of April 4, 1949,

The parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of the treaty, and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area, to accede to this treaty.

68 Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Turkey, Iceland, Norway, Canada and the United States.
69 Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria, Finland and Sweden.
The Clinton Administration’s initial reluctance to consider an enlargement of the Alliance was due in part to the fact that the U.S. and its principal allies had made a gentlemen’s agreement with Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze, at the time it was agreed that Germany could be reunited and remain within NATO, that NATO would not be extended to the east.

Thus in the beginning of this first phase, in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the focus was on the European Union, and here, as was the case in a number of later instances, the EU was to disappoint the westward-looking countries of central and eastern Europe. It was the reluctance of certain powers, chiefly Great Britain and France, to extend the European Union to the Visegrad countries that led ineluctably to an intensive look at NATO enlargement, which would have seemed quite improbable at the start of the 1990’s.

At the same time it was also during this early period that NATO began looking for ways to expand its horizons beyond that of a primarily military alliance dedicated to the collective defense of its member countries. This look was given particular impetus by the successive wars in the Balkans that broke out at the beginning of the decade and that demonstrated over time not only the impotence of the UN in contrast with effectiveness of NATO as an instrument of regional coercion, but also a growing divergence in strategic perceptions between the United States and its West European allies. The incoherence and indecisiveness of the Europeans, as perceived by the Clinton Administration, was to have an effect on the U.S.’s gradual decision to go forward with NATO enlargement.

At its London NATO Summit, held a half a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was evident that NATO was searching for a role that would enable it to break out from the confines of a Cold War military alliance, now that the Cold War was ending. The Alliance declared itself in effect as much a political institution as an instrument for the collective defense of Western Europe:

We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by Article 2 of our Treaty.

At London, the NATO Heads of State and Government called for the elaboration of a New Strategic Concept, which was promulgated at the next Summit, in Rome at the end of 1991, and which moved NATO strategically, though not geographically, outside the confines of its member states, and into a new role as a democratizing and stabilizing element in the European region as a whole. While not modifying the language of the Washington Treaty regarding the mission of collective defense (Article 5) and the territory of the member countries to which it applied (Article 6), the New Strategic Concept fell back on a rather liberal interpretation of Article 4 as a catchall for other missions:

Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of their efforts including their responses to such risks.

What Article 4 of the Washington Treaty states is as follows: “The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened.”

As for the “democratizing” role of NATO, it should be noted that Article 2 of the Washington Treaty had mentioned the “development of peaceful and friendly international relations” as well as the strengthening of “free institutions” and the promoting of “conditions of stability.” The New Strategic Concept reaffirmed these principles, while at the same time giving a pro-active emphasis to NATO’s pan-European vocation:

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71 Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia are the so-called “Visegrad Four.”

72 http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm, p. 1. N.B. Article 2 of the Washington Treaty of 1949 states in part, “The parties will continue towards the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions...”

73 http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm, pp.4-5.
Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.\textsuperscript{74}

It was thus out of these two Summits, at London and Rome, that the groundwork was laid for a change of role for NATO. Nevertheless the expansion of NATO was not on the agenda at this point. And opposition to it was not confined to Russia. There was also some opposition within Western Europe to an expansion of NATO's roles, chiefly centered on France, which had accepted NATO's New Strategic Concept with some reluctance and which traditionally has regarded itself as the conscience of a Europe desirous of not being overwhelmed by the United States' economic and military superiority.

Although making some concessions to NATO because of the imperatives for Western cooperation in the wars that broke out in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990's, François Mitterrand remained until the end of his Presidency (in May 1995) a firm advocate of keeping NATO (and thus the U.S.) "on the reservation" – confined to the original zone of the countries of Western Europe and the original mission of collective defense, as called for respectively in Articles 6 and 5 of the Washington Treaty of 1949. Over time, however, the successive wars in the disintegrating Yugoslav federation made moot the issue of NATO involvement in interventions outside its collective defense zone.

Moreover, the attempted rapprochement of France with NATO in the mid-1990's, initiated by Mitterrand's successor, Jacques Chirac, as a means of lessening France's strategic isolation evident in the Gulf and Yugoslav wars (a rapprochement which did not come to fruition), was an additional reason for France revising its objections to an expanded role for NATO.

\textit{Phase Two (1994-1999)}

In the second phase, starting informally in the Fall of 1993 but officially at the time of the next NATO Summit, in January 1994 at Brussels, an oscillation took place away from the EU and towards NATO, culminating in the admission to NATO of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary at the Washington NATO Summit five years later, in April 1999. The signal for this change was given in a seminal article entitled, "Building a New NATO," published in "Foreign Affairs" in the fall of 1993.\textsuperscript{75} This was the public version of a study that had been done for the RAND Corporation by three experts on NATO and Europe, Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee.\textsuperscript{76} The article called for a new "grand strategy for the West" to handle challenges in two "arcs of crisis," one an eastern arc running from north central Europe down through Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the other running from the Maghreb through the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Wrote the authors:

Such a strategy must be, first and foremost, political and economic. But the West must also establish a stable security framework for these regions.

The obvious tool for this new strategy is NATO. The Persian Gulf War and the ongoing Yugoslav crisis have shown the European Community incapable of taking on such a task. Achieving consensus among the 12 EC members, especially when military action is required, is nearly impossible.\textsuperscript{77}

Significantly, the RAND trio did not advocate a "unilateral" extension of NATO. They emphasized the need for "a coherent and coordinated Western strategy for the integration of Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and possibly Slovakia) into both the EC and NATO."\textsuperscript{78} This new strategy of integration to the East was vitally essential for NATO, which would have to "go out of area or go out of business."\textsuperscript{79}

In the period from the early to mid-1990's, NATO sought to coordinate its own ideas on enlargement with the plans of the EU in this domain but was told, in the words of a knowledgeable senior American official, that this was none of NATO's business. According to a French NATO specialist, a joint effort

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. 5.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Foreign Affairs}, September/October 1993, pp. 28-40.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Not Whether But When}, pp. 32-33.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., p. 31.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., p. 35.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. 31.
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was undertaken in 1994 to see if the two processes could be coordinated. The effort was abandoned as unworkable.

While NATO expansion was not on the agenda in the early 1990’s, NATO had nevertheless established a policy of reaching out to the East to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, and thereby provide security to the existentially threatened states of central Europe. The first manifestation of this was the creation in 1991 of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which was to lead to the idea of the Partnership for Peace (PfP).

NATO expansion did not become officialized as an aim of the Alliance until the January 1994 Brussels Summit. It was then that a commitment to enlarge NATO at some point in the future was made (“We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process”\textsuperscript{80}).

Also announced at the Brussels Summit was the creation of the Partnership for Peace, described as a “major initiative...in which we invite Partners to joint us in new political and military efforts to work alongside the Alliance.”\textsuperscript{81} According to a senior U.S. Defense official, the concept behind the PfP was to slow down the rush to NATO enlargement by giving the governments in eastern and central Europe something concrete, but it turned out to have the opposite effect. It only whetted the appetites of these governments for joining NATO.

A third major decision of the Brussels NATO Summit gave shape to a nascent European defense identity. The tentatively worded Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) incorporated into the EU’s Maastricht Treaty, signed in February 1992, had evolved into something more concrete with the Petersberg Declaration of the WEU four months later, in which the WEU assigned to itself the less militarily onerous tasks of peacekeeping and crisis management, thus implicitly leaving the “heavy lifting,” i.e. collective defense, to NATO. Something still more concrete was to emerge from the Brussels Summit: the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) which was officialized as a sort of institutional expression of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The ESDI was to be made manifest through the WEU, which would use NATO assets for European-only operations of the “Petersberg” variety, through the mechanism of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF’s). These assets (in communications, intelligence, logistics, etc.) would be returned to NATO after a particular operation. In this manner, under the formula enunciated at the Brussels Summit, they would be “separable” but not “separate.”

The strands of a nascent European defense entity and the adaptation of NATO away from its Cold War mission came together in the concept of the CJTF’s.\textsuperscript{82} On the European Union side, it could be said that ESDI was the operationalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the CJTF’s were the tactical instrumentalization of ESDI. In a parallel way, NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) was the operationalization of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which had been created in 1991 as part of NATO’s outreach towards Eastern Europe; and the CJTF’s could be considered at the same time as the tactical instrumentalization of the PfP.\textsuperscript{83} This parallelism was reflected in the Brussels Summit communiqué which described the CJTF’s “as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance.”\textsuperscript{84} In other words, both NATO and the WEU (acting at the time as the defense arm of the EU) could create ad hoc task force arrangements with nations outside their respective alliances.

Serious attempts to harmonize European and American viewpoints on ESDI and to operationalize the CJTF concept were made at the subsequent Berlin NATO Ministerial meeting in July 1996 which, in

\textsuperscript{80} Brussels Summit Declaration (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1994/p94-003.htm, p. 3).

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., p. 1.

\textsuperscript{82} N.B. “Combined” meant that more than one nation would participate; “joint” meant that all three branches of service would be involved.

\textsuperscript{83} It is noteworthy that a study that was part of a working group effort to prepare for the Brussels Summit was entitled, “Operationalizing NACC and a Draft NACC Charter.” (\textit{Not Whether But When}, p. 24).

\textsuperscript{84} http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1994/p94-003.htm, p. 33
retrospect, was the high point in the rationalization of U.S. and European (mainly French) concerns. Subsequent negotiations foundered over the issue of how much freedom of action the Europeans would have in bringing into being an ESDI. The insistence of NATO (read the U.S.) that ESDI be “within the Alliance” was reflected in the Berlin communiqué (and other NATO communiqués), where the phrase is repeated no less than five times in juxtaposition with the term, “European Security and Defense Identity.”

By the time of the next NATO Summit, held in Madrid on July 7-8, 1997, progress on achieving a greater equilibrium in NATO between Americans and Europeans, through the CJTF concept and related proposals, had stalled, even though the Summit declaration contained soothing language to the effect that “substantial progress has been achieved in the internal adaptation of the Alliance.” By this time, however, the U.S. had other preoccupations. In a sort of inverse parallel to the EU, the U.S. had put aside the “deepening” of NATO (i.e. its internal reform) in favor of the enlargement of NATO. The push toward enlargement began to quicken as the Bosnian war was being brought to a close in late 1995. It was crowned at the Madrid Summit in July 1997, with invitations being issued to three Central European countries, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and with the further statement that “no European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.”

Whether consciously or not, the U.S. was putting itself in the position of being able to use these prospective new members as a counterweight to the “autonomists” within NATO led by France. This was particularly true as regards Poland, which dwarfs the other Eastern European countries in population and has strong ties to the U.S. through its large immigration there. As Nicole Gnesotto has pointed out, public opinion in these Central European countries regards the U.S. as an equalizing force vis-à-vis the Western European powers, in particular the French-German “couple.” This power balance, if it can be called as such, is one that has persisted to this day.

With the U.S. preoccupation with the enlargement of NATO, a trend toward autonomy for the ESDI began to develop in Europe. In June 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty, the sequel to the Maastricht Treaty, had gone into effect, incorporating into the legal corpus of the EU the rather meager results of the EU’s Intergovernmental Conference of 1996-1997. In the matter of European defense, however, the Amsterdam Treaty contained certain new provisions. Firstly it created the post of a High Representative to preside over the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP). Secondly it strengthened slightly the highly conditional language of the preceding Maastricht Summit by referring to “the progressive definition of a common defense policy.” (Italics added). Thirdly, the so-called “Petersberg tasks,” which the WEU had assigned to itself in 1992, were incorporated into the Treaty, thus reinforcing the legitimacy of the EU’s political-military role. These Petersberg tasks were specified in the Amsterdam Treaty language as follows: “humanitarian and evacuation missions, missions for maintaining peace and missions using combat forces in crisis management, including missions for the establishment of peace.” And finally, the Treaty foresaw the incorporation of the WEU into the EU, should the European Council so decide.

Amsterdam notwithstanding, without a meeting of the minds between Britain and France on European defense, no movement towards a tangible CFSP and a tangible ESDI was possible, as Jolyon Howorth has pointed out. A break in this situation appeared with the British elections in May of 1997 and the

86 Ibid., p. 3.
88 *La puissance et l’Europe*, p. 82.
89 See p. 11.
90 *La puissance et l’Europe*, p. 82.
arrival on the scene of a “New Labor” Government headed by Tony Blair. At this point the British position began to change. According to a senior British defense official, Blair and his team on coming into office were taken aback as they discovered the lack of military self-sufficiency among Europe’s major powers. As the Kosovo crisis developed in 1998, the continued reluctance of the Clinton Administration to contemplate the use of American ground troops there prior to a settlement stood in contrast to the British (and to a lesser extent the French) willingness to entertain a ground intervention.

Thus the stage was set for a major sea-change in British policy, which became evident in late 1998, first with the informal EU summit at Pörtschach, Austria (October 24-25), then in a speech by Prime Minister Blair in Edinburgh in November, and finally with the Anglo-French summit at St. Malo (December 3-4, 1998). The St. Malo declaration made clear that Prime Minister Blair was ending Britain’s long-standing proscription against the European Union becoming involved in defense matters. The declaration stated in part:

The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam…[by implementing] the Amsterdam provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the framing of a common defense policy of CFSP…To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces [and] the means to decide to use them…in order to respond to international crises.93

Although the St. Malo declaration did not state so outright, it prefigured the absorption of the WEU into the EU. With the WEU out of the way, this would mean that the EU would become the European defense counterpart of NATO -- thus adding coherence and balance to the equation. The WEU had remained in an emasculated state vis-à-vis NATO since 1954, when the European Defense Community project died in the French parliament, and it was then agreed as an alternative that Germany would enter into NATO (and also into the WEU). This effectively left the WEU without a role, since NATO was much the stronger organization, and the Germans were in it. This situation has persisted down to this day, despite French efforts to revive the WEU starting in the 1980’s.

Phase Three (1999-present)

In the third phase, there was a slowing down of NATO expansion, as signaled by the decision in April 1999 by the Washington Summit (to be read as a decision of the U.S.) to limit the new members to the three longstanding candidates: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The slowdown was at least in part related to the hostile Russian reaction.

The problems that NATO enlargement caused in the West’s relations with Russia, and the new tensions that arose in NATO-Russian relations as a result of the Kosovo war, gave rise to a renewed impulsion in European public opinion in favor of EU enlargement, as a more benign way of uniting Western and Eastern Europe, and as an insurance policy against further unrest developing in the Eastern European region. As a group of European intellectuals stated in a declaration in early August 1999, “The war in Kosovo should compel the European Union to rethink its future. [It should] redirect an institution that is introverted and wrapped up in its economic program towards a pan-European political plan...Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the vision of a reunified Europe seems to have disappeared.”94

Following NATO’s Summit in Washington in April 1999 on the occasion of the Alliance’s 50th anniversary, the Europeans continued to move toward making ESDI more autonomous. They began referring to ESDI as ESDP – the “P” standing for policy. According to one NATO official, this is essentially a French invention, to give a sense of autonomy (since ESDI has always been referred to as “within the Alliance”), and also to make the term more congruent with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU.95 The next meeting of the European Council, in Cologne in June 1999, reflected this new impulsion in its communiqué:

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95 Interview with a NATO Headquarters official.
… the European Council should be in a position to take decisions dealing with the range of activities aimed at conflict prevention and missions of crisis management, defined in the European Union Treaty as ‘Petersberg missions.’ To this end, the Union must have a capacity for autonomous action supported by credible military forces, have the means for deciding to have recourse to them and be ready to do it so in order to react to international crises, without prejudice to actions taken by NATO.96

At the next European Council meeting, at Helsinki in December 1999, and after considerable American pressure, the Cologne language was modified so as to make it more in conformity with that of the New Strategic Concept that had been put forth at the Washington NATO Summit of April 1999:

The European Union should have at its disposition, in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, an autonomous capability for deciding and, where NATO per se is not engaged, for mounting and then conducting military operations in response to international crises.97

The key phrase in question is “where NATO is not engaged,” and this was more or less in conformity with the New Strategic Concept language ("in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily")98. Behind these arcanum of language is the issue of whether NATO has the “right of first refusal,” and this question has yet to be completely settled.

The Helsinki EU Summit provided for a number of concrete measures as a follow-on to the Cologne Summit’s call for “a capacity for autonomous action.” Firstly, the EU would create a multinational mobilizable force of the equivalent of an Army corps (15 brigades) totaling 50,000-60,000 troops. This so-called “Headline Goal” would constitute a “capability” or a mobilizable structure rather than a permanent formation. It would be in effect a rapid reaction force with an air and naval component, capable of being deployed within the space of two months, and self-sufficient to the extent that it could remain deployed for one year.99 In addition, the Helsinki Summit decided that there would be set up under the European Council three politico-military committees which would eventually be able to direct the gamut of “Petersberg missions.” For the time being these would be designated as interim bodies. They are:

An Interim Political and Security committee (IPSC) that would be based in Brussels at the ambassadorial level and would provide the political and strategic direction that would lead to effective and rapid EU decisions.

An Interim Military Committee composed of the Chiefs of Defense Staffs of the member countries or their designees. This committee would provide recommendations to the IPSC.

A military staff to provide military expertise to support the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including in the conduct of EU-led military operations.100

At this same Helsinki meeting, and in part at least in response to European public opinion, the EU somewhat precipitately to put six postulant countries into the same basket with the six already accepted candidate countries, and not to exclude a 13th – Turkey – from being eventually considered for membership:

The European Council confirms the importance of the enlargement process started at Luxembourg in December 1997...[and] reaffirms the inclusive character of the adhesion process, which now groups together 13 candidate countries into a single category. The candidate countries participate in this process on an equal footing.101

100 Interview with a U.S. Defense official. It should be noted that one reason these bodies are designated as “interim” is that a determination is to be made as to whether their creation will require an amendment to the European Treaty language.
101 http://www.diplomatie.fr/actual/evenements/helsinki/cl.html, p. 1
No firm timetable was set for any new admissions, only the forecast that “the [EU] should be in a position to welcome new state members starting at the end of 2002.” Nevertheless, expectations were raised, and this came at a time when the EU was only beginning to address anew the unwieldiness of its institutions, stemming from the fact that its structures were designed for its original six members, let alone the present 16 or the future 28 or more. This is supposed to be done by a new Intergovernmental Conference, which is due to complete its work by December 2000.

Partly because of this unwieldiness, and partly because the Euro has not become the strong currency that was expected, the European project as a whole has come in for increasing questioning. German Foreign Minister Joshka Fischer, in his bold initiative for a federation of the states of Europe, enunciated in Berlin on May 12, 2000, declared that the method of Jean Monnet has run its course: the communitarian method of putting together Europe from the bottom up, without a political authority at the top to realize the unity of Europe, is proving more and more difficult, as the Union has expanded from six to 15 members. As it goes beyond this number, as the Union has now pledged to do, the lack of unity, as well as the lack of a purpose (“la finalité de l’Europe”) will be even more evident. Both Fischer, and Jacques Delors, the former head of the European Commission in an earlier initiative, tried to square the idea of a community of nations with that of a federal government that could speak for all of them. Fischer even suggested that there could be a president of such a federal government elected by universal suffrage.

What was evident post-Helsinki is that NATO now recognizes that its interlocutor for European defense matters is henceforth the EU; and Lord George Robertson, the new Secretary-General of NATO, and his predecessor, Javier Solana, who is now both the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Secretary-General of the to-be-dissolved WEU, have begun meeting on a nearly weekly basis.103

But meetings at the top are a far cry from institutionalizing the relationship between the two institutions, and this NATO (again read the U.S.) wants to accomplish without delay. Whether the “autonomists” within the EU will want such closeness and transparency is far from certain. The French position is that the interim committees created to manage the autonomous EU defense force should be set up first before getting into a fixed relationship with NATO. In part this reflects the French desire that the EU organs remain intergovernmental and not be drawn into the NATO integrated command orbit.104

In December 2000, a Capabilities Pledging Conference is due to be held, in which the various EU members’ contributions to the Headline Goal will be established. Whether NATO will be allowed to assess the results of this conference has not yet been decided, as the French, in particular, do not want NATO help in the planning of the Headline Goal, out of concern that the U.S. will come to dominate it.105 However, it appears likely that some sort of compromise formula will be found to allow NATO to play a role, likely under the rationale of the need to avoid duplication between the EU force and NATO, which is in the process of assessing its own military requirements (“Defense Capabilities Initiative”) and the contributions expected from the member states.

Conclusions

With the EU hanging back from its own enlargement during most of the decade of the 1990’s, a combination of forces began to look towards NATO enlargement, in particular the Eastern European leaders themselves and certain activists in the Clinton Administration. At first glance, it seemed justified that the three prospective new countries, especially Poland and the Czech Republic, deserved to be safeguarded from attack, considering how the Western European allies had been unable to help them when they were invaded in 1939 – Poland from two sides and not just one. Guaranteeing their security was a way of wiping away the sins of the past. Hungary, though an ally of Nazi Germany in World War II, had been attacked by the Soviet Union in 1956 and therefore qualified, though to a lesser

102 Ibid.
103 Le Monde, February 29, 2000, p. 4.
104 Interview with a U.S. Defense official.
105 Interview with a U.S. Defense official.
degree, for Western protection. Furthermore, to venture a bit into the terrain of political incorrectness, all three countries belong to the culture of Western Christendom, in the framework of Samuel P. Huntington's controversial theme in “The Clash of Civilizations.” This may not have been absent at least from the subconscious of American planners, as well as, more palpably, that of the large numbers of persons of Polish, and to some extent Czech and even Hungarian) descent living in the U.S.

But among those who questioned NATO enlargement, some posed the question whether these three countries were threatened by Russia, other than existentially? As one French official put it, the problem with this first round of NATO enlargement was that it protected those that were secure and left unprotected those that were insecure. Put another way, enlarging NATO meant that sooner or later the question of what to do about the Baltic countries would have to be addressed. Not to have expanded NATO would not have opened this question at all. But NATO has expanded, and this has left the question of what to do next in suspense. Admitting the Baltic countries to NATO would constitute an affront to Russia and could produce an unacceptable level of stress in the East-West relationship. And yet doing nothing would only increase the sense of hollowness and ambiguity that has begun to envelop the NATO enlargement exercise. In the view of a senior U.S. official familiar with NATO affairs, at least one additional country will have to be admitted in the next round of consideration scheduled to take place in 2002, in order for NATO to remain credible; this would likely be Slovenia, according this official. One can pose the question of whether, to use the phrase of Talleyrand, “Il est urgent d’attendre.” (“It is urgent to wait”). In other words, this time might it be wiser to wait for the EU to go first? It may turn out to be a long time to wait for the EU to move eastward, perhaps as long as by the end of the present decade. Theoretically, if the EU expands eastward, a corresponding move subsequently by NATO would seem then to be less objectionable to the Russians. (Such a move by NATO might even be then seen as unnecessary). Notwithstanding, the Russians would not regard an EU enlargement with complete unanimity, especially now that the EU is taking on a defense role for itself.

Another solution was hinted at by President Clinton in his speech at Aachen, Germany on June 2, 2000; that is, to finesse the question of boundaries altogether by including Russia. Said Mr. Clinton: “Russia should be an integral part of Europe, which means that no door should be closed to her, neither that of the European Union nor NATO.”106 That Russia might also join the EU was for the first time mentioned by the President. If such were to come to pass, it would transform both institutions into much more diffuse groupings than have existed in the past. In effect, in the coming age of low-intensity conflicts, NATO would become a low-intensity alliance. This would remove or greatly modify what was its cachet of success during the Cold War: the integrated military command. It is doubtful whether the American (or the European) political class would accept reverting to an OSCE-type organization as a means of bringing Russia “into the reservation.”107

Side by side with the issue of NATO vis-à-vis European enlargement lies the question of European defense. The Kosovo war has intensified the debate within the major countries of Western Europe over their own military inadequacy, a debate that began to come into focus with the Anglo-French declaration of December 1998 at St. Malo, calling for greater European autonomy in defense matters. As the 21st Century begins, one is drawn to the conclusion that Europe cannot and will not remain indefinitely an area of relative military impotence; though many, particularly on the other side of the Atlantic, doubt that the major European powers have the will to commit the resources necessary to accomplish such an aggiornamento. But, as Stanley Hoffmann has stated, “Europe must not remain an economic giant and a diplomatic and military dwarf; in the long run, its weakness in the latter domains will sap its force in others.”108

On the one hand, there is a United States, powerful but geographically removed, desirous of retaining its status as the sole superpower, and wanting to remain in Europe and therefore in control in Europe. On the other hand, there is a congeries of European powers increasingly jealous of American power and increasingly disabused at the way the U.S. exercises this power. Thus one is drawn to a second

106 Le Monde, June 4-5, 2000, p. 2.
107 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) includes all the European countries plus Canada and the U.S. and makes its decisions by unanimity.
conclusion: that the tie between Europe and the United States will inevitably weaken as the Alliance discipline imposed by the rigors of the Cold War continues to fade away. A decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the now “sole superpower” has less capacity to impose its will on its Allies than it was able to during most of the Cold War.

APPENDIX

The immensely complicated interaction between these two regional organizations -- NATO and the EU -- that have existed resolutely apart until recently, needs to be the subject of greater illumination, in order to assist in an understanding of the unforeseen events of the last decade – the first decade of the post-Cold War era. In seeking to illuminate the NATO-EU dialectic, or, put another way, the contest for enlargement, this paper includes in this appendix two templates, side by side, consisting mainly of decisions taken at the biennial European Council and NATO Council meetings. External factors and events are also keyed in along this time-line, as an aid to analysis.

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Globalisation, Regionalisation and the History of International Relations


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Travemünde DefMins Meeting October 1993 Partnership for Peace mentioned.


Sarajevo Ultimatum To Bosnian Serbs February 1994.

Contact Group for Ex-Yugoslavia April 1994.

Essen Summit Eastern Europeans As observers December 1994.

Turkey into Customs Union Cyprus into 1st Tier of Applicants Spring 1995.


Srebrenica Massacre July 1995.
London Conference Ends Dual
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Williamsburg DefMins IFOR agreed October 1995.


IFOR Deployed To Bosnia December 1995.

France Returns to NATO Military Committee December 1995.

Berlin Ministerial WEU to use NATO “separable but not separate” assets. CJTF’s and NATO Reform to be Implemented June 1996.

French-U.S. Dispute Over Southern Command At Naples. Fall 1996.


Key July 1995.

IFOR Deployed To Bosnia December 1995.

NATO-Russia Founding Act May 1997.


Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo February 1999.


Helsinki EU Summit. Use of EU only where NATO not involved. December 1999.
Globalisation and the Crisis of International Society. Martin Wight and Carl Schmitt’s Reflections on the Cultural and Institutional Dimensions of International Relations

Due riflessioni parallele. Il realismo di Wight e Schmitt

Sebbene riavvicinate, negli ultimi anni, dalla tardiva riscoperta dello studioso tedesco da parte della comunità scientifica britannica, le riflessioni di Carl Schmitt e di Martin Wight sono state oggetto di una tenace separazione. E non ci si può nascondere che l’accostamento di due autori così distinti per sensibilità e formazione possa creare qualche imbarazzo, tanto più che le differenze appaiono molto più marcate delle somiglianze: in parte perché è diversa la loro formazione culturale, storico-filosofica quella di Wight, politico-giuridica quella di Schmitt; in parte perché diversa è la loro storia personale e politica, ispirata a un sofferto cristianesimo liberale quella di Wight, risolutamente anti-liberale e anti-democratica quella di Schmitt; in parte perché le loro riflessioni seguono percorsi distinti, con punti di contatto solo casuali con quelle dell’altro, e per di più radicati in comunità scientifiche più o meno snobisticamente chiuse in se stesse.

E tuttavia, sebbene meno evidenti, non si può dire che manchino le ragioni di comunanza. La prima, un po’ paradossale, sta nel fatto che tutti e due sono rimasti confinati ai margini delle Relazioni Internazionali come disciplina, soprattutto in Italia. Di Martin Wight basterebbe forse dire che la sua opera non è ancora tradotta in italiano; ma a condizione di non dimenticare che questa mancata recezione, più che semplice segno di disattenzione, riflette una estraneità pressoché totale nei confronti degli indirizzi più recenti della riflessione internazionalistica, alimentata da una fortissima diffidenza reciproca e, da parte di Wight, da una sostanziale indifferenza nei confronti del dibattito nordamericano. Carl Schmitt, poi, è un caso a sé: riscoperto, a partire dalla fine degli anni Settanta, al punto da diventare oggetto di una piccola moda culturale, Schmitt è stato quasi completamente ignorato dagli internazionalisti, non soltanto italiani, sebbene abbia dedicato il suo tempo e la sua politica internazionale una riflessione continua, culminata in quell’opera capitale di storia delle relazioni internazionali che è il Nomos della Terra, e sebbene, lungo questo percorso, abbia anticipato molti dei temi che si trovano al centro della riflessione attuale: dalla fine del monopolio statuale sulla politica alla metamorfosi del diritto internazionale, dalla crisi della società internazionale di impronta europea alla tensione che questo produce tra universalismo e particolarismo.

La seconda ragione è più sostantiva, e si riferisce al fatto che tutti e due i nostri autori sono studiosi europei, cioè estranei al contesto storico e culturale nel quale si è sviluppata per l’intero dopoguerra la disciplina delle Relazioni Internazionali - “scienza americana”, come l’ha definita non a caso lo studioso americano più sensibile alla lezione di un altro grande studioso europeo come Raymond Aron, Stanley Hoffmann. Questa diversa origine non poteva non lasciare impronte sulla loro riflessione. Innanzitutto, è ad essa che si deve la sensibilità che Wight e Schmitt manifestano (pur con accenti e gradi diversi) per due esperienze enormemente sottovalutate nella riflessione internazionalistica nordamericana: il rifluire della centralità dell’Europa, da un lato, e la sua lacerazione dall’altro. Ma quello che conta di più è che proprio l’esperienza di questa doppia crisi – di centralità e di coesione – dà a Wight e Schmitt un particolarissimo senso del tempo, molto diverso da quello che ha dominato e continua a dominare le Relazioni Internazionali. Intanto, perché consente loro di reimmerge la storia delle relazioni internazionali del Novecento in un tempo più lungo di quello dettato dalla guerra fredda e, a differenza di questo, incentrato non sul senso dell’eccezionalità e dell’incomparabilità del nostro secolo ma, tutto all’opposto, sul problema – tenacemente eluso nella riflessione post-bellica – dei suoi rapporti con i secoli che l’hanno preceduto, delle loro eredità e, se mai, del modo in cui queste sono andate incrinandosi o deformandosi nel corso del nostro. Invece di esaurire l’attenzione, come la gran parte della riflessione contemporanea delle Relazioni Internazionali, su temi quali la maggiore o minore stabilità del bipolarismo e del multipolarismo, il loro interesse si rivolge a quelle vicende di lungo

Alessandro Colombo
University of Milan, Italy
periodo che in questa riflessione vengono correntemente trascurate e i cui risultati, invece di essere visti nella loro relatività storica, vengono semplicemente dati per scontati: l’equiparazione tra sistema internazionale e sistema interstatale, il complesso di regole politico-diplomatiche che in questa equiparazione affidano le proprie radici, la lenta trasformazione del sistema europeo in sistema mondiale.

In secondo luogo, perché proprio da questo confronto i nostri autori ricavano un senso altrettanto profondo della sostanziale fragilità della convivenza internazionale così come la conosciamo noi e così come, sulla base della nostra esperienza, siamo soliti definirla. Se, pur con qualche forzatura, è possibile affermare che la riflessione internazionalista del dopoguerra abbia continuato a oscillare tra la rimozione della dimensione temporale (simboleggiata dalla teoria dei sistemi) e la sua soluzione in termini di progresso, quella di Wight, Schmitt piega la storia del Novecento in una direzione completamente diversa: non si interessa agli elementi di novità – anzi, come nel caso di Wight, si diverte a smontarli rintracciandovii analogie sorprendenti (e spesso provocatorie) con tempi più o meno lontani – bensì alla crisi delle strutture portanti della convivenza internazionale che il Novecento ha ereditato dai secoli precedenti; non nega la discontinuità, ma la cerca, invece che nel “radicalmente nuovo”, nella longue durée del sistema interstatale moderno e della sua lenta espansione mondiale.

Normalità ed eccezionalità sono rimesse in discussione, a volte persino rovesciate. Da un lato, come vedremo meglio più avanti, tutti e tre i nostri autori hanno ben chiara la consapevolezza che lo Stato e il sistema interstatale non costituiscono affatto condizioni normali, bensì quasi assolute eccezioni storiche, delle quali ha senso chiedersi se e quanto siano ancora destinate a durare. “La <<<power politics>>”, scrive Martin Wight, “suggerisce la relazione tra potenze indipendenti, e noi diamo per scontato un tale stato di cose. Esso implica due condizioni. Primo, che ci siano unità politiche indipendenti che non riconoscono alcun superiore politico, e che si proclamano sovrane; secondo, che ci siano relazioni continue e organizzate fra di loro. Questo è il sistema interstatale moderno. Noi abbiamo le unità indipendenti, che chiamiamo stati, nazioni, paesi o potenze, e poi un sistema altamente organizzato di relazioni fra loro, politiche ed economiche, diplomazia e commercio, a volte la pace e a volte la guerra. Noi comprenderemmo meglio questo stato di cose se ricorderemo che esso non è affatto la regola nella storia. L’attuale sistema interstatale è esistito grosso modo a partire dal sedicesimo secolo, e noi abbiamo l’illusione che sia normale. Ma se guardiamo più indietro, scopriamo che esso è stato preceduto da qualche cosa di diverso”.

Dall’altro lato, attraverso la sensibilità per i periodi rivoluzionari, nel corso dei quali le relazioni transnazionali o orizzontali prevalgono su quelle dettate dallo stato, essi ci ricordano che il ruolo attuale di queste relazioni nella politica internazionale non è affatto senza precedenti, come sembrano credere i sostenitori attuali del primato dei legami e delle fratture transnazionali, anzi probabilmente non è tanto grande quanto è stato in diversi periodi del passato. L’intera storia del sistema internazionale come sistema interstatale può anzi essere raffigurata, come fa Schmitt, come una lunga parentesi di “razionalizzazione e umanizzazione della guerra” tra due ondate di guerra civile; oppure, come preferisce Wight, come una continua oscillazione tra guerre statali e guerre rivoluzionarie, nelle quali normalità ed eccezionalità si scambiano le parti a seconda di dove si ponga l’origine del sistema moderno - attorno al 1648, come è diventato consuetudine, o attorno al 1494, come suggerisce Wight.

Marginalità ed europeità, quindi - e sarebbe da chiedersi se la connessione sia casuale, oppure rifletta a propria volta lo slittamento della posizione dell’Europa. Ma la ragione di comunanza più singolare tra Martin Wight e Carl Schmitt è il loro rapporto con la tradizione cosiddetta “realista”. Che essi vi appartengano non può essere seriamente messo in discussione. Tutti e due ne accolgono, dopo tutto, i presupposti più comuni: la centralità dello Stato, il primato delle relazioni politiche rispetto a quelle economiche, l’attenzione (i critici del realismo potrebbero dire: l’ossessione) per il “caso peggiore”, la tensione tra “etica della convinzione” ed “etica della responsabilità”, il carattere anarchico della vita internazionale e l’inevitabilità che ne deriva non delle singole guerre, ma della guerra come tale. “La causa fondamentale della guerra” come osserva Wight “è l’assenza di un governo internazionale; in altre parole, l’anarchia degli stati sovrani. (...) Questa è la situazione di <<<paura hobbesiana>> che Herbert Butterfield ha chiamato <<la condizione assoluta e il dilemma irriducibile della politica internazionale>>. Le guerre sono combattute per cause molto diverse (...). Ma tutte le cause particolari della guerra operano all’interno del contesto dell’anarchia internazionale e della paura hobbesiana”.

E tuttavia non ci vuol molto a riconoscere tanto in Wight quanto, ironicamente, in Schmitt, acconti molto meno perentori di quelli che dominano il realismo e, a maggior ragione, il neorealismo nelle
Relazioni Internazionali. Le prime ad essere rimesse in discussione sono le motivazioni degli attori, cioè le ragioni in base alle quali questi prendono le proprie decisioni (comprese quelle relative alla pace e alla guerra) e scelgono i propri obiettivi. Testimoni e per molti versi partecipi dei grandi conflitti ideologici del loro tempo, Wight e Schmitt rigettano esplicitamente l’idea che la politica estera possa esaurirsi in un calcolo dominato da interessi nazionali oggettivi e indifferenti alle preferenze degli attori. Non sottovalutano, anzi condividono con il realismo ortodosso, l’importanza dei rapporti di forza e delle considerazioni di interesse ma, a differenza di questo, si guardano bene dal trattare politica estera e politica interna come compartimenti stagni, indifferenti ciascuna all’evoluzione dell’altra. Allontanandosi energicamente dalla parsimonia che consente a Morgenthau di considerare le differenze ideologiche e culturali come semplici maschere della lotta per il potere e a Waltz di liquidare il problema come riduzionistico, essi restituiscono alla politica estera la tensione che le è propria tra interessi e valori o, come la esprime Wight, necessità e libertà. “Non è possibile” scrive Wight “comprendere la politica internazionale solo in termini meccanici. Le potenze hanno differenze qualitative oltre che quantitative, e la loro attrazione e influenza non è correlata esattamente alla massa e al peso. Gli uomini possiedono non soltanto territori, materie prime e armi, ma anche credenze e opinioni. E’ vero che le credenze non prevalgono nella politica internazionale se non sono associate al potere (…). Ma è altrettanto vero che l’efficacia del potere varia molto a seconda della forza delle credenze che lo ispirano”. E non è da meno Carl Schmitt: “Politico significa qui propriamente non l’impiego e il dominio di certi fattori di potere sociali ed internazionali, come vuole la concezione machiavellistica della politica, la quale fa di essa una pura tecnica, isolando un momento singolo ed esteriore della vita politica (…). Al politico appartiene l’idea, perché non si dà alcuna politica senza un’etica della persuasione”.

La seconda vittima del “realismo eterodosso” di Wight e Schmitt è un altro dei punti cardinali del realismo post-bellico: quello della sostanziale immutabilità della politica internazionale nel corso dei secoli. Non che, anche riguardo ad essa, i nostri autori si collocino totalmente al di fuori della tradizione realista. Al contrario: è persino troppo evidente che anche in loro, come in tutti i realisti, l’accento cada prima di tutto sugli elementi di continuità, che Carl Schmitt ravvisa nel “politico” come tale, mentre Martin Wight nella politica internazionale come “regno della ricorrenza e della ripetizione” e, in contrasto con la politica interna, sfera “meno suscettibile di interpretazioni progressiste”: “Se, poniamo, Tommaso Moro o Enrico IV tornassero in Inghilterra e in Francia nel 1960, è plausibile che essi riconoscerebbero che i loro paesi si sono mossi al proprio interno verso obiettivi e attraverso strade che essi potrebbero approvare. Ma se contemplassero la scena internazionale, è più probabile che essi sarebbero colpiti dalle somiglianze con ciò che ricordavano”.

E tuttavia, malgrado questa prognosi pessimista (che in Wight e, parzialmente, in Schmitt, si nutre anche di convinzioni religiose), tutti e due i nostri autori hanno altrettanto chiara la consapevolezza che tutt’altra cosa deve dirsi delle forme e dei modi attraverso i quali la lotta per il potere viene combattuta e regolata e che, se è vero che la power politics cara al realismo ortodosso può servire a comprendere aspetti fondamentali della politica internazionale, è altrettanto vero che essa dipende da condizioni che storicamente possono darsi ma che, una volta date, possono anche venire meno. La più trasparente è quella che Wight e Schmitt hanno sotto gli occhi, e cioè la tenuta di un universo diplomatico fondato sulla competizione tra potenze, limitato agli Stati e ai loro governanti e capace di relativizzare (o “neutralizzare”, come preferisce Schmitt) tutte le altre fratture di matrice religiosa o ideologica. Il passaggio alla situazione opposta – come quello innescato dalla rivoluzione bolscevica - scardina alla radice l’elegante universo realista, anzi porta alla superficie la sua incapacità di cogliere, dietro il dogma dell’immutabilità della politica internazionale nei secoli, tanto il grado di istituzionalizzazione della vita internazionale precedente, quanto il processo inverso di deistituzionalizzazione che caratterizza il Novecento come secolo delle ideologie.

Ma non basta: al di sotto di questa prima discontinuità, Wight e Schmitt ne individuano un’altra, più profonda, che non riguarda più il rapporto degli Stati e del sistema degli Stati con le ondate rivoluzionarie, ma riguarda il sistema degli Stati come tale, la sua eccezionalità e, con essa, la sua sottrerranea fragilità. Lo scostamento dal dogma realista dell’immutabilità acquista una dimensione più radicale. Sarà pur vero, infatti, che la politica internazionale che si svolge tra potenze indipendenti che non riconoscono autorità superiori e sono delimitate fra loro da confini certi mostra impressionanti elementi di continuità nel corso dei secoli; ma, questo è il punto, queste continuità sono inscritte a propria volta in un contesto particolare, che non equivale affatto alla politica internazionale tout court, bensì solo a un determinato tipo, storicamente e geograficamente determinato, di politica.
internazionale, per nulla simile (e neppure paragonabile) a quei contesti – storicamente molto più numerosi del nostro - nei quali i rapporti di fedeltà politica non erano esclusivi, i confini non erano lineari, e una unità politica rivendicava la suzerainty su tutte le altre.

Tutti i principali tratti distintivi del realismo di Wight e Schmitt procedono da questo rovesciamento. In primo luogo, la riscoperta della dimensione istituzionale della convivenza internazionale, cioè proprio di quella dimensione che risulta più sacrificata nel realismo ortodosso e nel neorealismo. Se, a differenza dell'idealismo, Wight e Schmitt si tengono ben fermi ai principi-cardine dell’analisi realista – la centralità dello Stato, l’indifferenza funzionale delle parti, la balance of power, la stessa anarchia internazionale – a differenza del realismo ortodosso essi riconoscono che questi principi non sono semplici assunti, beni istituzioni; che, anzi, ad avere il carattere di “istituzione” sono quasi tutte le caratteristiche in base alle quali siamo soliti definire la politica internazionale, dalla nozione della politica internazionale come (essenzialmente) politica interstatale all’idea di confine alla distinzione stessa tra politica interna e politica internazionale e tra guerra “interna” e guerra “esterna”; che, pertanto, una analisi autenticamente realista delle relazioni internazionali non si può accontentare di muovere da questi principi ma, al contrario, deve farne il suo principale oggetto di indagine.

In secondo luogo, la riscoperta della dimensione istituzionale pone anche alla comparazione storica limiti precisi, e comunque molto più stretti di quelli che ci si dovrebbe aspettare dal dogma dell’immutabilità. Se, infatti, l’attuale sistema degli Stati, con i suoi principi, le sue norme e le sue procedure, è una creazione relativamente recente (che si collochi la sua origine nella pace di Westphalia o, come preferisce Wight, un secolo e mezzo prima), mentre prima di esso (così come fuori dell’Europa) la convivenza dei popoli non conosceva nulla di simile al principio di sovranità o alla nostra idea di confine, allora è evidente che qualunque tentativo di applicare le sue categorie a questi altri contesti è destinato ad infrangerli proprio contro ciò di cui il realismo ortodosso non può tenere conto: la differenza istituzionale. E’ ad essa che si deve l’insistenza di Wight e Schmitt sulla incomparabilità del sistema moderno e di quello medievale – nel quale, come osserva Wight, più che di “politica internazionale” nel senso corrente della parola sarebbe il caso di parlare di “politica ecumenica”. Ed è ad essa che si deve, al contrario, l’affinità che Wight riconosce tra il sistema moderno e gli unici altri due states-systems di cui è disposto ad ammettere l’esistenza: quello cinese dei regni combattenti e quello greco-ellenistico.

Ma la conseguenza forse più importante della riscoperta della dimensione istituzionale è un’altra ancora. Essa, infatti, non si limita a reintrodurre nella storia delle relazioni internazionali la tensione tra continuità e mutamento, ma individua anche il luogo per dove questa tensione passa, e nel quale è più riconoscibile. Continuità e discontinuità, immutabilità e catastrofe, si rincorrono e si intrecciano proprio attraverso le istituzioni: da un lato, una volta sorte, esse sono fatte per produrre aspettative, sormontare contingenze; dall’altro lato, la loro stessa esistenza è una contingenza, che non cambia ciò che nella politica internazionale è immutabile - la lotta per il potere, la diseguaglianza, il dilemma della sicurezza - ma cambia la natura dei giocatori, quella del campo di gioco e quella delle sue regole. L’immutabilità, rispetto al realismo ortodosso, cambia significato, si complica, prende, si può dire, due strade diverse. Da una parte, essa risulta relazionata dal riconoscimento che, se di essa si può parlare, è soltanto nei limiti del sistema interstatale moderno (e, se mai, di quegli altri sistemi interstatali dai quali, non a caso, anche il realismo e il neorealismo sono soliti ricavare i propri precedenti e i propri numi tutelari, Tucidide in testa). Dall’altro lato, seppure in questi limiti, l’immutabilità esce persino rafforzata dalla riscoperta delle istituzioni, non perché esse costituiscano, per i nostri autori, l’unico elemento di continuità nella storia delle relazioni internazionali moderne, ma perché ne costituiscono comunque uno, anzi precisamente quello che rende la nostra convivenza internazionale diversa da tutte le altre.

Ed è proprio qui che si colloca lo scostamento più significativo tra la riflessione di Wight e Schmitt e il tipo di realismo che ha finito per prevalere nelle Relazioni Internazionali. Pur senza rinunciare all’idea che la politica internazionale sia caratterizzata dall’assenza di governo, essi ridimensionano esplicitamente il peso dell’anarchia, e non tanto perché riconoscono, come fanno anche i realisti ortodossi, che un ambiente anarchico può benissimo essere ordinato, ma perché, a differenza di questi, ritengono che l’ordine internazionale sia qualcosa di più del prodotto (sempre mutevole) dei rapporti di forza; che esso dipenda anche, a un livello più profondo, da un insieme (più persistente) di vincoli politici, giuridici e culturali; che proprio a questi si deve il fatto che, negli ultimi secoli, la competizione internazionale abbia potuto svolgersi secondo certe regole e, soprattutto, nel rispetto di certi limiti - vale a dire, proprio di quelle regole e di quei limiti di cui Wight e Schmitt sperimentavano la crisi. "Le
potenze” scrive Wight “continueranno a cercare la sicurezza senza riguardo alla giustizia, e a perseguire i propri interessi vitali indifferenti agli interessi comuni, ma nella frazione in cui deviano da ciò sta la differenza tra la giungla e le tradizioni dell’Europa”. E Carl Schmitt, con una ovvia sensibilità per gli aspetti giuridici della convivenza internazionale: “(...) senza una comune autorità istituzionale superiore, i portatori dello jus belli si fronteggiano reciprocamente quali persone sovrane di egual diritto e legittimità. Si può vedere in ciò una situazione anarchica, ma assolutamente non una situazione priva di diritto. (...) A prima vista sembra che in questo diritto internazionale interstatale di sovrani equiparati tutto sia legato al filo sottile dei trattati con cui questi Leviatani vincolano se stessi (...). Ma in realtà continuavano a esistere forti vincoli tradizionali, legati a considerazioni di natura ecclesiastica, sociale ed economica”.

E’ facile intuire, a questo punto, che cosa ci può interessare di questa triplice riflessione. In primo luogo, ci chiederemo in che cosa consiste e su che cosa poggia, per ciascuno dei due autori, questo insieme di vincoli che si frappone, senza annullarla, alla dura realtà dei rapporti di forza, e in che senso questi vincoli rendano la competizione diversa da come sarebbe - e da come tornerebbe a essere – qualora non ci fossero. In secondo luogo, vedremo che rapporto esiste, per Wight e Schmitt, tra questa comunanza e l’esperienza particolare dell’Europa. Infine, ci chiederemo per quale ragione questo rapporto costitutivo tra società internazionale ed esperienza europea ponga in termini storicamente critici il processo di globalizzazione della società internazionale che tanto Wight quanto Schmitt osservano nel passaggio dal XIX al XX secolo.

Ordine e anarchia

Se, dunque, Wight e Schmitt concordano sul fatto che l’anarchia internazionale possa essere temperata da qualcosa che, a propria volta, ha un peso molto diverso a seconda delle epoche storiche - a volte leggerissimo, tanto da avvicinare davvero la politica internazionale allo stato di natura di Hobbes, e a volte invece tanto forte da sembrare sul punto di trasformarla alla radice - da questo elemento comune le loro strade, in qualche misura, si separano: in parte perché, come detto, è diversa la loro formazione culturale e politica; in parte perché sono diverse le esperienze storiche a cui guardano, il “passaggio dalla marea montante della dominazione europea sul mondo al suo successivo rifluire” in Wight, la caduta dei limiti tra guerra esterna e guerra interna, e tra queste e la guerra civile in Schmitt; in parte, infine, perché da queste diverse prospettive cambia anche il rapporto che ciascuno dei due istituisce tra la dimensione culturale e quella istituzionale della convivenza internazionale.

In Martin Wight l’accento cade direttamente sui vincoli istituzionali, che poi sono ciò che consente alla scuola inglese di affiancare al concetto di <<sistema>> quello di società internazionale, e cioè di un insieme di Stati (o, più generalmente, un insieme di comunità politiche indipendenti) che non sono uniti soltanto dal fatto che il comportamento di ciascuno è un fattore necessario nel calcolo degli altri, ma che hanno anche stabilito norme e istituzioni comuni "per poter mantenere l’ordine e - cosa particolarmente importante in una società così dinamica e in piena espansione - per riuscire a far fronte ai cambiamenti".

Wight è molto esplicito nel distinguere la presenza di una moltitudine di Stati - che è soltanto la condizione minima per l’esistenza di un sistema interstatale - dalla rete di istituzioni che ci consente di rappresentare questa moltitudine come una società, e che non è affatto detto che nasca e si sviluppi insieme ad essa: anzi la sua ricostruzione della storia del sistema internazionale moderno è ricchissima di frizioni, ritardi e arretramenti, come il periodo di radicale anarchia seguito al concilio di Costanza e, più in generale, tutti gli “intervalli di realismo politico” nel corso dei quali "le considerazioni della legge hanno avuto la tendenza a essere subordinate alle considerazioni di potere", come quello tra la fine del quindicesimo e l’inizio del sedicesimo secolo e, forse, gli ultimi tre quarti del diciassettesimo secolo.

Altrettanto chiaro Wight lo è nell’individuare queste istituzioni, in parte comuni a tutti e tre i sistemi di Stati della storia (quello moderno-occidentale, quello greco-ellenistico e quello cinese dei regni combattenti) - come nel caso del riconoscimento reciproco, dal momento che “sarebbe impossibile avere una società di Stati sovrani se ciascuno Stato, nello stesso momento in cui pretende la sovranità per sé, non riconoscesse che ogni altro Stato ha il diritto di pretendervi”; in parte caratteristiche del sistema moderno, sebbene presenti in altra forma anche negli altri - come nel caso dei mezzi di comunicazione regolare tra le potenze, che nel nostro sistema si arrischino di quella straordinaria invenzione
quattrocentesca che è lo scambio di ambasciatori residenti; in parte, infine, del tutto peculiari al sistema moderno. Tra queste ultime, oltre al diritto internazionale, Wight fa rientrare sorprendentemente due elementi che i realisti ortodossi non riconoscerebbero mai come istituzioni: il sistema delle grandi potenze, almeno in tanto in quanto il riconoscimento dello status di <<grande potenza>> riconosca loro particolari diritti e responsabilità, e il sistema dell’equilibrio di potenza, nel quale Wight non vede né il risultato inintenzionale della politica degli attori né l’obiettivo di qualcuno di loro, bensi il mezzo attraverso il quale una organizzazione politica debole come il sistema interstatale può difendere i propri interessi comuni.

E tuttavia non manca neppure in Wight la considerazione della dimensione culturale: che rapporto esiste, infatti, tra queste architetture di istituzioni e l’esistenza di una cultura comune? La società internazionale è soltanto una cosa o è anche l’altra? E, in questo secondo caso: è possibile immaginarne che essa proceda in direzioni diverse nelle due dimensioni, oppure è necessario un certo grado di omogeneità culturale perché possa sopravvivere? A differenza dei suoi allievi Hedley Bull e Adam Watson, i quali riconosceranno che le differenze culturali non hanno sempre impedito la percezione di interessi comuni, e che questo ha condotto all’invenzione di regole anche in assenza di una cultura comune che le contenesse già, Martin Wight non sembra nutrire dubbi sul fatto che i sistemi interstatali presuppongano una cultura comune - anzi sottolinea come questa abbia trovato quasi sempre la propria radice nella comunanza linguistica, come nel sistema greco-ellenistico, ma anche nel sistema italiano e in quello tedesco agli albori del sistema occidentale moderno.

La comunanza culturale assume una duplice funzione costituente. Da un lato, attraverso il senso di differenziazione che suggerisce tra chi sta dentro e chi sta fuori del sistema interstatale, essa è all’origine della designazione degli estranei come barbari e della distinzione tra guerre giuste, o guerre combattute contro membri del sistema per imporre le sue regole, e guerre sante, o guerre combattute per difendere il sistema nel suo complesso contro gli estranei: "Più grande è l’unità culturale di un sistema interstatale" osserva Wight "più grande è probabile che sia il suo senso di distinzione dal mondo circostante." Tutti i sistemi interstatali, "compreso quello occidentale ai suoi inizi, si sono espansi e hanno dovuto difendersi contro pressioni esterne. Di qui la designazione degli estranei come <<barbari>>. E di qui anche l’idea della <<guerra santa>>. L’istituzione della guerra santa (...) è distinta, in teoria e in pratica, dagli altri tipi di guerra”.

Dall’altro lato, la comunanza culturale assurge a requisito della piena appartenenza alla società internazionale: tanto che l’assenza di una tale cultura comune nelle relazioni tra stati ellenici e potenze barbarie come la Persia e Cartagine, o nelle relazioni tra gli stati europei moderni e la Turchia prima del diciannovesimo secolo, spiega buona parte delle perplessità che sorgono sull’appartenenza di queste potenze al sistema. Non c’è alcun dubbio, infatti, che esse vi appartengano dal punto di vista della Machtpolitik; ma, ribatte Wight, è altrettanto indubbio - come vedremo meglio a proposito del sistema moderno - che esse rimangano sotto altri aspetti separate, almeno tanto da non fare smarrire il senso che le relazioni con loro - a cominciare dalla guerra - restano qualitativamente diverse da quelle che si intrattengono con tutti gli altri.

Ma Wight non si accontenta di questa relazione. A mano a mano che procede, la sua risposta si complica, diventa meno univoca. Innanzitutto perché egli stesso riconosce che la distinzione tra ciò che è dentro e ciò che è fuori dal sistema può essere, e storicamente è spesso stata, problematica, poiché "quando due culture e sistemi di potere sono tanto strettamente interdipendenti quanto il sistema interstatale ellenico e l’impero persiano", o quanto la Russia nel sistema europeo a partire da Caterina, "le loro relazioni spesso appaiono non come un conflitto tra popolazioni civili e barbari, né come un conflitto fra civiltà (clash of civilizations), ma come una lotta ideologica all’interno di una stessa comunità". Molto efficacemente, Wight intravede attorno a ciascun sistema internazionale una penombra storica e geografica, nella quale ciò che c’era prima, o fuori, degrada progressivamente fino all’interno del sistema e, reciprocamente, ciò che costituisce la sua essenza degrada progressivamente in ciò che si trova fuori: "Un sistema interstatale storico può apparire un tipo di comunità, o un insieme di relazioni e pratiche, sufficientemente chiaro e distinto, fino a che noi studiiamo la sua struttura interna e la sua vita. Ma quando esaminiamo la sua penombra, guardiamo alle sue connessioni con ciò che sta oltre di esso, esploriamo le gradazioni difficilmente definibili attraverso le quali sfuma nel suo background culturale e diplomatico, ecco che esso comincia a perdere coerenza e identità, e che anzi possono sorgere dubbi sulla validità del concetto stesso di un sistema interstatale".
In secondo luogo, il rilievo che Wight attribuisce al fenomeno della guerra civile - e che lo spinge ad affermare che è proprio la condizione di \textit{stasis} nella quale la società internazionale versa dalla fine del diciottesimo secolo, più che la sua crescente distruittività, lo sviluppo più impressionante nel fenomeno guerra - non gli consente di dimenticare che la rottura della comunanza culturale non viene necessariamente dall’esterno, ma può benissimo venire dall’interno della società internazionale; e che, anzi, questa tendenza dell’unità culturale ad andare soggetta a fratture ricorrenti è una delle caratteristiche più impressionanti del sistema interstatale occidentale, dalle guerre di religione a quelle della rivoluzione francese fino al conflitto ideologico del suo tempo. "Una frattura dottrinale o uno scisma nel sistema interstatale" scrive Wight, con toni che ricordano quelli di Aron sull’eterogeneità ideologica "mina il tacito consenso in base al quale ogni membro del sistema, nello stesso momento in cui rivendica la sovranità e l’indipendenza politica per se stesso, riconosce la stessa pretesa agli altri membri. Per un militante cattolico o giacobino o comunista, i suoi oppositori non hanno un diritto intrinseco ad esistere: hanno soltanto il diritto a essere riportati alla vera fede o liberati o, come diceva Kruscev, sepolti. In queste circostanze il funzionamento normale del sistema interstatale è in pericolo. E sono introdotte all’interno del sistema interstatale le premesse e i comportamenti della guerra santa, e gli eretici e gli oppositori politici sono assimilati a barbari. Una posizione nella controversia attorno all’origine dell’idea di crociata la rinviene nell’idea agostiniana di bellum justum contro i nemici della fede, piuttosto che in una fonte islamica, e vede il jihad cristiano come qualcosa che sin dall’origine è stata rivolta verso l’interno contro gli infedeli. La guerra santa interna, originariamente di ispirazione cristiana e poi ispirata alle ideologie secolari che sono derivate almeno in questo dalla cristianità, è stata certamente una delle caratteristiche ricorrenti del sistema interstatale occidentale".

Ma la cosa più importante è che Wight non si nasconde che a essere problematica è, prima di tutto, la nozione di <<cultura comune>>:: "Come possiamo descrivere" si chiede "questa comunità culturale? Consiste essenzialmente in una moralità e in codice comune, che conducano a regole concordate sulla condotta della guerra, gli ostaggi, l’immunità diplomatica, il diritto di asilo e così via? O richiede assunzioni comuni di tipo più profondo, religioso o ideologico? E ancora: esistono ampie variazioni tra i codici comuni dei diversi sistemi interstatali? Oppure appartengono tutti a un grande insieme di pratiche e consuetudini quotidiane, presumibilmente comuni al genere umano, e nel quale gli uomini cercano il diritto naturale"? Tutti i principali quesiti e le principali ambiguità del dibattito attuale sono già presenti. Quale è, prima di tutto, il grado minimo di somiglianza, cioè quello sotto il quale la convivenza diviene problematica? E, in secondo luogo: somiglianza di che cosa? Di pratiche politico-diplomatiche, di ideologia, di regime politico, o di qualcosa di più comprensivo (quale è, per esempio, la civiltà di Huntington)? E infine, per tornare al punto fondamentale: che rapporto corre tra la comunanza culturale intesa nel senso più forte e le "regole concordate" di cui parla Wight? Regole e istituzioni sono davvero soltanto il riflesso di una cultura comune, oppure possono svilupparsi anche al di fuori di essa - se non, addirittura, contribuire a crearla?

Queste domande non interessano nella stessa misura Carl Schmitt: non perché Schmitt ignori l’importanza dell’appartenenza a una cultura comune - anzi essa riemerge prepotentemente nelle pagine che Schmitt dedica a quel diritto internazionale dell’economia che costituiva lo standard costituzionale comune dell’Europa del XIX secolo nonché il limite (assente, non a caso, nei rapporti tra Russia e Turchia) dell’\textit{occupatio bellica} - ma perché, ancora una volta, egli pone l’accento su un aspetto (parzialmente) diverso quello degli altri due. La funzione ordinatrice che in Aron è svolta dall’omogeneità ideologica e in Wight dalla società internazionale, Schmitt la attribuisce - "sull’altezza della scienza giuridica", come egli stesso scrive al principio del \textit{Nomos della Terra} - alla grande costruzione politico-giuridica dello \textit{Jus Publicum Europaeum}.

Come la società internazionale di Wight, anche lo \textit{Jus Publicum Europaeum} è un insieme di istituzioni: dal riconoscimento giuridico-internazionale alla disciplina dei mutamenti territoriali, dalla successione tra Stati all’\textit{occupatio bellica}, dal sistema delle conferenze internazionali all’istituto della neutralità. Come Wight, inoltre, anche Schmitt attribuisce la natura di istituzioni al sistema delle grandi potenze e a quello dell’equilibrio. "Le grandi potenze, più di tutti interessate all’ordinamento spaziale comune, svolgono in questo un ruolo guida. Proprio in ciò consiste" osserva Schmitt "l’essenza di una grande potenza, nella misura in cui questa parola non sia intesa solo genericamente, ma designi nel modo più pregnante una posizione di evidenza nel quadro di un dato ordinamento, all’interno del quale parecchie \textit{grandi potenze} siano riconosciute \textit{in quanto tali}. Il riconoscimento di una grande potenza da parte di un’altra grande potenza rappresenta la forma più alta del riconoscimento giuridico-internazionale", e in particolare "per le questioni relative alla conquista territoriale. Esso significa il diritto a prendere parte al sistema delle conferenze e delle trattative che caratterizza la realtà del diritto interstatale europeo", e
attraverso il quale erano proprio “le grandi potenze (...) a conferire il proprio riconoscimento a tutti i mutamenti territoriali più rilevanti”.

Lo stesso vale per l’equilibrio. Restituito al proprio radicamento spaziale, il suo significato diviene, per Schmitt, quello di esprimere il carattere vincolante dell’ordinamento complessivo degli Stati europei, che non significa affatto - come Schmitt rimprovera al sistema ginevrino - “tutelare lo status quo territoriale di una determinato momento storico”, ma neppure - come sarebbe in una situazione assolutamente anarchica - accettare qualunque tipo di mutamento: al contrario, ciò che viene tutelato attraverso il sistema dell’equilibrio è solo “il proprio nomos fondamentale, la propria struttura spaziale”, la quale esclude certi mutamenti ma ne rende possibili, anzi a volte persino necessari, altri. “A far saltare l’ordinamento” ammonisce Schmitt “non è la guerra in quanto tale, ma soltanto determinati metodi e scopi nella conduzione di essa, i quali violano e negano le limitazioni fino a quel momento accolte”.

Ed è proprio qui, come è noto, lo scostamento più paradossale tra Jus Publicum Europaeum e anarchia. La guerra, prodotto per antonomasia della mancanza di governo, diventa nello stesso tempo il luogo di massima istituzionalizzazione della vita internazionale: guerre en forme, come scrive Schmitt contrapponendola alla paurosa mancanza di forma della guerra civile, cioè “qualcosa di analogo a un duello, uno scontro armato tra personae morales determinate territorialmente” che si riconoscono reciprocamente lo jus belli, accettano di separare la justa causa dalla forma e, proprio in virtù di questo, riescono a dare forma giuridica al nemico e a distinguersi con chiarezza dal crimine (aliud est hostis, aliud rebellis). “La giustizia di guerre condotte sul suolo europeo da magni homines, ovvero dalle personae morales dello jus publicum Europaeum, rappresenta un problema di tipo particolare. In nessun caso può essere considerata sul piano del diritto internazionale come problema teologico-morale della colpa. Giuridicamente essa non implica assolutamente più una questione di colpa, ovvero un problema di contorni morali e soprattutto un problema normativistico della justa causa. Ovviamente nel diritto internazionale sono permesse soltanto guerre giuste. Ma la giustizia della guerra ora non consiste più nella concordanza con determinati contenuti di norme teologiche, morali o giuridiche, bensì nella qualità istituzionale e strutturale di entità politiche che si muovono guerra su uno stesso piano e che, malgrado la guerra, non si considerano reciprocamente come traditori e criminali, ma come justi hostes”.

E’ persino troppo evidente quali esperienze storiche stiano dietro questa costruzione – quali esperienze le diano, come scrive Schmitt a proposito di Bodin, la sua “verità esistenziale”; così come è evidente che l’impulso a cui essa risponde è quella “aspirazione ad una sfera neutrale” nella quale Schmitt riconosce una delle forze profonde della storia europea degli ultimi secoli, quella che le impone di spostare il proprio centro di riferimento ogni volta che quello in vigore torna a essere campo di lotta. Ma la cosa più interessante, almeno per i nostri scopi, è che la grande costruzione dello jus publicum europaeum mostra come, dietro lo schermo dell’anarchia internazionale, la guerra possa cambiare di volta in volta la propria forma, fino a diventare l’esatto opposto del disordine: “(...) così come vi sono conquiste e mutamenti territoriali che restano nell’ambito dell’ordinamento spaziale esistente, costituendo anzi un mezzo per il suo mantenimento, e altre conquiste che mettono in crisi e distruggono tale ordinamento, allo stesso modo vi sono – per gli stessi motivi – guerre che rimangono nel quadro dell’ordinamento giuridico-internazionale esistente. L’essenza del diritto internazionale europeo era la limitazione della guerra. L’essenza di tali guerre era un ordinato misurarsi delle forze, che si svolgeva di fronte a testimoni in uno spazio delimitato. Tali guerre sono il contrario del disordine. In esse sta la forma più alta di ordine di cui le forze umane siano capaci. Sono l’unica difesa contro la spirale delle rappresaglie, ovvero dall’odio nichilistico e dalle azioni di vendetta, il cui fine insensato sta nell’annientamento reciproco”.

L’analogia hobbesiana tra la politica internazionale e lo “stato di natura” è completamente stravolta. La guerra dello jus publicum europaeum non ha niente a che spartire con la <<guerra di tutti contro tutti>> di Hobbes, anzi non può essere compresa se non come risposta specifica ad essa e a ciò da cui aveva tratto il suo modello, le guerre civili di religione. In primo luogo, perché non tutti vi sono ammessi, e non perché - come sarebbe in un sistema compiutamente anarchico - alcuni hanno la capacità di farla e altri no, ma, perché, anche quando avrebbero la capacità di combattere, per poterlo fare legittimamente sono tenuti ad assumere una forma determinata, cioè diventare Stati, e a rispettare certe procedure, cioè quelle del diritto internazionale europeo. “In questo modo” scrive Schmitt “il diritto internazionale europeo riesce nell’impresa di limitare la guerra con l’ausilio del concetto di Stato. Tutte le definizioni che esaltano lo Stato, e che oggi per la maggior parte non vengono più comprese, risalgono a questa grande impresa, per quanto in situazioni successive possano apparire abusate e spiazzate. Un
ordinamento internazionale che si fonda sulla liquidazione della guerra civile e che limita la guerra trasformandola in un duello europeo tra Stati, si legittima di fatto come ambito di relativa razionalità. L'uguaglianza dei sovrani fa sì che questi siano fra di loro partner bellici equiparati e tiene lontani i metodi della guerra d'annientamento”.

In secondo luogo, perché nello jus Publicum Europaeum la guerra non è affatto onnipresente, anzi è confinata a uno spazio e a un tempo definiti, per varcare i quali è necessario seguire precise procedure sulla cui osservanza vigilano tutti gli altri. Tutto concorre a questo risultato: dalla separazione tra la superficie della terraferma e quella del mare libero a quella - che vedremo meglio più avanti - tra il suolo degli Stati europei e quello dei possedimenti d’oltremare, dalla distinzione tra combattenti e non combattenti fino all’istituto della dichiarazione di guerra che, come ricorda Schmitt, “si fondava sulla necessità di una forma giuridica e sull’idea che tra guerra e pace non si desse un terzo concetto. Tertium non datur. Essa doveva tracciare nell’interesse dei belligeranti e dei neutrali una chiara cesura tra due diversi status di diritto internazionale ed evitare quella condizione intermedia che oggi è conosciuta come guerra fredda”.

Ma la cosa più importante è che, conformemente alla sua natura di istituzione, la guerra diventa impermeabile tanto alle caratteristiche e alla ragioni soggettive dei belligeranti - nel senso che qualunque Stato (“virtuoso” o no) ha pieno diritto di combatterla - quanto ai rapporti di potere che, al suo esterno, esistono tra gli Stati - nel senso che agli Stati più forti non sono riconosciuti, nella conduzione della guerra, diritti diversi da quelli riconosciuti agli Stati più deboli. L’analogia, sulla quale Schmitt insiste, tra la guerra interstatale e il duello ha precisamente questo significato: “Là dove il duello viene riconosciuto come istituzione, la giustizia di un duello consiste proprio nella netta separazione della justa causa dalla forma, dell’astratta norma di giustizia dall’ordo concreto. Un duello, in altre parole, non è giusto perché in esso vince sempre la causa giusta, ma perché nella tutela della forma sono assicurate determinate garanzie: la qualità delle persone duellanti, l’osservanza - che consente la limitazione della lotta - di una determinata procedura, e in particolare il ricorso paritario a testimoni. Il diritto è divenuto qui forma compiutamente istituzionale, consistente nel fatto che uomini d’onore capaci di dare e di richiedere soddisfazione risolvono tra loro nelle forme prescritte un affare d’onore di fronte a testimoni imparziali”.

E’ in questo modo che il rapporto tra anarchia e diritto può perdere i caratteri dell’opposizione radicale e la guerra può diventare – come è stata nello jus publicum europaeum, e come non è detto che resti al di fuori di esso - oggetto di diritto. “Per altri motivi” osserva Schmitt “è altrettanto inesatto chiamare anarchia l’ordinamento giuridico-internazionale tra il XVII e il XX secolo solo perché esso ammetteva la guerra. Le guerre interstatali europee tra il 1815 e il 1914 furono in realtà processi ordinati, limitati da grandi potenze neutrali, pienamente giuridici (...).” E ancora, polemizzando contro coloro che, sforzandosi di abolire la guerra, rinunciano a imporre delle regole: “Anarchia e diritto non si escludono necessariamente. Il diritto di resistenza e quello all’autodifesa possono essere buoni diritti, e al contrario una serie di disposizioni senza possibilità di opposizione, tali da annichilire ogni idea di autodifesa, ovvero un sistema di norme e di sanzioni capace di eliminare tacitamente ogni perturbatore, possono significare una terribile distruzione nichilistica di ogni diritto”.

**La matrice europea dell’ordine internazionale**

Dovrebbe essere chiaro, quindi, in che cosa Wight e Schmitt si discostino dall’indifferenza del realismo ortodosso nei confronti delle istituzioni. Sebbene in forme diverse, infatti, tutti e due si guardano bene dall’accettare l’assunto che il sistema internazionale sia composto da stati sovrani limitati soltanto dall’equilibrio di potenza o dall’egemonia del più forte. Non negano, da realisti quali sono, che i rapporti di forza restino i fattori causali fondamentali nella politica internazionale, senonché, per restare nei termini nei quali questa questione fu espressa da Stephen Krasner, riconoscono che tra questi fattori fondamentali e i risultati e i comportamenti degli attori si frappongono alcune variabili intervenienti; che queste non si limitano a riflettere la struttura delle diseguaglianze e, quindi, non sono condannate a mutare ogni volta che questa muta; che, al contrario, esse agiscono come un filtro che cambia sia la lotta per l’acquisizione e il mantenimento del potere, a cominciare dalla guerra, sia le modalità del suo esercizio, per es. attraverso il sistema delle Conferenze internazionali.
attraverso atti di cessione, normalmente contenuti nei trattati di pace, alla distinzione tra paix maritimes e paix continentales, nella quale Wight vede la più importante e duratura forma di riconoscimento del carattere dualistico della società internazionale e, nello stesso tempo, dell'esistenza di una "penombra transeuropea del sistema interstatale".

Le seconde considerazioni sono quelle che affondano nel modo in cui questa suddivisione venne sistematizzata dai grandi giuristi europei, e in particolare da Grozio, a cui riuscì di conciliare la consapevolezza, comune a tutti gli europei, dell'esistenza di una Repubblica Christiana (che Grozio, tuttavia, non chiama più così) e la concezione, propria di pochi intellettuali, del diritto naturale e dell'unità della specie umana. Egli, infatti, riconobbe l'esistenza di un interesse e di un diritto comune nella specie umana, ma senza rinunciare all'idea che, al suo interno, un legame particolare unisse gli Stati cristiani, imponendo loro di non ridurre in schiavitù i rispettivi prigionieri di guerra, di non mettere a saccheggio le città, ma soprattutto di cercare in tutti i modi di evitare la guerra, tenendo quei congressi (conventus) delle potenze cristiane, nel corso dei quali le dispute possano essere composte da coloro che non hanno interesse in esse, e misure possano essere prese per costringere i contendenti ad accettare la pace in termini equi.>>.

Ma la ragione decisiva per la quale Wight non riconosce la piena appartenenza dei non europei alla società internazionale sta proprio nel fatto che questi non erano percepiti e riconosciuti come se vi appartenessero. E' qui, sul terreno interpretativo più che su quello empirico, che si situa lo scostamento decisivo tra sistema e società internazionale, tra la capacità di essere attori di un sistema, cioè di produrre conseguenze sugli altri e di diventare un fattore necessario nei loro calcoli, e quella di essere membri di una società, cioè di seguire "norme e istituzioni comuni fondate sul dialogo e il consenso, per regolare i (propri) rapporti reciproci". Ed è qui, soprattutto, che perde significato il luogo comune secondo il quale le potenze occidentali impararono ben presto a fare affari con i Turchi e ad includerli nelle loro macchinazioni diplomatiche. Se è vero, infatti, che l'Impero ottomano fu in un certo senso parte della comunità diplomatica sin da quando i veneziani e il papa lo coinvolsero nel quindicesimo secolo, una generazione prima dell'alleanza francese del 1535, esso continuò a rimanere escluso dallo scambio regolare di rappresentanze diplomatiche che era il segno della piena appartenenza - tanto che, per ottennerla, gli fu necessaria l'ammissione formale del Trattato di Parigi del 1856, nel quale le potenze firmanterie dichiararono << la Sublime Porta ammessa a partecipare ai vantaggi del diritto pubblico e del sistema (Concerto) europeo >>. Wight cita l'ultimo discorso di Burke alla Camera dei Comuni: "(...) l'impero turco non è mai stato considerato parte dell'equilibrio di potenza in Europa. Essi non hanno niente a che fare con il potere europeo, anzi si considerano pienamente asiatici. Dove era il residente turco alla nostra corte, o alla corte di Prussia, o in Olanda? Essi disprezzavano e condannavano tutti i principi cristiani come infedeli, e volevano soltanto soggiogare o sterminare loro e i loro popoli. Che cosa hanno avuto a che fare con le potenze d'Europa questi selvaggi, se non per il fatto di diffondere guerra, distruzione e pestilenze?" Lo scostamento tra sistema e società è espresso in maniera quasi brutale: sarà pur vero, infatti, che diffondere guerra e pestilenze è un modo di appartenere al primo – e che cosa sono, d'altra parte, guerre e pestilenze se non segmenti di interdipendenza? – ma, questo è il punto, la piena appartenenza alla società internazionale richiede qualcosa di più - sebbene non sia del tutto chiaro, poi, in che cosa questo consista: nel riconoscimento e nel sentimento effettivo di appartenervi, oppure, come condizione di entrambi, nell'appartenenza a una cultura e a una civiltà comune.

Se, dunque, la società internazionale di Wight conserva un fortissimo impianto eurocentrico, in Carl Schmitt la centralità dell'Europa riceve una vera e propria apoteosi. "Fare in modo che la guerra diventasse in tutto rigore una guerra tra Stati sovrani europei, e che essa fosse statalmente autorizzata e statalmente organizzata, tutto ciò" scrive Schmitt "fu un'impressa europea" Tutti i protagonisti di questa impresa furono, d'altra parte, europei: lo Stato, innanzitutto, agente della secolarizzazione della vita europea e del superamento della guerra civile tra le Chiese e le fazioni confessionali; il diritto romano, che proprio nella persona pubblica dello Stato trovò il punto di partenza per l'elaborazione concettuale del nuovo diritto internazionale; il pensiero per linee globali, a cui riuscì di dare forma alla nuova coscienza planetaria dello spazio, imponendo il proprio Nomos alla stupefacente rivoluzione spaziale dei secoli XVI e XVII; le istituzioni stesse che, attraverso questa imposizione, l'Europa dettò agli altri: "Il diritto internazionale europeo tra il secolo XVI e il secolo XX considerava le nazioni cristiane d'Europa quali creatrici e portatrici di un ordinamento valido per tutta quanta la terra. Con <<europeo>> si designava allora lo status <<normale>>, che si pretendeva determinante anche per la parte non europea del globo. Civiltà era sinonimo di civiltà europea. In questo senso l'Europa continuava a essere il centro della terra".
In questa ricostruzione, l’unica cosa che resta della visione stereoscopica di Wight è il contrasto tra la portata universale del diritto e il suo radicamento non-universale, tra la sua estensione e la sua origine. Da un lato, il Nomos della Terra non può essere compreso se non come risposta alla sfida posta dall’apertura di spazi immensi fuori dell’Europa (e in particolare dalla necessità di trovare un equilibrio fra Terra e Mare); dall’altro, questa risposta affonda le proprie radici non in un generico richiamo all’universalità – come quello che Schmitt rimprovererà al diritto internazionale successivo – bensì nell’”ordinamento spaziale concreto che andava allora formandosi in Europa, cioè dallo Stato e dalla concezione di un equilibrio europeo fra questi Stati. Il diritto internazionale europeo-continentale, lo jus publicum europaeum, fu essenzialmente - dal secolo XVI in poi - un diritto interstatale tra sovrani europei e determinò, partendo da questo nucleo europeo, il nomos del resto della terra. Quello di <<statualità>> non è quindi un concetto universale, valido per qualsiasi epoca e per qualsiasi popolo, ma un fenomeno storico concreto legato a un’epoca determinata”.

E tuttavia, al di fuori di questo contrasto originario, l’immagine complessiva del nomos della terra schmittiano va ben oltre il carattere dualistico della società internazionale di Wight. Innanzitutto perché, se è vero che la distinzione tra suolo europeo e suolo extraeuropeo è riconosciuta anche da Schmitt come parte integrante della sua struttura - tanto che proprio nella sua soppressione egli riconoscerà uno dei segni della sua fine - rispetto a Wight lo spazio circostante l’Europa diviene qualcosa di molto più oscuro di una penombra. Invece che una forma di riconoscimento del carattere dualistico della società internazionale, le amity lines, istituite dal 1559 per isolare l’Europa dalla competizione che aveva luogo nel nuovo mondo, diventano il suo limite estremo. “Qui cessava il diritto europeo, o perlomeno il vecchio <<diritto pubblico europeo>>. Qui aveva fine dunque anche la limitazione della guerra operata dal diritto internazionale fino ad allora vigente, così che la lotta per la conquista territoriale diventava sfrenata. Al di là della linea iniziava una zona <<d’oltremare>> dove, a causa della mancanza di ogni limitazione giuridica della guerra, valeva solo il diritto del più forte”.

Il rapporto tra ordine internazionale e spazio europeo si stringe fino quasi all’equivalenza: e non solo perché è alla “famiglia” degli Stati europei che spetta decidere quale posto debba avere, nel Nomos della Terra, il nuovo mondo, ma perché è proprio attraverso di esso che diventa possibile osservare sia che cosa sono state e che cosa tornerebbero a essere la convivenza e la guerra senza le istituzioni del sistema europeo - “In the beginning all the world was America”, come scrive Locke e come Schmitt lo piega alla sua interpretazione – sia, soprattutto, il distacco operato dallo jus publicum Europaeum rispetto all’assenza di regole propria del paradigma hobbesiano: “Lo stato di natura di Hobbes è la terra di nessuno, ma non per questo un non-luogo. Esso è localizzabile, e Hobbes lo localizza, tra l’altro, anche nel nuovo mondo”.

Ma non basta: la ragione fondamentale per la quale la matrice europea acquista, in Schmitt, un rilievo ancora superiore rispetto a quello che aveva in Wight, sta nel fatto che l’Europa diviene qualcosa di più che l’origine del diritto; piuttosto, il luogo del suo radicamento e ciò da cui esso trae tutta la propria forza. Il principio, centrale nella riflessione di Schmitt, per il quale “ogni diritto vale come tale solo nel giusto luogo”, lo spinge a cercare proprio nel suolo dell’Europa lo spazio nel quale risiede la connessione originaria di ordinamento e localizzazione (Ordnung und Ortung) e al quale rimangono vincolate tutte le istituzioni internazionali: dall’istituto del riconoscimento, che può avere un senso preciso solo in quanto resti chiaro quale è la famiglia delle nazioni alla quale si è ammessi, alle neutralizzazioni di singoli paesi che, per non essere ridotte a “pezzi da museo privi d’importanza”, devono poter esprimere la “struttura complessiva di quello stesso diritto internazionale cui esse devono la propria garanzia”, fino al riconoscimento dei mutamenti internazionali, il cui criterio, nello jus publicum Europaeum, non è qualche nozione astratta di giustizia, ma il modo in cui si inseriscano oppure no nell’ordinamento spaziale vigente, e il cui giudice non è qualche altrettanto astratta Corte di Giustizia ma sono, invece, tutti gli altri Stati – e non qualunque Stato, ma solo quelli che partecipano all’ordinamento europeo – in qualità di testimoni e di terzi interessati: “(…) poiché una guerra condotta tra i membri di una comunità giuridica internazionale deve verosimilmente portare alla conclusione di una pace, l’interesse dei non belligeranti deve manifestarsi in tutti i casi più importanti già durante la guerra. Tutte le giurisdizioni sul suolo europeo tra Stati europei sono sempre seguite con vivo interesse da tutte le grandi potenze europee, e da esse influenzate nei risultati anche quando le potenze si mantengano neutrali. Nessuno ha giudicato questo attento interesse come un’inferiorità: ogni uomo di Stato europeo lo ha considerato come ovvio e ne ha tenuto conto. Il libero diritto alla guerra, il sovrano jus ad bellum, permette ad ogni membro di questo ordinamento di intervenire formalmente in qualsiasi momento e di imporre così all’occorrenza la propria partecipazione alle consultazioni e alle deliberazioni!.”
La tensione tra universalità e particolarità. Globalizzazione e crisi della società internazionale

Ma il significato di questa connessione tra le istituzioni costitutive della società internazionale e l'esperienza particolare dell'Europa non si esaurisce qui. In essa, infatti, è già contenuto il problema storico e teorico destinato, alcuni decenni più tardi, a dominare il dibattito delle Relazioni Internazionali del dopo-guerra fredda, almeno a partire dal famoso articolo di Samuel Huntington sul conflitto fra le civiltà: che problemi pongono l'espansione globale di questa società internazionale e l'ingresso, in essa, di un insieme sempre più vasto di Stati non europei? Quanto pesa ancora, e in che modo, la sua impronta originaria? E infine: a quali condizioni questa impronta – ammesso che sia ancora riconoscibile, e nei limiti in cui ancora lo è – si trasforma da elemento connettivo a luogo di lacerazione della convivenza internazionale?

Questa questione è riconosciuta con chiarezza da Martin Wight. Se, infatti, Wight non sembra nutrire dubbi sul fatto che ogni sistema internazionale presupponga l'esistenza di una cultura comune e che il nostro, in particolare, sia il prodotto dell'esperienza occidentale ed europea, la sua espansione gli pone immediatamente una serie di interrogativi relativi alla sua tenuta: il sistema attuale è ancora oppure no fondato su una cultura comune e, in caso contrario, ha qualche prospettiva di sopravvivere? E' davvero in corso di disintegrazione, per il solo fatto di essersi allargato oltre la sua base europea originaria? Oppure sta trovando una nuova base nella cultura cosmopolita della cosiddetta modernità, qualunque sia, poi, il rapporto tra quest'ultima e l'esperienza occidentale?

Wight non affronta in modo sistematico queste domande, sebbene i suoi scritti possano aiutare altri a cercare una risposta e sebbene, comunque, egli sembri vedere nell'unità culturale una condizione favorevole all'ordine internazionale; anzi forse persino qualcosa di più, se è vero che la stessa esistenza dei sistemi interstatali sembra poggia, in Wight, sulla pre-esistenza di una cultura comune, e poi addirittura sulla formazione e sulla sopravvivenza di un'opinione pubblica internazionale. Non è un caso che, pur non considerando esaurita la vicenda della società internazionale di impronta europea, Wight riconosca che la sua espansione costituisce di per sé un problema; non perché sottovaluti il processo di cooptazione di cui il sistema interstatale è stato capace nel corso del nostro secolo – e che ha visto il proprio culmine, paradossalmente, nella “corsa allo Stato” seguita alla decolonizzazione – ma perché, in questo processo, egli vede altrettanti fattori critici, che danno alla sua riflessione un tono pessimistico, sebbene non ancora improntato al senso della fine che troveremo in Carl Schmitt.

Un primo elemento di crisi, che è anche il nocciolo dell'eccezionalità che Wight attribuisce al sistema interstatale del ventesimo secolo, è il venir meno del senso di distinzione dal mondo circostante, cioè proprio di ciò che aveva costretto i sistemi interstatali del passato a pensare per così dire alla propria sopravvivenza, difendendosi dalle minacce esterne e distinguendo chiaramente tra le relazioni e le guerre che si svolgevano al proprio interno e quelle comuni contro l'esterno. Rispetto ad essi, quello novecentesco appare a Wight come il primo sistema interstatale completamente chiuso della storia, cioè come il primo a essere libero da pressioni esterne (come quella della Persia sul sistema delle poleis greche, o quella dell'Impero turco sull'Europa moderna) ma, nello stesso tempo, anche dalla necessità che esse comportavano di evitare tutto ciò che avrebbe provocato un indebolimento del sistema verso l'esterno; privo di limiti ma, per la stessa ragione, egualmente privo di ciò che Wight sembra riconoscere come la ragion d'essere più profonda sia dei sistemi di sicurezza collettiva sia del sistema dell'equilibrio di potenza – la possibilità di concepire e di promuovere, al di sopra dei conflitti tra gli Stati, un “interesse comune” del sistema interstatale come tale.

Il secondo elemento si riferisce ancora a questo richiamo dell'universalità, ma in un senso profondamente diverso. Se, infatti, la società internazionale di Wight rimane una società di Stati, non c'è alcun dubbio che di società internazionale si possa parlare, e si parli sempre più spesso, anche a proposito delle relazioni transnazionali tra individui, imprese e, più in generale, tra soggetti non statuali, e che, in questo secondo senso, essa tenda a poggiaire sempre di meno sull'idea di sovranità e sempre di più su qualche concezione dell'unità del genere umano. Wight non sembra nutrire troppa fiducia in questo processo: in parte perché, come detto, non ne riconosce la novità; in parte perché non nasconde il proprio fastidio nei confronti delle visioni iренiche del commercio e dell'economia.
internazionale; in parte, soprattutto, perché non sembra disposto a riconoscere in questo qualcosa di simile a una società. Ma quello che interessa è che, nella diffusione di quest'altra forma di universalismo, Wight sembra intravedere un pericolo mortale per la società universale di Stati; e non un pericolo astratto, ma lo stesso che travolse il sistema interstatale con cui Wight si confronta più spesso, quello della Grecia classica prima ed ellenistica poi. Anche allora, infatti, la distinzione tra greci e barbari venne erosa, a poco a poco, dapprima dall'idea dell'unità del genere umano, e poi dal riconoscimento che la frontiera culturale tra greci e barbari non era rigida, che il linguaggio e la cultura greci erano intrinsecamente espansivi, e che per la forza delle circostanze o per desiderio i barbari sarebbero stati convertiti in greci; e anche allora questa visione unitaria trovò riscontro nel loro effettivo e inestricabile coinvolgimento in un sistema economico e politico comune, prima di trasformarsi, con Alessandro, in una vera e propria politica di ellenizzazione dell'Asia. Senonché, come osserva Wight, a questa espansione non si accompagnò affatto l'espansione del sistema interstatale greco; al contrario, essa coincide proprio con la sua fine. L'insegnamento che Wight trae da questa esperienza trasvalica di molto i suoi confini, si spinge, si può dire, fino al mondo attuale: la dissoluzione temporanea del sistema interstatale greco in una unità più ampia “illustrò, probabilmente per la prima volta nella storia, l'incompatibilità dell'ideale cosmopolita con l'esistenza di un sistema interstatale (the incompatibility of the cosmopolitan ideal with the existence of any states-system,)”.

E tuttavia non è qui che Wight vede il principale motivo di fragilità dell'espansione della società internazionale. Più che se la sfida del cosmopolitismo, infatti, quello che sembra preoccuparlo è la crescente tensione tra universalismo e particolarismo, tra la tentazione di portare ancora più avanti la costruzione della società internazionale e la crisi contemporanea di alcune delle sue istituzioni fondamentali, tra la promozione universale della democrazia, per esempio – attraverso il quale “il sistema interstatale è arrivato più vicino di qualunque altro a erigere la struttura del governo a principio di legittimità internazionale” – e l'indebolimento di istituzioni secolari come il governo municipale: “Gli standard diplomatici tradizionali hanno probabilmente raggiunto il loro livello più alto durante il secolo prima del 1914. Da allora sono nettamente declinati. Le potenze comunistiche ripudiavano implicitamente questi standard, salvo quando conviene loro reclamarne l'osservanza; gli stati afro-asiatici non sono ancora in grado di comprenderci o di apprezzarli”.

Di più: dietro l'indebolimento di queste istituzioni, Wight intravvede i primi possibili segni di una scomposizione della società internazionale lungo qualcosa di simile a un principio di solidarietà continentale; non un principio universalistico, ma una replica fondata sul diritto di ciascuna regione a provvedere da sé (e secondo i propri principi) al proprio ordine regionale; non quello che ci si potrebbe aspettare dopo quasi cinque secoli di ascesa del potere navale, ma la prova che, almeno “nella sfera della legittimità, sebbene non ancora in quella della strategia, il potere continentale ha trionfato sul potere marittimo”. Il confronto tra universalismo e particolarismo ritorna all'origine, non riesce a liberarsi della domanda iniziale: che cosa resta, dopo la sua espansione globale, dell'unità culturale che rese possibile la nascita e lo sviluppo del sistema europeo? E ancora ipotizzabile, in un sistema internazionale sempre più plurale, la tenuta di un unico tessuto istituzionale? O è più probabile che ciascuna regione ritrovi, presto o tardi, un proprio autonomo modello di ordine, in tutto o in parte diverso da quello degli altri?

Proprio questo contrasto tra universalismo e particolarismo costituisce il punto nodale della riflessione di Schmitt. Senonché, in questa riflessione, il contrasto cambia di segno, capovolge, si potrebbe dire, il proprio significato: perché l'idea stessa di una società e di un diritto internazionale universali appare, a Schmitt, qualcosa di simile a una contraddizione in termini; e perché, ad essa, egli oppone il costante richiamo alle diversità, nel quale convergono tutte le principali fonti di ispirazione del giurista tedesco - dalla polemica controrivoluzionaria contro il pensiero razionalistico (con le sue caratteristiche antitesi tra astratto e concreto e, nella riflessione giuridica, tra il diritto come prodotto immediato della ragione e il diritto come espressione della particolarità dei popoli), a quella di Nietzsche contro l'egalitarismo e l'universalismo, fino alle opposizioni tipiche della cultura tedesca dell'epoca tra Gemeinschaft e Gesellschaft e tra Kultur e Zivilisation.

Da questa nuova prospettiva, l'espansione del sistema interstatale mostra un volto completamente diverso, quasi irriveribile. E’ il disegno stesso della storia che viene ribaltato: l'espansione della società europea, che per Wight costituiva di per sé un problema, per Schmitt coincide nientedimeno che con la sua fine. “La dissoluzione nel generale-universale era contemporaneamente la distruzione dell'ordinamento globale della terra fino a quel momento esistente. Al suo posto subentrò per parecchi decenni un vuoto normativismo costituito da regole che si presumevano generalmente riconosciute, il quale occultava alla consapevolezza del tempo il fatto che l'ordinamento concreto delle potenze sino ad
allora riconosciute era crollato e che non se ne era ancora trovato uno nuovo”. E ancora: “Che una possibilità di un diritto internazionale diverso a seconda dei continenti, ciascuno vincolato, come lo jus pionieristico” di un giurista sudamericano, Alejandro Alvarez – che avrebbe consentito di riconoscere la mai, essa appare come una opportunità mancata, quella – che Schmitt va a rintracciare nel “libro contemporanea, la scomposizione della società internazionale non costituisce affatto una minaccia; se universalismo e particolarismo. Per Schmitt, a differenza che per la maggior parte della riflessione tenesse conto di un ultimo elemento, che ci riporta ancora una volta al serrato confronto tra

Ma il rovesciamento della vicenda dell’espansione della società europea non sarebbe completo se non tenesse conto di un ultimo elemento, che ci riporta ancora una volta al serrato confronto tra universalismo e particulismo. Per Schmitt, a differenza che per la maggior parte della riflessione contemporanea, la scomposizione della società internazionale non costituisce affatto una minaccia; se mai, essa appare come una opportunità mancata, quella – che Schmitt va a rintracciare nel “libro pionieristico” di un giurista sudamericano, Alejandro Alvarez – che avrebbe consentito di riconoscere la possibilità di un diritto internazionale diverso a seconda dei continenti, ciascuno vincolato, come lo jus
publicum europaeum, al proprio concreto ordinamento spaziale, e ciascuno rispettoso delle proprie peculiarità. Questa opportunità, uscita sconfitta dal confronto con il diritto internazionale universalistico, rimane per Schmitt uno degli esiti possibili del suo fallimento; anzi è proprio qui che egli intravede – quarant'anni prima del dibattito tra la visione unitaria del “nuovo ordine internazionale” e quella plurale del “conflitto fra le civiltà” di Huntington - la nuova “grande antitesi della politica mondiale, cioè il contrasto tra un dominio mondiale centrale e un equilibrio tra più ordinamenti spaziali, tra universalismo e pluralismo, monopolio e polipolio” – tra un diritto internazionale determinato dal “monopolio globale di un’unica potenza” e un diritto e una società internazionali riorganizzati attorno a “un pluralismo di grandi spazi in sé ordinati e coesistenti, di sfere d'intervento e di aree di civiltà.”
Wolfgang Döpcke

University of Brasilia, Brasil

About the Mystery and Misery of Regional Integration in Africa

Introduction

Two trends are currently characterizing international economic relations. On the one hand, we observe processes of globalization, that is, an increasing integration of relatively free factor markets by international trade, financial, information and culture flows. On the other hand, there exists, within the broader tendency of world-wide trade liberalization, a renewed interest in economic regionalism and the formation of trade blocs.

The African continent is largely bypassed by the first trend. Although generally forced to adopt more liberal trade regimes by structural adjustment policies, Africa was largely excluded from the dynamism of recent globalization and is thus confronted by an even more dramatic marginalization in world trade. However, it seems that Africa is fully participating in the second trend in world economies, that is in regionalization. Observers point to what they identify as a “new regionalism” in Africa since the mid-1980s, a type of economic regionalism which is meant to differ substantially from its predecessors. In contrast to economic integration schemes of the 1960s, which were linked to import-substitution strategies of industrialization and, thus, inward-looking and highly market-protecting, the “new regionalism” would happen in an economic environment of trade liberalization and would make part of a set of outward-looking policies. But in contrast to more optimistic assessments which appear in academic literature especially in the first half of the 1990s, it will be argued in this paper that this new phase of regional integration, like its predecessors, is likely encounter great obstacles. Indeed, it will be shown, that more recently the question of economic integration in the two major groupings (ECOWAS and SADC) has been seriously threatened in the face of an intensified struggle for political (and military) subregional hegemony. This paper, like many others before, aims at explaining the difficulties of regionalism in Africa, and, to put it more modestly, at adding some elements to the common debate on the huge gap between policy declarations and realities of African integration. The paper will concentrate its attention on one region (Southern Africa) and one grouping (the Southern African Development Community (SADC)).

1. Globalization and Africa

The complex process of globalization unites different elements into a forceful new trend in economic, political and cultural relations in contemporary international society: the globalization of financial markets, the globalization and deregulation of trade, the globalization of production factors and the rise and globalization of new technologies, and cultural globalization.109 These processes were

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accompanied and reinforced by the opening and integration into the capitalist world economy of the ex-socialist, non-OECD countries.

Africa seems to be the only region which is largely by-passed by this recent restructuring of international society. In contrast: parallel to the decline of political power and relevance of the continent in international society due to the end of the Cold War schism (which had had created for African countries abundant opportunities for international projection), the secular trend of economic marginalization of the African continent seems to be reinforced rather than halted by globalization. Since the 1950s, Black Africa’s share in world trade in on a constant decline (see table 1).

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The crises in Africa’s foreign trade is particular evident in the lopsided composition of exports and imports, which continue to exhibit the typical patterns of specialization, namely exports of agricultural, mineral and (sometimes) fossil raw materials and imports of capital goods, machinery, manufactured goods and (for most countries) energy. Most African countries did not show any change in the composition of their foreign trade since independence and continue to remain dependent on one or two products.110 On the other hand, the demand for African raw-materials is constantly declining in world markets, appointing to one long-term transformation in the production process of industrialized economies which was greatly accelerated by globalization: the declining intensity of raw materials in modern industrial production. Whereas, for example, in 1975, primary commodities represented 26% of the European Community (EU) imports, this figure has fallen to 22% in 1980 and 17% in 1986.111 Also, prices for tropical agricultural products dropped significantly during the last two decades, due to overproduction of these commodities by Third World countries. Thus even in the most priviledged market, the EU, which offers tariff incentives for producers from the ex-colonies (Lomé Agreement) and

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tries to penalise tropical producers from other regions, sub-Saharan Africa’s market participation has dropped from 8.3% in 1960 to 3.2% in 1992. At the same time, African markets lost in importance for European exports, from 8.0% of all European exports in 1960 to 3.7% in 1992.

In general, African economies fared much worse compared with the rest of the world, especially with the dynamic elements of the transforming world economy. Whereas, for example, the average GNP growth of Africa was 2.0% in the period of 1982-92, South Asia grew 5.2% a year and East Asia at 8.0%. In terms of per capita growth, the differences are even more stunning. The most startling difference relates to the level and quality of investment. In the 1980s, Africa’s share of global foreign investment was 4.5%, by 1990, it had declined to a mere 0.7%, of which three quarters went into the mineral sector. Comparing Africa in this respect with South Asia, the economic marginalization of the continent become even more dramatic. Whereas the average rates of return on investment rose slightly but steadily from 21.3% to 22.4% (1960s to 1980s) in East Asia, in Africa this rate dropped from 30.7% to just 2.5%. Capital flight and disinvestment haunt African economies: The latest report of the Economic Commission for Africa estimates that in 1997 the ratio between public debt and flight capital reached 94.5% in the case of Nigeria, 94.3% for Rwanda and 74.4% for Kenya. The entry of financial and economic resources into Africa continues to decline. Whereas in 1997, US$ 4.5 billion in foreign financial resources entered the continent, the figure has dropped to US$ 3 billion one year later. In terms of industrial and comercial disinvestment the African continent suffers as well from a clear trend. Callaghy shows that during the 1980s, for example, 43 of 139 British firms with industrial investments in Africa withdrew their holdings, companies from other countries followed their example.

The globalized world is a world of highly especialized industry and services. Africa remained rural: in 1965 manufacturing accounted for 9% of economic activity, by the late 1980s this figure has only risen to 11%. The reasons for Africa’s economic *malaise* are multiple and, certainly, subject to controversial assessments. But whatever the analysis might be, in our opinion, it is vital to understand the complexity and multidimensionality of the problem. Monocausal explanations remain incomplete and unsatisfactory. One has to consider external *and* internal reasons, world market forces *and* African traditions; politics, society, culture *and* economy. What we intend to show is that Africa, at least since the end of the Slave Trade, has always be peripheral and marginal to the dynamic centres of the world economy. This marginalization has increased dramatically during the last two decades. In sum, instead of making part of the more recent transformations in global society, instead of increasingly integrating its economies into a rapidly growing world market, Africa has turned itself into an economically unimportant part of these markets. Africa not only does not make part of globalization, it is also marginalized in absolute terms. Unable to break with the colonial pattern of international insertion (as producer of primary products), the continent stayed *internationalized* and highly dependent on world markets in the same way as it was at the end of the 19th century. At the same time, it becomes less and less *globalized*. The continent can be considered, at best, as an *indirect* victim of globalization, in the sense that globalization devalues what Africa has to offer and values more and more what Africa is unable to offer.

Nevertheless, in another context, the recent process of globalization shows a deep and powerful impact on African societies. In the first place, it becomes very clear that globalization, and more directly, the growing powers of international agencies like IMF and World Bank, have a destructive impact on the capacities of the national states in Africa to determine their own political, social and economic directions. The politics of international organizations in Africa contribute to the deconstruction of the state, a powerful trend in African societies which receives its main force from inside but has an important international dimension. Central authority declines in African societies, reflecting the diminishing of economic and political sources for power and prestige. According to many authors, the joint impact of globalization, World Bank, economic decline and, in some cases, the end of Cold War “sponsering” results in a deep crisis of Africa’s neo-patrimonial regimes, because the lack of resources leads to a breakdown of the pattern of clientelistic politics which hitherto sustained African states.117 The consequences are the upsurge of more violent forms of competition for resources and more brutal and determined forms of exclusion which sometimes cause the “privatization”, disintegration and collapse of the central state and the militarization of social relations.118 The increased competition between African states on a regional basis and mutual interventions in domestic politics of neighboring countries, tendency which puts at risk the attempts of regional integration, must be seen as well in the context of globalization and the end of the Cold War.

The second context in which one central aspect of globalization causes a profound impact on African societies is related to the liberalization of trade regimes. During the last decade, the (neo-)liberal paradigm of international trade has advanced significantly and approaches a position of ideological hegemony. On the African continent, it were the politics of the IMF and the World Bank since the mid-1980s which have enforced the adoption of more liberal economic regimes, in terms of internal structures as well as of external trade relations. It is a well-known story which does not need to be repeated here.119 Suffice to say that the result of external pressures was a relative liberalization of African trade regimes. In many instances, a certain degree of protection was maintained, inspite of IMF conditionailities. More recently, however, it seems, that the liberal paradigm of international trade has gained a renewed force and new ground on the African continent. The major landmarks of these developments are the conclusion of a trade agreement between the Republic of South Africa and the European Union, the terms of the new “Lomé”-Agreement between the European Union and the 71 ACP states.

In march of 1999, after long and extremely difficult negotiations,120 the Republic of South Africa (including the other SACU states) and the European Union signed a Trade Agreement, which contains very strong elements of reciprocity. In fact, the principle of reciprocity in the mutual opening of their

117 For a comprehensive introductorio discussion of this impact of globalization on Africna societies see: Review of African Political Economy.

118 The literature, comenting on these more recent trends, is extensive. See for example: Reno, W.; Warlord Politics and African States, Boulder & London, Lynne Rienner Publ., 1998 LIT.


120 The negotitations are well documented in the Daily Mail and Guardian (South Africa). See its electronic listing (wysiwyg://32http://www.mg.co.za/mg/za/links/biz/trade.html)
economies dominates the agreement and characterizes its spirit. The exceptions to this principle can be considered as minor. The treaty, which entered into effect in January of 2000 (and which was celebrated as a fare-well present to Nelson Mandela) provides for the de facto opening of the South African (and SACU) market, allowing for the almost duty-free entry of 86% of the products exported by the EC, whereas the EC concedes the almost duty-free admission of 95% of the South African range of exports. This almost complete opening of the South African economy will be realized during a period of 12 years, whereas the EU has 10 years to adopt itself. When the negotiations between South Africa and Europe started after the end of the apartheid regime, South Africa had hoped to be included in the terms of the Lomé Agreement, which, at the time, provided for a privileged access to the European market for a range of products from the ACP states, but did not oblige to render equivalent concessions to EU products on the ACP markets. But South Africa’s dream, to be treated as a genuine Third World country by the EU, soon evaporated and the costs of the deal, which South Africa had made an absolute priority of its foreign policy, are now considered to be very high. Unrestricted European imports are feared not only to cause a very negative impact on South African secondary industries, but also South African farmers are very much concerned by the opening of their domestic market to, subsidized, European agricultural products.121

Even more significantly, the spirit governing the EU-South African trade agreement, that is, the idea of reciprocity and the rejection of overall protection of the weaker partner’s economy, seems also to have deeply influenced the renegotiation of the Lomé Agreement which, in June of 2000, saw its rebirth, albeit being very different than its predecessor, as the Cotonou Agreement (after Suva, on the Fidji Islands, lost the honour to give ist name in the last minute due to internal turmoil). The Lomé Agreement (1975-1999), which initially reflected Europe’s concern about secure access to raw materials and, particularly on the side of France, about post-colonial links with former colonies, had soon turned into what Ravenhill once called an arrangement of “collective clientelism”, in which the commodity the ACPs offered was their very “being there”, which rendered more symbolic than immediate material rewards to the “patron” that is Europe. The new agreement reflects the diminished importance of this symbolic reward of just “being there” in a globalized and none-bi-polar world on the one hand, and strong pressures by the WTO and United States against this type of preferential trade system on the other hand. The new agreement stipulates for a phasing out during a 15 years period of the preferential arrangements between the 71 ACP states and the European Union and their replacement by individual free trade treaties, especially with the “better-off” Third World countries, which provide for a mutual opening of the markets. Only the very poor ACP member states will continue to enjoy substantial, non-reciprocal, priviledges.

Summarizing the argument, so far proposed, we like to pinpoint to a contradictory impact of recent globalization on African societies. On the one hand, globalization did not interrupt the long-term process of Africa’s marginalization in the world economy but rather emphasizes and accelerates this trend. One the other hand, Africa clearly become a victim of some of globalization’s main features: the deconstruction of the state and trade liberalization.

2. Regionalism and Africa

Whereas the first dominant trend in global society (that of globalization) ignores Africa as far as the economically dynamic thrust is concerned, the second trend, that of regionalization, seems to have fully effected the African continent. Regional integration is not new in world society or in Africa. It has been a continuing part of the post-World War II trade landscape, being led by the economically and politically motivated integration of Western Europe into the EU. On the African continent, regionalism started with colonial schemes (SACU, East African Comunity, Central African Federation) to be followed by the first wave of regionalism between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s (see table 3), after pan-africanist ideas of unity had failed. But with the exception of the EU, the idea and practice of economic integration, especially among Third World countries, and in Africa, suffered serious setbacks and doubts in the early 1980s. More recently, however, it attracted once again increased interest, initiating the so-called “second wave” of regionalism. Existing arrangements have been, or are being, extended in their membership

and deepened in their coverage, old arrangements are being revived and new groupings are being formed. The three distinctive features of this new trend are: the conversion of the United States to regionalism; the emergence of regional arrangements integrating industrial and developing countries; and an apparent move away from inward-oriented towards more outward-oriented arrangements among developing countries, that is, the abandoning of the once very strong link between regional integration and (protected) import-substituting industrialization. In developing countries, regional integration exercises are now mostly being accompanied by unilateral trade liberalization, alias often enforced upon these countries by IMF and World Bank policy dictates.

Sub-Saharan Africa made decisively part of the first wave of regionalism (linked to import substitution) and once again is fully participating in the renovated exercise of more liberalized regional integration practise. It has the largest number of regional groupings in the world, alias with considerable overlapping membership. In the early 1990s there were counted over 30 intergovernmental organizations in West Africa alone. Seven or eight of these aim at fully-fledged economic integration (see attached table). Regional integration practices are often classified and typified, based on Balassa’s “stage of economic integration”, in a) economic cooperation; b) free trade area; c) customs union; d) common market; e) economic union. A free trade area is being created when barriers to trade among the participating nations are removed but each member state maintains its own restrictive practices, including tariffs, against trade with non-members. A customs union exists when the member states adopt a common external barrier to trade with non-members, sharing tariffs on import and other restrictions on free trade with non-members. In a common market these trade arrangements are joined by a free flow of capital, labour and services and an economic union combines the characteristics of a common market with common fiscal and monetary policies.  

The appeal of some form of regional integration in Subsaharan Africa has been described as "almost intuitive". Asante speaks of a new "global consensus (that) has emerged on the need for closer regional cooperation and integration in Africa if the continent is to be able to face up to the challenges of the 1990s and beyond. It is widely recognized that regionalism will have a crucial role to play in relaunching development and growth in Africa and to improve the economic outlook in the continent."  

The need for integration is usually perceived to be the result of the nature of the problem that individual African countries are confronted with the attempts to industrialize and modernize their economies, while achieving self-sufficiency. These problems include difficulties in gaining access to all required materials, following the uneven spread of natural resources and the lack of fund; difficulties in finding efficient and affordable technologies; difficulties in securing domestic and external markets for manufactured goods. Individual countries are perceived to be too small to provide significant domestic markets for both heavy and light industrial goods, thereby not permitting its industries working with economies of scale.

What might be the concrete benefits economic integration can offer to African countries? (Neo-)classical economic thinking has been deeply influenced in its evaluation of regionalism by J. Viner’s theory of customs union, which postulates that economic integration would be beneficial (in terms of welfare creation) only if trade creation effects outweigh trade diversion effects. Classical thinking almost


exclusively focusses on static trade effects of integration. In more recent years, economic theory has widened its perspective and has added a series of possible “non-orthodox”, dynamic gains and positive impacts of regional integration. Such dynamic gains are expected to arise from “economies of scale in trade supporting industries and services which are caused by market enlargement; spill-over effects resulting from wider knowledge transfer costs across the region on both an intra-industry and inter-industry basis; increased competition; increased level of investment ...”. Possible dynamic gains can be listed as follows: investment creation and diversion; administrative efficiency; lowering transaction costs; gains from policy coordination and economy of scale in public sector. Apart from the economic sphere, possible gains from integration might arise in the field of politics, in terms of achieving peaceful regional relations as well as securing a more forceful combined representation in world politics and vis-a-vis first world interests.

But despite this “intuitive appeal” of regional integration in Subsaharan Africa and despite of the innumerable schemes, the practise and achievements have been almost consensually been described as utterly disappointing. Faezeh Fouroutan speaks of a complete “failure” of integration in Africa. Mansoor and Inotai argue that regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa have been more disappointing than in other parts of the world. Ostheimer speaks of “ample ironies and frustrations inherent in the experiences of African states towards cooperation.” The list of negative assessments is without limits. Especially concerning the item which is best measurable, trade integration and trade creation, the African experiences fare very badly. Langhammer argues, for Third World integration in general but particularly for Africa, that “most of the empirical studies on static trade effects (...) confirm that these arrangements in their early years were net trade diverting - if indeed they had any measurable effects at all.” Aryeetey and Oduro confirm that, considering that increases in intra-regional trade must be accompanied by increasing relative weight of the region in world trade (if not we have only cases of trade diversion), “we note that for almost all the regional groupings, there has been no significant increase in intra-regional trade.” The following table confirms that statement. It is important to reaffirm that some of the higher figures, with the possible exception of UEMOA, don’t necessarily represent results in terms of the aims of regional integration. In the case of ECOWAS, for example, most of the intra-trade is made up be nigerian petroleum.

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Globalisation, Regionalisation and the History of International Relations

Table 2. Intra-trade of regional groupings in Black Africa
(Intra-trade of group as percentage of total exports of each group)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEPGL</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRU</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDEAC</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEMOA</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMA</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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</tbody>
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Why did African integration lead to such meagre results? Scholarly studies appoint to two basic fields of failure: a) structural constraints in the African economies (that is, a low potential for integration) and b) lack of implementation of rules, which pinpoints to a low valorization of integration on the part of the African political elites, despite a highly supportive discourse. Aryeetey and Oduro, for example, identify the following reasons for failure: multiple objectives, overlapping membership, poor private sector participation, absence of strong supra-national institutions, inadequate sanctioning authority, non-implementation of harmonization provisions, lack of political commitments, unclear perception of gains, inequality from the distribution of gains, inadequate compensation mechanisms.\(^{132}\) Langhammer and Hiemenz appoint to a combination of structural and political reasons: intensifying intra-regional competition was discourages rather than encouraged; supply patterns were more competitive than complementary and - because of the low level of development - the potential for shaping the sectoral structure of the economies more towards complementarity was not large in the short run; short-term distribution conflicts dominated medium term considerations of allocative efficiency; vulnerability to external shocks; the complex problem of compensation payments was not tackled.\(^{133}\)

This paper will focus on two aspects which contribute to the explaination of the tremendous difficulties, the Southern African Development Comunity (SADC) encounters in its attempts to put into practise the regionalistic discourse which caraterizes regional relations for some time now: a) the problem of potential desindustrialization of the economically weaker members of the comunity and of unequal distribution of benefits of economic integration; b) the problems arising from intensified regional competition among the states in a post-cold War regional environment.


3. The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

3.1 From SADCC to SADC

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was founded inofficially at a meeting at Arusha, Tanzania, in July 1979, officially at Lusaka in April 1980. The founding of SADCC was closely linked to the end of the liberation war in Zimbabwe and the independence of that country. The joined experience of the liberation wars, translated into a common political culture, was now directed against the threatening apartheid state. SADCC’s declared objectives were: reduction of economic dependence, principally on South Africa; promotion of co-operation and coordination to enhance development; regional integration; co-ordination and international co-operation for political liberation of South Africa. The group’s political practise was characterised by voluntary participation of its members, pragmatic and substantive programmes, decentralised responsibilities and structures. SADCC divided its activities in sectorial committees, each of them under a different chairmanship of one of the memberstates, who also host the committees.134 The largest setor is transport, which also attracts most foreign funding.

SADCC’s concrete achievements are subject to rather devastating criticism in the literature. Hawkins argues that SADCC did not realize many of its declared objects. It did not decrease external economic dependence of the region. In contrast, intra-SADCC trade declined in the 1980s and centred heavily on Zimbabwe and, but less, on Zambia.135 Trade links with South Africa have indeed been reduced, especially by Zimbabwe. But they were not substituted by intra-SADCC trade, but by new trade links mainly with Europe.136 The transport dependence on South Africa has been, according to Hawkins, reduced. Blumenfield, like other authors, doubts even these achievements and arrives at a more negative evaluation.137 But although SADCC’s economic performance might have been disappointing, its drive for coordination of developmentalist anti-apartheid efforts contributed to a common culture and consensual political values in Southern Africa, which, after the democratization of South Africa formed the basis for the, up to now most ambitious, integration effort in the region.

Since the early 1990s important changes in the global and regional environments profoundly transformed the interaction of Southern African states. Within a few years, all major traditional threats to regional security (with the exception of the Angolan civil war) had been terminated (Namibian independence, foreign intervention and civil war in Mozambique and apartheid in South Africa). Although other threats to security remain and gain importance138, the region nevertheless entered into a situation of peace and inter-state security, virtually unknown for more than one generation. To say this in President R. Mugabe’s words: “Today Africa is indeed pulling out of the dark age, an age of

134 Southern Africa Transport and Communications Commission: Maputo; Energy Sector and Technical Administrative Unit: Luanda; Agricultural Research and Animal Disease Control: Gaborone; Tourism: Maseru; Social and Water Conservation and Utilization: Maseru; Fisheries, Wildlife and Forestry: Lilongwe; Manpower Development: Mbabane; Trade and Industrial Coordination Division, Dar-es-Salaam; Mining: Lusaka; Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit: Harare.


unreason, cruelty and irrationality. But it is a dark age into which it was plunged by others, not by itself."

Globally, the demise of ideological conflict and system competition, globalization and regionalization in the form of trading blocs (EC, NAFTA, Mercosul and in Southeast Asia) and the rise of the Pacific Rim "tigers" is restructuring the economic environment, as well as the insertion of individual states in it. Finally, economic liberalization, deregulation and the retreat of state dirigism in most Southern African countries reflect the recognition of global trends in economic policy orientation, but also pinpoint to the winner of a prolonged struggle between Southern African governments and agencies of international capitalism, like the IMF and the World Bank.

The Southern African states responded to these global and regional changes in a contradictory way, combining long-term and thorough commitments to integration with a short-term intensification of economic conflict. Within this constellation of cooperation and conflict, SADCC, transformed into SADC in 1992, clearly emerged as the major instrument and entity for the realization of stronger integration, leaving aside its main competitor (PTA/COMESA) as well as the idea of using SACU as a model and core for Southern African integration.

When the end of apartheid and democratization of South Africa revealed its irreversible nature, academic observers prognosed a doomed future for SADCC. With its prime reason of existence taken away (reduction of dependence on apartheid South Africa) and its weak record of concrete achievements, other than political, SADCC’s prospects of survival (at least in its existing form) were rated very low. "If SADCC were to be disbanded tomorrow", writes Anthony Hawkins in 1992, "it would leave little behind of any permanence other than a large new secretariat building in Gaborone." But instead of disappearing together with the enemy, SADCC used its political capital, its experience in political coordination and the common political culture created during the years of struggle against colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa\textsuperscript{141} to transform itself into an agent of integration. SADCC realized what Hawkins called processes of "broadening" (with the inclusion of Namibia, Mauritius and South Africa) and "deepening" (with the transformation of the "Coordination Conference" (SADCC) into a "Community" (SADC) in 1992, and the adoption of the Trade Protocol in 1996, which intends to establish a free trade zone among the 12 SADC memberstates within 8 to 10 years time).

At the same time, and parallel to the moves for stronger integration, Southern Africa is witnessing the intensification of trade conflicts, styled as "trade wars", principally between South Africa and the more developed SADC countries, that is Zimbabwe and also Zambia. The end of sanctions against South Africa led, on the one hand, to a tremendous South African trade offensive in Southern African markets. On the other hand, the hopes of SADC countries, like Zimbabwe, that the re-integration of South Africa into the regional economy would offer immense export opportunities on that market, vanished rapidly, when it became clear that South Africa would at least try to buy time by protecting her homemarket from imports. But trade conflict also emerged between other SAARC states, notably between Botswana and Zimbabwe. Finally, the competition between SADC and PTA/COMESA points to another area of conflict, creating difficulties for further integration.

The broadening of SADCC/SADC occurred on three occasions. The inclusion of Namibia after its independence in 1990 did not represent major problems. It happened within the spirit of the "old" SADCC, that is when the organization still presented a political and economic counterpoise against South Africa. Namibia joined as well the South Africa-dominated groups (SACU and the Rand Monetary Area), thereby recognizing its de facto integration into the South African economy. This dual orientation makes Namibia's position within SADC similiar to the other SADC countries of South Africa's "inner periphery". Zaire/DRC as well as french-speaking Mauritius joined as well the Community.

In contrast, the joining of SADC by South Africa had major repercussions and inspired an intensive debate about the positioning of Southern Africa vis-a-vis the liberated economic giant. This debate oscillated around the two extreme positions, that either South Africa would transform itself into the

\textsuperscript{139} ........... The Herald, Harare, 1997, 11.3.: "Africa poised to become the world’s leading region, Mugabe”.

\textsuperscript{140} Hawkins, A.M.; Economic Development in the SADCC Countries, in: Maasdorp, G. und Whiteside, A.: Towards a P

\textsuperscript{141} Nolutshungu, S. C.: Southern Africa in a global context: towards a southern African security community, Harare (4...
motor for economic growth in the region (the neo-classical and neo-liberal "optimism") or that South Africa would, due to her comparative advantages and intra-regional competitiveness, drain wealth and resources from other SADC countries (the critical attitude of dependence approaches). The debate took for granted that Southern Africa was in an irreversible process of transformation into a more integrated economic region.

As early as 1991, SADCC established a joint planning commission, comprising of representatives of four SADCC countries and the major South African liberation movements, to prepare South Africa’s admission to the group. The then executive secretary of SADCC, Simba Makoni, left no doubt about the two processes, i.e. the transformation of SADCC into a “fully integrated Southern African Community” and the admission of South Africa, “once democracy was instituted”. But already on the 12th annual consultative conference of SADCC, held in Maputo in January of 1992, the keynote document, which strongly advocated effective integration, and thus prepared in a way SADC’s future redefinition, linked South African membership to the move to integration and warned, that “having in place a functioning programme and effective institutions of integration could well be decisive in determining whether it will be South Africa that joins Sadcc or Sadcc that joins South Africa”.

SADCC tried to implement a coordinated policy towards South Africa during the transition period, and encouraged its members from pursuing bilateral trade links with that country. When SADC opened her mission in April of 1993 in Johannesburg, South African reaction was reserved and divided. South African indefinition of its regional policy during the transition period, as well as openly given warnings to South African business, that “regional exploitation [is] not on”, made the rapprochement a cautious one. SADC officials continued to articulate fears about the desequilibrium South African membership would create within SADC and about the possibility of South African industries “swamping” SADC markets. But at the same time, SADC-sponsored studies and declarations minimised publicly the possibility of future South African hegemony and rejected the projection of South Africa as a “saviour” or the “engine, locomotive or powerhouse for the development of the whole region.” Long-term commitment, political reasoning and general security considerations, as well as western donors preference made that democratic South Africa’s membership was never seriously questioned. In August 1994, at the Gaborone summit meeting, South Africa joined SADC as its 11th memberstate.

In accordance with the “low profile” of South African foreign policy on the African continent during the first two years of democratic government, South Africa’s role in SADC was limited and its policy cautious. South Africa’s low political profile on the continent, in contrast to her trade offensive, caused apprehension on the part of African states. The former President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere and the OAU warned, “that if South Africa continues to hide behind the rhetoric of not wanting to play a leadership role, Africa would indeed suspect a hidden agenda.” South African foreign policy gradually responded to these expectations: “Our perceived reluctance to have a ‘hands on’ approach to our region and to be pro-active in our continent has to some extent been viewed by our neighbors and friends with
some suspicion and a great deal of cautions”, explains a background paper of the South African MFA.\textsuperscript{149} The assuming of SADC chairmanship by South Africa and President Nelson Mandela (together with a more active policy in regional and African security issues, like Mandela’s acceptance of mediation responsibilities in the Zaire/Congo crisis) marks the departure from this discreet regional policy.\textsuperscript{150}

b) The “deepening” of SADCC occurred so far in three distinctive steps: the transformation of SADCC into SADC in 1992, the signing of the Trade Protocol in August 1996 and the formation of a new SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, under R. Mugabe’s chairmanship in June 1996.\textsuperscript{151}

SADCC’s transformation from an organ, coordinating sectoral development efforts, directed against the dependence on South Africa, into a “community” with the declared aim of regional integration, including South Africa, began with discussions in 1991, which resulted in the formulation of the keynote document: “SADCC: towards economic integration” for the 12th annual consultative conference in Maputo in January of 1992. At this conference, Simba Makoni explained the vision of integrating the entire region into a “true Southern African Community”, and establishing “a genuinely regional economy, through creating a free trade area, later a common market and eventually a common Southern African currency. Closer economic integration was seen as “imperative for growth and development, and indeed survival.” The formation of the Southern African Community represented a response to the world wide formation of trading blocs and would enhance the bargaining position of the region in the world economy.\textsuperscript{152} It would represent a counter-measure against the increasing loss of investment interest in the region and Africa in general by international capital. SADCC’s new vision was welcomed by western donor countries.\textsuperscript{153}

The next step from coordination to integration occurred at the Windhoek summit in August 1992, when SADCC was formally transformed into SADC and the commitment to regional economic integration was reaffirmed.\textsuperscript{154} SADC’s newly defined objectives are: “deeper economic cooperation and integration, on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit, cross-border investment and trade, and freer movement of factors of production across national borders; b) evolution of common economic, political and social values and systems such as free enterprise, free elections and multiparty systems, respect for the rule of law and the guarantee of human rights.”\textsuperscript{155}

Although a series of general policies to achieve these objectives were outlined, no concrete steps to implement further integration were decided at the Windhoek meeting. The regional coordination of projects and the channelling of donors’ funds into these projects still characterize SADC activities. By 1996 ca. 600 projects had been approved, summing up financial requirements of 6.5 bil US$. The transport sector represents most coordinated activities joining 200 projects totaling the value of US$ 5 bil. Priority has the recuperation and extension of the road and railway transport lines and ports (Beira corridor, Limpopo corridor, Nacala corridor, TAZARA Railway, Lobito corridor, harbour of Dar-es-Salaam, Trans-Kalahari roads, Trans-Caprivi road) and of the energy supplies and transmission lines.

\textsuperscript{149} Background Document delivered by the MFA at the Parliamentary Media Briefing Week, 11/2/1997

\textsuperscript{150} Daily News, Gaborone, 1997, 10.2.: “SADC looking to SA for guidance”. Background Document delivered by the MFA at the Parliamentary Media Briefing Week, 11/2/1997

\textsuperscript{151} Daily News, Gaborone, 1996, 20.6.: “Summit launches new SADC organ”.


\textsuperscript{155} This part is based on: Tsie, B.: States and Markets in the Southern African Development Community (SADC): Beyond the Neo-Liberal Paradigma, in: Journal of Southern African Studies, 22, 1, pp. 75, 1996.
Other SADC project-activities are so diverse as: Oil and energy sector coordination, anti-drought and famine coordination, the operation of a Regional Business Council, promotion of cross-border cultural activities, coordination of policies and activities against crime, poaching and drug trafficking, the coordination of water policies and the joint utilization of the big, “international” rivers, the development of a new industrial and productivity policy, adapted to the plans of a free-trade zone, training of journalists, policies to realize gender equality and to enhance the situation of women. One very sensitive issue, intensively negotiated, is the abolishing of visas and the permission of free cross-border movements of all SADC citizens. From the end of 1995 onwards, SADC began to acquire a more distinct profile as a political grouping within Africa, when it developed a coordinated policy against Nigerian human rights violations. This approach continued in joint policies towards Angola and in joint mediation attempts in the crisis in the Central African lakes region. SADC represented itself as well with a common position at the WTO meeting in Singapore in December 1996.

But the materialization of stronger economic integration was tackled very slowly. Since 1994 negotiations were taken place to formulate a trade protocol. In 1995, an influential new organ, the sector on finance and investment, under South African coordination, was founded. Its purpose is to coordinate the harmonization of the region’s monetary and investment policies. At the 16th SADC summit held in Maseru, Lesotho, in August 1996, finally, the trade protocol was presented and signed by all SADC member states, except Angola. It was praised as a major turning point in SADC’s history. It provides for the establishment of a free trade area among the SADC member states by the elimination of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers.

To negotiate this tariff elimination, and to consider „special cases”, a trade negotiation forum is to be established. Once the protocol becomes effective, with its ratification by two thirds of SADC’s member states, the individual states will be barred from increasing import tariffs. The ratification was expected to take about six months, but until today this process is not completed. The protocol, which by now is more than 3 years old, has until now been signed by 11 members of SADC. At this moment, it is the so-called textile war (see below), but partially as well the severe difficulties caused by the complex division of the SADC member states in relation to the question of intervention into the Congo civil war, represent the main obstacles. Once signed and in force, it will need another 8 years until free trade will be effective in the SADC region.

3.2. The (re-)politicization of SADC and regional power struggles

Since the reintegration of South Africa into the international and sub-regional community, trade between the SADC member states increased substantially, not as a result of SADC policies but as a consequence of general trade liberalizations within the region (which had suffered pressures from GATT/WTO and the IMF in this respect) and of a South African trade offensive. This has led to intensive tensions within the region. Later, in 1998, tensions escalate further, when the region was involved in a severe power struggle between South African and Zimbabwean interests, which emerged to the open in relation to the question of intervention into the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, after the new Head of State, L. Kabila, had to face regional upsurgence by opposition groups as well as by multiple interventions by neighboring states. Both tendencies (economic conflict, in the face of the absence of compensation mechanisms in the case of a economically dominating member of a trade zone, and political conflict and the utilization of the instruments of regionalism in this conflict) are

156 The Herald, Harare, 1996, 13.8.: "SADC ministers adopt draft trade protocol".
157 The Star, 1995, 17.5.: "Let’s merge economies, say leaders". The Herald, Harare, 1995, 12.5.: "SADC committed to economic unity".
158 Daily News, Gaberone, 1996, 29.8.: "Summit was turning point in efforts of regional grouping".
159 "According to Sadc executive secretary Kaire Mbuende, the time frame was one of the most controversial issues that delayed agreement on the protocol, with some countries like Zimbabwe, pushing for a shorter period while others, like South Africa were pressing for a longer time. Mbuende said they also felt each member state had products it considered sensitive on which they would prefer to go slow in reducing tariffs." The Herald, Harare, 21.8.1996.
160 The Herald, Harare, 1996, 13.8.: "SADC ministers adopt draft trade protocol".
161 The Herald, Harare, 1996, 13.8.: "SADC ministers adopt draft trade protocol".
being discussed here. Both tendencies, it will be argued, appoint to new trends in regional relations on the African continent, after the removal of Cold War restraints and dampen the hopes for a rationally oriented process of regional approximation and integration.

"Trade wars"

Trade conflicts in Southern Africa have a long history, principally between the two most advanced and industrialized economies, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The years of political confrontation and sanctions against South Africa did not remove South African products from the non-SACU subregional markets, but reduced their presence substantially. Since 1981, South Africa's export to non-SACU delimited in volume and value.\(^{162}\) Zimbabwe for example, South Africa's "natural market" to the north, reduced its imports from South Africa from 27% of all imports in 1981 to 19% in 1990 and its exports to this country from 21% to 9%.\(^{163}\)

With the unbanning of South African anti-apartheid organizations and the release of Nelson Mandela from prison (Feb. 1990), the signing of the National Peace Accord (Sept. 1991) and the inciation of political negotiations (Codesa, Dec. 1991), Africa began to open its markets again for South African products, well before its democratic elections in 1994. The South African economy, amidst a severe domestic economic crisis, long-term decline of growth rates and official unemployment figures at around 35%, responded with an unprecedented vigour.\(^{164}\) Between 1987 and 1992 South African exports to Africa jumped from a 4% of all exports to 9.1%.\(^{165}\) Between 1992 and 1994 trade with Africa rose by another 50%, reaching $2.5 billion.\(^{166}\) In 1995, 8% of all South African exports (outside the SACU) went to SADC countries, growing at rates of 20% annually.\(^{167}\) Prime destination of South African exports is Zimbabwe, which assumes today for South Africa the same importance as the West German market. There, South African imports jumped from 19% of all imports in 1990 to a staggering 38% in 1996, only counting official trade.\(^{168}\)

South Africa entered as well very successfully the Mozambican market. Between 1992 and 1993 South African exports to Mozambique surged by 42%, turning that country into South Africa's second largest African trading partner (after Zimbabwe) outside the SACU. Sophisticated marketing and sales techniques are being applied by South African exporters in Mozambique. South African firms as well gained a substantial portion of the aid funds entering Mozambique to assist the reconstruction efforts. South African firms have won major contracts for road and bridge construction, airport renovation and the elimination of land mines.\(^{169}\) It is not without a certain irony that South Africa is now profiting from the destruction that it had helped to cause to Mozambique during the years of destabilization policy.


\(^{165}\) Financial Mail, Johannesburg, 1992, 28.8.: "Trade. New directions".

\(^{166}\) The East African, Nairobi, 1995, 24.7.: "S. African firms fill void as West turns elsewhere".


\(^{168}\) Mail & Guardian, 1997, 23. - 29.5.: "South Africa accused of bully-boy tactics in trade with Zimbabwe."

The South African trade offensive is accompanied by rapidly growing engagement of South African firms outside its traditional scope of activities in Southern Africa. South African mining companies are prospecting in Zaire, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and several other countries of West Africa. South African hotel companies are investing in the East African countries and South African Airways entered into management agreements with Tanzania and Uganda. Railroads are being built by South African companies in Zaire, and South African Railways is upgrading the ports of Beira and Maputo. Botswana’s telephone network and the power grids of Mozambique, Angola and Lesotho have attracted South African interest.170

The South African export upsurge is not accompanied by reciprocity: South Africa continues to import very little from its African trading partners. A very heavy trade balance surplus in favour of South Africa is the consequence. South Africa exports 50 times more to Tanzania, 30 times more to Uganda and 20 times more to Kenya that it exports to these countries in 1995.171 Zimbabwe’s trade deficit with South Africa amounted in 1995 to $3 billion ($5 billion South African exports against $2 billion Zimbabwean exports).172

Until the end of the decade, South Africa conquest of African markets was so successful that the country had a huge positive trade balance with every of its African trading partners, with the exception of oil-producing Nigeria, Gabon and Egypt. As it shown in the table below, in 1999 the value of South Africa’s export to Angola were ten times, to Congo (DRC) 60 times, to Kenya 20 times, to Mozambique about 15 times, to Tanzania 40 times and to Zimbabwe 4 times as high as imports from those countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>56,948,676</td>
<td>12,535,341</td>
<td>499,788,115</td>
<td>472,350,226</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>3,302,379</td>
<td>1,752,386</td>
<td>29,357,911</td>
<td>59,650,203</td>
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<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>78,602,410</td>
<td>76,869,728</td>
<td>121,814,034</td>
<td>68,305,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC-Congo</td>
<td>16,426,990</td>
<td>11,442,302</td>
<td>406,959,296</td>
<td>647,373,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>27,179,987</td>
<td>268,978,281</td>
<td>56,847,352</td>
<td>48,550,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>10,991,675</td>
<td>15,844,073</td>
<td>289,501,191</td>
<td>176,558,155</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>17,729,562</td>
<td>33,003,421</td>
<td>609,567,618</td>
<td>609,875,648</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>6,840,714</td>
<td>21,604,214</td>
<td>132,485,175</td>
<td>108,715,617</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
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<td>199,412,300</td>
<td>610,228,089</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>1,194,293,680</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>279,201,285</td>
<td>267,750,732</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>105,288,075</td>
<td>90,069,254</td>
<td>954,450,323</td>
<td>902,671,009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

170 The East African, Nairobi, 1995, 24.7.: “S. African firms fill void as West turns elsewhere”.
172 The Herald, Harare, 1996, 24.5.: “President tells SA to co-operate”.

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These huge trade deficits between South Africa and its region is not exclusively the result of "pure economics" and the "invisible hand" of market forces. It is as well partly due to South African regional economic policies which combine export promotion up to the point of subsidies (principally under the General Export Incentive Scheme) with certain elements of market protection. At the same time, many African countries since the mid-1980s under IMF and World Bank pressures are liberalizing their trade regimes and opening their markets. From this constellation arose severe trade conflicts, especially between South Africa and the industrially more advanced countries of SADC (Zimbabwe and Zambia) which saw their markets being "swamped" with South African products whereas their own industries are being excluded from the huge South African market. These conflicts culminated in what has been styled as a "trade war" between South Africa and Zimbabwe, which illustrates vividly the centripetal tendencies Southern African integration efforts still have to overcome.

Trade conflicts between the two countries have a long history which dated back to the 1930s. They rose again, this time rather profoundly, when the 1964 Customs Agreement expired in 1992. The South African government declared its intentions to renegotiate the agreement, but employed in practice subtle delaying tactics which successfully inhibited the conclusion of a new agreement until today. During these five years, sectoral interests, as defined to a high degree by employers and the Trade Unions, like the Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union, came to influence substantially regional trade policies. The result was, rather ironically accompanying the South African trade offensive in Africa, a protectionism against a range of products from Zimbabwe, in first place against articles of the Zimbabwean textile and clothing industries. This caused tensions between the two countries, and principally between the employers involved, and made some Zimbabweans proclaim that "President Nelson Mandela is doing more to hurt them now than apartheid ever did".

The renegotiations of the trade agreement started already in September 1991 with detailed Zimbabwean proposals for amendment. By mid-1992, in response to the depressed homemarket and to increased imports, especially from Asian countries (principally India and Pakistan), South Africa introduced what Zimbabwean industry called a protective tariff, for products of the textile and clothing industry. But what really happened was that South Africa withdrew the suspension of import duties which made part of the 1964 trade agreement. With this, import duties rose from 30% to 90% of the value of the product. Zimbabwe traditionally enjoyed a trade surplus with South Africa in textile products. Although Zimbabwean textile exports to South Africa made up only 3% of national South African production, for Zimbabwean manufactures the southern market represented a vital outlet. As a result of this measure, which "virtually wiped out exports to South Africa", in combination with drought and recession in Zimbabwe, local textiles industries retrenched over 7000 workers. Later, it was claimed that 17.000 workers (out of 50.000) had been retrenched in the Zimbabwean clothing sector.


174 Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, 1996, 7.6.: "Zim attacks SA on Trade policies."

175 Financial Gazette, Harare, 1992, 14.5.: "Negociations for new trade pact with SA on".

176 Financial Gazette, Harare, 1993, 4.3.: "Textile barons hold key to SA trade talks".

177 The Herald, Harare, 1995, 23.8.: "Zimb, SA in textile agreement".

178 In 1992, Zimbabwe imported from South Africa textile product in the value of $142,1 million, exported the value of 250 million. The Herald, Harare, 1993, 23.7.: "Zimbabwe pleads for duty concessions".

179 The Herald, Harare, 1993, 23.7.: "Zimbabwe pleads for duty concessions".

Due to political representation, South Africa agreed to waive import duties temporarily on 1th of May 1992. But at the same time it stopped issuing import licenses for South African textile importers, and thereby hindered Zimbabwean exports indirectly.181 On 31th of December 1992, the import duties were re-imposed. In the meantime, Southern Africa saw an intensive shuttle diplomacy between the two countries, resulting in mutual declarations that the preferential trade agreement would be maintained, but in no concrete achievements on details. In March 1995 the two countries signed an agreement which would initiate and structure the negotiations.182 But at the same time, South Africa indicated very low priority for the renegotiation of the trade agreement and launched the three arguments, which would in future cause much further delay: that a multilateral, SADC-wide trade arrangement would have preference to bilateral agreements; that the conclusion of a new SACU agreement would have priority; and that rules adopted by the WTO would make the conclusion of bilateral preferential trade agreements with developing countries like Zimbabwe only possible, if South Africa, which is rated by WTO as a middle income country, would extend the preferences to other developing countries.183

In August 1995, both governments reached agreement on removing the punitive tariff on Zimbabwean textile imports to South Africa, which was outrightly rejected by the South African clothing industry, insisting on the 90% tariff.184 Negotiations dragged on without any result, but the mutual accusations between South African industry and her trade unions on the one hand and their Zimbabwean counterparts on the other hand intensified. The Zimbabwean side accused South Africa openly of practicing severe protectionism and of "dumping" of its manufactured products on the Zimbabwean market at a price below costs of production, whereas the South Africans claimed that Zimbabwe's textile industry does not need preferential tariffs, because it would enjoy comparative advantages like labour costs 25% lower that the South African rates.185 The South African Textile Workers' Union accused Zimbabwe of exploiting cheap labour and allowing her country to be used as an entry point for cheap Asian textiles, which then would end up on the South African market wrongly labelled as Zimbabwean products.186 The Union as well pointed to the severe crisis in South African textile industry which, according to SACTWU, had lost about 12.000 jobs alone in the last half of 1995.187

By mid-1995, for the first time, Zimbabwean industrialist pressed publicly for retaliatory tariff measures against South African imports.188 President R. Mugabe took up this thread and, calling for a closer co-operation between government and the private sector, declared, "that time has come to protect our industries. We must act in defense."189 Zambia and Zimbabwe raised the issue at the 12th SADC

182 The Herald, Harare, 1995, 2.3.: "Zim and SA to sign long-awaited trade pact". The Herald, Harare, 1995, 3.3.: "Big step ahead as Zim and SA sign pact".
186 Because of these fears, South Africa insisted during the negotiations on a 75% local content rule, whereas Zimbabwe tried to fix it at 25%. There has also been some "replacing of labels" by Malawian companies in its trade with South Africa, which in 1996 threatened the conclusion of a trade agreement between the two countries. The Nation, Blantyre, 1997, ?.2.: "Malawi-SA trade accord threatened". Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, 1996, 14.6.: "Erwin defuses ZIM trade row".
188 Financial Gazette, Harare, 1995, 13.7.: "Retaliatory tariffs urged against SA".
189 The Herald, Harare, 1996, 24.5.: "President tells SA to co-operate".
summit in 1996, where South Africa came "under fire" from SADC countries.\textsuperscript{190} At this point, the European Community as well voiced, albeit light, criticism of South African policies.\textsuperscript{191}

In November 1995, the trade negotiations reached their very low point, "collapsing" because both parts failed to reach agreement on any of the sensitive issues.\textsuperscript{192} In June 1996 they were revived with the formation of three technical committees to advance negotiations in the fields of textile and clothing, leather and footwear and agriculture.\textsuperscript{193}

One month later the Zimbabwean Governments took the decisive step and announced a new tariff regime which would bring effective protection especially to those branches of manufacturing which had suffered most from the South African trade offensive (clothing and textile sector, battery manufacturers, luggage-ware industries, the manufacturers of medical equipment and goods for disabled persons and selected agricultural products).\textsuperscript{194} With this decision, the Zimbabwean government gave in to pressures form certain fractions of local manufacturing capital, while at the same time antagonizing SADC efforts to reduce tariffs and to form a free-trade area. Although officially denied, severe pressures must have come down on the Zimbabwean Government by SADC and South Africa, and also, less intensive by those Zimbabwean industrialists who would suffer from the new tariff structure. The Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) criticized certain "anomalies" in the new tariff regime and asked, in the same way as SADC, for its temporary suspension to enable further consultations. Days after its publication, the Government ceded to these pressures and announced the suspension of the new tariff regime, leaving it as a warning shot towards South Africa.\textsuperscript{195} In February 1997, finally, the revised new tariff structure was announced another time. It was received with mixed feelings. On the one hand, it provided definitely for a protective tariff for local manufacturers and lowered the duties for importation of capital goods like machinery. On the other hand it will penalize those manufactures who depend on importation of raw materials (like for example the clothing, printing and packing industries) and, clearly, those trading companies, who sell finished imported products.\textsuperscript{196}

It seems that the Zimbabwean hard-line approach and the new drive for protectionist, "national-developmentalist" policies, paid off. Shortly after the first "warning shot" in July 1996, Zimbabwean-South African negotiations on textile and clothing imports were concluded with the decision to reduce South African tariffs from 90% to 18% to 30% for the various products of the industry. The agreement fixed as well Zimbabwean quotas on the South African market.\textsuperscript{197} It can be argued that Zimbabwe, after 5 years of agony, "won" the "trade war" in textiles with her southern neighbour. South Africa as well indicated a renewed willingness to negotiate the other sensitive areas of bilateral trade.\textsuperscript{198}

\textsuperscript{190} The Sunday Mail, Harare, 1996, 4.2.: "SA under fire at SADC conference".
\textsuperscript{191} The Herald, Harare, 1996, 5.6.: "View SADC with a soft heart, SA told".
\textsuperscript{193} The Herald, Harare, 1996, 10.7.: "Zimb, SA trade pact under scrutiny". The Herald, Harare, 1996, 13.7.: "Long road to trade agreement with SA".
\textsuperscript{194} The Star, Johannesburg, 1996, 3.7.: "SA-Zimbabwe trade war looms". The Herald, Harare, 1996, 22.7.: "New tariffs announced to protect goods from external competition".
\textsuperscript{195} The Herald, Harare, 1996, 27.7.: "New tariffs suspended pending consultations".
\textsuperscript{197} The Herald, Harare, 1996, ?.8.: "At last SA agrees to cut tariffs. Thousands of local textile jobs now safe". The Herald, Harare, 1996, 8.8.: "Details on deal with SA".
\textsuperscript{198} The Herald, Harare, 1996, ?.10.: "Zimb, SA agree to speed up trade talks". The Herald, Harare, 1996, 8.10.: "SA committed to trade deal".
since been made on the agricultural sector.\textsuperscript{199} The general economic recovery in both countries in 1997, and the "politicization" of the trade issue,\textsuperscript{200} facilitated substantially this new economic rapprochement.

But the "textile war" did not stop at this point. It was rather transformed into a wider commercial conflict, involving now the member countries of SACU (South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland) on the one hand and the remaining SADC members on the other hand, which effectively, until today, represents one of the main obstacles of economic integration and free trade in the region. One deadline after the other is being ignored in the implementing of the SADC free area, because of the impasse created by the disagreement on the textile sector. "If Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries were to go to war", writes the South African Mail and Guardian, "it would be over a piece of a fabric. Belligerents would consist of South Africa and its Southern African Customs Union (SACU) partners of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland on the one hand, and the remaining SADC countries of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mauritius and Seychelles, on the other."\textsuperscript{201} The dispute now concentrate on questions of rule of origin in SADC trade in clothing and textiles. Many, in fact principally the economically weaker, SADC member states import some components on the production chain in the textile industry from outside SADC. South Africa is inclined to not accept these textiles as genuine SADC products and to not open its domestic market accordingly. The problem is, that the textile industry represents one of the very few industrial branches which the poorer SADC countries have developed and that textile exports to the South African market make up one of the very few, if not the only, industrial area which potentially would be able to counterbalance, albeit only slightly, the huge trade deficits these countries have with South Africa.

The issue at stake is, of course, linked to an even more profound problem which represents one of the central difficulties, which schemes of integration between economically very uneven partners encounter. As it has been shown above, the less industrialized SADC countries run a serious risk of deindustrialization caused by South African advantages on their markets. Any regional free trade arrangement has to deal with this differentiated impact of trade liberalization and apply effective compensation measures in order to achieve a more equal distribution of the benefits of economic integration.

South Africa’s response to this problem consists in the suggestion of a differentiated time frame of liberalization and must be considered as inadequate. According to the Mail and Guardian, “South Africa’s free-trade offer to non-SACU/SADC countries is structured into three categories: Immediate liberalisation. These are products that attract less than 17\% import duty. They include copper, iron products and steel, wood and articles made of wood, machinery and appliances, paper and paperboard and printed materials, hides, skins and leather. Gradual liberalisation. These are products that attract between 18\% and 25\% of import duties, and would be removed in the first three years of implementation. They include furniture and bedding, selected chemicals, paper products, machinery and appliances. Products that attract duties above 25\% would be duty free within the first five years of the free-trade agreement implementation. Products in this category include articles of leather, rubber, selected textiles, vehicles, parts and commodities, selected footwear, cutlery, ceramic kitchen and tableware. Sensitive list. These are largely textiles, clothing and footwear products that are the subject of disagreement and outstanding negotiations among the SADC member states. These products constitute 0,78\% of tariff lines and represent 3,04\% of SADC imports.”\textsuperscript{202} The question of deindustrialization and of possible compensation measures is not seriously tackled by this approach.

\textsuperscript{199} Financial Gazette, Harare, 1997, 6.3.: "SA offer raises hop for stalled trade talks". The Herald, Harare, 1997, 8.3.: "Trade deal will see beef exports to SA".

\textsuperscript{200} The trade dispute was for example officially treated at Mandela's state visit to Zimbabwe in May 1997, when he also adressed the Zimbabwean Parliament on the issue. See: Gvt of SA, Office of the President: Mandela Address to the Parliament of Zimbabwe.


"Real wars"

In 1994 SADC ministers of defense, at their meeting in Tanzania, approved the establishment of a rapid deployment peace-keeping force, which could be used to contain regional conflicts or civil unrest within a SADC member country. In June 1996, SADC heads of state and government, inaugurated a new Organ on Politics, Defense and Security, under the chairmanship of President Mugabe, which was expected to enhance co-ordination of national security policies. The objectives of the body were as declared: to safeguard the people and development of the region against instability arising from civil disorder, inter-state conflict and external aggression; to undertake conflict prevention, management and resolution activities, pre-empting conflicts through an early-warning system and using diplomacy and peace keeping to achieve sustainable peace; to develop a common foreign policy; to develop close co-operation between the police and security services within the region, among other objectives.

What could be interpreted as a consensual step to a mutually accepted security regime turned out to develop into the major obstacle for further integration of the region. In the first place, only two countries in Southern Africa have real military and infrastructural capacities to contribute to and realize the implementation of this organ (South Africa and Zimbabwe). Thus, fears were created on the part of smaller countries. The summit elected the Zimbabwean President, R. Mugabe, to chair the organ. From then onwards upsurged a second conflict: Mugabe, feeling to have lost in prestige, influence and regional power due to Nelson Mandela’s accession to South African presidency and having to cope as well with South African aggressive regional economic policies, sought to create a regional power base using the chairmanship of the new organ. He, for a long time, upheld the legally dubious position, that he, as the chairman of the organ, could act independently, in the name of SADC, in military matters. This reading was heavily, and later successfully contested by South Africa. Thus, in August 1998, Mugabe called for a meeting of the heads of state of SADC member states (7 of which attended) to discuss the escalation of civil conflict in the DRC and, to find means and ways to actively, and legitimized, intervene in this conflict in pursuit of rather particular economic and political interests. From the fall of the Mobuto regime until today the Congo civil war transformed itself into a regional conflict, involving at least 7 African states in terms of military engagement (Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, Mali) and at least another 6 African countries (South Africa, Burundi, Chad, Libya, Tanzania, Congo-Brazzaville) with strong political, economic and diplomatic interest and engagement. The conflict emerged in two distinctive phases. The first moment corresponds with the ousting from power of the Mobuto regime by a complex (and some observers say obscure) alliance, made up by Congolese of Tutsi ethnic background and other forces like the “Katanga Gendarmes”, headed by the also rather enigmatic figure of Laurant Kabila. The actual fighting was, since the beginning, mainly in the hands of non-Congolese soldiers. On the side of Kabila fought parts of the Angolan, Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces, Mobuto mobilizou members of the ex-armed forces of Rwanda (of the former Hutu regime), of former ruandease militias (Interahamwe) e mercenaries from various countries. It seems that Zimbabwe did not involve itself directly in the fighting at this stage, but provided vital equipment to the insurgents. South Africa was the only country of the region, having strong interests in the Congo, which insisted, with United States’ backing, in a negotiated solution to the end of the Mobuto regime.

With Kabila’s military victory, which excluded the urban-based political and civic opposition against Mobuto from power and opened the way for Kabila’s autocratic rule, the interests and influence of his allies Uganda, Rwanda, Angola e Zimbabwe turned prevalent, if not dominant in the region. But Kabila’s autocratic e despotic government, as well as a complex conjuncture of regional interests (especially of Ruanda and Uganda), led to the growth of an effective military opposition movement against Kabila which had its geographical origins in the Eastern parts of the country. Like some other neo-patrimonial African regimes in the post-Cold War period, the Kabila government since the very beginning practised much more politics of exclusion than of inclusion and integration. Kabila started to systematically persecute his former internal allies (the Congolese Tutsi) and to construct his state on a
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... ethnically, politically and socially very small basis. At the same time, he tried to free himself from his former patrons, that is, Rwanda and Uganda and from their influence on Congolese politics. The politics of exclusion and persecution practised by the new Congolese regime provoked the rise of a new armed opposition which rapidly made significant advances in the eastern region of the country. The military situation worsened to such extend that it threatened his military survival of the Kabila regime. At this point, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe decided to intervene with the full force of his army on the side of Kabila, declaring publicly this intervention to happen in the name of SADC. His chairmanship of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security would give him the right to decide this intervention in the name of the Community without the prior consultation of a meeting of Heads of State. Soon Zimbabwe found itself deeply involved in the Congo civil war. Zimbabwean combat engagement was decisive in saving Kabila for the moment, but contributed immensely to the internationalization of the war and provoked a deep schism in SADC. Later that August 1998, ministers of defense and defense official of various SADC countries declared their support to the Zimmbabwean initiative, which was joined by Angola and Namibia, sending combat troops as well. South Africa rejected any military intervention under SADC auspices and insisted that SADC would pursue a diplomatic approach. Nelson Mandela, as SADC President, convened a SADC emergency meeting, which Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia did not attend. There followed a series of talks between SADC members as well as non-SADC states of the interlacustrine region. Various peace plans were drawn up but fighting intensified and Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola had to send reinforcement to guarantee Kabila’s survival. Meanwhile, in September 1998, South Africa, together with Botswana intervened militarily in Lesotho, “to restore law and order”, following an coup attempt by the Lesotho military. The operation was declared to have been conducted under SADC auspices, but it provoked widespread criticism.

SADC military involvement in Congo robbed the organization’s ‘innocence’. SADC became the stage of a fierce power struggle and was effectively divided into two groups, following respectively the South Africa and Zimbabwean lines of conduct. SADC became “victim” of what can be called the new intra-african relations after the end of the Cold War. Being freed of direct superpower intervention and their more direct political and military interest, the states began to readjust their relations. Intervention in one’s neighbor’s internal affairs becomes more common and the determination of sub-regional hegemonic powers, like South Africa, Zimbabwe and, in the case of West Africa, Nigeria to impose their interests upon the weaker neighbors and to confront each other more directly and openly come to characterize the continent in its attempt to redefine relations in the 1990s. The idea of integration, and its economic rationale, in the case of Southern Africa the ratifying and implementation of the Trade Protocol, stays behind. Regionalism becomes more political, and thus more fragil and contested. The discourse of integration, though, remains strong and powerful: it makes part of Africa’s ‘jurical statehood’ (Jackson).

Conclusions

It is one striking feature of recent international society that the forceful trend of the “new wave” of regional integration seems to strike positive results in some regions but seems to encounter tremendous obstacles in the African case. The recent functionalization of the two largest groupings (SADC and ECOWAS) in a fierce power struggle between countries and economic, political and military interests seems to pinpoint the direction in regional relations in post-Cold War Africa. At the same time, the unsolved question of deindustrialization and of the unequal distribution of benefits from integration hinder more decisive steps towards regionalism. To conclude, and to offer a more general and abstract perspective on the issue, it is argued here, that the economic constraints of African economies alone don’t explain the difficulties of regional integration. Apart from a low, but still largely unexplored, potential for economic integration, especially in terms of “non-orthodox” benefits, it was the lack of political will which hindered integration more in recent years, that is, the lack of implementation of concrete policy steps. On the other hand, the verbal commitment to integration on the part of the political elites is overwhelming. To understand the huge gap between political reality and discourse one has to grasp the nature of political rule in Africa and the fragile basis of the power of the ruling classes which, in their perspective, does not allow the questioning of their control of the meagre resources they need to appropriate and in part redistribute in a patrimonial manner in order to sustain their domination.
Serious regional integration will complicate the control of the flow of political and material resources by the political elites. On the other hand, their power derives directly from them serving as linkages between African societies and the international environment. International legitimacy is vital for the survival of African elites, it renders material, repressive and ideological resources. This idea is strongly influenced by Jackson's and Rosberg's notion of *juridical statehood*, *negative sovereignty*, and *international legitimacy*, which Clapham successfully applied to the study of international relations in Africa. It is argued here that the notion of regional integration makes on the one hand renewed part of a developmentalist *discourse*, in parts surrealistic and fictitious, but necessary in the search for international legitimacy and influencing the flow of resources from the West to African States. On the other hand, regional integration displays a very uneasy, if not contradictory, relationship to the patrimonial character of political rule in Africa, leading to a thorough lack of enthusiasm in its implementation by the political elites.

### Table 3a: Economic Communities and other regional groupings: Eastern and Southern Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ABREV.</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>COUNTRIES</th>
<th>OBJECTIVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
<td>desde 1910</td>
<td>África do Sul, Sudáfrica, Lesoto, Botsuana, Namíbia</td>
<td>Customs Union and Free Trade Area (CU &amp; FTA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Central African Federation</td>
<td>1953 - 1963</td>
<td>Zâmbia (Rodésia do Sul), Malavi (Nyasalândia)</td>
<td>Customs Union and Free Trade Area (CU &amp; FTA), political union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
<td>1917 - 1967 (?)</td>
<td>Tanzânia, Quênia, Uganda (?)</td>
<td>CU, TFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Cooperation</td>
<td>desde 1996</td>
<td>Tanzânia, Quênia, Uganda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC (u SADC)</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Tanzânia, Moçambique, Malavi, Angola, Zâmbia, Zimbábue, Botsuana, Lesoto, Suazilândia</td>
<td>cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Tanzânia, Moçambique, Malavi, Angola, Zâmbia, Zimbábue, Botsuana, Lesoto, Suazilândia</td>
<td>FTA, common market</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Economic Communities and other regional groupings: West Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ABR.</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>COUNTRIES</th>
<th>OBJECTIVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>Conseil de l’Entente</td>
<td>desde 1959</td>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Costa de Marfim, Níger, Togo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMOA (t) UEMOA</td>
<td>Union Monétaire Ouest-Africaine</td>
<td>1959 - 1994</td>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Costa de Marfim, Mali (*1984), Níger, Senegal, Togo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEMOA</td>
<td>Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine</td>
<td>11.1.1994</td>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Costa de Marfim, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo</td>
<td>monetary union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCAM</td>
<td>Organisation Commune Africaine et Mauricienne</td>
<td>1959 - 1965</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African State</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Costa de Marfim, Gâmbia, Gana, Guiné, Guinea-Bissau, Cabo Verde, Libéria, Mali, Mauritânia, Níger, Nigéria, Senegal, Serra Leoa, Togo</td>
<td>FTA, common market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRU</td>
<td>Manu River Union</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Guiné, Libéria, Serra Leoa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economic Communities and other regional groupings: Central Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ABR.</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>COUNTRIES</th>
<th>OBJECTIVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEEAC</td>
<td>Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale</td>
<td></td>
<td>Guiné Equatorial, Angola, Burundi, Gabão, Congo, Ruanda, São Tomé e Príncipe, Chade, Zaire, República da África Central</td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDEAC</td>
<td>Union Douanière et Economique de l’Afrique Centrale</td>
<td></td>
<td>Guiné Equatorial, Camarões, Gabão, Congo, Chade, República da África Central</td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPGL</td>
<td>Communauté des Pays des Grands Lacs</td>
<td></td>
<td>Burundi, Ruanda, Zaire,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Charles F. Doran  
**John Hopkins University of Washington D.C, USA**

**Globalization, Regionalization and the Cost of Secession**

This paper begins with a short discourse on the impact that history has on the state through systems transformation and through globalization. It then quickly turns to the essence of the analysis, the 21st century problem of size and growth as a factor in the matter of secession occurring in the advanced industrial democracy.

First is the question whether cultural nationalism in world terms is on the increase or the decrease and why. Some writers like Jean-Marie Guehenno, Kenichi Ohmae, and Stanley Hoffmann contend that nationalism is dead. They see the nation-state dissolving under pressure from the solvents of regionalism, the movement of global capital, decline of political ideology, and the changing nature of the firm as it erodes the sovereignty of government. Yet others like the historian William McNeil see nationalism as alive and even virulent. They describe this nationalism as demotic, that is, emergent from below from inside the subunits of society. They see immigration and labor mobility as charging this demotic nationalism with new energy.

In some ways these two interpretations are not opposites. They seem to suggest the same end. Old established nation-states have become enfeebled. New, vibrant national movements are emerging from below to further weaken and perhaps replace the older polities.

But whether nationalism is disappearing or is flourishing is to be determined to some extent by how the process of societal change is occurring, by what exactly is the dynamic relationship between nation-state and internal national movements or regional sub-units. Complicating this assessment is awareness that structural change is occurring at the level of the international system as well as at the level of the nation-state and below. To what extent is change at the level of the international system responsible for generating or at least transmitting the ideas and forces that are chiseling at the foundations of the modern nation-state?

Originating from tensions within society, secession is the attempt by a sub-unit to break up, or to break away from the nation-state. Are the forces of secession transmitted downward to government from the level of global politics, or are the forces of secession principally internal to the individual polity? Moreover, are certain types of international systems such as the balance of power system more or less conducive to secession from established states than is the present unipolar system? Or is type of international system less important than the change that is occurring within that system, in particular during the interval of transformation from one type of international system to another?

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208 Contrast, for example, the assumptions of Kenneth Waltz that the type of system eg. bi-polarity, determines the magnitude and probability of instability between states and to great extent within the
the whole matter of the type of international system structure less important than the historical interval itself in explaining the origins of state break-up? Secession may be time-dependent. The twenty-first century may simply be more or less catalytic of secessionist attempts than was the twentieth century.

**A New Variety of Systems Transformation?**

With the end of the Cold War, a new, peaceful systems transformation from bipolarity to unipolarity is in the making. But this systems transformation is unique not only because, in contrast to its predecessors, it has not caused a major war. The contemporary systems transformation toward unipolarity, or comparative hegemony of the United States, has also had a very different type of impact upon nationalism. As Hobsbawm has observed, this time systems transformation has precipitated not a unifying nationalism but a divisive nationalism. Moreover, unlike other nationalisms of the past, this nationalism is aimed as much at the mature nation-state as at dying empires or fledgling governments. Secession of regional units is the hallmark of this new nationalism. It results from the confluence of two developments. Nation-states themselves in this era seem more vulnerable, as though some nation-states seem to have reached the apogee of their political cohesiveness. Although central governments are scarcely more tolerant of secession than in the past, and although the impact of immigration and labor mobility on the multi-ethnic state has yet to be felt in any regionally evident way, contemporary government has fostered a setting that is kind to secession. Recrudescence of secessionist movements has occurred in the wake of the disappearance of communism and fascism as mass ideologies. People have sought identity in cultural collectivities to replace the loss of faith in political ideology. At the same time, comparative peace and security have given the secessionist state hope of survival. Access to giant trade areas or common markets has also given divisive nationalism a new faith in its vitality. Success of the nation-state has in some sense contributed to strains upon it.

From the top of the system during systems transformation has come a permissiveness that complements the nurture of divisive nationalism arising from beneath the level of the nation-state. Systems transformation in the aftermath of the Cold War has been accompanied by many structural uncertainties that have been distractions to the systemic leadership, hindering concentration and the effort to combat national divisiveness. The United States has understandably acknowledged limits to the extent that it is willing to intervene on behalf of nation-state unity and stability. Who is to share what responsibility and what cost, even if strategies are agreed upon and clear, is a matter that has not yet been worked out in terms of a coherent security regime. Finally, supra nationalism adds ambiguities about foreign policy action at a time when ambiguities already abound in the midst of massive alteration of the distribution of world power.

Secessionist movements have responded to this confluence of forces within the nation-state, and above the nation-state at the top of the international system, during the rigors of systems transformation. Once thought immutable, the nation-state of the twenty-first century looks neither so cohesive nor so self-confident, especially in situations where long-standing cultural-linguistic movements on a regional basis have managed to find or to contrive a new nationality of resistance to a real or imagined adversary.

**Can Democratic Pluralism Survive? Divisive Nationalism And The Future**

Much of the argument so far has explored the origins of secession and has, consequently, perhaps given the impression that state fragmentation is on the rise. But, indeed, the late twentieth century is likewise a celebration in statehood. Every corner of the international system is occupied by the state.209

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209 Antartica, the High Seas, and space remain the frontiers not yet conquered by the nation-state, yet even here inroads have been made. Some seven countries have staked claims on the frozen ice-cap at
For the present, empire has conceded defeat to the nation-state. Fourteen thousand bureaucrats administer the European Union, but in most matters of high policy involving foreign affairs and defense, decisions still reside with the nation-state. NATO may be the most powerful military alliance in the world, but the Charter still allows national parliaments the last say in the decision to go to war. NAFTA and ASEAN may signify breakthroughs in cooperative economic policy, and surely in the commitment to regional (and partial) trade liberalization, but the concessions in terms of autonomy are still quite compatible with national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{210}

Since we as observers are both participant and analyst, the triumph of the nation-state is often obscured to us by the incremental nature of the historical process and the temptation to take the existence of the territorial state for granted as though it has always existed with its present solidity. This assumption of permanence and security is in reality only a late twentieth century phenomenon.

Although not teleological in the sense that the process is moving toward a predestined outcome, the process of nation-building is certainly evolutionary in nature.\textsuperscript{211} An index of the historical nature of the state enterprise is the gradual filling of the system by states as they replace other forms of social and political organization. Another index is in the nature of state institutions themselves over time as they incorporate at higher levels of sophistication the four mechanisms underlying state-making: apprehension of national purpose, consolidation of territory, legitimization of authority, and differentiation of function. Each of these mechanisms is continuous and ongoing, with positive results in terms of the degree of attainment across time. Chirac's France, notwithstanding its problems of social adjustment and reform, is an instrument that provides benefits for far more people, at a much higher level of safety and prosperity, than Louis XIV's France in all of its cultural grandeur could possibly have imagined.

But to engage the question posed at the beginning of this essay—is secession on the rise such that the durability of the nation-state is in doubt—this question requires quite a different answer. Most of the fragmentation of nation-states at the end of the twentieth century outside Africa has been associated with the collapse of the Soviet empire, in the Balkans, in the "near abroad," and inside Russia itself. The collapse of the Soviet empire in turn is the result of change in the structure at the top of the international system, in a word, the result of systems transformation from bipolarity to unipolarity. Like two other systems transformations earlier in the twentieth century, the legacy of unfulfilled promise from the peace treaties at the end of each major war has been further political instability.

Each of the three major trouble spots in the post-1945 system were a result of the treaty compromises following World War Two: a divided Korea, a divided Vietnam, and a divided Germany. Two ended in reunification, one on Western terms (Germany), one on Communist terms now slowly being modified (Vietnam), and one as yet unresolved (Korea). Yet what is most striking about these huge post-World War Two preoccupations has been the propensity of these societies and states to cohere and endure even when torn by ideological difference and to some extent (Korea and Vietnam) cultural difference between North and South.

Each of the problems in South-eastern Europe in turn is a legacy of the systems transformation following World War One, where Wilson tried to unite small polities, rearrange populations, and "rationalize" the "crazy zig-saw puzzle of the Balkans."\textsuperscript{212} Yugoslavia, Czechoslavkia, Hungary, and
Globalisation, Regionalisation and the History of International Relations

Romania all were state solutions to problems that came to the fore during the systems transformation that preceded and was associated with the Great War. Hence systems transformation is to some extent the cause of state fragmentation, but it is also used as the occasion for attempted state-building.

With the systems transformation at the end of the Cold War, it is not therefore surprising that state fragmentation should once again become a problem. Nor is it surprising that the type of international system prevailing today is perhaps more tolerant of devolution within states and increased regional autonomy within states than was the bipolarity system, especially in the Soviet realm, during the latter half of the twentieth century.

But there is a fundamental difference between the effects of systems transformation on secessionist impulse, and even the effect of type of international system on that impulse, and the overall fate of the nation-state in the twenty-first century. Once outside these geographic areas of massive structural strain most often associated with the collapse of past empire, the nation-state is thriving. Not only in numbers, but in terms of the efficacy of governance, the state is a success story.

What is remarkable in terms of secessionist impulse among the advanced industrial countries is not so much how wide-spread is the sentiment, but especially how halting are the movements and how politically pragmatic are the adherents. Secessionist claims find so many possible state responses. Proponents of secession are themselves cross-pressured and given to multiple affinities. Expressions of interest in secession, moreover, are far different than examples of successful secession. At the turn of the twenty-first century, what is striking is the political capacity of the state through a mixture of democratic compromise and resilience to cohere and to prosper.

That the nation-state has become more difficult to administer as it becomes larger is undoubtedly true. But there is little evidence of "systems overload" within decision circles, in part because information and communication have advanced so fast and far. Devolution of tax and other responsibilities is not the same as making good on a claim to secession. "Down-sizing" of the state is more often a substitute for state fragmentation than a prelude. Reform of state bureaucracy is less an indicator of crisis of state purpose than an appropriate response to such crisis.

Tolerance, indeed celebration, for communities with cultural and linguistic preference that is at odds with that of the majority in the polity is now the rule for the liberal democratic multiethnic state. Culturally and linguistically homogeneous states are less common than in the past. Almost every state of consequence as a target for immigration has been changed by the very populations that it has sought to attract and integrate within its institutions and values.

Democratic pluralism slowly is becoming not the exception but the norm for the advanced industrial polity. Slowly even monolithic societies like Germany and Japan are coming to grips with the presence of long-standing minorities within their populations who are demanding citizenship and full rights. It was after all not so long ago that segregation paralysed the American South, that apartheid sickened politics in South Africa and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), and that double social standards denied women everywhere equal opportunity. Democratic pluralism walks hand in hand with legal equality and cultural toleration.

For the most part, as the international system confronts the twenty-first century, the modern nation-state, whether bi-national or multi-national is, because of democratic pluralism, not weaker but stronger. All the more reason why, when there is back-sliding away from democratic pluralism, or when secession occurs along ethno-linguistic lines such that democratic pluralism is negated, these events damage all of liberal democracy.

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the three ethnic groups can live in harmony. But if pressed on a global basis, will the concept of ethnic self-determination not splinter the world into unmanageable confusion? And, at the extremes, what might it do to the cohesion of our own society?" Henry Kissinger, "Bosnia: Only Just Beginning...," The Washington Post, September 11, 1997; David Cameron, Nationalism, Self-Determination, and the Quebec Question (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1974), pp. 143-157.
Centralization, Globalization And North America

Worldwide, evolution and devolution have accelerated since the end of the Cold War. Centralization and decentralization are coterminous processes. In North America, movement of governmental functions along the latter lines has been shifting up and down the federal ladder for even a longer time. Ever since the New Deal of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the U.S. Federal Government has added functions and expanded its role relative to the states in keeping with the dictates of the welfare society. Under the Great Society programs of Lyndon Johnson, the centralization of authority in Washington over civil rights, welfare, education and health care sharply increased. Only under the Reagan Administration was a sincere bid made, with the exception of defense, not only to down-size government (slow the increase in size) but to reallocate functions and authority to the states. In all of this decentralization of function, one large problem stood out. If "fairness" is to be regarded in country-wide terms, the problem of how to enforce equal standards throughout the nation when each state does its own enforcing always remains an issue.

Canada has experienced its own roller-coaster of shifting governmental decision-making and functions. Quebec and the conservative Western provinces, or constituencies within those provinces, have reacted most strongly to the attempted sharp centralization of leadership during the sixteen years of the Trudeau administrations. One sees this increase in centralization in everything from policy toward the Native Peoples to the way decision-making was carried out in the Department of External Affairs. With the advent of the Clark and the Mulroney governments, some devolution of functions took place. As far as Quebec relations are concerned, the Chretein government seems to be caught between the desire on the one hand to devolve more authority in specific areas such as manpower training and social policy to Quebec while, on the other hand, not to upset the other provinces or to deviate too far from the general liberal philosophy of strong central government.

It is probably safe to say that Ottawa is suspicious of both too much centralization and too much decentralization. That this is so is not surprising because each trend, at least in the extreme, is a threat to nation-state sovereignty. Yet decentralization of the subsidiarity type is also essential in the context of greater regional integration. Otherwise everything gets tied up in bureaucratic knots at the federal or supra-nation-state levels. The dilemma is much like that regarding taxation. As inflation increases the nominal income of the citizen, the tax rate also increases for that citizen, even though he or she does not earn any more money in real terms and, because of the inadvertent tax increase, is taking home less. Without subsidiarity, regional integration would lead to a bureaucratic mess at the top levels of decision-making. Brussels is often accused of being mired in this quandary. Quebec is not out of bounds in its claim that Ottawa should take more seriously both the historical balance of power within the original British North American Act between province and federal government, and the contemporary situation in which the provinces can do a better (more responsive and probably more efficient) job of administration than can Ottawa. Every policy area must be treated on its own merits, but subsidiarity is a principle all the members of NAFTA ought to heed.

But all of this is very far from saying that centralization at one level "causes" decentralization at another level or that the advance of regional integration will expedite the break-up of Canada. Evolution and devolution go hand in hand, just as do centralization and decentralization. They seem like opposites but, in fact, are complementary processes that, when allowed to proceed, will strengthen the nation-state as a whole while meeting the needs of the individual community, province, or state.

In terms of the evolution of the system towards globalization, what is the impact on the nation-state as we know it? According to Jeffrey Sachs,

We are therefore in the midst of a startling, yet early, tug of war between polities at all levels. Where will the future of decision-making, tax powers, and regulatory authorities reside: with localities, subnational regions, nation-states or multilateral institutions (both within geographic regions such as the European Union and at the international level)? To the extent that increased regulatory, tax, and even judicial powers shift to the international setting, how should and will international institutions be governed in
the future? Will there be a democracy deficit, as is now charged about decision making in the European Union.\footnote{Jeffrey Sachs, "Economics: Unlocking the Mysteries of Globalization," \textit{Foreign Policy}, No. 10, Spring, 1998, p. 109.}

In this view, globalization will re-make the nation-state. The locus of taxes, regulation, and even justice is likely to move either upwards or downwards within the authority structure of the international system, but mainly upwards. Regions and systems are likely to be shuffled like cards, as governments rush to shed functions or adopt new ones. Borders are not likely to remain constant. Whether political authority will remain stable is open to question, though revolution is not among the predicted outcomes. This is not the first time such a challenge to world order as we know it has been prophesied.

In \textit{The End of the Nation-State}, Jean-Marie Guehenno asks the question whether the world will become "Lebanonized," quite a bit more disturbing a prophesy than that of Sachs because of the break-down of authority in Lebanon and the resulting civil war. He claims that a one-dimensional reality will emerge. "The community is likely to appear as the natural framework within which everyone may recover his identity."\footnote{Jean-Marie Guehenno, \textit{The End of the Nation-State} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 45.} Since communities and nation-states often do not occupy precisely the same territory in North America, such a conclusion about the supremacy of communal values fails to support identity. Such is increasingly the norm for communities within the modern nation-state.

Similarly, Kenichi Ohmae, in a book that carries the same main title, asserts that "regional" states will replace the nation-state because the new economic engines of growth do not conform to the territorial dimensions of the nation-state.\footnote{Kenichi Ohmae, \textit{The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economics} (New York: The Free Press, 1995).} These engines are conglomerations of cities, interlocked by common transportation links and mostly educated populations producing for world markets.

However, these regional entities for the most part, as identified by Ohmae himself, fall inside the nation-state, not across national borders. Silicon Valley, Route 128 Boston, the Washington, D.C./Baltimore corridor, the larger metropolitan areas of Ottawa, Montreal and Toronto all conform to Ohmae-like engines of growth, but none spills over borders. Indeed, if they did, they might solidify existing borders, since one-half of an "engine" is very unlikely to operate in the absence of the other.

This empirical observation about sub-state region, as opposed to extra-state regions, is borne out by Michael Porter's discussion of "clusters" of industrial growth within nation-sates highlighting the enduring comparative advantage of each nation-state.\footnote{Michael E. Porter, \textit{The Competitive Advantage of Nations} (New York: The Free Press, 1990), pp. 179-238.} Porter's clusters do not often cross borders either. For reasons that must reside ultimately in the way people organize themselves, both politically and economically, these lasting industrial specializations seem to respect the borders of existing nation-states, even in highly concentrated Europe, showing no signs of overlapping borders or further subdividing the states in which the industrial clusters flourish.

But other reasons exist as well for doubting the prognostications of Sachs, Guehenno, Ohmae and others that the nation-state is dead because of globalization.

First, the firm and the nation-state are not opposites, colliding with each other for space and power. More often than not, they are complementary institutions, each performing responsibilities and functions that cannot be performed by the other. Yet they are organizations that are dependent upon each other for contributions without which the other would be poorer, both materially and institutionally.

Second, globalization, the phenomenon of the spread of financial, marketing, production, and management functions of the firm world-wide through specialization, has been going on for fifty years at least and is yet far from complete. This could of course suggest that "we haven't seen anything yet" and that future impacts will be even more shocking. In reality several times greater effects on the
national economy are occurring from within, in the absence of any similar claims regarding devastating political consequence. The far greater effect on the factors of production stem from technological innovation, often confused with globalization but having almost none of (indeed often the converse) effects such as the stimulus to down-sizing. Technological innovation is a faster, more encompassing process that threatens few if any political structures and promises no border revisions.

Third, the singly most traumatic shock often associated with globalization is the movement of capital. Combined with volatile exchange rates, the massive shifts of capital instantaneously across borders does present difficult problems of monitoring and management. In time, these will be dealt with both by national initiatives such as minor restrictions on the flow of short-term investment capital (an interest-rate surcharge perhaps for capital movement under a year in duration), and by better macro-management at the global level through enhanced IMF reserves. Though they could unseat a government or two, these capital movements will not "Lebanonize" countries. Nor will the territorial or political fragmentation of the nation-state in any way improve the management of short-term capital movements.

Fourth, only for those countries that persist in attempting to side-step the market or intervene against the effects of the market rather than encouraging market forces and thus extracting benefits liberally from them, only for such governments will globalization present any threat to governance. The East Asian financial crisis of 1997 was abetted by poor management practice of governments that allowed bad loans to persist for too long and began to become too dependent upon short-term foreign capital loans as a "bridge." Other much poorer governments in the same region, such as India, with some of the same management problems in banking but less reliance on a "quick-fix" from abroad, were better able to weather the financial storm. Markets are unforgiving if the individual, the firm, or government tries to go against them. But globalization that is allowed to proceed in unison with good economic practice on the part of government will not only leave the polity undamaged but will enrich its citizens beyond anything the twentieth century otherwise produced.

Despite calls of premature death, the nation-state like the firm is here to stay. These two forms of organization, because of their adaptability and clear accountability, are the two most vibrant forms of institutional organization today. Some might aver that the university and the church have a greater lineage. While I would agree, I would claim that without the firm and the nation-state, the other two institutions, qua institutions, would in isolation not thrive.

In North America, neither regionalization nor globalization is a threat to the vitality of Canada. Mildred Schwartz has assessed the sociology of Canadian thought regarding international trade. Protectionism, she reminds the reader, was long regarded as a bulwark of the national identity. NAFTA and freer trade represented a break with this view. While the traditional view was that trade protectionism reinforced the national identity, the advent of freer trade need not be seen as a threat to the Canadian identity. On the contrary, a stronger, more robust Canadian economy resulting from NAFTA membership may be the best guarantee that Canada can survive as a unified state.

Inside Canada, Quebec will find great opportunity and flexibility because of the contacts and other access that regionalization and globalization afford. Each process tends to strengthen the other. Regionalization enables the polities of North America to proceed with structural changes in the marketplace more quickly and more sensitively in terms of local needs, cultural as well as social. Globalization ensures that the process will not get too parochial or too out of touch with the trade, financial, and commercial trends necessary to deliver optimal increases in economic welfare for each citizen.

If globalization and technological change are allowed to operate effectively, then Canada and Quebec are not likely to fall behind in terms of the self-sustaining growth necessary to preserve the physical and social environment in the twenty-first century. A self-confident and prosperous Canada will create the political space for a vibrant Quebec to share fully in all the benefits that modern Canada offers its citizens. Inside such a Canada, Quebec will attain the height of self-expression that it requires to fulfill all of the promise associated with that remarkable development, occurring now a half century ago, known as the Quiet Revolution.

Secession And The Size/Growth Threshold: Economic Costs Of Separation To Quebec

In an October 1997 issue of The Boston Globe, Lester Thurow, former dean of the graduate school of business at MIT, claims that secession from Canada would not harm Quebec economically, and might even help it, as long as Quebec becomes a full partner to NAFTA. This thought that small size need not obstruct economic advancement is often put forward by separatists in Quebec as well. Thus the statement from an articulate and highly visible American economist that all Quebec needs to do to preserve its economic future is to become a full member of NAFTA, is undoubtedly catalytic. Visions of Singapore, however different the underlying cultural, political, and economic structures and settings may be, immediately flash into mind.

This viewpoint that small size does not diminish the possibility of unlimited economic progress appears as well to obtain backing from an assessment by Harvard growth economist Robert J. Barro. "There is no relation between the growth or level of per capita income," he argues, "and the size of a country, measured by population or area." "No relation" implies that as the population or area of a country increases, no increase in the level or rate of growth in welfare occurs. On this evidence size does not facilitate growth. Even small countries with a population size as little as one million, Barro further asserts, can do well if they do not close their borders to trade and to investment.

In fact, in an empirical study, Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore see large size contributing to secession because of the greater propensity for internal conflict resulting from the heterogeneity of populations. Democracy additionally facilitates secession, they believe. Trade and investment liberalization, according to these views, is a threat to the large, multiethnic state because there is no economic cost to secession. In an open international trading system, a small state can do as well economically as a large state. Conversely, there may be a genuine political cost involved in maintaining unity. Thus from the perspective of such unity, unity may not appear "cost effective" either in economic or political terms.

What is remarkable about these theoretical speculations is how they challenge traditional assumptions regarding the movement toward economic integration.

Neo-classical Notion that Size Promotes Growth

In the neo-classical Vinerian model, the prospect of trade creation as opposed to trade diversion determines whether international integration proceeds with benefits to the overall trading system.

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222 This is exactly the opposite conclusion that James Madison came to in the Federalist Papers, No. 10. He argued that factionalism is more probable in the small state because political parties and interest groups are not as likely to be cross-cutting or offsetting as in the larger polity where there is more room for diversity and choice. Put in economics language, the probability of local monopolies is less and of balanced competition is greater in the larger polity. See also Robert Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973. Maurice East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models," World Politics, Vol. 25, No. 4, July 1973, pp. 560-565. Eric A. Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 29 (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1972).

There is no way of knowing a priori, or in terms of generalization of the theory, whether preferential trade unions are good or bad for the welfare of the system as a whole. Each case must be analyzed individually. But as textbooks in international economics aver, the "argument leads back to the classical proposition that a customs union, because it moves us closer to free trade, is presumed to be welfare-improving." That certainly is the policy interpretation on the part of the architects of actual trade unions.

So far the argument of the neo-classical school may seem in agreement with that of the modern economic theorists. But the crux of the difference is that the modern theorists see the present international economic order as sufficiently open, either through large regional trade areas or the global trade order more generally, such that small political size is no longer a limitation to growth. The neo-classical writers always held that small size was a hindrance to growth.

Neo-classicists regarded economic integration as desirable because, among other things, through economies of scale, firms that were otherwise too small for optimum efficiency could enjoy longer production runs. This definitely was the assumption with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the predecessor of the present European Union. Local steel companies within each European country were too small to compete with the much larger American firms.

So-called international economies of scale associated with specialization in terms of subordinate segments of production, or in the production of complementary products, also become feasible with larger market size. Elimination of national monopolies that restrict competition may be possible as small markets are replaced by larger ones and local monopolies face new competition. Managerial efficiencies created out of the opportunities to expand and to restructure are also among the dynamic benefits of the neo-classical model of economic integration. Finally, factor market integration, that is, the movement of firms or of labor from lower productivity locations outside the customs union to higher productivity locations inside the union, also can be welfare-creating.

Perhaps the neo-classical argument that best illustrates the salutary benefits of larger economic size for increased welfare is a study by Kemp and Wan. They argue that insofar as a larger economic entity is created out of smaller entities with excess supplies and demands, the larger entity can always theoretically organize itself in a fashion that will improve the welfare of its citizens. By eliminating distortions in the smaller markets, the larger market can always create a preferred equilibrium position. Despite the questionable assumptions about international welfare transfers and other movements of resources across prior borders inside the larger resulting economic entity, this model's characteristic optimism about the prospects for economic integration is the cornerstone of intellectual support for the pro-integration school of international economics.

In short, the architects of the neo-classical integration model identified many efficiencies as enhancements to economic growth. This fundamental assumption, that larger economic size promotes economic growth and productivity, underlies the establishment of every preferential trade area starting with the European Union. Hand in hand with neo-classical assumptions about the economic benefits of integration was the assumption that larger size negated war among polities, eased trade disputes, and through stability provided an additional political benefit to market integration.

Inverting the Neo-classical Logic

Contemporary economists now appear to be standing the neo-classical assumption on its head. Small market size is as attractive as large market size because the open trading system allows for specialization that is as good as that found within the larger market whether that market is a state

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market or a preferential trading area. If there is no relationship between increasing per capita income growth and larger market size, then why integrate?

Equally, if the relationship between growth and larger market size does not hold, then why remain integrated inside the nation-state? If such is the case, balkanization of nation-states will not harm world economic welfare or the welfare of the resulting smaller state. If there is no association, notwithstanding increased heterogeneity of society, between reduced political conflict and larger market size, then why form larger political unions? Again, the assumption seems to be that external security is already provided for. Under these circumstances, better a series of small states than a single larger state in which opposed populations vie against each other internal to that state.

Global trade and investment liberalization appear to be eroding the incentive for regional economic integration. Global trade and investment liberalization also seem to be undermining the modern nation-state, as secession becomes more likely, because the neo-classical assumptions about economies of scale internal to the state hold less and less in the face of a world market that offers the same advantages through openness.

Who is right, the neo-classical writers on integration or the modern revisionists? Does small economic size no longer penalize a state in terms of foregone economic growth, a penalty that thwarted secession and strengthened the bid for regional economic integration? To put this, the central question of this chapter, into the larger context of the work on international political economy that generated it, the analysis now turns to (1) a brief exposition of the per capita growth rate cycle, (2) an even briefer discussion of the economic underpinnings of the power cycle, (3) the implications of power cycle analysis regarding how security policy helps shape the context for trade and investment liberalization (including regional integration), and (4) the significance of the debate over convergence for identification of the size/growth threshold. The chapter then returns to a specific theoretical and empirical treatment of the size/growth threshold and the even more specific impact on Quebec.

The Structure Of World Order And Trade

International political economy to some extent marches to its own cadence, but it also responds to the underlying structure of world order. This section explores that linkage.

(1) Sketching the Per Capita Income Growth Rate Cycle (Curve)\textsuperscript{227}

Two intuitive models, seemingly opposed, put the discussion of the relationship between per capital income growth rates and size in an appropriately larger context. Their reconciliation makes possible the resolution of the problem of growth and size in this study.

**Widening Rich/Poor Gap.** The first model is commonly known as the rich/poor gap model.\textsuperscript{228} It describes the situation in which, although both rich and poor states are increasing their wealth, the richer states have the higher growth rate. They are leaving the poorer states farther and farther behind in growth terms because the rate of their per capita income growth is higher and the level of their per capita income is already greater (they are richer). The gap results as the faster growing Newly Developing

\textsuperscript{227} Used here is a minimal definition of cycle as "a period of time during which something becomes established, reaches a peak, and declines." That "something" is the per capita income growth rate. And the "cycle" is the period of time during which it completes a non-linear curvilinear pattern of change, rising to a peak and then turning into decline. There is no notion of repetition here (as would be the case in other definitions of cycle). Hence some readers may prefer the label "curve" instead of "cycle." This same definition applies to the "power cycle" concept treated later in this paper.

\textsuperscript{228} Epitomizing this older literature on growth is the discussion by Richard Easterlin. "The gap in the percentage of labor force in nonagricultural activity has continued to widen. With regard to GNP per capita, it can also be inferred, despite the limited data, that relative levels have continued to diverge." "Economic Growth: Overview," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Crowell, Collier, and McMillan Inc., 1968/1977), p. 404.
Countries leave behind the countries that have not really started to grow such as those in the Sahael region (Africa).

Catch-Up: Growth Rate Asymptote(s) In contrast, the model commonly known as the "catch-up" thesis argues just the opposite interpretation.229 As states mature in the developmental experience, their growth rates decline. Thus, far from lagging behind in growth terms as the rich/poor gap model maintains, developing countries are actually able to catch up in growth with the advanced industrial countries. The reason catch-up is possible is that the rate of growth of the advanced industrial countries declines towards a growth asymptote. In practice, the United States as the leading economy in the world as measured by level of wealth and size, is closer to this asymptote than say China or Mexico. Elsewhere economists have labeled this phenomenon, of declining per capita income growth rates and underlying total productivity growth rates, as that of convergence. But in dynamical terms, a perhaps better description of the phenomenon is that each country as a mature economy reaches a rate-of-growth asymptote. The convergence thesis contends that in the long term the rate of growth asymptotes for all of the advanced industrial countries are identical. All of the rates of growth for the individual countries will have converged.

Two Ends of the Growth Experience Although opposites, these two models are in fact both correct.230 Each describes the partial situation of the state's growth at a given time in its development. Both are seen to be correct when they are combined as the opposite ends of the growth experience. The rich/poor gap model describes the situation early in that experience when the faster growing countries are leaving the slower growing countries behind. The catch-up thesis describes the situation in which the decline in the rate of per capita income growth of the advanced industrial countries allows the more rapidly growing developing country to "catch up" with the advanced industrial country in terms of level of per capita income.

Hence, in combination, the two perspectives are accounted for by an "idealized" per capita income rate cycle (curve) through which each developing country eventually is expected to pass. Each developing country enters a very rapidly growing phase. This phase of rapid growth then dissipates albeit at a much higher level of per capita income. Hence the actual marginal output may or may not continue to increase relative to smaller but faster growing states in an earlier development phase. It is the interaction of both rate and level that will determine the extent to which a given country will actually catch up with the advanced industrial country in terms of overall per capita wealth.

Causation accounting for the catch-up of countries in terms of economic growth must be explained first by what determines the remarkable acceleration of growth in the middle phase of development and second by what explains the decline in the rate of per capita income growth to a growth asymptote thereafter.

Some of the explanation is found in the reality that technological initiation is easier than technological innovation.231 Some is found in the relative shift from efficiency concerns to equity concerns involving welfare, pensions, education, health care, workers' rights, environmental protection, and oligopolistic behavior of firms, in the mature economy.232 Some of the explanation is found in the dynamic of the


230P.T. Bauer, for example, rightly calls into question the notion of the `widening gap' as an overall description of the economic growth situation without going the next step which is a combining of the rich/poor gap and the catch-up thesis into a single more compelling explanation of relative per capita income change. "The Vicious Circle of Poverty and the Widening Gap," Dissent on Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971), Chapter 1-2, pp. 31-49, 49-68.


232Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). For a critique see David R. Cameron, "Distributional Coalitions and Others Sources of Economic Stagnation:
growth curve itself, as larger economies for reasons of factor combination and productivity tend to grow less fast than smaller economies, a phenomenon illustrated inside the firm as much as inside the state.233

In short, the per capita income rate cycle or curve reconciles all of these conceptual and empirical loose ends, thus creating a single unifying interpretation of how the entire growth experience accounts for very different growth patterns at different points in time. All of this is key to the understanding of one additional cycle central to statecraft, the power cycle.

(2) Economic Underpinnings of the Power Cycle (Curve)

Composed of a number of indicators of national capability such as GDP, population size, per capita income, and military spending, the power cycle is a relative concept.234 It indexes the national capability of one state relative to that of others across time. It traces the state’s rise in relative size and importance, the period of its participation as a major player in the system, and its relative decline as other states increase their economic and military capabilities at a faster rate. Reduced to simplest structure, state power has a size and a wealth dimension (substantive aspects of capability to which we will return after a brief review of the dynamic of change itself).235 The relative capability of a state is a ratio, with the capability of the state itself in the numerator, and the capability of its competitors in the denominator. Hence relative power can be regarded as the percent share of power that a state possesses at each point in its evolution within the international system.

Importantly, the cycle of relative power has properties of the logistic (or, as it is sometimes less formally described, an S curve): acceleration to a point of inflection followed by deceleration to an asymptotic level. In reality, the cycle conforms to two logistic curves, one on the upside and one on the downside of the cycle; it thus has a minimum, a maximum, and another minimum asymptotic level.236 In each instance, the relevant logistic is the asymmetric logistic, that is, the time required to reach the inflection point does not necessarily correspond to the time from inflection point to upper (or lower) asymptotic peak (or decline). Properties of power in international relations correspond to the conditions for such asymmetric logistic of growth in a limited environment: There are only 100 percent shares of power in the system. The dynamism of other states (and eventually, if it becomes big enough, its own size) places limits on how far and fast an individual state’s power will grow.

Underlying the dynamic of the power cycle is the dynamic of the per capita income growth rate cycle. More precisely, underlying the power cycle for each state are the per capita income growth rate cycles for all of the states encompassed in the relative power ratio. Therefore what happens to the per capita income growth rate cycles across the system very much affects the periodicity and amplitude of each state power cycle.

On the other hand, since power is composed of a size as well as a wealth dimension, what happens to per capita wealth over time is only a partial determinant of change on the overall power cycle. Whether the wealth dimension is a more important determinant of power than the size dimension is uncertain.


But when movement on the wealth cycle is upwards, everything else being equal, an increase in position on the power cycle also generally occurs.

How does the power cycle impact upon the secessionist impulse in wealthy states? Mature states or states on the declining side of their power cycle may be particularly vulnerable to secession. States that are in relative decline may be more subject to challenge politically by communal groups dissatisfied with their cultural or socio-political position inside the state and no longer attached to the unified state by an earlier, more ardent nationalism within the society as a whole. With security provided, and with the promise of access to a larger preferential trade area in the offing, secessionist groups feel the loosening of ties internal to the state and at the same time assume that they may be able to do better by striking out on the own in the world of high finance and statecraft.

Thus as momentum changes on the power cycle, secessionist entities feel the altered nature of the political-economic equilibrium within the state and are encouraged to search for a new grand bargain. In this sense, locus on the power cycle of the state is causally related to the impulse for revisionist nationalism by communal groups inside the state perhaps epitomized by the situation in which the United Kingdom finds itself. The same might be said for Belgium, Spain, and Italy. But is the unity of Germany, with its growing decentralization of the Laender from Bavaria to Baden-Wuertemberg, any less vulnerable to these secessionist urges?

The power cycle has another important impact upon the thesis question of this chapter, that is, upon the theoretical and empirical relationship between size and per capita income. This effect follows because the state power cycles map the changing structure of the international system.

(3) Logic of the Security Imperative and Trade Openness

Presence of structural stability among countries creates a political environment conducive to trade and to increasing trade openness. Conversely, presence of structural instability causes a political setting in which protectionism and a closure of the trading system become more likely. The claim is that structural stability generates a propensity for trade liberalization, whereas structural instability causes a breakdown of confidence in security, a political inwardness, a commercial defensiveness, and an inclination towards protectionism. Linking the realms of commerce and security, the argument advanced here explains important constraints and stimuli to trade liberalization.

How Structural Stability Fosters Trade Liberalization Structural stability is descriptive of a situation where the expectations of governments about their future foreign policy role and power are congruent with the actual change in their power and role. Since in practice the only time this congruence occurs between the change in state power and role on the one hand, and the change in foreign policy expectations on the other, is when growth is linear, major periods of structural stability are indexed by linear change.

In long periods of comparatively linear change on the power cycle of a state, there are no surprises in terms of future foreign policy expectations. Future foreign policy expectations are expressed as a line drawn tangent to the power curve. Indeed, when a state increases its share of relative power at an accelerating rate prior to the first inflection point, each forecast of future foreign policy expectations is too conservative (slopes of the expectations line trend ever upwards) rather than too alarmist. (Similarly, the continuation of prior trends reinforces predictions for states on other segments of the cycle, whether it is experiencing diminishing rates of increase, accelerating decline, or deceleration toward a lower threshold.) The confidence in past forecasts therefore reinforces the confidence in future forecasts.


Linear change thus means that states are able to forecast their futures with some consistency and a minimum of surprise. A sense of confidence emerges during such periods of linear change in the state experience. This confidence is amplified when it is shared across states (i.e., when a number of states experience linear change in the growth of their power during the same interval of history) and encompasses the most powerful states in the system. This ambiance of certainty and confidence associated with a stable structural situation in the international system is a pre-condition for security.

In such a stable structural situation, extending perhaps over a period of decades, the sense of assuredness about where power is trending becomes irresistible to the policy-maker. This confidence spreads to the private sector as well. The argument made here is that in this "secure" kind of decision environment, trade liberalization becomes easier.

Business thrives under these circumstances of certainty, calm, and predictability. Firms are able to make decisions about investment and production in an atmosphere of comparative trust and confidence. When the international conditions of structural stability prevail, some of the risk associated with international business is removed. Firms are better able to forecast their own futures, their profitability, and their potential for expansion.

In these commercial circumstances of greater predictability, firms and governments are much more prone to support trade liberalization. They enjoy growth and profitability. Trade liberalization is not looked upon as a threat to their output but rather as a vehicle to even greater prosperity. Thus confidence associated with a more certain and predictable political environment is transmitted to the commercial and trade setting. A willingness to open markets results. Government and firm together facilitate a liberalization of trade that is systems-wide and reinforcing. Structural stability becomes the key international catalyst to a more open trading world.

How Structural Instability Undermines Trade Liberalization Structural instability generates effects that are the opposite of those associated with structural stability. That is, structural instability creates a propensity for protectionism. How this occurs is seen more easily when structural instability is examined more fully.

As argued above, most periods of history involve structural change that continues prior trends and hence is fairly predictable. But there are also periods when a number of leading states in the system experience an abrupt and monumental shift in the trend of their respective relative power trajectories. These shifting trends map the changing structure of the system. The argument here is that these so-called "shifting tides of history" force states to abandon long-held projections of future foreign policy role, creating great political uncertainty and even bellicosity. Such a setting of massive structural change and uncertainty, called systems transformation, is likely to generate protectionism as states look inward, viewing the external environment as essentially competitive if not also hostile, and become extremely averse to economic risk.

Structural instability results from such abrupt and monumental trend shifts as states move either up or down their respective power cycles. These times of abrupt change are indexed more specifically as passage through a "critical point" on the state power cycle. These critical points are the places on the curve where long-experienced linear change abruptly becomes non-linear change, an inversion from the prior trend. There are four critical points of non-linearity on the power cycle: first inflection, upper turning point, second inflection, and lower turning point. But when these critical points will occur is not predictable. This is the exact opposite of linear change, where predictions (expectations) are more or less certain. Unpredictability is a characteristic of non-linear change, which is the most abrupt and total alteration of past behavior possible. Non-linearity is the denouement of the forecaster, since all linear forecasts will fail by definition in the face of non-linear change.

Hence major structural change translates into abrupt, unpredictable, and massive change on the state power cycle. At a critical point, everything changes: the slope of the expectations line trends in the opposite direction from the long previous period of history. A complete discontinuity has occurred. Such change is totally upsetting to the foreign policy decision-maker, and, as it happens, also to the commercial firm attempting to operate in such a political environment. This is what is meant by

239Doran, in Manus Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies II.

240Doran, Systems in Crisis, pp. 93-116.
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structural instability. The effects of structural instability find a focus in the foreign policy expectations of government. Change that is abrupt and monumental unsettles the international system, and it unsettles the commercial and trading environment as well.

When governments are unable reliably to foresee policy trends, they function poorly, sometimes overreact, and become defensive. When firms experience the same type of inability to plan and to anticipate the future because of a sudden discontinuity in governmental (and their own) expectations, they become wary, defensive, and prone to risk-aversion. In such a context, both government and firm become vulnerable to easy solutions. The answer to previously normal problems of competition now commonly becomes government assistance. A familiar type of government assistance for industry to request is the imposition of some form of trade impediment. Protectionism takes root.

Hence, during periods of structural instability, the firm must contend with an ambiance beset with governmental uncertainty, overreaction, and foreign policy strain. This is not an environment in which commerce thrives. Rather, in such an environment, government is vulnerable to the pleas from business for a halt to imports that seem to erode the market share of the import-competing industries. Export industries at the same time may experience growing interference with trade abroad and thus may seek to enlarge their domestic market share through the imposition of tariffs, quotas, or other non-tariff barriers. The reaction of foreign firms to recently erected trade barriers, in an atmosphere of increasing uncertainty and distrust between governments, tends to reinforce the protectionist tendencies of domestic firms as they assess what for them seems to be an increasingly hostile foreign trade environment as well.

Hence, the essence of the problem of increasing protectionism, as seen from this perspective, is the discontinuity in foreign policy expectations that eventually affects the power trajectory of each government. When a number of major governments all go through critical points on their power curves at about the same time, the problem of uncertainty and foreign policy tension is magnified considerably. Indeed, this is the interval of systems transformation when structural change is at a maximum within the international system. Such intervals of systems transformation are especially problematic for the trading, financial, and commercial arena as well as for the arena of world order. Structural instability undermines the prerequisites within the political order for the kind of commercial and trade openness and farsightedness that is essential to the furtherance of the liberal trade regime.

In sum, intervals of history with low to moderate structural change are periods when increased trade and investment liberalization become possible. Abrupt non-linear change in the system unsettles this confidence, causes governments to think increasingly in relative gains and zero sum terms, and undermines willingness to open borders to trade. The possible relationship between this structural variable and per capita income growth (past and future) is a theoretical question we return to later in this chapter.

(4) Impact of Convergence

Convergence is the decline of total factor productivities and hence of per capita income growth in the later stages of economic development toward an asymptotic level. By stint of its wealth and size, the United States is closest to this asymptotic level. According to Paul Krugman and others a maximum growth rate for the United States in the long run given its structural and industrial composition is about 2.5 per cent. More it cannot do without inflation.

All states converge in their per capita income growth rates. Newly Industrializing Countries such as China, Brazil, India, or Mexico enjoy very high rates of growth in per capita wealth. But for various

241Doran, in Manus Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies II.


reasons associated with the age of the economy, switches from efficiency to equality concerns, changes in the age composition of the work force, and inability to innovate technologically as easily as to imitate, the productivity of the more advanced economies tends to decline. Per capita income growth rates follow although only to an asymptotic level that because of the then size of these economies still generates very significant employment and revenue.

Convergence probably reinforces the strength of the size/growth threshold. Since as economies mature, their per capita income growth rates tend to converge toward that of the United States at present, this convergence generates a tighter fit for the non-linear size-growth threshold. Japan, for example, in the 1983-1993 interval of this study enjoyed a per capita income growth rate measured in PPP terms of about 4.3. But in the next ten year interval its growth has been in the range of 2.5 per cent, much like that of the United States. While in the earlier period its relatively high growth rate made Japan look like something of an outlier, distorting the regression fit of the size/growth threshold somewhat, in the subsequent period its per capita income growth rate looks much more like that of a "normal" advanced industrial country.

The likely effect of economic growth and of convergence will be to reinforce the limiting characteristics of the size/growth threshold on per capita incomes of the advanced industrial states.

Is There No Relationship Between The Size Of A Polity And The Increase In The Wealth Of Its Citizens?

Analytically, the problem of whether size is a brake on economic growth can be posed by calling attention to the following empirical observations and theoretical assumptions.

(1) Controlling for Development Since patterns of per capita income growth exist for countries across the developmental experience of a polity, these patterns must be controlled for. Otherwise a pattern of conflicting per capita income growth rates associated with level of development will distort or obscure the relationship between state size and growth. Countries at each phase of the developmental experience ought to be treated relative to each other rather than relative to countries in earlier or later phases. Inasmuch as the set of countries of greatest interest to studies of regional economic integration as articulated here are the advanced industrial countries, the easiest way to control for stage of economic development is to isolate this set of advanced industrial countries for analysis.

(2) Movement to a Larger Trade System Diminishes Integration The secessionist entity is smaller, usually much smaller, than the original state of which it was a member. The modern writers see this entry of the secessionist fragment into the world trading system as painless since size and the increase in growth rate are said to be uncorrelated. Neo-classical writers only went so far as to say that the level of economic growth could improve if a state as a unified entity entered a larger trade area or union. Following neo-classical theory on economic integration, (a) economies of scale, (b) international scale considerations, (c) management efficiencies, (d) monopoly effects, (e) factor integration efficiencies, and (f) reductions of border risk all are associated with both the size of a polity and the degree of its integration. Increased productivity benefits from the concatenation of these influences. With secession, an entity moves from a larger, highly integrated state economy to an even larger entity (a regional trade area or union, or the liberalized global trading system itself) at a lower degree of integration.\textsuperscript{244} Degree of Integration: When the degree of integration is also considered, and X is the degree of integration of the state, Y is the degree of integration of a regional trade area, and Z is the degree of integration of the larger trade system, then the secessionist entity will benefit when \( Y \exists Z \exists X \).

\textsuperscript{244}More formally expressed, the theory of the secessionist state as expressed in terms of size and in terms of degree of integration is as follows.

Size: If A is the state, B is the fragment that separates from A, and C is a regional trade grouping of which B eventually
Levels of Integration  The process of separation evolves in three stages: (1) statehood, (2) secession, and (3) entry into the larger trade system. Under the further pressures of globalization and technological impact, the degree of integration everywhere may be increasing. But the greatest economic and political cohesion still exists within the nation-state. From the perspective of economic efficiency, "separation of nations is never desirable." Unified countries possess advantages in terms of avoidance of duplication costs for administration, local security, and defense.

The next highest level of integration occurs within the regional preferential trade area or community such as the European Union or NAFTA. Investment figures, for example, show that the concentration of investment by a state's own investors is of course highest within the state itself, next highest within a regional trading bloc of which the state is a member, and finally least high or most diffuse within the international trading system as a whole.

While increasingly interdependent, the polities within the trade order at large are the least economically cohesive in both trade and investment terms. Hence the secessionist state, facing loss of the benefits of integration even as the advantages of scale may increase, within the preferential regional trade area but even more so among the states of the larger global trading system, must decide how to establish a better bargain. But the problem for the secessionist entity is that no one at the regional, much less the global, level is going to replace the benefits of integration that the entity has foregone through separation. No one is going to provide the support for education, technological innovation, greater financial stability, international security, absence of border risk, and bargaining leverage that the entity had enjoyed when it was part of the larger, more integrated, unified state. There is no economic or other reason to suppose otherwise.

Nonlinearity  Standard linear models do not fit the relation between market size and growing per capita income. A simple thought experiment indicates why. If a direct relationship existed between size and the rate of per capita income growth, then the larger the market became, either treated cross-sectionally or across time, the higher would be the rate of per capita income growth. Since size is open-ended (limitless) in terms of magnitude, i.e., ever-expanding, the rate of growth in per capita income would be ever-expanding. This is logically and empirically an impossibility.

Hence the relation between market size and rate of per capita income growth must be non-linear. Suppose population size is the independent variable indexing market size, and growth rate of per capita income -- or of Purchasing Power Parity (PAP) per capita -- growth is the dependent variable indexing the rate of increase in wealth. If percent change in (PAP) per capita is plotted on the Y-axis and population size is plotted on the X-axis, then the form that the non-linear curve must take is concave downwards. Specific shape of the curve and the actual quantitative values of the functional relationship are an empirical matter.

It is a mistake simply to dub any curve that is concave downwards as "diminishing marginal returns." In this case, the relation for small states between increasing size and rate of increasing per capita wealth is direct and strong. But the relation suddenly hits an upper limit and disappears. What happens here mathematically is quite different from the traditional diminishing marginal returns curve found elsewhere in economics.

Size/Growth Threshold  On theoretical grounds we thus posit a threshold effect. At some point the increase in size of the polity and of its market no longer possesses a positive impact upon the increase in the rate of per capita income (or PAP per capita) growth. This threshold is likely to be sharp and quite impermeable as the need for specialization is satisfied across industries at a given level of technology by a market of adequate size. The threshold effect causes the previously strong relationship suddenly to disappear. For the larger states the relation between increased size and increased per capita wealth is non-existent.


246. I am grateful to Gustav Schmidt, University of the Ruhr, Bochum, Germany for this insight.
But for very small states of the size equated with most secessionist entities, the relation between size and the rate of income in welfare is quite different. For these very small polities, especially in the advanced industrial world where growth rates have already stabilized, the association between size and the rate of per capita or PAP income growth will be strong and direct. For these small polities, size is a damper on growth rate.

**Empirical Analysis On The Size/Growth Threshold**

When we carry out the empirical analysis, the results are striking, as evidenced by Figure 1. The relationship is indeed close and positive for the smaller economies. As the economies increase in size past a certain threshold, the rate of increase in per capita income (PAP) does fall off precipitously. Thus the relationship between size and the rate of growth of per capita wealth is decidedly non-linear as is captured in Figure 1.

**FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE**

Using a linearized least squares regression technique, more than half of the variance in the rate of growth in per capita PAP is explained by market size (R-Squared = .64). When averaged over the period 1983-1993, and indexed separately either by population size or by GDP, each indicator of market size revealed approximately the same result. For a single indicator to explain so much of the variance in the dependent variable is welcome. Regarding this set of advanced industrial countries at least, such strong and parsimonious statistical results suggest that the relation between size and rate of growth is quite robust.

An objection may be raised to this research design, however. The objection is that Quebec is assumed for the purposes of the argument to accede directly to membership in a regional trade agreement. This membership is supposed to offer all of the benefits of scale and security that a state in isolation does not have. Therefore, it might be argued, the research design is spurious because it pits countries at large in the international system, some of which are not members of a regional economic entity, against a situation in which Quebec might find itself a full member of a preferential trade area. Thus, results from the empirical test, so the argument might go, would not apply to an independent Quebec that immediately becomes a full member of NAFTA.

The problem with this criticism is that it ignores the composition of the sample of countries employed in the empirical test. These countries are initially for the most part either members of the former European Economic Community (EEC) or of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Many as well become members of the European Community or of the subsequent European Union. Thus the empirical relationship that is observed in this analysis is fully compatible with any situation that a future Quebec might experience. The key observation is that the threshold effect regarding the relation between size and growth holds in spite of the reality that many of the states in the sample are members of preferential trade areas or unions.

But this conclusion prompts a further question. How can the presence of a direct relation between size and the rate of growth be explained for the very small state when the relation appears to hold even inside a larger regional trade area or union? If the explanation is pursued in the context of the Vinerian model, the extension by Max Corden may be helpful in terms of scale economies. First, part of the reason that the small state still experiences a drag on its rate of growth inside a regional trade area may be that trade diversion occurs from the state of which the secessionist entity was originally a member to the regional trade grouping of which it subsequently becomes a member. The regional

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248. There is good empirical evidence that this supposition may have validity here since increasing trade diversion seems to be a problem for the European countries associated with the European Union. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, *Europe 1992: An American Perspective* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1990), p. 23.
trade area benefits from the membership of the secessionist entity but the entity itself does not. Hence small size continues to be penalized even though the secessionist entity continues to enjoy access to the larger trade grouping, albeit as an independent political actor.

Second, following Corden, there may be important scale effects that also account for the direct relation between size and growth for the very small state. Corden posits cost-reduction as well as trade creation effects on the one hand, and trade-suppression as well as trade diversion effects on the other. Trade-suppression could result if “imports” from the state of which the secessionist entity was originally a member are replaced by domestic production after secession. Scale effects would make this new production possible for firms within the secessionist state after secession. Perhaps non-tariff barriers ought to be substituted for formal tariffs to make this use of trade diversion and of trade-suppression plausible since tariffs themselves are presumably being phased out throughout the regional trade area. Together trade diversion and trade-suppression help explain the perpetuation of the size/growth relation for the very small state.

Translating Abstract Costs into Social Meaning

As far as Canada is concerned, the results are particularly interesting. According to the expected results for a country of the size of Canada, Canada ought to have a growth rate of wealth of 2.75 per cent. In reality, for the period 1983-1993, Canada averaged a growth rate of about 3 per cent. Thus Canada has been growing faster than the systemic norm for a country of its size.

Now let us further address the question we started out to measure, that is, the relationship between economic size and the rate of growth in per capita wealth for Quebec.

Notwithstanding the fact that Quebec has been in virtual recession in terms of the level of unemployment, for example, because of the hovering threat of secession, let us assume that Quebec in confederation can do at least as well as any other province in terms of the generation of personal wealth. This means that in the decade of 1983-1993, the growth rate of per capita PAP ought to be about 3 per cent, the same as for the growth rate of Canada for the decade 1983-1993. However, if Quebec size were plotted on the graph (Figure I) depicting the relationship between economic size and the rate of per capita PAP growth, the corresponding growth rate expected of Quebec would be only about 2 per cent.

This means that if Quebec were to separate, its generation of per capita wealth would occur at a rate that is perhaps one-half of what Quebec could generate inside confederation. That is a profoundly significant result!

According to these findings based on the experience of some eighteen advanced-industrial nations, if Quebec goes independent it sacrifices a large percentage of its aggregate economic growth and increase in per capita wealth. This is the trade-off that the Quebec voter must contemplate on referendum night. This is the hard empirical evidence necessary to back up the speculation that “heart” and “head” were different after the 1998 Quebec government election on the matter of secession, and that emotional appeals to sovereignty had to take into account the sacrifice expected of the voter in personal economic terms.

Since the empirical analysis was done on countries that were for the most part members of some type of preferential trade area or union, NAFTA membership for Quebec would not change the disparity in the figures between a Canada growth rate for Quebec and a much lower independence growth rate for Quebec even if it were eventually a member of NAFTA. Membership in NAFTA for an independent Quebec is not likely to erase the threshold effect on the relation between size and growth. The myth is that NAFTA can substitute for Canada as an integrated market in strengthening the Quebec per capita income growth rate. But this myth is wrong. Quebec as an independent entity, inside or outside NAFTA, will always pay a growth premium to a Quebec that remains inside Canadian confederation.

In sum, for the decade 1983-1993, if Quebec had become independent in 1983, the average Quebec citizen would be poorer by about fifty percent of its increase in per capita income. This means the following in terms of income for an average Quebecer over the last decade.
In 1997 a per capita unit of Purchasing Power Parity (PAP) for an average Canadian was about $20,970 U.S. If PAP per capita were the same in Quebec as on average in the rest of Canada, then the amount gained in terms of growth over the prior year by that same average Quebecer was about $210 U.S. That figure is calculated by recognizing that the growth rate of per capita PAP was about 50 percent more (i.e. 3 percent) for Quebec as a province than for Quebec as an independent country (i.e. about 2 percent). In 1993, for a Quebec family of four, this growth premium resulting from participation in confederation amounts to about $850 U.S.

If Quebec had seceded in 1983, that same family of four would have relinquished more than $8000 U.S. by 1997, not counting interest, relative to the amount of per capita PAP the family actually enjoyed because Quebec was a full member of confederation.

This figure may not seem like much to those at the top of the income pyramid. But to those at the bottom of the income pyramid, and to many of those in the middle, this is a very high economic price to pay for slightly greater political sovereignty after secession relative to the extensive sovereignty (sovereignty-association according to the late Robert Bourassa) Quebec already possesses. Aggregated over the life of a child and properly invested, this is an amount that could pay for the college education of a couple of children at public universities. Or if such an amount were aggregated over the lifetime of an individual and again properly invested this amount could yield quite a retirement nest egg. In an era experiencing uncertainty with respect to pension funds, such an amount could reasonably be considered as a kind of insurance policy to augment the possible inadequacy of public pension proceeds.

All of the costs identified in this study accompanying secession, because of the small size of the secessionist state, add up to something very real, a considerable loss of wealth for the average Quebecer. Whether the average Quebecer is willing to assume these costs is not for others to decide. But the Quebec voter should at least have the requisite information available to him or her upon which to make an acute and balanced judgment about the opportunity costs associated with small economic size.

A further caution is also in order. Based on our earlier discussion of the relation between structural stability and trade liberalization, the question arises whether the future international system will support the same rates of growth of the past half century. It is well to remember that all of the growth in per capita income occurred amidst monumental trade and investment liberalization, through some eight major rounds of global tariff reduction, during a very propitious interval of structural change from 1945 to 1990. Notwithstanding the Cold War, the underlying structural situation was quite stable and lacking in abrupt or massive surprise. With the advent of systems transformation in the 1990s, the effect on the trading regime in the first decades of the twenty-first century could be less helpful to whatever impulse to liberalization that may exist.

**Resolving The Paradigmatic Controversy**

The findings of this chapter resolve much of the controversy between the neo-classical writers on economic integration and the contemporary theorists. Both appear to be wrong. Both are right. Relation between economic size and the rate of per capita income (or PAP) growth is more complex than originally thought.

Each group of theorists appears to have been wrong in some measure. The neoclassical writers did not foresee how sharply the economic benefits of larger market size tends to fall off. They may also have underestimated the propensity for secession among multi-ethnic states that also are democracies once regional economic integration among polities of a certain size proceeds. Likewise the contemporary theorists of size and integration appear to be wrong about their assumption that there is no relation between market size and per capita income (or PAP) growth.

On the other hand, and more significantly, when the size/growth threshold effect is introduced, each group of theorists appears to be right in their respective assumptions about how integration impacts economic growth. The per capita income growth rate cycle (curve) explains the accelerative and subsequent decelerative growth rates for countries at either end of the growth experience.

The neo-classical analysts were correct that there is a substantial impact of market size on the increase in per capita income (per capita income growth rate) for the very small polities. Economic integration
offers the possibility of reduced border risk for the firm and various efficiencies that the very small market cannot supply. In these matters, the neo-classical theorists were on solid conceptual ground.

But the modern theorists of growth and economic integration are also correct in that these benefits of economic specialization seem to fall off quickly. Big countries, especially in the context of globalization, can supply most of the needs of exchange and specialization as well as security for the firm. The modern writers may well be right too in their seeming conclusion that moderate-to-large sized polities in conjunction with liberalized world markets may have little need for the preferential, regional trade order.

Key to a resolution of this difference of interpretation between the neo-classical and the modern theorist of size and growth is the existence of the threshold effect. Suitably reinforced by empirical evidence, the existence of the threshold effect helps sort out conceptual contradiction and makes possible a reconciliation of the two sets of theoretical argument.

Assessing The Policy Implications

Existence of the threshold effect now clarifies several long-standing policy ambiguities. First, when the Common Market was initially formed, the Benelux countries and Italy surely joined to obtain the economic benefits of scale economies and related efficiencies that are so evident prior to reaching the integration threshold of 25 million or so citizens. These considerations probably meant less to the bigger German and French populations (economies). Germany and France entered the Common Market largely for political reasons, to overcome centuries of animosity, a problem that the smaller polities in turn did not pose towards each other. Thus different governments sought membership in the regional collective for different yet complementary economic and political reasons in a fashion that the threshold effect now makes explicit.

Second, it is now beginning to be more clear why the propensity for secession has not gone very far in Spain, Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Canada and other advanced industrial countries. Even though the WTO has advanced the cause of global free trade from which all may have the chance to benefit, and even though the EU and NAFTA respectively offer potentially secessionist fragments the prospect of enhanced specialization of markets, the degree of integration within each of these realms is still less than that afforded by the individual nation-state of which each secessionist fragment remains a member. Similarly, trade diversion and trade-depression may hold back the very small state from experiencing the scale effects and freedom from border risk that states beyond the size/growth threshold seem to enjoy.

For instance, for the Basques to rely (after secession) on the European Union instead of the Spanish economy for primary commercial and trade interchange means that the Basques will be assuming significant opportunity costs. The degree of integration within the European Union, all things considered, is still considerably less than the degree of integration presently enjoyed by the Basque community and by Basque enterprises within the Spanish economy. For the Basque business community to make the abrupt adjustment to the lower level of integration afforded by the European Union, shorn of many of their prior cultural associations, institutional contacts, subsidies, and commercial preferences, is a step many of them may not be prepared to take.

Third, is the size/growth threshold applicable internal to polities as well with respect to agglomeration of cities? Evidence indicates that, although the largest cities grew fastest in terms of productivity gains in the 1980s, the group of cities in the second largest category of employment grew fastest in productivity terms in the 1990s. Explanation is that innovations in communications technology have allowed large companies to relocate operations to smaller cities where labor costs are lower. Overall, size remains important because the larger cities are the urban areas that offer the most skilled workers and specialized services needed by corporations. But, as the advantage of urban size suddenly changes under the influence of the information revolution, the size/growth threshold may be operating internal to states too.

Fourth, to advocate for example that Quebec—if it should secede, and even if it becomes a full member of NAFTA (not without making many changes perhaps for the better in its own government to economy interaction)—can do so without loss of economic advantage is simply not borne out by this theoretical argument and set of empirical findings. Given its population of 7.5 million people, Quebec will continue to enjoy the advantages of association with the more highly integrated Canadian economy relative to NAFTA at a lower level of integration. According to these findings on the threshold effect, not until Quebec obtains a population perhaps three or four times as large will it entirely be able to dispense with the benefits of Canadian economic union. Secession, according to the threshold effect, will come at a high economic price for Quebec and other similarly small separatist-minded communities.

In sum, notwithstanding arguments to the contrary that do, or appear to, alter neo-classical interpretation regarding the value of size, a small state that secedes from a larger polity pays a price in terms of a reduced rate of growth. Of course, in an era of trade liberalization and assured territorial security, the small state can survive. Some like Singapore may “beat the odds” and even grow at disproportionately high rates, especially if they enjoy the benefits of early development long known to be correlated with faster rates of growth than advanced industrialism. But, on average, until it reaches a population size of perhaps 25 million, the rate of growth of the small, advanced industrial state is constrained.

At that point, a threshold effect occurs in which the association between size and rate of growth changes. For the large state, size no longer has much impact on rate of growth since scale, degree of integration, factor efficiencies, and reduction of border risk all become much less important to the large state as rates of per capita income (PAP) growth approach an asymptotic limit.

Postulated theoretically, and tested empirically, a threshold effect exists in the relation between increasing state size and increasing rate of growth in Purchasing Power Parity. Secession carries a burden for the small independent actor, regardless of whether it enters a regional trade bloc, in terms of the rapidity with which in the proximate future it is likely to grow.

This paper draws upon Chapters 5 and 6 of the author’s forthcoming book, *Democratic Pluralism at Risk: Why Canadian Unity Matters*. 
A central issue in the study of contemporary world politics by both social science theorists and historians is assessing change,\(^\text{250}\) that is, the degree to which the present resembles the past or is so different as to constitute a difference in kind. This problem underlies some of the current and often interrelated debates regarding globalization, regionalization, “the clash of civilizations,” world cities, and the “decline” of the sovereign state. Perhaps surprisingly, the difficulty in making comparisons is rarely a matter of controversy about actual conditions in the past or present. Much more often the controversy hinges upon the interpretation or “spin” that is put upon the facts about which nearly all agree. Also frequently fueling disagreements is conceptual fuzziness, in that analysts may believe or try to convince us they are discussing \(x\) when they are really focusing on different aspects of \(x\), or even \(y\) or \(z\).

Hence, I argue, it is perhaps best to avoid getting bogged down any of the present-day “great debates” in the IR field and, instead, to engage in deliberate and substantial ground-clearing. Those of us who are interested in global politics will find it useful to borrow from some political geographers and think of the world as “political space.” Doing so invites us to re-map the world of politics generically, with few preconceptions, to break away from the traditional map of sovereign states engaged in international relations or at least to put that traditional map in perspective. What we would wish to have on any new map, of course, depends very much on what exactly it is we want or need to show.

This paper explores alternative ways of thinking about political space, each of which illuminates various dimensions of past and present “reality” in global politics. I propose that it is especially helpful to focus on the relationship between politics and territory, and patterns of governance broadly conceived. Who or what controls or significantly influences political outcomes (value allocation)--and why? Such a map will be far more complex than the familiar one of sovereign-state boxes, but will be also be a far better guide to the history, current issues, and future of global politics.

Assessing Change in Global Politics

Writing about the impact of globalizing trends upon the power structures, actors, institutions, and processes of contemporary world politics has become almost a cottage industry among present-day social scientists and historians. Full-scale globalists go so far as to predict in the near term the emergence of a virtually unfettered capitalist world market, the fading away of sovereignty and the nation-state, the end of “history” and any alternative to neoliberal ideology, and the triumph of Western (mainly American-style) democracy and popular culture.\(^\text{252}\) The normative foundations of such arguments range from a genuine faith in markets and desire to remove any government-imposed barriers to free economic intercourse, to an eagerness to spread Western notions of representative politics and human rights, to a determined aim to reduce the cultural differences among peoples. From


\(^{251}\) The phrase was popularized by Samuel P. Huntington. See his, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

\(^{252}\) Although they do not all make all of these arguments, examples of globalist authors include Francis Fukayama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992) and W. Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1992).
such standpoints, states are political dinosaurs that harbor dangerous nationalist sentiments and whose boundaries no longer make good economic sense.

Not surprisingly, the surge of globalist literature and talk has generated a substantial and diverse skeptical backlash. The normative foundations of skeptics range from an opposition to “big business” generally, to a concern that economic liberalization (e.g., through the WTO) poses a threat to “progressive” labor and environmental policies, to moral outrage that a globalizing world economy is widening the gaps between rich and poor, to an intense professional and ideological attachment to the state as the primary unit for the practice of political democracy, Keynesian liberal policies, and national cultural expression.

Ironically, concern about such matters often generates a form of denial, a self-reassuring skepticism that globalism is not really either as novel or far advanced as globalists proclaim. Several leading analysts argue that, in many respects, the world today is actually less “interdependent” and “integrated” economically than it was in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century heyday of the European state system and empires; that few large corporations are truly global in their organizational style, market strategies, or production facilities; that the speed of communication has hardly improved since the telegraph and telephone were invented; that the enlightenment had a cultural vision of “one world” and “the rights of man” at least as universal as any contemporary vision; and so on.

Still other analysts attempt to counter “decline of the state” arguments with assertions about the primacy of the use of armed force by states from past to present or an insistence that little has changed because both states and sovereignty have been highly varied in practice since Westphalia. For example, William H. McNeill writes that any “requiem for the Westphalian state is premature,” mainly “because no promising alternative to the territorial organization of armed force has even begun to emerge” and it is still the capacity to “organize and maintain superior armed force” that determines “pride of place” among polities. Stephen D. Krasner’s position that sovereignty has always been “organized hypocrisy” is an ingenious example of defense of the state by double-think. Looking backwards as far as Westphalia, he points up, correctly, “the characteristics that are associated with sovereignty—territory, autonomy, recognition, and control—do not provide an accurate description of actual practices that have characterized many entities that have conveniently been viewed as sovereign states.” So, by implication, little or nothing has fundamentally changed for sovereign states in the current globalizing world. Eric Helleiner similarly argues that such functions as regulating finance or making macroeconomic policies “were either never fully performed by sovereign states or only performed recently by them.” Thus, by implication, we need not be particularly concerned that globalization trends are undermining state capacity to fulfill those functions.


Other analysts acknowledge that there are globalizing tendencies and states still have a prominent role but nonetheless insist that the world can best be understood as being deeply divided or significantly variegated in other respects. Some maintain that civilizations or regions have always been the main actors on the global stage and remain so today, whether one speaks broadly of "the clash of civilizations" or more specifically about the European Union or "the Asian model." By contrast, Peter J. Taylor has identified some 55 "world cities" and "inter-city relations as a model of the global economy." In his view, "the future of globalization is linked to the possibilities for world city network knowledge monopolies." Saskia Sassen speaks in a somewhat more site-specific fashion about the "embedding" of "the global in the national." She observes: "Some of what we code as national because it takes place in national territory has become the global. And some of what we code as global is contingent on the national state as an administrative capacity and as a source of legitimacy." There is a "denationalizing of specific institutional arenas: Manhattan and the City of London are the equivalent of free-trade zones when it comes to finance."

Through yet another lens, economic globalization has been anything but "universal," in that it has only increasingly divided the world between those regions, countries, and elites wherever they may be situated who benefit from economic growth and the info-tech revolution--and those who not only do not benefit but also may, in some cases, be increasingly impoverished. Factoring in security considerations, for example, Barry Buzan and Richard Little believe that "uneven development is pulling the international system into two worlds." One, "a zone of peace" is "a postmodern security community of powerful advanced industrial democracies" that no longer war against one another and are negotiating permeable boundaries. In this zone, "economies and societies are highly open and interdependent, transnational players are numerous and strong, and international society is well developed." The other world or "zone of conflict" "is comprised of a mixture of modern and premodern states," where "realist rules still obtain, sovereignty remains sacred, and war is a usable and used instrument of policy."

Buzan and Little do note, however, that globalizing trends are beginning to transform at least some aspects of states in the zone of conflict as well.

**Fuzzy Concepts**

Proponents of different positions in debates such as these frequently are talk past one another because they are discussing at least somewhat (and often very) different subjects. Is the world more "globalized" today than ever before? It obviously depends substantially upon one's definition of "globalization": What is the difference between globalization and "mere" internationalization or interdependence? Must there be genuine institutional growth and integration transnationally, including new forms and patterns of governance? Should we focus upon revolutions in transportation and communication, the movement of peoples (migration), or the growth of a global "civil society." Are our concerns political,

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264 On this point, see Jones, The World Turned Upside Down?, 12-17.
military, economic, cultural, or environmental? The conclusions we reach regarding the extent to which the world is globalized are bound to be profoundly affected by choices such as these.

There are important definitional issues even within particular choices or categories. If we are discussing economic globalization, for example, do we refer to the relative intensity of countries’ “external” versus “internal” GDP with regard to trade in particular goods, services, or investment; to the sheer increased volume and density of cross-border currency transactions; and/or to firm management, market strategy, or location of production facilities and service centers?

If we limit our consideration of “globalization” to the growth of international trade and investment, as Hirst does rather arbitrarily, such a process (as he observes) has indeed been going on, with fits and starts, for well over a century. He identifies three earlier sustained periods, 1870-1914, the end of WWII to 1973, and 1973-70. Even today, over 90 percent of FDI (foreign direct investment) still takes place between and among the rich countries, representing just over a quarter of the world’s population. Under such conditions, he concludes, the potential for a relatively small number of affected countries to design effective joint regulatory strategies remains high. Helleiner cites Giovanni Arrighi on the related point that financial markets, too, have been highly “globalized” in several previous historical periods, particularly in the several decades before 1931. In its way, the gold standard that prevailed for so many years was a remarkable testament to financial integration. So, Helleiner contends, those who “assert that financial globalization is eroding the sovereign state . . . must do more to explain why sovereign states were able easily to coexist with—and indeed were often strengthened by—global financial markets in those earlier periods but are apparently being undermined by them today.”

Actually, that is a relatively easy task and one that a number of distinguished scholars interested in the relationship of international finance and the increasingly digital global economy have undertaken. What is strikingly different about the current era is the sheer volume and volatility of transnational currency flows for purposes of speculation, far exceeding the transactions required either for trade in goods and services or for traditional forms of investment. E-commerce is meanwhile rapidly transforming not only the processes by which individuals invest in stocks and other financial instruments but also the nature of the global marketplace for goods and services.

The foregoing perhaps suggests that we require a much broader rather than narrower notion of globalization that will allow us to identify and appreciate features of the contemporary era that are dramatic departures from the past. David Held, et. al. offer just such a conceptualization. As they explain it: “Globalization can best be understood as a process or set of processes rather than a singular condition” that does not necessarily reflect “a simple linear developmental logic,” a prefiguration of “a world society or world community,” or “global integration.” What it does reflect is “the enmeshment of national and societal systems in wider global processes . . . complex webs and networks of relations between communities, states, international institutions, non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations which make up the global order.” “Under conditions of globalization, élocal,i énational,i or even écontinentalí political, social, and economic space is re-formed such that it is no longer necessarily coterminous with established legal and territorial boundaries.” The “exercise of


Hirst, “the Global Economy.”


power through the decisions, actions, or inactions, of agencies on one continent can have significant consequences for nations, communities and households on other continents.” To be sure, they observe, “elites in the world’s major metropolitan areas” have much more impact on global networks than do “subsistence farmers in Burundi.”

Expanding our definitional horizons, then, what is similar and what is different about the contemporary era from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? In Jones’s opinion, the main differences are the cumulative impact of the internal combustion engine upon travel (not least air travel) and the impact of the microprocessor and associated technologies. Whether together these developments have created a compression of space and time and thus “an uncontrolled and uncontrollable acceleration in the pace and scale of change” remains for him an open question that requires a nuanced and qualified response.²⁷¹ Held et al. have a somewhat more radical assessment of contemporary globalization that involves (among other features) “historically unprecedented extensity, intensity, velocity and impact propensity of global flows, interactions and networks embracing all social domains,” “new forms of multinational regulation and multilayered governance,” and regionalization and globalization as “largely mutually reinforcing tendencies within the global political economy.”²⁷²

I shall return in the concluding section of this paper to explore some of the theoretical implications of open-ended conceptions of globalization, which seem to me to be by far the most useful. However, while we on the subject of fuzzy concepts, we should not neglect some of the alternatives to a globalized world that are often proposed in the literature.

Consider first, only in passing, because a veritable fire-storm of criticism greeted Samuel P. Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis when it first appeared: what, indeed, is a “civilization”? Without question, certain parts of the world share some features of common culture and attitudes towards “the other” as well as particular issues of global politics. Such places as China, the Arab countries, and Latin America come to mind. But for every “civilization,” one also cannot help but discern major fault lines, rather similar to the problem of identifying “regions” and subregions we discuss next. Are the Arabs a civilization when they are seriously divided along Sunni/Shiite, national, and even tribal and family lines? Those divisions prompt not only internecine conflicts but also even different positions on the elusive “peace process” in the Middle East and cooperation with the West. Huntington himself seems to contradict his own argument when he draws distinctions like “the West Versus the Rest,” which seems a far more profound division (if correct, which is highly dubious) than that between and among separate civilizations.

Turn next to the concepts of “region” and “regionalization” in the contemporary world. For instance, is Latin America a region? Many would rightly insist that it is really a collection of ill-defined subregions defined as much or more by history, or by political and economic relationships, than geography (e.g., the ABC countries, Mercosur, the Central American Common Market, the Andean region, CARICOM). But the “Western Hemisphere” as embodied in the Monroe Doctrine has played a prominent part in Latin American history, and perhaps equally or more important has been an Atlantic Triangle. In more recent times, of course, there have been such additional institutional ties as the OAS and NAFTA, not to mention Latin Americans increasing integration in a global economy or the isolation of Cuba. Similarly, is there an “Asian model” of development that is equally applicable to Japan and China, Korea and Taiwan, and countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore? Many Asian specialists would suggest that, despite some similarities such as a relatively strong state and unusually close ties between government and private companies, the political and economic differences among different countries are much more striking. Or even within certain countries? For instance, Kenneth Pomeranz remarks: “China does not resemble single European countries, but the whole continent; we need to compare like regions with each area.”²⁷³ Yet Asia today seems considerably easier to conceive of as a

region than, say, the Balkans--or does the traditional term, “balkanization,” capture something that is genuinely regional in character?

If there is any “region” more clearly accepted in the literature, it is surely Europe, yet that too is problematical. Which Europe are we referring to? The Europe whose security since the mid-twentieth century has been bound up in NATO? The EU, whose membership and specific functions are continually in evolution (the perennial “how wide and how deep?” questions). The EMU, which excludes the British pound? The transborder “regions” within the EU that are exercising increasingly significant forms of local governance?

Jones attempts to sort out issues like these by proposing that we think in terms of three types of regionalism: micro-regionalism, meso-regionalism, and macro-regionalism. Micro-regionalism includes areas like the “Silicon Valley” in the United States, the North-East within the United Kingdom, and Brittany in France. Meso-regionalism accounts especially for parts of Europe like the Rhone-Alps from Lyon to Northern Italy. And macro-regionalism would encompass broader areas that develop intense economic interaction and/or international institutions. In this category fall the EU, ASEAN, the WTO, and so on. Such a formulation helps to point up that regions and regionalism in fact come in at least several varieties. What it does not do, as Jones would surely agree, is begin to address the nesting dimension of regions, how, for instance, Northern Italy is the focus of an intense Lombard League separatist campaign while it is also part of the Rhone Alps.

Finally, as our discussion above implied, whether we view the state today as more or less viable depends mainly on how “the state” is to be defined and what states we are considering. Over a decade ago Richard W. Mansbach and I wrote a book arguing that, as a conservative estimate, there were at least fifteen different definitions of “the state” that were prominent in international relations. Whether one, for instance, viewed the state as a normative order, a functional unit, an ethno-cultural unit, a national bureaucracy, or as a constituent unit with certain capabilities of an international system makes a critical difference. In fact, we concluded that the state has so many meanings that the concept is virtually useless for theory-building. That conclusion is no less relevant today. Because of the post-Cold War resurgence of ethnicity in world affairs, current students of nationalism are much more likely than previous generations of scholars to make a clear distinction between “nation” and “state.” Some historical sociologists like Michael Mann and most archaeologists use the term “state” in a such a broad sense that it applies equally well (or poorly) to almost any substantial polity past or present--city-states, Rome at the height of the Empire, the Aztec polity, and so on. Is the situation much better at the dawn of the twenty-first century, when we continue to label as states everything from the world’s only superpower to countries like Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Nauru? Add in the concept of “sovereignty” to make “sovereign state,” and we only compound our difficulties. What exactly is sovereignty? Is it absolute authority, final authority, control of selected functional or policy domains, or simply a claim or claims to authority? Is sovereignty divisible, so that we can fairly speak of states ceding or losing sovereignty to an entity like the EU?

This problem of conceptualizing the state bears heavily, as well, upon current positions of analysts who are determined to counter the decline of the state thesis. For example, some writers insist that states in general are not “declining” in the face of globalization pressures--only “changing” or “restructuring.” Helleiner remarks: “The welfare-nationalist form of state that triumphed in many parts of the world in the post-1931 era is being replaced by a “neo-liberal” form of state similar in some respects to that which existed prior to 1931. Regulatory instruments such as exchange controls, which became so common in the post-1931 era, are being dismantled, while international forms of regulatory cooperation to prevent financial crises and track illegal flows of money are being strengthened just as they were before the 1930s. Private forms of financial power and regulatory activities are also resurfacing . . . . [There are] transformations in state-society relations, intrastate bureaucratic structures and even

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patterns of interstate interactions. But not all of this should be interpreted as a decline in the sovereign state.\textsuperscript{276}

As the foregoing suggests, related arguments are that globalization and freer markets are actually demanding that states produce more rules on the “domestic” front and also that states are managing to recover some of their lost prerogatives by cooperating through international institutions.\textsuperscript{277} Leave aside the important points that we have yet to witness very many national politicians and bureaucrats evincing a sophisticated grasp of the challenges at hand or an impressive upsurge in effective institutions and regulatory activities at the international level. Even if such effective action is eventually to be forthcoming, most concede, much of the impetus for that would surely have to come be from a private sector that finds--much as it did in the depths of the 1930s depression--that a few rules can help curb market volatility and flagrantly corrupt behavior. In sum, which--the state or the private sector--is the tail and which is the dog under such conditions? Who the ruler or sovereign and who the servant? Similar questions might be raised when others maintain that states still have an important role to play in providing adequate infrastructure and services to maintain their country’s competitiveness in a global economy. Likewise, will the prospective growth of international cooperation promote institutions that will prove to be more than the sum of their member-state parts, that is, new loci of authority and identity in world affairs?

Political Space in a Postinternational World

In the midst of so much uncertainty, a few matters seem certain enough. The political world of the twenty-first century is evolving at an unprecedented pace, and our understanding of that world is lagging seriously behind. Globalization and regionalization, as well as traditional states, world cities, cultures, and substantial fragmentation are all part of contemporary “reality,” but such general statements are about as far as our current theories and fuzzy concepts will take us.

Hence, as I suggested at the outset of this paper, the time has come for us to engage in a major ground-clearing exercise, with the aim not so much of destructive deconstruction (which we can leave to postmodern extreme relativists) but of positive reconstruction. We can begin by borrowing from some political geographers and conceive of the world of global politics simply as “political space.”\textsuperscript{278} Doing so invites us to break away from the traditional map of sovereign states engaged in international relations or at least to put that traditional map in perspective. What we would wish to have on any new map, of course, depends very much on what exactly it is we want or need to show. The following list is only intended to be illustrative and is by no means exhaustive.

Legal boundaries clearly persist, but not only those of states (countries). What state-centric analysts have often overlooked, or at least underplayed, is that legal boundaries also lie within states, and increasingly overarch and transcend them as well. Within many national governments, a single executive, various executive bureaucracies, legislative bodies, and courts have their separate and to some extent overlapping, legally-defined realms of authority. Their actual influence and control varies with particular issues and the political currents of the day. Most countries also have political subdivisions like the states in federal regimes, provinces or departments, counties, cities and towns, and so on. Moreover, in most relatively open and developed societies, private property rights, a host of firms and financial establishing organizational structures, alliances, and networks that cross national boundaries, as are an ever-growing number of international organizations (IOs) and less-formal regimes created by treaties and other agreements. Many IOs, too, have internal administrative and legislative subdivisions as well as a variety of linkages to member-states, other IOs and regimes, and global civil society.


\textsuperscript{278} See especially Ferguson and Jones, Political Space. My discussion of the concept here tracks closely part of the Introduction to that volume.
An additional useful set of features on our map might be actual transaction flows. Who is interacting with whom, that is, “diplomacy” broadly conceived?: such as summit meetings between heads of state, bureaucratic politics, intergovernmental relations, relations between and among firms, between firms and governments, or between NGOs and IOs? What do we observe about trade, in general and with respect to specific commodities, goods, and services? To what extent is it bilateral or increasingly globalized, concentrated regionally, inter-city, or intra-firm? We could ask similar questions about direct investment, loans from development banks, personal mail, telephone calls, hits on worldwide web sites, and other sorts of interactions.

Frequently neglected but nonetheless important is what we might term the subjective dimension of global politics. For example, maps supposedly identifying concentrations of certain ethnic groups can be extremely misleading. Although “ethnicity” may sometimes rest on such factors as a common history or language, there is no escaping the fact that it is largely a social construct like most other identities. The degree to which an individual or a group regards itself as “Scottish,” “Kurdish,” “Hispanic,” “Mayan,” “Slavic,” “Ukrainian,” or another ethnicity, almost always depends on a much broader context and often varies over time and with regard to particular issues. The same might be said for the concept of “nation,” despite the fact that most states define their own nationals and citizens by law. A key question is: With whom or what do individuals and groups actually identify? Religions have their faithful, internal schisms, and heretics. Firms have their local and often far-flung facilities and markets. Scholars have their professions and arcane specializations. Women and gay, their respective and (in the case of lesbians) overlapping constituencies, and so forth. Identities are normally not mutually exclusive. However, as a category like “women” strongly suggests, what perhaps matters most is not identity as such, but intensity of identification and loyalty. How do identities affect political behavior? Where do true loyalties lie?—and why?

Last but not least, we need to concern ourselves with patterns of governance. A traditional approach to that task, beyond a mere outlining of sovereign state boundaries, would be to highlight political regime types. We may map the worldís democracies, governments undergoing apparent transitions from authoritarianism, personal dictatorships, military regimes, failed states, and others. However, especially today we need to reconsider the relationship between territory and governance. All individuals and groups are situated in physical space, and for most nationalist movements the notion of a specific homeland remains strong. Yet much of what is important in global politics and surely the world economy is increasingly incongruent with state boundaries, or put another way, lies within or transcends those boundaries. Not only (as Sassen reminds us) is the global embedded in the national (and vice versa), but there is also a significant and perhaps growing degree of “deterritorialization.” Cyberspace, for example, gives a new meaning to the more familiar legal concept of “offshore.”

Whether our concern is with the past or the present or both, we should continually ask: Who or what controls or significantly influences actual political outcomes (value allocation)? That question captures “governance”—or perhaps better, “global governance”—in the most helpful and revealing sense of those words. When we ask it in as open-minded a fashion as possible, our thoughts immediately drift to a host of actors, some of which lie within or cross sovereign state boundaries—states, political subdivisions within them, bureaucracies, political parties, IOs, less-formal regimes, NGOs, different sorts of regions, transnational corporations, banks, hedge funds, criminal networks, and so on. The usual distinction between public and private actors and authority blurs. Actors’ actual control or influence is far more important than their own legitimacy or that of the power that they exercise. Each actor has a territorial “reach” of sorts—even if cyberspace extends that reach almost infinitely—although what is possibly the most crucial feature of actors is that they overlap and layer without any clear hierarchy. In a sense, their relative significance shifts depending on the political issue involved. So does the amount of anarchy or order—that is, coexistence, cooperation, and conflict—that prevails in the global system vary by issue. Some issues in global politics are highly predictable and relatively orderly, while others are chaotic and fraught with conflict and violence. The world thus looks very different from particular


issue perspectives; there are different background factors, relevant processes, actors, interactions, boundaries, and frontiers.

Viewed in these ways, the world map becomes increasingly complex, but—as I stated in the beginning—it will be a far better guide to the history, present, and future of global politics than the familiar map of sovereign-state boxes. It also helps to place present-day “great debates” in the study of global politics, including arguments about globalization and regionalization, in perspective.

I should also note, in conclusion, that the current approaches in contemporary IR theory that incorporate such a map are the “postinternational” framework of James N. Rosenau and the Ferguson/Mansbach “polities” model. Both approaches recognize that globalization and regionalization are both powerful processes that have an important relationship to fragmentation or localization. Breakaway small polities now have a wide range of transnational affiliations to help replace the ties they have cast off. Smaller units of self-identification also can offer a psychological refuge from cultural homogenization or the McWorld phenomenon. Ferguson/Mansbach stress the extent to which fission/fusion and the existence of numerous types of polities have been central features of global politics since ancient times. The sovereign state assumed center stage only in a relatively brief “Westphalian” era that may already be starting to wane. Indeed, the complexity of present-day global politics resembles most of human history possibly more than it does the state-centric period. Yet Ferguson/Mansbach also strongly agree with Rosenau that, at least in some major respects, global politics in this new millennium is unprecedented and we are experiencing what is no less than a difference in kind.


The Globalization Process from South to East Asia and Japan's Adhesion to the Colombo Plan in 1954

Since the San Francisco peace treaty of 1951 Japan's foreign policies efforts were largely directed to get out of the international difficulties ensuing from the lost war, making it not less important to cancel the memory also of the trade frictions with western countries going back up to the 1930ies. In this connection the need for partnership with the Asiatic countries of new independence was important for both economic and political reasons. As to the former it helped to compensate for the loss of the Chinese market after the pro-ROC choice as a signer of the peace treaty. As to the latter confidence regained vs. the Asiatic states and the “white members” of Commonwealth obviously was designed to enter a network of reciprocal collaboration and to put end to isolation.

As the principal aim of Japanese Government at that time was to promote domestic economy, two orders of questions had to be faced. One was the liberalisation of foreign trade as a tendency of international organisation on world scale, another one were the existing concrete projects of international co-operation at local level in South East Asia and in the area of the Indian Ocean.

Broadly speaking all that was framed in the general atmosphere of that moment there is not need to remember that the attempt to give birth to Ito (International Trade Organisation) failed just in 1948 while only a little later, for unconnected reasons, the project was launched of an international coordinated effort of the British Commonwealth (ultimately the Colombo plan of 1950) to develop a programme addressed to countries, still subjected to colonial rule or of new independence, in South East-Asia and based on bilateral schemes of technical or financial collaboration and trade agreements.

Though both initiatives were going different ways, they were shapes of an unique process based on the philosophy understood by the post-war settlement to ease reconstruction and social progress through softening or cancelling the traditional systems of tariffs and barriers and moving resources from more rich to poorer countries. To use an word become popular about the 1990ies, the pace of globalization was accelerating according to a pattern becoming almost normative since then for the 20th century. In that case if the countries of South-East Asia opened to Japanese trade, i.e. to a power whose trational range of action only bordered the Indian Ocean, it could but imply, though it was not clear at that time, that the distinction between East and South Asia as two traditionally distinguished regions, was vanishing and a larger more undifferentiated rea was taking its place.

At diplomatic level the matter was discussed in July 1952 during the visit to Tokyo of the British High Commissioner in South East Asia Sir Malcolm Macdonald, the first western official envoy to visit Japan after the peace treaty, and later a Japanese Government representative, Ogata Taketora, broached the issue with him in Singapore again.

Moreover the so-called western alliance had strong interest to have the Rising Sun politically align with her but that implied to gain sympathy from Japanese people. The latter would feel attracted only if the attitude of former winners should not look revengeful. Therefore the balance of power in the Far East largely was affected through the return to prosperity of the Rising Sun, which in its turn could be restored only if South Asian states showed willingful of more exchanges. By the way the most of them were developing and consequently the efforts of Japan to establish links had to take account of the international initiatives aiming to support their growth. If one considers the Cold War framework of such picture two more implications are becoming apparent: Aid initiatives were pursued in order to keep new Asian states aloof from the influence of Communist China and of the Soviet Union also, while

283 Koronbo Puran ni tsuite (On the Colombo Plan), Ajiakyoku Daikka (Asia Office, 1st Section), December 1952, Gaimu Gaikô Shiryôkan (Historical Archive of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, thereafter GSK), E’ 4.1.0.12.
Japan’s joining the helping efforts could take political nuances and give more substance to Prime Minister’s Yoshida Shigeru’s bid for collaboration with the western bloc, in spite of his policy to keep Japan out of military alliances and his allergy to amend the anti-war clause of the 1947 constitution. Besides Japan’s strategic collaboration with the western alliance, for instance through his work in the Paris Group created in order to isolate economically China and the USSR, could but work better if the archipel economy standards were to come back to the pre-war level of prosperity. Admitting Japan, as the latter demanded, to the Colombo Plan could help start all the above mechanism.

Another aspect of the matter however was the less rigid structure of bipolarism in Asia than in Europe early in the 1950ies. Specially between England and the United States both the perception of danger coming from the Chinese revolution and of instruments able to check the spread of communism were considerably different. The United Kingdom intention to keep links with former colonies, in most cases become independent members of the Commonwealth, implied a softer attitude than the Americans had vis-à-vis the envisaged menace coming from the eastern bloc as some of the latter were rejecting, safely under the influence of neutralist India, the method of military alliance as a way to dam the red wave up. Besides some British high officials and experts were convinced that communist China, as a country weary of war, did not nourish aggressive purposes and could be detached from the Soviet Union through tactful diplomacy or that time could be gained at least waiting until an attempt in that direction appeared possible. Moreover, the role of the United Kingdom as a great power could be played, after the economic collapse followed the war, only in the framework of the Commonwealth, to which belonged countries economically sound whose political notions not always fully coincided. While the very special influence of India, as a new member and a great Asian country, put conditions on British policies versus China, on the other hand the choice to protect the sterling area markets from American competition or to revise the overall institutional machinery in order to make the Commonwealth itself more compact and similar to an alliance proper was successfully opposed specially by Canada. While Australia was comparatively close to London in the sterling area, her attitude in defence China-related matters was generally speaking closer to the United States.

Japanese aims to establish economic relations with South Asian countries must be seen against that background, but as far as they could but relate to monetary and financial global issues, they interacted with larger problems also. In such process the importance of Japan’s admission to GATT, which of course had implications going beyond East Asia, and to the Colombo Plan, which had a more regional dimension, has been pointed out by recent scholarship already. It seems me however that the general meaning of that process should not be neglected. The obstacles put to her aims in both cases had common roots. Commenting MacDonald’s visit to Japan a British Official minuted:

If , as I think we should, we accept Mr. MacDonald’s suggestions for keeping Japan away from Communism, we shall have to engineer a radical change of front by the Board of Trade and also, in less degree, by the public. This will have to be done quickly if we are to avoid missing opportunities, of which one occurs in October when Japan will applying for accession to G.A.T.T. Unless we are then to do just those things which Mr. MacDonald urges we should not, we should support Japanese application instead of standing out against it as the Board of Trade would like. This latter course will, as the “Financial Times” and “Economist” have only recently pointed out, achieve no good purpose but will certainly invite Japanese odium. Likewise it is for consideration whether we should not make another attempt to overcome the Board of Trade’s reluctance to have us sponsor Japan’s admission to the Colombo Plan [...]

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284 Cfr. for instance the minute of K.C. Christofaras, 1/9/1952, on PRO FO371/99506 FJ 1633/25/G.

285 That was, even apart from his visit to Japan, the opinion of Macdonald. Cfr. High Commissioner to the United Kingdom to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 22/12/1949, Documents on Canadian External Relations (hereafter DCER), vol.15, p.1390.

286 As ponted out by the ambassador to Tokyo, Sir Esler Dening to Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru at the time of MacDonald’s visit to the latter’s villa in Hakone, Dening to Eden, 10/7/1952, PRO FO371/99506 FJ1633/24. Japanese and British outlooks looked very close.

287 On that important topic, see much material in, DCER, vols. 15-18.

288 Minute by D.A.H. Wright, 26th Aug.1952, PRO FO371/99506 FJ1633/25/G.
In other words, the Japanese had made clear to the British envoy their wish to enter the Colombo Plan as a mean to develop trade, confirming the rumour circulating at the Karachi meeting of the Plan Consultative Committee in March 1952, that they were going to apply in order to send an observer. At that time contrary intentions had been made manifest by Australia and New Zealand who still thought of the war, by India, whose reasons have not been carefully investigated yet, and by British colonial Government in Malaya.

The British Foreign Office had tried first to gain time and to avoid a clash between the USA and Australia, but more in depth the main problem, involving the GATT question at same time, did regard the domestic related attitude of the Board of Trade which touched on important issues like unemployment at home. On the other hand, as MacDonald had reported “The Great peril in Japan is Communism [...] in my opinion there is real danger of their coming into power sooner or later during the next ten years”. That smart diplomat realised that there was something more. He was convinced of “the useful part which Japan may play in capital investment, technical aid and other form of assistance to economic and social progress in Southern Asia”, though care had to be put on Japanese selfishness, and concluded that “Whatever can be arranged in this way - through the Colombo Plan or other schemes - which is of mutual benefit to Japan and the other countries concerned will be extremely helpful towards our main aim”. Once more an useful comparison can be made with the issue of GATT. In England the protectionist standing of the Board of Trade met the criticisms in economic terms of the Treasury, which had a more liberal approach towards the international trade and ultimately seemed to believe that if Japan economy were to expand, the sterling area and Commonwealth themselves could be positively rewarded.

The story of the negotiations leading to the final acceptance of Japan in both bodies (the Colombo Plan and GATT) is outside the purposes of this paper, but if one looks at both subjects, in the light of the globalization process, it is worth stressing that resistance to the former stopped almost abruptly, when, after the Geneva Conference on Indochina, Australia changed its attitude, while discussions over the GATT issue were very lengthy and painful, stepping through two diplomatic battles ultimately won by the pro-Japanese party respectively in 1953, on eve of the so-called provisional admission, and, though seventeen voters abstained, of the final decision two years later. As to the GATT business, in addition to the political reasons decisively orientating countries like France, much weight has been laid on the role of Canada, who lacked economic convenience to contrast Japan and was more broadly speaking engaged in campaigning the cause of free trade together with the United States, thus taking a line opposite to most of the sterling area group.

Moreover a somehow puzzling question is coming out at this point. Ottawa, who was flanking Japan on that difficult problem and had no reasons to fear her commercial competition, ultimately exerted a slowing influence on the much easier matter of the Colombo Plan, even after the “implacable” Australians had changed their minds. The explanation of such apparent inconsistency may help I suppose, to unveil an overlooked dimension which earlier in the 1950ies was transforming East Asia and the Indian Ocean in a globalized area where the same economic and political factors were acting.

289 Japanese participation in the Colombo Plan, PRO FO 371/99506.

290 Note on Japan, 26/7/1952, PRO FO371/99506 Fj 1633/13.

291 Cfr. F. Langdon, The Politics of Canadian-Japanese Economic Relations, 1953-1983, Vancouver, 1989, sp. p.25. In his meeting with Yoshida, during the latter’s visit to Ottawa, the Canadian Prime Minister Saint Laurent told him that there were not strong reasons to refuse Japan admission to the Colombo Plan and that it was against Canada’s interest to maintain the existing surplus in the bilateral balance of payments, Matsudaira to Okaazaki, 4/10/1954, GSK, A - 1.5.0.3.


293 That expression was used by the Chief British Representative at the Karachi conference Lord Reading, PRO FO371/101248 Fz11011/22.
After the Karachi meeting, where the Canadian representative did not take part in the backstage discussions concerning Japanese hopes, an official demand from Tokyo was sent in at the subsequent New Delhi conference in 1953, where it was rejected with the argument of its “late” submission. Actually it followed the advice given to the Indians by the British High Commissioner, who had realised the risk of clash, once more, between USA and Australia, on the one side, and the hesitations of some Asian countries, like Indonesia and India, just while the matter could indirectly affect the GATT business.” It seemed inappropriate “he later reported to London” too for the official meeting to have what is really a policy matter sprung on it at no notice at all”. The instructions he had at that time “not to oppose Japan’s admission if proposed by others” mirrored the conclusions reached by the Foreign Office after MacDonald’s visit to Tokyo not to propose it directly, but to assent if one or more members, specially Asian sponsors, had come forth. Hence the brake to a more positive attitude seems to have been inter-departmental quarrel and the difficult balance among the contrasting arguments to be taken into consideration. Though without “very strong views” the same line was taken in New Delhi by Canada as well.

The latter however was obliged to ponder again on the matter as Ottawa was chosen as the seat for the following meeting of the Plan Consultative Council in 1954. The reflection made on that occasion allow to sense motivations fairly different in respect to the United Kingdom, although the outward appearance had been the same up to then.

In the Spring of 1954 the matter was studied in the Department for External Affairs. On reviewing the way in which that question had been dealt with before, for use of the Ambassador to Tokyo, the conclusion was reached that “it would create considerable difficulty for Canada if either Communist or Nationalist China were to seek membership on the basis of Japanese participation in the plan”. It actually looked as if Canadian diplomacy had been struck through the attitude shown by the Asian members of the Plan the year before. While Ceylon had taken a pro-Japanese stand but had not gone so far as to officially support Tokyo application. India had looked “by no means keen on seeing the Japanese represented even by an observer”, and Indonesia was afraid to establish a precedent which could be used by former colonial powers like France or Holland.

Canada realised to have a delicate role in the Plan largely because of its comparatively good financial resources. They specially felt to be in a good position to mediate between Asiatic states like India, which distrusted the American Cold War strategy, and the USA, whose participation to the plan was tried by the British and the westerners. Such position became an even weightier factor after September 1954 when Ottawa did not join SEATO, as for this reason an important role could be played in the strategy of containing Communism in Asia. As a diplomatic minute remarked

“[...] For some countries, the receipt of assistance from Canada or other donors who might been less suspect that the United States would make it easier to accept aid from the United States. In this sense Canadian aid could be helpful in enabling the United States to carry out any more ambitious programme of assistance on which it may embark.. Generally, Canadian aid would assumed increase importance in such a situation in helping to avoid the impression that the

296 PRO FO371/99506 FJ1633/25/G, cit. minutes.
United States was dominating the Colombo Plan. Canada’s decision not to take part in south-east Asia defence organisation would also appear a to be a related reason for increasing the contribution which we can make to the stability of South and south-east Asia through the Colombo Plan’.

That document understood the delicacy of political problems related to East-West contrasts, which could imperil the cohesion between members of the Colombo Plan, while it largely suited Canada to smooth such sort of asperities. As in Asia one of the principal dividing issues looked the attitude to the Chinese problem, officials in Ottawa thought that if any subsequent contrasts had arisen clearly Japan’s admission, it itself not a negative event, might provoke unwelcome consequences.

In other words the danger looked like pending “to underwrite any proposal which may result in the wakening of our ties with the other free countries of south-eastern Asia which we have worked so carefully to create through the medium of the Colombo Plan”. All that of course did not imply that Canada was far from the standing of the United States on the Japanese issue. They did not basically share the suspicion of other countries that Japan aspired to recipient status and doubted that the Plan was the only or the best way to promote Japanese trade, while recognizing that she had promised to be “capable of providing technical assistance gratuitously and capital goods at competitive price”. Besides account was taken into that “the original concepts of the Colombo Plan [...] related to under-developed countries in South and South East Asia”. But the very point was that objections raised in New Delhi had still not waned. The peril to arouse political frictions among the Asians led them to believe that “for the moment it is not clear that Japan’s participation in the Colombo Plan could be reconciled with the basic aspirations of the Plan”. Beyond that such position implied two more nuances. On the one hand Canada’s failing to take part in Seato put them in exactly the same position as Japan, who did not join the anti-Communist alliance, but welcomed it and made manifest her intention to collaborate in the policies to stop communism by promoting the economic development of Asian countries. On the other one they realised that if Japan, though an East-Asian country, was involved in South-Asian strategy, automatically China, whatever meaning attached to that term, could be involved too.

All that make us reflect on some consequences of the settlement following the Pacific War. The independence of new countries and the success of Mao in China gave more importance to South East Asia as a field where the two blocs were competing, but, because of the pro-western inclination of the Yoshida government Japan too was obliged to look at that area as a room where to make use of her means for local development and to expand trade. Continental China however, through the end of the Civil War, had completed national revolution as well and consequently had gained respect from many among the younger states. Even some western powers hesitated to recognise her only for world scale, balance of power related motives. Once Japan admitted to a scheme like the Colombo Plan it could look unsound to exclude such a big country from a scheme basically aiming to promote economic growth on multilateral bases. As Japanese co-operation looked opportune in such framework, the paradoxical consequence was that excluding PRC, a major communist power, could look groundless and bear thorny diplomatic trouble. Objectively speaking real dividing lines among two areas separated in the past along the main currents of Asian history did not appear convincing any more and tended to fade.

It is interesting to note that the Canadian attitude did not basically change later and coloured the last phase of negotiations.

Additional pressure was exerted on Canada by the United States in Summer. On July 21st, Emerson Ross, an official of the State Department, insisted with the ambassador to Washington that “in the

302 Memorandum from under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 29/11/1954, DCER, vol.20, p.832.

303 Japanese left press was stressing this point on commenting the adhesion to the Colombo Plan, See the Asahi Shinbun of 12/11/1954. Cfr., Japan and the United Kingdom, 5/9/1954, GSK, A’1-5.0.3,

course of association with the Colombo Plan opportunities may arise [...] which would serve not only the objectives of the Plan but also Japan economic interests.” Sponsorship from an Asian member however was preferred and to to be sounded out before the meeting. The ambassador “tentatively [...] suggested “ that” Since Japan was likely to fit the role of a donor country, so far as the extension of technical assistance was concerned, [...] it might be possible for her to request full membership in the Council for Technical Cooperation. Observer status in the Consultative Committee would not [...] be difficult to arrange in these circumstances”.

Ottawa however did not soften her previous conclusions. Ross’ words were not taken for “a formal proposal that Canada should circulate to the other Colombo Plan governments for their views” Instructions were confirming the differences between the two powers diplomacy. “ Because of the United States interest” the Department continued “they should be prepared to undertake this exploration themselves if they wish the subject pursued”, but information already gathered confirmed that since the Karachi meeting views critical about Japan’s application had not changed. The principal care in Ottawa remained, though accepting in principle the demands of Japan, to “avoid exposing the Colombo plan unnecessarily to any other controversial issues which may have the affect of weakening the reasonably effective and co-operative links which we have worked to create through the medium of the Plan”.

In August 1954, facing the strong American back up offered to Japan, the Canadian Secretary of state reiterated to the Ambassador to the United States that, though no formal distinction was envisaged between donor and recipient country, the very reason to turn down such a possible request, if submitted by Tokyo, could be that:

If Japan were regarded as a potential recipient -as we think she must be regarded if one is realistic- observer status for Japan might lead to expansion of the accepted area of the plan and ultimately raise the possibility of application for admission from Korea or Nationalist China. In view of the relations between Japan and Korea, and the attitude of many existing members toward Nationalist China, such developments might imperil the co-operative nature of the Colombo Plan. In our view the main immediate consideration is whether or not a Japanese association could be arranged without serious opposition from existing members, particularly those from Asia. We are anxious to avoid submitting the Plan to stresses which might lessen its present effective basis of cooperation.

In the Second half of 1954, the entire scenario unexpectedly changed. Largely as a consequence of diverging views about China between The United Kingdom and the United States, the output of the Geneva Conference on Indochina was a compromise, which loosely recognised, though not formally, the presence of the RPC as a decisive factor in the South Asia. Hence Australia, unwillingful as she was to face Communist expansion and the rebirth of Japanese nationalism at the same time, did ultimately decide to sponsor Japan’s admission to the Colombo plan, on the sole condition that the latter took the role of a donor, not recipient, country. Though an Asian sponsor (Ceylon), also existed, meeting previous conditions suggested by the three Anglo-Saxon countries, as an host country of the next conference Canada did not want to take any initiative and waited for the opinions of all members to be carefully and discretely sounded by Australia before giving any substantially positive answer to the Japanese.

Only after the other governments views were known and revealed positive Japan was invited to send an observer to the preparatory official-level meeting and was allowed to be represented as a full member of the Consultative Committee of the Plan to the Ottawa conference, where her admission was formally approved.

307 Akaneya Tatsuo, op.cit.,pp.252-4.PRO FO 371/111908D 11011/11(D), minutes.
308 See, Matsudaira to Ogata, 9/10/1954, GSK, E’0013.
309 DCER, vol.20, docs. 405-408.
Among the purposes of Yoshida Shigeru’s to Canada, western Europe and USA in October and November of 1954, pleading for Japan’s acceptance in the Colombo plan was originally the principal aim, though it was obtained before he reached Continental Europe and consequently had minor importance during his talks with the western statesmen310.

The above discussion however shows that the issues of economic development in South Asia, of Japan’s attitude to foreign relations since the peace treaty and of China or of Taiwan admission to international organisations were issues difficult to be dealt separately, as concretely shown through the dilemmas of Canada. That confirms how in political or economic objective terms after the end of western colonialism and the pro-western choice of Yoshida’s Japan, South and East Asia tended to become an unique, global area. Almost forty years later China’s admission to WTO invites us to reflect on later achievements of the same process.

310 Many documents confirming that point are in ,GSK A’ 1-5.0.3.
Globalization Versus Regionalization

After a certain period in which social description abjured material contextualization, that is to say, the necessary “geographization” of the social facts, we are taking part in an offensive toward desired cognitive-interpretive innovation, which involves an abusive use of the geographic phraseology.

Globalization is a sort of megacontext, a great background, indispensable for the understanding of any event which finds, in this way, a new meaning. However, globalization is supposed to be a declared impulse to the maximum reduction in distances, that sets with this, an uncontrollable tendency towards the dissolution of differences, which are an inevitable result of the tangible presence of the first ones.

In other terms, “globalization”, as a phenomenon, might possibly mean not taking into account the construction of reality as concrete, but in the abstract.

As a result, geographization ends up being the opposite, a denial of geography, which is understood as the concrete instance of the development of reality.

As far as the realm of uniformity is concerned, the appearance of the so-called Regionalization Phenomenon is particularly interesting, which would just be another consequence of globalization.

A priori this event, which seems to preside the evolution in the last decades and usually represents the tendency towards the conformation of the common trade, implies a certain relativization of the absolute preeminence of globalizing uniformity. However, even more than this, the regional phenomenon is an exceptional bludgeon with a view to criticizing ideological representations which constitute a new and dominant paradigm of the analysis of reality, namely globalization.
Between Decolonization and Globalization: The Catholic Church and the 20th Century Missions

The evolving of the Catholic Church’s strategy for the missions seems to be of great interest in the purview of the “Churches and Globalisation” issue. In the context of the “approaching”, favoured by European initiative, among traditionally very far areas of the world, and in presence of the progressive decline of European hegemony, the Catholic Church assumed an attitude of growing “adaptation” (to use a Pious XII’s expression) to non-European civilisations.

It is a long evolutive period: some premises began to come out with Leo XIII, after the Congress of Berlin (1876), and others, more explicit, with Benedict XV, after the First World War (see his apostolic letter *Maximum illud* in 1919 and then Pious XI’s *Rerum Ecclesiae* in 1926).

One of the more significant moments which favoured the way of the Church during the XXth century was, without any doubt, the short but intense pontificate of Benedict XV, the pope who defined the war “an unnecessary massacre” and who, even more explicitly than Leo XIII, defended the fundamental rights of non-Catholics (see his intervention against the genocide of Armenian people). Moreover, after the first world war, Benedict XV expressed the need to guarantee a lasting peace through an international organisation of the States of the world. For Benedict XV the relations among peoples and States should leave the anarchy of everlasting conflict, recognising a common “international society”.

At the end of 1999, was celebrated the 80th anniversary of apostolic letter *Maximum illud*, devoted to missionary questions. In this occasion, few people reminded that in 1959, John XXIII had published an encyclical, *Princeps Pastorum*, to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the former. It shows how important for John XXIII was Benedict XV’s letter. Published, it was said, to keep different forms of European nationalism at distance and to blame every form of “religious colonialism”, *Maximum illud* underlines the giving up of an idea of Christianity survived, on Colonial ground, to the secularisation of the European States during the XIX century. Against the claims of France and other “Christian nations” to defend the Church in the “pagan nations”, Benedict XV recommended Catholic missionaries to bring the country in which they were sent as a “second country”.

Benedict XV’s turning-point indicated a new way of understanding the relations between universality and localism, favouring a sort of universality at the service of localism. Indeed, he was able to keep up and to stress the modification of the Catholic centralisation, inherited from the previous century, into a universality which could support the birth and the development of local Churches, especially in extra-European areas. Everyone knows that the “missions turning-point”, proposed by *Maximum illud* and developed all along XX century, often thanks to “Roman” suggestions, occurred at the same time with the foundation of local Churches, the development of indigenous clergy, the formation of national episcopates, the growing up, outside Europe, of ecclesiastical communities previously depending from European or American ones, whilst the missionaries withdrew or assumed subsidiary functions. Drawing on quite an ancient trend –yet established in the well-known *Istruzione* of “Propaganda Fide” in 1659- throughout the XXth century the pope, Roman Curia and Rome were landmarks for a new and still frail Catholicism, which was expanding outside the traditional borders of Christianity. Already with Benedict XV the premises of an attitude, which would be emphasised especially after the second world war, favouring the demand of political independence of several former colonial States, were put down (*Evangeli praecones*, 1952). This trend found its zenith during Second Vatican Council, when the concept of evangelisation of cultures took over that of “implantatio ecclesiae”.

On the whole, the way of the Catholic Church was towards different landing-places from those emerging in European culture in XX century, with which Catholic Church often confronted. As we said, Catholic Church departed from the Colonial logic of European countries step by step, but this did not mean indifference or carelessness toward the South of the world, as a lot of European countries, which criticised their Colonial past very severely, did. Already during the period of pope John XXIII and the
Council the growing projection of the Church toward extra-European world showed. From *Populorum Progressio* to *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* the pontiffs underlined very persistently European and Western responsibilities toward the rest of the world. At the end of the XXth century the attention of the Catholic Church for extra-European world has become very evident, even if it has not renounced to a particular attention for Europe.

It is well known that the period after the Council coincided with a new phase of international relations, which put new and still open problems to Churches. On one side, the phenomena of growing world interdependence, on the other one migration of peoples which almost everywhere broke the link “territory-people-culture”: in the same land (or in spaces which more and more efficacious mass media make more and more next-door) different peoples and cultures live together, changing in a radical manner the ways in which different national identities and multi-ethnical relationships show, changing the relations with the other and the dialogue with the unlike. Europe began to receive as a guest a growing number of Islamic people, whilst –owing to the process of secularisation and to the expansion of missions- most of Catholics live no more in Europe.

At the beginning of XXIst century, in different parts of the world multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious societies start; in the same land different communities live together and in the same place different cultural identities overlap and melt. In the same local Churches believers from different ethnical and religious communities meet together; very often they are scattered in different places and far from a specific reference place.

From a Catholic point of view, development of local Churches and enculturation were parallel processes which seemed to reply adequately to current transformations. But with the decline of the territory as a landmark for cultural identities, migration processes, diffusion of media and success of “global village” with all its ambiguity, even the Catholic Church had to face new problems. In this context, the dialogue of the Church with the different cultures, had an increasing role. Plunged in the net of intercultural relations, the Church is urged to move away from traditional patterns of enculturation and from the localism, but the point of view of the dialogue with the unlike –in contrast to the point of view of the homogeneity of the equal- builds the oneness accepting the differences and redrawing the relation between the centre and the periphery. These problems concern the internal shape of the Catholic Church.

As a matter of fact, these problems began to put, even if only in part, on the ground of the missions. Already with Benedict XV the item of the relation between Gospel and cultures began to come out. It was later faced more explicitly by Second Vatican Council and several papal documents. Benedict XV, with his *Maximum illud*, and his successors encouraged the Church to separate from the sole relation with western civilisation. All century long, a way to look at the differences among peoples, ethnical groups, nations mainly through cultural identities, privileging language, mentality and history instead of “races”, territory or institutions, prevailed inside the Catholic Church.

This way lead to the inter-religious dialogue favoured by John Paul II, who in 1986 invited to Assisi leaders of all the world religions to pray together for the peace. In Assisi, different religions, but also very different cultures started dialoguing, moving from their worlds and their territorial landmarks.
The Italian Economy in the International Context: the International Setting

The International Setting

A clear contradiction denotes the events of the nineties. A globalized economy has been set up both on the trade and financial levels. The barrier of transportation costs has been overcome, geographical distances have been made shorter or eliminated altogether, orders and confirmations are transmitted within seconds, goods and financial capitals move from any market to anyone else as quickly and safely as one could hard imagine in the past.

The Italian economy is not only increasingly integrated in the Western European context, but also strongly influenced by the increasing globalisation of the world economy.

Two factors, the one mainly technical in nature, the other one clearly belonging to the sphere of economic policy (if not of sheer politics) work in this direction. The first factor acting for the globalisation of the world economy is the enormous progress in transportation and communication, a progress that has produced tremendous cost reductions. It is now possible and often convenient to locate the various phases of production in widely distant countries and then proceed to assemble the finished product and ship it all over the world. The second factor, mainly a political one, has been the decision, fully enacted for the last ten years, to allow free movements of financial capital all over the world. The two factors go hand in hand. Not only speculators, but also big international concerns the activity of which is scattered around the world need to move freely their financial capitals in order to be able to fully co-ordinate their industrial and commercial activities.

In principle the presence of a wider and more integrated market should bring about a greater efficiency in the use of resources. This would be certainly true if the big world market were actually working under perfect competition. Unfortunately the actual structure of the world market is quite different. That’s why A. K. Bagchi, on thinking about the evolution of the modern world, sadly asks whether we are really going through a globalization of the world economy or rather through a globalization of big capital.311 A similar question has been raised by the Governor of the Bank of Italy who seriously doubts whether the increasing globalization may has really brought about a greater competition since over one half of the world exports are in the hands of big multinational companies who act in a world of oligopolies, certainly not of competition.312

Starting with year 1999, eleven European countries have adopted a common accounting monetary unit, the so-called Euro, a new currency that will become a regular means of payment with year 2002. While the advanced countries of Western Europe tend to unify their monetary system, an increasing fragmentation prevails in the countries of Eastern Europe formerly belonging to the Soviet bloc. At present, some 28 different official currencies can be counted in Eastern Europe, where in the past only three main currencies prevailed, the Soviet rouble, the Czech crown and the Yugoslav dinar. The monetary fragmentation is only reduced by the fact that some countries have introduced a fixed exchange rate between the German mark and the national currency thus de facto adopting the German mark as national currency.

In contrast to the increasing economic integration, the world seems to be increasingly torn by social conflicts. Frictions and wars explode not only among national entities but also, and with an even

311 Bagchi 1998.

greater violence, among ethnic groups belonging to the same nation. Solidarity is more and more confined to relationships inside single ethnic groups; on the other hand, solidarity bypasses national borders when ethnically similar groups are involved. More than one case can be mentioned in which people belonging to the same ethnic group set up organizations across the political borders aiming at the protection of common interests in the fields of education, culture, history, or economic life. The same people can show the most hostile feelings towards members of different ethnic groups even if belonging to the same political entity.

The formation of a commercial, financial and monetary block among European countries is not only a response to external competition but also a part of a wider game involving the relationships between Europe and the US. The very perspective of a vast European area dominated by the German influence alters the balance of international power and creates a crucial uncertainty as to the economic and political stability of the continent.

While in the past the heart of Europe gravitated around France, which was somehow occupying a central position between Germany and Great Britain, nowadays the very geographical appearance of Europe has changed. Great Britain seems to be less involved in the construction of Europe. On the other hand, after the fall of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the unified Germany has become the economic and political centre of the European Union. Where the eastern borderlines of the German economic sphere will be set is still uncertain. The US are also engaged in the Balkans (Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro) in order to resist the Russian pressure. The borderline that will divide the German, American, and Russian areas of influence is still to be drawn.

While German expands its own influence to the East, the US are active in the former socialist countries with the aim of consolidating their presence in the Middle East. Through the intermediation of Turkey, the US are trying to impose their own leadership in the Islamic belt of Asia. The United States have invested considerable funds and efforts in Poland, and are firmly intentioned to defend an American presence in the Balkans, to begin with Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania, countries that the US are well determined to keep out of the Russian influence. Equal attention is being paid to the Islamic Republics formerly belonging to the Soviet Union.

The definition of new borderlines dividing the areas of influence of the great powers is always a highly conflictual process. In the European case, the necessity of drawing new borderlines, brought about by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, has evolved through the emergence of ethnic conflicts and widespread claims to political autonomy. The awakening of such violent cultural and nationalistic feelings has often taken the form and substance of genuine racism. Local frictions and world conflicts often go hand in hand. Claims for a higher local autonomy produce a fragmentation of the old borderlines, which are replaced by a multiplicity of micro-borders thus making it easier to define totally new macro-borders in the future. Globalization is often defined as the creation of a worldwide economic space where the only kind of conflict will take up the form of competition among industries for conquering the international market. In fact, under the appearance of a unified and competitive market, more violent conflicts are gradually emerging.

Cultural roots or economic interests

The question has to be raised as to reasons of the widespread re-emergence of ethничal feelings no longer in a purely historical and cultural meaning but in a deeply felt hostile attitude.

The traditional explanation is well-known: ethnic feelings belong to deep-rooted feelings and show up in a need of reverting to one’s own cultural roots, to form a community of people having in common past history, language, religion and customs.

Other social scientists are more inclined to a materialistic interpretation of ethnic feelings. In their view, ethnic conflicts originate from discrepancies in wealth. The richer groups tend to get together and build barriers allowing them to enjoy their wealth inside their own circles, without being disturbed by others, and even denying any solidarity to the less privileged groups. In this view, economic interests coupled to a form of group selfishness are at the origin of ethnic conflicts.

Both explanations, the one based on historical and cultural roots and the one based on economic selfishness, have in common the fact of rejecting any interpretation based on purely racist grounds. The idea that ethnic groups can be distinguished according to real racial and material differences, is based
on a “zoological reading” of social phenomena\textsuperscript{313}. Any distinction between races or ethnic groups, as Max Weber would say, lacks any reasonable basis and is rather in the nature of a subjective belief or of a personal perspective. In fact, we should trust in the gradual disappearance of prejudice and in the consequent overcoming of the alleged distinction among different ethnic groups.

The theory of ethnic groups as being the result of a personal belief lacking any sound basis is implicitly accepted by the historians who, on studying the formation of modern nations, remark how the presence of a common nationality was often used as an argument for the justification of a new national entity. In fact, they remark, history shows that things went the other way round. The political formation of a new national entity came first and was followed, at a later moment, by a slow and troublesome construction of a national conscience and of a common culture, a construction deliberately performed by the acting governments\textsuperscript{314}.

On the political level, a nation is born by a deliberate act of will of a ruling class\textsuperscript{315}. Once the political unity has been reached, the Governments have to do their best in order to successfully introduce the idea of a common fatherland. From that moment onwards what was called the run for the construction of a mythical past takes place; something intertwined with the diffusion of forged documents aiming at the creation of common noble ancestors\textsuperscript{316}.

In this complex operation the schooling system is a fundamental instrument. The role of a public school run by the State is that of imposing upon a heterogeneous population a common language, common cultures and ideologies, the belief of having a common historical background, of having fought the same battles, of honouring the same heroes. A similar mythical and symbolic elaboration does not consist in discovering a pre-existing common historical past but in building up largely non-existent common roots\textsuperscript{317}. When the need of a strict national unity starts fading, public schools lose their political function and, along with the emerging local ethnical groups, local private schools come to the fore extolling the historical, cultural, linguistic idiosyncrasies of each single regional entity.

Nowadays the optimistic ideal of gradually reducing the weight of ethnical difference seems to have been defeated. Once more, ethnic peculiarities assert themselves in a spirit of violence and abuse. One often gains the impression that the very term ‘ethnic group’ is used in an alleged cultural meaning and with the only aim of claiming a fuller administrative autonomy, if not a total political independence, in favour of a specific population; but it is in fact used for indicating what in the past used to be named a race. At the same time, the concept of ethnic group, just as in the past the term race, is used in order to deny the substantial equality of the human kind, to distinguish among superior and inferior races, and to justify the dominance of groups having acquired a de facto position at the top of society. The concept of ethnic groups becomes in this case a screen for a political design aiming at dominance and oppression.

**Local groups and great powers**

Since the reading of ethnic feelings and conflicts as based on a common historical origin doesn’t prove satisfactory, the explanation has to be found by looking in other directions. To begin with, in a direction which, even if not universal and valid in any circumstance, is at least able to shed light on present day historical events.

\textsuperscript{313} Renan 1882, p. 14 ff.

\textsuperscript{314} Chabod 1974, p. ...

\textsuperscript{315} Weber maintains that “the very concept of nation is always related to a political power” (Weber, 1961, vol. I, p. 408) and that “in given circumstances, a group of men is able, by means of specific behaviours, acquire the status of a nation or pretend it as a conquest - and all that within a short time” (ibid. vol. II, p. 225).

\textsuperscript{316} Graziosi 1999, pp. 39 and 48.

\textsuperscript{317} Hobsbawm mentions a "history selected, written, circulated, institutionalized by people explicitly instructed" and "concepts containing a component of construction or invention" (1987, pp. 8-9, 15-16).
The explanations so far mentioned all start so to say "from below", in that they are based on the specific peculiarities or requirements of each single ethnic group as having its own pre-existing culture, economic interests, or political aims. It can perhaps be more revealing to try an explanation starting "from above", namely from the specific interests not of a single group but of the great powers occupying the political world scene. A similar reading seems the sounder the more it is applied to the more recent political events.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the US have followed a policy aimed at surrounding Russia with a belt of countries well under their own control. The Kuwait war of 1991, the landing in Somalia, the covered action in Afghanistan where the Talebans are supported by the US through Pakistan, the Bosnian war followed by the Nato intervention in Kosovo (an action that will lead anyhow to the establishment of a Nato force in the former Yugoslavian territory), are all proofs of the same strategy. An image borrowed from the science of geopolitics would say that the US are trying the construction of an "external circle" around Russia.

At the same time, the unified Germany is trying to expand eastwards in order to set up a wide area of influence under its own control. Again, a concept borrowed from geopolitics would denote the German strategy as an attempt to break the "inner circle".

Now, it is not hard to realize that most ethnic conflicts to be counted in Europe, beyond the aspiration to a greater autonomy, go hand in hand with the passage to a different area of influence. The Baltic Republics, once gained their independence, have left the Russian area and now gravitate around the German economy; the division of the former Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia has brought the first one into the western sphere the second one under the Russian influence. The dissolution of the former Yugoslavian Federation has brought Croatia and Slovenia in the western world (it should not be forgotten that Germany, without even notifying the other European countries, was the first nation to recognize the new Croatian Government and that Germany has acquired a de facto control of all Croatian ports along the Adriatic coast). The Serbian war of 1999 has produced the passage of Macedonia and Montenegro to the western area, while Serbia remains under the Russian influence. Within western Europe, in a peaceful and silent way, Belgium has been turned into a Federal state made up of Vallony, the Flanders, and the Brussels region, of which Vallony gravitates on France, and the Flanders on the Netherlands and Germany.

The Interests at stake

It seems therefore that cultural roots, local problems, or the aspiration to independence are not enough to explain the present day ethnic conflicts. Something more extended is clearly present.

In the Middle East, political unrest is strictly tied to the presence of considerable and immediate economic interests. The Islamic Republics will provide the route for bringing to the western markets oil coming from the Caspian see and from the countries beyond the Caspian. Even if a reliable measurement has not yet been achieved, the oil fields in this region might be even richer that the mythical fields of Saudi Arabia. To the US it is essential to prevent such reserves from falling under Russian control.

The war for the oil fields becomes immediately a war for the control of the pipelines. Russia insists on a pipeline through Chechnya and its own territory and pointing to the Russian harbour of Novorossijsk on the northern bank of the Black See. This explains the decision with which Russia has repressed the Chechnyan movement for independence. A rival project, supported by Turkey and by the Us, defends a pipeline going through Turkey and ending in the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Also this project has its weak points since the pipeline would pass through a region populated by Curds.

It seems now that both projects have a high probability of being realised. The Kosovo war, fought in the spring of 1999 and in which Italy was directly involved, is strictly connected to the controversy over the

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318 In April 1999, R. Blackburn, editor of The New Left Review, declared that the US strategy has in view the establishment of a ring around Russia and requires the presence of military bases in the Balkans. In October of the same year, official US sources announced the establishment of a big military base in Urosevac, Kosovo, endowed with 5000 men and of a second camp in Gnjilane with 1500 men.
Globalisation, Regionalisation and the History of International Relations

Caspian oil and to the possibility of bringing the oil supplies directly to the Adriatic coast. An ambitious project, the so-called "Corridor 8" (a whole network of roads, railroads, pipelines), strongly supported by the US and financed by the IMF, should establish a further connection between the Black Sea and the Adriatic going through Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia. Here the material interests lying behind the Kosovo war and the Nato intervention urged by the US become evident. It need not be added that Russia is a strong opponent of the planned Corridor 8, while Italy in principle supports its realization. Beyond that Italy has granted her co-operation to a planned pipeline bringing gas through the Black Sea from Russia to Turkey. The project was confirmed during the official visit of the Russian Prime Minister Putin to Italy in June.

Problems of the Italian Economy

The Italian economy has been confronted with two main problems. The highly controversial decision taken by the Italian Government to enter the European Monetary Union at the first round and at any cost has imposed a policy of severe austerity in terms of a reduction in Government expenditure coupled with an equally severe increase in taxation. At the same time, Italian industry has felt the consequences of increased competition and has been induced to acquire a higher competitiveness mainly by reducing the cost of labour.

The lines of industrial policy enacted by the Italian Governments have pointed to three main structural changes.

The first line of action has been a reduction in the weight of big industry to make room to an increasing sector of small and medium-size firms. A similar line was inaugurated long ago, when in the late sixties and early seventies the first strong labour movements made themselves felt. But over the last years the same line was brought to its extreme consequences.

In some regions, such as the Northeast or Central Italy, the development of small industry has been successful. Here small firms were not originated as suppliers of one big plant (this being instead the typical industrial structure of the region around the Fiat factory of Turin). In the north-east of Italy small firms were born right from the start as autonomous initiatives being able to count on a market of their own and open to the export market. The emergence of this new sector induced Bagnasco to speak of Italy as being divided into three different regions: the north-west, the traditional location of the first industrial districts, the Mezzogiorno, a typically agricultural and low income region, and the Third Italy, where the new industrial structure made up of small and medium-sized industry was based.

The decline in big industry has considerably altered the structure of industrial relations. In the past, the unions had fought and won their main battles inside the big plants. The peak of their success was reached in 1970, when the so-called "Statuto dei lavoratori" (a law establishing the rights of the worker on the workplace) was approved by the Italian Parliament. The development of an overwhelming sector of small firms has made the Unions considerably weaker. Employment has become precarious, a number of guarantees concerning working hours, overtime work, safety on the workplace, protection against pollution, are no longer observed.

In some regions, the proliferation of medium-size firms has given rise to agglomerations reminding the Marshallian industrial district. In such districts a number of firms often belonging to the same sector, are gathered in a limited space. This allows technical knowledge to be transmitted from one generation of workers to the next. Moreover, the workers, being mostly residents of the same region, have a number of problems in common (the schooling system, housing, transports, health assistance) which makes their organization easier not only inside the factory but also in social life. That is why authoritative authors have described such districts as examples both of economic competitiveness and social democracy319. According to some more recent research, it seems however that also within the industrial districts a small number of bigger firms is emerging, which creates a totally new kind of hierarchy. The bigger and more solid firms, having access to bank credit, become the buyers of the products supplied by the smaller ones. The ideal of a fully democratic industrial district seems in fact hard to materialize.

319 Becattini 1998.
The fact remains that the decline in the presence of large-size firms has consistently reduced the ability of Italian industry to perform research and to operate in an advanced line of technology.

A second line of action of the Italian Governments has been a deliberate reduction in the presence of State-owned firms. The policy of progressive privatization of the industrial sector was first introduced as a means of reducing the stock of Government debt. In fact the so-called Document of Economic and Financial Planning for 1993 prescribed that any yield coming from the sale of public industries should not be used for financing new expenditures but only for reducing the stock of public debt. In fact the whole policy was supported, both in official statements and in the public opinion, by the idea that as a rule private industry is more efficient and better run. It cannot be denied that the experience of Italian public industry is mixed. In some cases public industry has been one of the more effective instruments in the hands of the Government while in other cases it has been only used as a hidden source of finance for political parties. Well-founded as this diagnosis may have been in the past, it is of course debatable whether it would have been more reasonable to reform State-owned industry rather than dismantling it altogether.

Ever since 1983, when Prodi became the President of IRI, the main public industrial holding, he declared that his plan was of yielding to private entrepreneurs any branch having no strategic role for the national economy. At a later stage, official statements made clear that in principle, in an open, globalized and competitive economy, no industry could be considered as having a strategic value. The result of this line is that a number of firms, including among them totally efficient and competitive ones, have been sold to private financial groups belonging to the manufacturing and to the service sector as well. Moreover it is to be seriously feared that the dismantling of public industry has deprived the Government of the main instrument of industrial policy, an instrument that could have been used for fostering the technological progress of the country.

A third change in the Italian industrial structure has been the increasing presence of foreign capital. An increasing number of industrial firms, both belonging to the private as to the public sectors, have been sold to foreign financial groups. The presence of foreign capital in a number of industrial branches has been read as a proof of the confidence placed by foreign investors in the fundamental solidity of the Italian economy. In many cases however, it would be hard to deny that foreign capital has shown an interest in Italian firms just for the sake of entering the local market or of eliminating a competitor. The proof is that while the marketing network has been preserved, many plants acquired by foreign firms have been closed. In any case, while the manufacturing lines are held, all the most profitable segments of the industry (research, production planning, finance, marketing) are concentrated in the headquarters of the company and therefore moved to the places where the parent companies are based. This means a clear loss to the Italian industrial structure in terms of advanced industry and of high level employment.

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321 Ever since 1986, the car industry Alfa Romeo was sold for a niminal sum to the Fiat group. In the manufacturing sector the following are examples of concerns sold to private capital: Italsider (steel) to the Italians Failek and Riva and to the German Krupp; Nuovo Pignone (high level mechanics) to a US group; SME (food industry) partly sold to Cirio-Bertolli-De Rica. A number of big banks (Credito Italiano, Banca Commerciale, Banca di Roma, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro), other credit institutions (Istituto Mobiliare Italiano), insurance companies (Istituto Nazionale delle Assicurazione), the national oil and electricity boards (ENI and ENEL) have been partially privatized. In the telecommunication sector the Italian Telecom was sold to a group of small entrepreneurs largely financed by the banks and by foreign financial groups.

322 Olivetti computers was sold to the British Piedmont group, the pharmaceutical industry was almost entirely bought by Swiss and Swedish groups. The presence of Krupp has already been mentioned. The Italian food industry is largely controlled by foreign firms who have bought the best known brands (Maretti& Rossi, Cinzano, Fini, Buton, Galbani, Buitoni, Campari, Stock).
Concluding remarks

The result of the whole set of measures just described has been a consistent weakening of the Italian industrial structure, both as a source of technologically advanced products and for its ability of creating employment. More and more Italy has been abandoning the sectors nowadays being considered as the more advanced ones (nuclear power, electronics, sophisticated chemical products, pharmaceuticals), and concentrating on the more traditional ones, which are the same where it has to meet the competition from the new industrial countries. The increasing weakness of the Italian industry has been pointed out more than once by the Bank of Italy as well as by single scholars.\(^\text{323}\)

An immediate consequence of the gradual downgrading of Italian industry makes itself felt in the labour market. Let us abstract from the regions of South Italy, where unemployment is in the nature of a structural disequilibrium, and concentrate on the so-called full employment regions (notably the Northeast and Central regions). Even here a malformation of the labour market appears. Throughout these regions, regular and stable employment disappears to give way to irregular and precarious work. Moreover, employment is high for the lower manual qualifications, to the point that young people desert high school in favour of an immediate gain. On the other hand, employment is scarce for highly qualified workers having a specialized technological training or a scientific background.

Since the line of financial austerity has produced, among other things, the interruption of any policy tending to eliminate regional disparities, a further result is an increase in disparities between the North and the South of the country. Regional disparities had been consistently reduced in the seventies and early eighties. They are now increasing again.

In spite of such discouraging results, the leading circles insist on supporting the virtues of an uncontrolled free market system and on condemning any kind of Government intervention as a source of distortion in the use of productive resources.

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Globalism and Regionalism in East-Central Europe: 
Nationality Problem and Regional Cooperation under the EU 
and NATO Enlargement

I. Introduction: Globalization and the EU/ NATO Enlargement

After the collapse of the Socialist System in East Central Europe, Nation State rebuilding began to 
start as well as the economic marketization and privatization. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
EU and NATO eastern enlargement also followed the globalization trend. As the EU and NATO 
eastern enlargement trial during this one decade is a very swift one, if we check on the first and second 
group, which have applied for membership in the EU and NATO early in the 21st century, the new 
defined political borders are quite near the border of Russia. (See Table 1)

The author lived in London and Budapest for two years from 1994-1996, where it was easy to observe 
daily the progression of EU integration and enlargement. She revisited East Central Europe: Hungary, 
Slovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia in July and August 1999 after the NATO’s Kosovo Campaign. This 
gave her the opportunity to investigate the Central European situation as a result of globalization and 
EU/ NATO expansion after NATO’s Kosovo bombing, and the chance to interview some important 
politicians & scholars on the balance-sheet of a transitional ten years, recent Nationality questions after 
the Kosovo Bombing, and Regional Cooperation for regional security in the 21st century324.

Globalization originated from the idea of the precious Globe, “which cannot be replaced ” or ”a Spaceship, community of fate”, that is, as the world is one precious community, by the widening of the production, 
information and communication in the scale of the globe, we have to think of the solution to problems on 
a global scale as well. So it connects the “grass roots” social movement for the protection of regional 
ecology and regional development against ecological destruction, increase of population, lack of food or 
exhausting of energy. Such ideas developed swiftly from the 1970s to 1980s.

But the term globalization now (so called Economic Globalism) is completely different. It is 
characterized as the liberalization of people, goods, money, and services under the GATT/WTO system

324 The author visited in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania(Transylvania), Yugoslavia (Vojvodina), 
especially Foreign Ministry in Hungary and Hungarian Minority Organizations in surroundings 
countries (Romanian Hungarian democratic Alliance: RMDSz, Hungarian Coalition Party in Slovakia: 
MKP, Hungarian Union in Vojvodina in Yugoslavia: VMK). She interviewed Goncz Arpad, the 
Hungarian President, Orban Victor, Hungarian Prime Minister, Koto Jozsef, Vice Secretary of 
Educational Ministry in Romania, the Leader of RMDSZ, Kasza Jozsef, the Head of the Party VMK and 
Major in Svotica, Vojvodina in Yugoslavia, Agh Attila Prof., the Head of Hungarian Democratic Studies 
Institution and Prof. of Budapest Economic University, Palankai Tibor, the Rector of Budapest 
Economic University, Varady Tibor, ex-Low Minister in Pasic Government in Yugoslavia, now the Prof. 
of Central European University, and participated in the Foundation Conference of Yugoslavian 
Hungarians Provisional Council, etc. About these investigation, she has some presentations in 
International Convention and other Annual Convention in London, Boston, Washington D.C., and Los 
on a global scale, development of borderless international finance and currency markets, and the borderless and skid less liberalization in the world market by the multi-national enterprises. These situations progressed all at once, especially under "the triumph of Capitalist System" (triumph of the U.S.) against the Socialist System, and lack of a critical power after the end of the Cold War, since the 1990s.

But if we leave these situations alone uncritically and defenselessly, the destruction of ecology, the difference between the rich and the poor, and the regional differences will continue to widen, so the "economic globalization of the law of the jungle" destroys the "original globalism", that is, "a precious globe, which cannot be replaced".

The challenge in the 21st Century is how we can control such an "economic globalization" to insure it protects the "original precious globalism".

Against such a financial or economic Globalism like in the U.S., West European people put a certain distance politically and socially, even while they are evolving to it economically. Especially after the establishment of the Socialist or Social coalition governments in Western Europe after 1996, Gidens' and Blaire's "the Third Way" in U.K., Schleder's "New Middle (Moderate)" in Germany, and Jospen's "The Third Left" in France, or the Italian "Olive Tree" wish to search a new road for the protection of people, ecology, society under the globalism. Central Europe paid attention to these ways, because of their citizens and problems are just as similar or perhaps even stronger than that of the Western countries. This is because of the forfeiture of social security by the state and economic efficiency as a result of privatization under globalism and the EU/NATO enlargement, and a lack of personal funds.

NATO's Kosovo bombing destroyed this delicate balance between American economic globalism and the European Third Way, and actually exposed the lack of power the American leadership and European possess.

Here the author wishes to investigate Globalization/the EU and NATO Enlargement, Nationality Problems, and Regional Cooperation from the viewpoint of society and the people in East Central Europe.

II. The EU and NATO's Eastern Enlargement and Problems

1) The EU Enlargement towards Eastern Europe

It is said that the idea of European Integration was focused on the idea of a "Pan-Europe", by Kudenhof Calergy, so called the father of EC, who was an Austrian diplomat, the son of nobility of the Habsburg Monarchy and Japanese Lady Mitsuko. So Japan also contributed somehow to the formation of the idea of European Integration. It is well known that under the Habsburg Monarchy many nationalities coexisted comparatively peacefully, so he hinted from such historical context.

Historically East Central European minorities were put under the hinterland of the western European industrialization and modernization since the end of the 18th century. As a result of the development of Nationality awareness, the movements for regional autonomy and the idea of regional confederation began to grow, like the Danubian Federation and Balkan Federation in Habsburg lands after the national revolution of 1848 to the transition period of 19th-20th century325.

After the breakdown of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1918, however, during the era between wars and through the Socialist System, regions could not play their own roles or tasks because of the strong centralization and the serious restriction on borders by the Soviet Army. But the idea of cooperation by multinational nationalities always continued in East Central Europe.

After the collapse of the Socialist System in 1989 and the opening of the borders previously closed by the Soviet Army, the importance of regions and the mutual communication between borders began to activate again. These structures existed originally and historically in these regions, so spontaneous

communications began after the opening of borders, like Visegrad Cooperation (Hungary, Czech, Slovakia, and Poland), or Central European Initiative (now 16 countries: Hungary, Czech, Slovakia, Poland. .......).(See Table 1)

A demand to join to the EU and NATO began from Central Europe, especially the Visegrad Countries in earnest from 1991, just after the coup-d’etat of conservative communists in the Soviet Union that summer, and in a process for the collapse of it at the end of 1991. At that time, however, the western countries were not willing to support their desire to join European organizations quickly, for fear of provoking the Soviet Union. So at first, the wish to join to the EU/NATO is only one part love from Central European countries.

But after 1995-1996, the EU itself began to swiftly conclude the "Free Trade Agreements" with many regions: at first with EFTA, secondly with the East European Countries, and thirdly with NAFTA, MERCOCUR, APEC and others. The EU wished to remain an important economic bloc against the U.S. and Asian economic spheres .

Under these situations the first EU Enlargement group nominated (6 countries: Hungary, Poland, Czech, Estonia, Slovenia, Cyprus) in Madrid in July 1997, under Agenda 2000. It outlined severe and detailed criteria to join to the EU; with many conditions for each country to meet regarding their politics, economics, and society, and especially their policies concerning minority’s rights.

As the criteria for joining to the EU was so difficult and had so many conditions, and although East Central European Governments tried to meet the criteria, progress was not so easy to accomplish.

2) NATO Enlargement and Kosovo Bombing

Concerning NATO Enlargement, the Head of NATO was prudent at first, in spite of the strong desire of the Visegrad countries to join NATO fearing the anarchy of ex-Soviet Union and security from the Balkan war. So when the Head of NATO created NACC(North Atlantic Cooperation Council), of PFP(Peace for Partnership), and all ex-socialist countries were eligible to participate in them, as an option which was felt would not be threatening to the ex-Soviet Union, the governments of Central Europe were disappointed by this NATO initiative.

But a turning point of NATO also came in 1996-97. Its leadership came from the U.S., not Western Europe. The U.S. Congress decided to send aid to Central Europe in the amount of 60 million dollars in June 1996 and President Clinton spoke of the enlargement of NATO and the joining of the first new group by the 50th anniversary of NATO in Detroit in October 1996. Under these decisions, the NATO enlargement progressed more by the leadership of the U.S., and as a consequence of it, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic joined NATO on 12 March 1999.

Kosovo Bombing

The Kosovo Bombing was the second turning point of the EU and NATO Enlargement in April 1999. For the three countries of Central Europe, which had just joined NATO 12 days before, NATO’s Kosovo Bombing became a loyalty stone (test) for unity and accomplishment of their obligations.

Hungary had to suffer the bitterest experience. Hungary has a direct border with Yugoslavia and just over the border lives a Hungarian Minority in Vojvodina, who sent a statement to the Hungarian Government requesting they don’t bomb Yugoslavia. (It is interesting that Hungarian Minority in


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Romanian Transylvania, who prescribes them as the Romanian “Kosovo” minority, rather welcomed NATO bombing and prayed for the widening of minority rights as a result of the actions by the West. Hungary stopped a Russian Train, which was believed to be carrying munitions, and the diplomatic relations with Russia were then very strained. Under these situations, Hungary offered an airport for NATO forces, but they themselves only participated in rear area support such as medical and food supplies.

NATO’s Kosovo Bombing also resulted in strong dissatisfaction in surrounding countries, like Greece, Macedonia, and the Czech Republic, actually resulting in investigations and hearings from some authorities. Strong fear against changing the national borders existed in Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey as well. So on the contrary to the superficial unity of East Central Europe and the Balkan countries, there was actually anxiety and bewilderment of the intervention of NATO to the historical Nationality questions in East Central Europe, and against the widening of such military intervention towards other (their own) areas of minority conflicts by wide interpretation of “humanitarian intervention” all over Eastern Europe.

3) The Second Phase of Enlargement

In the Conference of the 50th anniversary of NATO in Washington D.C., NATO’s 19 membership and 23 PfP membership countries participated and resolved the continuity and reform of their cooperation. They estimated the joining of Central European countries as the end of European Division, and stated continued cooperation with Russia. And they stated that NATO’s most important subject is Eastern Enlargement, and Solana, the ex-Secretary General of NATO, said that they will show and invite second joining countries by 2002: he said that the second group member plausibly nominated would be Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Bulgaria, indicating that membership for Albania and Macedonia was also possible. He stressed to speculate partnership with the Ukraine, because it contributes to East European security and stability. After the end of NATO’s Kosovo Bombing, the EU enlargement trend also progressed, because of the viewpoint that Balkan stability is indispensable to European Economic and Political development.

So the European Committee nominated the second enlargement group 6+1 (Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, and Turkey) in December 1999, and started the negotiation for the accomplishment of the criteria from February 2000.

When we see the map of countries in negotiation for enlargement, a new economic and security system will widen all over the Europe, which surrounds Yugoslavia and will spread until the real border of Russia and CIS by the early years of the 21st century. (Table 1)

4). Problems of Enlargement or Transitional Reform

The swift System Transformation in Eastern Europe and the widening of Economic Globalization brought many problems in Central and Eastern Europe. We can show the most important problems below:

1. It expensive to accomplish the political, economic, social and military

2. criteria/or conditionality for joining the EU and NATO. People are deeply suffering from it. After one decade of the transformation in Central Europe, it seems that the economic and political systematic framework was settled to a certain extent (Table 2. 1)-4)), but the social situation has worsened: the difference between rich and poor is widening, unemployment is increasing (Table 4), and “the poor are consolidated” in a lower level.  Goncz, the Hungarian President said the

327 26 April, 1999, Nepszabadsag.

average pay differentials are 8 times wide, and Orban, the Hungarian Prime Minister said, the real wage differentials between Germany, Austria and Hungary is 8 or more times\textsuperscript{329}. Real disparity in wealth feels much more bigger than that by people (15 times, or sometimes 100 times: Interviewed). From such circumstances, demonstrations and strikes are increasing against the economic inequality in East Central Europe in 1999-2000.

3. The enlargement criteria divides ex-socialist countries between Central Europe, the Balkans, Russia & Central Asia. Differences between Central Europe and the Balkans have decreased, because of the "free" competition for the joining to EU and NATO by all nominated countries, but Russia is completely isolated from such European organizations. Russia also tries to search for her own way after the NATO's Kosovo bombing. Russian alternatives are: Asian cooperation: 1) at first cooperation with Japan in 1998, but they stroke a rock because of the "Question of the Northern islands" , 2) secondly with Central Asia. Their goal only half succeeded, as Central Asia itself wishes to alienate itself from Russia, if it is possible. 3) Thirdly with China (they started military cooperation from April 2000.). All of them aggravate the worldwide strain, and it is not good for Russia itself, because they wish for U.S.-Western European cooperation for getting economic aid. Recently Russian President Putin tried to cooperate with the U.S. by military cooperation in June 2000.

4. The last problem is the radical Right and Nationalists growth as a result of the people's increasing dissatisfaction and disillusion with democracy\textsuperscript{330}.

The increase of Globalism and the widening of the disparity in wealth make the dissatisfaction and criticism of socialism weaker. As a result of liberal economic competition and the cutbacks of social security under both Conservative and "Socialist " governments in Western and East Central Europe, the people cannot find a solution for the general universal suffrage of the two general big party systems, so they wish to vote for a new, fresh, energetic radical party like Hider’s Liberal Party. In East Central Europe the radical and Nationalist Parties are also growing, because all the big parties are forced to propagate very similar policies towards joining to the EU/NATO to continue economic efficiency and aid in the cutback of social security in a globalist environment\textsuperscript{331}.

We have to pay attention to the so called Neo Nazi groups, Radical Right or Left, or Extreme Nationalist, who protest openly against the EU/NATO enlargement or Western monopoly of their "national" enterprises and lands. Now the discussion of the protection of national interest is very important under the enlarging European organization\textsuperscript{332}.

III. New Development of Minority Problems: Hungarian Minorities in Central Europe

After the transformation in Central Europe in 1989, and the concurrent nation rebuilding in Central Europe, the governments of multi-national countries in Yugoslavia, Romania, and Slovakia eagerly tried to integrate a nationalization of minorities. They wished to integrate to a national language, and tried to reduce a minority education, and wouldn’t give investment or funds to the minority regions. So the minority areas went into decline and suffered from depopulation because of young and brain workers leaving minorities' small villages and immigrating to foreign countries as a result of the opening the borders in the first half of 1990s.

\textsuperscript{329} Interview to Arpad Goncz, Hungarian President & Viktor Orban, Prime Minister, 23 August 1999. Kumiko Haba, "Hungary: Wish to Return to Europe: Interview to President and Prime Minster", Special Series on European Change 10 years, Sekai(World), Tokyo, December 1999.


\textsuperscript{332} Andras Balogh, Integracio es nemzeti erdek ( Integration and National Interest), Budapest, 1998.
Western help and aid for the "Catholic or ex-Habsburg" countries, for example Croatia and Slovenia, urged the division of the Federal Countries like Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. As the result of that, the Nation rebuilding against such western “intervention” was legitimated in such countries, and resulted in the Yugoslavian civil war against minorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo, or Mecial extreme nationalism in Slovakia.

But the EU/NATO enlargement began to have good effects about 1996-98.

By the effect of the general election in Romania in November 1996, a democratic coalition government was established. Romania’s new democratic government invited the Hungarian Minority Party (Romanian Hungarian Democratic Alliance) into the government, and after that rapid progress in the improvement of the minority situation was made when the Romanian President declared: Elementary and Secondary Education of Hungarian Minority, Introduction of minority public servants in Minorities villages (more than 20% of the population), improvement of living standard of minorities and so on ...

These reforms were enacted to accomplish the security of minority rights criteria required to join the EU. A democratic coalition government established by new elections in Slovakia in 1998 also resulted in the Hungarian Minority Party (Hungarian Coalition Party) joining the Cabinet, and the minority situation subsequently improved.

So the desire for the joining the EU of East Central Europe is bringing a good life to minorities.

On the other hand, there is the other situation in Vojvodina. Vojvodina was a representative multinational co-existence region, which enjoyed wide autonomy in the Tito period. But after the death of Tito, and especially after Miloshevic’s coming to power in the 1990s, it was also involved in multinational conflict. But it is said that all through the conflict in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo, Hungarian Minorities in Vojvodina weren’t subjected to ethnic cleansing333.

But during the Kosovo’s war, internal control was strengthened. Kasza Jozsef, the Leader of the Hungarian Alliance of Vojvodina said that “territorial autonomy” is impossible recently, so they demand “personal and cultural autonomy” like rights of education, rights of minority language, or publication of minority newspaper, journals and books, and so on. Varady Tibor, ex-Law Minister in the Pasic Government in Yugoslavia, said, “if the democratic system is introduced in Yugoslavia”, however, “they have a historical multinational coexistent base of development in Vojvodina more than in Romanian Transylvania or Slovakia”334. He said that they can learn the model of solution of nationality problems from the German community in South Tyrol or German Minorities in Catalonia or Belgium335.

Different from other Yugoslavian minorities, they don’t use terror or extreme nationalism, but rather use democratic and legal means, that is, they have won some major positions through rural elections, or placed some representatives in the national assembly, and they are trying to widen their right peacefully.

IV. Development of Regional Cooperation over National Borders

PHARE Program in Central Europe

The EU aid of funds towards Central Europe, like PHARE program (Poland and Hungary Aid for Reorganization of Economics) is developing smoothly, against depopulation and young and brain workers immigration after the opening borders and small investment and economic decline in minority villages. From 1990 to 1996, 4,5 billion and 5 million ECU was given to help in the development of East Central Europe (Table 3)

The contents of aid are economic reconstruction, infrastructure (including cross-border), human resources, social development, public administration, civil society, general technical assistance, and so

333 Interview to Orban Victor, Hungarian Prime Minister, op. cit., 23 August 1999.
334 Interview to Varady Tibor, ex-Low Minister of Pasic Government in Yugoslavia, Prof. of Central European University, August 1999.
335 Interview to Varady Tibor, 12 August 19999, Nepszabadsag
globalisation, regionalisation and the history of international relations

On. Aid was also earmarked for environmental and nuclear safety. These funds are really for preparing to join the EU. Poland, Hungary, Czech, and Romania especially are getting high percentages of aid.

Both the Hungarian President and Prime Minister stressed the significance of PHARE, Regionalism and Regional Autonomy. Especially Orban insisted that although their diplomatic priority is joining the EU, that in order to accomplish this, PHARE, Euro-Region, and the cooperation with Hungarian Minorities over the national borders is absolutely necessary for their cooperative development inside the EU in the future336.

Euro-Regions in Central Europe

Euro-Region development by EU aid also supported restoring historical and original communications and associations between borders. They are preparing the regional cooperation and communication between borders that will exist after the joining the EU.

Recently near the Hungarian borders, following Euro-Regions are functioning.
1. Carpathian Euro-Region (Slovakia, Ukraine, Poland, Czech, and Hungary)
2. Danube-Koros-Maros-Tisza (Rivers) Euro-Region (Romanian Transylvania and Hungarian East-South districts)
3. Burgenland Euro-Region (Austrian Burgenland and Hungarian West districts)
4. South Slovakian Euro-Region (South Slovakia and Hungarian Northern districts)
5. Vienna-Bratislava-Gyor Euro-Region (border districts of Austria, Slovakia, and Hungary)

In these Euro-Regions, regional enterprises and local governments of each country participate and cooperate with, as well as EU fund aid, in long term programs for multinational coexistence and economic and regional development in areas with a history of minority conflicts. So it basically is precautionary diplomacy of peoples against the nationality conflicts, and each government hopes for their favorable development.

This supports the base of regional development before and after joining the EU and NATO, and it is promoting a policy of regional development in local government under Globalism in Europe.

Concerning the Shengen Treaty in which citizens of member nations can freely move over the borders, Orban Victor, the Hungarian Prime Minister stated the following: it is a difficult subject that foreign Hungarian minorities can freely move from their country to Hungary through the border. It will be very hard that Hungary and the other countries in which a Hungarian Minority lives, can join to the EU at nearly the same time. Therefore it will need special negotiation. "We would like to discuss about a new Shengen Treaty in the next year. " Orban stressed, "now the Romanian people cannot possibly come to Hungary without Visa, so it is extremely difficult to give a free visa to 2 million Hungarian minorities to move, but the Hungarian Government will try to give a free visa in the next one or two years from the neighboring countries where Hungarian Minorities live.”337

V. Conclusions

Agh Attila, the Head of the Hungarian Center for Democracy Studies Foundation wrote in his article, Which Europeanization will be the best for Central Europe? He classified the following scenarios: 1) Germanization, 2)

Turkization, 3) Yugoslavization, 4) Europeanization. And he concludes the Europeanization cum democratization and cooperation is the best-case scenario for them.

The future subject is:

337 ibid.
How can they solve the Social cost under the EU/NATO enlargement or widening of Globalism? It shifts the loss and sacrifice on to the weak of society.

How can they solve the social disparity like widening unemployment, differential of districts, wealth differentials under globalism?

How can they solve the difference between Central Europe and the Balkans? They can compete in the line to join to the EU and NATO after the first and second nomination, but the cultural and social differentials are widening as well as Economics and Politics.

How to manage and solve Russian Isolation?

How to avoid the further national conflicts? Under the widening of Globalization, the harmonized policy of Integration and National Interests, especially the protection of the social weak, and the Regional Cooperation and communication against the national conflicts is needed urgently, otherwise the Radical Right will be stronger in many parts of Central Europe.
The Presence of Global Capital in Australia and the Debate over National Identity

Introduction

Globalization is seen as a pervasive and complex phenomenon with an ever-increasing range of effects and an ability to impact on people's lives, perceptions and experience. As an economic phenomenon it has been well documented by economic writers such as Martin, Leyshon, Strange, and Hanink. For example, Martin (1994: 256) writes of globalization as 'the increasing freedom of movement, transfer and tradability of monies and finance capital across the globe, in effect integrating national markets into a new supranational system'. However many historians and social scientists have not been satisfied with such a narrow economic definition. They see globalization more as Giddens (1991: 64) has articulated it, namely as ‘the intensification of world-wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa’. Such increasing interlinkages are not only the result of information, images and decisions being transmitted from one end of the globe to the other, but also of the temporary or permanent movement of large numbers of people over long distances. This has resulted, as Antonio and Kellner (1994: 143) have argued, of people, or culture groups whose traditional homes are far from each other coming into close contact. The result of this process may be an increasing multiculturalism in some places of the world, but at others it may result in little intermingling if not increased suspicion and hostility between people of different cultures now juxtaposed to each other. As people show very different degrees of receptivity to new cultural influences, Appadurai (1996: 32-8) argues that it is through this aspect of the process of globalization that feelings of ethnic tolerance or intolerance, cultural change, fear of loss of identity, xenophobia and such become manifest.

An aspect of particular relevance to the theme which follows is the dialectic which globalization has opened between two opposing concepts of cultural identity. On the one hand is the adherence to the concept of ‘national identity’ that evolved in Western cultures during the 18th and 19th Centuries; in this notions of identity are territorially-bounded and are seen to be the products of long ethno-historical processes. The other concept of identity is one based on the universality of human beings each with inalienable human rights and needs. According to Ehlers (1996:343-3) and Featherstone (1995: 92-3), these two perceived images of identity are Janus-faced. At their most obvious one sharpens the other, in the age of globalization the feelings of regional or even national identity become defined in relation to the ‘outsiders’ whose influence, whose very presence is seen as being on the ascendent. In the case of Australia and the perception of national identity had by many of its inhabitants, it has been the relationship with Asia that has been such a catalyst. MacKay argued that ‘nothing sharpens our tribal sense like a threat to submerge it in some larger identity...(in the case of Australia for example), the thing which is most likely to clarify our sense of who we are – ironically- is the push to identify us as being part of Asia’ (The Australian Weekend Review: 16-17 April 1994). It was in the context of this issue that the question of Australian national identity surfaced in the late 1980s and is still an important topic of debate in Australian public life today.

This paper will seek to address this issue in the following way. Firstly, an introductory comment on the evolution of Australian national identity will be followed by an explanation of the impact of global capital on Australia in the 1980s. Secondly, the socio-economic characteristics of one of the major recipients of this capital, the Gold Coast, will be detailed.
Thirdly, the nature of the politico-cultural conflict engendered by the presence and investment of the bearers this capital on the Gold Coast will be analysed and explained in relation to the debate over Australia’s national identity that it engendered.

**Globalization and Australia’s Gold Coast in the 1980s:**

In a general sense external forces have always impinged upon, if not in fact created, modern Australia. From 1788 onwards Britain colonised the continent and over the next century and a half the flow of people there was predominantly from the British Isles. British institutions were in large part replicated there, even though those that created the Australian Federation in 1901 also had features that were drawn from the United States. The most significant conflicts on Australian national identity during this period were the culturo-religious disputes fanned by Australians of English descent versus those from Ireland. However even here, the major features of this conflict tended to mirror that between the Irish Catholics and the British Crown.

Australia’s integration into a ‘British globe’ and later into an American-dominated one were equally decisive in the economic sphere. During the 19th Century British capital financed much of Australia’s pastoral industry, its railways and early mining and manufacturing development (Fagan & Webber, 1994: 29). From the second quarter of the 20th Century increased flows of American capital augmented that coming from Britain. The result was that an Australia completely open to such investment and the influence which goes with it was seen by most Australians as ‘natural’, or least ‘inevitable’. Views of Australia in which such Anglo-American finance was seen as a threat were limited to some in the intelligentsia and left-wing groups of society, whose influence ebbed and flowed in the Australian Labor Party. However the situation in the 1980s changed in a number of fundamental ways.

The second half of the 1980s saw a global economic boom, which was at its most robust in the countries of Eastern and South Eastern Asia. The engine of this Asian boom was Japan. The outflow of capital from Japan increased dramatically from $4.7 billion in 1980 to peak at $67.5 billion in 1989 (Matsui, 1996: 42). In half a decade Japan became the world’s largest source of investment capital. Australia’s proximity to eastern Asia, it’s rich environmental and resource endowment helped channel some of this flow towards it. The largest component of it went into real estate. Estimates by property consultants of the volumes invested by the Japanese into Australian property ranged between ten and twelve billion Australian dollars, of this between $4.2 to $ 4.7 billion, or about 40%, occurred on the Gold Coast (Gold Coast Bulletin, 20 October 1988; The Australian, 31 March 1990). For the first time in Australia’s history the largest volume of capital was coming from a country with a very different culture, and a country with whom earlier phases of contact had been anything but harmonious.

The Gold Coast on the northeast coast of the Continent had developed to be the most important holiday resort in Australia, as well as a favoured location for retirees from eastern Australia. The sudden arrival of Japanese tourists and investors had a dramatic impact on the appearance and development of this coastal city. It funded numerous top-of-the market house and apartment developments, it fuelled a boom in hotel construction and golf course resorts, as well as the appearance of a proliferation of shops catering to the Japanese visitor and resident. The size of the permanent Japanese-born population on the Gold Coast increased from 203 at the 1981 census to 2,448 in 1991. This was a steep rise, though still only about 1% of the total population. However it was the visible presence of the Japanese, especially the large numbers of tourists at key locations and the reports of their large property deals that raised awareness of their presence among the community. This has to be seen in relation to two salient characteristics of the Gold Coast community: its socio-occupational- and its age structure.
The Characteristics of the Gold Coast Community

The Gold Coast had developed essentially as a tourist and retirement centre. According to a study by Mullins, it has a higher than average number of people in the ‘self-employed’ and ‘employer’ category-24.4% of the total in employment, compared with 13.0% and 12.8% in Melbourne and Sydney (Mullins, 1993: 404). The self-employed are mainly people working in the tourist and building industries; people running small shops, cafés, small blocks of holiday flats, motels, petrol stations, and working as small builders, plumbers, electricians, etc. People such as these are, according to Bechhofer and Elliott (1981: 194), the core of the ‘petite-bourgeoise’. These historians argue that their low capitalization makes this group particularly vulnerable to downturns in the economic cycle, if not potential loss of livelihood. Also, they often have below average levels of formal education and being tied into time-consuming work routines have limited social networks and so lack the social confidence of the large entrepreneurial and professional classes. Their receptivity to new influences is likely to be less than enthusiastic, particularly when coming from a source perceived to be as culturally different as Japan is to Australia.

Also, the age pattern of the Gold Coast population and the significance of that for debates on national identity needs a brief comment. At the beginning of the period under consideration (at the 1986 census) the proportion of the Gold Coast population over the age of 55 was 27.7%, while that over 65 was 15.9%; comparable statistics for the city of Melbourne were 19.5% and 10.4%. It is these higher age groups who are likely to have the memories of the Second World War, a period during which feelings of fear, threat and national solidarity crystallized as never before. This was particularly the case in relation to the danger posed to the Australian population by Japanese aggression and the actual experiences of war.

In 1991 Barry McQueen (1991: 263) an Australian historian was able to write that:

‘Australian attitudes to all of Asia are filtered through a prism of memories from the Pacific war: Coral Sea Battle, Changi jail, the Thai-Burma railroad and the Kokoda trail became not merely place names but mythic sites. These inheritances still shape the choices that Australian governments can make in international relations’.

Whereas McRobbie (1988: 595) refers to ‘the ticking time bomb of bitterness buried in the memory of many Australians towards all things Japanese’. The experience of the Second World War in the Pacific served only to reinforce an Australian identity defined by Imperial loyalty, racial exclusiveness and the fear of being overwhelmed by threats from the north’. It was in this context that the opposition to the Japanese presence arose on the Gold Coast and on closer examination was seen to be an increasingly furious debate about the sort of people Australians are and should be and the policies required to assure that they would remain so, or become so.

The community debate on the Gold Coast engendered by the Japanese presence and the resultant political controversy spanned the period 1986-91. It saw a series of six public meetings on the Gold Coast, three hundred letters to the local press and had reverberations in the 1987 and 1990 national and 1989 state elections. At the over level it was a debate for and against Japanese investment in Australian property. However on closer appraisal it was a debate about Australian national identity.

The Images of Australian Identity seen in the Utterances of those critical of the Japanese Presence

The first of these was the image of a people who had the right of exclusive possession of the unique continent of Australia. Thus the widely used slogan by many advocates in Australia of global integration that ‘Australia is a part of Asia’ had to be contradicted as forcefully as possible. Thus one letter writer to the ‘Gold Coast Bulletin’ (4 August 1989) stated: ‘We are not part of anybody’s empire. We are an island continent, wealthy in our own right. We must fight. We must fight for our right to remain so’. This belief in, and attachment to Australia can be interpreted as showing that here national identity involves a belief in there being a
symbiotic relationship between the land of Australia and the people. Further statements show that underlying this notion of possession is the implication of exclusivity: ‘If we don't draw a line in the sand, (our) children might be living in central Australia in the desert while the coastline has been sold off to foreign landowners’ (Gold Coast Bulletin 3 August 1990). Change, evolution in the meaning of national identity is not possible in such a definition. For land and its possession is seen as a birthright, ‘those who own part of Australia must first of all be Australian and owe allegiance to no one else’ (Gold Coast Bulletin 13 April 1988). A manifesto published by the group that formed on the Gold Coast to oppose Japanese investment called itself ‘Heart of a Nation’ and inter alia, made the following point:

‘What riles Australians most of all and rightly so is the selling of their country’s soil. This strikes at the heart of a sovereign people’. (‘What is Heart of a Nation?’ May 1988).

Some Australian historians have argued for a long time that the conquest, the development and the inalienable retention of the continent have always been basic to the Australian self-image. Barnes (1994: 41) a cultural historian wrote that ‘the essence of the Australian legend is the struggle of man (read- European man) with the land….and the importance of legend is that the Australian (white man) has earned the right to possess the land’.

At the same time a hidden meaning within this text of cultural iconography can be sensed: this claim to identify with, and enjoy possession of the Australian continent by Europeans has lurking behind it a certain fragility and insecurity. The writings of the novelist and social critic Nettie Palmer (1932: 25) in the 1930s discuss this in some detail. The seminal point of her discussion was that:

‘three or four generations have not been enough to allow us to get thoroughly rooted in the soil. Waves of uncertainty sweep over us. Is this continent really our home, or are we just migrants form another civilisation?’.

Therefore it is plausible to argue that the experience of the Second World War was coloured by fears of dispossession of a continent they had struggled to ‘conquer’ and ‘tame’. The appearance of the Japanese on the Gold Coast, especially the property investors, reawakened the memories of the fears of nearly half a century earlier in a population some of whom had personal experiences of that period. These older Australians saw their continent as something like a fortress and now there was a sense of ‘letting the enemy into our castle’.

This leads to the second aspect of their meaning of national identity, and that is one in which the defence of Australia is seen as a test of nationhood. This is a theme that writers on Australian culture, such as White (1981: 73) and Bennett (1994:58-9), have both identified. As the manifesto of ‘Heart of a Nation’ (May 1988) stated:

‘Men have laid their life on the line fighting to defend a country and way of life that they believe in. When this soil on which we stand was under threat from invading forces, the demarcation lines of war were clearly defined. Many believe that in a more subtle way we are again facing a threat of invasion’.

References to Australian politicians who had spoken in favour of Japanese investment were made in terms of them being willing to sell their homeland ‘for thirty pieces of silver’. In the eyes of this group this image of treachery culminated in a speech made by the then Prime Minister Bob Hawke on the 13th January 1989. In this speech Hawke said that Japanese investment in Australia was ‘unequivocally welcome’. The Chairman of Heart of a Nation responded instantly by saying that: ‘Mr. Hawke is selling out our childrens’ heritage for a few miserable yen. What Bob Hawke said was tantamount to a fifth columnist’ (Gold Coast Bulletin, 13 February 1989).
Behind this is a belief in an Australia whose inhabitants 'have control' of its resources, especially land. This belief is reflected in the perception that the purchase of property by the Japanese was territorial conquest by financial means. One interviewee spoke of the Japanese as wanting to 'Blitzkrieg us with money'; another of how 'they are bombing their way into huge investment wealth' on the Gold Coast. The Second World War analogy was spelt out by John Cumming (1993: 60) a retired businessman. Cummings wrote in his memoirs that it is apparent that the Japanese regard their military defeat in 1945 as only a setback to their long-term plan for world power. However this time their power would be economic not military. This ascribes to the Japanese an intrinsically aggressive national identity, against an Australian one that is justifiably defensive of that which is rightfully its own.

Underlying this of course is the assumption is that the 'nation', 'national character' are the basic points of reference of human beliefs and modes of behaviour. Furthermore these, the characteristics of a nation and the behaviour of its members, produce individual and group behaviour that is immutable. “They (Japanese) are the same people today as those who horrified the world with their barbarous atrocities against those they conquered’ wrote D. W. Barrett in the ‘Gold Coast Bulletin’ of 15 April 1988. It was at this time and indirectly in this context that the historian Geoffrey Blainey made a series public speeches ostensibly about the level of Asian immigration into Australia, but implicitly about the threats to his vision of Australia. These speeches were published subsequently in a collection titled ‘All for Australia’. He writes of an Australia that has lost its ‘sense of national cohesion’ because it is becoming fragmented into ‘a cluster of tribes’. In this he formulated an image of an Anglo-Celtic Australia having immutable characteristics formed at some stage of the previous two centuries, an Australia whose national character is now under threat. Though Blainey never actually specified the Japanese and their capital as being that threat, his acceptance of speaking engagements on Gold Coast during this controversy gave credence to the idea that he was giving tacit support to their cause.

One specific aspect of this view of Australian identity which caused particular media attention was the extent to which it could be seen as being racist. Though in an interview, Bruce Whiteside, the Chairman of Heart of a Nation, denied accusations of racism (‘Racism's got nothing to do with it….What I'm talking about has more to do with economic security'), in subsequent comments the imagery became unmistakably culturo-racist:

‘I venture to say that the British, the New Zealanders owning land here, the Americans owning land here, there is not the same degree of concern as what there is with the Japanese….The fact of the matter is you can't change the mentality, you can educate people, but when it comes to an out and out stoush, people will revert to their natural inclinations'.

And the meaning in the above words is that Australians are by familiarity, and even biological make-up like these other people from English-speaking countries so they can trust them, they can fit into the Australian identity. However the Japanese, people of another culture, another race are by definition aggressive and so they and Australians are territorially mutually exclusive. The fact that the speaker quoted above and many of his ideological colleagues were over sixty years old meant that their formative years were in the Australia of the British Empire, had memories of the Second World War, and with small likelihood of personal gain form the Japanese presence on the Gold Coast, predisposed them to generate such a set of views. As far as they were concerned globalization meant that Australia should continue nurturing its ties with other English-speaking countries, primarily Britain and the United States.

However the Japanese presence on the Gold Coast was also the context for the articulation of a very different national image for Australia.
The Changing Image of Australia in the Era of Globalization in the 1980s:

As could be expected it was people from the property industry who were quickest to challenge the image of Australia articulated above. Alan Midwood, a Gold Coast surveyor and property consultant commented that, ‘People who are opposed to change reflect the drawbridge principle, which cannot exist in a developing community’ (Gold Coast Bulletin, 1 July 1988). Whereas Lyn Ginns, an economist with Max Christmas Pty. Ltd. the largest real estate company on the Gold Coast, pointed to the most emotionally-charged aspect of the Australia to which the critics of Japanese investment seemed to be attached: ‘The concern over foreign investment on the Gold Coast disguises the racism and bigotry of some Australians’ (Gold Coast Bulletin, 16 November 1988). These types of comments showed that those individuals and groups on the Gold Coast who sought to counter the criticisms their opponents were making of the Japanese presence usually did this by converting any self-interest they may have had into a general view of Australia in the world. This image was of an Australia very much within the context of globalization, in fact exposure to globalization was regarded as always having been part of the national image and should continue to be so.

The most frequently articulated aspect of an Australia in an increasingly globalized setting was the economic. Here Australia is seen as a ‘wide-open’ country in which commonsense as well as logic suggests that if Australian investors can export capital overseas, then overseas investors should also be able to export capital to Australia’ (JonesLangWootton, 1989: 7). The image most frequently articulated here was of the world as a global market that must be allowed to function as a ‘level playing field’ so that each state gains its relative economic advantage from it. Thus the global economy with unhindered flows of capital was seen as the basic frame of reference and Australia as a distinct nation-state, a distinct culture, was assumed to be integrated into a world dominated by the forces of globalization. In this scenario of national image issues of possession and control are seen as essentially irrelevant. Governments are not seen as fundamental symbols of national identity. It is the relative benefits of being part of the globe that determine who and what a people are and these should be allowed to move freely. As a final point in support of an economically-globalized Australia, the distinctive nature of land and property is highlighted. As Douglas (1989: 1) comments, ‘People sometimes forget that real estate, unlike cash and commodities, cannot be exported offshore’.

This view of Australia attempted to make reference to that of a dynamic country in which ‘opening-up the continent’, ‘national development’ were seen as very much part of its raison d’etre. In this context the linkage had been made by many between an economically open Australia and development. The word ‘development’ was always used, and words such as ‘possession’ or ‘control’ were not uttered. For example, one prominent member of the Gold Coast property industry wrote that, ‘A strong correlation exists between our periods of high development and rising living standards and high levels of foreign investment’ (Max Christmas Pty. Ltd., 1989: 69). In other words, capital inflow equals development, and development equals ‘the Good Life’, and Australians see themselves as a people being entitled to, and enjoying the Gold Life’. A number of politicians who supported this view encapsulated it into headline-grabbing slogans, such as, ‘One Japanese visitor is worth more than a few tonnes of coal (exported), ‘Each jumbo load of tourists could inject $100,000 into the Gold Coast’, and ‘Foreign investment will create the Australia of tomorrow’ (Gold Coast Bulletin, 28 March 1989; 30 April 1990).

Another version of a globally receptive Australia, image of Australia as not just economically ‘open’, but also culturally tolerant and receptive to the rest of the world, was also articulated. Its spokespersons on the Gold Coast based their views on the conviction that Australia had changed fundamentally from the country that was under threat in 1941-5. As one resident commented, ‘Australia has successfully absorbed millions of people from overseas without
serious disharmony’ (Gold Coast Bulletin, 24 January 1990). This has completely changed the nature of Australia, so that ‘We are a cosmopolitan society now and our birthright is based on a mix of races and cultures’ Gold Coast Bulletin, 13 August 1987). This therefore, is an Australia whose cultural identity is based on a high level of global integration and that can absorb rising levels of Japanese investment and property ownership without the fear of loss of national cohesion and identity. In fact, according to this view, Australian identity is the outcome of this continuous process of outside influences that are then reformed to create a distinctive Australia. This national image, under the label of ‘a multicultural Australia’ was the one that politically and socially progressive groups in Australia sought to portray in public debates during the 1980s and 90s (Jupp, 1994: 81-4). In this context the increasing flows of immigrants from Asian countries were seen as a welcome cultural enrichment of Australia, a country whose identity has always been one based on development, change and enrichment from the rest of the world.

However the desirability of globalization as a formative agent of Australian national identity was also seen by some in relation to a national image much more negative than that globally-inspired by national development and multiculturalism. It was rather one of a culture that had become lethargic, unadventurous and obsessed with ‘our sacred working conditions of long service leave, paid sickies and all those penalty rates’ (Gold Coast Bulletin, 28 May 1988). This image of Australian worker complacency and self-indulgence was matched by a comment in a similar vein about the Australian business community. As the Gold Coast property consultant and development planner Geoff Burchill commented in an interview (11 April 1994): ‘We must have foreign investment from whatever source. The Australian investors, especially the banks, do not have the foresight to invest in tourist infrastructure. Our economy is just too immature for that. We have never stood on our own feet. We cannot cut ourselves-off from the rest of the world’. In other words, this image of Australia is of a relatively small, conservative, shortsighted capitalist culture that needs the stimulus of globalization to maintain its vitality, so that it can provide the good life for its people. If not, then the good life, this crucial aspect of their national self-image will become less and less possible.

Conclusion

Globalization has had the potential to challenge long-established assumptions of national identity. This is particularly the case because it has often thrust people of very different cultures into close proximity to each other, and it can do this at a speed and on a scale rare in previous phases of human experience. The sudden arrival of the Japanese on Australia’s Gold Coast in the 1980s was one such instance. The business elite of the Gold Coast community, as well as some other groups, saw this as the vindication of their image of an Australia that was becoming increasingly prosperous through its progressive integration into global economic flows, particularly investment capital. Such economic ‘open-mindedness’ was also seen as just one aspect of this awakening national self-image. It was matched in their eyes, by the socio-cultural dimensions of a tolerant, multicultural Australia deriving increasing vitality form the unhindered inflow of people, talents, skills and ideas. In fact, this diversity was seen as being that which was starting to give, and would increasingly give if encouraged, the defining characteristics of the Australian self-image. Its uniting values would be tolerance, a culture of democracy and a respect for human rights. However other groups on the Gold Coast perceived the Japanese and the onrush of their investment capital as a threat to their Australia, to their self-image as members of a distinct nation defined by its two centuries of European history on a unique continent. Here the exclusive possession of this continent and the will to defend it were seen as tests of nationhood. If the adherents of the globalist image of Australia spoke of ‘national development and prosperity’ occurring through unhindered interaction with the rest of the world, than those who felt threatened spoke of ‘complete possession and control’, and of an Australia continuing to be Australia by means of a cultural, if not racial exclusivity in relation to ‘outsiders’. Outsiders however were implicitly categorized into those from Britain New Zealand and the United States; they were much less ‘outsiders’ than those from other countries, with the greatest degree of ‘outsiderness’ being attached to the
Japanese, whose military aggression half a century earlier was seen as a permanent national trait, know again being pursued, but this time by financial means.

To conclude, thus on the one hand globalization has the power to reformulate national identity and to give it new contours, on the other, it may also revive earlier self-images of a people, particularly if the agents of globalization had a role in the formulation or reinforcement of that national image at an earlier stage of national experience. That was the basic issue with the arrival of the Japanese to the Gold Coast in the 1980s.

Bibliography


Globalization and Regionalization in the Baltic States and Finland in the 1920’s and 1930’s.

The emerging new states on the Eastern shore of the Baltic Sea had had their experience of globalization. They had belonged to the Russian Empire and profited of its vast resources and possibilities in economy, culture and science. Still the emerging states definitely strived off of their binding ties with Russia. The solution was clearly political. In Finland all parties, including the revolutionary Social Democrats, supported independence. In Estonia and Latvia the Bolsheviks wanted to stay with the Russian revolution, in some kind of autonomy, but all other parties, including Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries favored independence. The case was the same in Lithuania. Only the extreme Left tended to maintain federative links, either with Poland or with Russia. The Soviet Republic, which was proclaimed in the turmoil of 1918-1919, was Lithuano-Belorussian one. The war raging on all Western borders of Soviet Russia strengthened the new governments determination to cut off all ties with Russia.

The Finnish wood-processing industry managed to move its markets from Russia to the West, but the Baltic metal industry had to abandon its flourishing, markets mainly without compensation. On cultural and scientific life occurred clear narrowing in prospects and channels. Nevertheless the seeds of globalization were definitely abandoned, and every nation continued their own way.

Did the regionalization provide an alternative to the newly abandoned globalization in the Eastern Baltic? This was clearly the case. There had been hand, between Estonia and Finland from the other. There were discussions on the more general cooperation, too. Especially there emerged a certain understanding and friendship between the future Finnish, Estonian and Latvian foreign ministers, at the same time in London. They were Rudolf Holsti, Ants Piip and Zigfrids Meierovuics respectively.

The general wish for regional cooperation between Finland and the Baltic States, occasionally with Poland, too, gave birth to the so called Border State or Baltic Conferences. The need for cooperation was so great that some 40 on various levels were held in the years 1919-1926. It was by far the most dense and active regional cooperation of its time. What was desperately needed was a treaty of defense against Soviet Russia and a common front in the Peace question with the same power. In addition there was a need to regulate all kinds of every day problems like traffic connections, delivery of post, legal and sanitary care, copyrights of the artists and so on, all in all things that were important especially for the Baltic States, which were not - in the first years - recognized as states and not part of international regulations.

The conferences began between Lithuania and Latvia, who were most pressed on their fronts. Lithuanian and Latvian representatives met at Riga on September 1, 1919. It was immediately agreed that Estonia and Finland should be asked to join the conferences. These small conferences were held altogether six in the Fall of 1919, and the question of a defense alliance and of a common front in the peace negotiations were the most pressing problems. The big conferences of all the five participants started in 1920. In this year the peace question was solved when Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Poland concluded peace treaties separately with Soviet Russia. There were left only the question of the common defense and the every day regulations. The big conferences were held in Helsinki January 1920, Riga August-September 1920 and in Warsaw Mars 1922. Several draft texts of defense agreement were negotiated but none of them were accepted by the governments and parliaments concerned. Nevertheless the discussion of the joint defense continued until 1925.

So there was a vivid interest in the regional cooperation between Finland, the Baltic States and Poland in these years. In has been maintained that the Border State or Baltic policy was a failure while it did not succeed in its most pressing problems. On the other hand the regular meetings of the Prime and Foreign Ministers, at least twice a year, as well as other ministers and experts meant such a keeping in touch and influence on the policy of others that it could be seen as equivalent to a formal defense treaty.
This was at least the stand-point of the Finnish Government which repudiated all the defense agreements but participated to the conferences up to their very end.

Despite of all cooperation there were also so features which worked against regionalization in the Baltic. The most severe barrier to the regional cooperation were the frontier disputes between the participants. The most severe quarrel emerged between Poland and Lithuania over the Vilna district. Vilna was the historical capital of Lithuania, but it belonged to the Polish tradition, too, and it was populated mostly by Poles. Furthermore the changing fortunes of war disturbed the situation. The Red Army conquered Vilna in January 1919 from Lithuanians, in April the Polish Army captured Vilna and kept it for the time being. In the next June the Red Army conquered Vilna again, and when they had to retreat, they handed Vilna to the Lithuanian government in August 1920. A good month later the Poles captured the city and kept it until the second World War. This turn destroyed the Lithuanian relations to the Poles totally. Lithuanians broke all connections to Poland and refused to participate in the Baltic conferences if the Poles were invited.

The Vilna dispute was the most severe break-up in the Baltic regionalization but there were other disputes, too. The second severest was the Estonian-Latvian quarrel about the frontier town Valga/Valk. The town used to be inhabited by the Latvians, but the Estonian population had increased, foremost during the First World War. There was war going on in Estonia and Latvia, too. Latvia was more pressed on her frontiers, and the Estonians took advantage of their stronger position. They demanded Valga as a compensation of their help, and in the turn of 1919-1920 they occupied Valga, repulsed Latvian officials of the town and started to collect raw materials from the Northern Latvian territory. The Latvian Government protested and cut the railway south of Valga in order to prevent the Estonian armored trains to attack deeper in Latvia. The neighboring countries were on the brink of war, which renewed again in March 1920.

There were some minor disputes between the Lithuanians and the Latvians and the Estonians and the Finns, too. In my opinion these tensions were severe enough to prevent the endeavors of that primary importance as the Defense agreements against the Soviet Russia as well as a common front in the peace question with the same power. It is clearly seen in the case of Estonian-Latvian defense agreement. In Summer 1920 the British mediated a division of Valga district. It did not immediately stop the tension and manifestations in the region. The respective governments tried to negotiate a defense agreement between the countries in Summer 1921, but it was too early. It was not ratified by the parliaments. Only in November 1923 it succeeded. It meant, too, that of the several alliance schemes between the Baltic States, Finland and Poland was realized the smallest possible, the defense treaty between Estonia and Latvia.

So there were features which worked against regionalization in the Baltic. About the same time there occurred a possibility of new globalization in the region. Finland was accepted to the League of nations in 1920, Estonia and Latvia in 1921 and Lithuania in 1922. In Geneva the Baltic States worked together, and the Baltic cooperation continued there. The Baltic States supported, e.g., the choice of the former Finnish Foreign minister Holsti as a semipermanent member of the League Council in 1927.

Nevertheless the regionalization, not to speak about globalization, left something to be desired. Finland already oriented towards neutrality and later on towards Scandinavia. It is very revealing to the mental links between the other Baltic nations that the Estonian president never paid an official State visit to Latvia or Lithuania or vice versa, but reciprocal visits were organized between Estonia and Finland.

At the beginning of 1930’s the international situation changed. The pressure from the Soviet Union and Germany begun to be felt. The Baltic States sought to a closer cooperation between themselves. Estonia and Latvia renewed and enlarged their defense treaty in February 1934, and their governments decided to have mutual meetings in order to observe the situation and defend their neutrality. In April 1934 Lithuania joined the group. The new cooperation became known as a Baltic Entente. It held regularly conferences of the Foreign Ministers, founded an office for the advancement of economic and cultural activities. All Baltic States promoted the choice of the Latvian Foreign Minister Valters Munters as a semipermanent member of the League of Nations Council in 1936.

The Baltic Entente did not fulfill the expectations which were attached to it. The economic structure of the member states was very similar, and the plans for customs union failed. The results of cultural achievements were still lesser, due to the basic cultural and ethnic differences on the nations. When the international situation hardened from 1938 on, the Baltic Entente failed to provide any security, and
the member states sought the best way to rescue their own fortunes. All Baltic states faced their destiny separately in 1939-1940.

So Finland and the Baltic States repudiated at the very beginning the globalization which Russia offered. Regionalization was seen as a clear substitute and was practiced during many years. Still in last estimation it failed, firstly because of internal disputes and different outlook of what the foreign policy position demanded. This was the case of Finland and Poland which saw their positions differently compared with the Baltic States. In the last effort also the competing economic systems and basic cultural and ethnic differences between the Baltic States, not to speak about overwhelming external threat, destroyed the fruits of regionalization, too.

_Literature:_


This essay intends to clarify some conflictive socio-political and socio-cultural phenomenons, within the current phase of capitalism, which take place in different geographical scenes, although they have similar identity problems in their origins. The aim is to analyze the historical, cultural and political conditions in two conflicts at the end of the century whose scenarios are India and Yugoslavia: this is the case of Kosovo and Kashmir.

Both situations are within the frame of complex historical contexts and nationalist or ultranationalist arguments which are distinguished by ethnic, linguistic and religious elements and woven in the case Kashmir- with old forms of “communalism”, in a context which bristles with political violence and intolerant reactions. In another dimension, in the selected places, it is observed a territorial fragmentation in a two-way direction: on the one hand, the international political definition resulting from the post-war negotiations and on the other hand, the emergence of “localism” as political expression and reaffirmation of profound historical-cultural identities.

At the end of the century and millennium, we do observe a global tendency of the economy that moves toward the fulfilment of the utopia of a market at a worldwide scale. The Balkan suffered the consequences of a rapid change from communism to the market economy under the conditions imposed by the international financial institutions, which included even the process leading to “democracy”. These situations would be difficult under the best circumstances and nearly impossible at a time when an excluding nationalism had been arising and the policy consisted in privileging the ethnic identity. So economic dispute was transformed into “national” dispute. In this way the globalization could foster the productive, jealous protectors of the national culture inside state-nation. The revitalized interethnic conflicts and the search of new way of relation between communities of various origins, was the result of a historical model of “real socialism”.

The frustration of the economic model and self-imposed repression, which was due to many years of unsatisfied promises, generated an atmosphere propitious to expressions of intolerance between minorities which called back interpersonal bounds to situations similar to those existing before the Second World War. In the periods of economic uncertainty, the ethnic separatism is a frequent phenomenon. The nations are divided into racial or ethnic groups above any social class difference, when there is neither dominant internal ideology nor an external threat. These arguments have been legitimized by the “world economy”, because in order to be successful it is not necessary to have great economy with a wide “inner market”.

The identity is a form of affirmation that denies any expression of diversity, as “ultranationalism” in old Yugoslavia and India. In the latter, the “ethnicity” may appear as a counterhegemonic force acting as a source of solidarity in a moment of political conflict, when ethnic ties and economic and political subordination are related. In this sense, identity is a model of social conscience and a form of secular arrangement. Communal confrontations or disputes are said to be restricted to geographical regions or villages, which are understand also as regional autonomies associated to the political-geographical fragmentation. The aim of this proposal is to discuss the analysis of the category and concept definitions, in nowadays agenda of ethnic conflicts, ethnic nationalism, communal identity, collective identity and “communalism”. In recent years, there has been a change in the meaning of the word “nationalism”. Nowadays the ethnic culture is considered the basis of people’s unification. The
nationalism is impregnated by “ethnization” due to a mythical-symbolical formulation that defines an identity.

The formation the nation states were motivated and incentivized by western power. They were created and impulsed “from above”. As an answer, it generated the “communal identity” with root in the religious element as self-defence: The identity with exacerbated reactions in front of the another and the different. Foreign political values are considered as a means of western ideology’s invasion, which is de-humanizing and it avails to mobilize their community. In Kosovo and Kashmir the religious element is used in high dose. This peculiar characteristic is used by the powers for strategic interests, as well as economic and political. All these questions are considered true problems of international political.
Introduction

"Without a leader, an alliance system lacks a head; without an inner core of solidarity, it has no heart.”

It is almost a truism that all alliances – and the wars that they fight – are essentially political. Is this always the case? Clausewitz’s dictum that wars are politics by other means (roughly adapted) is especially relevant to coalition warfare. As Professor George Liska observed: “...an Atlantic Alliance with an extended consultation regime would appear more than ever responsible for all actions of its members everywhere.” It is this necessity for consensus in regard to NATO’s responsibility for its treaty-prescribed Cold War area that makes it difficult for the Alliance to operate with the same unanimity in its post-Cold War “out-of-area” interventions. When we add that the politics of the greatest and most influential member of NATO is governed by shifting domestic political coalitions embedded in a divided system of government, then the entire situation becomes even less “military” and even more “political.” So what is NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) to do?

If the experience of General Lauris Norstad, NATO’s SACEUR during the height of the Cold War, is any guide, there is almost inevitably tension over decision-making in war between the SACEUR and his “political masters.” A good example can be found in Norstad’s desire, during the Berlin crises of the late 1950s, to adopt a more bellicose response toward Khrushchev’s threats, than either President Eisenhower or Secretary of State Dulles desired. In short, they were willing to posture militarily, but acted more cautiously diplomatically than Norstad preferred, in order to maintain Alliance political solidarity, and to reassure their domestic audience. The assumption (or hope) was that if the Alliance remained firm, the Soviet Union would give way, thus avoiding a “shootout” that would benefit no one.

A similar situation confronted General Wesley T. Clark, the SACEUR during the Bosnian and Kosovo interventions. On 24 March 1999 -- forty-eight hours after the air campaign began -- Clark had urgently requested permission from Washington to have the Army’s Apache attack helicopter made available to him so that he could pursue more effectively the Serb army and paramilitary forces that were cleansing Kosovo of Kosivar Albanians. After several weeks, he finally obtained authorization for their relocation to a staging airfield in Albania, but no permission was ever forthcoming either from the White House or the Pentagon for their employment in combat. As it was put: “The issue is that Clark is being aggressive, and there is some resistance to doing what he wants to do.”

Nonetheless, letting Norstad appear more willing to risk war, but at the same time searching for a diplomatic solution, proved an effective means for the U.S. to defuse the Berlin crises without appearing to “back down.” It worked in that case; but a similar tactic toward Serbia did not work. Clark’s last-minute direct diplomacy with Milosevic did not persuade him to “back down” and so NATO’s bluff was called - or perhaps NATO was forced to call Milosevic’s bluff. Norstad’s role in the Berlin crises was considered effective because he did not have to order his NATO forces into combat; Clark’s role in the Kosovo crisis ended up appearing at least partially ineffective because he was compelled to order his NATO air forces into combat after the failure to achieve an acceptable diplomatic solution.

Also, as with Norstad, Clark, as SACEUR, was restrained in his position as a NATO commander by his USCINCEUR “hat.” In both cases, although the SACEUR, always an American general, would have enjoyed full access to Washington’s highest political and military circles than would a non-American SACEUR, the other side of this coin has been that the American SACEUR must, if required,
subordinate his SACEUR “hat” to his USCINCEUR “hat.” In this vital aspect, not much changed from NATO’s Cold War command posture to its post-Cold War posture.

Does this mean that today the SACEUR is less of a political general than a military general? The indications at this point are that today’s SACEUR, as is discussed later in this chapter, must operate in a more complex political/military environment than did Norstad. But the central fact is that the overarching influence of the U.S. has remained unchanged.

Adding to this “two-hat” tension, the longer Norstad occupied his post, the more he became engaged in aligning himself with the European “pillar” of NATO, to the discomfiture and then the irritation of his national government. For example, Norstad listened carefully to President Charles de Gaulle’s proposal for a two-tier definition of NATO membership, which de Gaulle termed a tripartite “directorate” – consisting of France, the U.K., and the U.S. -- whereas President Eisenhower virtually ignored the proposal. Another example is that Norstad desired that NATO played a greater role in the command and control of nuclear weapons based in NATO/Europe, than did the U.S. -- especially after the advent of the Kennedy Administration. The realities of power and the scale of national contribution, willy nilly, should have impelled Norstad to listen more carefully to some members (i.e. the U.S.) and, perhaps, less carefully to others (i.e. France). Put another way, European geopolitics became more important to Norstad than Atlantic geopolitics.

Can we discern a similar pattern in the experience of Clark? As the Kosovo intervention revealed, in coalition war, unanimity can be delegated to a “core” decision-making group without necessarily discrediting consensus. Just as in Norstad’s case and the nerve-wracking Berlin crises, Clark may well have reluctantly concluded that: “Dreams of multilateral solutions to international conflicts are dying a nasty death over Yugoslavia.” Or he may have concluded : “Unified planning, centralised control, and a single point of responsibility are the very minimum requirements for a unity of effort which will offer success.” Certainly Norstad strived for both unified planning and centralized control, and he achieved only partial success in the two primary areas of his responsibility – nuclear weapons and Western access to Berlin. Clark, in actual war, found himself responding both to a “core” group of the NATO Council and to unilateral U.S. constraints.

In any event, for Norstad, the decision as to who or which authority would order the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, lay at the heart of his role as a “commander.” If NATO could not retaliate instantaneously (or even launch a pre-emptive strike) then there would be little or no hope that NATO could fulfil its dual mission of first, credible deterrence, and then, of offensive military operations. This is why Norstad kept pressing the political consultative organs of NATO as well as his own government to pre-delegate such authority to him. As he put it: “...as new weapons come into being -- those that related to the task of NATO directly -- it is planned that they will come under, they are coming under at the present time NATO direction. I am personally very strongly in favour of that.”

But in reality, as the level of crisis not only ratchets upward, but also is prolonged, the political pressure on the SACEUR also increases dramatically, and most directly from his own government. Norstad experienced this process during the extended crises over Berlin, and it appears to have taken place for Clark also, in the crisis over Kosovo. In Clark’s case, of course, after prolonged negotiations failed to produce an acceptable political settlement over the status of Kosovo and its majority Muslim Albanian population, NATO reluctantly went to war.

As Oxford Professor Robert O’Neill observed:

The political context into which the Atlantic Alliance was born helped to ensure that its members had a sophisticated understanding of the international system. [The founders] knew that their creation had to be viable both in the eyes of the putative enemy in order to deter him and in those of Western voters in order to win their support for it....The Europeans had to satisfy themselves that in this new association they were not about to become harnessed to American policy without powerful means of influencing it, or to be placed at risk by their ally in some higher degree than he placed himself.

Clark was confronted by this dilemma at least as much as was Norstad. Whether NATO called Milosevic’s bluff or the other way around, is still not clear. What is clear is that, as the intervention unfolded, the tension between Clark and NATO’s political consultative organs – and especially some of the larger European members as well as the U.S. – increased.
II. Locus of Decision-Making in Coalition Warfare.

In the case of Norstad, during the Berlin crises, he was accountable to the U.S. in his USCINCEUR "hat" and to NATO in his SACEUR "hat." He also had a third "hat" because he was responsible for the LIVE OAK operation, which was a special planning unit that he established near SHAPE to deal with Berlin contingencies. But the LIVE OAK Planning Staff operated under the direct supervision of the Deputy USCINCEUR. Thus LIVE OAK was not formally a NATO organization; it consisted of France, the U.K., and the U.S., with the Canadians and the West Germans sharing some information. Another avenue of communication for Norstad was a direct channel to the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group, also consisting of France, the U.K., and the U.S., and located in Washington. He was, of course, accountable formally to the Military Committee (MC) and thence to the NATO Council, but the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group provided the conduit from the three major NATO members (and also from the State Department) to Norstad. Thus, for Norstad, in the discharge of his duties, political equality conferred by a common membership in NATO did not necessarily reflect the disparities of national power.

For Clark, in his USCINCEUR "hat," the chain of command flowed from USCINCEUR to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), to a group within the Joint Staff designated J-2T, who worked closely with Clark's planners. From the Joint Staff, decisions on major targets went through the Secretary of Defense, and if particularly sensitive, on to the White House and the National Security Council (NSC). Clark could communicate directly with the White House, although he was better advised to keep the Secretary of Defense and the Pentagon in the picture. For him more than for Norstad, who had easy and informal access to the Eisenhower White House, there was also the necessity to keep the Secretary of State and the State Department informed. Thus, Clark in his U.S. role was not by any means a free agent.

Put another way, even if war planning might best be done in a coalition framework, war execution has to be handled quite differently in order to take advantage of such elements as surprise, mobility, targeting, weapons employment, troop movements, etc. Both Norstad and Clark were quite aware that war consists of the unexpected and the unforeseen, and that to respond to these circumstances, NATO as a coalition had to collectively act and react quickly. Although this might make good political sense, it did not make good military sense, especially in the opinion of NATO's leading member, the U.S. War by NATO committee meant, in practice, that the SACEUR was also required to keep his USCINCEUR "hat" firmly in place. If he neglected the latter in favour of the former, then he would find himself at risk, which is why both Norstad and Clark were placed on the retirement list by their national government sooner than they had planned.

A striking difference between Norstad and Clark is the fact that today there exists several forms of "European security architecture." To enable the European members to play a collective role in their own security, and having in mind the challenges of NATO membership enlargement that embraced the Visegrad states of Central Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland), agreement was reached at the NATO summit of January 1994 on the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). As it was portrayed by Robert Hunter, then U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO:

We proposed a deal at the 1994 Brussels Summit. In exchange for our European Allies not attempting through the ESDI [European Security and Defence Initiative] to duplicate a set of resources which, frankly, none of the European countries were going to build anyway – this is a matter of political will and resources – we declared we would be prepared to take the lead in gaining agreement at NATO for direct support of the WEU [Western European Union], based upon the concept of “separable but not separate” forces and assets. We also proposed at that time that the CJTFs could be a major instrument in making available to the WEU, under appropriate circumstances, assets that are uniquely available to NATO.

But Michael Brenner pointed out, drawing on observations of Willem van Eekelen: “We concentrated much more on the new possibilities of having NATO resources made available to WEU or to an ad hoc coalition’ than to simply making NATO more flexible.”

Sacrificing flexibility to maximize participation, as we have observed, is often a political imperative in an alliance, or in coalition warfare. The objective in this case was to maintain NATO as the chief European security organization in order to create a stable zone in Central Europe comprising a unified Germany alongside its former enemies to the East. For this, there had to be a continued, strong, and credible American military presence, which is afforded through NATO. In this respect, having an
American general as SACEUR in both the Cold War and post-Cold War variants of NATO, has made very good political/military sense. In contrast, Hunter observed: “With NATO-led operations in Bosnia [...] SACEUR has taken on a wide range of tasks that were never contemplated during the Cold War [...]. SACEUR’s role is thus not to focus on a single threat (however branches it might have had [...] but rather to lead a coalition force in day-to-day operations of great complexity...The ‘C’ in Saceur, in effect, has finally come into its own.” Doubtless Clark would wish it had been.

III. The Old NATO and the New NATO

Quite clearly, NATO during Norstad’s tenure was entirely different than NATO under Clark’s tenure – and not only in national composition. Under Norstad, the NATO military structure was designed primarily for planning purposes. This is why Norstad, the pre-eminent planner, was so successful in his role as SACEUR. The idea was to anticipate as much as possible the “scenarios” that might arise between the two Cold War hostile alliances. Elaborate plans were worked out to take care of these contingencies so that the element of surprise would be minimized. These arrangements included planning for pre-positioning of supplies, scheduling of troop movements, refining command and control procedures, creating time-lines for reinforcement and resupply, earmarking national forces, conducting both command and operational exercises and war gaming, arranging common codes and signals, etc.

All of these activities would enhance the capacity of NATO during the Cold War to react automatically to a threat considered unambiguous. In other words, once a hostile military movement in Eastern Europe threatened to cross the threshold of NATO/Europe, all of the planning that had taken place would render it relatively easy for NATO, under SHAPE and the SACEUR, to put into motion its war plans. National discretion would already have given way to multinational action.

The very act of military planning, by whittling down the element of surprise and unintended consequences, also ineluctably gave more and more authority to SACEUR, the chief planner, who when war broke out, presumably would assume responsibility for implementing NATO’s military response. Concomitantly, the capacity of individual NATO members to withhold consent would in effect be minimized. The mission had already been defined; the commitments to support that mission had already been put in place; the command arrangements (including national representation) had been worked out; the weapons and forces had been supplied or had been earmarked. In other words, during the Cold War the sum of NATO collective war-planning that would lead to war-making, gave the appearance of being greater than the sum of its individual nationalistic parts, especially if the U.S. nuclear strategic retaliatory component is included.

This is a situation which, perhaps, Clark might have envied, given the diametrically different situation in which he found himself. As it was bluntly put, referring to Kosovo and President Clinton: “When a president threatens a war he should plan for it.” The same can be applied to NATO. NATO’s “Strategic Concept” of April 1999 provided the following:

53.c. that NATO’s command structure will be able to undertake command and control of the full range of the Alliance’s military missions including through the use of deployable combined and joint HQs, in particular CJTF headquarters, to command and control multinational and multiservice forces. It will also be able to support operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, thereby contributing to the development of the ESDI within the Alliance, and to conduct NATO-led non-Article 5 crisis response operations in which Partners and other countries may participate.

Nonetheless, the Europeans are still committed to “strengthen the European pillar within the alliance.” How this will play itself out in practice remains to be seen and therefore it very likely will occur (if at all) beyond the tenure of Clark, but it will certainly be of great interest to the SACEUR of the time.

In any event, under such complicated current and possibly foreseeable circumstances, how could Clark’s command engage in contingency planning with anything near the specificity that Norstad could? In the ongoing Balkan crises, Clark’s complex NATO command relationships have necessitated direct input from, in particular, France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S. He can approach directly the Military Committee, and he can if he wishes go directly to the NATO Council.
Adding to the complexity, the admission of the three new Visegrad members altered the political landscape in NATO, and little time had elapsed for these changes to accommodate themselves before NATO was at war in the Balkans. Further, the elaborate quasi-consultative machinery in the form of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), although neither is a legal deterrent to NATO Council decision-making, makes clear-cut advance commitments more difficult to work out among the members. And the NATO-Russian Founding Agreement and Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which gives Russia a direct pipeline into NATO political discussions, could roil the waters further. Finally, increasingly, non-military and quasi-military factors must also be taken into account. This is not to suggest that these post-Cold War political/military accommodations are neither necessary nor desirable. They are both, if NATO is to be considered both a planning and an operational organization, with an agreed-upon mission, and possessing advance commitments from the members to fulfil that mission.

But in Kosovo, NATO was caught short in planning, with no firm advance commitments from the members to wage an unanticipated air war of attrition which the opponent initially dominated through surprise and flexibility (as well as ruthlessness). Initially, the war was to have been the NATO-U.S. concept of the AirLand battle, with an initial knock-out blow comprised of both air and ground forces acting together. As it was reported: “[NATO officials] have not said publicly,...[but] disclosed privately, that the alliance started with a battle plan designed for a summer offensive last year that was taken off the shelf without extensive rethinking when NATO started its war on March 24 -- with bad weather a statistical probability.”

When only the air war was implemented, it was clear that a “minimalist” rather than a “maximalist” strategy was the preferred option. This, according to the commander of NATO’s air war was not good doctrine: “Airmen would have liked to have gone after that target set [so-called leadership targets] on the first night and sent a clear signal that we were taking the gloves off from the very beginning, that we were not going to incrementalize, that we're not going to try a little bit of this and see how you like it and try a little bit of that and see how you like it...Nineteen nations voting, competing pressures, that makes it very, very difficult to do that.” Furthermore, setting out unambiguous self-restraints such as no commitment of ground troops, and possessing insufficient air weaponry to deal with the changing situation on the ground in Kosovo, provided not a deterrent, but an incentive to the enemy to resist rather than to capitulate.

The unintended consequences of the NATO air intervention in Kosovo enabled Milosevic to continue to pursue his “war aims.” But the destruction of Serbia's national infrastructure that was the consequence of NATO’s air campaign, and of Kosovo that was the consequence of Milosevic's ethnic cleansing campaign, awarded Clark only a partial victory.

Yet through the experience of this unanticipated prolonged air campaign, SACEUR ultimately might accumulate more authority to act more quickly when other crises arose. In this respect, Clark was in a similar situation as was Norstad, for certainly one great bone of contention within NATO has been who should control targeting decisions. Very early in the Kosovo hostilities, by the end of March, Clark was able to obtain agreement from the NATO Council that he did not have to consult with all 19 NATO members for targeting decisions. Instead, he had only to deal with France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S. As it was optimistically observed: “Political considerations within each of these continue to restrain military actions, but the centralization of approval decisions within a core concert-within-the-alliance is independently significant.”

However, NATO's political leadership could intervene at any point. Secretary of Defense Cohen acknowledged this in testimony before the Senate: “Each president of the NATO countries, at least the major players, are given the opportunity to at least express their judgement on the targets.” They can also object after an air strike, which Italy did after the destruction of the Serbian TV center in Belgrade. In this instance, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana helped to smooth things out, but it could also have been done through direct contacts between SACEUR and the national commander of the complaining member.

Another example of political constraints on SACEUR was Clark’s desire to enforce an oil blockade at sea against Yugoslavia. He submitted an enforcement plan that would allow NATO warships to fire on tankers that defied search requests. As it was put: “It really comes down to force [...] Do we ask them, ‘Do you mind if we board?’ Or do we ask them first but then say, ‘You’re not going to stop us.’ General Clark wanted to have more teeth in it.” Although Clark had the backing of the U.S., other NATO Allies,
including France and Germany, objected. They feared that forcibly rather than voluntarily implementing the blockade would result in confrontations with ships from non-NATO countries, especially Russia.

The abrupt announcement by the White House in July 1999 that Clark was to be replaced underscores the political fragility of the office of SACEUR. As it was observed at the time:

[...] despite [Clark’s] claims of a smooth succession, a Washington Post editorial said his early removal ‘can only undermine the [U.S.’s] ostensible commitment to bring peace to the Balkans.’ It said Gen. Clark had been criticised for being ‘too political’ simply because he wanted to ‘use his authority to actually accomplish something’ [...]. Gen. Clark has repeatedly denied speculation that the decision for him to leave his post next April instead of next July was due to his handling of the alliance’s 11-week air war against Yugoslavia [...]. Correspondents say he consistently urged more aggressive tactics, including the possibility of a ground invasion of Kosovo if the air strikes failed [...]. In an interview published in The New Yorker magazine, Gen. Clark acknowledged his frustration with what he called ‘the only air campaign in history in which lovers strolled down riverbanks in the gathering twilight [...] to watch the fireworks.’

IV. Conclusions

Without the need for speed in wartime decision-making that characterized the Cold War and nuclear weaponry, today NATO’s out-of-area wartime decision-making is much more firmly under the control of the Alliance’s political authorities. As it was said: “[...] from the outset, the NATO Allies approached their engagement both in the Bosnia crisis and then in the Kosovo war air operations, with the most cautious concern to retain political control over all allied military activities.” In Norstad’s case, de facto if not de jure, if the alarm bells had gone off, there was a high probability that the SACEUR would have acted promptly, risking acting precipitously in spite of any Alliance misgivings (and especially those emanating from Washington). The fundamental contradiction for Norstad -- that of planning and preparing for a nuclear holocaust that if it occurred would have had disastrous consequences for all of the participating belligerents -- was not shared by Clark. But Clark had much less political leeway in his crisis decision-making dictated not only by diverging conceptions of how to deal with the threat posed by Milosovic and Serbia, but also because the Allies’ individual conceptions of their vital interests were not shared. Clark had no chance of turning toward a European “pillar” to offset the preponderance of the U.S. -- the nearest thing to such a pillar would have been the EU and WEU, and that possibility was still more of an idea than a reality, and in any event such a formation would not have rested directly within SACEUR’s purview. The former Chairman of the Military Committee, General Klaus Naumann, openly referring to Clark’s situation, said: “We need to find a way to reconcile the conditions of a coalition war with the principle of military operations such as surprise and overwhelming force. We did not apply either in Operation Allied Force and this cost time, effort and potentially additional casualties. The net result is that the campaign is undoubtedly prolonged.” He was also quoted as asserting: “We need to think through our organization’s structure in time of war.”

Nonetheless, the search for a diplomatic “exit strategy” must go on not only during hostilities, but also during post-hostilities peacekeeping or “nation-rebuilding” efforts, which is the political challenge still facing NATO in Kosovo, and with Serbia in general. This must involve close coordination between the SACEUR and the Secretary-General, the Alliance’s chief political officer. Sometimes this coordination can break down temporarily, but without it the overall posture of NATO is weakened.

It also requires close coordination with such non-NATO political organizations as the United Nations (UN), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). But as U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott cautioned: “...we must be careful not to subordinate NATO to any other international body or compromise the integrity of its command structure. We will try to act in concert with other organizations, and with respect for their principles and purposes. But the Alliance must reserve the right and the freedom to act when its members, by consensus, deem it necessary.” The search for a Clausewitzian diplomatic solution, in fact, has brought back into the picture the role of the Security Council, even though NATO embarked on its anti-Serbian hostilities without consulting the UN. Obviously, the negotiating field today for NATO and for Clark and for his designated successor, Air Force General Joseph Ralston, is much larger than it was for Norstad, with more national and multinational “layers” adding complexity both politically and militarily.
Globalisation, Regionalisation and the History of International Relations

NATO’s post-Cold War political ideology, which to a considerable extent defines its mission, as Clausewitz noted, is rooted in the advocacy of liberal democracy, which means a balancing of the principle of political equality (equal membership) with inequality in national power (unequal participation). As has been pointed out earlier, for this reason, NATO decision-making has consisted of several categories or modes of participation in an effort to accommodate this power/political conundrum. In this respect, NATO’s post-Cold War emphasis that its members possess democratic political systems and embrace democratic values, conforms to what Professor Felix Oppenheim, a leading 20th century international law scholar claimed:

The progress of International Law is intimately connected with the victory everywhere of constitutional government over autocratic government, or, what is the same thing, of democracy over autocracy. Autocratic government, not being responsible to the nation it dominates, has a tendency to base the external policy of the State, just as much as its internal policy, on brute force and intrigue; whereas constitutional government cannot help basing both its external and its internal policy ultimately on the consent of the governed. And although it is not at all to be taken for granted that democracy will always and everywhere stand for international right and justice, so much is certain, that it excludes a policy of personal aggrandisement and insatiable territorial expansion, which in the past has been the cause of many wars.

In these respects, both Norstad and Clark share a common ideological commitment. Norstad was especially anxious to see a democratic Germany (perhaps not united immediately) rejoin the “family of nations,” and he was convinced that the means to bring this about was through NATO. Closer military integration throughout Western Europe, linked to the military power of the U.S., was what he strived for.

Certainly the NATO military intervention in Kosovo under Clark’s leadership fulfils Oppenheim’s criterion, even though it threatens the sacredness of the territorial imperative embodied in the international legal notion of sovereignty. The Kosovo intervention also appeals to the more recent international legal norm of humanitarian intervention.

The reintegration of a democratic Serbia (whether with or without Montenegro) into an international system of democratic states must surely have been the ultimate mission for Clark if he had remained SACEUR, and for NATO as a whole. If this were to be the case, then the SACEUR, as the pre-eminent military commander within the Alliance, will continue to play a leading role in assuring that this democratic political trend continues, is reinforced, and expands to all the corners of Europe.

For Clark as for all of his predecessors: “Regardless of the circumstances surrounding his appointment, it is clear [...] that each incumbent has had wide latitude in overcoming any initial liability and in setting his own mark on the office.” Clark was not one to suppress his view of his responsibilities to those of his own government, and in this important respect he and Norstad were alike, and both suffered the same fate.
Globalization and European Society

This paper will try to compare global social trends with convergences of European societies and European social transfers rather than to treat the European discourse on globalization or the rising dependencies of Europe from non-European social and cultural forces and vanishing European social and cultural autonomy.

The paper is based on the assumption that for a long time Europe was and still is a global player rather than a victim of globalization, but this assumption is not dealt with in detail. The paper treats three aspects of globalization and European society.

First it explores to what degree international convergences between European societies after World War II are due to global trends or due to particular European convergences.

Secondly it tries to find out to what degree the opening of national and regional European societies since 1945 was due to international global transfers or due to particular European transfers and what degree it has to be seen as a global opening or a European opening.

Thirdly the paper will explore to what degree the change of European particularities since 1945, i.e. the shift from a particular European family, specific European social classes, specific European work, specific urban trends, a specific European welfare state, specific European consumption, makes a crucial difference for globalization and European society. These rather general, but badly explored topics will be treated by choosing particular fields of European societies as examples.
Globalisation, Regionalization and the Military. The Evolution of NATO as a Military Organization

The Treaty, 1949-1950

Scholars examining the history of NATO usually make a distinction between the alliance formed by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and the organization structured after the Korean War in 1950. In brief, Korea put the “O” in NATO. This essay looks more closely into the distinctions between political alliance and military organization as NATO's history unfolded in its first fifty years.

For the most part the relationship was complementary, but at critical moments their paths diverged. Similarly, consensus prevailed most of the time among the member nations over the functions of NATO's military dimension, but this consensus was at times the result of pressures from the dominant ally, particularly in the first generation. In the latter years the “NATO” method was increasingly challenged as transatlantic differences became more pronounced. The changes over time offer an opportunity to judge just how significant the military character of NATO has been, what forms it has taken in the past, and where the symbiotic connections between the political and military aspects may take the organization in the future.

Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, military concerns were inextricably connected with the political alliance that the United States, Canada, and the members of the Western Union were trying to fashion in their Washington negotiations in the summer of 1948. It was not that any of the parties anticipated imminent Soviet invasion of Western Europe, although such fears did surface in February and March of that year when Czechoslovakia fell completely under Communist rule and Norway felt threatened by a Soviet proffer of a nonaggression pact reminiscent of Hitler's a decade before. Rather, the future partners worried about internal weaknesses in many of the West European nations that encouraged Communist subversion of the political process. The negotiations for an alliance centered partly on the immediate need of American assistance to the weak defense forces in those countries. More important was the vital need for a guarantee that should an attack be made on any one country the United States would come to its aid. The former concern was reflected in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the latter in the pledge of Article 5.

While the language of the treaty emphasized the military dimension the steps to implement it were political. Military assistance was designed primarily to cope with domestic violence from Communists within the country, and was initially of a modest size, hardly sufficient to outfit national armies in the manner of pre-World War II Europe. Such military capacity as the new organization had derived from American power. Given the diminished state of the military establishment after the massive demobilization in post-war America, the army was in no position to provide sufficient forces to repel a Soviet invasion. Indeed, the short-term plans emerging from the Pentagon in 1949 envisioned an abandonment of all Europe, except Britain. The only means the United States had to deal with potential Soviet aggression was through its possession of the atomic bomb.

The image circulating among the allies was that of American B-29s, armed with atomic bombs, prepared to strike with devastating force against any aggression from the Soviet Union.

The image was misleading. Given the limited number of bombs in the atomic arsenal and the equally limited means of delivering the bomb, the significance of the American commitment was primarily in the psychological lift it gave to disheartened Europeans. By abandoning a 150-year old tradition of nonentanglement, the United States gave its allies the sense, even if illusory, that the break with tradition alone could deter Soviet aggression. As General Omar Bradley observed, advance knowledge of American involvement in the event of war would avoid the misjudgments that ignited world conflict in 1914 and 1939.
But NATO from its inception was more than a psychological sop to lift European morale; it was conceived as a collective defense effort as Article 3 asserts: self-help and mutual aid “will develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” And, even more specifically in Article 5, “...an armed attack against one or more of them...” will set in motion action”...including the use of armed forces, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” The collective nature of such response as each nation would make was reflected in Article 9, which established “a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty.” Effectively, this article had the greatest impact on NATO's future; the O” was more than implicitly present in the charge to the Council to set up whatever subsidiary bodies that may be needed, and specifically and immediately “a defense committee” to implement relevant articles. NATO may not have possessed military power in 1949 but the infrastructure for its creation was in place from the outset.

In this context the Korean War accelerated rather than initiated the development. There were four meetings of the North Atlantic Council prior to that war, and in all of them defense preparations were at the center of the agendas. At the first session in September 1949, the Council established a Defense Committee that was instructed to draw up “unified defense plans for the North Atlantic area.” In turn, the Defense Committee would create a Military Committee, composed of Chiefs of Staff or their representatives, and “to facilitate the rapid and efficient conduct of the work of the Military Committee” a subcommittee, the Standing Group would coordinate and integrate defense plans originating in five regional planning groups. Significantly, the Standing Group consisted of representatives from the major NATO powers, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

To underscore the seriousness of the military mission the third meeting of the Council approved the Defense Committee’s recommendation for a strategic concept of an integrated defense3

The activities of the Council and its subsidiary committee should have been ample evidence to confirm the primacy of the military in the new organization. But there were elements of illusion in these flurries of activity, which suggest that the aim was more political than military, more psychological than practical. The strategic concept, for example, was essentially a cosmetic device imposed by the United States Congress as a prerequisite to the delivery of military assistance. It contained little substance; the European allies had to be content with supplying foot soldiers while American promised only strategic air power. This was an acceptable price in exchange for the assurance of America’s abandonment of its isolationist tradition. At a meeting of the Defense Committee in March 1950 the initial short term defense plan was replaced by a medium term plan that extended the defense line from Gibraltar to the Rhine.4 Again, there was little substance to this change.

An observer in 1950 would be justified in asserting that these activities obscured the reality that no actions were actually taking place. In London a Military Production and Supply Board should have been in close contact with the Defense Finance and Economic Committee in Rome, and both committees should have been providing information to serve the Military Committee in Washington, along with the products of the regional planning groups. There was little communication among these entities, and there was little need for it. The primary purpose of their existence prior to June 1950 was to maintain the morale of the allies. The military functions of the organization were subsumed the political imperatives.

Impact of the Korean War, 1950-1957

The Korean War forced a dramatic change in NATO. Before the year had ended U.S. appropriations for military aid had increased fourfold; the European members had made plans for an integrated military force under centralized command, with a German contribution; the United States had agreed to dispatch four divisions as its contribution to the defense of Europe; and –above all– NATO created a Supreme Allied Command under the leadership of General Dwight D. Eisenhower.5 All of these changes took place in the last six months of 1950, and they reflected a conviction that a divided Germany could invite a Communist invasion much as a divided Korea had tempted North Korea to invade the Republic of Korea. American forces in Japan under General Douglas MacArthur had prevented disaster in Asia. Only a similar and stronger NATO armies could prevent, if not deter,
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Communist attempts to unite the Germanies. Deterrence by means of America’s atomic power was insufficient, particularly when the Soviet were acquiring their own nuclear capabilities. Such was the reasoning behind the new military face of NATO.

More changes were made in 1951 to emphasize the alliance’s commitment to counter Soviet power on the ground. The older committees, such as the Military Production and Supply Board and Defense Finance and Economic Committee were given new names and were expected to work closely with the new headquarters in Paris. Their contributions were important to the costing as well as the production facilities of an ambitious military program NATO fashioned in 1951. The details were released at the Lisbon meeting of the Council in February 1952, and their scope would have been inconceivable two years before. They included the establishment of a civilian headquarters, the office of secretary-general, which would be located in Paris in close proximity to the military counterpart, the Supreme Allied Command, Europe (SHAPE). Greece and Turkey were granted admission to NATO, partly for the manpower Turkey’s military would supply, but mostly to complete SHAPE’s defense perimeter, filling in the southeastern flank.6

The most significant action taken in Lisbon was the projection of a large military force, some 50 divisions in readiness, 45 in reserve, all by the end of 1952. Indeed, by the end of 1954 the force levels should reach 96 divisions. There is no question that NATO after Korea was to be essentially a military organization, with the political role pushed into the background. It is noteworthy that the political officials over the next twenty years speaking for the allies were men of considerable distinction in their homelands—Ismay of Britain, Spaak of Belgium, Stikker of the Netherlands, and Brosio of Italy—but their title was that of secretary-general. By contrast, the military leaders, all American generals—Eisenhower, Ridgway, Gruenther, Ridgway, Norstad, and Lemnitzer—held the title of Supreme Allied Commander. This was true as well of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic—also invariably an American. What Lisbon underscored was the continuing domination of the United States in NATO affairs in the first generation. Given the low level of Europe’s preparedness in the 1950s, American leadership was necessary, even if increasingly heavy-handed.

The promise of Lisbon, however, never materialized. Western Europe still recovering from World War II could not afford the economic burden the Lisbon military build-up would require. The prospect of matching the number of divisions the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies was too daunting and too expensive. Lord Ismay, the first secretary-general, informed Churchill at the end of 1953 that “we had 18 M-Day facing 30 Russian M-Day divisions.”7 A few years later the difference was even more dramatic.

The American partner agreed. In retreating from the goal of 50 divisions, the United States in the Eisenhower years found a substitute in less costly nuclear weaponry, including tactical nuclear weapons. This substitution was acceptable to the European allies, despite concern that should a nuclear war break out, it would be fought on their soil. What comforted them was the assurance that American nuclear superiority would deter any Soviet aggression; the mantra was “massive retaliation” against any violation of allied territory. From an American perspective more was needed. Throughout Eisenhower’s administration the Supreme Allied Commanders did their best to convince the allies that effort should be made to build a conventional defense force, to at least have a “shield” of 30 divisions on the ground to hold off Soviet onslaught until the “sword” of nuclear could be wielded. In this way deterrence would be assured.8

The European allies preferred to rest under the American nuclear umbrella. NATO in the 1950s was in most respects an American military organization that permitted Europe to recover economically from the ravages of World War II. The cost of conventional armies or navies would interfere with the remarkable prosperity spreading through Europe. Moreover, conventional forces evoked memories of earlier wars and the kind of preparations SHAPE leaders were urging would force to deal with contingencies they wished to keep buried. Let massive American nuclear power serve as the deterrent.

The Critical Years, 1958-1966

The Soviet launching of the first earth satellite, Sputnik, in 1957 shocked and dismayed the alliance. If the Soviets could dispatch a satellite around the globe they could also aim intercontinental ballistic missiles as well. It meant that the United States would be as vulnerable to Soviet attack as Europe had been, and if this were so, would Europeans be able to depend on America’s commitment to Europe’s
defense? Would the United States act on Europe’s behalf if by so doing it would expose its own cities to Soviet retaliation? “Massive retaliation” would then be an empty phrase and the alliance might collapse in the face of overwhelming Soviet power. This change in Soviet-American relations led to the most dangerous crises of the Cold War as the United States in the early 1960s confronted its adversary in Berlin and in Cuba.

Ironically, the political functions of the alliance came to fore at the very time war appeared most imminent. After Sputnik the United States was required to give constant proofs of its pledge of 1949. The means were ostensibly military — placing nuclear stockpiles in Europe; mounting its own intercontinental ballistic missiles and accelerating the pace of their production; and dispatching intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Britain, Italy, and Turkey. Under the name of a multilateral force (MLF) the United States promoted the development of a seemingly independent European nuclear capability. These were striking examples of military action, nowhere more visibly expressed than in the refusal to accept the incorporation of West Berlin into Communist East Germany. Indeed, the number of American troops in Germany at the height of the Berlin crisis in the fall of 1961 exceeded 400,000 personnel, a figure that was not to be matched again during the Cold War.

But the military buildup between 1958 and 1962 intentionally obscured the objective of these activities: namely, to convince doubting Europeans that the United States had not fallen behind the Soviet adversary in its military capabilities, and that the United States commitment to its transatlantic allies was as strong as it ever been in the past. Such was the message in President Kennedy’s visit to West Germany in 1963. West Berlin was not literally under NATO’s guarantee, but if the allies succumbed to Soviet pressure to turn the city over to the German Democratic Republic, it would signal a retreat that could be fatal to the future of the alliance.

This effort was made all the more necessary because of the boasts General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev was making about Soviet nuclear superiority. Their implication was that America’s role as Europe’s protector had become hollow. But it was not only Khrushchev’s threats that disturbed the allies. President de Gaulle of France presented a political challenge that was potentially more daunting than Khrushchev’s posturing. The Soviet leader’s blustering assertions could be more easily discounted than de Gaulle’s “logical” assumption that it was not normal for any country to commit its resources and its troops to a common cause for an indefinite time, particularly when the benefactor was no longer invulnerable to attack. But more than testing the limits of American benevolence was involved in the 1960s. An economically recovered Europe really did not need America any longer, especially when he pointed out the exploitive nature of America’s control of Europe. He exposed the MLF as a sham, since the nuclear warheads on European nuclear weapons would remain under American control.

De Gaulle’s France ultimately left SHAPE, forced the departure of American and NATO forces from the country in 1966, and tried to establish Europe as a “third force” between the two superpowers. He failed to convince the allies that the United States was almost as dangerous a foe to Europe as the Soviet Union. But there was always some resonance to his call for European independence from the United States. This was inevitable. Even as the Kennedy administration tried to keep the alliance intact, its abandonment of the doctrine of massive retaliation in favor of “flexible response” raised once again European fears that the United States was turning away from its commitment to use nuclear weapons as the major deterrent to Soviet aggression. Flexible response was equated with preferring conventional defense to nuclear given the suicidal destructiveness of those weapons, while the European allies preferred to retain a low threshold of nuclear response. In other words the primary means of preventing attack would be a guarantee that nuclear weaponry would be employed.

The climax of the internal conflict in NATO apparently over strategy occurred at the Athens meeting of the North Atlantic Council in May 1962. There Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the dominant figure in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, made a case against excessive reliance on the nuclear weapon, and especially against Europeans developing their own nuclear capabilities, as France had done. His argument rested not only on the danger of this form of warfare but also on the ability of the United States to cope with a Soviet nuclear threat through its own powerful arsenal. He went on to urge the allies to increase conventional forces as an appropriate deterrent on the grounds that the much touted Warsaw pact superiority in numbers was exaggerated.

McNamara failed in his attempts to have Europeans make substantial increases of their military establishments, but he succeeded in countering de Gaulle’s efforts to decouple Europe from America.
The alliance and organization emerged intact from the storms of the 1960s. An examination of defense expenditures of the European members of NATO reveals a decline from the 1950s when the percentage reached 8.0 in 1953 to 5.7 in 1963 and then a steady though gradual decline to 4.1 in 1974. Throughout this twenty-five year period the American contribution was always between two and three percentage points higher than those of the European allies.\footnote{13}

Détente, 1968-1978

Europe's unwillingness to accept the United States position on conventional vs. nuclear forces did not indicate a transatlantic break. NATO, in fact, finally if reluctantly, accepted the doctrine of flexible response. But it is significant the Council's acceptance accompanied the acceptance as well of the influential Harmel Report on the future tasks of the alliance. This was the work of the smaller allies under the leadership of Belgium's foreign minister. The thrust of the report was that the defense function of NATO was no longer the alliance's preeminent raison d'être; détente with the Soviet bloc was to occupy an equal place among NATO's objectives.\footnote{14}

In retrospect, the ability of the smaller nations to win a consensus in the Council was a testament to the superiority of NATO's political role in NATO in the 1960s. Unlike in the 1950s, the allies could afford to air serious differences in their approach to defense because the threat perception from the Warsaw Pact had diminished after the Berlin and Cuban crises had passed. NATO solidarity and American dominance could be challenged after Europe had recovered its economic power and moved toward unification and after the Soviets no longer posed a serious menace to the security of Western Europe. The wrangling over flexible response in the early 1960s permitted the European partners to flex their muscles because the pall of imminent danger had been lifted. The Soviets may be hostile, their armies larger, but their ambitions were no longer the invasion of the West.

And as Europe prospered the prospects of Communist electoral victories in the West had similarly declined. If the Communism remained a challenge, it was to the American superpower competing for advantage in the Third World, not in Europe. NATO was essentially a political alliance with a diminished military purpose.

The result of the shift in focus was not massive demobilization of NATO's military arm. The Warsaw Pact's suppression in 1969 of Czechoslovakia's attempt to maintain a freer role within the Soviet sphere was a warning that complete normality in East-West relations had not been achieved. But while SHAPE was concerned about the implications of the Soviet exercise of its military might, the allies in general preferred to emphasize the Soviet assurance that no aggression against NATO was intended.

Movement toward détente then proceeded rapidly in the early 1970s. The Federal Republic which had been adamant about recognizing the legitimacy of the East Germany reached out to the Soviet Union to accept the permanency of the Oder-Neisse line separating East Germany from Poland. The United States, weakened by its experience in Vietnam, engaged in successful Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union. And NATO as a body entered into Mutual and Balanced Forced (MBFR) negotiations, addressing the downsizing of conventional forces. Presumably the crowning achievement of the early 1970s was establishment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) which sponsored the Helsinki Agreement of 1975. This essentially was a declaration of coexistence of East and West, a mutual recognition of the lines of demarcation drawn at Yalta thirty years before. In 1973 the Defense Planning Committee reflected the spirit within NATO as it welcomed the prospects of stable relations between East and West in the near future.\footnote{15}

In this environment NATO's military character emerged as a stabilizing factor but of distinctly less importance than the peacemaking functions of the alliance. Communism itself in the mid-1970s was seemingly respectable in Italy where under the name of "Eurocommunists" the Italian Communist party was prepared to enter government coalitions in support of NATO itself.

Cold War Redux, 1979-1985

Disillusionment set in, however, before the decade ended, although its manifestations were more American than European. Belatedly, the
Carter administration recognized that the Communist adversary was building up its missile capabilities at a time when the West was concentrating on détente. In the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council the allies “viewed with concern the high level of military expenditure in the Soviet Union and the continued disquieting expansion of the military power of the Warsaw Pact...” which “were difficult to reconcile with the avowed desire of the Soviet Union to improve East-West relations.” By the late 1970s NATO was forced to push the military role of the organization to the forefront once again. Arguably, a milestone was passed when the Council in December 1979 determined to counter the Soviet intermediate range missiles targeted against major centers in Western Europe with a new arsenal of theater nuclear weapons stationed in key Western European countries. But the goal of arms control was included in the communique, with its hope of restoring détente in Europe. Such were the dual track initiatives of 1979.

The linking of steps toward détente with increased defense expenditures came to fruition later in the 1980s, but not before relations between East and West plunged to levels only slightly less fractious than in the years of the Berlin and Cuban crises. Under the leadership of President Ronald Reagan NATO moved quickly back to a military track. He challenged the adversary with more than fiery rhetoric; the allies had agreed to a three percent annual increase in defense expenditures in 1980, but the Americans more than doubled this amount. Lip service was paid to détente in the form of a Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) purportedly to go beyond “limitation” talks. If the Soviets removed their nuclear weapons, the United States would not deploy their counterparts. This proposal was not acceptable to the Soviet leadership, as many skeptics had anticipated. The Soviet representatives left the negotiating table in 1983, assuming that the NATO publics would turn out governments that approved the stationing of the new missiles in selected member nations.

The Soviets miscalculated. The rejuvenated military emphasis of NATO assured electoral victories for the conservative governments of Britain and Germany in 1983. The old leaders of the USSR had to confront the effects of massive investment in nuclear weaponry, which would include a strategic defense initiative (Star Wars) that aspired to make the United States invulnerable to any missile attack. The cost of building such a system would be enormous, a factor that would force the adversary to spend more for its military than the Soviet economy could bear. In these moves the assumptions of the previous decade did not seem to apply. Diplomacy and détente yielded to military imperatives. The latter, however, did not simply replicate the military posture of the 1950s. Ground forces were not a priority. U.S. troop strength stabilized in the 200,000 range from 1980 to 1990, 100,000 fewer than in 1970 when détente was the focus of the alliance. The change was in the modernization of nuclear capabilities, particularly intermediate and short-range weaponry.

Détente Redux, 1985-1990

American determination to raise the level of nuclear competition disturbed many of the European allies as well as the Warsaw Pact adversaries. Reagan’s impetuosity might have brought on war while his infatuation with Star Wars could lead to a decoupling of the United States from Europe. Neither eventuality took place. A new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, took power in 1985 and led the way toward reform and reconciliation with the West. In the course of his reforms Gorbachev exposed the bankruptcy of the Communist system and inadvertently caused the destruction of the Soviet empire. His policy of opening the way to change created a chain reaction that included the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989 German unification, the implosion of the Soviet Union, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact followed in the next two years.

What did these sudden and dramatic changes mean for the future of NATO? Inevitably, observers predicted the end of the alliance, or at least of the organization in the post-Cold War 1990s. There was a level of collaboration with the new Russia that would have been inconceivable with the Soviet Union. It was manifested in the flurry of actions intended to minimize possibilities of a future nuclear conflict, and a serious effort to make START a reality. The Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (CFE), signed before the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact drastically the military establishments of both sides. Given the new relationship between East and West, what role did NATO have in the future?
After the Cold War, 1990---

The allies themselves flailed about for answers, with such possibilities as NATO serving as an arm of the United Nations, or subsuming its function within the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This was an umbrella organization created during the detente of the 1970s to bring together NATO and the Warsaw Pact. NATO’s deliberations resulted ultimately in the promulgation of a new strategic concept at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Rome in 1991. NATO was to become the crisis manager, preserving peace and stability in Europe. To fulfill this function the military component would be transformed from large armies confronting the former Warsaw Pact countries into small rapid deployment forces prepared at short notice to intervene in areas outside NATO territories where conflict could endanger the security of a member nation. An important by-product of the new concept was the rapid reduction of conventional forces and military budgets of all member nations. The United States presence in Europe was represented by 100,000 personnel; any further lowering of troop strength would render the American contribution ineffective.

The success of this new military function was still in question at the end of the decade. NATO’s intervention in the Balkans marked the only times NATO had engaged in military action, first in Bosnia in 1995 with UN sanction, and then in Kosovo in 1999 without UN approval. The unresolved situation in the Balkans remains a source of unease within NATO. Some allies are concerned over worsening relations with Russia with respect to NATO’s enlargement as well as Russian opposition over Kosovo. Others, particularly the French, are discontent with the American “hyperpower”, and seek a European defense entity to perform the functions of NATO. The United States is resentful over the burdens it bears in problems distant from its own security, and yet is suspicious of Europe’s interest in using NATO resources to organize its own military force. The foregoing tensions all seem to revolve around military problems and presumably involve military solutions. Such a judgment would be superficially accurate. NATO remains a military organization, and the security of its members requires the maintenance of SHAPE, no matter how limited its current missions may be. But the balance between political and military functions that had shifted once again to the former in the late 1980s Remained in place. NATO’s problems are primarily political, and as in so many times in the past they are also transatlantic. The United States’ vision of the alliance diverges more from that of its allies today than it had in the past. How long will the nation agree to stationing troops in Europe? How long will Europeans, as they work toward a united states of Europe agree to American predominance in the alliance? These are questions without answers in the year 2000. But despite the many centrifugal strains affecting the alliance as it moves into its second half-century there is a silent consensus that the alliance should not be disbanded. Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty offers an opportunity for any member to terminate its membership without difficulty. No member has chosen this path, including France and Greece which at different times dissociated themselves from the organization, not from the alliance. All members continue to agree that the psychological assurance that the treaty provided in 1949 is important to the security of their nations today. There is still a military role for NATO, but there is no military challenge that would make the alliance primarily a military organization.

Endnotes

5. NAC meeting, Brussels, 18-19 December 1950, ...Communiques,61-62.
12. Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, 6 May 1962, NATO ministerial meeting, Athens, restricted session, pp.12-13, Department of State Records, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Box 8, RG 59, NARA, Washington, DC.
15. Defense Planning Committee meeting, Brussels, 7 June 1973, ibid, 290.
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Globalisation, Regionalisation and the History of International Relations

Sean Kay

Department of Politics and Government, Ohio Wesleyan University
Delaware, USA

Security Regionalization In The New Europe. International Institutions And Balkan Crises

Introduction And Overview

European security lies at the crossroads of globalization and regionalization. As many international issues have become globalization such as human rights, regional solutions have become popular. At the theoretical and policy level, Europe has served as both a model for regionalization of security and presented serious contradictions. Europe is the region of the world with the most institutionalized security dynamics with its many formal international organizations highlighted by the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Yet in spite of the presence of such institutions, European security still remains in doubt. This essay tests whether European security institutions have responded as promised to new security challenges. It uses three case studies - Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1991-1995, Albania in 1997, and the Kosovo war of 1999 to show that Europe's traditional security institutions, even after ten years of post-Cold War adaptation, are at risk in terms of the ability or willingness of member states to utilize them to their full potential.

Institutions And Security Regionalization

Europe is, of course, a very distinct geographic region. Now largely undivided politically between East and West, the continent has made dramatic steps toward post-Cold War reconciliation. However, within Europe there is also a clearly distinguishable core and periphery between stability and instability. It is at this periphery where the continent struggles to expand its identity within a global context. Generally, European officials have seen security as part of an increasingly complex network of interdependence and linkages among issues. No longer is security seen in merely state versus state terms. Global issues such as economic, environmental, and perhaps most significantly, human rights priorities have come to the forefront for managing post-Cold War European security.

Just as Europe is a crossroads of globalization, Europe is also conflicted on how to manage its new security priorities. Having empowered international institutions to manage regional conflicts, states in Europe must now consider how well equipped are they to live up to their new mandates? International institutions are defined, at the conceptual level, as being persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behavior roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations through international regimes and organizations such as the EU, the OSCE, and NATO. Institutions are characterized by the principles, norms rules and decision-making procedures around which state expectations converge in a given issue area.

When assessing the relationship between institutions and security it is useful to assess specific institutional tasks; organizational capacity; norms, principles, rules, and procedures; and capacity for change in the larger context of security outcomes. The case studies addressed in this essay demonstrate that there is a large persistent gap in contemporary regional institutions in Europe between the goals and capabilities necessary for crisis management in the Balkans. Conversely, there is slightly greater promise in the area of long-term peacekeeping.

There is considerable debate within the scholarly literature over the relevance and role of international institutions. Some scholars argue that institutions play a positive role in increasing international security. Institutions are thought to have power in that they can make international cooperation easier to attain that it would be in their absence. Institutionalized multilateral cooperation, conducted over time, is thus thought to become the norm as states are socialized into new patterns of security behavior. Security would thus be enhanced because states will have a greater opportunity to learn about each other and their intentions. Though most institutionalists recognized the impact of state interests, they generally see state interests and institutions working in concert to produce positive international outcomes. Thus, the shadow of the future and the uncertainty of anarchy in the international system allow for an environment in which international institutions both embody and affect state expectations. Regarding Europe, one leading institutional scholar concluded: "If the theories of institutions have any validity, the rich tapestry of institutions should both constrain states, through the operation of rules, and provide them with opportunities without positing the threats to other states that are so characteristic of realist anarchy." 

Institutionalist literature has successfully described the dominant trends in European security. Europe’s major institutions have been adapted by states who believe that by altering institutional mandates and expanding the roles of existing organizations, they will advance their national interests. Institutional thinking has been clearly reflected in the language of policymakers on a host of issues - for example in terms of lowering the transaction costs of multilateral institutional planning for peacekeeping and NATO enlargement. Indeed, NATO enlargement was both sold to allied publics and implemented in almost purely institutional terms with little attention to hard security guarantees to new members or actual threats which ranged from nuclear proliferation to instability in NATO’s southern region.

Yet in spite of both the increased theoretical and policy attention to Europe’s security institutions, the track record to date does not support the basic assumption that institutions necessarily increase security. There are three relevant test cases in Europe in the 1990s since the process of institution-building began: Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, Albania in 1997, and Kosovo in 1999. Each case shows that attributes of international institutions not only failed to increase security in an independent manner - they occasionally did worse. At the moment of crisis, international institutions became obstacles to conflict resolution and actually exacerbated international crises. While institutions have performed reasonably well in post-crisis activity such as peacekeeping, serious doubts persist about the efficacy of international institutions in the new Europe. This conclusion supports the general case of realist scholars such as John J. Mearsheimer who conclude that international institutions are at best intervening dynamics in security relations - and at worst promote a false sense of national security. To date, institutionalist literature has suffered from being overly descriptive and has not focused enough on specific outcomes of institutional procedures to test propositions about security relationships among states within an institutional context. As the Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, and Kosovo cases show, considerable work remains to be done before the promise of international institutions can be adequately shown to be fulfilled.

341 For more detailed discussion of each issue in an institutional context, see Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).
From 1991-1995, Europe embarked on a concerted effort to build an amalgamated form of collective security based on interlocking institutions. This was a period of considerable institutional activity. However, the United Nations (UN), the EU, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE - renamed OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] in 1995), and NATO were unable to prevent or end war in the Balkans. Some 250,000 people were killed or went missing in the Balkan wars. Europe's institutions proved unable to manage the continent's worst conflict since World War II. While they eventually contributed to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the capacity of international institutions to enhance long-term security was seriously limited.

Prior to 1995, the UN and EU had the lead role in this region. However, the UN's primary contribution ended up being to enforce an arms embargo that yielded more power to the Serb forces who had become most responsible for a growing humanitarian disaster in the region. The EU took the lead in brokering cease-fires and its members provided the bulk of peacekeeping forces into the region - but the ceasefires yielded no peace to keep. By 1995, the member states of Europe's primary institutions - especially NATO - realized that their failure to act was undermining institutional credibility. Thus by 1995, NATO embarked first on a limited air campaign, which supported Croatian and Muslim troop advances against Serbs on the ground combined with a major peace initiative that led to the introduction of NATO peacekeeping troops - first as an implementation force (IFOR) and then subsequently as a stabilization force (SFOR).

Despite NATO's intervention, its decision to engage fully came four years after the bloodshed began in the Balkans. Even genocide in the heart of Europe could not mobilize the NATO members to respond effectively in or outside the institutional setting. Without shared national interests or independent capabilities, institutions promoted a false sense of security and institutional action in Brussels and New York became confused with positive security outcomes on the ground in the Balkans. Nevertheless, by late 1995, NATO did use a combination of power and diplomacy to bring about a cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina which has been sustained with the ongoing presence of NATO troops on the ground. NATO's institutional attributes did enhance the peace in two key ways.

First, NATO planning substantially lowered the transaction costs of forming and maintaining a peacekeeping coalition to facilitate the agreed separation of the Croats, Muslims, and Serbs. The Dayton accords, reached during the autumn of 1995, depended on a rapid deployment of peacekeeping forces - which only NATO could adequately supply. This immediate intervention was possible because of two years of institutional planning in NATO. NATO was essential to promoting reassurance so the warring parties could commit to peace. By organizing 60,000 troops for IFOR, NATO demonstrated that it had evolved to become more flexible and adaptive in its missions. NATO could field new and creative command structures and facilitate the use of power. While still fundamentally an instrument of states, NATO made the implementation of a collective decision easier to attain than it would have been in the absence of the institution.

Second, through NATO's outreach programs to Central and Eastern Europe - the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PFP) - NATO integrated nonmember countries into its military planning for peacekeeping operations based on Article 4 consultation. A better understanding of the capabilities available for multinational peacekeeping lowered the transaction costs of planning and reduced the danger that command and control confusion could harm this multinational coalition. NATO's coordination of IFOR included 10,000 personnel from PFP countries. The provision of non-NATO forces was politically significant, as domestic constraints limited the amount of forces the US was willing to commit to Balkan security. NATO's new institutional characteristics thus helped make it possible for its leading member to provide only one-third of the forces. Additionally, IFOR and SFOR would feed back on the PFP process. Operational experience helped partners better define and refine their own security needs in the context of their relationship with NATO.

Ultimately, NATO's capacity to help Bosnia-Herzegovina move from a situation of peace to one of lasting security was, nevertheless, seriously limited. The removal of NATO from the region would once again expose the weakness of other institutions such as the EU and the OSCE. The most important lesson of NATO's contribution to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina was that the alliance was successful only when the US was fully engaged. NATO could exchange information and facilitate multinational planning for peacekeeping, but this could be implemented only with US leadership. In practice and in
security outcomes, NATO as an institution had proven itself to be a dependent variable - dependent up on the exertion of power by its leading member - the United States.

Albania

In spring 1997, Albania collapsed into anarchy following a myriad of complex economic crisis culminating in the collapse of a nation-wide pyramid investment scheme. As much as $1 billion of personal savings may have been lost in a country with a population of about 3.2 million people. When the government could not protect these investments, the state collapsed. Rebel groups and individuals hoarded weapons from abandoned state institutions, and refugees fled to nearby Italy - likely more than sixteen thousand by April 1997. Due to their proximity, EU and NATO members Italy and Greece were immediately affected by the refugee crisis and sought to activate Europe’s principal security institutions into action. Both NATO and the EU refused to use military capabilities to intervene in Albania. The EU faced strong opposition from its northern members and NATO faced the same regional opposition plus that of the United States. The United States and its leading European allies were unwilling to let their institutions engage in Albania because they perceived their interests as low and the risks too high. This institutional breakdown was a serious blow to the idea that the mere presence of institutions would increase security.343

With refugees flowing in from Albania, Italy opted not to let the failure of NATO or the EU to decrease its national security. Italy identified Albania as a threat to regional security and attained a United Nations mandate to lead an extra-institutional “coalition of the willing” into Albania - known as Operation Alba. The irony of Operation Alba is that it succeeded in spite of the absence of international institutions. Had Italy waited for Europe’s primary security institutions, its security interests would not have been met. However, by assuming an extra-institutional leadership function, Italy successfully sustained a clear mandate and its own rules of engagement for the eleven state coalition; sustained a functional lead-state command and control; and most significantly, avoided any institutional vetoes from member states of institutions who sought to shape the outcome of the mission. Italy had a free hand and over a three month period, succeeded in its mission of stabilizing Albania.

After the crisis period settled, Europe’s security institutions did assume a role in Albania with mixed results. NATO played an important post-crisis role through its Partnership for Peace program responding to a request from a newly elected Albanian government to assist in rebuilding national armed forces. NATO engaged by sending fact-finding teams to Tirana to identify requirements for assistance and to prioritize them on the basis of information shared by Albanian officials. From October 1997 through January 1998 NATO had sent twelve expert teams to work on military rebuilding. In the process, NATO discovered that thousands of tons of unexploded munitions remained in the open at various unprotected sites. Thus NATO responded in March 1999 with a program for munitions disposal through which Albanian military crews would begin clearing eleven major “hot spots” where live ammunition was exposed on the ground. This program was a direct beneficiary of training and equipment that the reconstructed Albanian armed forces received via the Partnership for Peace.

The European Union through its (then) security arm the Western European Union (WEU) played an important though incomplete role after Operation Alba. After sending a fact-finding mission to Albania in April 1997, WEU member states approved a mandate for the creation of the WEU-run Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE), whose mission was finalized in June 1997. The MAPE was to assist in rebuilding the Albanian police via modernization and training. The program, whose presence is ongoing provides up to 170 personnel. Programs involving WEU members, associate members, and observer countries focus on creating working procedures in main police directorates; organizing new local police structures; training officers at all levels; and assisting public information programs. Through the MAPE, legal advisers helped to design proposals for a state police law and general regulations for judicial police. The MAPE provides basic training to the Albanian police force and evaluates the need for specialized programs at centers in Tirana and Durres. MAPE representatives conducted specialized training in criminal investigation, traffic control, border policing, and public order.

maintenance. They also facilitated equipment and infrastructure support for the Albanian police. While the MAPE did not necessarily create the highest quality police in Albania, the program was an important institutional response to a long-term public security need with regional implications. The fact, though, that the program did not go far enough was demonstrated during the Kosovo conflict of spring 1999 when Kosovar refugees streamed into Albania. Refugee camps which sprang up in Albania were policed largely by criminal gangs, with little authority asserted by the Albanian government.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe maintained a profile throughout the Albanian crisis as the principal coordinating organization for international engagement - as a regional institution under the United Nations framework. The OSCE assumed primary responsibility for democratization, media and human rights issues, and election preparation and monitoring. With representatives on the ground in Albania throughout Operation Alba, OSCE officials prepared the country for nationwide elections. Along with the EU, the OSCE promoted a Friends of Albania forum, which contributes to coordination of international financial, humanitarian, and technical assistance to Albania. In early 1998, the OSCE mandate was expanded to include border monitoring between Albania and Kosovo as events in nearby Yugoslavia deteriorated. Subsequently, the OSCE played a complementary role bolstering the infrastructure that prevented Albania from collapsing under the strain of the Kosovar refugee exodus of 1998-1999. Nevertheless, an official report of an OSCE observer mission filed in November 1998 concluded that “the security situation in Albania is still precarious and raises concerns...The government does not have full control over the whole country.”

Yet in spite of these short-comings in a relatively benign environment, the OSCE was soon tasked to place unarmed peace observers next door in the highly explosive Kosovo in fall 1998.

Kosovo

Kosovo was the most signposted crisis of the 1990s. Scholarly and government experts had been warning for nearly ten years that Kosovo was the most critical tinderbox of the Balkan region. Yet when ethnic cleansing broke out in 1998 with Serbs targeting the 90 percent Albanian population in the region and with a growing Kosovo Liberation Army seeking independence for the territory - Europe's institutions were unprepared to act. Through 1998 NATO engaged in an ongoing period of threatening the Serbs in Yugoslavia to cease and desist ethnic cleansing but without action. Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic calculated that 'a village a day keeps NATO away.' Though the OSCE was installed into Kosovo in autumn 1998, its observer mission was a weak substitute for the force of the international community and by late winter 1999, Kosovo had descended into a nightmare of mutual attacks between Serbs and Albanians. Having taken the lead in threatening force against the Serbs, NATO became the organization to manage an escalating crisis culminating in Operation Allied force beginning on 24 March 1999.

NATO showed itself to be far from the transformed institution for peace in the new Europe that its member states political leaders had regularly declared during the 1990s. Indeed, NATO nearly lost the war. NATO's military forces worked to the best of their ability in a highly politicized and operationally constrained environment, producing the most precise and lowest collateral damage air campaign in history. No aircrews were lost, and Yugoslav forces retreated. However, at the political level, NATO fell short in its most important institutional function - efficient multinational military planning and operations.

NATO's political leaders believed that several days of bombing would force Milosevic to negotiate a peace. Therefore, the allies conducted a graduated air campaign. NATO as an institution had not successfully absorbed the lessons of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which air power was combined with a Croat and Muslim ground offensive. Limited airpower did coerce the Serbs to negotiate in 1995, but only when combined with ground pressure. Yet NATO political leaders denied their military this essential tool. When the war began, US President Bill Clinton declared that "I do not intend to put our troops into Kosovo to fight a war." NATO thus ceded the timing of victory to the enemy.

NATO’s political and military strategy allowed the Serbs to evacuate and move targets, and to formulate a political goal of dividing the NATO allies. When, prior to the air campaign, Italian Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema asked President Clinton what would happen if air strikes failed, Clinton had no answer. NATO military plans for operations against Serbia dated back to mid-1998. However, when NATO military officials sought political authorization to update their options in case NATO air attacks were unsuccessful, they were rebuffed. If Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Wesley K. Clark insisted on considering the consequences of failure of the initial air campaign, there might not have been any authorization for a war at all.

NATO’s initial plan was to use military punishment in an escalating manner to deter an attack by 40,000 Serb forces on Albanians known as ‘Operation Horseshoe.’ However, to begin the air campaign, NATO evacuated OSCE observers who had been in Kosovo since fall 1998. This opened the ground for Serb forces to move freely. Officials from the US Joint Chiefs-of-Staff had warned that, without a ground threat, the air campaign would not deter attacks on Kosovo Albanians. US intelligence officials warned that the air campaign was likely to exacerbate a refugee crisis and strengthen the Serb regime in Belgrade.

NATO reasonably concluded that Operation Horseshoe was inevitable and blame for the exodus lay with Belgrade. However, if NATO expected the crisis, why did it not prepare for refugees instead of scrambling to provide emergency relief so as to stabilize Albania and Macedonia? Since a spread of the war to Albania and Macedonia was the greatest risk, this planning gap made NATO ineffective in battle because its members failed to anticipate any other scenarios than immediate success.

NATO’s promise of efficient planning of multilateral operations was undermined by political constraints on military planning and operations. Some senior military officials suggest that it would have been preferable for NATO not to be politically engaged in the war at all, but rather serve as a mandating organization for a coalition of the willing. During the conflict, senior NATO military planners openly expressed deep frustration with the way the war was fought. For example, the commander of NATO’s air operations noted:

As an airman, I would have done this differently...It would not be an incremental air campaign or a slow buildup, but we would go downtown from the first night...so that on the first morning, the influential citizens of Belgrade gathered around Milosevic would have awakened to significant destruction and a clear signal from NATO that we were taking the gloves off.

Three weeks into the air campaign - which US and NATO officials had assumed would only take several days - the Yugoslav air defense system remained largely in place and nearly one million Albanians had fled Kosovo. Ultimately, to win this humanitarian war, NATO was forced to act with less than humanitarian means including the targeting of civilian infrastructure around Belgrade. NATO ultimately did what its military commanders wanted to do from day one, but it took the institution three months to get there.

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350 Based on interviews, US Department of Defense, summer 1999.
Conclusion

The cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, and Kosovo demonstrate that the promise of international institutions remains largely unfulfilled. In fact, institutions became tools of states either to delay action in Bosnia-Herzegovina, block action in Albania, and dilute the effectiveness of action in Kosovo. To date, such institutional activity has let to relatively low costs. Despite the tragedy of the Balkans, there are no major defections from European security cooperation organized within institutions. No one is quitting NATO - for example - but rather more are seeking to get in and Russia has utilized its contacts within NATO to seek outcomes in the alliance favorable to its own interests. However, two major regional trends within the European region do bear serious watching. Operation Alba succeeded in spite of, and in some ways because of, the lack of institutional involvement. This precedent has not been lost on other countries in the Balkan region as Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Italy plan to create a standing multinational brigade and Italy plans to create a standing multinational brigade available for regional crisis management. Such an approach may create informal subregional solutions to crises that increasingly make regional international institutions less significant. Moreover, another regional institution emerged after the Kosovo conflict determined to take a new lead - and independent role in European security - the European Union. Europe’s institutions have not performed as scholars and policymaker hoped as the realist critique has returned to dominate the debate in Europe. This is not to conclude that the promise of institutions in Europe cannot be met. However, it does mean that considerable more work needs to be done both at the scholarly and policymaking level.
Three World Wars: Australia and the Global Implications of Twentieth Century Wars

On 21 June 1950 Australia's top defence planning body, the Council of Defence, assembled in Canberra for conference with Britain's Chief of Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir William Slim. The Council of Defence was an amalgam of leading Cabinet members and Australia's top defence personnel, and it met with Slim to consider the gravity of the Cold War crisis and its implications for Australians. It was mid-century (almost exactly), some fifty years since Australian federation and eight years since the Japanese began their assault on Papua New Guinea, an attack which was seen as the greatest external threat yet to Australia.

Slim wanted agreement from the Australians that Europe and the Middle East were the most crucial theatres to hold in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. More specifically, he wanted the Australians to agree to send an expeditionary force to help defend British airbases in the Middle East. Interestingly, he prompted something of a collective excursion into the history of Australia at war. Robert Menzies, Prime Minister said, 'The Middle East has been an Australian theatre now in two wars. We raised and sent the 2nd AIF to it and it was our primary preoccupation until Japan entered the war'. His Chief of General Staff, Sidney Rowell, added, 'We did right to help out in M. East in [the] last war, and [the] situation now resembles this'; while another Cabinet member suggested that the situation was in fact 'more comparable to [the] first world war than to [the] second.'

From the detailed notes taken of this meeting, Slim seemed both pleased and surprised at the historical turn the conversation took. He encouraged the Australians to assume that war with the Soviet Union would be global, and he pointedly reminded them of how the British empire might unravel should the Middle East not be held. If this happened, he said, 'it may open the route to Africa, finish cooperation by Pakistan and India, cut the sea route through the Mediterranean and deny to us oil resources which may be essential to the prosecution of this war.' Menzies agreed, adding that the Russians were also students of history: 'If they take note of the lessons of past history their aim must be to knock us out in the early period of the war.'

This episode, I think, illustrates well the paradigmatic problems historians of Australia in the world have faced. In the global crisis of the late 1940s-early 1950s, a crisis which resembled the beginning of a third world war according to Menzies, leading policy-makers were quick to think globally and to envisage their involvement in terms of global strategic dictates. When war comes, Australians get in ships and sail to the Middle East. They had done it in two previous world wars and in the early 1950s they would agree to do so again. The events of the 1940s, including declarations of the new importance of the United States for security in the Pacific, and ratification of a statute conferring legal independence for Australia, had not disturbed the pattern of what Australians did when global war broke out.

The June 1950 talks therefore present a problem for those who would chart ascendant nationalism or independence in Australia's international relations. For such commentators, it has to be an interregnum, an aberration or an imperial hangover in a story of progressive change for the better. But, as I will argue further, it does not seem like an aberration. The big problem with the independence/nationalism line of inquiry is that it tends to appropriate the consequences of the two world wars through the selective blend of national sacrifice and highlighted moments of self-consciousness. The soul-searching and shock resulting from more than 58,000 deaths in Europe and the

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353 Ibid.
Middle East in the first world war, when the population stood at a mere 5 million, and the prospect of a worst nightmare coming true in the second world war with the apparent likelihood of Japanese invasion, contains a tempting teleology. Australians must have grown more conscious of their distinctive national interests in the South Pacific, and more sensitive to changes in their region.

The three main propositions in this paper suggest another way of viewing the history of Australia in international affairs. The first is that Australian policy-makers were, from the moment of federation and even earlier, deeply interested in change in their region. Secondly, they were equally conscious that their security in their region depended on the fate of European empires in the global order, especially of course the British empire of which Australia was a proud member and which maintained the Royal Navy, Australians' main source of regional protection in the first half of the century. The third proposition is that the world wars, as interpreted by key Australian policy-makers, did not undermine this situation so much as throw it into even sharper relief.

**Australians and their Region in the Global Order**

One the pioneers in the history of early Australian perceptions of and contacts with Asia, Neville Meaney, writes that the question of how to relate Europe to Asia was, from the start, the central issue in Australian foreign policy.²⁵⁴ Coping with Asia was a major theme from the outset even if the idea of engaging with Asia has a decidedly patchy history for much of the twentieth century. Australians, for example, insisted quickly on varying the dominant British nomenclature of the 'Far East' to account for their own perspective on the Asia-Pacific region. Between 1909 and the outbreak of the second world war prominent Australians ventured descriptions ranging from the 'Near East' and 'Far North' to the more apposite conflation, 'Near North', a description Prime Minister Menzies used in 1939 when the threat from Japan seemed imminent.²⁵⁵

At the same time, Australian ministers were always acutely sensitive to the global implications of their being part of the project that was the British empire. They were very conscious of the tension between far-flung imperial responsibilities and their own concrete needs for security in the Pacific. In 1910 Minister of Defence George Pearce reminded his fellow parliamentarians that while the British empire had long been Australians' source of protection, their connection with it entailed the possibility that they could, at any time, find themselves at war with an enemy who had no designs on Australia.²⁵⁶ Australian involvement in imperial battles was also a picture that London also sketched, stressing that it was only with the strongest empire effort that the Royal Navy would be able to carry out its many tasks. Imperial defence plans implied mutual help. The more unified the empire, the better able it was to protect distant frontiers. The consequences of a stretched empire for Australian defence was therefore one of the most worrying unknowns informing Australian foreign and defence policy for more than half of the century.

Not surprisingly then, most of the Australian initiatives towards stronger regional defence before the First World War incorporated the empire. Instead of merely contributing financially to the maintenance of the Royal Navy, Prime Minister Alfred Deakin suggested the creation of an independent Australian Navy and, more radically, the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the western Pacific. Australia's separate navy was born soon afterwards, but closer association with the Americans through an extended Monroe Doctrine was an idea that sank quickly, if not completely. Importantly, both outcomes were very much the product of Anglo-Australian negotiations.²⁵⁷

The great problem for Australians during the first two decades of the century was that Britain was allied by treaty with Japan, the source of most Australian anxiety. This treaty was, according to


³⁵⁶ Pearce, 18 August 1910, in Ibid, p. 192.

Whitehall, meant in part to benefit Australia. It was intended to take the strain off the Royal Navy in its mammoth roving brief, thereby enabling it to be more effective when it counted. Instead, it probably prompted more Australian probing of imperial strategy than had it not been struck.³⁵⁸

At the end of the first world war, some Australians were still calling for a more generous Monroe Doctrine, and therefore direct American involvement in Australian security.³⁵⁹ And later, in the mid-to-late 1930s, Australians made a comprehensive case for a Pacific pact, linked to the League of Nations Charter and ideally involving the British, Americans, Japanese, Russians and other European powers such as France and the Netherlands, with strong interests in the region. The proposal was considered seriously in foreign capitals around the world but did not enjoy enough support to get off the ground. London's cool response was consistent with its earlier reactions to Australians venturing thoughts on improving their security in the Pacific: sympathetic, but knowing better given the complexities of international politics at the time.

There were some half-chances for Australians to promote regional thinking and become more involved in strengthening links with Asia and across the Pacific. The 1930s was a period in which restrictive trading patterns and a depressed world economy stimulated forms of regionalism in east Asia. Japanese activity on the Asian mainland had a strong economic as well as a military dimension, the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere being fleshed out, and plans developed for its full realisation. Not surprisingly, Australians had not such grand vision of regional trade, especially not a regionalism dominated by Japan, but they did enjoy healthy bilateral trade with Japan. Even these were sacrificed, though, when number one trading partner, Britain, seemed threatened. Between mid-1936 and early 1938 the Australians imposed severe restrictions on Japanese imports (mainly textiles), and the other major trading nation bordering the Pacific, the United States (mainly motor chassis). In the case of Japan, the trade diversion was particularly short-sighted given that Australia enjoyed a very favourable balance of trade with Japan, which had in fact become the Australians' second best customer for major produce. British textiles exporters were the main beneficiaries. As one observer has put it, the policy amounted to sacrificing the interests of the second best customer in order to protect those of the best customer, Britain, and hope for even more custom from Britain.³⁶⁰

It was only really in the late 1940s that an Australian government, the Labor government of Ben Chifley, gave serious thought to Australian involvement in regional cooperative diplomacy. This was made possible partly because the Chifley government had watched closely and had become involved in Indonesia's bloody struggle for independence from the Dutch; and they were ready to contemplate the ending of European empires in the region. There was also a personality factor. Chifley had struck some rapport with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru during the complex negotiations leading to India's retaining membership of the Commonwealth in 1949 while introducing a republican constitution. In the same year Australia sent representatives to an essentially regional meeting in New Delhi to discuss Indonesia and possibilities for further regional meetings. And just before Chifley lost office and the decade ticked over his government was pondering ways of making helping make Southeast Asia a buffer between Australia and the rest of Asia through measures such as education and technical aid and other development-related assistance.³⁶¹

Two things curbed this line of thinking severely, the first being the arrival of a new Menzies government not as prepared as Labor to contemplate the region drained of civilising European influence; and the second was the re-emergence of world war as a dominant way of viewing change in world affairs.

³⁵⁸ Ibid
³⁵⁹ eg Prime Minister Billy Hughes in parliament, 10 September 1919: Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol LXXXIX, p. 12172.
³⁶¹ Lowe, Menzies and the 'Great World Struggle', pp. 36-37.
World Wars

It is little wonder that the three world wars locked regional thinking into the most imperial and most global of gazes. Compared to previous wars, the first world war was of course extraordinary for its parameters - all of the major powers involved, and many of the smaller ones - its duration, its extravagant use of vast transport and weapons industries, its destruction of property, and the appalling loss of life, mostly European men, numbering nearly 10 million. Its magnitude left a deep imprint on the generation which lived through it. The war ended with the creation of the first codified international body designed to mediate disputes and uphold the rule of international law. Whatever its limitations as a source of collective security, the League was a fillip to an emerging internationalism which grew during the century through increasing activity across national boundaries in legal, humanitarian, economic and cultural spheres.\textsuperscript{362}

The second world war involved even more nations. Air power now enabled more constant and easy transgression of national boundaries, and aerial bombardment and the concept of total war made mockery of the distinction between soldiers and citizens. Of the 50 million killed, at least half were civilians. Almost as many were uprooted as refugees in Europe, and not all were able to return to their pre-war homelands. Nazi ideology targeted Jews and Slavs, and in the case of Jews almost brought about their destruction as a group, killing six million. The war ended with the creation of a world organisation, the United Nations, intended to reform the international system which had allowed war to occur. It also ended with the dropping of two atomic bombs, signalling a new high-point in space-time compression, an absurd level of disproportion between the use of weapons and human suffering, and the prospect of human self-destruction.

The long Cold War bears few of the characteristics of the earlier world wars, save that, by 1950 at the latest, it was global in character. The early Cold War, however, from 1948 to 1952-53, was remarkable for how it was widely seen as resembling the eve of another world war. From 1948, Australians were treated to a stream of forboding British analyses of the Soviet threat. The Chifley government tried to maintain a distinction between the Cold War polarity in Europe and more multi-faceted problems in Southeast Asia, but the global logic of Cold War was formidable, and was positively embraced by the Menzies government sworn at the end of 1949. By the middle months of 1950, both before and after the outbreak of the Korean War, leading British and American policy-makers began employing even more climactic metaphors, arguing that the time was fast approaching when had to take a stand and fight communism squarely. Menzies, as noted earlier, agreed.\textsuperscript{363}

And Australian Prime Minister Menzies did more than merely speak in terms of history lessons. He doubled the defence budget as a percentage of domestic product, he introduced a big, expensive national service program for 18-year old men, he led Cabinet into agreeing to send troops and aircraft again to the Middle East when war broke out, and he commenced stockpiling and gearing the economy for war.\textsuperscript{364} His Chief of General Staff made ambitious promises about how many troops would be available to travel to the Middle East on the basis that universal trainees had joined up in droves when the First World War had broken out. The trainees of the early 1950s would surely do the same.\textsuperscript{365}

Australians fought in all three of these world wars, if we include involvement in the Korean War and preparations to safeguard defence of the Middle East in the early 1950s. Leading Australian politicians saw the world wars as having huge implications not only for western civilisation but also for their own pocket of western civilisation trying to keep the uncivilised regional peoples out. Returning from a visit to Britain in 1916 Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes reminded his countrymen and women that the mighty issues involved in the war would determine the future of the world, including Australia. He


\textsuperscript{363} See Lowe, \textit{Menzies and the 'Great World Struggle'}, pp. 29-30, 43-44.

\textsuperscript{364} Ibid, pp. 80-99, 128-51.

\textsuperscript{365} Rowell memo for McBride, 'Citizen Military Forces - Survey', 28 February 1952, CRS A5954 item 2291/4, AA.
urged Australians to remember that they had sheltered from the horrors of the war beneath the 'widestretched wings' of the British Navy, and told them to look again at their maps:

So far from being far removed from the busy hive of men we live almost within hail of its greatest populations. We have nailed 'White Australia' to the top of the mast. Yet we are but a tiny drop in a coloured ocean. We are 5,000,000 of white people claiming to hold inviolate a great continent which would maintain 100,000,000 and we live almost within coo-ee of a thousand millions of coloured people, who jostle one another for want of room.\textsuperscript{366}

Apart from his ugly racism, characteristic of many in the English-speaking world at the time, Hughes's warning highlighted existing key features of Australia in the world. Australians were constantly measuring British declarations about the Royal Navy's capabilities against what they, the Australians, thought they might be capable of when tested in several oceans at the same time. They were very practised, even before the first world war, at considering how wars might cross boundaries or have consequences for several spheres of influences. Global war accentuated this global-regional interdependence rather than transforming Australians' concepts of international power and competition.

This was also the case in Australian anticipations of world war. Australians were amongst the keenest appeasers of Germany and Japan during the second half of the 1930s. Senior politicians and advisers had studied Hitler's rise to power carefully and had divided over whether revision of the Treaty of Versailles would satisfy the new Germany. By late 1937 most felt that dealing with Hitler would have to involve either substantial territorial concessions, at the expense of central Europe, or rearmament and declarations of intent to take up arms. It was the appeasers, led by Prime Minister Joe Lyons and then Attorney-General Menzies, who won out in Australian debates. In the months leading up to the Munich agreement of September 1938 the Australian Cabinet moved quickly to separate the Sudetenland issue from the bigger issue of Czechoslovakia and other international problems, and to petition London that the Czechs did not warrant going to war. After war with Germany had been declared, the Menzies government was similarly most reluctant to provoke Japan into aggression, pressuring London to keep closed the Burma Road that supplied Chinese nationalists, and declining to make significant reductions in exports to Japan well into 1941.\textsuperscript{367} For a time, Australian appeasement was amongst the most fear-driven, informed by a panicked guess at how quickly global war with several main fronts could bring unstuck plans for the Royal Navy to protect Australia's north.

There is no equivalent of appeasement in the Menzies' government of the early 1950s. On the contrary, like many others in western capitols, the Australian policy-making elite was hypersensitive to any allegations of appeasement of the new threat, the Soviet Union and its communist satellites. Memories of Manchuria and Munich were close to the surface of Australian discussions with Slim in 1950. Menzies, however, was also most sensitive to the possibility of a war even more global than the two before it stretching the democracies' resources across even more theatres. Having visited Britain, the United States, Korea and Japan shortly after the outbreak of the Korean war he noted in his diary another historically-informed interpretation of communist activity in Korea and other parts of Asia:

All these Asian adventures are diversions by the Russians

(a) to contain substantial democratic forces

(b) to create a psychology which will make countries like Australia unwilling to make commitment outside S.E. Asia

(c) to try out weapons and techniques first as in the Spanish civil war.\textsuperscript{368}

\textsuperscript{366} Hughes’s speech, Melbourne Town Hall, 14 August 1916, in Neville Meaney (ed.), \textit{Australia and the World: A Documentary History from the 1870s to the 1970s}, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1985, p. 236.


\textsuperscript{368} Diary entry, 10 July 1950, Menzies Papers, MS4936, box 397, National Library of Australia, Canberra.
In the wake of these thoughts, Menzies urged the British and Americans to resist Stalin's invitations to spread their defence resources thinly in response to the several communist-led crises. He wanted them to choose between those areas that were vital and worth defending, and those that were not. The idea of preserving the empire's military forces, and now also American forces, in order to best safeguard Australia's own regional security was as strong as ever.

Occasionally, both sides of Australian politics suggested some capacity for Australians to look after themselves, some measure of self-sufficiency in Australian defence. Labor leaders in opposition promoted big spending on air power in the late 1930s as a move designed to conquer geography and provide a defensive screen for the great island continent. Conservatives indulged in the same wishful thinking. A few weeks after the declaration of war in September 1939 Prime Minister Menzies told the public that they must keep two great questions in mind: What must we do in Australia to protect ourselves against a danger of attack in our own waters or on our own shores? Having made all proper provisions for that, in what way can we best contribute to the victory of Great Britain? No amount of grammatical construction could hide the fact though, that it was only through British victories or American intervention that the Australians would be adequately defended under their current defence provisions.

Occasionally also, Australians led the way in Australian-British involvement in the Southeast Asian region. During the latter half of the second world war, John Curtin's Labor government spoke ambitiously and even took some action to give Australia a more prominent role in the local region at the end of the war. In addition to rather grandiose musings about assuming the mantle of European empires destined to withdraw from Southeast Asia, the Australians struck an agreement with New Zealand at the beginning of 1944 to promote their interests in the region.

The ANZAC Agreement was bold, bordering on belligerent in its declarations that Australia and New Zealand had to be parties to any peace in the Pacific, and that they refused to recognise any change in sovereignty in the region as a result of allied use of bases during the war, a clause aimed especially at the United States. The agreement arose through a mixture of local imperialism and imagined power vacuums in the postwar Pacific, frustration at having been ignored in the making of key allied decisions in the latter half of the war, and a sense of new opportunity as representatives of the British Commonwealth in the South Pacific. Curtin said that it served a 'global idea', stressing that Australia and New Zealand had imposed on them 'for all time to come, the great associated role of trusteeship in the South Pacific'. It was a global idea which suffered from another dose of wishful thinking about Australia's capacities as a military power, and which still had a line thrown to Britain for support. The Americans were unimpressed, as were those European powers, such as Portugal and the Netherlands, whose colonies seemed to be in the Australians' sights. As a result, the ANZAC Agreement did not enjoy high status overseas.

And in the third world war, in 1951, Australians' long-sought Pacific Pact was finally achieved in the form of the ANZUS Treaty, a security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Having often been described as the cornerstone of Australian foreign policy since its inception, and also the great symbol of Australia's 'turn' away from Britain towards the United States, ANZUS has attracted a lot of historical attention. Very rarely, however, has its correct context, that of the war-like planning of the early 1950s, been adequately appreciated. What is clear is that, despite some clumsy diplomacy and some British bristling at being excluded from this pact, both London and Washington

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370 Menzies’ comment of 27 September 1939, in Meaney (ed), Australia in the World, p. 462.
371 Curtin, 21 January 1944, in Meaney, Australia in the World, pp. 492-3
373 An example which does not adequately cover the global context of ANZUS is Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1988; and a more detailed study which incorporates the global strategic setting is W. David McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945-55, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1995.
saw its main value in the context of how it related to the global crisis. As the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations told Menzies in 1951:

> We completely accept your thesis that it is essential for your back door to be bolted. A guarantee [of your security] by the United States would make a significant contribution to the strengthening of our joint plans for global strategy and for the defence of the Middle East, which I know from our recent talks in London is so much on your mind.\(^374\)

Importantly, the Americans viewed ANZUS in the same way: providing the Australians with the security guarantee that would enable them to send forces overseas to help in areas of global significance, such as the Middle East.\(^375\) Whatever its status would become in future years, ANZUS was, at the time of its drafting, another example of a regional security measure tied inextricably to global imperatives and the role of Australia in imperial defence planning.

It was not until the mid-1950s that the idea of a long Cold War replaced expectations of a likely 'hot' one. This slow transition paved the way for harder thinking in Australia about the consequences of past and likely future decolonisation in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.\(^376\) It did not mean the end of interdependence between security in a regional context and involvement in British and American global strategy. Such interdependence has never disappeared. The transition was also far from smooth, as was well-illustrated by the the Menzies government’s strident support for Britain during the Suez crisis of 1956. A crisis in the Middle East in which British and French interests were at stake triggered a default setting in government for Australian rallying to preserve the imperial life-line, the sea-lines between Britain and Australia. But without an overpowering anticipation of another world war there was more space to think constructively, from the second half of the 1950s, about Australian involvement in its region.

**Conclusion**

The term independence did not loom large in Australians’ notions of their foreign policies in the first half of the twentieth century. This has not stopped historians from spreading considerable ink on the matter of Australian dependence and independence - admittedly more in titles and structural architecture than as incisive analytical approaches. Most of these studies have obscured the fact that constant tension between and interdependence of globalism and regional security concerns was present from the outset, and Australia’s involvement in the world wars of the first half of the century confirmed rather changed this.

One of the implications of my interpretation here is that there is, in the Australian case-study, plenty of support for Eric Hobsbawm’s comment that there is no understanding of the world since 1914 without understanding the impact of world war. The twentieth century, he argues, ‘lived and thought in terms of world war, even when the guns were silent and the bombs were not exploding.’\(^377\) Hobsbawm discusses the two world wars in one chapter on total war, and other historians have linked them through the idea of a 30 years war.\(^378\) If the Australian experience can contribute to the bigger project of structuring the history of international relations, there may even be a case of extending the continuous war idea to 40 years - or perhaps employ the metaphor of a triptych, to deal adequately with the special circumstances of the late 1940s and early 1950s.

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\(^375\) Omar Bradley (Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff) to Marshall (Secretary of Defense), 9 July 1951, RG 59, 790.5/7-2051, United States National Archives, Washington DC; Joint Chiefs memorandum for Secretary of Defense (Lovett), 'The Military Role of Australia and New Zealand', 28 December 1951, RG 330 box 265, CD 337, USNA.

\(^376\) This is one of the main arguments in Lowe, *Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’*.

\(^377\) Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*, p. 22.

\(^378\) As discussed, for example, P.M.H. Bell, *The Origins of the Second World War in Europe*, Longman, Harlow, 1986, pp. 14-52
Less ambitiously, we can conclude that the history lesson played out in Canberra in June 1950 was testament to the globalism of the two world wars. Here, some clarification of terminology might be made. Globalisation, in its relatively untheorised form of space-time compression and increasing interconnectedness, was also something which the two world wars promoted. For reasons outlined in this paper, Australians tended to be very sensitive to forces which made the world seem more interconnected, and which might affect the Royal Navy’s capacity to save them from invasion. They were sensitive to revolutions in technology and communications and challenges to the imperial world order. The work and life-span of the Australian Council of Defence provide some illustration of this. Its June 1950 meeting with Slim was the last but one before the Council was disbanded, and its first meeting had been in May 1905, coincident with the stunning Japanese demolition of the Russian Baltic fleet in the Tsushima Straits.

In relation to the key themes of this session, the Australian experience in the first half of the twentieth century suggests that globalism was a more central idea than globalisation. The on-going process implied in the term globalisation is not as important in explaining the early 1950s Cold War episode as the globalist mind-set: the interpretation of economic and foreign policy in relation to events and developments throughout the world. Australian federation occurred at the beginning of the century, at a time when the British Empire was near its peak of expansion. Federated Australia was therefore born thinking global, even if it was global via empire.

We can safely say that globalisation during the twentieth century also assisted in Australians’ capacity to think in regional terms. Southeast and the Pacific underwent changes that owed much to shifts in world power and the changing nature of the world economy. But there were also two more specific processes that facilitated Australians’ closer engagement with their region in the second half of this century. One was the slow, complicated end of the far-flung British empire and Australians’ identification with it, and the other was the erosion of strong expectations in another world war. With respect to the latter, the Australian case-study suggests that changing strategic circumstances and also the ageing of a generation of policy-makers led by experience to expect global struggle were both necessary. As the 1960s wore on there grew fewer Cabinet colleagues and public servants with whom one could sit down and reminisce about what we had done in the last war and how this would guide us in the next one.
India and China in Comparative Perspective: Between Regionalism and Globalization

As part of a larger project, this paper attempts to look at China and India in comparative perspective in the context of their common continent, Asia, and a possibly emerging global community. The concept of global community is a recent one and similar to that of international society coined by the English school of international theorists. It is different from the concepts of global village or world society that envisage individuals and small self-governing communities as units rather than states. Broadly speaking, global community implies a construct of states (but does not exclude non-state actors), with people increasingly inter-connected across national borders through a globalised economy, ease of communications and travel, interchanges of ideas and popular cultures, shared participation in regimes governing various functional arenas, and with states moving away from using force or the threat of force to manage their power relations toward some kind of security community. Regional associations that create complex interdependence and reduce the risk of military conflict among their members may be considered to be building blocks of a global community, as also are institutions of civil society with cooperative ties across frontiers to further common norms and values. The European Union is commonly seen as a good example of an international society underpinned by a common culture, and sometimes held up as a template for other regional associations or a possible model for future global community. However attractive such a concept might be, it is seldom articulated in China or India, or in other parts of Asia, which together is home to 60 per cent of the world's population. Hence this tentative attempt to look at the actual and potential contributions of India and China toward an Asian or future global community.

This effort is necessary partly because the impact of Europe on the rest of the world was so profound over the last four to five hundred years that many analysts of contemporary affairs--in which the presence of an European off-shoot, the United States, is overwhelming-- tend to overlook the contributions of pre-European or non-Western civilisations. Also, assumptions are widespread that modernization is synonymous with Westernisation; that the present phase of globalisation means mainly an accelerated modernisation, with a closer knitting together of the world along behavioural, cultural, economic, institutional, and political patterns designed and dominated by the West; that this process might lead to a global community underpinned by the spread of Western individualistic values, popular culture and socio-political norms. These assumptions conflating modernisation with Westernisation and globalisation can be challenged on several grounds with respect to India and China, and perhaps also with respect to creating a truly global community underpinned by many compatible cultures.

First, there are, and have been, multiple forms of modernity\(^\text{379}\) manifested in Europe itself, in the world as a whole, and in Asia (where Japan and Turkey are also located), as well. The two oldest continuous civilisations of China and India, for example, grappled separately with the initial Western impact on them and evolved different but equally interesting responses to the challenges of the Enlightenment and other, less inspiring, aspects of imperialism and modernisation in the 19th and 20th centuries. Secondly, globalisation is a catch-all phrase encompassing many processes but most meaningful in the sense of accelerated time and compressed space because of technological advances in communications, and the global reach of trans-national corporations. The differential impact of globalisation is visible everywhere in widening disparities, and supporters as well as opponents of globalisation are to be found in every country both in the West and in Asia. In the aftermath of the Cold War, some interesting

\(^{379}\) See *Daedalus*, Winter 2000 for ten essays on multiple modernity that perceptively render the complexity of the contemporary world. The debates within China and India on modernity and modernisation have spawned such an extensive literature that it is not cited here.
concepts are being elaborated within the rubric of globalisation, including those of ‘new world order’, ‘clash of civilisations’, ‘security community’, ‘international society’, and ‘regional integration’, with varying interpretations on which there is little consensus. Several countries, especially China, France, India, Iran and Russia, explicitly reject the implicit ideas of continued American dominance, undiluted market capitalism, an uni-polar configuration of power, and world-wide conformity to American food and culture on the one hand, or on the other hand, inevitable conflict along ethnic or civilisational lines, contained in such concepts. At the same time, they participate actively in world forums and seek closer relations with the United States and the West.

Thirdly, the super-region of Asia is conventionally seen as comprising several geo-political sub-regions with common challenges and the potential for integration: East Asia, Southeast Asia--both mainland and maritime, South Asia or the Indian subcontinent, Southwest or West Asia including the Arabian peninsula, and Central Asia or Inner Asia. Levels of interaction or institutionalisation or sense of collective identity are not the same in all of them, none fit easily into Euro-centric theories of regionalism, and there is no pan-Asian organisation comparable to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) or the Organisation of American States (OAS), much less the European Union. Asian building blocks to a global community are yet to be fashioned. Moreover, the cultural and geographic spread as well as the many neighbours380 of both China and India makes it difficult (if not infrequent) to look at either India or China as belonging to only one Asian sub-region, though each looms immense in its ascribed sub-region of South Asia and East Asia respectively and is obviously pivotal to the development of any regional association or security community there. At the same time, the widely diffused cultural influences of India and China since ancient times especially in Southeast and in Central Asia, their espousal of Asian resilience before and after World War II, their respective national aspirations to play a global role, their current security concerns, and their very large diasporas381 far-flung throughout Asia and every other continent, add weight to their respective contemporary contributions to a larger Asian and global community. However, this paper does not examine China or India’s relations with the countries of Central or West Asia, both su-regions having different characteristics from South and Southeast Asia.

Fourthly, while both China and India have engaged in varying degrees summarised below with their sub-regions, the rest of Asia, and the world, within the norms of the prevailing international system, they also have offered alternative suggestions for growth and social equity, and for the conduct of international relations, worthy of serious consideration in any emerging global community. Of especial importance are the ideas of Mahatma Gandhi on non-violent resolution of conflict, of Amartya Sen on poverty alleviation and sustainable development, of Confucious on social harmony, and of the jointly propounded five principles of peaceful coexistence or Panchasheel. And fifthly, there cannot be a truly global construction of any kind that does not include China and India, home to about 40 per cent of the world’s population and with multiple communities and enduring cultures of their own. It is both desirable and likely that a future global community will be underpinned by juxtaposition, perhaps even a fusion, of cultures to which both India and China are making major contributions at the popular and conceptual levels.382

380 China has land borders with Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, North Korea; and maritime borders with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan (claimed as part of China), Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia. India has land borders with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Bhutan, Nepal, the Tibet and Xinjiang regions of China, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan; and maritime borders with Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Maldives.

381 Estimates of diaspora figures vary from 30 to 50 million in the case of Chinese, and 15 to 20 million in the case of Indians, depending on which categories of persons are included. As a result of past and present emigration, people of Chinese and Indian origin are to be found in every continent, and almost in every country, though their situations vary greatly. Diaspora literature is currently a growth industry, but see especially Lynn Pan, Sons of the Yellow Emperor, Boston: Little, Brown & CO,1990; Wang Gungwu, “Greater China and Chinese Overseas.” China Quarterly, #136, December 1993, pp. 926-948; I.K. Bahadur Singh, Other India, K.S Sandhu & A. Mani, Eds., Indians in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993

382 This sentiment is powerfully expressed by Singapore’s senior diplomat Kishore Mahbubani writing in the late 1990s, partly in reaction to what he calls ‘Western triumphalism’ that he encountered in the
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I

The challenge of placing contemporary China and India in comparative perspective is so formidable that few analysts attempt to go beyond appraising their economic performances, focusing on the recent period of China’s opening up after 1978 and India’s liberalisation since 1991. Many would justifiably maintain that China and India are each sui generis and very different in tradition, in contemporary life, and in their respective sense of collective selfhood or statehood; that the intellectual and emotional energy required in comprehending even one precludes meaningful comparison. Yet, these two ancient, proud, large, agrarian, heavily populated, civilisational states making self-conscious transition from the slough of the colonial period to full participation in the contemporary world are obviously comparable in more categories than size of populations. The problems they face in their internal and their external environments are not dissimilar. These include problems attendant on building new nation states out of earlier, looser, political and social structures; transforming their traditional economies and societies without losing cultural identity, and now of reducing state roles in their economies and witnessing a revival of traditional cultures; gaining stable borders and the goodwill of their neighbours that might suspect them of Han or Hindu chavinism; and winning acceptability from existing great powers as they aim for high status in the international system that they hope to modify. Each has been constrained or helped in tackling these problems by the US at any given time; their respective relationship with the US remains of crucial importance to each, especially in the contexts of regionalism and globalisation.

There are no less obvious contrasts in the way China and India have responded to their domestic challenges; through a revolution led by a cohesive Chinese Communist Party and successive supreme leaders capable of making dramatic shifts of policy on the one hand, and on the other hand, through the incremental, apparently chaotic, and frequently self-contradictory steps of democratic politics in a multi-party system, where even personalised central power has been limited and coalition governments have become the norm. Their contrasting methods have generated different successes and failures, which bear on their roles in Asia and the world. In external affairs too, the seemingly well-coordinated, long-range, diplomatic-defence strategies of China can be contrasted with India’s apparently ad hoc, ambiguous, and reactive postures. The interplay of internal and external constraints or opportunities is common, but we underline the difference between China’s status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council since 1971, an economic heavy-weight in the 1990s, a recognised nuclear weapons power and acknowledged global player, and India’s position as a late aspirant to similar status.

The contrasts may not be so great however, and the comparabilities more tangible, on the limited canvas of this paper. We survey briefly notions of Asian resurgence and cooperation articulated by the leaders of India and China around the time of independence, liberation, and after. We examine broad features of their respective relations with Southeast Asia, especially the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and note their participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). India’s pivotal role in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is stressed as also China’s importance in an un-institutionalised East Asia. In both East Asia and South Asia, regional cultural affinities are strong, communities are linked across state borders by kinship, language, faith, and pecuniary considerations, but the political fissures are deep. Flashpoints of potential or actual conflict exist between China and Taiwan, on the Korean peninsula and in the South China Sea, and between India and Pakistan. Regional cooperation was not initially espoused by either China or India, which preferred bilateral dealings with their respective neighbours to multilateral settings; but both have been persuaded to engage also in regional dialogues and encourage a sense of community in ASEAN and SAARC. Inquiring into globalisations, we look at the participation of China and India in the global economy and their attitudes towards various ‘regimes’ on environment, human rights, and nuclear

383 At the time of writing China’s population is assessed as over 1.2 billion, and India’s population is estimated to have just crossed the one billion mark.

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matters, stressing some differences between them as well their equal concern with safe-guarding national sovereignty from what both regard as unwarranted (Western) intrusion. Since it is obvious that the combined weight of China and India would be more influential than either's alone, we also comment on their bilateral relations where appropriate, though that subject is not the focus of this paper. Finally we try and postulate some of the contributions Chinese and Indians are making formally and informally to the emergence of a global community.

II

One question that often surfaces in discussions on Asia in Asia is what, if any, deeper meaning of common identity can be attached to the name given by the ancient Greeks to Anatolia, and by modern geographers to the world's second largest and most populous continent? All the great religions or ethical systems of the world—Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Daoism, Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Judaism, Shintoism, Sikhism—originated in Asia, as did many sciences and technologies. Archaeologists have unearthed antiquities beyond number and more, undoubtedly, are lost forever. Xinru Liu has recounted ancient patterns of trade and pilgrimage that wove around Buddhism between different parts of Asia and helped diffuse the cultures of India and China for more than a thousand years. The spread of Islam from Arabia added another design to the Asian tapestry. Kinship networks, especially among merchants, were strong and wide. But we cannot speak of Asian civilisation in the singular; there were and are many Asian civilisations, literally thousands of well-defined communities and languages, and multiple centres of culture, wealth, power and influence. Traditional interchanges as well as curiosity about and knowledge of each was frozen at minimal levels once Asia passed under Western dominance and countries lost control of their own political and economic developments. Even half a century after de-colonisation, most Asians are less interested in each other than in the West, and constructions of Asia vary from one Asian country to the next.

The notion of Asia or Asian as a form of identification and not merely a geographical appellation seems to have been largely a product of Europe, not only by its racist use of 'Asiatic' as a pejorative, but by scholarly pursuits that uncovered some of Asia's artistic and literary heritage, and by stimulating Asian nationalism. Introspection and self-identification as Asian (or not) among Japanese intellectuals in the early 20th century was soon followed by nationalist feelings among other Asian peoples and attempts by their leaders to establish contacts across colonial borders in the context of anti-imperialism. So it was with China and India. Sun Yat-Sen, leader of the Chinese republican revolution of 1911, spent time mobilising support in Japan and among the Chinese communities of Southeast Asia. Jawaharlal Nehru of India participated in the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in Brussels in 1927 and visited Ceylon, Malaya and China in the 1930s. Rabindranath Tagore lectured both in Japan and China and established a centre for China studies at his innovative University in Shantiniketan. The Communist Party of China (CCP) opened a foreign affairs cell at Wuhan under Zhou Enlai, and Mao Zedong formulated a theoretical nexus between the CCP and all nationalist and anti-imperial movements in the colonised world. He cast India in a pivotal role, a natural partner, in a global united front against

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385 See Surjit Mansingh & C.V. Ranganathan, China’s and India’s Approaches to State Sovereignty. In G.P. Deshpande & Alka Acharya, Eds., China and India at Fifty, New Delhi, 2000.
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Nehru for his part was profoundly moved by the Chinese struggle against (Japanese) imperialism. He sent out a medical mission on behalf of the Indian National Congress, and in his writings postulated an ‘Eastern Federation’ built on the twin pillars of India and China. As he told a Chinese journalist, “If China and India hold together, the future of Asia is assured”.

In his very first broadcast as Vice-President of the Interim Government in September 1946, Nehru stressed India’s non-alignment in global power struggles, its Asian identity, and its hopes of friendship with other countries, especially China. He elaborated these ideas in his address to the first Asian Relations Conference, which intended to “lay the foundation of our mutual progress, well-being and friendship” and ushering in a new era when Asia assumes her rightful place with the other continents. Two further conferences were hosted by India in early 1949 to discuss disruptive conditions in Burma and the independence of Indonesia. Close but lightly publicised political and military collaboration marked relations between India and these two strategically important and similarly non-aligned neighbours in the 1950s. During the Korean War and after, India’s diplomacy in the United Nations coordinated an Asian-Arab grouping among members who were determinedly non-aligned in Cold War power rivalries. An international gathering in New Delhi in 1956 celebrated the 2,500th anniversary of the Buddha’s birth but was not pursued as an important plank in the cultural diplomacy of secular India.

The Communist victory in China’s civil war, its intervention in the Korean War, its assertion of sovereignty by force in Tibet in 1950, and its active assistance to communist movements elsewhere in Asia, such as North Vietnam, aroused deep apprehensions in India, in Southeast Asia, and of course in the West. However, Mao propounded his ‘three worlds’ theory, assigned to India an influential role in the intermediate zone, and sent Zhou Enlai to India and Burma to assuage fears and win agreement on the five principles of peaceful coexistence as a basis of conducting relations among themselves, as well as among all nations with different socio-political systems. As formally written into the Preamble to the Agreement Between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India signed on April 29, 1954, these principles were enumerated as: a) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. b) Mutual non-aggression. c) Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. d) Equality and mutual benefit. e) Peaceful coexistence.

Zhou Enlai announced and elaborated these principles with moderation and graciousness at the Bandung Asian-African Conference attended by 29 countries and co-hosted by Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan over six days of discussions and debates in April 1955. Intended as an ‘educational device’ that would establish an Asian, rather than a communist, identity for China and alleviate apprehensions of it playing a subversive role in the region through local communist parties and Chinese communities (easily conflated in Malaya and elsewhere), the Bandung conference was divided by the different perspectives vigorously expressed by members of three different groupings: non-aligned, pro-Western, and communist. Agreement on broad ideas of anti-colonialism and nuclear disarmament could not conceal the fact that the Cold War had overtaken nascent Asian solidarity. The newly independent states of Southeast and Southwest Asia were separated between those that had joined the US sponsored Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation and Central Treaty Organisation in 1954, the non-aligned such as India that opposed these alliances verbally, and the armed communist movements in Vietnam and elsewhere that opposed them more radically. These divisions became rigid during the following decade and the Vietnam War and further inhibited the building of any Asian

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391 This was held in New Delhi under the auspices of the newly established Indian Council of World Affairs in March 1947, five months before Indian independence. 31 delegations attended from a range of countries including Turkey and Egypt, some Central Asian Republics within the USSR, Tibet, the Republic of China, Australia and New Zealand

392 From text of Nehru’s address, reprinted in Surjit Mansingh Ed., _Nehru_s Foreign Policy, Fifty Years On_, New Delhi: Mosaic Books, 1998. Appendix A.
community at the state level. Serious differences between China and India surfaced in 1959-1960 combined with mutual misperceptions and recriminations. The short but sharp border conflict of 1962 ended whatever hopes had been entertained of the two consolidating friendship and together reviving the rest of Asia. Each became increasingly preoccupied with domestic problems. Their international stances diverged in the 1960s and 1970s and they re-established full Ambassadorial relations only in 1976. China did not host a second Afro-Asian conference as expected and little was heard about the “Bandung spirit”.

Meanwhile, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was launched at Belgrade in 1961 and soon absorbed most of India’s multilateral diplomatic attention. India was also a leading member of the Group of 77 (G-77) developing nations that formed a caucus in United Nations forums and attempted to redress inequities in international relationships. NAM initiated a well-articulated agenda calling for a New International Economic Order in the 1970s and the accompanying concept of South-South Cooperation incorporated many ideas of ‘community’—common interests, high levels of communication and interaction, institution building—in the Third World as a whole, not Asia alone. China too supported that effort, asserting its own developing country identity and conducting an active diplomacy in the Third World. But China did not join the G-77 or NAM, and was not a member of any international organisation before taking its seat as a permanent member of the UN Security Council in 1971. Mao’s China was respected for its revolutionary achievements and self-reliance, but also feared in Asia because of its export of radicalism during the Cultural Revolution, and its military power augmented by an independent nuclear force after 1964. Therefore, its relations with other Asian countries were often ambiguous and troubled, especially as ethnic Chinese communities played key economic roles throughout Southeast Asia and sometimes became targets of local attack, as in Indonesia in 1965. Fear of communism and China is believed to have sparked the formation of ASEAN in 1967, and China was actively involved in the politics and conflicts of Indochina, but it is difficult to discern direct Chinese contributions to building an Asian community. Meanwhile, the rhetoric of NIEO had outstripped its tangible or institutional achievements even before new political forces in the West led by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan slapped down Third World hopes of sharing largesse. The new cold war of the 1980s fought heatedly in Afghanistan and Cambodia naturally impacted on Central, South, and Southeast Asia and revealed the absence of common approaches to security issues in the regions.

III

Hopes of China and India participating in Asian regional cooperation were renewed by several developments in the 1980s and after the end of the Cold War, notably ASEAN’s success and expansion, the creation and moderate progress of SAARC, overall economic dynamism in Asia despite hiccups especially those of 1997-99, regular interaction among Asian leaders, and increasing exchanges among non-governmental citizens groups. ASEAN demonstrated how political and economic cooperation combined with decision-making by consensus, respect for state sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs, contributed to a sense of regional community among its original five members—Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand—and minimised the risk of conflict between any of them. ASEAN proved capable of dealing collectively with the situation in Cambodia in the 1980s by evolving an agreement securing the withdrawal of Vietnam and an end to Chinese assistance of Pol Pot that received support from the rest of the international community and UN implementation. Having expanded to include Brunei, ASEAN in the 1990s went on to admit Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as members and finally problematic Myanmar (Burma), and so embraced all of Southeast Asia. None of these steps was simple or free of controversy but were designed to prevent Vietnamese domination of Indochina and draw military controlled Myanmar toward international norms. ASEAN also gained confidence in dealing with the larger problem of China, choosing a mixture of engagement rather than confrontation, reliance on support from the US, Japan, and Europe, and calls for


The presence of large, well-defined, and prosperous Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia was a constant source of anxiety to local governments for two main reasons: doubtful loyalty because of their continued connections with China where they became the largest single source of direct investment; their vital roles in local economies that made them potential targets of domestic violence which might trigger a coercive response from China. However, China declined to recognise dual citizenship and did not react with force to discriminatory treatment of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, not even to the massacres in Indonesia in 1965, except in the case of Vietnam in 1979. Beijing’s reaction to the killings of Chinese in Indonesia in 1994 and 1998, for example, were much milder and underplayed than the press reactions in Hong Kong and Taiwan. While the position of Chinese communities varies from one multi-ethnic ASEAN member to another, forming the majority in Singapore, a large majority in Malaysia where the *bumiputras* or Malays receive preferential treatment, a significant minority in Indonesia, and almost indistinguishable from the mainstream in the Philippines and Thailand, the Chinese in Southeast Asia cannot be regarded either as marginal minorities or as agents of Chinese domination. Rather, they are integrated into economic and political life even where remaining socially distinct, and act in some ways as guarantors of China’s good behaviour. Certainly, they have assisted the process of China’s economic, cultural, and political engagement with ASEAN, accelerated after 1989.

First invited to attend a post-summit ASEAN ministerial meeting in 1991, then invited to become a full dialogue partner and member of the ARF, China moved fast and “by early 1995, China had the most extensive institutionalised dialogue mechanisms with ASEAN at all levels.”\footnote{Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Brotherly Engagement: India, China and ASEAN.” Fourth India-ASEAN Eminent Persons Lecture, New Delhi, August 12, 1998.} The volume of trade between them increased rapidly to the value of $17.5 billion in 1995 and $25 billion in 1997.\footnote{Guangzhi Zhao. “China and Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Prospects for Economic Cooperation”. In Christopher Hudson, Ed., *The China Handbook*, Chicago: Fitzroy Yearbook, 1997. p. 83. Also Kavi Chongkittavorn above.} Joint infrastructure projects in the Mekong valley and elsewhere were contemplated, and Yunnan province in southwest China became a hub of cross-border trade with all its neighbours and over all growth. China refrained from devaluing its currency in 1997-98 in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis and so earned goodwill. Security problems and ASEAN apprehensions of China remained strong however, centred on China’s unilateralism in approaching conflicting claims to islands in the South China Sea by occupying the Paracels, passing a law declaring sovereignty over territorial and adjoining waters in 1992, greatly augmenting its naval power, and erecting military outposts on Mischief Reef. In ministerial meetings of 1995, ASEAN leaders openly and bluntly criticised China and demanded multilateral treatment of the issue. Reluctant though China was to accede to ASEAN demands, it eventually agreed to discuss the South China Sea in a Consultative Forum on the basis of the UN Law of the Sea Convention, provided the issue was not raised again in the ARF, and made conciliatory statements on joint development of undersea resources. ASEAN was less confident in the wake of the financial crisis of 1997 and China turned down a code of conduct drafted by the Philippines and Vietnam in 1998 but said it was amenable to ‘guidelines.’\footnote{Zakaria Haji Ahmaad & Baladas Ghoshal, “The Political Future of ASEAN After the Asian Crisis.” *International Studies*, Vol. 75 # 4, October 1999. pp.759-778.} China also announced support for ASEAN’s Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). In other forums as well, especially those pitting ‘Asian Values’ against Western criticisms of human rights records, China made common cause with ASEAN countries, treated them with respect, and did not brandish its obvious superiority in every category of power. China also moved toward diplomatic flexibility in Northeast Asia in the 1990s, establishing diplomatic and economic relations with South Korea, and acting in background concert...
with the US in a “two plus two” formula to defuse the crisis arising from North Korea's nuclear programme in 1994 and after. If one glosses over various confrontations on the Taiwan issue, and many details and nuances of China’s foreign relations, it is possible to assert that China in the 1990s has tried to project itself as a ‘normal’, ‘responsible’, and non-hegemonic member of the Asian and international community of nations. It has succeeded to large extent in overcoming Southeast Asia’s “perception of China as a powerful destabilizing and disruptive actor in the region, which posed both an ideological and a security threat”, but has in the process apparently foresworn a leadership role in creating a ‘resurgent Asia’ or a new international order.

Despite deep cultural ties and the absence of friction or apprehensions of India among Southeast Asian countries, it was only after 1991, when Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao enunciated a new ‘Look East’ policy and moved to liberalise the over-regulated Indian economy, that a serious engagement commenced between India and ASEAN. India had been initially suspicious of ASEAN as a Western sponsored association and declined an invitation to join in 1967-68. Invited once again in 1980, India's foreign minister broke off his journey to Kuala Lumpur for reasons of ill health. But simultaneously India announced recognition of the Vietnam-backed Heng Samrin government in Cambodia, anathema to ASEAN, and became associated with the Soviet Union and Vietnam in Southeast Asian perceptions. On its side, India did not emulate the “Little Tigers” pattern of export-led growth, and paid scant attention to its smaller eastern neighbours. Even adjacent Burma was neglected for 35 years after Ne Win’s military take-over and the expulsion of the large Indian community from that country in 1964. In 1987 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi made a path-breaking visit to Thailand, by which time the Cambodia conflict was being resolved. His successor P.V.N. Rao was determined to identify India with the rest of dynamic Asia and the economic reforms initiated by Finance Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh stimulated world-wide interest in South Asia.

In 1993 ASEAN invited both India and Pakistan to become sectoral partners in trade, investment, and tourism, despite fearing that the protracted Pakistan-India conflict would spill over into ASEAN forums and rupture consensus. That did not occur, however, because of India’s restraint and also Pakistan’s low level of participation, and the ASEAN-India Business Council worked hard to create awareness of India’s potential as an economic partner. India became a full dialogue partner and member of the ARF in 1995, high level visits were exchanged regularly, and Singapore and Thailand took the lead in exploring region wide joint ventures in hoteliering, chemical and light industry, and other avenues of direct investment—such as port facilities and airlines--inside India. India established Information Technical Training Centres within ASEAN, continued bilateral assistance to Vietnam, and received many students and Buddhist pilgrims from Southeast Asia. Bottlenecks in both India’s physical and decision-making infrastructure obstructed rapid expansion of economic ties with Southeast Asia, as did the Asian financial crisis of 1997. More importantly, perhaps, and in contrast to Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, persons of Indian origin there tend to be agricultural workers, traders, or service professionals, and number few wealthy or large entrepreneurs. Old networks among merchant communities and kinship groups continued but India was not a major trading nation after the 1950s. Its trade with ASEAN amounted only to $7 billion in 1997, which was double the 1996 figure but amounted only to about one percent of ASEAN’s world trade.

Many ideas for multifaceted cooperation were brought forward in the 1990s, including a growth quadrangle around the Bay of Bengal comprising Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Singapore and Thailand, a growth corridor connecting southwest China and northeast India through Thailand and Myanmar, and institutional ties between ASEAN and SAARC. Non-governmental sponsorship of lectures in India by ‘Eminent Persons’ from other parts of Asia, annual pan-Asian conferences on Asian Security, widening interest in topics such as comprehensive security and human security, and a variety of reciprocal cultural programmes, helped build awareness about the rest of Asia among India’s internationalised elite. However, the general level of awareness remained low, as indicated by the paucity of media coverage of Asia and the absence of Indian correspondents (other than from Press

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Agencies) resident in Asian countries outside the Indian sub-continent. In contrast, more than 30 Asian news agencies and newspapers support resident correspondents in India.400

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 dismayed ASEAN, but it adopted a cautious approach of expressing ‘grave concern’ at its summit meeting of that year. India’s announcements of moratorium, ‘no first use’, and support for ZOPFAN seem to have been reassuring. Cooperative ties between India (especially its four southern states) and ASEAN members are being strengthened in all fields and four heads of government from ASEAN made state visits to India in the first quarter of 2000. India has adopted a lower profile than China in the ARF and associated Track II conferences, partly because no distinct institutional structure has been erected for the purpose inside or outside the Ministry of External Affairs, and partly because there are no boundary or security problems between India and ASEAN members.401 ASEAN’s preference for ‘normal’, that is cordial, relations between India and China is clear, and it finds improvements in Sino-Indian dealings gratifying. Exchanges of high level visits between Beijing and New Delhi, a small but steady increase in trade and joint ventures, and the 1993 and 1996 agreements (on maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control and the strengthening of Confidence Building Measures) sufficiently improved the atmosphere between the two Asian giants to prevent rupture in the angry aftermath of Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. By early 2000 India and China had initiated a bilateral security dialogue and announced their intent to expedite resolution of their long-standing border problem. Apprehensions of China remain strong in some Indian circles, however, especially because of China’s assistance to Pakistan’s military modernisation, missile development, and nuclear weapons programme. It remains to be seen if regular participation in the ARF by China and India, alongside other and extra-regional powers, will cement an Asian identity and stimulate the evolution of an Asian economic and security community. The absence of collective action to deal with the economic crisis of 1997, or the breakdown of order in Indonesia and the conflict in East Timor, and the reliance on outside powers and international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund to deal with these problems is striking. Nevertheless, the habit of consultation is growing, as is the sentiment of Asian community.

The creation of an interdependent and cooperative South Asian community seems equally problematical at the time of writing, though highly desirable. The imperatives are strong; the obstacles are many. Among the imperatives are common cultures, common faiths, common languages, shared histories, familial and kinship ties amounting to communities lying across borders which are easily traversed even when formally closed, common problems such as poverty, underdevelopment, cross-border crime and ethnic or communal tensions that cannot be tackled effectively by any single state acting alone, not even India, and growing awareness that the prevailing international economic system penalises small units and rewards large groupings. Among the obstacles are differently interpreted histories, historical preferences for a multiplicity of political entities on the subcontinent (in contrast to China’s historical preference for a unified state), assertions of modern national or sub-national identities, difficulties in building states and sustaining viable institutions of governance, the overwhelming presence of India at the core of South Asia accounting for close to 80 per cent of its area, population, resources, and skills, and the consequent twin nightmares of the region. That is, either Indian domination of its smaller neighbours, or encirclement and strangulation of India by its smaller neighbours acting in concert with a hostile outside power.402

The strongest and most evident impediment to the process of building a South Asian community is that the hasty and traumatic partition of British India in 1947 left wounds that are periodically reopened by military conflict between Pakistan and India. The most recent such episode initiated by Pakistan at Kargil in mid-1999 set back an encouraging trend of normalising Indo-Pakistan ties through the February 1999 Lahore Process of composite dialogue and specific agreements. An equally strong

400 Calculated from Media Guide, Delhi, 1998.

401 Problems between India and Myanmar were tackled bilaterally after 1992 when the Indian government opened informal talks with the State Law and Order Council (SLORC) in Rangoon despite continuing public sympathy for Aung San Syu Ki and the democracy movement she symbolises.

402 The author coined the terms ‘Raj nightmare’ and ‘Kautilya nightmare’ to describe these opposite South Asia perceptions in her India’s Search for Power, Beverly Hills, New Delhi: Sage, 1984. Chapter 6 “Imperatives and Obstacles to Regional Cooperation in South Asia.”
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The impediment to South Asian regional cooperation was partition’s rupturing of economic complementarity on the subcontinent and the pursuit of different economic (and foreign) policies by different states. The adoption of more liberal or market oriented economic policies in India and throughout South Asia in the 1990s, and their common obligations and rights as members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), have made it possible for SAARC members to initiate the framework for creating first a regional preferential trade area (SAPTA), and subsequently a regional free trade area (SAFTA). Moreover, some nongovernmental organisations, women, peace movements, business groups, and influential individuals\(^{403}\) are forming region-wide networks of cooperation to help women and other disadvantaged persons, holding regular meetings and seminars to heighten awareness, and putting pressure on their respective governments to consolidate and extend the functional areas of cooperation specified in the SAARC charter, to implement agreements already reached, and not to abandon annual summits of heads of government or ministerial meetings for the exigencies of a moment.

SAARC was formed in 1985, largely through the successful efforts of Bangladesh President Ziaur Rahman to overcome reluctance in India and Pakistan. The charter was deliberately modest and functional, emphasising unanimity and ruling out contentious bilateral issues from discussion. SAARC’s momentum was slow but its engine did not stall completely. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, major external powers such as the US and China advised India’s neighbours not to depend on them too much but to take due account of ground realities in South Asia and deal directly with India. In the mid-1990s India enunciated a policy of magnanimity and non-reciprocal concessions to its smaller neighbours known as the Gujral Doctrine; this was tangibly expressed in bilateral agreements with Bangladesh on the eastern rivers, Nepal on trade and transit, and Sri Lanka on eliminating tariffs on a long list of traded items. India’s initiatives were expected to contribute significantly to the consolidation of SAARC and the actualisation of SAPTA and SAFTA in the coming decade.

Resistance to processes leading to an economic community continues for political reasons as well as the sense of differential benefit that creates vocal opposition in South Asia (and elsewhere) to globalisation and trans-national corporations. Moreover, emphasising the cultural or civilisational commonality of South Asia around an Indian core risks antagonising some of the more exclusivist, fundamentalist or insecure groups in the region and so exacerbating communal, ethnic, and inter-state tensions. In the meantime, SAARC refrains from discussing domestic or bilateral disputes, waits on Pakistan recovering from the military coup of October 1999 and acute economic crisis, and has not intervened in Sri Lanka’s prolonged civil war. India too has declined a repetition of the 1987-1989 effort (when a peace keeping force was sent to Sri Lanka) but offered humanitarian assistance and support to Norway’s mediatory effort there. SAARC has not yet created a forum similar to the ARF where security problems can be discussed in the presence of extra-regional powers. Transformation of SAARC into a genuine community akin to an international society depends on the success of member states in tackling their many internal problems in a cooperative rather than a conflictual framework. Of crucial importance to the entire region is how skilfully India grapples with resolution of conflicts within Jammu and Kashmir state and in the northeast, how well it integrates its own more than 4,000 communities speaking more than 300 languages and dialects in 12 distinct language families and practising different religions in a federal, democratic, and economically dynamic polity. India’s success would prove magnetic and serve to coalesce the region around principles and institutions easily compatible with those of an emerging global community.

IV

Globalisation is the consequence of many processes, notably technological advances in communications and information, increasing integration of trade and other economic activities worldwide, greater travel and interaction of peoples at many levels, and wide adherence to international institutions and regimes in areas of trans-border concern such as protection of the environment, nuclear issues, drugs and crime,

\(^{403}\) Some examples are: Women in Security, Conflict Management, and Peace (WISCOMP), Women for Peace, Coalition for Action on South Asian Cooperation (CASAC) and the Group of Eminent Persons. The latter two frequently call attention to the common civilisation of South Asia and India’s pivotal role in it with concomitant obligations and privileges.
and human rights. Globalisation has compressed space and accelerated time everywhere, but has not had a uniform effect on all places and peoples. Both China and India are involved in the major processes of globalisation, but not wholly so, and their respective participation is briefly compared.

Phenomenal advances in the field of telecommunications have transformed the human and intellectual landscapes of both India and China by providing their peoples with much easier access to each other, as well as to the outside world, via telephones, television, and the Internet. Tens of millions of Indians and Chinese now have access to these instruments of communication in the urban centres and even the rural areas of their own countries, and growth-rates of accessibility are expected to be exponential in the immediate future. However large the absolute numbers may be, they represent only a very small percentage of the total populations in either country and show a much lower level of usage relative to the rate in the US or the EU for example. 70 per cent of all Internet users presently reside in the US; less than one per cent of the population in China or India has access to Internet. But a fact of equal and perhaps greater importance is that hundreds of thousands of individual Indians and Chinese, born and educated in their homelands, have become indispensable to the worldwide advancement and implementation of computer and information technology. Their services are courted by the leading industrial economies; their presence in Silicon Valley (California) and its equivalents elsewhere is palpable; their knowledge and earnings enrich many societies and can thus be regarded as direct contributions of the emergence of a multicultural global community. Both China and India participate in the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Both encourage local manufacture of computers; sometimes China enters into joint ventures with major trans national corporations and is beginning to compete in hardware production, and Indian contributions to the software industry is internationally recognised. The major difference between them is in receptivity to information and electronic programmes generated elsewhere. While India is open to the outer world and its free press vigorously opposes any governmental control, China has tried to limit the types of communication and technology introduced into the country for fear of ‘spiritual pollution’, with limited success. In this context it is appropriate to comment on the growing exports of films, music, and TV programmes produced in India and China which are popular in many parts of the world, and not only among ethnic communities, as well as the rising profile of Indian and Chinese artistes and directors working internationally. Food preferences may also be included on the level of popular culture, commonly regarded as a key indicator of globalisation. The mixed experiences of McDonalds and other Western fast food chains are similar, though not identical, in China and India. As James Watson puts it, “global capitalism pushes one way, and local consumers push right back. Herewith, a parable of globalisation.” At the same time, local consumers all over the world enthusiastically embrace the many and diverse cuisines of China and India; therein another parable of globalisation as a more than one sided phenomenon.

China’s economic ‘opening up’ was initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 and has followed broadly systematic, flexible, and widening patterns, despite several stops and starts along the way. Having joined the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, China became a major recipient of multilateral and bilateral developmental assistance. Once its agricultural and market reforms took effect, China’s GDP quadrupled in 20 years and national prosperity became a substitute for Marxist-Leninist ideology in legitimising the continuing leadership of the CCP. The World Bank has projected China as the second largest economy in the world by the year 2020. In 1998 China exported goods worth $182,697 million and imported goods worth $142,361 million, accounting for approximately two per cent of world trade. China simultaneously opened selected areas and industries to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and made efforts to attract it from Chinese communities overseas as well as from the international capital market; in 1997 and 1998 China received FDI flows of $45 billion and $44 billion respectively. Inevitably, attracting FDI entailed bringing domestic law into greater conformity with international agreements applying to copyright, patents, and trademarks, as well as training new generations in

corporate and international law. China’s application for membership of the WTO and successful conclusion of agreements on the subject with its major trading partners, including the US in the last year, implies further opening of China’s markets—especially the agricultural and energy sectors—to the outside world, and a greater willingness on China’s part to join the prevailing international order rather than undermine it (as in the Maoist era). But it is possible that China may find such a deeper level of integration more difficult to accomplish than the first phase of shallow integration because it is accompanied with worries about reconstructing state owned enterprises, domestic pressures to protect infant industries, and the overall importance of maintaining social stability as a requirement for political order. Moreover, there is a certain tension between China’s posture towards joining international institutions such as the WTO as a means of furthering China’s interests, and expectations in some American circles that China will comply with international obligations “in ways that conform to American interests.” As mentioned earlier, a similar tension underlies definitions of globalisation and global society. Are these inclusive or exclusive processes, do they embrace the cultures and interests of member civilisations, or are they Western impositions on the rest of the world?

India has been less dramatic than China in making and changing economic policies over the last half-century, though similar considerations of raising standards of living, retaining autonomy of decision making, and attracting first foreign assistance and more recently FDI are visible. Unlike China, India was a founder member of post World War II international organisations including the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) transmuted into the WTO, and so did not have to face the same interrogation on joining, though the obligation of bringing domestic law into conformity with international agreements on patents, intellectual property, trademarks, insurance and other services is common to both. India’s legal and banking systems too are compatible with Western—especially British—systems. But having eschewed a revolutionary or Marxist path in favour of a ‘mixed economy’ and heavy reliance on multilateral development assistance, India remained suspicious of market-driven, export-led, strategies of economic growth and erected a protective shield of high tariffs and multiple regulations around its industries in the 1960s and 1970s. India’s diplomacy in behalf of NIEO sharpened an international image of India’s unfavourable investment climate and constrained those at home who advocated liberalisation. A financial crisis in 1991 forced the Rao government to introduce the first generation of economic reforms and actively solicit FDI. After a succession of weak or coalition governments, the possibility of another crisis led a BJP-led government to introduce further liberalising measures in 1999-2000. Populist calls for swadeshi (home produced) and Leftist or NGO led protests against the activities of certain trans national corporations in India are loud. They slow, but do not halt, the process of economic globalisation.

Meanwhile, India’s growth rates in the 1990s (around six or seven per cent) improved significantly over those of the 1980s (around three to five per cent) and are likely to be sustained at about eight per cent in the coming year. The World Bank slates India as the fourth largest economy in the world by 2020. However, India is not yet a major trading power, and with exports worth Rs. 1,301,006 million and imports worth Rs.1,541,763 million in 1997, India accounted for about 0.6 per cent of world trade, in contrast to its earlier share of two per cent in the late 1940s. Similarly, India’s ambivalence about FDI is reflected in the 1997 and 1997 figures of about $3.5 billion and $2.5 billion respectively. According to a recent study, however, India’s share in total flows of FDI to the Asia Pacific region trebled in the 1995-1998 period, and a series of 37 bilateral investment agreements and 72 double taxation (prevention) treaties are seen to have improved the investment climate in India. As a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency since 1994, India is not seen by potential investors as risky, merely as dilatory!

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410 Asian Development Bank, op. cit., p. 121.

411 World Investment Report, p.54


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Among the most challenging issues of our time is conservation of the environment. As is well known, several international conferences on the subject have produced impressive documents, and even some agreements, but their implementation varies widely. There is considerable contention on who is most responsible for pollution and who should pay the costs of detoxification. Few countries have good environmental records. China's participation in environmental treaties and international institutions supporting environmental protection has been extensive, and some supporting domestic institutions have sprung up under the aegis of the state. 200 research institutes employing some 20,000 scientists and technicians are engaged in environmental research, and nongovernmental organisations devoted to conservation are also springing up. China adheres to ISO 9000 and 14000 standards applying to product quality and insisted upon by China's major trading partners in the advanced industrial world. Though China's eagerness for economic growth prompts its positive response to international regimes, China is reluctant to accept international monitoring, intrusive reporting, or any transfer of decision-making authority to international agencies. It places national sovereignty and security first.

India is party to 33 international conventions on the environment, including the Vienna Convention, the Montreal Protocol, the Rio Declaration, and the Kyoto Agreement. India's Ministry of Environment and Forests is the interface between domestic administration and international bodies, such as the Global Environment Facility, extending some intellectual and/or financial assistance to conservation projects. Perhaps the most striking feature of the environmental movement in India is its voluntary, grassroots, passionate and non-violent character epitomised in the leadership roles of women and small communities (such as the Bishnois) keeping alive ancient holistic traditions. Over the past two decades, non-governmental organisations and private individuals have pushed for environmental protection on a scientific basis in the face of perceived governmental indifference and/or corruption. Citizens' reports on the state of India's environment receive greater credence than official pronouncements. Ever since Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told the first environmental conference at Stockholm in 1972 that poverty was the worst pollutant, there has been debate within India over the relative costs and benefits of development and environmental protection, as also over strategies of sustainable growth. These are relevant to all discussions on globalisation and the emergence of a global community because it seems clear that the planet will not support repetition of European and American industrial models on a wide scale; equally, the poorer peoples of the world are not likely to tolerate continued exploitation and impoverishment by the already rich for very long. Therefore, two important platforms are common to India and China in their engagement with international environmental and trading regimes. First, that their respective biodiversities and traditionally geospecific products be fully safeguarded by the WTO against predatory extraction and patenting by foreign pharmaceutical or other companies. Second, that environmental standards, or labour standards, not become tools of protectionism in the hands of the advanced industrial economies to keep out the products of developing countries. The Convention on Biodiversity of 1992 encompasses the first concern; the second remains a matter of negotiation.

Human rights, like environmental conservation, attract universal support in theory but variation in practice. It has become a highly contentious subject, especially since some Western states have used human rights issues as instruments of political leverage over developing countries including China and India, since atrocities in Africa and the former Yugoslavia have led to UN or US-led armed intervention, and since attempts are made to elevate human rights concerns above the principle of state sovereignty. Largely because of the dilemmas they face in dealing with insurgencies, both China and India have been sensitive and defensive on human rights issues in forums such as the UN Commission for Human Rights where they have been targeted. Both have upheld the principle of state sovereignty, criticised military intervention, and defended their respective records. In other, non-political respects, India and China have different positions on the subject of human rights summed up in the Confucian priority placed on social order, and the Indian priority placed on individual freedom and spiritual emancipation. Beijing's responses to external pressures since 1989 show a mixture of realism, consistency and tactical flexibility. Resistance was combined with selective concession—such as release of individual dissidents—designed to appeal to the Western advocates of 'engagement' for business reasons. Other concessions involve structured dialogues with officials such as UN Commissioner Mary Robinson, release of political prisoners at tactical moments, publication of a White Paper on Human Rights in 1990, promulgation of a Criminal Code and revision of the criminal procedure law, adoption of

Human rights falls under the purview of its own cultural values (including economic and social security) and its own national authorities, so that the international community has no right to pry into the human rights situation in China, not even its minority regions of Tibet and Xinjiang.

Any objective analysis of human rights and India must differentiate at more than one level. A contrast can be drawn between the India of the 1940s and 1950s in the vanguard of the international human rights movement, among the first to sign the Universal declaration, and incorporating Fundamental Rights as a justiciable chapter of its Republican constitution on the one hand, and the India of the 1990s defending the reputation of its security forces against attacks by foreigners and dissidents. Another contrast can be drawn between reformers seeking to correct the grave social abuses that amount to violations of human rights in every Indian community, and reactionaries attempting to uphold their own authority at the expense of women and depressed classes. A third contrast can be drawn between individual Indians, inside and outside the government, international organisations, and NGOs, who are the most dedicated of human rights workers anywhere on the one hand, and on the other hand the Government of India, struggling to combat foreign-sponsored separatism, terrorism and militancy while upholding democratic norms. India has been an active member of the UN Commission on Human Rights and related committees. It helped lay the conceptual basis for de-legitimising colonial and apartheid governments on grounds of their abuses of human rights. India also helped draft the Vienna Declaration of 1993, which declared protection of human rights to be the first responsibility of government, and recognised the interdependence of democracy, development and fundamental freedoms. In the 1990s India strove, with some success, to keep out any reference to Kashmir in international human rights pronouncements, and to get international recognition of terrorism as a violation of human rights. India’s National Human Rights Commission, large voluntary sector, and free press have performed sterling service at home in protecting citizens from abuse. Though India joined the International Criminal Court established at Rome in 1998, it entered various reservations on domestic jurisdiction; it was not the only state to do so.

Current international regimes on the subjects of weapons of mass destruction and all nuclear issues are designed to safeguard the security of the West and maintain its technological and military superiority over the rest of the world. The Non Proliferation Treaty of 1968 is a central plank of the regime, with accompanying agreements among nuclear and technology suppliers. India rejected the NPT as being discriminatory in nature and applying unequal obligations on nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. China also remained outside the NPT until 1992. India had been in the vanguard of the movement for a nuclear free world since the early 1950s but made no headway during the Cold War; India tested a nuclear device in 1974 but did not pursue a weapons path until a worsening security environment prompted a belated series of tests in 1998 and self-proclamation as a state with nuclear weapons. China became a nuclear weapons state in 1964 but did not participate in any arms control negotiations on grounds that the two super powers must first reduce their nuclear weaponry drastically.

V

The above rapid survey and rough comparisons leads us to the following ten conclusions on China and India in the context of regionalism and the emergence of a possible global community.

- Perhaps the greatest and comparable contributions made by China and India to Asia and a global community since liberation and independence have been to become and remain united countries—reasonably stable, and increasingly prosperous—in the face of immense challenges of size and diversity. It is not too far-fetched to term each of them a sub continental region on its own, capable of furthering Asian regionalism and global community.

- The value of the above mentioned achievements can be gauged from contrasting the situations in India and China immediately preceding independence and liberation, as well as from the anxiety underlying all current evaluations of ‘instability’, ‘ethnic conflict’, and fissiparous tendencies in the two countries. A breakdown in either case would spell international disaster of greater magnitude.

414 In the context of national unity we stress partition and the existence of 565 separately administered Princely states in India, and warlords and civil war in China.
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than seen elsewhere in the 1990s. India’s democratic, federal, secular, polity has enabled it hitherto to control separatism and dampen communal strife over the long run, and the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir also might be resolved through autonomy. China’s challenge is to adjust its political system—tightly controlled by the CCP—so as to meet the demands of an open economy, an increasingly mobile and well-informed majority Han population and the aspirations for autonomy among minority nationalities especially in Tibet and Xinjiang.

Early expectations that China and India would together ‘lead’ the rest of Asia were not fulfilled; subsequently, smaller countries took the lead in building regional associations. They recognize that the constructive participation of India and China is essential to the success of regional associations in furthering prosperity and security in the widest sense of that term. At the same time, regional confidence is essential to the stability and international engagement of both China and India. China’s role as a global player in the 1990s was undermined by the suspicions of expansionism it had aroused in Southeast Asia. It will be very difficult for India to realise its potential as a global player until it has consolidated its home base and built a cooperative South Asia.

Though the initial premise of India-China friendship as a basis of Asian resurgence did not last through the 1950s, the impact of the China-India conflict was less divisive on the rest of Asia than the impact of the China-US or China-Soviet conflicts. Moreover, the smaller states of South and Southeast Asia see benefits in the steady improvement of relations between India and China since 1988, and the ARF provides one forum for discussions on all aspects of security and the possibility of evolving consensual approaches to Asian problems. A growing sentiment of Asian solidarity could find expression in other institutions and associations.

Regionalism and globalisation are complementary rather than contradictory processes. Both ASEAN and SAARC are moving (slowly) towards forming economic communities even as member states participate in the global economy. Similarly, Asian cultures are compatible with each other as also with Western cultures and a continuous cross-fertilisation is taking place, largely through the agency of Asian communities residing outside their homelands and dramatic acceleration of communications among peoples.

The emergence of a truly global community is more likely to be accompanied by the reconciliation and mutual creativity of many cultures, including those of China and India, than by the imposition of one set of current Western ideas on the rest of the world. At the level of popular culture worldwide, some fusion of preferences in activities, dress, entertainment, food, music, movies, reading matter, sports and so on is already visible. It remains to be seen if similar fusions will occur at other levels. For example, will habits of hedonism and high consumption in the affluent societies of today be modified by the ethical teachings of the Buddha simultaneously being spread there by Tibetan monks? Will the recent barbarities of ‘ethnic cleansing’ to achieve homogenous populations in a state be softened by learning from the long experience of innumerable communities living side by side in the multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-religious mosaic that is India

The rapid pace of economic globalisation has revealed divisions between those who benefit from the process and those who do not. In the shorthand of international politics this usually means divisions between advanced industrial countries and developing countries with commonalities as well as competition within each group. Thus, China, India, and other Asian countries share interests in multilateral forums such as the WTO, even as they compete for investment capital and buyers of their products in the international marketplace.

The contributions of China and India to a global economy exceed the figures found in national or international reports that do not take into account separately the tangible and intangible work—commercial, electronic, financial, informational, professional, scientific, service—of their far-flung diasporas and recent emigrants to the developed world.

Traditional (Westphalian) notions and practices of state sovereignty are under assault from many of the processes of globalisation, including communications and information technologies, electronic transfers of currency, international regimes on the environment and arms control, control of production and marketing by trans-national corporations and the privileging of concepts such as human rights over domestic jurisdiction. While China and India, like others, vigorously defend the principle of state sovereignty against perceived attempts of domination and/or intervention by the West, they also are making practical concessions to the current realities of international regimes.
The evolution of a state-based global community could be facilitated by adjustment to concepts of sovereignty held in most states and the replacement of power as the basis of relationships by a mutually agreed upon code of conduct. One such code was informally presented as “The Ten Cs” at a recent India-China seminar. These enlarge on the five principles of peaceful coexistence or Panchasheel as follows415:

1. Commitment that existing state limits either as de jure borders or as de facto arrangements will not be disputed by force.
2. Concern for the stability of states and societies especially in times of domestic unrest. Each state has the responsibility to resolve domestic problems by peaceful means.
3. Concern and respect for the legitimate interests of all states.
4. Commitment to no alliances or military arrangements directed against third states, and no use of territory of one state to threaten, interfere, or aggress against another state.
5. Concern for the human rights of smaller or disaffected minorities, directed to governments on a bilateral non-intrusive measure.
6. Commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons against all states, in particular against non-nuclear weapons states, as a first step to universal nuclear disarmament and a non-nuclear world.
7. Commitment to non-support of militarism, terrorism, interventionism, and separatism.
8. Commitment to greater transparency and information sharing in military and security matters.
9. Commitment to encourage non-exclusive regional cooperative and sharing arrangements.
10. Cooperation in the fight against drugs, disease and environmental degradation. Were China and India to act on such a code and persuade other large powers to do so as well, they would truly their obligations to the Asian super-region and an emerging global community.

Andrés Musacchio

Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia Económica y Social
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires, Argentina

The Concept of Globalisation

The concept of globalization has been defined in general terms and it has become a common place in the field of social sciences. Many scientists currently make reference to a global world or to the leaning to globalization. However, few scientists have made the attempt to define its meaning precisely. Therefore, globalization is a widespread concept with a considerable degree of ambiguity. It should be noted this ambiguity doesn't mean it remains unclear or ill-defined in the publications on the issue, although it is not clear enough to establish a solid foundation for the further (re) construction of the social sciences.

When social scientists speak about globalization, they usually use the term referring to different meanings. Since a standard definition has not been adopted, it is not always compatible. Therefore, the issue entails a problem closer to a linguistic neurosis than to the complexity of a scientific theory.

The first part of this contribution aims to characterize the usual approaches to the concept.

Three different although compatible notions emerge from the analysis.

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One of the interpretations attempts to define it as a process of reinforcement and extension of the international flux of commerce capitals, technology and labour force.

The second interpretation refers to the institutional changes, which are brought about in the society by the increase of these flows, and the development of the transnational corporations. In this point of view it is stressed the weakening of the regulating function of the national states. In its stronger version, globalization implies the disappearance of the state in its economic dimension. A subtler version considers the globalization just as the lost of an important portion of the economic sovereignty.

The third interpretation refers to the growing homogenization of certain processes and behaviours, like the introduction of global standards in the production of goods. However, the most extended idea in this field is the existence of a convergence in the demands of goods and services, a homogenization in the regulation of the capital goods and the technology.

The result of these combined factors is the imposition of neoliberalism and the market upon old structures of political regulation, implying also the homogenization of regulating mechanism, political resources and the ideology.

The second part of this article deals with the confrontation of the different concepts of globalization with the empiric indicators. The goals of this section are:

To verify empirically the hypotheses about a globalized world.

To inquire to which extent the hypotheses corresponding with the facts imply a break with the past.

During the last quarter of the century, the prevailing tendencies have become more consistent with a process of regionalization than with one of globalization. On the other side, comparing the present-time data with those of the first quarter of the century, a major break is not observed.

In the last section, some theoretical issues, which are implied in the concept of globalization, are discussed. It is pointed out that the neoliberal interpretation shows a weak time-space conception. An alternative theoretical frame of reference introducing the notion of cyclical behaviour of the world economy is proposed. The causes and relationships of alternating periods of stability and crisis revalue the importance of the temporal conception and allow a better basis for the periodicity of the international relationships.

The introduction of the concept of “productive system”, as the space of accumulation and regulation in periods of stability, bestows the analysis a clear notion of space and allows a better characterization of the international relationships, of their temporal evolution and their specificities.
I intend to handle the theme above all as a historian and, instead of using the superficial and obscure concept of «globalisation», dare to speak of interplay, dare to speak of interplay, cooperation and integration of the Nordic region with the outer world.

Historically, Scandinavia and Finland, closely knit together since prehistoric times, have not lacked interest in the outer world, but they have in fact cultivated it, along with their regional neighbours. We may quote an example from the age of Vikings: although originating from Scandinavia, the Viking culture is in many respects shared by the Finns as well as the Balts and the Russians. Consider also the role played by the Scandinavians, especially by Sweden along their largely Finnish armies, in interfering in the 17th century Central European affairs at the pretext of protecting Protestants.

We may similarly recall, from the century onwards, the trade and colonisation activities of the Danes and the Swedes which had the permanent result of extending Nordic influence to Iceland and Greenland as well as to the arctic islands now in Norwegian possession. And last but not least we may observe that the age of great discoveries, which is sometimes mentioned as an early example of globalisation, ended only in the last century, to the glory of many Scandinavians, especially Norwegian explorers.

The impact of Nordic culture on the world, in music as well as in literature, in arts and architecture, has been remarkable since the end of the 19th century. From this time onwards, Scandinavia has been cited as a global model for adult education and cooperatives, and Finland was the first European state to grant the franchise to women. Let us also add the world of sports, of great popular interest to all the Nordic countries for more than a century.

Celebrating three years ago the 600th anniversary of the Kalmar Union established under the Danish Queen Margareta, the nordic countries referred to it as their earliest achievement of their regional integration. Without turning any longer to the past, I may add a historic period, in the 16th century, when the Scandinavians collided with powers representing the outside world, call them here representatives of globalisation: Gustavus Vasa, founding father of the Swedish national state defeated, by means of reformation, in his kingdom the Universal Catholic Church, then the trading monopoly of the Hanseatic League.

At this time, however, the Swedes were bitter enemies with their Scandinavian neighbours, and only started to get on better terms with them three centuries later. The political background to the Swedish interest in the then fairly academic «Scandinavianism» was that the kingdom had been able, after the loss of Finland to Russia in 1809, to unite with Norway under its crown, and also felt it necessary to approach Denmark, the old rival and former suzerain of the land of fjords. The Swedish-Danish honeymoon did not last very long and never resulted in any closer cooperation, since the Danes, desolated at having been obliged in 1864 to face alone the invading German armies, soon lost their illusions of Scandinavian solidarity.

Meanwhile, for national romantic as well as for social political reasons, Scandinavian cooperation was promoted on a civic level. Besides student unions, probably the most active supporters of Scandinavian

unity were national worker movements: the first Scandinavian Workers Congress took place as early as 1886 with a view of realising a Socialist society in the participating countries.

Later, the aims of the so-called Workers Scandinavianism became less radical and more pragmatic. At the same time, when the Social Democrats consolidated their position and came into power in all three states, this cooperation had a special significance in developing common Scandinavian ideas, not the least in the field of social security.417

On the civic level even the Finns, with Social Democratic Party and trade union representatives included, were, despite Tsarist control, able to participate in Scandinavian gatherings and early on promoted the spirit of Nordic togetherness before Finland gained independence from Russia in 1917. The fact that during the following war in 1918 the Scandinavians did not interfere in Finland and thus drove the distressed white Finnish government into German arms, had the effect of distinctly cooling Finnish relations with them.418

Having all succeeded in maintaining their neutrality during the Great War, Denmark, Norway and Sweden decided in the 1920's to continue it, initially under the League of Nations security system. Finland took the same line and participated, despite her differences with Sweden, in the rising Nordic cooperation, for example in eliminating national passports among the four states in 1929. However, the main goal for Finns seeking Nordic cooperation, namely security, was never realised. The Swedish government, who was alarmed by the neglected state of the Danish and Norwegian defence forces and was willing to promote regional security by military cooperation with Finland, did not finally want to go to war on behalf of its neighbour. When attacked by the USSR in 1939, the Finns were, despite popular Nordic backing, left isolated by the neighbouring Scandinavian governments.

We may admit that Nordic Cooperation has never resulted in an integration process, in the full meaning of the term, sufficient to make the states involved in a workable whole. The dreamy objectives of 19th century Scandinavianism aiming at the unification of the three kingdoms still somehow survived as late as the postwar years of the 1940's. Even the most Nordic-minded representatives of the Swedish Social Democrats like Rickard Sandler and Per Evind Sköld defended the idea of a federation which included Finland. Possibly the Swedes had even been willing in the autumn of 1940 to go so far as to form a real union with Finland in order to hinder it falling under German and / or Soviet influence.

However, the psychological factors tending to undermine Nordic unity were still considerable. Take, for example, the old national antagonism between the Danes and the Norwegians on the one hand and the Swedes on the other, also past territorial and language differences between the Finns and the Swedes, and the rivalry for arctic possessions between Denmark and Norway, likewise. The newly independent Iceland seemed more inclined to turn toward America rather than Scandinavia.419

However, the most influential factor concerning the weakness of Nordic unification was lack of security. The Danes and Norwegians disillusioned by the Swedes' unwillingness to resist the Germans during the years 1940-44, were convinced that their neighbour would be similarly unable to defend them in the future.420

As a consequence, in 1949 they gave up the proposal of a regional alliance of neutrality in preference to more global security solution by joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Even with Iceland
making the same choice, Sweden continuing its own armed neutrality, and Finland remaining after the war under the influence of the Kremlin, the Nordic region was militarily divided.

For these reasons the interstate cooperation activated by the establishment of the Nordic Council in 1952 was at first cautious and limited. For three years Finland remained outside the council, although she participated in practically all the projects of cooperation, starting in 1952 with the abolishment of national passports between the Nordic States and continuing in 1953 with the agreement on reciprocal social security and culminating in 1954 in the establishment of a common labour market between them. Hoping that Finland’s membership in the council would also serve Soviet interests, Moscow accepted it under the condition that the Finns would not be present if this organ - which after all was only a consultative body formed by parliamentary and governmental representatives - would treat questions of foreign policy or security.

A step forward in deepening the Nordic interstate cooperation was taken by the foundation in 1971 of a ministerial council composed of the prime ministers and cabinet ministers who dealt with questions of Nordic development. Whereas the Nordic Council still remains in its function as a consultative body, the Ministerial Council with its preliminary decision-making status can be regard as a kind of supranational institution. Both councils have their permanent secretariat in Copenhagen.

An important target in bringing about Nordic unity has been economic cooperation. The earliest example in this respect was the monetary union established between the kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden-Norway as early as 1873. An inter-Nordic customs union was seriously under consideration from 1948 onwards. Later it was for a while replaced by a larger project of the free market called NORDIC, Nordic Economic Community.

Nordic derived from the idea of a custom union revived in 1968 by Danish Prime Minister Hilar Baumsgaard. Besides being a customs union it included plans for other economic and financial institutions like a central inter-Nordic investment bank. In spite of many controversies the project seemed by the end of 1969 ready to be realised. Meanwhile, however, the Baunsgaard government had concluded their negotiations on Danish EEC-membership, which gave Finland reason to withdraw from the NORDEK undertaking. In fact, the Finns feared that the project would be seen in Moscow as a kind of bridge for the Nordic states to enter the European Economic Community. The EEC was of course at that time in Soviet eyes a forbidden fruit for Finland, because of its supranational character and closeness to Western interests.

The setback did not hinder the Nordic states later completing their economic cooperation in many other ways, for instance by founding their planned investment bank separately by 1976. The main lines of Nordic development followed the basic Treaty signed in Helsinki 1962, in which the participating states obliged themselves to maintain and develop their cooperation in the fields of justice, culture and communications as well as in economic, social, and environmental questions.

An important aspect in Nordic cooperation has been questions related to the realisation of the welfare state. This idea was born in Scandinavia earlier than even in Britain: for instance Swedish Social Democrats advocated a leading role for the state in fighting unemployment already in 1931, four years before the publication of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money by John Maynard Keynes. Similarly noteworthy in cooperation has been the cultural sector: even today one half of the annual budget of the Nordic ministerial council is allocated to this field, education, training and research included.

The reasons for Nordic integration with the outer world are manifold. To take only the economic picture: the main interests of Norwegian shipping lay far outside northern waters, the Danes sell the great majority of their agricultural products outside the Nordic countries, as do the Finns and the Swedes with their paper and pulp. Emigration has often played an important role in Northern Europe. We can see that young Scandinavians as well as Finns will even in the future seek their fortunes outside their own home countries. Nowadays they would mainly be educated and skilled people who cannot find appropriate employment at home. In fact, Nordic countries will now need blu-collar workers as an additional labour force immigrating from outside.

In some cases, at least for the Finns, integration has been motivated by security needs. For the bulk of them the Eastern menace - even eight years after the fall of the Soviet Union - still exists. But for many Finns, as well as for Scandinavians, integration has also a reverse picture: an eventual invasion of unwelcomed aliens, tourists and big businesses. The first Scandinavian member of the EC/EU,
Denmark, has expressed her reluctance by voting 1992 against the proposed common currency. Iceland and Norway have preferred to stay totally outside the EU. In 1994 the majority of Swedes voting for EU membership was smaller than even that of Finns, who in the same year accepted the Union only by 56.9% to 43.1% against.

A key reason for Scandinavians and even for Finns to distance themselves from an integrating Europe has been to avoid losing their national decision-making. In 1961 the NATO members Denmark and Norway, followed Britain when she was forced to stay outside the newly-established «Six» of the European Economic Community, and formed a counter organisation, EFTA. Iceland and Sweden joined the «Outer Seven», as the new group was nicknamed. So did Finland, as an associated member. The Finns were able to negotiate a special arrangement granting the USSR the same favoured nation's treatment as given to EFTA partners: along with this integration solution they managed to have the best of both worlds and thereby greatly expanded their trade markets in the following years.

The next challenge following from the development of European integration was for both the Scandinavians and the Finns the moment at the end of the year 1969 when the EEC finally agreed to Britain's membership, inviting also Denmark and Norway to join. Only Denmark accepted the invitation, Norway - who had turned it down after a referendum - as well as the other Nordic countries remaining in EFTA, had to protect their market interests (especially in Britain) by negotiating a special trade agreement with the EEC.

The test was painful above all of the Finns, who had to overcome Soviet suspicions of having an affair with the EEC. The price for the Finnish participation was again the most favoured nation's clause, similar to that granted to all EC members. This time the treatment was extended besides the USSR to all the countries belonging to the COMECON / SEV bloc. By the benevolent connivance of her western trade partners (who allowed the Finns to expand their eastern export markets with the result that these were able to import more from the West), Finland was in a position to solve integration dilemmas without compromising her neutrality and relations with the Russians.

Towards the end of Soviet era the Kremlin's control became less rigid: Finland, too, succeeded in starting on the road to Europe on the same schedule as the other two neutrals, Austria and Sweden. The economic consequences for her joining the European Union were soon found to be positive. Exports to the West greatly increased and partly compensated for the great losses which the country had suffered with the collapse of its eastern markets. An interesting result was that the new affiliation stimulated Finnish trade even with Denmark and Sweden, notwithstanding the fact that the exchanges with these Nordic countries had been continuing without barriers for a long time.

Pessimists, both right-wing nationalists and leftist opponents to the EU did not lose time in prophesying that the new European dimension would offer to the Scandinavians as well as to the Finns new advantages which, as a consequence, would diminish their mutual affinity and spirit of cooperation. Many nationalistic Finns already argue that Swedish language classes at school should be reduced, using the argument that in European intercourse Swedish is not needed.

On the other hand, there are reason to fear that in the expanding EC smaller languages, including Swedish, will find it difficult to maintain their status and even their cultural importance. One does not have to be a Frenchman to predict that with the current cultural imperialism of the anglophone media even Europe can lose its multinational heritage and identity.

Another question, more pressing than that of safeguarding cultural identity, is the possibility for Nordic neutrals to preserve their former «non engaged» status. For many Finns their 1300 kilometre-long common border with Russia, the lack of confidence in the Western capacity and will to defend it, cause a troublesome problem: they would prefer to keep their diplomacy and defence in own hands without being obliged to follow automatically the Brussels Russian policy. A good many Swedes, for their past, would like to go on with the tradition of neutrality, which was initiated by King Karl XIV Johan, a former marshal of Napoleon, and which has served as an example even among other Scandinavians until the end of the 1940's.

Politically speaking, the first approach of the Nordic countries to the world outside the European scene took place after the First World War. The four then independent states joined at an early date the new world organisation, the League of Nations. All of them within the next ten years submitted their mutual territorial disputes to the authority of the League and to its affiliated Permanent International
Tribunal accepting loyally their verdict: Sweden in the dispute with Finland concerning Åland and Norway in the dispute with Denmark about Greenland.

As fervent League members they greatly contributed to the activities of the organisation but in a critical hour in 1938 denounced the sanctions obligations in its Covenant, thus forcing the organisation into a state of paralysis. Having denounced the sanctions the Swedish and Norwegian governments felt free two years later not to be obliged to allow the Western Powers, even under the League mandate, to send troops to Finland, to push back Soviet invasion.

On the other hand, the Nordic countries took an active part in international assistance, both social, economic, and military. Fridtjof Nansen made his name known when helping a starving Russia in 1919-21, Finnish soldiers like General Bruno Jaland were called during the Spanish Civil War to serve in the first peace-keeping force in the world, Danes and Swedes sent a medical corps to assist Abyssinians, victims of Mussolini’s aggression and so on.

We may see already in the 1930’s an example of Nordic regional cooperation developing into global cooperation namely the group of the Oslo Treaty states, which had been established in order to liberalise trade exchanges between them. The group was joined not only by European neutrals, but also the United States.

During the Second World War very many Scandinavian and Finnish ships were destroyed or forced into alien service as they were during the Great War 1914-18. Sailors and military personnel especially in Denmark and Norway were involved in war service practically all over the world. After the war all the Nordic governments, including the Finnish government after Finland joined the United Nations, participated in the activities of the new world organisation in a most remarkable way. The Norwegian Tryggve Lie, the first Secretary General of the United Nations, had as successor a Swede, Knut Hammarskjöld. In 1962 in Kongo he shared the fate of his countryman, Folke Bernadotte, assassinated fourteen years earlier when mediating on the UN’s behalf the truce in Palestine.

All the Scandinavian countries and Finland have since 1956 continuously participated in UN peace-keeping activities, Finland along with nearly 40,000 men. Several Finnish as well as Danish and Norwegian generals have served the world organisation in the capacity of military commander or advisor. In 1972, one of them, Ensio Siilasvuo, mediated as the UN Commander-in-Chief the armistice between Egypt and Israel - a truce that still holds. Today similar good offices in the service of the international community, mandated by the UN Organisation of European Cooperation and Security or the European Union, not to speak of other international governmental or non-governmental organisations, continue to activate Nordic citizens on a larger scale than ever before. A special reference in this respect should be made to numerous Scandinavian and Finnish official and private missions which are assisting developing and distressed areas all over the world.

Speaking about globalisation without mentioning the world «business» seem in modern terms a nonsense. Not having and opportunity to deal with this vast subject in the present context, I may simply observe that Nordic business is today in the front line of globalisation, not only with trade exchanges and banking but also where innovation is concerned. Despite the many aspect affected by international economic factors, such as a liberation of capital markets, privatisation of state property and the concentration of trusts, governments seem both in Scandinavia as well as in Finland to have the situation under control.

The basic explanation for this firmness is the fact that laissez-faire policies have never had any noticeable backing from Nordic voters. Not only the Social Democrats - who still have great influence in all the five countries - but probably the majority of the parties as well fear that unbridled capitalism could upset the stability of society. Anxious to protect their countries against excessive damage caused by outside economic fluctuations and unforeseen business moves, many Nordic politicians also seem to question whether integration within the European Union would not in the future endanger their countries’ social structure, most of all the welfare state. In their eyes Nordic cooperation has been in this respect much ahead of European integration.

All parties do not share this spirit of resistance and welcome, for instance, the later developments in the labour market by which the trade unions are likely to lose the ear of the workers. E.g. in Finland a confrontation situation exists between the leading trade unions, which would like to force the government to stop state property privatisation, and those who criticise them for dictatorial tendencies unsuitable in a democracy.
In Denmark, where in 1992 the voters rejected the European monetary Union as a protest against a high interest rate policy incompatible with Danish unemployment, as well as in Finland, where the government practically forced the Parliament to ratify the EMU agreement, the people still wonder how the European Central Bank will be able to cope with the monetary policy without endangering the outside-EU trade of the member states.

As a conclusion we may say that, despite their numerical insignificance, the Nordic peoples have, even in this quickly changing world, many assets for their future. Ethnically and linguistically homogenous - the non-Germanic Finns being the only exception - primarily Lutheran Protestants with a historically good popular education (the lowest illiteracy rates in the world) the Nordic people have long democratic and egalitarian traditions and, in general, a deep sense of social responsibility. Basically rich and industrious, the Nordic countries enjoy also the highest national income rates per capita in the world. This kind of region is not likely to be the first loser but rather a winner in the process of opening the world markets to free trade.

Another question is will and can the Nordic governments have their voices heard in matters which direct economic policies in the united Europe, and are they at the same time able to profit fully from the markets, trade and finance offered by globalisation.
The Historical Construction of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region

The idea of a transnational region including the northern most parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia was launched by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry in 1992 to fill the vacuum that followed the termination of the Cold War.

Just as the EC cooperation was established in the 1950s in order to build confidence between the hereditary enemies Germany and France, so the idea behind the Barents Region was to establish a network of positive contacts across the East-West border in the North to promote growth and to make future conflicts less likely.

The establishment of the Barents Region has provided new materials for the debate on how modern regions evolve: are they basically political constructions, or do they grow spontaneously at grass root level, in order to meet particular needs of the area itself?

The Barents Region is undoubtedly first and foremost a political construction, which sprang from reassessments of the security policies of the Nordic countries after the breakdown of the bipolar world. At the same time it has been actively marketed as a historical region, deeply rooted in the past of the European Arctic area.

In this undertaking the initiators of the Barents Region have been assisted by professional historians, who have been accused of acting as "region-builders, in historical guise" and compared to the nation-builders" of the past.

The present paper analyses the constituent elements of the "historical construction" of the Barents Region, trying to separate historical realities from historical myth - and at the same time looking at the role of professional historians in this process (partly based on personal experiences).
Globalising and Regionalising Forces Affecting the Dependent World (19th and 20th Centuries)

Next to an approach from a macro-regional perspective, a cross-cutting and comparative conceptualization seems to be worth exploring.

By "dependent world" I mean all the peoples, regions and countries that were incorporated in a subordinate position into formal and informal empires. The empires to be considered should include not only the European oversea empires, but also the Japanese and the Russian/Soviet empires and the imperium Americanum.

Imperial projects in modern times have always been contradictory in themselves. The very idea of empire is a universalistic one. Empire as a far-flung network of rule and domination transcends the boundaries of pre-imperial territorial units, of individual ethnic groups and of traditional systems of production and trade. Getting incorporated by an empire results in an enormous augmentation of contacts with the outside world, at least for indigenous elites. Empires transgress cultural boundaries. They join together civilizations of the most diverse kind. Moreover, empires are usually sustained by universalist ideologies or cosmologies. They tend to claim a right and duty to carry out a mission civilisatrice vis-à-vis those who are considered "barbarian", "primitive" or just economically "backward".

This is one side of the problem. On the other side, imperial powers deliberately strengthen local orientations. They rule by the maxim of divide et impera. They monopolise the foreign relations of their subject states and communities. They tend to support certain forms of localized economic organization, and they encourage a kind of cultural identity formation that remains within traditional or traditionalist limits and does not aspire to national scope.

These tensions between universalising or globalizing tendencies and regionalizing or localising orientations deserve closer empirical scrutiny; abstract talk about "globalisation" is not particularly helpful. It is here suggested to consider them in their political, social, economic and cultural dimensions. Various aspects might be explored:

1. the opening or closure of indigenous communities and ways of life through the agency of the colonial state;
2. equivalent functions of the quasi-colonial state (under conditions of "informal empire") in countries like China, Siam, the Ottoman Empire, etc.;
3. the spatial aspects ("geopolitics") of the globalizing/regionalizing process, i.e. the emergence of a cosmopolitan culture in certain urban centres as opposed to relatively "closed" and remote interiors and hinterlands;
4. the universalism of some anti-colonial and anti-imperial movements (Panafricanism, the activities of the Comintern in Asia, etc.) seen in relation to attempts to revive or "invent" an indigenous and culture-bound political symbolism (Gandhi, for example, was a master of both strategies);
5. the transition to the post-imperial age: new challenges of globalization and new responses;
6. etc.

Obviously, most papers on topics like these will have to be particular case studies. However, comparative contributions would be especially welcome as would papers attempting a long-term overview.
Denmark and Norden in the Post-War Period.
Between Sub-Regionalism, Regionalism and Globalism.

Small states, who do not have the option of staying away from international politics, face difficult choices in their attempts to protect their interests. As bilateralism often implies dependency on greater powers, multilateralism, i.e. participating in broader cooperative forum, offers itself a solution. But what kind of multilateralism? Sub-regionalism, regionalism or globalism? In this paper on Danish foreign policy sub-regionalism will be exemplified by Nordic cooperation, regionalism will be exemplified by European and trans-Atlantic cooperation while the globalist perspective will be represented by the United Nations and North-South cooperation.

In the Danish foreign policy tradition sub-regionalism in the form of Scandinavism is the oldest one, dating back to the 19th century. With the League of Nations globalism became an additional option, while regionalism in the form of NATO, the European Union and the OSCE gradually offered themselves as forum for Danish foreign policy after the World War II. Until the end of the Cold war sub-regionalism, regionalisation and globalism formed an intricate pattern of sometimes supplementary and sometime conflicting orientations in Danish foreign policy. According to the official doctrine there was full harmony between the different trends, but reality was often one of conflict. After the Cold War these problems have largely been solved by a far going integration of sub-regionalism, regionalism and even globalism in Danish foreign policy.

Thus over time, the role of Nordism has been on the wane. It is a firm root in a joint history, geographic closeness, as well as cultural, political and societal affinities, which makes cooperation easy among the Nordic countries, both in the region and in forum like the United Nations. On the other hand, in concrete cases, interests often diverge, e.g. in the economic field. This explains why Nordic economic cooperation has never materialised, and why the three Nordic EU members cooperate so little. A further complication is that Nordic cooperation often cannot “deliver the goods” because of limitations of size. Nordic defence cooperation foundered on this rock in 1949, and so did later attempts in the economic field, such as “Nordek” in the late 1960’s. In these circumstances the scope of Nordic cooperation has remained fairly limited and on the whole diminishing over the post-war period. But it has been and still is important in several respects:

1. there is a wide-ranging cooperation in the cultural and social field;
2. Nordic cooperation is still important in the United Nations (but “threatened” by the impact of CFSO);
3. Nordek has still an important identity function in giving the Nordic peoples a broader identity than the national one, and one that often feels more comfortable than a wider European or cosmopolitan identity.

My paper will follow these different strands of analysis in post-war Danish foreign policy. First, the historical background in 19th century Scandinavism and in inter-war cooperation will be followed with an emphasis on the role of World War II experiences in boosting Nordic feelings in Denmark.

Secondly, the abortive post-war attempts at expanding Nordic cooperation into the security and economic fields will be analysed. Denmark (and especially the governing Social Democrats) fought hard for a Nordic Defence Union in 1948-49 and only joined NATO as a second-best option. However, once in NATO the option of Nordic defence cooperation was shelved as official policy, even though Denmark eagerly joined Nordic cooperation over UN peace-keeping from the 1960’s. In the 1980’s the idea of a Nordic nuclear weapons free zone became hotly contested between government and opposition in Denmark.
In the economic field, Norden was never seen as a fully satisfactory setting, but despite this Denmark worked eagerly for Nordic cooperation, e.g. by taking the Nordek initiative in 1968. However, in the prevailing view, Denmark had no choice but joining the EEC, when than became possible in 1973. But opponents of this move continued to argue the case of Norden as an alternative to Europe, just as NATO critics continued to hanker back to the idea of Nordic defence cooperation.

Besides in the field of cultural and social affairs, Nordic cooperation in these years flourished at the United Nations where voting together with the Nordic countries was important and usually more important than voting with the members of the EPC (EC countries).

In this period, then, a certain official doctrine evolved which gave Nordic cooperation a limited, though not unimportant, place in Danish foreign policy, but against this the opposition, mostly from the left wing, argued for a broader role.

Finally, the Nordic dimension of present Danish foreign policy will be analysed. Among relevant developments are the accession of Sweden and Finland to the EU (which has opened up possibilities -so far largely unrealised- for Nordic cooperation within the EU) and creation of a “greater Norden” in the Baltic region with possibilities of both increased cooperation, e.g. in the Council of Baltic Sea States, and rivalry. Both have materialised, the latter mostly in the form of Danish-Swedish competition for Baltic leadership.
Inventing North America. The Evolution of Regionalism in a Globalized Political Economy

North America has long been a geographic expression. However, it also may become something quite a bit more than that as well. By the late twentieth century, North America began to coalesce loosely as a region of states. Even so, the evolution of North America as a region was rather late in coming and it has not yet evolved very far. The three states of the United States, Canada, and Mexico engaged in an innovative yet cautious effort to come closer together through the use of two regional integration agreements (RIAs). The first was the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) of 1988. It set the ball in motion, although neither party to the agreement at the time probably conceived of it as a first step toward a trinational RIA. The second was the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1993. Building on the earlier agreement, NAFTA became the centerpiece for moving the three states toward a more self-conscious and more integrated mechanism for conducting business among themselves. North America as geography had always included Mexico. With NAFTA, it included Mexico economically and politically as well.

The emergence of regionalism in North America in the late twentieth century is an act of deliberate invention by three states. Still, what is meant by regionalism? It is the policy of some states, usually in close proximity to each other, usually through legal agreements, to create closer economic and political ties. In recent years, the New Regionalism has been coined to argue that regionalism is now “open” and “liberal” rather than inward looking and statist. Regionalisation is something slightly different. It is a set of complex processes of structural change. These may be linked to regionalism (as in Europe and North America), but they can develop independently as well. The process is associated with globalisation in which states, firms, labor, and other actors come to rely upon each other across state borders in order to maximise gains. In North America, regionalisation came first. But in the 1990s, regionalism gave new momentum and interest to the process of moving toward greater integration within North America.

Inventing North America as a region is therefore about how states use regionalism to build upon regionalisation, all the while participating in a globalized economy. Regionalism in North America began with trade and investment. However, eventually, inventing North America as a region may sooner or later become something more than a business deal. Inventing North America may also become a process involving the state for creating a shared set of rules, expectations, and practices as well as how the three states of North America will deal with common problems involving, dispute settlement, labor rights, environmental protection, national treatment, reciprocity, and intellectual property rights as well as trade and investment. The paradox of North American regionalism is that to invent North America as a region means using the state to bring components of the region closer together while at the same time making the state eventually less central to the life of the region.

The evolution of regionalism in North America raises two questions we will address here. First, what are the historic antecedents or roots of regionalism in North America? Second, what are the more proximate, recent factors at the global and regional (as well as subnational) levels that induced the North American states to invent a limited partnership for themselves?

The Historical Antecedents

The evolution of regionalism in North America had inauspicious beginnings. Indeed, for much of the history of North America, it was not regionalism but nationalism and state building that dominated the continent. During the nineteenth and even some of the twentieth century, the United States, Canada, and Mexico were more concerned with the consolidation of their own political structures over territory and population rather than seeking to forge some sense of common regional identity and unity.
With domestic agendas taking priority, it was no surprise that the North American states considered each other only in passing or even warily during times of tension and conflict. To make matters worse, the rise of the United States as a great power at the turn of the century did little to calm neighborly suspicions about motives. By the turn of the twentieth century, the United States loomed over its neighbors, creating a sense of unease about their own independence and protection.

In the United States, state building proved to be trying, at best. Early on, its policy was to remain independent and aloof, although the War of 1812 with Britain almost led to the end of the American experiment with self-rule. Still, in the longer term, the main ordeal was internal. The basic conflict of the state between the individual states and the federal government was only really resolved by a bloody civil war during the 1860s.

In Mexico, state building was even more traumatic. Internal misrule, political instability, regional divisions, and territorial disputes jeopardized for almost a century Mexico’s prospects as a viable, coherent state. Mexico was defeated in a war with the United States in 1848, losing almost half of its territory, including Texas, California, and much of what is now the American southwest. In the 1860s, the five-year French Bourbon intervention also threatened Mexico’s independence. By the end of nineteenth century, Mexico had survived but just ahead in the early twentieth century was another challenge called the revolution.

Canada’s path toward state building was evolutionary. Canada did not seek a dramatic break from Britain; rather, its interests were more compatible with British interests. During the nineteenth century, Canada was focused on becoming a modern country allied with Britain. At the same time, it sought to keep the United States at arms’ length. To survive as a separate and distinct state able to resist absorption by the United States, Canada delayed its eventual separation from Britain. The British North American Act of 1867 and the Charter of Rights of 1982 formalized the gradual movement of Canada away from its colonial past. Slow in coming, state building in Canada was negotiated rather than contested with the colonial master.

Intra-regional relations during much of this time did little to promote a sense of continental unity. True, the United States had come to terms with its neighbors over demarcating common borders. More generally, a relative certain calm descended upon North America by as early as the turn of the twentieth century. Still, isolation and indifference among the three also typified relations. As the United States became a world power, its interests became riveted on more pressing global problems and trouble spots. The Cold War and Third World insurrections later in the twentieth century only served to reinforce this. For its part, Canada had a trans Atlantic rather than pan American perspective during the nineteenth and even much of the twentieth century. It was not until 1989 that Canada joined the Organization of American States. Canadian self-preservation was linked to keeping the United States at bay. To put it another way, closer integration with the United States could have consequences for Canadian survival as a unified state.

The U.S. goal earlier in the twentieth century was to disengage Canada from Britain rather than to integrate Canada with the United States (Stewart, 1992: 185). Mexico had its own reasons for keeping the United States at arms’ length. The “Barbarian to the North” had become an economic threat rather than a territorial one. From a nationalist point of view, what the United States did not take from Mexico with the sword it could do with the dollar. In the early twentieth century, the Mexican Revolution reinforced this nationalist and statist resistance to U.S. domination. For Mexico even more than Canada, it seemed prudent at the time to be a “distant neighbor” of the United States.

While state building, territorial disputes, tension, and conflict at times characterized North American relations well into the twentieth century, the roots of regionalism were also being slowly nourished in potentially fertile soil. All three states gradually came to terms with their North American neighborhood and with each other. Despite their diversity, the states of North America shared a great deal, including Western cultural traditions, democratic ideology, and capitalist systems. While economic size, levels of development, and political differences kept them apart, these commonalities nestled within an isolated neighborhood made regionalism a possible but by no means inevitable priority.

The most important historical antecedent for regionalism prior to the 1980s was the economic benefits of greater cooperation. This suggested that it would be better for one and all to pursue a liberal strategy of bandwagoning with the United States rather than the nationalist strategy of balancing
against it. As the proverbial moth is drawn to the flame, Canada and Mexico understood the benefits of the U.S. embrace but feared its consequences for their own independence. This theme of nationalist resistance to—and the liberal embrace of—closer ties permeate the historical evolution of regionalism in North America.

Nationalism and liberalism are uniquely revealing in the Canada-U.S. relationship. The United States practiced high tariff protectionism in the nineteenth century while Canada sought reciprocal trade agreements. However, in 1854, both signed a reciprocal trade agreement that allowed for limited free trade in natural resources. In 1866, the United States abrogated the treaty in 1866. Domestic pressures and national resentment over Canadian actions during the U.S. civil war made it politically expendable (Doern and Tomlin, 1991: 57-58). By the end of the century, tariffs and protectionism had once again allowed the nationalist, statist trend to overwhelm the liberal, integrationist one.

In the twentieth century, the oscillation between the two tendencies in bilateral relations continued. By 1910, the United States had once again favored reciprocal free trade with Canada. A year later, the national elections in Canada made free trade with the United States a pivotal issue. Framed as a choice between "Canadianism or Continentalism", free trade with the United States was decisively rejected at the polls. Fear and wariness once again overcame the promise from greater cooperation. Reciprocal free trade was not a realistic hope as a long-term solution.

Despite this setback for free trade regionalism, regionalisation went ahead. By the 1920s, U.S. economic penetration of the Canadian economy had overtaken British involvement, forming a "cash nexus" between the two economies (Granatstein and Hillmer, 1991: 86). In the early days of the depression, the nationalist tendency gained momentum. The United States and Canada raised tariffs against each other and against others. Still, by the late 1930s, the liberal tendency made something of a comeback. Franklin Roosevelt and MacKenzie King, the two national leaders of the time, were able to get bilateral tariff reductions on some natural resources and commodities in 1938, reducing tariffs and excise taxes covering 60 to 80 per cent of the export trade between the two countries (Granatstein and Hillmer, 1991: 116). Canada regarded this breakthrough as pragmatic; the U.S. negotiators saw it as a small step toward eventual economic integration (Diebold, 1988: 24).

While multilateralism was the liberal economic credo of the United States and Canada in the post World War II reconstruction of the world economy, nationalist and liberal tendencies continued to shape the U.S.-Canadian bond during the decades following World War II. The nationalist tendency peaked in the 1970s. The United States and Canada clashed openly over the protectionist positions the other took. The 1971 import surcharge levied to stem balance of trade problems antagonized Canada as well as many other U.S. trade partners. Canadian fears about U.S. power even led President Nixon to promise Prime Minister Trudeau that the United States would not "gobble up" Canada (Granatstein and Hillmer, 1991: 250). Canada sought to regulate U.S. involvement in its economy through the Foreign Investment Review Agency and the National Energy Program.

By the 1980s, the nationalist tendency faded into the background in favor of the liberal one. The Foreign Investment Review Agency reversed course. Rather than regulate foreign investment, the agency, renamed Investment Canada, sought to encourage it. For its part, the United States under the pro-business Reagan administration seemed even more than ever to be promoting economic liberalism at home and, to some extent, abroad.

Mexico's relations with the United States also reflect the historical antecedents of tension and collaboration. The struggle between nationalism and liberalism shaped U.S.-Mexican relations for decades. Like Canada, Mexico had become economically dependent on the United States long before the Mexican state officially adopted liberalism or regionalism in its relations with the United States. The Mexican Revolution (1910-1921) was a watershed in U.S.-Mexico economic relations. With a new state based upon authoritarianism, corporatism, and protectionism, Mexico nationalized U.S. petroleum interests in 1938. In the decades to come, it adopted the import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy to bring about "stabilizing development". This favored and protected Mexican industries over foreign investors. The government used subsidies, sky-high tariffs, non-tariff barriers, anti-competitive policies, state ownership of major businesses, and a host of other interventionist policies to keep U.S. dominance at bay. And, for a time, this strategy seemed to work. Yet, once the Mexican Miracle of "stabilizing development" had run its course in the 1970s and 1980s, the nationalist and statist approach to economic development was discredited and abandoned. In 1982, Mexico's default on the foreign debt, much of it to private banks, marked the end of an era for Mexican economic policy. After a dosage of austerity, in which public spending was slashed in the mid-1980s, Mexico launched a liberal program of economic liberalization.
economic reform program that opened up the economy to foreign investment and to freer trade with its 1986 accession to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and through Mexican efforts to reach a liberal accommodation with its most important trading partner (de Mateo, 1988: 175). In 1990, Mexico decided to go all the way when it proposed a free trade agreement with the United States. No longer would the liberal tendency be subservient to the nationalist one in terms of basic economic and trade policy. By adopting privatization, fiscal restraint, free trade, and deregulation, Mexico took a major leap toward promoting North American regionalism by seeking greater ties with the United States.

Global Factors

The historical antecedents set the stage for, but also set limits on, the New Regionalism in North America that emerged during the late twentieth century. Global factors had a great deal of influence on the North American states; without them, it would be hard to imagine that North American regionalism would have gotten its start. The desirability of all three North American states working more closely with each other within a liberal framework can only be fully understood within the context of global challenges.

What global factors encouraged the North American states to invent a region focused on trade and investment rules? Much has been written about globalisation as a transformative force in the world political economy. Globalisation is the process of integrating across national borders a host of economic, technological, and other human activities. It is often associated with the tighter integration of financial markets, internationalisation of corporate strategies, cross-national production schemes, diffusion of technologies, coordination of national regulatory capabilities, a diminished role for the state, and cultural exchange through consumer markets (Petrella, 1996: 64).

Along with globalisation comes regionalisation. The tendency for economic regions to emerge in a globalising economy certainly was not lost on the North American three. Regions are part of globalisation in two ways. They are also a response to globalisation and even help to drive it. Regionalism is a state policy that encourages the kinds of changes common to globalisation but it does so in a more geographically limited area. Therefore, regionalism uses the state to extend preferences to some but not to all. Regionalism becomes selective globalisation.

U.S. power in the world also influenced regionalism in North America. The United States converted to economic regionalism in its own neighborhood because it was seen as one way to bolster U.S. influence in an increasingly competitive world of states, regions, and firms. In other words, although the United States is the last superpower, its ability to manage the entire world economy is relatively constrained by the diffusion of economic power, especially to the Asia Pacific and to the European Union. By organizing its own economic sphere of influence, the United States was engaged in a geoeconomic strategy that promised subtle and political advantages in dealing with bilateral, regional, and multilateral negotiations over how the world political economy would take shape in the post Cold War world.

Multilateralism was also a motive for regionalism in North America. NAFTA was part of a U.S. strategy for leveraging members of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. This was another reason why the United States sought a regional response to global challenges. By adopting the disciplines of NAFTA in the areas of services, agriculture, and intellectual property rights, to name just a few. The United States was able to communicate to its economic rivals and partners within GATT that it was able and willing to pursue its own economic policies even without their agreement in the Uruguay Round. Of course, NAFTA was also seen as a regional device to push ahead the multilateral process. And to some extent, it probably did this. Still, NAFTA, when it was first implemented in 1994, was far more attuned to U.S. preferences than was the outcome of the Uruguay Round in the same year.

North American regionalism was also a response to the increasing regionalisation of the world economy. The tripolar regions of Asia Pacific, Europe, and North America account for most of the world’s trade; most of the world’s trade is also intra-regional. The regionalisation of the Asia Pacific, in which Japan remained dominant, and the regionalism and regionalisation of the European Union, in which deepening and widening both led to a more coherent integrative experiment, all signaled to the United States, Mexico, and Canada that it was time to band together on their own. The three great economic
regions confirm the view that globalisation and regionalisation taken together are arenas for balancing balance unity against diversity in the evolving world economy (Grilli, 1997: 194-233). North America simply reaffirmed once again that RIAs like NAFTA can exist within a globalized market economy (Stalllings and Streek, 1995; 67).

North American regionalism was also a response targeted at the Asia Pacific and the European Union as distinct regions. In the late 1980s, the United States was particularly concerned about Japanese trade policies, U.S. trade deficits with Japan, and the inability of Japan or the United States to find a satisfactory rapprochement over trade and investment issues. NAFTA was meant to bolster U.S. leverage in dealing with its ongoing dispute with Japan. Years of public recrimination on both sides and interminable squabbles over export and investment policies helped the U.S. trade negotiators to come to the conclusion that inventing North America might be a way of putting pressure on the Japanese to make concessions over non-tariff barriers and domestic economic reforms. If NAFTA was aimed at any one country, that country was Japan. North America was not a fortress with a moat around it; rather, the United States used regionalism to influence Japanese behavior in general and to put Japan’s trade with North America on terms more favorable to the United States. This was done through the use of certain protectionist provisions in NAFTA, such as rules of origin, which encouraged Japan to invest more in the United States in order to take advantage of national content requirements. NAFTA was therefore a part of U.S. trade policy for dealing with Japan.

In Europe, the United States faced a larger, more formally organized trade bloc. The deepening and widening of the European Union (EU) presented the United States with opportunities and challenges for which a North American response might be useful. Although the United States has long applauded the single market and other measures to integrate the European Union more closely, it was becoming evident that the EU, through its monetary policy and sheer economic weight, might one day be a rival as well as a partner with North America in managing global economic relations. It was not merely the different path the EU was taking but it was also the fact that the EU members were taking common positions on economic policy, such as the multilateral negotiations in the World Trade Organization. In other words, there would be EU policies on agricultural subsidies and other areas such as service liberalization, all vital and contentious for North America. The EU had to be dealt with as a more or less coherent bloc rather than as fifteen different members. Moreover, although the EU is a liberalizing force within Europe and in the world, it did not necessarily accept U.S. positions on how to do this. North American regionalism was therefore a response to EU development.

Finally, North American regionalism was an attempt to have one’s cake and eat it too. On the one hand, the United States, Canada, and Mexico had embraced the market principles of globalisation. On the other, each wanted to use state policy to stack the rules slightly in their favor as the world becomes more competitive. Although North American regionalism clearly tilts toward markets, NAFTA allows the states to make rules over which the three can exercise more control. Rather than put all of their eggs in one basket, the North American triumvirate is able to play both ends against the middle. North American regionalism accepts globalisation but on North American terms.

Regional Factors

North America had its own role in inventing itself as a region. It was not just responding passively to larger cross currents within the world political economy of the late twentieth century. There are three vital intra-regional factors that, coming together when they did, made it possible for the North American states to push for a more formal embodiment of North American unity. These three factors are convergence, coalitions, and regionalised interdependence.

Convergence refers to the gradual coming closer together if not actual merging of perspectives, interests, and policies on matters of trade, investment, and other issues related to economic liberalism. What occurred during the last decade or so of the twentieth century was that a North American preference emerged in which all three states agreed to adopt common policies on how to treat each other within a liberal economic framework. Free trade became the banner for this convergence but it involved far more than that. The United States, Canada, and Mexico agreed to a generally liberal template in NAFTA that would make investment, intellectual property rights, dispute settlement, agriculture, services (including finance), and other issues a central part of their more closely integrated region. Reciprocity, national treatment, liberalisation of services as well as traded goods, and equality
in dispute settlement mechanisms all became important pillars for a shared convergence over a more liberal and open intra-regional economy. The many years of nationalist and statist resistance to a more open and deregulated regional economy had given way as all three states for the time being embraced, at least in broad terms, the precepts and disciplines of market economies. This convergence did not mean complete liberalisation, however. Exemptions, limitations, and outright protectionism (such as U.S. “fair” trade laws) were also imbedded in NAFTA.

Coalitions were also vital for regionalism. Free trade coalitions within all three states made it possible to arrive at the two agreements, CUFTA and NAFTA. Without the virtually simultaneous emergence of these domestic coalitions in all three countries during the late 1980s and the early 1990s, an important ingredient necessary for the evolution of North American regionalism would have been missing.

In the United States, the conservative bent in national politics during the 1980s (or as some call it, the Reagan Revolution) helped to tilt domestic policy toward greater economic liberalism and, along with it, toward free trade within North America. Business, southern Reagan Democrats, the radical right, and much of the middle class fell in line behind the drift to the conservative agenda. Although free trade had been growing as a priority for a time within the United States, the Reagan years saw a renewed commitment to pro-business policies that free trade would strengthen. Although free trade in the region did not become official policy until later in the 1980s, some advisors within the Reagan circle had toyed with the idea even before 1981 (Orme, 1996: 35). But, despite this early support, the Republican agenda in the Reagan administration only later adopted free trade as an important priority. By the mid-1980s, Reagan and Mulroney, the “two Irishmen”, had used personal summity to arrive at the point that the United States and Canada signed a bilateral free trade agreement. This free trade coalition in the United States was stronger for the Canadian agreement and faced less domestic opposition than was true for NAFTA a few years later.

Canadian politics took a turn towards free trade during the 1980s as well. As in 1911, free trade once again stirred passions. A coalition of union leaders, academics, artists, women's groups, churches, charitable organizations, and even some industrial and agricultural leaders were skeptical or opposed to such an agreement with the United States. On the other hand, the Tory government of Brian Mulroney adopted free trade as its own soon after it got into power in the early 1980s. This was an important shift in economy policy. What is more, the business community, especially those from larger firms and industries, also came to see free trade as a necessary component of Canadian national economic policy (Bothwell, 1992: 149; Vernon, Spar, and Tobin, 1991: 27). But free trade was not the only issue. Mulroney's government was also trying to get a new agreement on the status of Quebec in Canada and, at the same time, he was trying to build a Tory majority that would endure for years (Lusztig, 1996: 71). This ambitious agenda came crashing down by 1993; only the free trade agreement survived the debacle of the Tory agenda in the 1990s. Unlike the United States, Canada's coalition had little difficulty in getting NAFTA approved.

Mexico's free trade coalition was the most far reaching because Mexico's history of support for multilateral free trade was less than a decade old and it had never been eager to embrace a liberal, free trade relationship with the United States until 1990. Commitments Mexico made to free trade were possible due to shift of power within domestic politics. Mexico had for years been ruled by a nationalist-statist coalition based on the Revolutionary party. However, the collapse of the ISI model in the early 1980s and the onslaught of the “lost decade” led to changes of tectonic proportions in Mexico's politics. By 1988, the ruling party had been able to retain control and maintain its authoritarian grip on the country but it also had become a neoliberal bastion of technocrats and politicians who forged strong links with sectors of the business community. This meant that the party had moved away from heavy public spending, government ownership, tariff protection, and other anti-liberal policies. Under Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), Mexico launched a counterrevolution in policy that moved the ruling coalition toward neoliberal policies at home and free trade policies in the world and in the region (Poitras and Robertson, 1994).

Regionalised interdependence is the third factor pushing the three states to invent North America as a region. Economic interdependence within North America is unique for all three states. Trade and other economic exchanges are far more intense within North America than they are between North America and the rest of the global economy. This goes well beyond trade, investment, and production to include cross-border transactions, cultural interchange, technology transfer, environmental issues, migration, crime and drug trafficking, and increasing transnational connections in civil society. Of
course, the prime movers are businesses and firms. Although they are the heavy hitters in this kind of interdependence, they share the stage with an amazingly complex array of private, public, and non-profit organizations.

Money is not everything in this regionalised interdependence but it is clearly compelling. Canada and Mexico are the top two trading partners of the United States. The United States is the largest market for North American exports. It is a two way street as well. By the early 1990s, Canadian firms invested more in actual dollars in the United State than the other way around (Harrison, 1997: 59). Mexico is increasingly becoming tied to the United States, although Canadian ties to Mexico remain marginal yet growing. Like Canada, Mexico mostly trades with the United States. What is more, as the currency crisis pointed out in 1995, mutual vulnerability between Mexico and the United States means that U.S. capital and Mexican financial stability are closely linked. Put differently, the United States has become interdependent with Canada and with Mexico in ways that are found only among very developed economies elsewhere in the world. Regionalised interdependence is a more unique, intense variety of exchange that strongly inclines all three North American states toward a deliberate policy of regionalism.

What Kind Of Regionalism?

The historical antecedents within North America extending well into the late twentieth century, the global changes in the political economy and U.S. power, and important regional factors involving policy and structure all contributed to the evolution of North American regionalism. But what kind of region is it or will it become? Regionalism in North America is a work in progress. It will be some time, if ever, when we have a definitive answer to this question.

North American regionalism is unique and innovative, leaving a distinct character on this particular brand of the New Regionalism. But it is also a breed of regionalism that emerged from a particular historical context. And this may well affect how its future. Although North America as a region may evolve in the twenty first century, its original incarnation and its evolutionary development point to certain characteristics that limit its potential to create a region that is considerably more integrated as a community than it now is. Finally, North American regionalism is a strategy rather than a goal. In other words, as a free trade area with some innovative measures, it adopts liberalism in trade and investment and includes provisions on services, IPRs, and the environment going beyond traditional RIAs. Yet it was not originally meant to be, and may indeed never become, a state-led effort to create a highly integrated region in which North America is in some sense greater than the sum of its parts.

This notion of North American regionalism leaves most of the important prerogatives for the future in the hands of public leaders and private groups within each national society. There is no great movement toward a supranational regional structure for making decisions about inventing North America’s future, despite the fact that the dispute settlement panels of the RIAs to deal with trade and related issues may tilt in that direction.

When all is said and done, North American regionalism is a distinctive invention. Essentially, it is a limited partnership of two developed countries and one developing country. More formal and institutionalized than the Asia Pacific yen bloc, or even the more far flung Asia Pacific Exporting Countries forum (APEC), it may continue its own evolutionary path or even become linked to a broader experiment in regionalism such as the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). Regionalism may have a future in North America. However, what may happen is that the architecture of a more integrated regionalism in North America may emerge not from conscious design but rather from necessity or convenience. Regionalisation may be the prime mover of North America as a region in the future. Inventing North America as a premeditated act of state-led innovation may then be only one option for moving North America toward a more integration region in the world.

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Globalisation and Regionalisation: An Historical Approach

Globalization is today a buzz word, even if studies regarding this issue from an historical point of view are still at a very early stage. I put this historiography lack down to the general trend, when speaking about globalization, to refer only to the contemporary age.

Economists, indeed, use to set the beginning of the globalization process in the eighties and nineties, and only a few of them consider the seventies as the starting period of this process.

The first reflection should be focused on the periodization.

I consider Ludwig Dehio’s statement as a reference. While before Second World War -Dehio said-nothing outside Europe was intelligible without referring to the European system, after that nothing, in Europe as well as all over the world, was intelligible without referring to the World States’ system.

From an historiographical point of view, we can speak about globalization since the birth of the World States system. So, when? For sure, it is correct to consider Second World War as a turning point, marking the historical death of the European State system, being the European States turned into “dust without substance”, and the birth of the new World System of States, dominated by the USA and the USSR.

It is important to point out that this is nothing but the last act of a long process, that slowly crossed the whole eighteen century.

If the transition from the European to the World-States System can be considered achieved only after the Second World War, and if the period between the two wars recorded what Dehio describes as the “agony of European-States System”, this transition has been evident from the end of the eighteen century and the beginning of the nineteen century, and it has shown its warning signs since the end of the seventeenth century, with its two great revolutions - the French one and the Industrial one - which deeply modified the international context, establishing the basis for both horizontal integration - with the cancellation of barriers among social classes, and the rise of democracy - and vertical integration - with the abolition of physical entry-barriers among the States.

The last two centuries - as highlighted by Bairoch and Hobsbawm - have recorded an unsurpassed change in the human society. Yet in the last fifty years before the First World War, under the British flag of free-trade, it took place a unique (and surprisingly free) global system of economic transactions and goods exchange, together with a dramatic increase of cross border trade and emigration flows.

Although offset in 1914, this trend came to a new - and even stronger - life, after Second World War, under the US political and economic power of and the US currency steadiness.

After the two World Wars, new technologies, based on scientific research, transformed the speed and range of communications and transportation, allowing globalization and automation of the industrial processes.

A second point seems to emerge from the historical perspective: the duel between hegemony and balance of powers, between division and desire of union, was perpetuated within the World-wide organization of States. Nevertheless there is a relevant difference, which stiffens the system: inside the world system there are no more marginal States, but only States which are part of the system.

The current globalization process of the economy can be seen, from an historical standpoint, as the last evidence, in a political system enlarged to the whole globe, of the long-lasting process which, in the ages, is represented by the aim at unification.

If the first and fundamental law of the European-States system was to avoid the unification of the continent under the hegemony of one of them, with the consequent loss of sovereignty, -from there the coalition that defeated Charles V, Philip II and Luis XIV, Napoleon and Hitler- it seems to me that
moving to the field of the World-States System, the necessity to avoid hegemonic unification at a worldwide level is deeply felt. The danger of cultural, social, political hegemony implied by globalization, although different from the past, set us in front of the same queries and alternatives.

I wonder: can unlimited globalization become a new form of hegemony?

Certainly, the trend to unity is not positive or negative in itself: unity is hegemony as well as democratic federal State. The main issue is how this unit is realized, how globalization is affirmed. On one side, there is the great prospect of a world unification, which will put an end to the conflicts among states, realizing, according to Kant, the sovereignty of reason in history; but on the other side there is the danger of a discordant development.

I wonder: is it possible to affirm that today we are facing the same alternative - balance or hegemony, as in the past - transferred to a worldwide level?

Here I come to a third and last reflection concerning the role that, in this context, the continental integration processes may assume.

At a worldwide level, the historical decadence of national States which did not reach continental dimension, has shown its warning sign since the end of the nineteenth century, at the age of the late industrial revolution.

The outstanding States have been those provided with continental spaces, or great colonial empires (such as Great Britain).

After the age of colonialism the only alternative was the amplification of the States size, in a form neither national nor imperialistic nor hegemonic but democratic and federal. A unification which reconciles unity and differences, which makes possible the sharing of sovereignty at several degrees, and therefore pluralism.

Can regionalization be considered as an attempt to face an out-of-control process by single national State, which can no more oppose with efficacy to hegemonic trends?

Does not regionalization risk to bear in itself a conservative, defensive, potentially protectionistic, somehow nationalistic trend? Doesn’t it risk to create the same barriers which made the national State oppressive and despotic?

Moreover, can the opposition to political regionalization be considered as a tendency to maintain the economic supremacy of the industrialized States over the other ones?

Historically, we can point out some moments in which the two strategies of the construction of a new world system were opposed. Between the first and the second World War the Atlantic and the European alternatives compete everywhere it was possible, that’s to say at movements level.

In the second post-war period, during the consolidation phase of a new international order, we can single out two different trends. On one side the creation of international institutions and organizations (ONU, IMF, Bretton Woods, GATT, FAO, World Bank, UNICEF, ITO and linked entities), on the other side the creation of continental or regional institutions (OECE, CECA, MEC, COMECON, SEATO).

This dichotomy is peculiar to the second post-war period, during which regionalization projects are opposed to globalization. We can think to Roosevelt’s Grand Design, parallel with the projects of continental European integration. Besides, let’s think to the opposition between De Gaulle’s political community project and Kennedy’s project of a large area of free trade, in the sixties.

This “paper” is more in the nature of a “report” -- designed to give potentially interested colleagues in the International Relations field some information concerning a collaborative research project that has been taking shape over the past 18 months. At this point, the undertaking described here is still very much malleable and open-ended: while the outline of certain components is quite clear, others are still being delineated or are only barely contemplated. Opportunities for further growth and enrichment are therefore plentiful, so it seems desirable to disseminate information and invite feedback.

I have included several items in this report, of varying lengths: 1. an overview of the origins of the research project; 2. information concerning the project’s inaugural conference (held at the Eisenhower Center in New Orleans in November 1999) and portions of the “preparatory essay” that was distributed in advance of the conference; 3. some information concerning ongoing or upcoming efforts.

Part 1: Origins and background

“Growing the System” took root when my personal research agenda began to move in new directions – and when discussion of these directions prompted interested responses from numerous colleagues.

In my own case, the most relevant specific source was my ongoing work on a biography of John Foster Dulles. An initial interest in the European issues that had dominated Dulles’s earlier legal and diplomatic career had gradually expanded to include attention to the wider range of questions that filled his agenda during the Eisenhower presidency. Although I generally remained convinced that transatlantic issues were Dulles’s highest priority, that is, I could not escape the fact that he was forced to spend a great deal of time in dealing with Asian, Middle Eastern, and Latin American problems. And as I began to pursue archival research on tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the Suez Crisis, and hostile Washington reactions to developments in Guatemala and Cuba(among others), I began to be intrigued by the way in which Dulles – and Eisenhower and others – constantly moved from one “hotspot” in the international arena to another and constantly juggled two, three, or more of what might be seen as quasi-local, quasi-global hand grenades. I began to see Dulles as a prototype of the mid-20th century leader coming to grips with a globalized environment – and trying to manage the sometimes dangerous, sometimes enticing currents of that environment.

As I talked over some of my thoughts with colleagues in Europe, North America, and Asia – at conferences and workshops, as well as on the wings of e-mail exchanges – I found a good deal of interest in the analytical concepts I merely been playing with at first. Some of the interest was sparked, I’m sure, by late 1990s interest in anything connected with the term “globalization.” Some came as well, however, from what I believe is a fairly wide-spread feeling that discussions of “globalization” have often been too much permeated by the jargon and sometimes glib theorizing of political science and sociology: might historians bring important insights to the scholarly table and enrich both debate and understanding in the process?

Very tentative discussions moved toward speculation about more systematic explorations. As a way of testing out possibilities, I drafted and circulated what I thought of as a “prospectus” – and I include it portions of it here as a way of rounding out a sketch of the collaborative project’s earliest days:

Growing the System: The Evolution of Global Management Efforts, 1950-75

Background/Logic:
The idea for a “Growing the System” research project owes much to the special atmosphere of the “post-Cold War” years – with its counterpoint of anxiety and exhilaration concerning the structures of “a new
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world order.” The collapse of the Soviet Union, the dramatic emergence of important Asian players in international affairs, the galloping advance of the “information age,” sharper sensitivity to environmental problems: these and other developments have made it clear that many familiar (and perhaps more comfortable) norms will be insufficient for those wanting to avoid confusion or worse in the 21st century. New definitions of “security” are emerging, going beyond the predominantly military cast fostered by World War II and the Cold War. New approaches to the conduct of economic life are taking shape as well, with increasing emphasis on both regional and global interdependency. A precisely reconfigured model is not yet in place, but it is obvious that the “system” by which global affairs are managed – and through which solutions to global problems are sought – is experiencing significant re-engineering.

The collaborative research project is designed to enrich understanding of the emerging “new world order” by studying a key earlier stage of “global management” efforts: Careful analysis of the 1950-75 period reveals important roots of current development; increased awareness of these roots, in turn, illuminates key facets of present-day problems.

One of the immediate dividends offered by a study of the 1950-75 period is the realization that current preoccupations with devising a stable and efficient international system are really part of a longer historical process. We are not, in the late 1990s, dealing with totally new problems – whatever the prevalence of the “post-Cold War” label might suggest. From the 1940s on, at the least, various political and economic leaders sought to develop processes and institutions that would help avoid duplication of devastating global crises like the Depression and World War II. Early years saw choppy progress, to be sure, give a context plagued by rapid escalation of Cold War tensions and the need to recuperate from wartime destruction. Beginning in the 1950s, however, important shifts occurred in the experiences of both individual states and regions: “long haul” conceptualizations of the Cold War and even hints of detente (dating from the Geneva “summit” conference) grew into developments like Ostpolitik and the Nixon-Kissinger breakthrough with China; the success of the European Common Market and Japanese industrial/technological recovery shifted global economic dynamics away from the patterns that had characterized a brief period of thorough U.S. dominance; surging nationalism and anti-colonialism altered both the maps and methods of dealing with Asia, Africa, and Latin America; powerful “multinational corporations” raised questions about the potency of the traditional “nation state.

Questions:

The collaborative research project aims to yield a clearer understanding of this eventful quarter century span in and of itself – and to apply such an understanding to the global management issues of the present day. It will work toward these objectives by essentially applying a “systems analysis” approach to the 1950-75 period. Among key questions that will figure in research and deliberations are the following:

• how far did the conceptualization of an interdependent “global” arena develop between 1950 and 1975? In particular, did political and economic leaders consciously see global developments as major priorities ...as opposed, for example, to thinking in predominantly regional terms? i.e., were their definitions of key problems couched in global terms?

• were there conscious efforts to manage global affairs in this period – as opposed to ad hoc linkages or processes that only implicitly suggested the evolution of global approaches...or as opposed to efforts to manage regional and other more finite clusters of relationships?

• what global management tools were utilized or developed – either explicitly or implicitly? How much attention was paid to bilateral vs. multilateral vs. regional mechanisms – and was there any sensitivity to strains inherent in making choices between such varied approaches?

• how successful were nascent global management tools? As far as contemporaries were concerned, were there ongoing efforts to monitor progress in dealing with perceived problems, i.e., attempts to delineate what seemed to be “working”...attempts to comprehend why some efforts were not? Did flexibility or resistance to further change characterize ongoing problem-solving efforts? And what judgments might be offered from the vantage point of the 1990s? What does hindsight tell us about the balance between the “costs” and “benefits” of early global management efforts?

Many of these questions are relevant to analysis of current global interdependence, of course – which is simply another way of highlighting the prospective resonance of historical research along these lines. To put it even more positively, efforts of historians can add several dimensions to any study of
contemporary issues that inadvertently proceeds without historical sensitivity. The experiences of the 1950-75 period offer up a wide range of “comparables” of great potential value to an understanding of present-day problems, for example. And it is of special significance that an understanding of such comparables would be based on substantial access to the archival records of governments and institutions: this kind of deep research, virtually impossible with respect to current affairs, can be extremely useful in sensitizing analysts to factors or dynamics that are often less obvious in interviews or the public record. Indeed, the availability of archives is a key reason for focusing on the specific 1950-75 period.

How to Proceed?
Because “Growing the System” has the potential to become a large-scale and complex international research project, it seems desirable to approach collaborative efforts in a step-by-step fashion – to gradually build toward results that may be only partially predictable at the beginning. Such a process would benefit greatly from both a series of conferences and workshops and a cluster of inter-related research teams.

Early discussions suggest a three-year, preliminary schedule:

Autumn 1999: An exploratory conference that will provide an opportunity to survey in a preliminary fashion many issues of potential relevance to the project’s partners – and to add in-person synergies to ongoing planning efforts.

2000 – 2001: The goal for this two year period would be the convening of several initial “workshops” on more specialized subjects with distinct “teams” of scholars developed for each: the subjects would be relevant to the broad theme of the collaborative project as a whole, but would have “stand alone” value as well.

An enormous range of topics and issues could figure in the inaugural conference and in subsequent workshops. Choices of specific foci should gradually be made on the basis of the shared interests and priorities of project partners and teams. Some of the possibilities would include the following:

• The experiences of various governments. There is some temptation to emphasize the most powerful international powers, however, some attention should also be directed to middle-level and weaker states. (E.g., Austria, Yugoslavia, India, Egypt, Brazil: studying the experiences of such countries as they interacted with both the “great powers” and the global arena as a whole would have much to contribute to “systems analysis” of the 1950-75 period).

• The experiences of prominent political leaders, especially those with a measure of intellectual affinity for “global” conceptualization and developments: e.g., Eisenhower, Dulles, Nixon, Kissinger, deGaulle, Brandt, Khrushchev, Mao, Zhou – Kreisky, Tito, Nehru, Nasser.

• The evolution and experiences of various institutions, e.g., the U.N., N.A.T.O., O.E.C.D., G.A.T.T., the World Bank, the European Common Market, O.P.E.C.

• “Globalization” in the “private” sector: the growth and evolution of multinational corporations – and the outlooks/experience of private sector leaders.

• Key “realms” or “fields” in which globalization and “global management is particularly relevant: e.g., oil; food; communication; banking; advanced technology.

• Key “issues” where globalization and global management can be studied especially effectively: e.g., disarmament or control of nuclear weapons; “development” and “nation-building” in the post-colonial age; trade and currency regulation; environmental problems.

Late 2001: Another larger-scale conference could then be held in 2001 – to allow interaction between the research groups involved in the early series of workshops. Partners and participants would also consider here the possibility of extending the collaborative project.

If it seems desirable to go forward, a planning committee could set to work during 2002 (while additional workshops continued to be held): such a group would be given the responsibility of charting a new three to five year gamelan and approaching various foundations regarding support.
At this point, continuation of the collaborative project would seem to be a distinct possibility. The 1999-2002 schedule will involve conferences, workshops, and publishing efforts that are thoroughly worthwhile in and of themselves – yet, at the same time, they will focus only on selected facets of the broad “global management” and “globalization” themes. In some cases, for example, early workshops may suggest the logic of ongoing work concerning certain topics (e.g., Latin America and the global arena; “trilateralism,” etc.) In other cases, limited attention during one or two sessions at a larger conference may point toward the logic of expanded collaboration. It would be easy to envision further attention to any of the following, for instance:

- environmental problems and global management
- the role of multinational corporations
- technology and global management
- the evolution of trade practices and regimes
- the Arab world and the global arena
- Africa and the global arena
- the evolution of the United Nations
- what happened after 1975?

Part 2: Inaugural Conference – and Preparatory Essay

I will not review all of the complicated discussions and exchanges that followed circulation of this “prospectus.” Suffice it to say here that a welcome opportunity to test possibilities and “launch” what might or might not survive as a collaborative project was eventually provided by the Eisenhower Center in New Orleans. The Center offered to host a small exploratory conference for the “Growing the System” project in the autumn of 1999.

It was decided to focus on key individual leaders at this first meeting: to consider “globalization”/“global management” from a biographical perspective in order to give the subject a (perhaps) more immediately accessible and “human” face. This turned out to have a deceptively simple sound to it, however. In fact, few potential biographer/participants – myself very much included – had actually grappled in any precise way with the connections between their subjects’ lives and the “globalization” phenomenon. As a result, early conversations and e-mail exchanges concerning the specific content and thrust of invited conference papers became increasingly complex: Just what did the conference organizers want participants to address in their papers? What questions needed to be answered or issues addressed?

To address at least some of the numerous and very sensible questions, I attempted to prepare the ground for the New Orleans conference by circulating what I called a “preparatory essay.” For me, at least (and I think for others), it proved to be a useful exercise. I will append it to this report – and, indeed, I think it will offer the greatest measure of detail here concerning the focus (to date) of the “Growing the System” project.

The New Orleans conference proved to be an extremely interesting gathering. The “leaders” considered included Willy Brandt, Jimmy Carter, Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, John Foster Dulles, Ludwig Erhard, J. William Fulbright, Paul Hoffmann, Nikita Khrushchev, Henry Kissinger, Bruno Kreisky, Mao Tse-tung, Jean Monnet, Gamal Abdul Nasser, Jawarlahal Nehru, and Thomas Watson; there was also a very useful “group portrait” paper dealing with Japanese leaders of the 1950s-60s. Analytical discussions moved in many directions during the conference and two “procedural” observations stood out as we moved along. First, many of us were struck by the fact that we were a group of participants who had rarely worked with each other at other conferences – and that there was much to be gained from comparing leaders and experiences that were often considered within the confines of separate boxes or compartments. In this respect, it was precisely the focus on “globalization” that encouraged or even forced historians to break through some traditional boundary lines. Second, the participants unanimously concluded that the ground explored in New Orleans deserved further development – both with respect to publication of a volume of papers dealing with the leaders we had been discussing and comparing and with respect to further historical research concerning the “globalization”/“global management” theme.
Part 3: The Road Ahead

Even before the New Orleans conference was held, plans were being settled for further steps in the development of the “Growing the System” project. Let me outline just a few of the events and efforts that have now taken shape:

A. Scholars at Bonn University, the University of Cologne, the National University of Singapore and the University of Toronto are working together on a study of decolonization and post-colonial development in the post-World War II era. Attention will be paid to the relevance of both increasing interconnectedness in the global arena and evolving “First World” desires to “manage” complex economic and strategic developments. A first “workshop” in this undertaking will be held in Singapore in February 2001 and will focus on decolonization in Southeast Asia. A second workshop will be held in late 2001 and will focus on Africa.

B. From September 2000 through April 2001, the Center for International Studies at the University of Toronto will be holding a seminar series focused on the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Participants in the series will consider the connections between historical developments and current controversies. Valuable in and of itself, the seminar series is also designed to explore the possibility of a larger-scale conference dealing with the IMF and World Bank.

C. In February and March 2001, the Department of History at the University of Toronto will sponsor a series of lectures and seminars focused on “China and the World, 1949-2000.” An examination of interaction between the People's Republic of China and a globalizing international arena is designed to pave the way for further efforts focused on overall Asian experiences (as is the Singapore conference dealing with decolonization and post-colonial development in Southeast Asia).

D. In collaboration with the “Growing the System” project, the Willy Brandt Stiftung, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the Bruno Kreisky Stiftung will hold a conference dealing with “global management” efforts in the 1970s and 1980s. The conference will be held in Berlin in late 2001.

Conclusion

Other activities connected to the “Growing the System” collaborative project are also being considered or designed. A key point to underline, however, is that those of us already participating in the project share the conviction that we are still at an early stage in our efforts. We have grown more and more convinced that the interests and work we are sharing has great potential value – but we also look forward to the possibility of drawing in others and moving in directions we may be only partially conscious of at this point. I therefore offer an invitation to colleagues associated with the Commission of History of International Relations – both those present in Oslo and those unable to participate in the 10th International Congress: feel free to pass along your questions, comments, and expressions of interest! (I can be reached by fax at 416-978-4810 or by e-mail: pruessen@chass.utoronto.ca)

Attachment:


There would be something appropriately dramatic about combining the birth of a "new world order" with the dawn of a new millennium. But are the structures and processes of international relations really taking on fundamentally altered identities? Is a truly historic landmark going to be passed in synchronicity with a merely chronological one? Certainly the portents have grown ambiguous as the 1990s have run their course. Some developments have fueled optimism (and hype); others have spurred doubts. It seems safest to opt for an interim conclusion: that a clear judgment will require more time for the weighing of evidence -- and that a further consideration of both historical and future experiences should figure in the process.

George Bush’s “new world order” phraseology used simple words to convey heady images: "New": referring obliquely to the end of an often tragic and draining Cold War -- and the promise of a subsequent era of peace.
"World": pointedly underlining the assumption that beneficial changes would extend as far as the "globalization" process that had become so familiar.

"Order": the key dividend, with its implied declaration that ways were now available to manage conflict and ensure stable prosperity.

Such images are not absurdly fanciful. If there have been moments of dubious exhilaration in the past decade -- Frances Fukuyama's speculations concerning "the end of history" as we had known it, for instance421 -- there has been evidence with genuine weight as well. Early on, of course, the "Desert Storm" coalition suggested how aggression could be tamed by an international community, with energetic mobilization of resources both in and beyond the United Nations. Quietly evolving discussions within the G-7 format also revealed potential for management of the international economy. And ongoing Washington-Moscow negotiations brought steady progress toward the control of nuclear arsenals.

Initial movement toward a "new world order" also showed signs of stamina, even momentum. In the United States, for example, the Bill Clinton who emphasized domestic priorities in the 1992 election contest revealed few "isolationist" inclinations once in office. If his campaign mantra had been "It's the economy, stupid," his administration quickly made it clear that this precept would generate an active role within the international arena. Robert Rubin, Alan Greenspan, and others have constantly sought to channel the currents and tame the tempests of the global economy -- through both unilateral moves and cooperative action in the G7/8, the International Monetary Fund, and other structures. Clinton has spoken of his overall interest in "assertive multilateralism," as well, and has shown that this impulse can range freely over a spectrum of economic and strategic issues. Resulting U.S. actions have been crucial to the evolution of UN and NATO efforts to deal with a series of horrendous conflicts in recent years -- and it is entirely legitimate to see crises in Bosnia, the Korean peninsula, Somalia, Rwanda (among others) as important components of any discussion of the birth pains of a "new world order." And would anyone doubt that recent Kosovo developments will figure very large in ongoing analysis?422

But the ultimate conclusions of such ongoing analysis are hardly foreordained. Virtually every development that suggests the maturation of global order in the 1990s, in fact, has had a counterpart (or mirror image) that raises serious questions. Attempts to gauge the degree of transformation must certainly take account of the slow and clumsy choreography that preceded international action in Bosnia, Somalia, etc. -- not to mention the fragility or elusiveness of subsequent stability. Not that such problematic scenarios should be surprising. Although Cold War preoccupations have obviously faded, there has been steadily increasing sensitivity to "new" dangers and conundra. The world has seen almost one hundred civil wars since 1989, for example, far more than enough to highlight the human disasters that can be sparked by fragmentation and "micronationalism."423 Nor has there been any shortage of crises in the economic realm. For all the virtues of expanding trade and integration -- fueled in part by the glittering promise and performance of information-age technology -- Russia, Latin America, and Asia have experienced traumatic jolts. There has been no meltdown comparable to that of the 1930s, but the end of the 1990s sees less automatic satisfaction with G-7/IMF/Washington management capabilities.

I.

How to weigh the ambivalent evidence concerning the "new world order"? Should there be greater emphasis on the way international institutions and practices have progressed -- or on the limits or problematic consequences of change? Certainly the past decade has produced no consensus. Just a few examples from the ongoing debate:


422 See, for example, Timothy Garton Ash, "Kosovo: The nightmares ahead," The Independent, June 13, 1999.

Among the optimistic voices in the scholarly community, some analysts have emphasized the way the end of the Cold War has hastened a return to a multipolar world -- and the opportunities thereby opened up for "collective security" and "conflict management" systems like the 19th century's "Concert of Europe."424 Others have suggested that the brutality of conflict and war in the 20th century as a whole has finally generated a healthy measure of "social learning": as one political scientist put it, "war in the developed world may be following once-fashionable dueling into obsolescence...The conviction has now become widespread that war...would be intolerably costly, unwise, futile, and debased."425

There are more pessimistic voices as well, however. Although a shift away from bipolarity has an understandable appeal in the shadow of Soviet-American conflict, for instance, there are warnings aplenty concerning the dangers of romanticizing the charms of alternative systems: how genuinely effective was "balance of power" statesmanship in avoiding war, after all, even when it reached quite highly developed forms like the "Concert of Europe" or Bismarckian diplomacy?426 As for war going out of style, doubters point out that both weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems have spread far beyond the hypothetically sophisticated "developed" world. And how thoroughly mature are more powerful states in any event, given the scale of the arms industry in Europe and the United States -- and painfully slow arms limitation negotiations?427

There are, obviously, very different perspectives on the state and potential of the "new world order." At the least, therefore, debate will continue. And who should be surprised? It would have been hard to imagine that such a profound transformation of international relations could take place in so obvious and precisely delineated a fashion that it would leave absolutely no observers in doubt.

If further evidence is to be gathered and weighed, it should come from at last two significantly different sources -- one more obvious, but the other no less important. On one hand, of course, there will be intense attention to constantly unfolding events. The entrails of the daily news should be studied for insights into the nature of the "system" within which we are living. Inevitably, for instance -- and legitimately -- there will be careful post mortems concerning once and future developments in Kosovo. What do military operations and diplomatic maneuvers tell us about the workings and power of NATO -- and the UN? What do operations and maneuvers tell is about the way an essentially regional institution can work within a global context? What will Kosovo's -- and Serbia's -- experiences over the next several years tell us about the effectiveness (or consequences) of multilateral action and conflict management?

As valuable as it will be to track tomorrow's headlines, there is a second source of evidence that should also figure prominently in ongoing analysis of the "new world order": the past. Although phenomena like "globalization" and "global management" are often perceived as almost newly minted, they are actually very old in significant respects. As some scholars have already noted, key components and characteristics of the post-Cold War era are anchored in deeply historical processes. To intensify our attention to roots as we seek to understand present-day developments -- or to the routes which led to the specific landscape of the 1990s -- will yield important analytical benefits. At the very least, for


example, historical sensitivity will usefully multiply the abilities of a purely presentist approach to delineate complexities. (We may not want to grapple with yet more complexities, but we would want even less to undercut the insightfulness of our analysis by not reckoning with those which do exist.) As well, historical research will be especially relevant to identifying the crucial sources of the complexities we confront. Recent controversies surrounding hypermobile capital or IMF policies, for example, might be more fully appreciated in a lengthier chronological context that encourages attention to the legacies of imperialism and neo-colonialism. Problems spurred by nuclear programs in India, Pakistan, China, or North Korea might be diagnosed more fully if deep-seated Asian suspicions of "Western" behavior were brought into calculations -- or if even more deeply historical 'Great Power' dynamics were given greater weight. Etc.

It might be added here that various factors generate the relevance of "history" to analysis of recent (and future) events. Consideration of a deeper and broader range of historical experiences provides an abundance of "comparables," for example. More importantly, perhaps, historians have access to a far greater amount of information about earlier developments than is available to all but a tiny number of the observers of current affairs. Consider the case of the United States in the 1960s, for instance. Government and personal archives now provide scholars with a richly detailed picture of the thoughts and actions of political leaders -- thoughts revealed in highly secret meetings and communications, actions only partially explained to the public at the time or partially understood by policy makers themselves. Not surprisingly, as a result, the information available in the archives is gradually producing a far more nuanced and complex picture than was possible during the 1960s themselves. This is a scenario that can be multiplied many times -- and it has great relevance to a consideration of current issues. It has particular resonance when there are significant specific linkages between the experiences or developments of an earlier period and the experiences or developments being analyzed in the present tense. In such cases, the richness of historical sources may engender sensitivity to present-day complexities that might otherwise hide in the shallows of sound-bites and political rhetoric.

One ironic indicator of history's relevance can be found in the fact that there is a literature pertaining to key "new world order" issues that now very much has a history of its own. Scholars, after all, were already beginning to explore aspects of 'globalization' and "global management" more than three decades ago. Richard N. Cooper's first study of the tensions between international economic integration and national sovereignty (The Economics of Interdependence) was published in 1968; Charles Kindleberger's early work on multinational enterprise appeared at almost the same time and included his declaration that "the nation-state is just about through as an economic unit."428 On such foundations, major analytical landmarks were built in the 1970s: e.g., Kindleberger's own Power and Money (1970) and The World in Depression, 1924-1939 (1973) as well as Robert Gilpin's "The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations" (1972); Robert O. Keohane's and Joseph S. Nye's Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (1977); and Walt W. Rostow's The World Economy: History and Prospect (1978).429

More importantly, the "historic" literature that began to take shape a quarter of a century ago was permeated with "history" -- and subsequent scholarly work was regularly consistent with this beginning. For both earlier and later analysts, at the least, sensitivity to the broad sweep of the past sometimes helped generate recognition of the more unique characteristics of the late 20th century. Perceptions of identity, of course, often have a way of emerging from an initial consciousness of differences. Familiarity with mercantilist practices, for example, might highlight elements of flexibility or openness in the global economy of the post-World War II era. To look at Bismarckian diplomacy

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might increase an ability to delineate any contrasting dynamics of "current" international relations. Etc.

There was an especially striking and elaborate deepening of historical concerns when "new" practices and regimes reached troubled waters. Many early writings had either implicitly or explicitly emphasized the positive potential of a nascent new world order: what Keohane and Nye had called "complex interdependence," it was commonly argued, would provide incentives for conflict management and an infrastructure for economic cooperation. By the mid-1970s, however, doubts were mounting -- spurred by trade disputes, the collapse of the Bretton Woods currency system, and a major oil crisis. Some analysts trying to navigate such problems again turned to the past for insight.

Robert Gilpin and Charles Kindleberger, in particular, launched what became a scholarly cottage industry with their studies of an earlier era of "liberal" economic arrangements that had come to grief: the 19th century's "Pax Britannica." Great Britain's loss of "hegemonic" power in the years leading up to World War I, the argument ran, had undercut the stability of the whole international order. Although the United States should have been able to play Britain's former role in the 1920s and 1930s, a Pax Americana would be forged only in the fires of the 1940s. "London provided order and coordinated international economic activities" before 1914, Gilpin wrote, but "London was unable and New York was unwilling to restructure the international economy disrupted by the First World War. The result was a leadership vacuum which contributed in part to the onset of the Great Depression and eventually the Second World War." Gilpin's and Kindleberger's speculations were then succeeded by a whole literature dealing with the linkage between U.S. hegemony and the economic growth of the post-1945 period -- as well as the consequences of declining U.S. power after the mid-1970s.

As valuable as they have been, the historic literature's discussions of the "new world order's" historical roots has been primarily suggestive. We have been prodded into recognizing the existence of relevant precedents and comparables -- but much in-depth research and analytical exploration is yet to be undertaken. The specific textures of previous eras and "regimes," for example, need fuller consideration by those anxious to delineate what might have been important earlier experiences of "globalization" and "global management" efforts: yet more attention to Pax Britannica, to be sure, but some as well to the growth and and dynamics of the Roman Empire, the Song dynasty in China and Asia, the papacy and the Roman Catholic church, etc. As an antidote to what can easily become glib and anecdotal commentary, attention could also be focused on the development of methods for the precise and meaningful comparison of present-day institutions and routines with those of earlier times.

For several reasons, the decades following World War II deserve special attention as scholars seek to more fully explore the roots of the "new world order." It is here, certainly, that the most immediately relevant (or obvious) antecedents are likely to be found. And it is here, as well, that historical research has been more than a little constricted. Some of the limitations have been imposed -- with archival resources often in short supply because of "30 year" rules and other secrecy regulations, for example. Limitations have also sprung from within the scholarly community itself, though often for perfectly understandable reasons. Given the thrust of headlines and public/political priorities, for example, studies of international relations in the 1950s, 1960s, etc., have overwhelmingly tended to focus on "Cold War" tensions and crises. Natural enough while historians and political scientists lacked the kind of distance that can encourage alternative perspectives, this nonetheless has made it too easy to roll with the assumption that what we have been experiencing in the 1990s is dramatically new -- a product of the "end of the Cold War."

430 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 8.


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Soviet-American conflict and the so-called "Free World-Communist" struggle, of course, have powerfully affected the character of the 20th century's second half. But other forces have had significant impact as well. Although it would be difficult to compartmentalize in any absolute sense, some of the most important developments and dynamics of the post-1945 era have had only limited intrinsic connection with the battling relationship between Moscow and Washington. Some, as well, very much predate World War II and the 1917 revolution. With an eye turned in this direction, it might be said that the end of the Cold War has sometimes been important not so much for opening the way to such developments and dynamics as for making it easier for analysts to gauge their fuller significance.

"Globalization" is certainly one of the non-Cold War/pre-Cold War forces that have been at work since 1945. There has often seemed to be a close connection, to be sure, given emphasis on a worldwide ideological struggle -- and the ultimate logic of the pervasive "domino theory." In fact, of course, the roots are very much deeper. It would be difficult, for example, not to see early visions of globalization in half a millennium of European empire-building. The very phrasing of 20th century history offers up symbols of other instances, i.e., in standardized references to World War I and World War II.

The decades since 1945 have seen a quickened pace of globalization, as well as increased sensitivity concerning it. From the 1940s into the 1960s, for example, the United States amassed more genuinely worldwide power than any previous "empire" -- with vast and far-flung military forces, economic influence that dwarfed all competitors, and even a magnetic cultural presence in distant corners. The history of business and finance in the post-World War II era probably reveals the most telling evidence of globalization. (It is evidence of special value too, because the data and patterns suggest the need to go beyond specifically American experiences.) Few would now question the transformative role of "multinational" or "transnational" corporations, for example. As early as 1973, the U.S. Senate's Finance Committee noted that the annual sales of a company like General Motors was greater than the gross national product of Switzerland or South Africa -- while Royal Dutch Shell's exceeded that of Iran or Venezuela. The reach and energies of multinationals dramatically affected production and marketing in most areas of the world, creating what Peter Drucker has called a "global shopping center." Total volume of trade expanded greatly in the process, even exceeding impressive continuing growth in overall productive capacity. (One study reveals that trade between members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development increased by 8% per year in the period 1955-68.) And similar synergies and dynamism were evident in the realm of global finance. In the early 1970s, the seven largest U.S. banks earned 40% of their total profits via international operations -- while the emergence of a vast "Eurodollar" pool brought other powerful players into the investment process. International consortiums became commonplace financial mechanisms as well: e.g., the Orion Bank launched by Chase Manhattan, National Westminster, the Royal Bank of Canada, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentral, and Nikko Securities, among others.

If the arena of international affairs became increasingly "globalized" and integrated in the post-World War II period as a whole, it is also clear that there was steadily growing attention to what we would now refer to as "global management." This was inherent to the work of business and banking executives, of course: as IBM's Jacques Maisonrouge put it as early as 1969, the driving logic of the multinational corporation was recognition of the "need to plan, organize, and manage on a global scale." But this was a conviction that political leaders had long since come to hold as well.

Some of the evidence here suggests that perceptions of a worldwide Cold War played a role in encouraging "global management" thinking. The "Free World" alliance system -- "NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS, etc. -- was an early example of combatants feeling their way toward mechanisms that

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would be more potent because of organization and efficiency. Dwight Eisenhower certainly built such logic into his "New Look" approach to national security policy: the U.S. needed to prepare for a "long haul" struggle with the Soviet Union and other enemies, he believed, and cooperative partnerships were a central ingredient in a plan to keep economic or psychological exhaustion at bay.439

But attraction to "global management" possibilities was far from being a dependent byproduct of the Cold War. Well before any escalation of Washington-Moscow tensions, indeed, a leader like Franklin D. Roosevelt was trying to conceptualize a "system" that would have avoided some of the disasters of the post-1945 era. FDR's "four policemen" concept was at the heart of what journalist Forrest Davis called the president's "World Blueprint" in 1943, for example.440 The launches of organizations like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank also testify to pre-Cold War/post-Cold War impulses toward multilateral planning, structural innovation, and global collaboration. Nor did such concerns then simply fall into the black hole of Soviet-American conflict. The Marshall Plan was one powerful reflection of ongoing U.S. interest in forging new tools and mechanisms for the management of an international political economy -- while the 1950s-1960s birth of the Common Market demonstrated continuing European and American interest in this direction.441 Such blueprints were complemented by periodic surges of effort aimed at exploring the potential for "détente." Already in the early 1950s, figures like Winston Churchill and Pierre Mendès-France were pushing Washington toward meaningful four power negotiations: these might have allowed a cooperative taming of specific Cold War tensions -- and freed up energies and resources for dealing with problems like economic development and "Third World" nationalism. Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev did little more than scout this kind of ground at the Geneva Summit Conference in July 1955, however -- and again at Camp David four years later.442 Still, these were early portents of the more significant strides that would come during the Nixon-Kissinger years and they do suggest the presence of another important thread in an overall pattern of post-1945 interest in "global management."

Two caveats should be added to these very impressionistic remarks about the ways in which "new world order" features might be traced through the post-1945 era.

First, it would be foolish not to note that full historical analysis would require explorations into the deeper past as well as the more recent. While World War II profoundly affected the course of international relations, many of the patterns and dynamics we associate with the "new world order" are discernible in some respects in much earlier times. "Globalization," for example, is ultimately linked to the pervasive and almost primordial impulse toward expansionism -- with its associated concerns for insuring security and growing economic opportunities. (Egypt, Rome, China; Phoenicia, Kiev, Venice; Constantine, Charlemagne, Napoleon, Hitler: even a hasty scouting of examples generates the beginning of a long list.) "Global management" has its wide-ranging comparables as well. Relevant here are many efforts to create order and stability in a chaotic world: empire-building and dynastic alliances in more distant centuries, for instance, as well as later moves to organize "concerts," a "balance of power," or a "League of Nations." Scale and detail vary greatly from what we see in the late 20th century, of course, but there are certain common denominators which might be interesting and useful to consider.


442 See, for example, Ronald W. Pruessen, "Beyond the Cold War -- Again: 1955 and the 1990s," Political Science Quarterly, Spring 1993.
This is not a plea to immediately broaden the focus of the "Growing the System" research project! It does seem reasonable, however, to at least note the way an examination of historical roots can lead down many roads.)

A second caveat: Although the most immediately relevant roots of the "new world order" are to be found in the post-1945 era, this does not mean that it will be a simple matter to either trace these roots or determine their precise influence on current events and concerns. A quick sketch of earlier "globalization" or "global management" impulses may suggest neat affinities or straightline progressions. Closer attention, however, reveals patterns of enormous complexity, with far more ambiguity and even countervailing tendencies than crystal clarity. There are conflicted impulses on every hand: e.g., European and U.S. tendencies to both cooperate and compete -- to work quite closely together on some issues (like "the German Question" and Iraq) while bitterly disagreeing on others (from Suez to bananas). Post-1945 patterns are replete with ambiguous results as well: e.g., economic and technological marvels twinned with environmental degradation -- or the apparent taming of large-scale war via the "balance of terror" inherent in nuclear stalemate. And the past half century may eventually be especially notable for its unanticipated consequences: e.g, the two-edged swords of high speed communications technology and the "information super-highway": these break down international barriers and support efficient, integrated management -- but they can also make centralized control of individuals and economic currents more difficult.

II.

There are many ways to explore such historical complexities and ambiguities -- many ways to clarify the nature of "new world order" patterns as they have evolved during the past fifty years. Biographical analysis is one that may be particularly useful at an early stage of scholarly effort.

Historians have long and often used biography as one valuable means of understanding the nature of complex experiences in previous times. From Plutarch to Allan Bullock, from Boswell to Jean Lacouture, many have recognized that there is great revelatory power in the thoughts and actions of individual human beings. Political leaders, artists, entrepreneurs, the man in the street: any and all are simultaneously both mirrors of the times in which they lived and actors who helped shape the characteristics of those times.

These are attributes of great potential value to analysis focused on the "new world order." Biography, in fact, is an approach especially well-suited to exploring phenomena whose scale is as vast as "globalization" and "global management." Just three examples of what the approach might offer:

- The study of individual lives essentially forces attention to the human face and imprint of the "tides of history." We often look for telling examples or "test cases" as we seek to understand the grand scale forces shaping our present-day experiences: why not lend extra depth to this effort by adding in more personalized evidence concerning previous times?

- A biographer can also come closer than many other scholars to capturing the full complexity of historical experience. For most people, that is, year to year existence involves a constant blending or juggling of diverse inclinations and priorities. No one is a purely political animal -- or an economic, intellectual, or sexual one, etc. Historians and political scientists, however, have a tendency to emphasize selected components. Choices vary widely -- and can certainly be complemented by appreciation for the fact that a story has other facets -- but compartmentalization is still often the result. A biographical perspective, on the contrary, encourages appreciation for the interplay of factors: how was a particular individual shaped by multiple forces and circumstances? how were these combined in day-to-day thoughts and actions? In essence, a biographer can approach a subject’s life as if it were a prism -- a tool which shows how human experience can break down into relatively distinct bands in a spectrum while simultaneously retaining functional wholeness. For analysts of international relations, as a result, the approach inherent to biography has great relevance. Given the need to take account of the political and economic and strategic and cultural and psychological dimensions of many developments or crises -- among other things -- an emphasis on both dissection and integration promises richer insights.

(This thought is a variation on Jules Michelet’s injunction in the preface to his History of France: "In order to re-discover historical life, one must follow it patiently along all its tracks and in all its forms and through all its elements. But besides this one ought -- and with more eagerness still -- to re-make
and to re-establish the play of all these things, the reciprocal acting of all these differing forces in a powerful movement which once more becomes life itself.")

- A biographical perspective may also make it easier to consider a period of history in its own terms. Whether the focus is on the more distant or recent past -- or, indeed, on the present -- attention to specific lives requires attention to the individual's engagement with his or her world. This means, at least initially, serious attention to what that person saw, what that person felt, and what that person said -- rather than exclusive reliance on the analyst's after-the-fact observations. It would be foolish to spurn the benefits of hindsight, of course: the cooler perspectives that the passage of time allows, access to other evidence, awareness of longer-term consequences, etc. Nonetheless, biographical research increases the likelihood that other and earlier perspectives will also enrich analysis.

If biography has its rewards, a comparative biographical approach can multiply them. In particular, attention to a wide range of leaders makes it easier to develop a full and fully-textured picture of the post-1945 era. On one hand, clarity and completeness emerge when developments and patterns are considered from multiple angles. On the other hand, appreciation for complexity does not fall between the cracks as easily as it can when there is relatively exclusive attention to only some particular perspectives. (E.g., it would obviously be pertinent to consider the ways in which Dwight Eisenhower and Charles de Gaulle differed in their readings of international issues in the 1950s and 1960s; it might be even more important to compare the thoughts of Eisenhower and Jawaharlal Nehru -- or de Gaulle and Gamal Abdel Nasser.)

With an eye to smoothing the way to comparative analysis during the New Orleans conference, it seems desirable to suggest a number of themes which all participants might keep in mind as they think through and prepare their individual papers. What follows, therefore, is an outline consisting of five broad categories and a varying number of specific questions within each.

A few general points and some cautionary words should preface this outline:

- "Y" has been used as an all-purpose designator for the specific individuals who will be the focus of separate papers. (It was tempting to use "X" for this purpose, but it has its own special history as far as specialists in post-World War II international relations are concerned.)

- These categories and questions are meant to be suggestive rather than restrictive. They are intended to nudge conference participants a few inches into the terrain we will be exploring -- and should certainly not be seen as a precise roadmap. Feel free to chart the course that makes the greatest sense to you when considering your subject's experiences with "globalization" and "global management" efforts. Indeed, don't hesitate to raise additional or alternative questions for consideration by other conference participants: this could be done in New Orleans in November or by e-mail at any time before then. (You will shortly be receiving a list of all conference participants and e-mail addresses.)

- Whatever approach you take -- and whatever questions you utilize -- do make sure to incorporate a plentiful number of concrete examples. Give your colleagues in New Orleans (and the wider audience to whom a published volume will be directed) a wide range of specific experiences, specific thoughts, and specific words to reflect on.

World-views/World Systems: Post-1945 Leaders and Globalization -- Suggested Questions

1. Acuity/conceptualization:

a) How much attention did Y pay to what could be considered "world" or "global" developments -- as opposed to those more appropriately identified as "regional" or "bilateral" or "local"? Did Y tend to pay attention to "world" issues frequently, regularly, or only occasionally?

b) What particular "global" issues or developments most attracted Y's attention?

c) Did Y believe that significant changes were underway in the nature of international affairs? If so, how did Y articulate the nature and scale of the changes?

d) At what point in Y's life and career did attention to "global" issues start to develop? Did Y's thinking go through relatively specific evolutionary stages after this?
e) What would you identify as the most important sources of Y’s attentiveness to global issues? Was Y conscious of factors or developments which were pushing his thoughts in this direction? Are there other factors or developments which you would emphasize as well?

2. Goals:

a) With respect to thoughts concerning "globalization" and "global management," are you at all struck by the presence of a longterm vision in Y -- as opposed to an approach which was more ad hoc and diffuse in nature?

b) If a longterm vision is discernible, how would Y have described his goals? How would you describe them?

c) If Y’s conceptualization of goals was more ad hoc and diffuse, what were some of the more important components?

d) What priorities are evident in Y’s articulation of goals? What were the sources of these priorities -- as Y would have seen them...and as you would see them?

e) Did Y’s conceptualization of goals go through evolutionary stages? If so, how would you describe these stages? And how would you explain shifts of emphasis or concern?

3. Tools:

a) Did Y have a clear overall gameplan in mind when considering the tools or methods that might be used to achieve key goals? Or did Y seem to improvise methods as situations and needs developed?

b) What tools or methods did Y favor as far as dealing with "global" developments was concerned? Do Y’s preferences suggest interest in "global management"? If so, what do Y’s preferences suggest about his conception of "global management"? E.g., did Y think in terms of wide-ranging collaboration among relatively equal partners -- or did Y tend toward emphasis on leadership by one country or a small group of countries?

c) Why do you think Y favored certain methods for achieving goals? (E.g., Were they tools which earlier life or career experiences had made comfortable or familiar? Were they tools which meshed almost inevitably with particular circumstances or predicaments?)

d) Did Y’s preferences concerning methods change over time? If so, how might shifts or adaptation be explained? (E.g., did Y regularly assess the effectiveness of certain policies and tools?)

4. Psychological dimensions:

a) How would you characterize Y’s frame of mind when contemplating an increasingly integrated "global" arena? E.g., was Y more often distressed or exhilarated by the changes he perceived? did Y see new circumstances and dynamics as problems requiring solutions...or as opportunities?

b) If Y’s emphasis would have been on the negative, what were the key problems that concerned him? If Y’s emphasis would have been on the positive, what were the principal opportunities he would have identified?

c) When it came to adaptation to "globalization" and integration, how did Y perceive himself in the context of his times? Within his own country, for example, did Y believe he was "out in front of" other leaders and citizens -- and that he might have regular difficulties in persuading others to support his goals and policies because of this? In the international arena, did Y believe there were other leaders who recognized the same kinds of changes he did? If so, did he see other leaders as potentially useful partners for dealing with problems and/or opportunities -- or as competitors or rivals?

d) Did Y’s positive or negative feelings about "globalization" or "global management" opportunities change over time? If so, how...and why?

5. Preliminary assessments:

a) In retrospect, would you characterize Y as a sophisticated and sensitive observer of "globalization" developments? What significant currents and patterns did Y recognize...what significant currents and patterns did Y not recognize? (It will eventually be desirable to place such questions into a comparative context, i.e., how did Y’s acuity compare with that of his contemporaries?)

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b) How would Y have assessed his success in achieving key goals relevant to "globalization" and "global management"? How would you appraise Y's success in this respect -- e.g., what goals did he reach...what goals remained out of reach?

c) Whatever the specific nature of longterm goals, how would you appraise Y's abilities as a tactician? E.g., Did Y demonstrate imagination with respect to devising tools and methods for achieving objectives? Was Y flexible when it came to evaluating established policies and considering new approaches?

d) How would you appraise Y's overall impact on the post-1945 era -- with particular reference to "globalization" and "global management" developments? Did Y "make a difference"?

e) If Y did "make a difference," did this result primarily from his personal abilities or from more abstract circumstances? or some combination of the two?

f) If you believe Y had relatively little impact on the post-1945 era, how would you explain his lack of influence? Whatever the degree of Y's impact, what do his experiences tell you about the course of "globalization" and "global management" efforts in the post-1945 era? E.g., did traditional regional or bilateral concerns really begin to fade in the face of "global" preoccupations and priorities -- and how far did the transition go during the years of Y's public role? how much actually changed as far as the conduct of "international relations" was concerned? did new definitions of "national interest" emerge -- or just new techniques for serving "national interest"?
Vasile Puskas

Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania

Post-1989 Central Europe. National Interests, European Integration and Globalisation

The starting assumption of this paper is related to the fact that “Central Europe” is a Kind of sub-regional identity, based on cultural, economic and political ties, shared values and concerns. Its countries shared over time a common culture of risk and insecurity associated with its geopolitical position between the Western civilization and the Eurasian one, as the land between the Germans and Russians.

As one of the densest area of the world, a cluster of peoples of different languages, religions and historical experiences, Central Europe had a tradition of nationalisms (developed over the 18th and 19th Centuries), confounded during the 20th Century with national and ethnocentric interests. The main reason: after the dissolution of the multinational empires, the newly political identities (national state or federations) inherited the same centrifugal forces, under the realm of ethnic nationalism. Another variable, ideology, usually helped these corrosive forces, rather than prevented them. The internationalism initially predicated by some ideologies was doomed to fail and ethnic nationalism always grew stronger, usually backed by the totalitarian regimes, in order to self-legitimize themselves.

After the 1989 and the end of the Cold War in Europe, the concept of national security shifted in Central Europe from its classical formula (military security) to the one of cooperative security and the extensive modern concept, involving all societal fields, from military to economic, social, even environmental security. The new formula was conceived in relation with the process of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. In a world of globalization, the Central European states acknowledged that only in an integrative formula, they can express their own identity within the international system and in the different aspects of globalization.

A propositive view over the 21st Century should encompass this historical background as a testing variable. The future must be one of unity in diversity (as Rothschild would say), or one of acknowledged plurality. The way Central Europeans will know how to appease their national interests with the presumptive common interests of a single, united Europe will mark the future of the region.
The New Leviathan: 
Globalisation and the Language of Apocalypse

At the turn of the third millennium public opinion is showing a renewed interest in interpreting current events and phenomena in theological, holy, and eschatological terms. Contemporary events are deciphered in a futuristic perspective while their interpretation is based on past myths and images. This holds for many recent events, but in particular for one of them, which appears in the historical moment we are now living as the most present, important, relevant, but also threatening and worrisome: globalisation.

We know that man is a teleological animal, who, when faced with a problem or an event always tries to detect its significance on the basis of a goal oriented vision which considers the flow of history as directed towards a goal, a telos, from its origin. As the very metaphor of ‘flowing’ suggests that history is therefore seen like a river whose canalised waters flow, peacefully or impetuously, towards the mouth, and not like a watery chaos spreading and flowing at random on the ground, without structure or direction.

The phenomenon of globalisation, interpreted according to the philosophy of history, appears rooted in the past and projected towards the future, and seems to be placed at the end of history. A Russian author writing at the end of the nineteenth century, Vladimir Solovjev, a religious and visionary thinker, foresaw this with great clarity: at the end of history the way to peace and to well-being is opened for the whole earth; at the end of history universality is established. As in our own times we have seen the Market substitute History in its symbolic valence, we see in the Global Market the chance of satisfying the demands for freedom, emancipation, self-determination, besides keeping alive those semantic elements which used to belong to the semantic field of history: growth, production, consumption, development, profit and accumulation.

Globalisation happens not only at the end of historical time, but also - and here lies the difference compared to other phenomena which have been imaginarily also placed at the end of time, of history, or of the world - at the end of space. Besides the conquered earth and the global market, besides the planet earth there is nothing else. All this gives us a keen sense of the roundness of the earth, as Ricoeur says, but also instils a lively anxiety of spatiotemporal emptiness, which in turn ushers in doomsday eschatological visions. The fears of globalisation - which coexist with enthusiastic acceptance, full of ‘progressive’ and libertarian hopes - are of various kinds. They are political fears, which worry about the birth of totalitarian world states, the reduction of local participation, the subordination of national interest, the abnormal growth of a political-economic-military power, which, while setting itself above the world decides about it. They are moral and psychological fears, concerning the loss of local identity versus a universal condition seen as not always desirable. They are cultural fears, concerning the sad loss of traditional cultures in the name of a global ‘civilisation de pacotille’ (trash civilisation) (Ricoeur), or they are simply unidentified fears, nameless worries and anxieties facing the new and the unknown.

Recent events show this phenomenon with extreme clarity: think about the Seattle siege: on December 13, 1999, globe -protesters tried to boycott the activity of the World Trade Organisation and while

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1 Wladimir Solowjow, Die Erzaehlung vom Antichrist [1900], German translation, Luzern, Vita Nova Verlag, 1946.

rebelling against the ‘machismo of globalisation’, they showed their dissatisfaction towards a world in which one is forced to live within an economy rather than in a society, the world of the end of politics.

Or just think about the launching of Windows 2000, as Bill Gates appears on the screens, with his good-boy face, in order to reassure those who identify Microsoft with the ‘dragon’ or the ‘devil’. And finally think about the boycott of the web site Yahoo in February 2000, four days before the official presentation of Window 2000, interpreted by media as ‘locust plague’, the same media which then tried to reassure web users, by explaining to them that it was not the ‘end of the world’

These events, which acquire here a paradigmatic value, show how widespread are the feelings of discomfort, malaise, anxiety, helplessness, and fear of the end of the world, of the end of history, of the end of politics. This discomfort is caused by the spreading of a global economy, which threatens to make us live in a standardised world headed by the omnipotent computer, a world of consumers of goods and not of citizens, members of a society. Besides: one realises that the surprising fact in the examples given above, is that the language used to express this fear is connected to a system of religious belief, it is linked to apocalyptic language.

One could find many other examples, above all taken from popular mass culture: in fact it is to be noticed that while the interpretation of apocalyptic texts once used to be the activity of the best minds of an epoch (A topic critically and in a philosophical perspective),

From mass culture comes the examples of the rock singer Marylin Manson, a self-proclaimed Satan worshipper or ‘Antichrist Superstar’, or of the singer Madonna who in the song ‘In this Life’, an elegy composed for her friends who died of AIDS, alternates the singing with the recitation of passages taken from the Apocalypse, including the condemnation of ‘fornicators’ and ‘idolaters’.

In order to understand this phenomenon we must start from two theoretical premises which can be generalised. The first says that political language has always filtered and still filters many images and metaphors derived from religious language. The second says that metaphors are not endless, or better that there are a few ones, Hans Blumenberg’s “absolute metaphors”, which have been used for millennia in order to describe or explain specific phenomena whose characters are perceived to be similar.

It is difficult to say when the osmotic transition of religious language into political language occurred. It is possible that this transition could be explained with the tendency to persuade and to exhort to action, a tendency which political language shares with religion. It is certain that the key concepts characterising the birth of modern politics as well as the contemporary debate on the forms of politics appear to be derived both from the old and new testament.

The paternity (of God over mankind), the brotherhood (of the believers as well as of the citizens), the covenant (of God with the faithfuls, which becomes the contract between the sovereign and his subjects or among the community members themselves); the ship (symbol of the church as well as of the state, evoking for both civil and religious groups a strong sense of unity and cohesion as well as the need for a determined and competent captain), the edifice (of Mosaic law as well as of civil law) another image of cohesion, but even more of duration and resistance.

As far as the second premise is concerned, that is about the presence of a recurring set of metaphors in order to explain very abstract concepts, it is structured around the concept of ‘absolute metaphores’

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447 R. Dellamora, Postmodern Apocalypse, p.1.
introduced by Hans Blumenberg. Few metaphores, but good ones, so to speak, capable of immediately crystallising response, like ‘a stone thrown into the pond’ or at ‘a certain temperature the water of the basin freezes suddenly’: metaphores which are therefore immediately comprehensible and which recur frequently, because of their strong explanatory purport.

Keeping in mind these theoretical premises we now want to look at the phenomenon of globalisation, by which we mean the extension to the entire planet of common structures and institutions in economic, political, scientific, educational and cultural fields, and not least in organised crime and environmental threats.

And now let us see how many times this event is compared to the Leviathan. It is well known that the Leviathan, before being the title of the very famous political work by Thomas Hobbes (1651), is a monster which appears in the Apocalypse, the biblical book which presents the end of history and of time with powerful images. It evokes the time of Armageddon, of the final struggle in which Christ, with his angels and his helpers, defeats the forces of the abysses, and sits on the throne of his Kingdom.

About the monster it is written in the Scripture: ‘I saw a beast emerging from the sea; it had ten horns and seven heads; on the horns there were ten diadems and the heads were carrying blasphemous names ......and they adore the beast and say: who is similar to the beast? Who can fight it? It had been given the power to wage war to the saints and to defeat them. It had been given power over every tribe, people, language and nation. It will be adored by all the inhabitants of the earth’ (Apocalypse, 13, 1-8).

The key points in the Leviathan representation are: its unabated, immense power, and the recognition coming from all the people of the earth. These are the very words used to explain globalisation (economic, political, cultural, criminal). Another similarity, essential to this analysis, is the very fear the monster causes. There is no greater or comparable power (non est potestas super terram quae comparetur ei). But it is thanks to this power that the political global state can ensure peace and welfare. It is in this sense for instance that Vittorio Hoesle and particularly Otfried Hoeffe hope in it: a federal democratic republican world state, as the only solution to ensure peace and human rights recognition448. But the very moment Hoeffe names the Leviathan, the respect for this power becomes fear, even terror, in the eyes of many, fear of a superpower, not necessarily destructive of freedom - Hoeffe makes sure that in his model all possible forms of freedom and rights are preserved - but certainly by suppressing differences.

Globalisation as a euphemism for capitalistic imperialism is another fear expressed by some of his critics, once again evoked by the metaphor of the Leviathan, the monster, the very personification of evil.

All kinds of natural and man-made calamities, every kind of mental and physical enemies have been identified with that monstrous animal. Hobbes chooses this metaphor, which had been present in Jewish and Christian literature and makes of it a rhetorical device in order to evoke a peaceful and safety ensuring power as well as to generate reverent and obedient respect for it: but not also a feeling of discomfort caused by the abnormality of the event? And perhaps also a premonition of the monstrosity of state power?

The theme of the fear of global power recurs not only in Hobbes, but also in cultural criticism: an important moment of which is certainly to be found in last century American and European cultures, in which the awerseness as well as the fear of globalisation emerge as imposed by the demands of technology and capitalism. Another decisive moment is the surfacing of the paradigm which has become prominent in the recent decades: a shift by which the nation has been substituted by the globe as a fundamental unit of human association, the crystallising of the globe, as a unique undifferentiated whole, to which popular American culture refers in such expressions as “think globally”. We are facing here, and this is my hypothesis, a collective discourse at mass level, with higher cultural connections, an approach intersecting public with scientific discourse, which is generated by the fear of the end of the world or of the end of a world.

In the multifarious panorama of the new apocalypses there are the peacemaker or, to borrow an effective term used by Umberto Eco, the „integrated“, those who, like Ulrich Beck, explain to us that in the age of global reality it is not the end of politics that is announced, but rather its new beginning. And those who miss the social state and the national state are not only irredeemably nostalgic people, both right and left wings, but also losers, who would like to go back to the state preceding the world market invasion. The integrated ones reassure us by telling us we are only losing „our traditional co-ordinates, not the right ones“. Maybe. Yet there is a slight indication which tells me it is possible, if not probable, that politics as a centre of decision and power has come to an end: men are getting away from it and women are entering it (perhaps favoured by quota), which, unfortunately, always means a loss of prestige and power for the institutions in which this occurs.

But let us go back to the core of the problem, which is the doomsday anxiety caused by globalisation. Let us try to define this term with greater precision as it has been so much used and misused in the last five years. We intend for globalisation the spreading of western lifestyles on a planetary scale, caused by the growing interdependence of communication flow and of economic and financial markets.

The prospect appearing in front of us, on the basis of such tendency, is that of multinational capitalism, whose only conceivable future is that of global capitalism, of planetary civilisation and of planetary consciousness. While there are peacemakers who try to reassure us, there are also watchers ready to alert us, they are the prophets of doom, the „apocalyptic ones“. They tell us that globalisation is only a euphemism for capitalistic imperialism, against which Marx had warned us more than a century ago, and that global capitalism is the new Leviathan which we have to come to term with. A new system of power stretching on a world basis, an indirect and fluid power which intervenes on the states, but which is also inside them, which does not defend the citizens of a certain nation against foreign invasion, as Hobbes observed about the Old Leviathan, but which rules and disciplines those who in each country exploit the weakness of the others. The characteristic „terror“ of the Old Leviathan was the policing power of the state. The characteristic terror of the New Leviathan is unemployment, pay cuts, the fear that the aspirations of families and groups towards environmental and economic improvements may cause investments to move to places where workers are more vulnerable to the requests of entrepreneurs.

The emergence of a global prospective has been mostly considered as a very recent product, a reality of the last twenty years. However global considerations can already be found in thinkers at the end of the eighteenth century, such as Henry James or Nietzsche, or perhaps in the intuitions of Pascal, reworded by Condorcet, when he wrote“ the whole humanity can be considered as one man who is ceaselessly learning and remembering...”.

Certainly however the most farsighted minds of the end of the nineteenth century show some awareness of the paradigmatic shift, which has become evident only in recent decades, according to which the nation has been substituted by globality as a fundamental unit of human association.

But when each of us start thinking of oneself as an inhabitant of a vast and unitary system then one loses local cultural and social parameters, which means that one is no longer one of the many terms of an informed system formed by its differences with the terms of another system: the inhabitant of this new system becomes part of a totality which is literally gasping in vacuum. Globalisation becomes in this case the radical form of a depressing sense of cultural relativity and arbitrariness instead of being

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450 Ibid.
a new sense of completeness and self-sufficient interconnection\textsuperscript{453}. In other words, globality in its full being is oxymoronically transformed into void, and the malaise one feels in experiencing it is transformed into horror vacui.

A global culture can, as a matter of fact, seem something very different from what the majority of people think culture is; it may not even look like a culture at all. As Roland Robertson stated, a central element of ideology, of culture, and of social identity can be perceived only with reference to the form and to the contents of interactions between a society nationally organised and another\textsuperscript{454}. But a culture globally conceived must be thought \textit{ex novo} for a simple reason: there is nothing outside it. The planetary consciousness does not only lead us to feel, as Ricoeur wrote in 1961(!), "a vif sentiment de la rondeur de la terre" (an intense feeling of the roundness of the earth.)\textsuperscript{455}. It leads us to the anxiety ridden idea that space, not only time, may have an end.

Globality of being, fullness of being, and, as a paradoxical effect, the feeling of void and helplessness, the \textit{horror vacui}, the gasping in the void of absent space and time. I would like to show how these feelings work in one of the main characters of nineteenth century literature, namely in Gustav Aschenbach in Thomas Mann's \textit{Death in Venice}. In the first pages of the novel the main character is taking a walk in Munich, his native city, in a morning at the beginning of May, when he reaches a building in Byzantine style. There he finds himself facing two apocalyptic animals guarding the open staircase, a premonitory sign shrewdly introduced by the narrator foreshadowing the fatal encounter of Aschenbach with Venice, which will have its parallel in a catastrophic revelation - and here I combine the fundamental and original meaning with the one given by modern languages: on the one hand revelation, that is removal of the veil, contemplation of the mystery finally manifested; on the other hand catastrophe, an extraordinary, terrible and disastrous event. In Venice Aschenbach hears the major European languages melting in gentle tones, while a wide, tolerant, understanding horizon opens in front of him. Charmed and totally disoriented by the cosmopolitan and multilingual atmosphere of the city and of the hotel, Aschenbach reveals here the anxiety, \textit{vis-à-vis} globalisation, of his author. Anxiety which will manifest itself fully in the conclusive revelation-catastrophe: cholera, which has come to Venice from distant and exotic lands to kill Aschenbach\textsuperscript{456}.

Cholera, a \textit{fin-du-siecle} epidemic, as much as Aids is \textit{fin-du-siecle} (but unfortunately also \textit{debut-du-siecle}) epidemic and pandemic, a disease of globalisation, which has also come from afar, around which the language of Apocalypses blossoms, ranging from the predictions of biomedicine to the sensational headlines of mass media. In a famous booklet written towards the end of the ‘80s, “\textit{Aids and Its metaphor},” Susan Sontag connects Aids with industrial pollution, nuclear armament race, the new system of global financial markets and other disasters. “The AIDS crisis is evidence of a world in which nothing important is regional, local, limited; in which every problem is, or is destined to become, worldwide\textsuperscript{457}.”

According to the writer, who seems to us fully immersed in the discourse concerning the ill-fated consequences of globalisation, Aids is a dis-topia, a negative utopia which threatens the global village, she interprets Aids as a metaphor, as Apocalypse, much in the same way Thomas Mann saw it in the metaphor of cholera.

The integrated intellectuals - but perhaps we should call them political realists- tell us that these anxieties are justified and that the theory of a society under global risk is naive and unjustified\textsuperscript{458}. All

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{454} Ibid. p.20
\item \textsuperscript{458} U. Beck,\textit{Was ist Globalisierung?}, p.195.
\end{itemize}

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the more so, they say addressing the (Cassandras) prophets of doom, because the process is irreversible. Those who oppose or in some way criticise this process are labelled backward and reactionary: religious fundamentalism, nationalism, ethnic and territorial identities are considered enemies of cosmopolitan society. Yet it seems to me hazardous to get rid of the ‘globe-protesters’ of Seattle and Davos by including them in one of the above categories, or to brand all those who express sincere worries for the magnificent destiny of globalisation as nostalgic, integralist or catastrophemongers. There are not only either apocalyptic or integrated people, those who thunder against the event and those who greet it with joy, those who believe that an uncontrolled evil power rules the world and those who smile at the globalistic prospects as at the best possible world. In between there is a vast range of points of view: there are those who are indifferent, neutral, who simply register facts, and there are those who try to think autonomously and see advantages and disadvantages in this tendency and try to consider and evaluate them. Among the advantages, there is certainly a mass access to the value of dignity and a better protection of human rights and of human resources. Perhaps also the fact that the remedies to negative aspects of the phenomenon will originate from the very globalisation, much in the same way industrialisation generated the remedies to its exaggerations. Among the disadvantages, the risk of mono-information and of distraction of cultures, the birth of confused syncretisms, the Americanisation, the Macdonaldisation, the suppression of differences, the substitution of the world of identity with the world of merchandise and of history with the market, the loss of memory. By loss of memory I mean, on one hand the phenomenon by which the acceleration of time determined by the ceaseless change of fashion and mores does not allow the recording of the changes, leaving behind only a mass of confused unorganizable perceptions; on the other hand the fading memory of national culture, which is substituted by the cosmopolitan, optional, contingent, complex, contradictory, fragmented reminiscence.

I come back again to the central pattern, that is to the apocalypse as a metaphor for the malaise and crisis affecting those who coexist with change, and who are not so naive that they welcome it openheartedly and celebrate the wonders of economic globalism and of cosmopolitan politics. I shall look into this pattern with a certain lightness, and underline some trivial forms of this phenomenon.

Nowadays there is a lively cultural trend, specially active in the United States, which is inspired by the apocalypse, which borrows its terminology, and does not limit itself to general references to revelation and apocalypse: it gathers a whole community of people who are at ease with terms such as ‘Gog and Magog’, ‘Antichrist’, the beast brand, the beast number, Armageddon, etc, and which transfers


[Market replaces History because it is forcefully presented as the reality capable of fulfilling those demands for freedom, emancipation and self-determination which History imaginary power can no longer fulfil.

But one could as well say... that History has ended up in the Market, because here it has found an ally which could not reproduce itself without keeping alive great part of the signifieds belonging to its semantic field. All the signifieds which reaffirm specifically the idea of future-shaping time which is typical of historical ontology:growth, production, consumption, development, gain, profit, accumulation.]
these terms to the transformations taking place in the world in which we live. It is interesting to see, I repeat, how the cluster of images borrowed from the apocalypse is projected exactly on the phenomena connected to the global economy which is made possible by the flow of media produced by the new technology."\textsuperscript{463}

In this context the European Common Market was, for instance, the new Babylon, the great whore, and when Greece joined, on 1.1.81, and the number of participating nations reached 10 (the numbers of the horns of the beast), the people of apocalypse were greatly excited. Babylon is anyway a symbol of the entire satanic commercial and financial systems controlled and directed by computers. In 1995 Internet was associated with the fourth beast of the apocalypse and Bill Gates with the antichrist\textsuperscript{464}. Before him, besides a large number of popes, Napoleon (so called at the beginning of \textit{War and Peace}) Hitler, Mussolini, Moshe Dayan, Sadat, and recently Saddam Hussein, just to remain in modern times, all enjoyed their moment of celebrity as personifications of the antichrist. In other cases it is the computer itself the beast of revelation, the antichrist, as revealed by some unimportant indications. An ingenious canny writer having noticed that VI is the Roman number for 6, which in ancient Greek was written A, and which in Babylonian script had (it seems) the value of 6, has calculated the three sixes of these three ancient languages (that is 6+6+6) give VISA, an important system of credit cards.

Another ingenious spirit has noticed that if A is given the value 6, B 12 and C 18, and so on one will obtain for the word COMPUTER the following value:

\begin{verbatim}
C=18
O=90
M=78
P=96
U=126
T=120
E=30
R=108
\end{verbatim}

\begin{verbatim}
666 or the number of the beast.
\end{verbatim}

Ronald Reagan, to conclude, this anecdotal part, had even the number of a ranch, donated to him by an admirer, changed from 666 to 668\textsuperscript{465}!

I come back, after this light intermezzo, to a point which I would like to emphasise: it is the very recent prospect, made possible by globalisation, of proposals and projects of a universal state, that is of a global form of unitary federal government, which could govern the entire planet, a project which has many supporters.\textsuperscript{466}

Once again this idea had many forerunners: to remain in modern times, Bernardin de Saint Pierre, Kant (with his image of the world state as a cemetery of freedom) the Russian visionary Vladimir Soloviev, to whom I referred previously, Karl Jaspers, the German philosopher and psychiatrist, who


\textsuperscript{463} One must say however that already Luther and others before him had demonized the power of international finance and commerce. See P. Boyer, \textit{When Time Shall Be No More}, p.263.


saw in the universal state a privileged centre for the establishment of despotism; or the movement for
a new international order based on a planetary state, which also originated in the United States, after
1945. It came about as a reaction to the atomic bomb, and as a defence against the general atomic
threat.\footnote{467}

In this case too, those who opposed the new order expressed their perplexity in an apocalyptic language,
much like the apocalyptic writers of today, giving thereby the integrated writers a chance to repeatedly
answer that their model of universal state is not the new Leviathan, because it respects the freedom,
the right and the rights of the citizen of the world, that the planetary state which should be born from
the ruins of the old order will be based on national sovereignty holding central decisional power, which
will progressively lose its sense and power, it will be a \textit{civitas civitatum} not a \textit{monstrum}.\footnote{468} It is not at all clear how
democratisation, freedom, the absence of dominance, will be ensured, in compliance with the laws and
with the rights of the universal state. Without joining either the apocalyptic pessimists, or the
integrated optimists, I have done my best to show that this situation should not be taken as an
inevitable fate, as a tyrant against whom no resistance can be opposed, as an absolute reality to which
we can only adjust or succumb. I rather place myself among those who have not made up their minds
yet and who believe they have a right to look sceptically at those changes which seem to usher in,
through the end of a world, of a history, of a politics, of a society, of a private life, new vital political,
economic and social forms.

\footnote{467}{Paul Boyer, \textit{By the Bomb's Early Light. American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic
Age}, New York, Pantheon Books, 1985, pp. 34-35.}

\footnote{468}{I refer to Tilman Evers, \textit{Supranationale Staatlichkeit am Beispiel der Europäischen Union: civitas
civitatum oder monstrum?}, in „Leviathan“, 1994, 22, 1, pp. 115-134.}
Russian Orthodox Church and Globalization

In a contribution to the 1917-1918 Council, Sergej Bulgakov presented a broad vision of the role which the patriarchate could have played in the future of the Russian church: “Unlike the Rus’ of Moscow, where the patriarchate was an instrument of excessive national isolation, now for us the patriarchate is the organ of the universal awareness of the Orthodox Church, which the provincial college of the synod could not have been. The patriarchate is the head of the church, which raises itself above local limits, sees the other summits and is seen by them... We live in an age in which the narrow and provincial existence of the local church has become impossible, since a series of questions is arising which are not only international but also interconfessional in character”. Bulgakov’s conception of the patriarchal institution was integrated with the conviction that Orthodoxy, as a national church, should have a particular status of primus inter pares in the Russian state in that it was “thus organically joined to the people, its culture and its statehood, which it is no longer possible to separate from the social organism which is the national state”. The culture of the “national church” and aspiration to a “universal consciousness” are terms which have been integrated differently in the course of the history of Russian Orthodoxy, and which after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the birth of the new Russian state are continuing to have a central place in the Russian ecclesial awareness.

The opening of the Russian orthodox church to an international and interreligious dimension during the XX century, presented different stages along a tortuous itinerary, often marked by the dramatic difficulties that the Russian Church had to face. The essay wants to describe, even if briefly, this itinerary trying to place it in tendencies of long period of the Russian orthodoxy. The 1917-1918 council, the persecution of the twenties and thirties, the Second World War, the international opening under the aegis of Stalin after the conflict, the ecumenical activity beginning from the ‘60s are some of the stages of this historical run.

The changes of the international situation after 1989-1991 and those inside the former Soviet societies, and particularly in the Russian one, have set the Russian Church in front of new challenges, that originated from the impact with a modernity of western mould and with the secularization of the society. The processes of globalization have constituted a new and in many verses slippery ground for the Russian orthodoxy, whose reactions have often the tendency to defend a confessional and national identity that they feel threatened by the affirmation of cultural, religious and social models perceived as extraneous to the Russian tradition. The analysis of recently taken positions on the matter of globalization from authoritative Russian cleric would like to conclude the essay in the attempt to underline some problematic knots of the present of the Russian Church in relationship to the processes of globalization.
Valters Scerbinskis

University of Latvia, Riga, Latvia

Latvia in the Process of Globalization and Regionalism During 1990’s

Processes of globalisation from the one side and regionalisation from the other are growing more and more influential. Due to the development of the science, ways of communications are developing especially quickly. It is impossible to avoid that and to survive in “splendid isolation” for small state during late 20th century. The first question is: are there any tendencies towards regionalisation in Latvia? We should say convincing “yes”.

First of all I mean Baltic Region as the eastern shore of Baltic sea- Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Still from the 20’s and 30’s a lot of evidences have existed on more or less successful process of regionalisation among Baltic state and also Finland and Poland were included in some fields of common and quite close communication. Though there were not (until Baltic Entente Convention was signed in 1934) any formal agreement and official relations between states remained unresolved, consciousness of identifying themselves with certain region grew up gradually. Clear proof of that is the time spent under Soviet occupation. In order not to lose their own identities Baltic peoples put themselves and was put by occupants into one common “Baltic” community. It was even more characteristic for Latvians (as well as Estonians and Lithuanians) when Soviet Union collapsed and Baltic people regained their independence in 1991. During 1990’s there where a lot of agreements between those states, including political, military and economic ones. Though there were a lot of contradictions between Baltic states building a closely connected region during 1990’s (and it is still under construction), it is possible to conclude, in comparison with some other post-Soviet and post-communist regions, that peaceful - and one can say friendly - relations in general could produce good perspectives for common development and promotion of the region as well. Another, and for Latvia very promising, trend is aspiration towards building of the larger one-Baltic sea region. There are a lot of evidences demonstrating that not only Baltic states are interested in development of common regionalism. One of the best organised and developed Northern region (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Iceland) is looking, however traditionally very carefully, towards tightening relations. Eagerness of Latvians to develop such a kind of closer ties is connected with political support and investments for the recover of state’s economic conditions as well desire to follow in building up of highly developed societies. Last but not the least consideration is based on historical roots, on positive image of Northern countries among Latvians even for centuries. It seems that ideas of building some kind of Baltic sea region are coming true through growing number of bilateral end- even more- already regional projects at all levels and fields from the political support to the international organisations to the cooperation between concrete institution and private organisations. In case of succeeding of that, Baltic could remain as subdivision.

Third level of possible regionalisation on a world scale is a common European identity. Belonging to European institutions, it is based in willingness of Latvia to try to secure her independence and in connection with both political and economical reasons, to draw Latvia in European economy as soon as possible. The best example is the painful and partly forced shift of Latvian industry from Russian markets to the European ones. Of great importance are geographical as well as cultural considerations. And we can safely add another immaterial condition- traditionally identity of Latvians as European in a wider sense of understanding.

Generally speaking, Latvia is included in the certain number of regions, which do not exclude each others. One could say, it is even some kind of supplement needed for further development. Regionalism has old roots in the history of Latvians and it has been accepted since long before 1990’s. Therefore the case of Latvia can clearly prove necessity of regionalisation for small nations to take part more actively in the process of globalization.
Ongoing Discussion: Globalization And Time-Turning

An old or new phenomenon?

A subject such as globalization is extremely difficult to tackle, due to wide range of sources and bibliography available (event though very often of a questionable level), the diversity of topics that fall within the same subject-matter (and which are consequently dealt with by scholars with very different fields of expertise: economists, historians, political scientists, geographers, sociologists, anthropologists, etc.) and, consequently, to the use of categories which can either be similar but employed in different cultural contexts, or entirely dissimilar.

Globalization is also hard to define because of the many aspects it involves (technological innovation, internationalization of economy and culture, the role of the State and of politics, social aspects,

469 After pointing out that “the historical profession has been slow to appreciate the importance of globalization”, Bruce Mazlish stresses that “one reason seems to be the confusion caused by the claims of the world history, which has been struggling to achieve its own identity. In its fight against more traditional, national approaches, world history has generally seen global history – that is, the study of globalization – as a dilution of its challenge to the establishment. Hence, world historians have tended either to ignore the new global history or to claim that it is already encompassed by what they are doing” (Comparing Global History to World History, in “Journal of Interdisciplinary History”, XXVIII, winter 1998, p. 383)

470 With a complex relationship between historians and theoreticians of international relations: “Of all the academic disciplines our world system history should speak to International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) are the most obvious candidates. World system analysis established its value by challenging both disciplines by its very multidisciplinary and holistic approach. By insisting on studying 500 years of world system history, world system analysis broke with the short-term post-1945 self-definition of both IR and IPE. It also broke with the then predominant state centric approach in IR, which was mirrored in the modernization approach in Development Studies. World system theory made a case for the superiority of taking the world system as a whole as the unit of analysis. Since its first onslaught on the state centric approach, conventional IR has been influenced by growing dissatisfaction with traditional realist state centrism (...) However, the main point of continuing contact and dialogue between IR theorists and world system theorists has been long cycle theory. Both were concerned with understanding the relationship between economic cycles of expansion and contraction and leadership/ hegemonic cycles” (A. GUUNDER FRANK- B. K. GILLS, The Five Thousand Year World System: An Interdisciplinary Introduction, in Humboldt Journal of Social Relations, vol. 18, n. 2, Spring 1992, p. 24). Even among theoreticians of international relations, there is a debate on the causes of globalization: “The main disagreement (...) is whether globalization is an exogenous process with 'its own inexorable logic'(driven by technology, economic organization, and related social and cultural change) – and to this extent independent of international relations – or whether it is itself a creation of international relations and the behavior of states” (I. CLARK, Globalization and Fragmentation. International Relations in the Twentieth Century, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997, p. 24)

471 “There at least five different dimensions of globalization that need to be distinguished (...): common ecological constraints, cultural globalization, globalization of communication, economic globalization, political globalization (...) It is found that different types of globalization have different temporal characteristics. Some are long-term upward trends while others display large cyclical oscillations (...) We contend that there is a lag between economic and political/cultural globalization” (C. CHASE-DUNN-Y. KAWANO-D. NIKITIN, Globalization: A World-Systems Perspective, contribute to the session
evaluation of the process itself). Undoubtedly, the reference to start with is almost invariably of an economic nature: the “integration and merging of national economies as a result of the transnational activities of firms”. On the one hand, the analysis of the phenomenon of globalization, of its causes, its development, its scope and its consequences generally originates from this point (however debatable it may be). On the other, we are very often faced with more ample definitions (“Globalization means the increasing scale and importance of exchanges of people, products, services, capital and ideas across international borders”) which go as far as to examine the effects at economic level:

Many of the phenomena classed under globalization are either not new - such as immigration and the transfer of political and scientific ideas - or will not have discontinuous effects on national economies in the years ahead. Global markets in foreign exchange, commodities and manufactured goods will continue to grow but not fundamentally change the world's economic landscape in the next 25 years. Their impact is already being felt today. The fundamental change in globalization is the way that the sectors of the economy previously untouched by international exchange - much of the service sector and a few lagging manufacturing industries - will be globally exposed. This will increase the size of the "globally contestable economy" from 15 percent to 60 percent of the world economy in the next 25 years.

As we know, the study of the time-turning of a historical event – however short or long the period may be – can be crucial to understand where the event originates from, its course and the explanations provided for it. However, the study of globalization is quite problematic (and at the most could complicate its explanation rather than clarifying it...) precisely because of its manifold aspects and the different competencies and categories involved. In addition, in the vast biography on the subject there are paradoxically very few studies devoted specifically to the relation between time-turning and globalization. To simplify matters, we could say that despite its countless variations, the debate focuses on very few questions, namely: is globalization an old phenomenon or a new one? If old, how old? And if new, how new?

The “world-system”

At present, the best-known and most discussed among the theories concerning the issue of time-turning and globalization is probably the “world-system” theory. Also in this case it is not easy to synthesize on the “Future of Globalization” at the International Sociological Association, XIV World Congress of Sociology, July 26 – August 1, 1998, passim

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473 For example, also from this standpoint, Christopher Chase-Dunn places particular emphasis on the importance of technological innovations: “The usage of this term generally implies that a recent change (within the last decade or two) has occurred in technology and in the size of the arena of economic competition. The general idea is that information technology has created a context in which the global market, rather than separate national markets, is the relevant arena for economic competition. It then follows that economic competitiveness needs to be assessed in the global context, rather than in a national or local context. These notions have been used to justify the adoption of new practices by firms and governments all over the world and these developments have altered the political balances among states, firms, unions and other interest groups” (Reflecting on some non-rhetorical question, in “Journal of World-Systems Research”, vol. V, 2, 1999, p. 188)


475 Even though Wallerstein rarely uses the word globalization and, in the semantic ambiguousness which is one of his characteristics, global e international seem to have more or less the same meaning, “the institutionalization of the worlds-systems approach undoubtedly prepared the ground for globalization in the social sciences. In some senses, Wallerstein and his school could rightly claim to have been ‘global’ all along - after all, what could be more global than the ‘world-system’? However, there is no specific concept of the ‘global’ in most world-systems literature (...) While it would be fair to
the “world-system” approach for a number of reasons. First of all because the advocates of this approach formulate hypotheses which are at times somewhat heterogeneous476; secondly, the theoretical proposition of each individual author has often been modified, even in relation to important issues; last but not least, it is sometimes difficult to identify all the elements of its bearing structure. This being said, and in the hope of not doing too much injustice to such a complex theoretical viewpoint, we should try to identify some explanatory guidelines, starting from a synthesis recently put forward by the most distinguished of the authors supporting this approach: Immanuel Wallerstein. In his analysis, Wallerstein starts from the concept of historical evolution, while at the same time recognizing its ambiguity:

I believe that what social scientists study is the evolution of historical systems. Since these entities are both systemic (lawlike) and historical (aleatory), it follows that neither of the two meanings of evolution is satisfactory for my purposes. Rather, I believe that all historical systems do evolve in the second sense, that is, that their historical trajectories are inscribed in their structures - but only up to a point. And this point is in some sense truly a point, or almost. That is to say, since all structures have inherent contradictions (or rather are contradictory), it follows that over time, the evolution of the structure reaches a point where it is no longer possible to make necessary adjustments to the structures and so the paralyzing effects of the contradictions will no longer be contained. When such a point is reached, further evolution ceases to be explained by the structure; it becomes aleatory. The fluctuations are wild or at least wilder; the impact of minor inputs become major in consequence, and there is a bifurcation, resulting in a new system. But the emerging structure of this new system is not predictable and is in no way inscribed in the structure of the historical system out of which it is emerging and which has become inviable. It follows that there are no general rules about human evolution, or the evolution of human social structures, except perhaps at a very abstract and not very meaningful level. For example, it might perhaps be argued that there is a multimillenial trend towards more complex historical systems (though even at this vague level I would be cautious), but this tells us little about the successive structures of historical systems, and nothing at all about future ones. In any case, there is no empirical basis for any suggestion of historical progress as inevitable or even as an adequate description of past history477

say that there are various remarks and ideas that do try to take the world-systems model beyond state-centrism, conceptions of the global that world-system theorist have tend to be embedded in the world-economy based on the system of nation-states” (L. SKLAIR, Main Approaches To Globalization, in “Journal of World-Systems Research”, Vol V, 2, 1999, p. 149-150). According to C. Chase-Dunn “today the terms ‘world economy’, ‘world market’, and ‘globalization’ are commonplace, appearing in the sound-bites of politicians, media commentators, and unemployed workers alike. But few know that the most important source for these phrases lies with work started by sociologists in the early Seventies. At a time when the mainstream assumption of accepted social, political, and economic science held that the ‘wealth of nations’ reflected mainly on the cultural developments within those nations, a growing group of social scientists recognized that national ‘development’ could be best understood as the complex outcome of local interactions with an aggressively expanding Europe-centered ‘world-system’. Not only did these scientists perceive the global nature of economic networks 20 years before they entered popular discourse, but they also saw that many of these networks extend back at least 600 years. Over this time, the peoples of the globe became linked into one integrated unit: the modern world-system” (Reflecting on some non-rhetorical question, cit., pages. 188-9). M M. Waters holds a different opinion, because he feels that Wallerstein ‘s theories are not linked to the analysis of globalization, because “his mechanism of geosystemic integration are exclusively economic” (Globalization, London 1995, p. 25); R. Robertson concludes that “globalization analysis and world-systems analysis are rival perspectives” (Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, London 1992, p. 15)

476 For instance André Gunder Frank e Barry K. Gills affirm that “the contemporary world system has a history of at least five thousand years. The rise to dominance of Europe and the West in this world system are only recent - and perhaps passing – events” (The Five Thousand Year World System: An Interdisciplinary Introduction, cit., p. 1)


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It could therefore be stated that:

Wallerstein’s project presupposes a dialectical approach with a socialist inclination. Rejecting most of the propositions about large-scale long-term staged social evolution associated with Engels, Morgan and Lenin, and even the Enlightenment assumptions of inevitable and actual social progress associated with Marxism in general, Wallerstein has sought to construct a comparative and evolutionary theory of social units and processes (...) Wallerstein seeks to retain a dialectical, historical approach, to remain economistic in focusing on production and distribution of economic goods as central to social change, yet also to accept a role for politics that is not simply reducible to economics, and a role for the nation and state not simply reducible to class. He tries to avert overly optimistic forecasts of the future by systematically expunging overly progressivist interpretations of the past 478

In this complex theoretical framework, Wallerstein concedes that the modern world-system has not been the only historical system (let alone the only world-system) to have emerged. It was preceded by a series of world-empires, political units based on a single division of labor and on a single (more or less large and centralized) State with the task of somehow redistributing profits between the social ranks and with a co-existence of cultures within it. According to Wallertsein, the Chinese empire is the model of world-empire 479. However, beyond a given space and time-limit, the world empires tended to crumble and eventually decline.

Hence, the peculiarity of the modern world-system consists in also being a world-economy, once again not the only world-economy 480 (since it has in common with the world-empires the division of labor and the cyclic nature of the economic flows) but the only one to have held out long enough to “institutionalize” the capitalistic mode of production 481 (that is to say the endless accumulation of

478 D. WILKINSON, World-Economic Theories and Problems: Quigley vs. Wallerstein vs Central Civilization in “Journal of World-Systems Research”, vol. 1, (1995), n. 19, p. 27. Wilkinson states also that (p. 72) “it is unusual among socialist-oriented theories in affirming the objective meaningfulness of the idea of human progress or development while simultaneously denying both the inevitability of future and actuality of past progress”


480 However, the world-economies prior to capitalistic economy were highly unstable and fragile structures sometimes destined to turn into Empires (China, Persia, Rome, Byzantium, Egypt) when a single State expanded (See I. WALLERSTEIN, The Capitalist World-Economy, quotation, p. 5-6, 37 and ID., The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, Academic Press, New York 1974, p. 16). Other types of world-economies are for example those of the late Middle Ages in the small city-states of Northern Italy, Flanders, Hanseatic Germany. According to Fernand Braudel, in disagreement with “Wallerstein’s fascination with the sixteenth century”, European capitalism originated precisely from the Italian cities of the 13th century (Civilization and Capitalism, vol. III, The Perspective of the World, Harper and Row, New York 1984, p. 57). According to Giovanni Arrighi, “at the basis of these differences in accounting for the emergence and evolution of the Eurocentric capitalist world-economy, we can detect equally fundamental differences in the very conceptualization of capitalism and its relationship to a trade-based division of labor. Whereas Wallerstein defines capitalism as a mode of production grounded in a trade-based division of labor, Braudel defines it as the top layer of the world of trade – the layer, that is, where the large profits are made – which he contrasts with the intermediate layer of the market economy and the bottom layer of the ‘non-economy’ or, rather, the layer of extremely elementary and mostly self-sufficient economies” (Capitalism and the Modern World-System: Rethinking the Non-Debates of the 1970s, paper presented at the American Sociological Association Meeting, New York, August 16-20 1996, Fernand Braudel Center 1997, p. 6)

481 According to Wallerstein, each economy is characterized by a specific mode of production, meaning by this the decisions relating to the type of division of labor, the quantity of production, investments and consumption. See I. WALLERSTEIN, The Capitalist World-Economy, quotation., p. 155 and ID., The Politics of the World-Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984, p. 162
capital\textsuperscript{482}; this push to accumulation is described by Wallerstein even in the dimension of a “psychological pressure”\textsuperscript{483}) and to spread worldwide, without being linked to a sole political system:

It is the peculiarity of the modern world-system that a world-economy has survived for 500 years and has not yet come to be transformed into a world-empire -a peculiarity that is the secret of its strength. This peculiarity is the political side of the form of economic organization called capitalism. Capitalism has been able to flourish precisely because the world-economy has had within its bounds not one but a multiplicity of political systems\textsuperscript{484}.

At any rate, the relation between capitalism and world-economy remains somewhat complex\textsuperscript{485}, especially because of the different characteristics that Wallerstein attributes to capitalism (a mode of production whereby the market redistributes profits\textsuperscript{486}, or based upon the principle of maximization of capital accumulation\textsuperscript{487}).

In Wallerstein’s analysis, this system operates in three areas (political, economic and social-cultural area) or rather on three levels (the State\textsuperscript{488}, the market, society) which are often independent from one another or even use differing logics.

\textsuperscript{482} What “distinguishes capitalism as a mode of production is that its multiple structures relate one to the other in such a way that, in consequence, the push to endless accumulation of capital becomes and remains dominant. Production tends always to be for profit rather than for use” (\textit{The Capitalist World-Economy}, cit., p. 272). “In this regard the ‘modern’ world system is not so different and this same process of capital accumulation has played a, if not the, central role in the world system for several millennia” (A. \textsc{Gunder Frank} – B. K. \textsc{Gills}, \textit{The Five Thousand Year World System: An Interdisciplinary Introduction}, cit., p. 1)

\textsuperscript{483} “A capitalist mode of production is one in which production is for exchange; that is, it is determined by its profitability on a market, a market in which each buyer wishes to buy cheap (and therefore that which is, in the long run, most efficiently produced and marketed) but in which each seller wishes to sell dear (and therefore is concerned that the efficiencies of others are not permitted to reduce his sales). Thus the individual as buyer rewards efficiency and as seller uses his political power to thwart it (…)

And what “distinguishes capitalism as a mode of production is that its multiple structures relate one to the other in such a way that, in consequence, the push to endless accumulation of capital becomes and remains dominant. Production tends always to be for profit rather than for use.” (I. \textsc{Wallerstein}, \textit{The Capitalist World-Economy}, cit., pages. 159, 272)

\textsuperscript{484} I. \textsc{Wallerstein}, \textit{The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century}, cit., p. 348. “Capitalism has existed in only one time and place, the modern world since the sixteenth century. Earlier there had been capitalists. There had even been embryonic or proto-capitalistic systems” (I. \textsc{Wallerstein}, \textit{The Capitalist World-Economy}, cit., p. 272). \textit{The world-system “from being a world became the historical system of the world”} (ID., \textit{Evolution of the Modern World-System}, in “Proto-Soziologie”, 1995, n. 4, p. 5)

\textsuperscript{485} According to Giovanni Arrighi “this alleged transformation of the European world-economy into a capitalist world-economy is both a great strength and a great weakness of Wallerstein’s account of the origins and evolution of the modern world-system. It is a great strength because – if it can be convincingly demonstrated – it provides a highly parsimonious and plausible explanation of the uniquely expansionary thrust of the Eurocentric world-system over the last 500 years. But it is also a major weakness because Wallerstein has no convincing explanation of how and why the transformation occurred when and where it did” (\textit{Capitalism and the Modern World-System: Rethinking the Non-Debates of the 1970s}, cit., p. 2)

\textsuperscript{486} see. \textsc{Wallerstein}, \textit{The Capitalist World-Economy}, cit., p. 159

\textsuperscript{487} See ID., \textit{The Politics of the World-Economy}, cit., p. 3

\textsuperscript{488} We use this term to simplify, since Wallerstein often uses – with more or less similar meanings – terms such as “political system”, “unified political system”, “political unity”, “political structure”, maintaining that States, as well as classes, are the consequence and not the cause of the capitalist system. (\textit{The Politics of the World-Economy}, quotation., p. 29). In certain passages (see \textit{Geopolitics and Geo-culture: Essays on the Changing World-System}, Cambridge
Within the States there are five mechanisms allowing the endless accumulation of capital:

a) “commoditization”: all activities encompassing production, exchange, saving or borrowing are performed in the form of currency and hence become market operations. A process anything but new, concedes Wallerstein, which began about ten thousand years ago, but which always finds in capitalism new areas to expand to (thereby affecting even the most intimate and personal sphere, as in the case of artificial insemination).

b) So far, the multiplicity of mechanisms of control and remuneration of labor – including wages – is not the most widespread form of remuneration in the world, thereby making it possible to limit demands for wage increase.

c) Production lines, “the integument of capitalist production processes from the outset.”489. This has resulted in the diversification of production, has increased the number of trusts and monopolies, and furthered de-localization by the large multinational companies490 and above all

University Press, Cambridge 1991, p. 39), Wallerstein seems to even affirm the existence of an “antinomy” between the survival of a multiplicity of States and the existence of a capitalist world-economy. However, Wallerstein seems to acknowledge in the principle of sovereignty the main feature of the modern State: “The modern state is a peculiar creature, since these states are so-called sovereign states within an interstate system. I contend that the political structures that existed in non-capitalist systems did not operate in the same way, and that they constituted qualitatively a different kind of institution. What then are the peculiarities of the modern state? First and foremost, that it claims sovereignty. Sovereignty, as it has been defined since the sixteenth century, is a claim not about the state but about the interstate system. It is a double claim, looking both inward and outward. Sovereignty of the state, inward-looking, is the assertion that, within its boundaries (which therefore must necessarily be clearly defined and legitimated within the interstate system) the state may pursue whatever policies it deems wise, decree whatever laws it deems necessary, and that it may do this without any individual, group, or state structure inside the state having the right to refuse to obey the laws. Sovereignty of the state, outward-looking, is the argument that no other state in the system has the right to exercise any authority, directly or indirectly, within the boundaries of the given state, since such an attempt would constitute a breach of the given state’s sovereignty. No doubt, earlier state forms also claimed authority within their realms, but “sovereignty” involves in addition the mutual recognition of these claims of the states within an interstate system. That is, sovereignty in the modern world is a reciprocal concept” (States? Sovereignty? The Dilemmas of Capitalists in an Age of Transition, keynote address at conference on “State and Sovereignty in the World Economy”, University of California, Irvine, 21-23 February 1997, p. 2).

In Wallerstein’s analysis, a State whose principal task seems that of guaranteeing the endless accumulation of capital: “The possibility of the endless accumulation of capital has depended upon the ability of the great accumulators not merely to concentrate the surplus-value, but to defend its concentration both against predators and against the demands of the workers that have produced it. The state and interstate structures are at one and the same time a rampart for the great accumulators and a continuing danger. The state can be the primary predator; no predator was ever as efficacious historically as an emperor atop a redistributive structure. Anything that would reproduce such a political structure with the increased technological efficiencies of the modern world would be a nemesis to the endless accumulation of capital. The great accumulators are thus notably wary of state-ness (the rhetoric about laissez-faire). Yet on the other hand, never has workplace bargaining power been greater than in the modern world-system, and never have monopolies been easier to crack than in modern times, which has meant that the great accumulators desperately needed political defense not only against the working classes but against their competitors. Balancing such contradictory constraints has been a tricky game from the beginning. The optimal mode has been found to be that formed by the creation of a network of so-called sovereign states (in fact sharply graded in political strength) operating within a loose, but meaningful, interstate system, in which hegemonic powers periodically and temporarily create regimes of interstate order that seek to maximize the possibilities of the endless accumulation of capital. Creating strong states in the core offers many advantages to monopolizing capitalists. It establishes a strong refuge for their property. It creates a political structure capable of advancing their interests in the world-system. Its higher level of taxation is simply a protection cost, eminently reasonable. Eventually, by making the strong state a liberal state as well, a high degree of internal order is ensured at relatively low cost. Furthermore, strong states in the core can work to ensure that states in the periphery do not become strong enough to interfere with the process of the worldwide accumulation of capital” (The Modern World-System and Evolution, cit., pages. 9-10)

490 “A world-economy requires physical transportation of commodities between productive processes, and ‘commerce’ (transfers, between autonomous organizations, of “rights” to commodities) as well as commodity transports. Its trade network is local and long-distance both. Actors in market commerce
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d) The unequal exchange between the core and the periphery (with the all too familiar differences in terms of profits and remuneration of the labor force). This differentiation has taken on more and more spatial and geographical connotations (North and South of the world, East and West), which are not the cause but the outcome of a process (in which it is easier to transfer goods and capital than people), as shown by the fact that these differentiations can be found within the same country (e.g. Italy or Spain) or the same geographic area (e.g. South-East Asia). Furthermore, there are semiperipheral or intermediate areas which "are in between the core and the periphery on a series of dimensions, such as the complexity of economic activities, strength of the state machinery, cultural integrity, etc. Some of these areas had been core areas of earlier versions of a given world-economy. Some had been peripheral areas that were later promoted, so to speak, as a result of the changing geopolitics of an expanding world-economy.

e) The existence of capitalist groups which, although non-specialized, aim at creating monopolies, thus performing an "anti-market" function. Obviously the market is all-important for a system based upon the production of goods. But in a truly (and not merely by name) free market, competition gets increasingly keen and makes it all the more difficult to reach appreciable levels of profit. Against this background, the great capital holders become "anti-market" forces, in that they end up using their political power to prevent free competition becoming the rule. This is why any monopoly (or oligopoly) is subject to continuous political attacks (and lasts on average no more than thirty years) and the great capital accumulators tend to focus at the very same time on production, trade, distribution, finance, transports, information, in the attempt to have always high profit margins.

Cycles and hegemonies

The capitalist world-economy has not grown at a steady rate, but has witnessed periods of expansion and contraction. Market forces have given rise to cyclically regular and significant expansion and stagnation of the system as a whole, thereby enabling it to reconstruct the "commodity chains", to reallocate resources and production structures more efficiently, while eliminating businesses and seek to maximize profit by reducing costs paid to suppliers for commodity rights, and by increasing prices charged to customers. Those who fail to conform are bankrupted (I. WALLERSTEIN, *The Politics of the World-Economy*, cit., pages 2-3).

491 Human equality is "by definition incompatible with the functioning of the capitalist world-economy, a hierarchical system based on uneven development, unequal exchange and the appropriation of surplus value" (*The Politics of the World-Economy*, cit., p. 21).

492 "World-empires had joined their 'edges' to the center by the collection of tribute, otherwise leaving relatively intact the production systems over which they had 'suzerainty,' whereas the capitalist world-economy 'peripheralized' areas economically by incorporating them into the division of labor" (T. K. HOPKINS – I. WALLERSTEIN, *Structural Transformations of the World-Economy*, in AA.VV., *World-Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology*, Sage, Beverly Hills, p. 55).


494 "Since actors are committed to their profits rather than to any market ideal, they attempt to avoid the operations of the market whenever these do not maximize their profit, by seeking through the power of states to remove market constraints that disadvantage them and create new constraints that benefit them (...) The functioning then of a capitalist world-economy requires that groups pursue their economic interests within a single world market while seeking to distort this market for their benefit by organizing to exert influence on states, some of which are far more powerful than others but none of which controls the world market in its entirety" (*The Capitalist World-Economy*, cit., pages. 17-18, 25).

495 "In such a system production is constantly expanded as long as further production is profitable, and men constantly innovate new ways of producing things that will expand the profit margin" (ibidem, p. 15)
workers from the market: “These are cycles of 75-100 years length in my view and the downward cycle is only resolved by a political reallocation of world income that effectively expands world demand” 496.

Partially related to this idea is that of the existence of “hegemonic” phases in the world-system. Here too, it is not easy to understand what Wallerstein means by “hegemony”. Hegemony is first and foremost a political situation, which occurs whenever a State imposes its regulations and goals in the economic, political, military, diplomatic and cultural field, so that the allied States prove in fact to be clients and the enemy powers are forced to stand on the defensive 497.

But Wallerstein defines the concept of hegemony also with reference to the economy:

The pattern of hegemony seems marvelously simple. Marked superiority in agro-industrial productive efficiency leads to dominance of the spheres of commercial distribution of world trade (...) Commercial primacy leads in turn to control of the financial sectors of banking (exchange,


At present, the most famous advocate of the cycle theory is probably George Modelski (whose best-known book is Long Cycles in World Politics, Macmillan, London 1987). However he follows a somewhat different time-turning from that of Wallerstein: “Combining empirical and theoretical considerations we arrive at a three-part classification of ‘eras of the global system’, each of which is some 450-500 years in length: 1. Eurasian transition; starting ca.930 (a suggestion drawn from W. MCNEILL, The Pursuit of Power, Blackwell, Oxford 1983) 2. West European, starting ca. 1420, and 3. Post-West European, starting ca. 1850. We call the first of these eras “Eurasian,” because that is where the center of gravity of the world system for the previous one or two millennia had been. During this era, the Eurasian Silk Roads served as the backbone of the world system’s communication network. The subsequent shift away from that system took some doing. The first thrust toward modern organization on a large scale took off in Sung China in the 10th century, and continued with the successful development of a number of globally-significant innovations. But in the 13th century, the experience and the resources of, at first North, and then South, China were captured by the Mongols who used them in an attempt to construct a world empire. For a time the rule of the Mongols extended from Eastern Europe, to Syria, to the Sea of Japan, and to the South China Sea, incorporating over 40 per cent of the world population (a proportion higher than that attained by any empire before or since). Mongol cavalry armies dominated the center of the world’s landmass and threatened the continental fringes in Europe, Egypt, India, Southeast Asia, and Japan. It was the first truly Eurasian social and political system, with Renaissance Italy forming no more than an outlying part of it. From a global perspective, the defining feature of the Eurasian transition era was the Mongol bid for world empire. But that was not all there was to it. The most important feature of that bid was its catastrophic failure, the utter collapse of the Mongolian design into devastation, disruption, and epidemic disease. The attempt to build a global political structure on the basis of imperial models of the classical era failed so completely that world system development was pushed in a new direction. But there was more to the Eurasian transition than the failure of the Mongols. This positive aspect is captured by the term “Renaissance,” which has been applied by historians to both the Chinese and the Italian periods of this era. A recurring feature of the West European era has been attempts at universal domination, in response to which “balance-of-power” coalitions were organized under global leadership that marked entire periods of this era. These times also gave rise to colonial empires, including the large British colonial holdings at the turn of the 20th century. But these were also times of vigorous competition, marked by feats of exploration and technological innovation, great economic expansion, and rapid population growth. In the post-West European era, whose shape we are only now beginning to discern, these tensions continue, though arguably in a more attenuated form (....) In a larger scheme of things, we might then see the Eurasian transition as one in which the preconditions of later developments were laid out: both negatively, in that imperial designs were ruled out, and positively, because innovations of global significance were diffused world-wide and the building of large-scale political and economic organizations was initiated in several areas. The West European era was one during which a few nation-states provided a regional nucleus for global organization that may not have emerged otherwise; states in this region took advantage of earlier innovations, and undertook their own initiatives, to lay down world-spanning webs of economic, political and social connections which had their center in Western Europe. In the post-West European era we move beyond this nucleus, towards an organization of increasing density, and towards increasingly oceanic global basing mode. This is a process that took off in the 19th century, gained force after 1945, is now gathering new momentum, but is likely to continue for the next two or three centuries. Beyond that a phase of consolidation, probably reaching out into space, will prospectively give it yet greater definition” (G. MODELSKI, The Evolution of Global Politics, in “Journal of World-System Research”, vol. I, 1995, n. 7, pages. 58-62)

497 I. WALLERSTEIN, The Politics of the World-Economy, cit., pages. 38-9
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Deposit, and credit) and of investment (direct and portfolio). These superiorities are successive, but they overlap in time. Similarly, the loss of advantage seems to be in the same order from productive to commercial to financial, and also largely successive. It follows that there is probably only a short moment when a given core power can manifest simultaneously productive, commercial and financial superiority over all other core powers. This momentary summit is what we call hegemony498.

However, in the picture portrayed by Wallerstein, the United Provinces499, Great Britain500 and the USA501 have played a hegemonic role in various historical stages of the world-system. Each one of these


499 “Leaving aside the obvious inference that France surely was, and Spain probably was, on balance more powerful than the Dutch, (...) a more traditional reading of history contends that the Thirty Years’ War marks a shift from the Habsburgs to France as the first-ranking, but not hegemonic, power in the states system. On the whole the traditional interpretation remains more persuasive than the Wallersteinian. It is hard to maintain the idea that the Dutch were a hegemonic power 1620-1650--or at any other time. In that period, there was no hegemony. The Dutch were forerunners, marvelously competitive and prosperous. Never did they have hegemony, never did they approach hegemony” (D. WILKINSON, World-Economic Theories and Problems: Quigley vs. Wallerstein vs Central Civilization, cit., p. 63)

500 “British world hegemony rested on a combination of many circumstances, three of which are particularly germane to an understanding of the rise and demise of the 19th-century global market. The first was British mastery of the European balance of power. The second was British leadership in the liberalization of trade in the Western world. And the third was British leadership in empire-building in the non-Western world (...) In the course of the Napoleonic wars, Britain had already gained considerable leverage over the European balance of power, thanks to its superior command over extra-European resources. When the wars ended, Britain acted promptly to consolidate this leverage. On the one hand, it reassured the absolutist governments of Continental Europe organized in the Holy Alliance that changes in the balance of power on the Continent would occur only through consultation within the newly established Concert of Europe. On the other hand, it created the perception that the preservation and consolidation of a fragmented and “balanced” power structure in Continental Europe, which served its national interest, served also a more general interest--the interest of former enemies as well as of former allies, of the new republics of the Americas as well as of the old monarchies of Europe. Britain further encouraged this perception by returning parts of the East and West Indies to the Netherlands and France and by providing Western governments and businesses with such “collective goods” as the protection of ocean commerce and the surveying and charting of the world’s oceans. A peace process dominated by Britain thus brought into existence conditions for global economic integration more favorable than ever before (...) This tendency was strengthened further by Britain’s leadership in the liberalization of trade in the Western world--a leadership which materialized in the unilateral opening up of Britain’s domestic market and culminated in the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1848 and of the Navigation Acts in 1849. Over the next twenty years, close to one third of the exports of the rest of the world went to Britain--the United States, with almost 25 percent of all imports and exports, being Britain’s single largest trading partner, and European countries accounting for another 25 percent. Massive and rapidly expanding imports cheapened the costs of vital supplies in Britain, while providing the means of payment for the rest of the world to buy British manufactures. A large and growing number of states and territories was thus “caged” in a world-scale division of labor that strengthened each one’s interest in participating in the British-centered global market, the more so as that market became virtually the sole source of critical inputs and sole outlet for remuneratively disposing of outputs. British mastery of the European balance of
stages took place in the wake of a war\textsuperscript{502} (continental or world-wide: the Thirty years' war, the Napoleon wars, the first and the second world war\textsuperscript{503} in which a power, formerly only maritime, turned also into a terrestrial power to defeat other powers (the Habsburg Empire, France, Germany) that seemed to be set on transforming the world-economy into a world-empire\textsuperscript{504}.

power and British leadership in trade liberalization reinforced one another and jointly strengthened the economic interdependence of Western nations mediated by Britain’s role as the workshop and central commercial entrepôt of the world. The entire construct, however, rested on Britain’s role as the leading Western imperial power in the non-Western world. It was this leadership that provided Britain with the resources needed to retain control over balance-of-power mechanisms and to practice free trade unilaterally in spite of persistent deficits in its balance of trade (...) In sum, the global market that came into existence in the second half of the nineteenth century through the extension of the industrial revolution to long-distance transport and communication was an expression of Britain’ unparalleled and unprecedented global power. In the Western world this power was largely based on consent—on the perception that British dominance served a general Western interest. In the non-Western world, it was largely based on coercion—on Britain’s capacity to forcibly extract resources from non-Western peoples. The destruction of the global market in the first half of the twentieth century was due primarily to a gradual exhaustion of these two sources of Britain’s global power” (G. ARRIGHI, \textit{The Global market Under British Hegemony}, in \textit{“Journal of World-Systems Research”}, Vol. V, 1999, n. 2, pages. 218-222).

For a different viewpoint see D. Wilkinson: “What is critical to the case for and against British hegemony is to examine the other "great powers"—in this period, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Prussia/Germany. One might also look closely at the conduct of the United States, given that hegemony theorists have named it as Britain’s successor. In the period 1850-1873, it is not easy to make a case that Britain’s hegemony was regularly felt by all these powers; nor regularly felt by any; nor, indeed, that it was ever felt” (\textit{World-Economic Theories and Problems: Quigley vs. Wallerstein vs Central Civilization}, cit., p. 65)

\textsuperscript{501} “Even before the First World War, therefore, the United States had emerged interstitially as a regional power that seriously limited the global power of hegemonic Britain. The emergence of the north American giant began to undermine also Britain’s financial supremacy. In 1910, the United States already controlled 31 percent of the world’s official gold reserves, while the Bank of England regulated the entire world monetary system with gold reserves amounting to less than 15 percent of the US reserves (...) At the same time, structural self-sufficiency, continental insularity, and competitiveness in the industrial production of means of war, put the United States in a unique position, not just to protect itself, but to profit even more massively than during the First World War from the breakdown of the British-centered global market. Initially the breakdown had more devastating effects on the US domestic economy than Deal in direct response to these effects strengthened further the US position in the Second World War” (G. ARRIGHI, \textit{The Reconstruction of the Global Market under US Hegemony}, in \textit{“Journal of World-Systems Research”}, Vol. V, 1999, n. 2, pages. 227-248)

Also in this case see David Wilkinson’s objection: “America was remarkably prosperous and a politico-military superpower 1945-1967, one of two, in a bipolar system in which it had regional hegemony and no more. In the world-system as a whole, there was no hegemon; and there was no American hegemony” (\textit{World-Economic Theories and Problems: Quigley vs. Wallerstein vs Central Civilization}, cit., p. 71)

\textsuperscript{502} “The organization of hegemonies gives distinct advantages to certain groups of monopolizing capitalists. But hegemonies are self-destructing because of their necessarily increasing costs. When hegemonic powers decline, others seek to take their place. This is a long process, and has historically resulted in their long geopolitical struggles, each of which culminated in a ‘thirty years’ world war,” and an eventual strengthening of the interstate structures” (I. WALLERSTEIN, \textit{The Modern World-System and Evolution}, cit., p. 11)

\textsuperscript{503} “In relation to the global economy there is, in each post-war settlement, an increment of consolidation and in the direction of freer (though not totally free) trade. In the phase of execution, the activities of large corporations and banks have oftentimes been crucial: witness the Dutch East Indies Company after 1609, the English East India Co. after 1714, the Rothschild banks after 1815, and US multinationals after 1945” (G. MODELSKI, \textit{The Evolution of Global Politics}, quotation, p. 24)

\textsuperscript{504} I. WALLERSTEIN, \textit{Historical Capitalism}, quotation pages. 58-9. According to G. Modelski, there are four “ingredients” to “produce ” a global leadership: “politico-strategic organization for global reach; lead economy; open society; responsiveness to global problems” (\textit{The Evolution of Global Politics}, cit., p. 27)
Situations of hegemony are nevertheless rare and somewhat short-lived, due both to the cost and to the fact that the “the mechanism of the balance of power intrude to reduce the political advantage of the single most powerful state”\(^{505}\).

**An historical social system**

For Wallerstein (and here we begin to deal more closely with the subject of time-turning) “the capitalist world-economy is an historical social system” and, as such, has its origin, its development and its probable future transformation into another social system.\(^{506}\)

Apparently this type of system was introduced between the late 15th and the early 16th century\(^{507}\) by a land-owning aristocracy destined to become the bourgeoisie, in response to the crisis of feudalism that


\(^{507}\) According to David Wilkinson, though, it would be necessary to develop the concept of “Central Civilization, born regionally in the Middle East about 1500 BC in the collision of two smaller, expanding local civilizations, expanded throughout the globe, engulfing all competing civilizations to become the unique global social system in the last 100-150 years. If continuing social struggles both are and imply continuing social entities, there is social continuity--stability, trends and cycles--in the struggles forming and maintaining Central Civilization. A consequence of accepting Central Civilization as a genuine entity, or a reason for treating it as a fruitful heuristic, is, in particular, the finding that it possesses a political cycle (states system--universal empire) characteristic of other entities commonly treated as civilizations as well as a political evolution (from multistate anarchy to balance-of-power) incipient but never successfully established in other world systems (*Central Civilization*, in “Comparative Civilization Review”, Fall 1987, pages. 53-56).

According to Janet Abu-Lughod, the mode of production described above existed already in the 13th century, not only in Europe but also in the Middle East, India and China. Moreover, “of crucial importance is the fact that the ‘fall of the East’ preceded the ‘rise of the West’ (...) if we assume that
had devastation Europe in the years 1300-1450\textsuperscript{508}. Its spatial boundaries originally included a large part of Europe and Latin America\textsuperscript{509}and at the end of the 19th century reached the entire world (Russia and India as early as the late 18th century).

“Westernization” and “modernization” are the terms used to indicate the cultural processes related to the world-wide expansion of this system\textsuperscript{510}.

Wallerstein’s time-turning is for the most part related to the development of capitalism as a system and, consequently, of the mechanism of production and division of labor:

The length of the commodity chains determines the boundaries of the division of labor of the world-economy. How long they are is a function of several factors: the kind of raw materials that need to be included in the chain, the state of the technology of transport and communications, and perhaps most important the degree to which the dominant forces in the capitalist world-economy have the political strength to incorporate additional areas into their network. I have argued that the historical geography of our present structure can be seen to have three principal moments. The first was the period of original creation between 1450-1650, during which time the modern world-system came to include primarily most of Europe (but neither Russia nor the Ottoman Empire) plus certain parts of the Americas. The second moment was the great expansion from 1750-1850, when primarily the Russian empire, the Ottoman Empire, southern and parts of Southeast Asia, large parts of West Africa, and the rest of the Americas were incorporated. The third and last expansion occurred in the period 1850-1900, when primarily East Asia, but also various other zones in Africa, the rest of Southeast Asia, and Oceania were brought inside the division of labor. At that point, the capitalist world-economy had become truly global for the first time. It became the first historical system to include the entire globe within its geography\textsuperscript{511}.

The signs of what Wallerstein refers to as “geo-cultures” – and what we, perhaps simplistically, could term “ideologies”, emerged during the French Revolution:

restructuring, rather than substitution, is what happens when world systems succeed one another, albeit after periods of disorganization, then failure cannot refer to the parts themselves but only to the declining efficacy of the ways in which they were formerly connected. In saying the thirteenth-century world system failed, we mean that the system itself devolved. From earliest times, the geographically central ‘core regions’ (...) were Central Asia and the Indian Ocean, to which the Mediterranean was eventually appended. These cores persisted through the classical and thirteenth-century world systems. A decisive reorganization of this pattern did not occur until the sixteenth century” (Before European Hegemony. The World System A. D. 1250-1350, Oxford University Press, New York 1989, pages. 343-45).

\textsuperscript{508} Theda Skocpol observed that “to explain what he holds to be the demise of feudalism around 1450, Wallerstein (...) employs, first, an amalgam of historians’ arguments about reasons for the crisis of feudalism (1300-14509 and, then, a series of teleological argument about how the crisis ‘had to be solved’ if ‘Europe’ or ‘the system’ were to survive. The merging of the capitalist world system is presented as the solution. Thus in this one instance where Wallerstein actually discusses a supposed transition from one mode of production to another, he uses the language of system survival, even though such language is quite incongruous” (Wallerstein’s World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique, in “American Journal of Sociology”, 1977, n. 5, p.1078)

\textsuperscript{509} See D. WILKINSON’s remarks (World-Economic Theories and Problems: Quigley vs. Wallerstein vs Central Civilization, cit., p. 47): “It seems strange even in shearly economic terms to find Spanish America (an object of predation and redistribution rather than commerce) has nonetheless gotten into the world-system, while Russia, Turkey and Persia are external to it”

\textsuperscript{510} I. WALLERSTEIN, Historical Capitalism, Verso, London 1983, p. 82

\textsuperscript{511} A time-turning in some ways similar to that used by scholars with very different ideologies: see R. BURBACH-W. ROBINSON, The Fin de Siecle Debate: Globalization as Epochal Shift, in “Science & Society”, Spring 1999, pages. 1-2
It was the French Revolution that catalyzed an important cultural transformation of the modern world-system. Although the origins and the trajectory of the French Revolution was in very large part the outgrowth of the Franco-British struggle for hegemony in the world-system, the most important consequence was the transformation of mentalities throughout the world-system, pointing up the long-existing anomaly that there existed no adequate geoculture to legitimate the economic and political structures of the capitalist world-economy (…). The nineteenth century was the moment of the construction of a coherent geo-culture for the modern world-system. One of the major factors was the rise of organized antisystemic movements in two forms: the social movement and the national movement. Although serious formal organization did not occur until the late nineteenth century, the early stirrings of these movements prompted preparatory responses almost immediately. The two themes -- normal change and popular sovereignty -- were of course exceedingly dangerous for the political stability of the world-system, legitimating democracy. In response to these themes there emerged a trinity of ideologies, which were really meta-strategies of political control: conservatism, liberalism, and radicalism/socialism. Each represented fundamentally a different mode of coping with the normality of change and popular sovereignty. By 1848, it became clear that the centrist ideology of liberal reformism (an ostensibly universalizing doctrine, but one whose application was always restricted to "deserving, civilized" persons) was the dominant one, the two other ideologies slowly turning themselves into modified versions of liberal reformism. Liberal reformism had an appealing political strategy, which conservatives eventually realized was necessary to contain the dangerous classes in ways that would preserve the processes of the endless accumulation of capital, while radicals/socialists eventually realized that this program was the maximum their real political strength could obtain for them at that stage of the historical development of the modern world-system.

Old and new in the Twentieth Century

Also as for time-turning of globalization, the relationship between old and new, continuity and discontinuity in various fields, the debate becomes even keener and more complex with regard to the 20th century (and this too raises questions: where does the 20th century begin? And where does it end?), both because the subject is very deeply felt by many and because technological innovations have undoubtedly accelerated our daily and personal life, the economy and maybe even history.

If war and suffering are the characteristics of all modern history, they tell us nothing about the distinctive quality of the twentieth century. If all social life since the sixteenth century has been shaped by a capitalist world economy, how can economic life have left a distinctive imprint on this century? If the twentieth century is but the culmination of 'modernity', its story cannot be told in separation from that of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. And if all international relations is but the repetitive play of power politics, shaped by anarchy and the distribution of power, then there is nothing of interest to be said about the twentieth century as a separate historical period.

The essential task of historian, as a first step, is then to identify the

512 I. WALLERSTEIN, *The Modern World-System and Evolution*, cit., pages. 12-13. According to Modelski instead: "Ideologies might be regarded as standardized definitions of global problems that are associated with definite action programs. They formulate competing solutions to persistent global problems, and they provide a common orientation to the future across domains and regions. Thus, Marxism might be thought of as having articulated one set of responses to problems created by the Industrial Revolution. Modern democracy, meanwhile, could be seen as having risen in the context of the information revolution. Ideologies therefore come and go; over long periods they reflect fluctuations in world opinion. In earlier times world opinion, that is, opinion relevant to the definition of global problems, had a rather narrow basis and was confined to some people in a few countries. Over the centuries, however, the social base of that opinion has widened steadily. The information revolution of the past century has significantly expanded it, making it now technically possible to conduct world public opinion polls. At the limit, the base of world opinion is coextensive with the human race" (*The Evolution of Global Politics*, cit., p. 41)

513 More than thirty years ago, Geoffrey Barraclough distinguished between contemporary and modern history on the basis of the economic and social changes that took place towards the end of the 19th century: the 20th century began with 1900 "beginning of the post-European age" (*An Introduction to Contemporary History*, Harmondsworth 1967, pages. 10-11)
elements of continuity and discontinuity which combine to give the century its characteristic qualities. We need to see how it fits in with, and how it stands out from, what came before, and what is likely to take its place.  

As a matter of fact, Wallerstein seems to place more emphasis on the search for the elements of continuity than those of discontinuity. This attitude (in addition to a healthy skepticism toward the continuous emergence of “innovation”) seems to be due to ideological reasons; after all, capitalism is capitalism. In Wallerstein this attitude leads to the almost incomprehensible underestimation of the role of the Industrial Revolution and makes it difficult to explain phenomena such as the industrialization of some areas of the Third world and hence the transition of some countries from periphery to semi-periphery.

In addition, there is a series of interpretations which confine globalization to the second half of the 20th century and associate it with the political and technological developments which took place after the second World War, with the international financial system of an economy which till that time was simply “internationalized”, with the changes brought about by the oil crisis of 1973-74 that boosted the creation of “linking groups of producers and plants in different territorial jurisdictions in order to supply markets in many countries”.

Also Wallerstein concedes that technological factors began to be influential in this latter period:

Though it is fashionable to speak of globalization today as a phenomenon that began at the earliest in the 1970's, in fact trans-national commodity chains were extensive from the very beginning of the system, and global since the second half of the nineteenth century. To be sure, the improvement in technology has made it possible to transport more and different kinds of items across great distances, but I contend that there has not been any fundamental change in the structuring and operations of these commodity chains in the twentieth century, and that none is likely to occur because of the so-called information revolution. Still, the dynamic growth of the capitalist world-economy over 500 years has been extraordinary and very impressive, and of course we are dazzled by the ever more remarkable machines and other forms of applied scientific knowledge that have come into existence. The basic claim of neoclassical economics is that this economic growth and these technological accomplishments are the result of capitalist entrepreneurial activity, and that, now that the last remaining barriers to the endless

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515 Giovanni Arrighi, conversely, finds an explanation – at least as far as the countries of East Asia are concerned - in the geopolitical choices made by the USA during the cold war vis-à-vis Japan Taiwan and South Korea. According to Arrighi, this step forward in a formerly marginal economic area is almost a landmark event: for the first time in history we are not faced with a power able to wield hegemony either at economic or at military level.

516 C. BRETHERTON – G. PONTON (eds.), *Global Politics: An Introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996, p. 3-12. “On this premise, it becomes impossible, definitionally, to interpret all twentieth-century international history in terms of globalization. Rather than see it as a discontinuous trend which has become more powerful in the second half of the century, this view suggests instead that globalization is a new departure. There may have been integration and extension of international relationship before, but globalization is qualitatively distinct from them. The trouble with such a perspective is that it reinforces the rigidity of the ‘century in two halves’ image and, if anything, impedes understanding of the post-cold war era” (I. CLARK, *Globalization and Fragmentation. International Relations in the Twentieth Century*, cit., p. 1)


accumulation of capital are being eliminated, the world shall go from glory to glory, wealth to wealth, and therefore satisfaction to satisfaction. Neoclassical economists, and their associates in other disciplines, paint a very rosy picture of the future, provided their formulae are accepted, and a quite dismal one if these formulae are rejected or even hampered519.

Here Wallerstein poses all the questions relating to the debate on the time-turning of globalization, which he describes as a phenomenon closely related to the development of capitalism. When did the process begin? When did it affect the world as a whole? What part have technological innovations played, especially those of the last twenty years520?

At this point Wallerstein tackles the last subject, namely the role of the State in relation to capitalism:

The concept of sovereignty was in fact formulated in western Europe at a time when state structures were very weak in reality. States had small and ineffective bureaucracies, armed forces they did not control very well, and all sorts of strong local authorities and overlapping jurisdictions with which to deal. It is only with the so-called new monarchies of the late fifteenth century that the balance begins, just begins, to be redressed. The doctrine of the absolute right of monarchs was a theoretical claim of weak rulers for a far-off utopia they hoped to establish. Their arbitrariness was the mirror of their relative impotence. Modern diplomacy, with its recognition of extraterritoriality and the safe passage of diplomats, was an invention of Renaissance Italy and spread Europe-wide only in the sixteenth century. The establishment of a minimally institutionalized interstate system took over a century to realize, with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The story of the past 500 years has been the slow but steady linear increase, within the framework of the capitalist world-economy, of the internal power of the states and of the authority of the institutions of the interstate system. Still, we should not exaggerate. These structures went from a very low point on the scale to somewhere further up the scale, but at no point have they approached anything that might be called absolute power. Furthermore, at all points in time, some states (those we call strong) had greater internal and greater external power that most other states (...). This political system of sovereign states within an interstate system, of states and an interstate system both having as intermediate degree of power, suited perfectly the needs of capitalist entrepreneurs521 and in the relationship between sovereignty and globalization:

The sovereignty of the states - their inward and outward sovereignty within the framework of an interstate system - is a fundamental pillar of the capitalist world-economy. If it falls, or seriously declines, capitalism is untenable as a system. I agree that it is in decline today, for the first time in the history of the modern world-system. This is the primary sign of the acute crisis of capitalism as an historical system. The essential dilemma of capitalists, singly and as a class, is whether to take full short-run advantage of the weakening of the states, or to try short-run repair to restore the legitimacy of the state structures, or to spend their energy trying to construct an alternative system. Behind the rhetoric, intelligent defenders of the status quo are aware of this critical situation. While they are trying to get the rest of us to talk about the

519 I. WALLERSTEIN, States? Sovereignty? The Dilemmas of Capitalists in an Age of Transition, cit., pages. 1-2
520 “The discourse about globalization has emerged mainly in the last decade. The term means many different things, and there are many reasons for its emergence as a popular concept. The usage of this term generally implies that a recent change (within the last decade or two) has occurred in technology and in the size of the arena of economic competition. The general idea is that information technology has created a context in which the global market, rather than separate national markets, is the relevant arena for economic competition. It then follows that economic competitiveness needs to be assessed in the global context, rather than in a national or local context. These notions have been used to justify the adoption of new practices by firms and governments all over the world and these developments have altered the political balances among states, firms, unions and other interest groups” (C. CHASE-DUNN, Reflecting on some non-rhetorical question, cit., p. 189)
521 I. WALLERSTEIN, States? Sovereignty? The Dilemmas of Capitalists in an Age of Transition, cit., p. 3
pseudo-issues of globalization, some of them at least are trying to figure out what a replacement system could be like, and how to move things in that direction.\footnote{I. WALLERSTEIN, States? Sovereignty? The Dilemmas of Capitalists in an Age of Transition, cit., p. 10: Modelski observes that the creation of international institutional structures follows the development of the global system, at least from the Vienna conference onwards. Given that as of 1945 the USA has assumed the leadership of the global political process and the initiatives (or lack whereof) at international institutional level (The Evolution of Global Politics, quotation, p. 24), “at the turn of the 21st century, we have advanced only partially toward the goal of improved global organization. If we are correct in this analysis, that era should comprise four long cycles. Of these the first, now complete, is best characterized as having produced a new knowledge-basis for global politics. Science and technology have taken off since 1850, so that the technical basis for world organization is now in place, both in the positive sense of communication and information and also in the possibilities of destruction of previously unimaginable scope. We are currently in the second cycle of that era, one whose principal global problem centers on “integration,” that is, on laying the social foundations of global organization. We can now see that any lasting foundation of “civil society” is likely to be provided by an emerging global democratic community. It is from within such a community which might emerge alternatives to global war, those arrangements that on previous several occasions functioned as rather primitive selection mechanisms for global leadership. These are major tasks whose solutions might not be arrived at for several more decades. It is only then, perhaps a century from now as a third cycle plays itself out, that global organization might acquire a full political framework of a federalist character which will be able to replace the forms of global leadership to which we have become accustomed. According to this analysis, therefore, the structure of global politics of the coming century will continue to give a prominent, though not exclusive, place to global leadership. Global organization will be a mixture of leadership that is, or is not, supplied by the world power in the form that is by now “traditional”, and of elements of universal organization in a federalist mode that are more recent, more tentative, and subject to evolutionary change. We might surmise that to the latter would increasingly gravitate the administration of routine tasks, while global leadership, acting through international institutions or ad hoc coalitions, will remain indispensable for resolving priority global problems (... The global system will continue to experience crises, and new global problems in response to which leadership of a “traditional” kind will continue to be called for. But such leadership is also likely to materialize in the context of an emerging democratic community that will temper it, and of an increasingly well-informed world opinion that will scrutinize it ever more closely” (pages. 74-77). Burbach and Robinson consider globalization as something similar to multiculturalism: “The transnational bourgeoisie exercises its class power through two channels. One is a dense network of supranational institutions and relationships that increasingly bypass formal states, and that should be conceived of as an emergent transnational state that has not yet acquired any centralized institutional form. The other is the utilization of national governments as territorially bound juridical units (the inter-state system), which are transformed into transmission belts and filtering devices, but also into proactive instruments for advancing the agenda of global capitalism (…) Therefore, the most critical question is what will be the role of the popular classes around the world in this process. While this question is too complex to be addressed fully in this essay, we can say that globalization has also led to an increasing popular awareness that transnational, rather than merely national, perspectives are necessary to deal with many issues of popular, grass-roots concern. The laboring classes in the North and the South have begun to realize that their struggles against the adverse effects of globalization must take on a transnational perspective and that they even need to engage in transnational organizing. Moreover, most of the new social movements, from the women's rights and gay movements to the environmental and indigenous movements, have a transnational perspective and can even be characterized in many ways as transnational movements or ideologies. In the long term the question is whether these movements can begin to coalesce and build a transnational platform to challenge capital and to make the new global economy serve the needs of the many rather than the interests of the rich and powerful, as it currently does (The Fin de Siecle Debate: Globalization as Epocal Shift, in “Science & Society”, Spring 1999, pages. 10-12).}

In this sense, according to Wallerstein we are living in a typical age of transition:

The 1990's have been deluged with a discourse about globalization. We are told by virtually everyone that we are now living, and for the first time, in an era of globalization. We are told that globalization has changed everything: the sovereignty of states has declined; everyone’s ability to resist the rules of the market has disappeared; our possibility of cultural autonomy has been virtually annulled; and the stability of all our identities has come into serious question. This state of presumed globalization has been celebrated by some, and bemoaned by others.

This discourse is in fact a gigantic misreading of current reality - a deception imposed upon us by powerful groups, and even worse one that we have imposed upon ourselves, often despairingly. It is a discourse that leads us to ignore the real issues before us, and to misunderstand the historical crisis within which we find ourselves. We do indeed stand at a
moment of transformation. But this is not that of an already established newly globalized world with clear rules. Rather we are located is an age of transition, transition not merely of a few backward countries who need to catch up with the spirit of globalization, but a transition in which the entire capitalist world-system will be transformed into something else. The future, far from being inevitable and one to which there is no alternative, is being determined in this transition that has an extremely uncertain outcome.\footnote{I. WALLERSTEIN, *Globalization or The Age of Transition? A Long-Term View of the Trajectory of the World System*, Fernand Braudel Center 1999}
Sovereignty, Regionalism and Globalization in Southeast Asian Politics

The purpose of this paper is to examine the change and continuity of the substance of sovereignty in relation to the development of regionalism and globalization in the Asia-Pacific region, especially focusing on Southeast Asian countries. The paper mainly discusses the following three points.

First, it is to clarify the gap between conceptual and political reality of sovereignty in many case of nation-building process of Southeast Asian countries. As sovereignty is premised on territoriality which state power controls exclusively, conceptually it becomes a political agenda after the completion of national integration. In reality, however, the shared concept of a nation had not developed enough to bring about an idea of society to be expected to control the state power, both before and during the state-building process in Southeast Asian countries. This meant that the notions of state, nation, and society were not easily congruent, and sovereignty was almost solely undertaken by state power especially during the Cold War period.

In such political circumstances, a priority was put on national stability which meant the stability of the state power. The Cold War sustained these state-centric considerations on sovereignty through economic and military assistance given by major powers to these governments. Originally the core purpose of regionalism such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was to promote primarily development and political stability of the member countries, along with the principle of non-interference in domestic affair among the member states.

Second, now a decade after the end of the Cold War, both this state-led conception of sovereignty and the inward-looking nature of regionalism in Southeast Asia are obviously being challenged by globalization from outside and by the growing aspirations for democratization from within the societies. In terms of the changing pattern of regionalism, the function and prospect of inter-regional relations such as the APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) will be discussed.

Third, with regard to the change and continuity of the function of sovereignty and regionalism, this paper picks up some cases of essential challenges to the conventional state practices of sovereignty among the ASEAN countries, by examining the responses of ASEAN to the human rights issues and environmental crises due to the forest fires in Indonesia. In this context, a need of new approaches to effective regional cooperation will be discussed.

By referring to the emerging NGOs’ activities with increasing global linkages, the point of this paper is, that sovereignty and globalization is not a zero-sum relation, but globalization requires sovereignty both practically and conceptually. Also, regionalism and globalization are not an either-or relation, but some initiatives can work well regionally in order to adjust to globalization. What matters now in the era of globalization is and will be the fresh substance of sovereignty, especially a new quality of politics and their relations with societies in Southeast Asian countries.
Globalisation of social-political and economic life is the main process of the 20th Century and it is characterised not only by integration processes but also by disintegration processes. The proof for this can be seen in the history of the Balkans in ‘80s and ‘90s. Disintegration in one part of the peninsula was parallel to the process of regional consolidation on a new base on other territories.

The movement to bring together Balkan states on the basis of economy and culture has started in the conditions of political and economic dissonance on the Balkans state on the basis of economy and culture has started in the conditions of political and economic dissonance on the Balkans (Greece and Turkey were members of NATO, Bulgaria and Romania were members of the Soviet Block and Albania and Yugoslavia were not joining any blocks). In the late seventies “The Balkans to the Balkan peoples” appeal was revived. Just as it happened at the end of the nineteenth century, the beginning of the twentieth century and in inter-wartime, the essence of the appeal consisted in protesting against interference of non-Balkans states into the affairs of the peninsula. The Balkan countries tried to establish multilateral co-operation. The tendency towards the regionalisation of international relations and, consequently, of the strengthening of the regionalisation of international relations and, consequently, of the strengthening of the independent role of small and middle-sized states was gaining ground.

On the initiative of Greek Prime Minister k. Karamanlis the meeting of economic experts from Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia took place in Athens in January-February 1976. Perspectives of co-operation in the sphere of production, economy, trade, tourism, transport, medicine, in organisation of scientific and cultural exchange were discussed at this meeting which marked the beginning of further slackening of tension between blocks in the Balkans region and in perspective, integration into European community.

At the end of the ‘70s – beginning of ‘80s meetings of representatives of branch ministers took place in Ankara (1979), Sofia (1981), Bucharest (1982), Belgrade (1984). The first summit of all Balkans states Foreign Ministers, including Albania, was an important step towards the improvement of the situation in the region. It must be mentioned that before Albania was the only state not taking part in any European (for example – Helsinki process) or Balkan initiatives. The summit was held in Belgrade on February 24-26, 1989. The formal state of war between Greece and Albania was ended. The discussion of different problems in the relation between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey was successful. Almost all members of the Balkans co-operation spoke for overcoming of its reserved character and for building ties with Western Europe and its integration structures. The regulars meetings of Foreign Ministers were held till the beginning of the ‘90s. the last meeting took place on November 1992, but Turkey and some of the republics of falling to pieces Yugoslavia did not take part in it. The positive process of political and economic consolidation had been interrupted. Speaking about globalisation, it must be noted that the situation on the Balkans became a headache for many states and governments on the globe.

The last decade of the 20th century was marked by the process of restructuring of geopolitical environment from Gibraltar to the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and self-liquidation of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation the countries of Easter Europe found themselves in isolation. Complicated problems in economy and Foreign policy was the heritage from the Soviet Union to new Russia. Many problems arose because of the idea of continuity between Russian and Soviet and also earlier imperial Foreign policy. But the situation has changed and Russia was not able to attract its natural allies in Eastern Europe. New centers of power have arisen, the character of marginal regions has changed and the restructuring of interregional relations began.
At the previous stages, especially in the 1980s, the primary reason for crisis in the economy and politics of the majority of Balkan countries, was the command administrative system, which brought to the decay of society, inefficient production, a steady decrease in the standard of living, and accelerated technological lag, compared to non-socialist countries, including as Greece and Turkey in the Balkan neighbourhood. Deep contradictions between the ruling leadership and the basic layers of society, full discreditation of regimes, loss of support from the Soviet Union – all these factors have brought about a situation in which former ruling parties, even renovated, with a changed name and essence of activities, proved able to retain power, as was the case of Bulgaria or Albania in the early 1990s. in the countries, however, where the ruling parties, in one or another form, have conserved their position (for example, in Serbia), they struck agreement with ultranationalist forces and groups, a fact which itself was creating a dangerous situation not only in their countries, but in the Balkan region as a whole.

All these circumstances produced a decrease in multilateral co-operation within the region. The growth (rise) of the political instability made them, in the first place, to their home problems and search for ways to prevent conflicts with their immediate neighbours. The balance of forcers in the Balkans was radically shaken in the late ‘80s- early ‘90s. The erosion of political structures that existed (**524**) in South Eastern Europe after the Second World War; the collapse of respective societies in Central and their slow transition to uncertain and still unstable democracy; the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the formation **525** of new independent states; the break-up of Yugoslavia, extremely painful, tragic and dangerous not only for the Balkans but also for the whole Europe- these are the main political events which caused the slowing down of multilateral regional and subregional co-operation.

As one of the most important ties in this complex of problems the Balkans became extremely important, the Yugoslavian crisis of 189-1999 resulted in destabilisation of international relations in the region and created a threat to the European security in general. Despite all the misfortunes of the crisis the main tendency of the regional development remained untouched. And here we are speaking about the process of integration (**526**) through the Balkan economic integration.

Kosovo crises, bombarding of Yugoslavia, enlargement of NATO’s presence had splitted the public opinion of the Balkan states (independently from the policy of governments) but could not stop the objective move for rebuilding of broken ties. It has cleared space for the activities of European business circles in the interests of joint reconstruction and restructuring of the Balkans economy starting from the liquidation of consequences of war. Kosovo felt out from the Yugoslavian economic structure for the whole decade, starting from the time when it had lost its autonomy in 1989 and during its full political and economic isolation at the time of the Bosnian conflict. Establishing peace on that territory, even in such an unsteady form as now is a step forward in the process of stabilisation in the region. Step aside from the political aspect of this question it is important to focus on the economy. Detailed program for reconstruction and development of the whole region demonstrates the move towards integration.

The pact on stability in south-eastern Europe worrtd out and adopted at the international forum in Cologne and Sarajevo in summer 1999 has created a base for the implementation of concrete urgent programs. These programs are partly mentioned in this pact and partly they will be worked out on the base of this document in the period from January the 1st 2000, to January the 1st 2003. In particular, one of the programs- creation of transport and utility communications with Western Europe along North-South and East-West routs. In future it will lead to creation of subregional non-government centres aimed at regulation of relations in the regional system.

Despite the differences and contradictions between the countries (big and small, poor and rather wealthy, rich in natural and not, multinational and mononational) the construction of politic and economic stability zone is seen as an urgent need. Regionalisation which means mutual co-operation on national an subnational level is a world development tendency and the form and the frame of this process are being created by modern practice.

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524 Words in Cyrillic.

525 Words in Cyrillic.

526 Words in Cyrillic.
But there are objective and subjective difficulties in this process. While globalisation is seen as unification and calls to refuse identity and sovereign rights in the sake of keeping unity (community) appear a tendency for disintegration will remain. Form the other hand is a danger of a split to separate segments as it is seen from the modern Balkans (and not only Balkan) experience. Now there is a move towards the diversification of ties and relation, an attempt to transform the to reach unity in diversity.
Regionalism In India

A State is a political entity and it provides a forceful identity to its citizens. In predominantly monolingual and monocultural societies of the West, a State was formed around unitary symbols – one language, one religion, one culture and in its extreme manifestation, one party and one leader. In a dominant monolingual, monocultural nation-State, the statist and national identities converge. But, in a multicultural State, different dominant groups seek national identity in their terms. Multiplicity and variation are the key concepts in a pluri-cultural State. Recognition and management of diverse identities is a challenge before politicians and political scientists in such a State.

In the contemporary world, states (big and small, industrially powerful and economically developing) are increasingly recognizing the compulsion of global interdependence, of non-centralised authority within the state, and of necessary and desirable accommodation of heterogeneity and pluralism. In this shift of paradigm, federal arrangements, are gaining greater recognition, as a means and method of peaceful co-existence of ethnic diversities and problem-solving efforts in a plural society. Today, four dominant processes have acquired – pre-eminence and global legitimacy in human consciousness, cutting-across the continents, ethnic conglomerations and ideological orientations, namely (I) peaceful co-existence, (ii) socio-economic development, (iii) secular democratic policy and (iv) extension of basic human rights to all segments of society. These have become universally valid guiding values of contemporary collective existence in our interdependent organic new world. States are acquiring newer forms of increasing accommodation of civil society, of ethnic diversities and socio-cultural specificities (1).

India’s fundamental integrative ethos and its self-identity have been drawn from a social reality that is composed of great diversity and plurality, running across which there were certain major cultural streams, and a cultural elite that shaped and interpreted these streams. Until recently, up to the growth of the national movement and founding of the Indian republic, what held Indians together was the basic identity of being a civilization tied together by a set of values, by a set of cultural norms and by an interpreting elite, first within the broad stream of Hinduism which itself had an extremely plural framework and then through a multicultural, multiethnic and ultimately multi-national society which we are now (2). India is not a unitary type of nation. It is not a ‘melting-pot’ of nationalities like the USA. It is also not a ‘prison-house of nationalities’ as Lenin described Czarist Russia, but it is a complicated pattern of different nationalities arranging themselves like a jigsaw puzzle with their own history, language and cultural-patterns. India preferred the ‘bonquet’ approach of exhibiting diverse flowers, each with its own individuality yet ‘tied’ together as a single whole. The modern Indian state is and association of citizens – equal and free, irrespective of caste, creed, colour, sex, language, region, domicile or status.

Today, all over the world, specific ethnic, linguistic and religious groups are seeking specific regional identities. The International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences defines a region “as a homogeneous area with physical and cultural characteristics, distinct from those of neighbouring areas. Thus, without going into hair-splitting arguments, it can safely be said that a region is a socio-cultural concept, which represents more of an analytic category than a geographical entity. Hence, in the proper sense of the term, ‘regionalism’ signifies “the regional idea in action as an ideology or as a social movement or as the theoretical basis for the regional planning, it is also applied to the scientific task of delimiting and analysing regions as entities lacking formal boundaries”. As a part of the national domain a region is sufficiently united to have consciousness of its customs and ideals, and thus possess a sense of identity distinct from the rest of the country. Notwithstanding this definition, anthropologist think of region in terms of culture and seek to relate specific cultures to specific geographic environments.

Regionalism refers to amalgamation of states into geographical, cultural, economic or administrative regions, and to resemblances in politics and policies among such states. Regionalism is portrayed as the effort to meet an area’s needs in such a way as to integrate the area into the national culture and economy (3). Regions and regionalism are relative to the context or the parameters within which they
are referred to and/or meaningfully operative. The social boundaries of a region are more often than not elusive as regions are seldom homogenous social groupings, differences within a region may be more significant than superficial similarities or traits. However, a combination of cultural and physical characteristics do make one area distinctive in some measure from another area (4).

Differences in population characteristics or attitudes alone do not necessarily lead to regionalism. It is only when these differences are specifically recognised as a differentiating feature from other regions that they can produce, reinforce or sustain regionalism. In other words, regionalism has a political dimension that involves a consciousness of kind, a collective identity, and a defence of territorial interests. Regionalism involves the politicization of regional concerns and the articulation of regional commitments (6). Januzzi argues that “regional identities are shaped not only by shared language, culture and political consciousness, but also by economic variables”(6). He cites land tenure as an example and argues that though Zamindars no longer exist in Bihar but the traditional land system persists and defines the nature of agrarian structure in India.

India has remained multi-lingual and multicultural from time immemorial. It has remained so because variation is accepted and differences are respected making conflict and conciliation a continuous process. Regionalism is rooted in India’s cultural and linguistic diversity. This has been so particularly since Mughal times. Mughals considered India too large and complex to be governed from a central capital. Since independence in 1947, cultural politics – whether in the demand for linguistic states or in the controversy over Hindi as the national language, or in the nativism of the “sons of the soil” – have deepened regional identities confirming Paul Brass that despite periodic appearances to the contrary, the long term tendency in India is towards pluralism, regionalism and decentralization. The politics of revivalism and subnationalism has created a dilemma for the State (7). The Indian state is increasingly concerned about its legitimacy, and, though uncertain about what course to follow, is open to compromise and bargaining. In this context, ethnic mobilisation has become one of the major instruments of grass root political activity, re-allocation and redistribution of resources and share in and access to political power.

Projected in geographic terms, regionalism at the State level is both an ethnic and an economic phenomenon. It is an expression of heightened political consciousness, expanding participation and increasing competition for scarce resources. Economic grievances expressed in charge of unfairness, discrimination or center neglect may be fused with cultural anxiety over language status and ethnic balance. It is this fusion that gives regionalism its potency. Language and culture, like religion, are at the core of an individual’s identity and when politicized take a potentially virulent form (8). The entire political structure in the post-colonial India is, in fact, built upon the accommodation of linguistic, religious and caste factors, as the only way to consolidate the state power and to enhance the legitimacy of the political system and maximise the possibility of ‘peaceful’ adjustments of social conflicts that arise during the developmental process.

The regional, sub-regional movements based on languages, religion, ethnicity or culture combine popular grievances from below with elements of manipulation from the above. The leadership of such regional movements seek to institutionalise its own political authority. These movements are expressed as secessionist, communal, often nativist and parochial. There was a time when people fought for their country. In the next phase people fought for their party. In the current phase of Indian politics the predominant mood is to fight for individual interest. Such movements seem to have been very powerful when economic issues are fused with cultural grievances, may be due to the hangover of communal killings and partition, over-reaction of the leaders and government authorities led to the intensification of regional sentiments and its fallout agitations. As a natural consequence, tensions gradually mounted over the past five decades within the different strata of the Indian society and in the process of state-functioning. The inadequate spread of capitalist growth, the non-revolutionary path it is taking, its fragmented class structure, and regional unevenness could perhaps go a long way in explaining what is happening all over the country, from Assam to Punjab, from Kashmir to Kerala. In this process, non-economic categories like caste, religion or ethnicity become mobilising factors of the socially discontented people against the authority of the state. Unevenness of retarded capitalist development, both region-wise and community-wise, heightens social tensions, providing a political space for the exclusivist interests seeking to appropriate larger share of control over the state power.
There are several models available to understand the regional movements based on language, ethnicity and nativist demands. Some of the important models for analysing the regional movements are discussed here.

A new State can be said to be passing through a process of reduction of its primordial sentiments to that of civil order. This transfer of sovereignty from a colonial power to an independent native one is more than a mere shift. It is a transformation of the whole pattern of political life, a metamorphosis of subjects into citizens (9). The primordialists, therefore, have culture as their major assets. To them, ethnic identities are not ‘chosen’, but are ‘given’, i.e. these identities proceed inexorably from the cultural past. Looked this way, they perceive ethnicity as ineluctable and immutable (10).

The emphasis laid by the primordialist on certain attachments in the cultural sphere as part of personality, formation and development which persist with them through life, consciously, is well taken. There is no doubt either that such affiliations provide the impetus and impulses for social and political mobilisation. By necessary implication these assumptions, in the form of cultural attachments, tend to change. For, among the various components of such a cultural core one may assume pre-eminence at a time but may be supplemented by another as the focal point of group identity assertion.

Furthermore, the premise of primordial ties being particularistic, they are perceived as potential road blocks in the process of national cohesion. It is also argued that since ethnic attachments pertain to the ‘non – rational’ domain of human personality they lead to social turbulence and violence and thereby tend to be dysfunctional in the development processes of the civil Society (11).

The primordialist view limits ethnicity to actual primordial-ties. But some of these ties can be changed or acquired. For instance, sectarian and even linguistic affiliations can be changed during the life time of an individual and can form the basis of ethnic identity. Secondly, even the ‘ascriptive’ identity of caste can also be acquired through appropriate mythologies, if it is founded on military power, and legitimized by priests. Thirdly, it is incorrect to argue that ethnic identities and boundaries remain fixed. On the contrary, they wax and wane according to situational contexts. Further, the mere presence of ethnic ties does not necessarily mean that they are ethnic formations. The latter are the result of political action (12).

India is beset with virtually the entire range of primordial conflicts – complexly superimposed one upon the other. It has to be so. India – that vast and various labyrinth of religious, linguistic, racial, tribal and caste allegiances – is developing a many sided political form to match for baffling irregularity her Daedalian social and cultural structure. One peels off Punjabi linguism and finds Sikh religious communalism; scratches Tamil regionalism and finds anti-Brahman racialism; views Bengali cultural arrogance from a slightly different angle and sees Greater Bengal patriotism. No general and uniform political solution to the problem of primordial discontent seems possible in such situation, only a loose assemblage of diverse, locally adapted, ad hoc solutions, related to one another only incidentally and pragmatically. The policies suitable for the tribal dissidence of the Assam Naga are not generalizable to the caste-based dissatisfaction of peasant landlords in Andhra. The Central Government’s stance towards Orissa Princes cannot be taken towards Gujarati industrialists. The problem of Hindu fundamentalism in Uttar Pradesh, the heart land of Indic culture, takes a rather different form in Dravadian Mysore. The rise of regionalism and of divisive forces is no more a phenomenon confined to the North-East (Assam) or North-West (Punjab). It has spread in every direction. So far as primordial issues are concerned, Indian civil politics amounts to a disconnected series of attempts to make the temporary endure (13).

There have been three great occasions in India’s short history after Independence which have darkened the optimists’ sunny projections. The first erupted soon after Independence when the demand for unilingual states (or provinces) engulfed large areas of the subcontinent. The second followed soon after when the ‘natives’ of these unilingual states demanded that economic opportunities in their states be reserved for them. The third great occasion is a contemporary one. It demands greater regional autonomy for the states in economic matters. Superficially viewed, these three instances can be seen as manifestations of an original, and unquenchable, primordial sentiment which the structure of the Indian nation-state cannot contain.

The regional movements in post Independence India may be characterised as a response to the imposition of alien process of nation building in the frame of a single political community. The process
was supposed to erode all the so-called primordial identities and build up a single national community. Influenced by political modernization, the Indian elite also did put faith in such version of nation building. The civilizational base of our nation and pluralist identities were considered incongruent with the modernising set up. Soon, the rise of linguistic state demands and popular movements based on religious-ethnic demands exposed the Western notions. A tough dealing with these agitations was of no avail, most of the demands had to be acceded. As the regional interest has become more powerful than the national outlook, sub-regional feelings have become even powerful than a regional outlook. The uneven economic development has led to increased interstate and intra-state disparity resulting in a qualitative transformation of the Indian policies. The direction and process of transformation depends upon the ability of the regional movements and parties.

In the case of linguistic movements, i.e., those movements demanding a unilingual state, it was the reiteration of primordial identity on the basis of language that bound the partisans into a coherent political group and signified them as ‘natives’. But soon after the major demands for linguistic states had been met on a national scale, India witnessed the emergence of ‘nativistic’ movements. The protagonists of these agitations claimed that the gift of the tongue was not enough, it had to be supplemented by tangible economic opportunities.

In the case of regional movements, language and nativism per se were not the crucial condensing factors. The demands were now primarily economic and were specific to the region, and the fact that the region also happened to be preponderantly populated by members of one linguistic group did not vitally alter the secular character of their charter. It is in this sense that regional mobilization and parties moved beyond language and nativism – from the tower of Babel finally to the truct farm of Mammon.

Regional movements are growing and have come to power in a number of states. Confirming that though, primordial groups and loyalties are traditional and predate even colonial rule, primordial discontents are also movements based on these frustration and are very often the result of independence and subsequent efforts at nation-building. Modern technology and knowledge have increased mobilizational potential of primordial loyalties faster than that of the political parties and other modern institutions. In political sphere, the processes of modernization are identified with secularisation, participatory democracy, structural differentiation and replacement of ascriptive loyalties to the rulers by achieved loyalties on the basis of elections or other mechanisms of participation, which within a democratic framework create a sense of self-awareness and sharpen edge for identities based on region. The ethnic groups acquire an added importance as they fill a vacuum created by the decline of institutions.

Modernisation tends to create awareness of separate identities, and the situation calls for considerable ingenuity in the development of new patterns of federal association. The secessionist demands in the Naga region are being managed by the establishment of an independent Naga state known as Nagaland and the adoption of a flexible attitude in New Delhi towards the “naga rebels” which has resulted in dissensions and divisions among the rebels. In Assam, the aspirations of the tribal party, the All Party Hill Leaders Conference (APHLC), have been accommodated by the establishment of a new kind of arrangement, a “subfederation” within the state of Assam with considerable internal autonomy and access to resources. Another constitutional innovation was tried earlier with respect to giving special status to Jammu and Kashmir.

**What causes Regionalism in India**

The model on which India is set is one of modernisation of an ancient and highly plural society in the context of an open polity with unevenness of economic development in different parts of the country as one of the most dramatic contributory causes of regionalism in India.

The dynamic approach to regionalism views regions as not just different territories with different names and characteristics but as units that must be understood in relation to one another. By analysing how regions relate to one another within a country, we understand more clearly how power is distributed throughout that society. Regional characteristics can serve merely as benign descriptors unless people within the various regions become aware of the meaning of their regional differences. Four explanations can be identified to understand the process of transformation of regional
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characteristics into a more political form of regional awareness which is the essence of regionalism (19). These are:

1. Uneven development
2. Fear of losing cultural identity
3. Political domination
4. Personal & selfish motives of politicians.

Indian problems are both to uplift the backward areas and to check the unplanned growth of metropolitan centres. Forces interacting between the two are to be regulated by judicious regionally oriented policy measures and, consequently, regional concepts are bound to be followed and the national planning is to be fitted in the framework of regional planning (20).

The Indian Society for all intents and purposes has adopted a capitalist path of development. This path was preferred by the Indian bourgeoisie which acquired control over the State and encouraged the development of capitalist relations (21). With the mechanization of farming industry and introduction of high yielding varieties, chemical fertilizers, cooperative credit and dependence on power oriented water resources, agriculture is becoming more and more a capital and labour intensive enterprise. The boom of field produce resulting from these shifts in cultivation (popularly called Green Revolution) has created a privileged class of rich farmers on the one hand and a pauperized stratum of marginal farmers, landless peasants and migratory labourers on the other (22).

The uneven development of capitalism led to regional concentration of industrial development. The unmitigated sharpening of contradictions of capitalist economy has led to the growth of monopolies, concentration of wealth in fewer hands and a slow pace of development on one side and an increase in wage erosion, unemployment poverty and crime on the other. The gap between expectation and achievement for a large mass of the population is increasingly widening. The State has tried to take the economy out of the woods from time to time by resorting to measures like nationalization of financing institutions, devaluation of currency, borrowing and deficit budgeting. The maladies ingrained in the path of development, however, have defied all these remedial steps (23). The growing contradictions of capitalist economy have obliged the State to play a more positive role in the crisis management. It has necessitated centralization of power at the governmental and the party levels on the one hand and unleashed a hostile regional reaction on the other. Hence the failure of planning developed economic imbalances between states, regions and sub-regions.

Many political issues have emerged because planning brought over centralization and the planning process failed to effectively deal with regional imbalances and especially backward regions of the country. Regional political parties are demanding restructuring of the federal divisions of powers especially transfer of financial resources from the centre to the States.

Regional imbalances are producing both prosperity and poverty between regions. Within the regions they are also giving rise to the birth of two classes, the rich and the poor. Punjab with the proud record of the highest per capita income during the sixties as a result of ‘Green Revolution’ in India represent a peculiar case of regionalism with heavy communal overtones. It also resulted in uneven development in different regions of the State. The fruits of the Green Revolution in the 1960’s led to the rise of the regional bourgeoisie. The regional political parties and formations which came to prominence in 1967 represented the interests of the locally placed ruling class groups like the landlords and the Kulaks in Punjab, or the Haryana, Western U.P. etc., or non big-bourgeoisie in Tamil Nadu. The uneven development has not only increased disparity between the States but also among different sections and regions within the State. Landless labourers, menial servants and what is perhaps best categorised as a lumpen proletariat in urban areas, are neither significantly mobilised nor relatively economically improved as compared with the past because ‘Green Revolution’ have been grabbed by just 20% of jat rich farmers who own more than 60% of the total land (24). It is this group of prosperous peasants who sought commanding positions in the Akali Dal as they were keen to match their economic muscle with political power. The Akali leadership which represented primarily the rich agrarian interests of the State took recourse to a rapidly religious path. It involves a combination of economic, cultural and religious issues and at its core is the identity of the Sikh community.

A significant dimension of the contradiction, born of the Green Revolution, was the creation of new “cultures of deprivation” (25). Large numbers of Scheduled Castes and rural proletariat of the Sikh
community felt alienated not only from the Akali Dal which was identified with the rich farmers who were Jats, but also from established Sikh institutions. To many among the socially and economically oppressed, it came to be identified as the religion of the oppressor Jats who with 20% of the Sikh population owned 60% of land. While the Green Revolution did not cause ‘poverty’ in the Punjab, those who were not fully participants in economic progress were placed in a position of at least “relative deprivation” as they perceived it. Green Revolution created new areas of influence and strengthened the economic and political powers of the Kulaks.

The rural poor though divided in various social, linguistic and religious groups, share a common inferior status and a common experience of oppression and exploitation by landlords, rich farmers and state machinery that is a binding force between them. The rural poor who constitute the vast majority have at different times resorted to collective action and protest to express their aspirations and discontent against injustice perpetrated by the dominant classes and the State which does not always protect their rights. Jannuzi writes that political extremism in Punjab nurtured by Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, drew support in the early 1980’s mainly from sections of the rural poor who had indeed been by passed by the Green Revolution and whose interests did not coincide with the land owning Sikh Jats who have dominated the leadership of the Akali Dal (26). The economic success and political turmoil in the Punjab are inextricably linked to rapidly rising expectations among the people – expectations that would generate pressure on any government, whatever its capacities and willingness to respond to pressure.

Here it is important to recognize that both the assertion of a regional identity and its assimilation in to a larger national identity have been essentially political – coalitional processes.

Several cultural, historical and political facts which reflected regional feelings in Jammu and Ladakh were not really sharp before independence. Internal communal tensions and cultural and political pulls from neighbouring Punjab inhabited the growth of this consciousness in Jammu. In the case of Ladakh, Tibet’s spiritual and cultural domination dwarfed its personality (27).

Regional divergence was widening by the controversy over the Centre-State relations. While Kashmiris demanded maximum autonomy for the state, regional urges of Jammu and Ladakh were articulated in the demand for maximum integration of the state with the Indian Union (28).

The fact is that right from October 26, 1947 political power, decision making, administration at higher levels, better deals in matters relating to employment, location of prestigious institutions and factories and funds for development have become the privileges of Kashmir alone with the people of Jammu and Ladakh becoming a hostage to the fickle leadership of the valley.

The regional identity of Jammu found its first effective though partial expression in the forum of the Praja Parishad, which was a coaltion of hurt regional pride, protest against arbitrary rule, urge for share in power and democratic expression, a sense of insecurity about the future of the state, dispossessed feudal and vested interests and Hindu communal sentiments. The coaltion was articulated in the slogan of ‘full accession’ and abrogation of Article 370 which guarantees a special status for the state within India.

The fact is that the people of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh belong to different worldviews, social customs and culture which are based on conflicting ideals and conceptions. They derive their inspiration from different sources of history. To keep together such people under a single state must lead to a growing discontent and ultimate destruction of any system that may be so built for the government of such a state.

The bifurcation of the state would be beneficial not only for the people of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, but for the whole of Indian freed from the suspicions generated in the Kashmiri mind regarding the regional and communal aspirations of the people of Jammu and Ladakh, the Kashmiris will be able to seek a future for themselves. They are bound to realise that they can find their real identity in democratic India rather than in Pakistan or in independence.

It may be argued that Punjab, Assam and Jammu and Kashmir are special cases because of their unique geographical locations, their peculiar communal problems, and their critical roles in preserving India's military security. There is no doubt that their internal politics and Centre-State relationships are extraordinarily vexed at present. But in a very real sense all of the Indian states are special cases, each possessing particular historical, geographic, cultural or economic conditions which give rise to
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idiosyncratic problems of governance. Over half of the Indian states have sensitive international borders, and most have distinctive minorities, whether communal, linguistic, tribal or regional. Virtually every State lays claim to a special cultural heritage and most can mount a case for being “neglected” or “maltreated” by New Delhi (29).

Regionalism may also manifest in the form of a movement for the special privileges for ‘the sons of the soil’ against outsiders. The inter-State migration of labour gives rise to ‘sons of soil’ movements. The agrarian bourgeoisie generally welcomes migrant rural labour as it helps to push wage rate down. Most of the ‘sons of soil’ movements have been urban based. The ‘sons of the soil’ began to demand that they be given the major, if not the sole, right to work on the soil of their linguistic states and reap the economic benefits therein without interference from people belonging to other linguistic communities. Bombay, a city known for the wide variety of its linguistic, religious and cultural communities, a political party called the Shiv Sena has demanded that jobs in the city not be given to migrants from other Indian States. The Shiv Sena has been particularly hostile to the Tamil migrants population for occupying the middle class jobs sought by the local Marathi speaking population (30). When an entire state is engulfed by varieties of outside migrants, as in the case of Assam, it leads to a situation of cumulative domination – enveloping all aspects of life – the economic domination by Marwari and Punjabi capitalists; the cultural educational and occupational – domination by the Bengali Hindi middle class; the domination of the rural economy through agricultural colonisation by Bengali Muslims (from Bangladesh); and the Nepali – Hindu peasantry, leading to a ‘loss of nerve’ among the native population. Clearly, there are two kinds of ethnic groups in this context. The illegal foreign immigrants and the Indian citizens who are in search of better economic opportunities (31).

In the Cyber city of Bangalore in the State of Karnataka, a political party emerged in the late sixties known as Kannada Chaluvaligars, calling for restrictions against Tamil, Malayali and Telugu migrants to the city, and demanding that employment preferences be given to the local Kannada speaking population. In Chota Nagpur, a native tribal population – a poor illiterate and predominantly rural people – have been overwhelmed by waves of migrants who have settled in their region over the past century.

In each of these instances, anti migrant sentiment took a highly organized political form; in four of the five cases (Assam is the only exception) opposition parties ran on nativist platforms calling for employment preferences for sons of the soil. In several of these States, there has been a substantial violence against the migrant communities.

In other States, nativism has taken a less organised and generally a less virulent form, but it has been present. Meghalaya has adopted a residential permit bill that requires that persons from outside the State have to obtain a permit from governmental authorities even to stay in the state for more than four months. In West Bengal, the State Assembly passed a law stipulating that anyone living in the state for ten years should be treated as a ‘son of the soil’ entitled to preferential treatment in employment. In Tamil Nadu, where people speak of mannin mainder (Tamil for ‘sons of the soil’), the state government retaliated against Maharashtra’s anti-Tamil policy by sending employers a replica of the Maharashtra government’s order on job reservations, though this proved to be largely a political gesture in a state where skilled local labour and the local middle class compete effectively against migrants (32). The enemy is within, the ‘aliens’, who by careful manipulation deny the native sons of the soil the benefits of economic advancement that their native state offers. These movements thus carry with their economic demands a vital linguistic element, and it is on the basis of discrimination on linguistic grounds that the economic demands are sought to be worked out. The major enemies of such movements are not other states so much as the linguistic groups from these other states who are seen as threats by the natives.

Hence in India, the nativist reaction is not only to foreign migrants – from another country, but to so-called “foreigners” from other parts of the country itself. Nativism in India is fundamentally a protectionist movement whose tariff walls and domicile regulations for employment and whose middle class population is like an infant industry seeking protection against competitive foreign imports.

What are generally referred to as “regional” movements in India are political movements by ethnic groups to create or govern states organised around an explicit ethnic identity; hence, the Akali Dal (and what was more broadly known as the Punjabi Suba movement) demanded the creation of a Punjabi speaking state; in Assam’s hill areas various tribal parties agitated for the creation of the tribal state of Meghalaya; and the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti called for the creation of a Marathi speaking state.
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After these and other ethnically (mainly linguistically) defined states were created, regional sentiments persisted and deepened. In each state the governing party expressed regional sentiments in clashes with the central government or with neighbouring states. Moreover, regional but particularly linguistic, sentiment affected state government policies concerning the choice of language in education and administration, and the adoption of a variety of cultural policies (33).

The number game in the politics of Punjab and Assam bear examples in which significance of economic factors have been put to a secondary position. The movement in both the states agitated for enforcing ethno-linguistic majority. Indeed, economic factors as the outsiders’ domination in service and industry, the lack of employment opportunities for the educated etc., were responsible for the ‘sons of the soil’ sentiment in Assam. But instead of fighting for the economic demands, Bengali language and the Bengalees as a whole were taken as symbols of domination and exploitation. In Punjab also, the sentimental wound (of neglect/non-recognition of religious demands, script) was the effective input for mobilising the popular emotion. The divided, uncertain linguistic composition in Assam and Punjab could by no means assure them of their identity – security (34).

Hence the regional identity – its formation, expression assertion has been a very complicated phenomenon. Economic regionalism, or movement based mainly on economic issues, remain less explosive phenomenon than campaigns based on socio-cultural issues (35), e.g. the age-long dispute between Maharashtra and Karnataka over the piece of land in Belgaum, the recent fight between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka on Cauvery water and Punjab-Haryana fight over Chandigarh. Even the genuine economic issues and development demands viz., the ethno religious idioms used in the movements have been channelised on ethnic lines giving rise to ethno-regionalism. Ethnicity and ethno-based identity factors came to prominence in 1980s. The Bodoland, Jharkhand and Gorkhaland movements bear examples of this new ethnic mood. In all the three cases, ethnicity and ethnic symbols have been used as instruments of mobilization, the economic factors being expressed in ethnic terms.

The Bodos claim to be the oldest tribal or ethnic group, largely inhabiting the northern bank of the Brahmaputra and the two districts of Nilanchal and Lalung on the southern bank. The origins of the Bodo movement can be traced to the passage of Official Language Bill in 1960 which led to the assertion of separate tribal cultures by the All Party Hill Leaders’ Conference, the Mizo Hill District Council and the Plains Tribals Council of Assam (PTCA). Apart from ethnic factors, complex economic forces played a part in the origin of the Bodo movement. The major ones were the problem of land alienation, poverty, indebtedness, unemployment and the lack of capital formation. The excessive pressure on land has pushed agriculture down to a marginal or below subsistence level. At the same time, vacant fallen land has been grabbed by outsiders, leading to economic stagnation and a consequent feeling of deprivation on the part of Bodos.

Another long drawn movement in the eastern region is the Jharkhand movement. The Jharkhand area, known as Chota Nagpur plateau, includes a cultural region comprising 16 contiguous districts in the states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and West Bengal. Later the demand for the proposed state included 21 districts. The region has the richest deposits of mineral wealth. Although, the region accounts for 2.5 per cent of the total geographical area of the country, more than 25 per cent mineral activities are carried on in this region (36). The Bihar portion of the proposed Jharkhand area provides the country 100 per cent of copper, 58.5 per cent of mica, 85 per cent of Kyanite, 44.5 per cent of coal, and 22.4 per cent of iron (37). The development and industrialisation process has rarely benefited the Jharkhandis, or the indigenous people. Rather, dispossession and forced migration have remained chronic among them. The movement based on ethnic and regional economic demands, has always been loaded with split and division on ethnic and religious lines. The Jharkhand movement has long progressed from ethnicity to regionalism. The basic components/issues on which the so called Jharkhand identity came up viz., exploitation by the dikus (outsiders) (38). Dikus are of two types: those from outside the state of Bihar – Bengalis, Marwaris etc., and those from within Bihar – the north Biharis. Once again the degree of legitimacy of the ethnic groups vary, those from outside the state being the object of virulent attack by those who lead the Jharkhand movement, its aim being carving out a separate homeland for the people of the region (39). The Jharkhand identity developed on antidiiku sentiment and loss of cultural self caused by dispossession and displacement. Subsequently, demands for recognition of language, right to culture, protection of forest rights were included.

Similarly, Uttarakhand – a region comprising eight hill districts of north-western U.P. – Almora, Nainital, Pithoragarh, Dehradun, Uttarkasi, Tehri Garhwal, Pauri and Chamoli districts – is also
passing through a turbulent crisis. An imbalanced process of economic development has resulted in distortions in the socio-economic structure of the region. A low level of urbanisation, illiteracy and the wide prevalence of unemployment is forcing the work force to migrate and making the families survive on what is called the “money order economy”. Migration is gigantic and in many villages the entire population has moved out except the old and very young.

The lack of political consciousness is another factor which has left the region dormant for four decades. In fact, almost the entire Himalayas are now revolting against the prevalent static systems, which kept the people in a state of extreme poverty. The utter disregard for socio-economic, political and cultural aspirations of the people in such areas has now led to spontaneous movements of people at the grassroots level with mass participation including that of women, considered politically the most ignorant segments of our social strata.

The seeds of awakening among the masses were sown by the Chipko movement, which inspired similar forms of grassroots movements with Gandhian style of protest in other parts of the country. It reflected the anger of the common man against ruthless exploitation and attack on the precious natural resources and heritage of the region.

The Gorkhaland agitation in West Bengal got momentum in 1986. Gorkhaland agitation was based on three or four key demands, viz., citizenship right for the settled Indian Nepalese, constitutional recognition of Nepali language, establishment of Indian Gorkha Regiment, liberation from the colonial rule of West Bengal. The Gorkhaland was to be carried out of the sub-division of Darjeeling, Kalimpong and Kurseong in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal. From time to time the movement adopted violent method, boycotted national festivals such as the Republic Day and the Independence Day celebrations, organised bandhs which frequently turned violent and took a heavy toll of men and material. Deft handling of the situation and democratic pressure tactics induced the Gorkha leaders to accept a district council with limited power.

The main thrust was on assertion of Indian Nepalese identity through citizenship demand. In the Gorkhaland Accord (1988) enacting the establishment of Gorkha Hill Development Council, none of the two main issues were touched upon, the Nepali language (not Gorkhali) was given constitutional recognition. Citizenship right and separate land demand did not receive any serious hearing. Of late, the GNLF leader Mr. Ghising has to discover new ploys to exploit the ethnic sentiment.

The process of state formation has since Independence, taken place for reasons of strategic security or administrative efficiency, but most frequently to accommodate a primordial demand. The centre in virtually every instance created states in response to pressure exerted by primordial groups that had the most to gain by acquiring statehood. But it was usually manipulative as the centre sought to outbid the primordialists and to ensure the installations of a state government that would support or at least not undermine national unity.

Two things have changed the complexion of Indian politics. First, all-India-party system has collapsed. All India parties with an all-India perspective have been reduced to regional levels. Politically the Central Government has ceased to be pre-eminent vis-à-vis State Governments. The constitutional arrangements make the Central Government pre-eminent, but the swift changes in the fortunes of political parties have robbed the centre of its leadership role. Second, rich strata in every state has emerged politically powerful whether it is the rich peasant class or its allies the local level industrialists. The rich peasants and the local industrialists in Tamil Nadu or Andhra Pradesh or Karnataka want more resources and powers for their state governments. Since the local rich have political influence only in their state, more resources for their state government will bring more advantages to the local power elite. Because of their power and inter-relatedness with other elites, the economic elite is able to lobby for central and regional policies that support its interests. In fact each region has its own local elite who may benefit from the regionalization of Indian society as agents for the central elite.

The regional elite attempts to marshall the powers of the region through the political apparatus of the region. Within a national state, regional units struggle against each other for development, and it is the economic and political elite in each region that are frequently at the centre of the heightened competition and struggle between regions. Regionalism has become equated with provincialism because the local economic and political elite use the province to challenge federal control, and to promote local development.
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The Akali Dal in Punjab, as mentioned earlier, is a party of rich peasant’s and hence its demand for more powers for the state Government. Local elites have become politically assertive and demand that political power should bring economic benefits. This is the goal of local elite. Decentralisers are representatives of local power elite and centralisers of an all India elite. Rising regional aspirations are a political and economic reality of India.

Regionalism, chauvinism or sons of the soil movements reveal important tendencies in Indian politics but in dealing with them a distinction should be made between wood and the trees.

Federal – provincial hostilities and confrontations reflect the interest of the regional elite, and long standing popular sentiment may even be manipulated in order to create regional solidarity (43).

On the whole the economy, both in its agricultural and industrial sectors, is becoming more national in character, drawing all regions in to an interactive web of mutual dependency. Power and water supply systems serve interstate regions, and a national system of rail and transport carries agricultural produce and industrial goods across the whole of India. Labour migration and employment opportunities for the middle class have given India's major cities ethnic diversity. An all-India managerial elite, in Government services and in private business, draws expertise from every region. The emergence of a national system of communication – the reach of newspapers, radio, cinema and television has nurtured the growth of national consciousness, the sense of being Indian, and it penetrates to all but the most isolated villages, linking the centre with the periphery, the rulers with the ruled, in (at least ideally) a two way flow of information. But greater interdependence sharpens consciousness of regional disparities and intensifies the struggle among states to protect and advance their interests. Greater national integration, ironically, may deepen rather than alleviate stress on the federal system (44).

The above discussion leads us to conclude that 'regionalism' in India is a multidimensional phenomenon. Its causes and consequences are not always the same. Ethno-cultural differences at times end in regional hostility, but roots in almost all cases, are economic. The economic component is the crux of the problem of regionalism. Five decades of administring big states in India has revealed certain anomalies and contradictions in the process of economic growth and political development. Huge states are both politically unmanageable and impede the growth of their backward regions. They have a greater propensity to perpetuate the existing inequality between economic strata, expand influence and political factionalism in the overall condition of the given economic disparities. Unequal regions within the same state inevitably results in the exploitation of the backward sub-region by the advanced sub-region and more particularly by the dominant caste elite, the nouveaux riches who have been the beneficiaries of the first phase of the working of a mixed economy in India.

There is a strong case for smaller and medium sized states, but the real problem is the re-composition of the Indian federation based on objective criteria of socio-economic homogeneity and 'felt' group-identity, in order to provide a more responsive infrastructure for an industrial break-through and modernisation. This is one of the challenges facing the world’s most authentic and complex plural society.

NOTES

5. Id., p.10.

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13. Supra. n.9, p.139.


19. Supra. n.4, p.130.


22. Id.


28. Ibid., p.189.


32. Supra. n.29, p.268.

33. Id., p.295.

34. Ibid.


38. Supra. n.14, p.56.
39. Supra. n.31.
40. Supra. n.8.
43. John R. Wood, Continuity and Crisis in Indian State Politics, p.7
Entre mondialisation et régionalisation: les relations entre l’Europe et l’Asie du Sud-Est depuis la seconde guerre mondiale

La mondialisation s’est accompagnée, en Europe et en Asie du Sud-Est, d’un processus de régionalisation inégal mais réel. En une cinquantaine d’années, les relations entre les deux ensembles ont évolué d’un mode bilatéral – de pays européens à pays asiatiques – à une rupture, elle-même génétratrice d’idée régionale ; et de cette rupture à une dimension multilatérale – d’organisation régionale à organisation régionale – totalement nouvelle. Par ailleurs, les deux entités, de même taille sur une carte mais très déséquilibrées – « centre » et « périphérie »… - n’entretiennent pas seulement des relations matérielisables : un effet de modèle s’est développé aussi de l’une à l’autre. Leurs relations constituent ainsi un champ particulier pour l’étude des interactions entre les deux processus de mondialisation et de régionalisation, qui se sont développés parallèlement. L’histoire des relations internationales doit en particulier se faire ici comparative : entre Europe et Asie du Sud-Est, il y a autant de « correspondances » que de relations proprement dites.

La déconstruction de l’ordre européen : de la domination au repli

A l’époque du « partage du monde » par les puissances européennes, entre la fin du 19e siècle et le début des années 1930, le lointain, pauvre et d’une diversité absolue, qui n’avait même pas de nom mais se trouvait être un lieu de passage entre les océans indien et pacifique : cet « angle de l’Asie » était devenu un véritable carrefour des colonisations.

Quatre puissances occidentales – cinq dans les marges avec le Portugal – se partageaient des ensembles territoriaux en 1930 que d’environ 530000 ouvriers, sur une population totale de quelque 95 millions d’habitants : cela représentait 1% de la population active alors qu’au même moment le secteur secondaire en concentrait en France 32%. Les capitaux originaires d’Europe étaient hégémoniques, à 95% en Indochine, à plus de 90% en Birmanie et à 70-80% en Malaisie et en Indonésie. La domination commerciale de l’Europe, quoique réelle, était moins absolue, car les colonies rayonnaient elles-mêmes sur le reste de l’Asie. Mais il était entendu que les relations commerciales en direction de l’Europe ne se faisaient qu’avec les métropoles, relations bilatérales et exclusives qui n’avaient d’autres fonctions que de renforcer la puissance du pays colonisateur concerné.

527 L’expression « Asie du Sud-Est » n’était pratiquement pas utilisée avant la seconde guerre mondiale.
528 Seule le royaume de Thaïlande échappe à la colonisation mais a longtemps été sous l’influence dominante du Royaume-Uni et, secondairement, de la France ; le Royaume-Uni est installé en Birmanie, en Malaisie, et à Hong Kong ; la France en Indochine (Cambodge, Laos, Vietnam) ; les Pays-Bas en Indonésie ; les États-Unis aux Philippines, à la suite de l’Espagne (1898) ; le Portugal à Macao et Timor-Oriental.


Cette première « régionalisation » asiatique ressemble bien sûr à une conquête. La zone du détroit de Malacca, qui met en contact les océans indien et pacifique, est pratiquement annexée : Singapour, rebaptisée Shonan, reçoit un maire japonais, toute la péninsule malaise « est désormais territoire japonais »531 et l’île indonésienne de Sumatra, de l’autre côté du détroit, y est un temps rattachée. Les circuits économiques sont réorientés vers l’archipel japonais, comme le riz indochinois, dont près de la moitié du surplus exportable est « réquisitionné » 532. Et la propagande de Tokyo, par exemple en Indonésie, ne rate pas une occasion de présenter le Japon comme le leader, la lumière et le sauveur de l’Asie533.


531 Shonan Times, 24 mars 1942, cité par Jones, Japan’s new order in East Asia et par Richer, L’Asie du Sud-Est.

532 L’accord du 20 janvier 1941 prévoit la fourniture de 700000 t. de riz au Japon à un prix uniforme ; le surplus exportable était avant-guerre de 1500000 t.

Européens, il s’agit d’un échec, pensé par ses acteurs comme un repli sur le Vieux Continent : mais l’idée européenne apparait comme un substitut à l’idée impériale et, d’une certaine manière, l’Europe comme une alternative à l’Asie du Sud-Est.

L’exemple de la France et de l’Indochine montre que le repli et l’élargissement sur l’Europe est avant tout conçu, dans le contexte de la guerre froide, en termes de sécurité. Le débat Europe ou Indochine n’en existait pas moins, particulièrement après le déclenchement du conflit coréen, moment fort de la nouvelle mondialisation stratégique. La France se bat alors en Asie du Sud-Est depuis cinq ans, sans succès décisif, et ce nouveau dérapage de la guerre froide paraît pouvoir menacer l’Europe elle-même, voire la Métropole : à la fois pour faire face à la menace et garder son rang en Europe, la France s’engage ainsi à partir de 1950 dans une politique de réarmement plus onéreuse encore que la guerre d’Indochine elle-même, la contraignant tôt ou tard à choisir entre les deux. Les archives montrent que René Pleven, président du Conseil à deux reprises entre 1950 et 1952 et principal concepteur de ce plan de réarmement, reçoit sur ce point de multiples conseils qui vont tous dans le même sens : un fort courant parmi les milieux dirigeants français, où l’on retrouve Jean Monnet et la mouvance radicale, mais aussi certains officiers généraux, plaide en effet pour un recentrage stratégique du pays sur l’Europe.

Les termes de l’alternative ont été donnés par Jean Monnet dès 1950 dans une lettre à René Pleven, à peine installé à Matignon : « la position critique de l’armée française en Indochine et le coût de cette guerre, qui empêche la France de jouer un rôle dans la défense de l’Europe, nous place dans une dépendance croissante vis-à-vis de nos alliés américains et peuvent nous entraîner dans une guerre que nous n’aurons pas voulu et où nous serons détruits ». Quand Pleven retrouve Matignon en août 1951, il reçoit de son ministre des Finances René Mayer un lettre qui va dans le même sens : il est en effet pour lui nécessaire « de réexaminer la nature de l’étendue de notre effort en Indochine, dans la double perspective de nos possibilités financières et des conséquences que notre rôle militaire et nos effectifs de cadre en Indochine ont sur nos possibilités de construction d’une armée française en Europe ». Cet état d’esprit se retrouvait curieusement au sein de l’Etat-major français. Ainsi le maréchal Juin, inspecteur général des Forces armées de retour de mission en Corée et en Indochine, en 1953, se déclara-t-il convaincu qu’il était nécessaire « de rechercher maintenant des économies sur les dépenses consenties en Extrême-Orient », économies « reversables au crédit de la défense métropolitaine, où l’argent fait manifestement défaut ».

L’idée maîtresse de cette stratégie consistait à s’appuyer de plus en plus sur l’aide américaine en Indochine, de manière à pouvoir s’en passer en Europe et à y offrir l’image d’une puissance retrouvée. Cela revenait à céder la place ou, compte tenu des coûts en jeu, à « vendre » la guerre d’Indochine aux Américains – tout en essayant d’y préserver l’influence française, ce qui était plus délicat. Un an avant Dien Bien Phu, la dévaluation par le président du Conseil René Mayer de la piastre indochinoise, surévaluée depuis 1945, amorçait le repli français d’Asie du Sud-Est et créait de meilleures conditions pour les prémisses de la construction européenne.

534 Dans le cadre de l’OTAN et du projet de CED
538 Rapport de la mission effectuée du 13 février au 7 mars 1953 par le maréchal Juin. SHAT, Fonds Juin, 1 K 238.
Les nouvelles constructions régionales : parallélisme et convergences


Les deux processus ne sont pas sans correspondances. Dans les deux cas, une certaine fragilisation se combinait avec la perception de nouvelles menaces pour pousser au regroupement. En Europe, plusieurs des pays fondateurs de la Communauté se trouvaient en situation de « repli colonial » : l’Italie, les Pays-Bas, la France541 ; l’Allemagne, quant à elle, n’avait pas d’empire à liquider mais était confrontée à un recul en Europe autrement préoccupant, après l’échec du Reich et la division d’avec la RDA. En Asie du Sud-Est, le repli colonial laissait une sorte de vide stratégique que les Grands, et particulièrement les Etats-Unis, s’employaient à combler. Les pays fondateurs de l’ASEAN ont ainsi dû surmonter leurs divergences de vues internationales pour pouvoir se rassembler – certains affectant un neutralisme actif (Indonésie542) quand d’autres se trouvaient très proches des Etats-Unis (Thaïlande, Philippines).


539 Association of South East Asian Nations (Association des nations de l’Asie du Sud-Est)
540 « Déclaration de Bangkok », La documentation française, Problèmes politiques et sociaux n° 349, 10 novembre 1978.
542 Le renversement de Soekarno en Indonésie, en 1965, avait levé l’hypothèse d’un neutralisme trop défiant à l’égard des Etats-Unis.
543 Entretien avec l’auteur, juillet 1981.


Les relations économiques entre Communauté européenne et ASEAN se développent donc : le marché européen est attractif pour l’ASEAN et les pays d’Asie du Sud-Est représentent un champ potentiel pour les investissements d’Europe ; les textiles et des produits alimentaires d’Asie du Sud-Est croisent les capitaux et produits divers (électroniques et chimiques) venus d’Europe. Mais ces échanges s’en tiennent à un niveau modeste : si la Communauté européenne représente le tiers partenaire commercial de l’ASEAN, celle-ci ne compte que pour moins de 5% dans les exportations européennes.

La fin des blocs et l’affirmation de la mondialisation économique et financière, au tournant des années 1990, créent une nouvelle dynamique. En Europe, la réunification allemande et l’effondrement de l’URSS conduit on le sait au traité de Maastricht (1991) : la Communauté prend la nom d’Union européenne, ouvre la perspective d’une monnaie unique et s’engage dans un nouvel élargissement, appelé à la faire regrouper pratiquement l’ensemble des pays européens. L’ASEAN s’élargit et s’affirme


546 Un comité spécial de coordination des nations de l’ASEAN, constitué des ministres du commerce des Cinq, se mit en place en juin 1972.


Faut-il voir à nouveau, dans cette affirmation de l’ASEAN, un modèle européen ? La chronologie y invite à nouveau mais, à la différence de l’Union européenne, l’Asie du Sud-Est se caractérise par sa vulnérabilité : il n’y a pas de vraie adéquation entre l’ASEAN et l’espace de la croissance asiatique, qui s’étale plutôt sur toute la façade maritime du continent et reste structuré par des capitaux japonais. Et le souci de concertation régionale qui s’y exprime ne pèse pas lourd face aux géants de l’Asie et du Pacifique, regroupés quoique de manière plus lâche dans l’APEC, le Forum de coopération Asie-Pacifique, qui prêche lui-même pour la mise en place d’une zone de libre-échange à l’échelle de l’ensemble du Pacifique : la conférence de Bogor (Indonésie) a fixé cet objectif à 2020 pour les pays industrialisés et à 2010 pour les pays en développement\(^{550}\).

En tout état de cause, de nouvelles relations se développent entre l’Union européenne et l’ASEAN, entourée d’autres pays asiatiques : un élément symboliquement important en a été, en 1994, la mise sur pied de l’ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting), à l’initiative de la France et de Singapour\(^{551}\). A l’instar de l’APEC, les pays membres se réunissent en sommets : Bangkok, le premier, en 1996 ; Londres ensuite en 1998 – le prochain est prévu à Séoul. L’objectif en est bien sûr, à l’heure de la mondialisation, de développer les relations économiques et, d’une manière générale, d’ouvrir de nouveaux canaux entre l’Europe et l’Asie. Mais il est en même temps, à l’heure aussi de la régionalisation, d’offrir à l’Asie du Sud-Est une alternative européenne à l’APEC et à la puissante Amérique.

*La méthode comparative, appliquée à l’histoire des relations internationales, devrait permet d’éclairer les processus de mondialisation et de régionalisation. Elle souligne ici que l’intégration régionale en Asie pacifique, si elle existe vraiment, reste fragile : l’Asie n’est pas l’Europe, loin s’en faut. Mais elle montre aussi, d’une part, combien depuis l’époque coloniale jusqu’à aujourd’hui, d’un mode de mondialisation à l’autre, la dynamique paraît la même dans les deux cas. L’hostilité d’Etats rivaux avec leurs dépendances a progressivement laissé la place à des constructions régionales, même si celles-ci sont de contenu inégal. Ces organisations régionales elles-mêmes permettent, d’autre part, un certain rééquilibrage entre l’ancien « centre » et l’ancienne « périphérie », cette dernière acquérant progressivement plus de poids et d’autonomie. Tout se passe ainsi comme si les processus de mondialisation - sous leurs différentes formes - et de régionalisation allaient de pair, l’un générant l’autre, qui lui-même ne peut se comprendre que par rapport au premier. L’exemple des relations entre l’Europe et l’Asie du Sud-Est illustre enfin l’idée que le réseau des régionalisations pourrait contribuer à donner à la mondialisation actuelle une part de son architecture.

\(^{548}\) Asia Free Trade Zone Area

\(^{549}\) Les cinq pays fondateurs (Thaïlande, Malaisie, Singapour, Indonésie, Philippines) et Brunei, admise en 1984 lors de son accession à l’indépendance.


\(^{551}\) L’ASEM regroupe aujourd’hui près de trente membres : les Quinze de l’UE, les Dix de l’ASEAN et les Grands de l’Asie pacifique.
Between Wars and International Cooperation Processes.  
A Possible Reading of the History of International Relations in
the 20th Century.

Bridge Paper

Despite two world wars, one can see in the development of international relations in the XX Century the emerging of a move toward an international community of free countries tending to join and become integrated in order to face the growing problems that development and modernization posed, in a global picture of international relations which witnesses a progressive involvement of all countries and their growing interdependence. The idea of resolving the problems of states and protecting their interests not through war, but through cooperation, integration and multilateral agreements, began to gain ground by means of a process that was not linear, rather it presented frequent interruptions or even regressions. In other words, a new type of international relations was being forged alongside the still prevalent, although declining, traditional force-based forms, the logic of power and war. To verify this assumption, it is necessary to stress some of the moments and problems in international relations normally considered less important, if for no other reason than because they appeared to have fewer immediate consequences.

International relations have always been dominated by the logic of power, even though it is possible to find examples over the centuries of an awareness of the existence of a sphere of common interests to be protected, and events marked by multilateralism and solidarity. The international community has certainly given the impression of being concerned above all with the relationships between states or, even more so, between monarchs or other potentates, but in the upheaval following great armed conflicts they were often used by the states as an opportunity to go beyond the level of searching purely for a formula for peace (peace treaties) and to transcend to the creation of a new post-war scenario. Generally, however, this rested on strong figures (monarchs or other) and not on impersonal politico-diplomatic institutions, to which recourse could be made to prevent or correct international crisis situations, such as the League of Nations or the United Nations would come to be.

Developing parallel to this, especially in the XIX Century, was a process of integration among states. One need only recall the various processes of national unification that can be seen, even when generated by wars or annexations, as processes of international integration based on ideal and cultural motivations, common sentiments and traditions, as well as on precise economic interests that preferred union to competition. National solidarity led to the overcoming of local, regional and class selfishness, and played a great role in history before degenerating into nationalism. In any event, it represented a fundamental moment in the development of democracy and in the overcoming of old political and economic institutions.

The development of pacifist movements from the late XIX to early in the XX Century had a favourable influence on the growing awareness of an active, operative international solidarity. Pacifist ideas then ceased being the appanage of a small number of isolated thinkers, as it had occurred in previous centuries, and acquired an increasingly larger following among political parties and the public in general. In the Catholic world, the values of peace and cooperation among countries became widespread, and internationalist and pacifist theories of a socialist nature also became increasingly popular, as they emphasized the common interests of the proletariat of all countries. Furthermore, currents of opinion were developed that looked to international arbitration as an instrument to help peace. Nationalist ideology prevailed, however, over all of these currents, leading to World War I and crushing the first timid signs of a new way for nations to relate to each other.
The First World War was a turning point in the history of mankind as well as in the history of international relations. The war marked the definitive beginning of the contemporary model of international relations: the global involvement – in these relations – of the various protagonists of the international scene on a political, economic, social and cultural level. The war also brought about the first attempt to create a model of international relations based on collective security as an alternative to the logic of power; the League of Nations was born, which was supposed to mark the beginning of a new stage of international relations characterized by peaceful solutions to international controversies. Nonetheless, despite some promising developments in international cooperation on both political and “technical” levels, in the period between the wars a number of totalitarian movements took shape and became consolidated, such as Fascism, Nazism and Communism. These extreme and exasperated forms of nationalism were at the same time a reaction to the many new things appearing in the world, including the relations between nations.

The period of profound transformations set off by the First World War, with its contradictions between the organizing of Europe into national states and the growing internationalization of the production process, ended with World War II, which appeared at the same time as an extreme and stronger attempt to reassert the logic of power. The Second World War was also a second and important moment of development in a worldwide process of aggregation that did not come about, as it did in the past, under the sign of imperialism, but rather through the conscious adhesion of various countries to a world system.

Following the Second World War, the sovereign state entered a period of crisis. This form of political organization continued to loose more and more of its self-sufficiency in regard to the controlling of security, the protecting of the environment and the guiding of economic-social development. Despite the defending of the principle of national sovereignty by the governments, this principle suffered a continual, substantial erosion.

Once again at the foundation of the new course in world politics were the profound changes in the method of production, to which were added the changes in the organization of security, due in large part to the invention of nuclear weapons. The revolutions in science and in mass communications had also made the world increasingly interdependent, and, as a consequence, a growing number of problems had assumed worldwide importance. The passing from a “personal” to an “institutional” concept of security was by now accepted by the international community, which had evolved from an “individualistic” model to one that has been continuing to be broader and more “consociative,” characterized by increasingly wider spheres of application. Thus bilateral agreements gave way to conventions, instruments that by nature are multilateral and marked by an appearing, if not always substantial, collectivity of positions.

The birth of the UN in the post-World War II period and of agencies and institutions connected with it are evidence of the will to continue along the road of collective security, in the broadest sense of the term. The new stage of international relations seemed to be interrupted quickly following the Cold War and the dividing of the world into two blocs. Today these phenomena can be examined not only through a traditional reading, but they can also be seen, especially as regards the Western bloc, as a difficult time of transition from an atomized international situation to one that is more cohesive. There was the awareness of acting toward a supposed common interest, toward goals that could not be reached other than through the concerted action of all countries; and this did not mean strictly military exigencies. The NATO was undoubtedly an instrument in order to satisfy military needs but, at least on paper, it should also promoted economic, political, and social cooperation. In line with the trend that we are attempting to characterize, the other experiment was more important and innovative instead which was begun after the war, i.e. the process of European integration, which actualized the intuitions which had emerged in the period between the two wars, although only on a regional scale. The European Union is a free and voluntary union of democratic sovereign states that for the first time was created without any imperious use of force. This union, which today definitely represents the highest manifestation of international cooperation, developed at various moments along a long and rocky road, based on the principle of gradual but continual evolution.

After World War II, the international horizon was expanded with the appearance of new protagonists on the world scene, the colonies, which one by one achieved independence, especially in the second half of the 1950s. The countries from the southern half of the world entered the international scene with their backwardness and problems, but also with their cultures and wealth. The logic of the Cold War
was soon extended also to the newcomers, often with the complicity of their ruling classes, but there gradually developed an awareness of the interdependence between the Northern and Southern hemispheres, and new hypotheses for world development took shape alongside the birth of organizations aimed at bringing together the developing countries, such as the Organization for African Unity, the movement of non-aligned countries, etc.

The UN is the privileged environment where the southern countries of the world attempt to assert their claims, first on a political and then on an economic level. It was primarily through this channel that the awareness of the importance of international cooperation slowly developed as an instrument to fight underdevelopment and hunger in the world, whose victims still number in the hundreds of thousands every year. Starting in 1961, the UN initiated the “decades of development,” which nevertheless have still not led to solutions for the problems of the southern countries of the world, whose imbalances have repercussions also on the northern countries, giving rise to recessions, emigration, environmental degradation, arms trafficking, and terrorism. For many countries development is still an open problem, and its solution is today one of the most important frontiers in the process of international cooperation and integration.

The fall of the Berlin Wall gave new vigour to the building of a new international order based on the free aggregation of various countries, and it made clear how the politics of power is not the sole moving force behind contemporary international relations. As in all stages of transition, however, it has had - and still has - moments of crisis, for which the UN has not been able to provide effective solutions. This is also because its structure has been subjected to tensions previously inconceivable, and while the states were struggling to organize a stable world political order, there have been episodes of an anachronistic re-emergence of nationalism.

Two historic events taking place in 1991, the Maastricht Treaty and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, symbolize the basic trends facing each other in the world today: the tendency toward integration and the tendency toward disgregation. The affirmation of these two tendencies is the consequence of the end of the bipolar world system. The surmounting of the East/West conflict and the end of the Cold War constitute a fundamental moment in the process of world integration, but at the same time they have created openings for the forces of nationalism, division and violence, which earlier had been contained and disciplined within the sphere of the blocs. On the one hand, there is the aspiration to create a new alternative order to the bipolar system, based on the growing role of the UN and of other regional organizations, such as the European Union, which are better suited to satisfy the cooperation and solidarity needs of a world that is increasingly interdependent. On the other hand, there is the desire for independence of those countries which have long been deprived of this and which bear grudges that unfortunately are not the most auspicious premises for a balanced foreign policy.

The rebirth of nationalism nourishes international anarchy, disorder and economic stagnation, authoritarism, and the oppression of minorities. The move toward cooperation and integration is not, however, simply an effect of goodwill; it is, above all, a consequence of the necessity to satisfy needs for which states are not able to find adequate solutions on their own. Widening the range of international cooperation in a way so as to satisfy fairly the interests of all countries thus appears to be the true challenge for the near future.
Between the end of the Second World War and the end of the ‘60s every governments succeeded at n° 10 of Downing Street were characterised by a coherence detectable in their Foreign activities. There were certain datum points (i.e.: the participation to the Western bloc or the friendship with the United States) that identified completely the international position of the country. In the same time these points were quite vague to consent a full freedom in the choice of tactical solutions, giving the possibility to confirm the national initiative and safeguarding the national interests.

The Historians depicted us a declining country in those years. In reality, we can see a Foreign policy far from being levelled on pro-American positions; a Nation restless, not totally aligned and sometime suspicious of the Atlantic ally. In general, it is possible to note that Great Britain tried to put under discussion the international stage and, sometime, the American primacy also. In fact, it is true that United Kingdom tried to adapt its Foreign policy to the global clash between the two blocs. But, the final aim was to resist and reply to the centripetal force and actions that characterised the international relations in those years. The British politicians knew very well the wealth of the national economy and the difficulties to maintain the freedom of action. So, they tried to modulate the international activities of the country in two ways. First, trying to diminish the tension with the enemy in every part of the world when it was possible; second, taking into account the possibility to interfere in local events, when inevitable. In this way, United Kingdom was compelled to sustain an endless political and diplomatic dispute with his main ally that caused a displeasing friction with Washington. But the final aim (the desire to avoid the danger to be closed in a bipolar system that was inclined to fed itself in a endless clash) brought London to this point without alternative. For London, such a system was more dangerous than a “hot war”, because the national resources should be overstretched and the national interests destroyed. Diminishing the level of the dispute with negotiations would offer the possibility to move the national scanty means without risk whereas they were needed. This objective meant to be ready to pay a good deal to USSR in Europe: for example, at least, the British politicians were ready to accept a neutralised Germany in the cente of the Continent. We will consider this fact in the next pages.

In general, we can say that in these years, Great Britain was a power with clear ideas of her interests, with a strong desire to defend them, and with the need to modulate her actions avoiding any danger both for the nation’s economic strength and for the international role of Country.

The post-war years.

The fact that United Kingdom was in part responsible for the progressive stiffening of the dispute between Western and Eastern blocs could seem an odd paradox but it is the truth. The labour government leading by Clement Attlee, perceiving the danger that the soviet ally could become an aggressive enemy, was able to convince the Truman Administration binding the USA to the defence of Europe, since the European States were not able to sustain themselves. In Bevin’s view, however, the American engagement could be fruitful only if it fostered the start of the dialogue between the two

552 The history of the Dunkirk Pact (it became the Brussels Pact when was opened to the Benelux countries) give us a bright example of the political, economical and military difficulties of the British government in those years. The British politicians had hoped to use the pact as the corner stone of a wider European and western defence system, leading by United Kingdom. On the contrary both Treaties encountered a lot of problems and were not able to guarantee either a political or an economic co-operation between the European countries. About the matter, A. VARSORI, Il Patto di Bruxelles (1948): tra integrazione europea e Alleanza Atlantica, Bonacci, Roma, 1988, pp. 6-7.
involved parties. When USSR realised the evidence of a Western bloc determined to stop its attempts to conquer the continent, Moscow should be more receptive to pay attention to a dialogue with the western interlocutors.\textsuperscript{553} The attempt was useless, in short time. All the actions carried out by the Superpowers with the aim to improve their strategic position in every part of the globe, fostered the tension between the blocs, rather than diminish it. The consequence for United Kingdom was the necessity to provide tighten relations with USA, paying no attention to the petition for more friendship coming from the European Continent in order to create stronger structure of co-operation between the European Countries. This caused two negative consequences for London. Firstly, the impression that Great Britain preferred relations with USA took root in Europe, because the friendship with Washington was the only way to obtain an international role, impossible to achieve otherwise in alliance with the European Countries.\textsuperscript{555} Secondly, binding itself so openly with the American ally caused an high tension with USSR in very important areas. In this way the negative consequences became immediately obvious: imperilled by the economic burdens, for example, United Kingdom was forced to withdraw its troops from Greece and give up the protective role of Greece and Turkey, giving it to USA.\textsuperscript{556}

Undoubtedly, the economical difficulties were the main reason of British disillusion. At the end of the ‘40s, these difficulties forced the country to renounce to political and military projects that could foster the “Leading Power” ambitions fed in London. At the end of the ‘40s, the action of the Soviet bloc began to be diverted from Europe and directed to other areas (for example, in Asia, where in November 1949 the communist party took power in China). The British idea was to investigate the possibility to build up an Eurafrica bloc including Western Europe and Africa. In this way it should have been possible to pass over the national shortage of economic resources, co-opting the European countries in a Great Power project. The Europeans had to furnish a significative help to develop the British influence in the world. Bevin widened the first draft presented by the Foreign Office, and provided for an increased commitment for the European Countries in developing the relation with the African continent. He added a military section, first of all because he wanted to create a structure able to constrain the Soviet bloc.\textsuperscript{557}

All these activities and programmes had the final intention to guarantee the independence of the nation in very internationalised and bi-polarised domain. In the British idea, the presence of an autonomous moderator should help to diminish risks for international peace and stability, giving to the Country the manoeuvring space fitted on the national resources. In the same time, the British politicians knew that they had not the possibility to hold fast an heterodox position compared to the Western bloc: the danger was to fall in contrast with the allies. This was a very frightening, but real risk. In fact, for example, even the birth of the NATO, a precious element for European defence and a key point in the English political and military system, was interpreted in different way in United Kingdom and USA.

\textsuperscript{553} A.BULLOCK, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951, Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 239. The British government hoped that, with Marshall Plan and OEEC, the Country could be helped in the economical field, improving its general condition, so difficult after the end of the war.


\textsuperscript{555} A.VARSORI, Il Patto di Bruxelles, quoted, pp. 240-251. The Brussels Pact is a good example. In London the new alliances were considered like good tools for the national interests only. In this way, the presence into them was conditioned by the exigency to held a complete national freedom of action, the core of the British political policy in that period.

\textsuperscript{556} E.DI NOLFO, Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali 1918-1992, Laterza, Bari, 1994, pp. 613, 634 e 684-690. The government decided to withdraw the troops within the 21\textsuperscript{st} February 1947. The USA had to succeed, giving the politic, economic and military help to the royalist Greek government fighting against the Communist guerrilla. About the civil war and the guerrilla’s warfare in Greece, see, T.ARGIOLAS, La guerriglia: storia e dottrina, Sansoni Editore, 1967, pp. 128-138.

Washington thought that NATO had to be a tool through which starting a dialogue with Moscow from a position of strength. For London, on the contrary, NATO should have been a source of military strength, permitting a new dialogue with and a new diplomatic approach to USSR, in Europe as well as in the world at large. The containment defined by Kennan and by the American administration was not well enough. It was created with the purpose to provide good rules for the dialogue with the Soviet Union, but after its birth it was transformed in the only purpose of the western policy. In this way, the Western bloc was compelled to answer at the Soviet’ s challenge with increasing of force levels558. Again, a frightful prospect for a country which needed first of all a period of rest to recover her national wealth.

Anyway, in the first part of the '50s, the Great Britain went on with its attempt to maintain an autonomous line in the world, in political as well as in military fields. The labour government leading by Attlee, and the conservative one leading by Churchill, kept, after all, the same approach to USSR, and tried to relaunch, whenever they could, the diplomatic action, the close and personal dialogue with the Soviet politicians. Different interests could be exceeded with the diplomatic work, finding a modus vivendi with every nation, however it could be detestable the government system in the opposite country559. In this way and with this philosophy, relations with USA got to higher point of tensions. Washington refused every contact with the Soviets and tried wherever was possible to eradicate the communist menace to the western interests around the world. For example, the McCarthyism in American society prevented the Administration from establishing a dialogue with the Communist China. On the contrary, United Kingdom, after the Mao Zedong’s victory, accepted the possibility of talks, recognising the new government in short time. It was a rip with the bloc, and, maybe, it was underlined when Great Britain wasn’t called to participate in the formation of ANZUS, a Treaty created formally against Japan, but really a barrier against the Popular China.

During the Korean War, the political action of the British Cabinet was the same. Truly, United Kingdom deployed a considerable expeditionary force in the Korean peninsula, and it was a bright contradiction with the rule to avoid such a commitments. London did so with the conviction that it was possible, gaining the allies’ trust on the field, to determine the wide political choice of the alliance in the peace negotiation, curbing the discussions. The best course of action was looking for the dialogue with USSR, with the last aim to avoid the Chinese troops' intervention and the fear in the Asian public opinion that the Western Powers were working to create a new colonial activity in the area. Trying to impose this policy, the labour and conservative governments were ready to run serious risks, firstly (again) the possibility to strain the relations with USA without remedy560.

Churchill and Eden

With the return in charge of Churchill, the British political line didn’t change. In Korean War, for example, he insisted on the dialogue with the other part. Having the alliance reached strong position in front of the enemy, the time was ready for the negotiation, trying to find a modus vivendi with the communists. As his predecessor, he felt that Great Britain needed more relaxed relations with an enemy, that couldn’t be defeated in that moment561.

In the same time, the conservative government prefer to deter the possible menace consisting in the communist influence spreading in the world, participating in regional Alliances, that covered the

559 E.BARKER, Britain in a Divided Europe, 1945-1950, Macmillan, London, pp. 47, 103-109, 177. At one time, Bevin was compelled to resist to the strong pressure coming from public opinion, Foreign Office and military circle, about the need to line up the country with the extreme anti-Communist position of the USA.
560 A.BULLOCK, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951, Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 795; and, P.N.FARRAR, Britain’s Proposal for a Buffer Zone South of the Yalu in November 1950: it was a Neglected Opportunity to End the Fighting in Korea?, in “Journal of Contemporary History”, vol. n° 18, autumn, pp. 327-351.
political and military nation duties in extra-European areas. The presence in SEATO (1954) and CENTO (1955) was the best solution because Great Britain was called to provide a qualified defence in important areas where the national interests were at stake. The role into SEATO permitted to drop down the American hypothesis to internationalised the war in Indochina, when the French government asked for a western help. It was a very dangerous request for United Kingdom, forced to choose between two explosive solutions. On one side, supporting the military action, could cause severe consequences for national economy; on the contrary, refusing their participation could provoke a negative showdown with USA, that remained the main ally of the country. Obviously, the government’s reaction was to press for a direct contact with the other side. The British action didn’t change the fortune of the franco-vietnamese war, but avoid more dangerous consequences, and confirmed the English politicians in their beliefs: there was the possibility to manoeuvre in the international domain; and the Great Britain, a country with globalised interests but no money to fulfil them completely, could play a leading role in the dialogue with the other part. The non-violent confrontation represented the most attractive line for London.

The same was for the British policy in Europe. After the election of President Eisenhower, Churchill launched the idea of a direct contact to the Soviets, after long years of formal relations, only. Beyond the unfortunate outcome of the Berlin’s talk in 1954 (consequence of the crossed vetoes and of the German attempts to control the United States’ attitude against the dialogue), it must be said that, thanks to the British efforts, in this period started a path that gave good effects in the long time. It was a very hard battle. During the ‘50s and the ‘60s, London was very far from Washington about the management of the German problem. Both United Kingdom and USA had appreciated the creation of West Germany, looking at the advantages that the western bloc could achieve from the German participation in military field. British government had the conviction that a rearmed Germany could be played against the other block but, in the same time, there was the strong opinion that Bonn, a good but passive barricade, had to remain under the control of the Western guardianship. In this way, Great Britain should remain the American main ally and the most important country in the western bloc (after the USA). In the same time, with the German help, there had been the possibility to transform the English presence in Europe, from the quantitative to qualitative side, having so more resource to act in the global domain. The Western European Union –WEU-, created by Anthony Eden with the intention to bond the German rearmament into the NATO structure, was inscribed into this line: to build up a framework in which the new Teutonic army should be controlled politically.

562 J. COLVILLE, The Churchillians, Weidenfield & Nicholson, London, 1981, p.106. In this way, the danger of a nuclear clash with USSR could grow, first of all because Moscow had obtained the “H” bomb like Washington. For this reason, Churchill and Eden worked every time persuading Eisenhower to avoid any nuclear threat against the Soviets. It could be a terrible blow for the starting dialogue.

563 A. EDEN, Full Circle, Cassel, London, 1960, p. 309. This concept was undelined again during the first crisis between the Peking and Taipei on the possession of the Off shore Islands.


565 R. BARNET, The Alliance, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1983, p. 138. The electoral campaign in USA was based on a strong anti-Soviet accent and on a refusal of the dialogue with Moscow. The American fear, at the middle of the ‘50s was that a dialogue with the enemy could feed the neutralist tendencies not only in Europe, but in USA also, imperilling the security of the western bloc and the American role in Europe.

566 e, A. CANNATA, La Gran Bretagna e la nascita della UEO (1954), in “Storia Delle Relazioni Internazionali”, n°1, 1990, pp. 137-159. The WEU compelled London to maintain a military Corp in Europe permanently. In the same time, the West Germany was recognised as a sovereign state and went into the NATO and the Brussels Treaty, that became the WEU. The German troops had to be controlled politically by the WEU, and controlled on the field by the NATO’s Commander in Chief (SACEUR).
Germany could be a good stimulus to further dialogues upon the continental situation and a possible reason for a more global discussion on the international situation\textsuperscript{567}.

It is possible to say this line of dialogue brought positive consequences in the Asian theatre. In Geneva, the British action allowed the dialogue between the two Chinese governments, on the ambassadorial level, and, more important, London was able to make easier the way for an acceptable agreement between France and Vietnam\textsuperscript{568}. Truly, the two blocs continued for long time to confront themselves on political, military and strategic questions; it is equally true that the “spirit of Geneva”, created by Eden and by other politicians, had a good effect on the inter-systemic dialogue, first of all in particular parts of the world, where London had got strong national interests.

As we have outlined yet, Churchill and Eden, were strongly determined to accept not only diplomatic but also military burdens when necessary, intervened directly where the British interests were at stake. But every time with a final aim that was a political one, reflecting the exigency to guarantee the security for the national and a significative reduction of the economical burdens. In Malaysia, for example, the British government committed itself in a long war (1948-1960) against the communist guerrilla. The final aim was the creation of a new pro-western state, containing Malaysia and the northern part of Borneo, preserving them from the Communist disease. The action in Kenya (1952-1956) had got the purpose to defend the national interests in the African state\textsuperscript{569}.

Not all the British decision had the same success. The Suez case is well-known, even if it was an unlucky event in the British history. It showed the absolutely inconsistency of an action that was perceived by the international public opinion like an old-fashioned Colonial one: there were no chances neither to relaunch an autonomous military action in a distant, but really important area for the international trade, nor to occupying \textit{manu militari} a place that had gained its independence yet. After Suez, anyway, United Kingdom didn’t renounce to the possibility to be an active military country, in every part of the world the national and western interests were at stake. The difference was marked by the fact that the British governments decided not to act without having prepared before a good diplomatic background. The presence of it could help the country to avoid the international public reproaches listened during the coup in Suez\textsuperscript{570}.

Finally, the experiences during the Churchillian’s second spell and the Eden period took root the conviction that only with particular tools, first of all the nuclear ones, the Country could maintain the possibility to stay in the narrow circle of the big powers. Without the nuclear deterrent there were no possibility to influence the international domain. The imposition of the McMahon Act in 1946 by the American Congress, compelled the United Kingdom firstly to persuade the American ally to suppress the restrictions for the nuclear knowledge diffusion to the allies, and secondly to work independently with the aim to maintain an high national knowledge in the nuclear field. The final purpose (the total autonomy in the sector) was achieved with the explosion of the A-bomb in 1952 and in 1957 with the explosion of the H-bomb at the Christmas Island\textsuperscript{571}. In this way, the American Administration had got the possibility to foresee the nuclear armaments sale to the Britons, without internal consequences (for

\textsuperscript{567} A.EDEN, Full Circle, quoted, pp. 107-145. The Eden Plan, about the German reunification, was rejected by the Americans and the Germans, because it accepted the division of Germany, recognising the status quo in Central Europe. Moreover, it didn’t give security for the western bloc.

\textsuperscript{568} S.KARNOW, Storia della guerra del Viet Nam, Rizzoli, Milano, 1985, pp. 101-106.


\textsuperscript{571} M.GOWING, Indepedence and Deterrence. Britain and atomic energy 1945/1952, voll.I-II, Macmillan, London, 1974. The US Armed Forces recognised the United Kingdom as a key point in Europe. It was an essential geo-strategic bridge, and the American Chiefs of Staff were ready to accept an unofficial nuclear co-operation, that was essential for the projection of the US power, in Europe. S.J.BALL, Military nuclear relations between the United States and Great Britain under the terms of the McMahon Act, 1946-1958, in “The Historical Journal”, vol.38 n°2, June 1995, pp.439-454.
example, reactions by the public opinion worried by the spread of the nuclear bombs in the world), and with good savings in the economic field for the British and Western bloc.

**Macmillan’s period.**

During the Macmillan’s government the attempt to be the “honest broker” of the international set was brought to the high level, in accordance with the need to create an international peace, that could permit to maintain and defend the global interests of the country without particular expenses. Since there were no improvements in the relations between the two blocs, Macmillan sought to act personally, relaunching the dialogue between the enemies, going forward the way traced by the Geneva conference. The Berlin crisis and its serious tensions gave a good opportunity to the Prime Minister to take direct approaches, trying to reach a fully freedom of action in front of USSR, without the moral conditionings that the American ally normally imposed on every possibilities of dialogue with the Soviets572. So, really important were the years between 1957 and the Paris Conference in 1960. During these years, Macmillan produced his main effort, working with the aim to facilitate the meeting and the dialogue between the blocs. In the same time, he never denied the British support to the western side. It was a really wary and preoccupied backing, but Macmillan never refused it, first of all when the Great Britain was called for an action in distant areas, where the national interest were deeply rooted. The reason is simple: if he wanted to maintain the Country at the top level of the international stage, he was forced to guarantee the full commitment wherever it was required. As in the Churchill’s period, the Macmillan’s government accepted the idea that only with a very thorough presence in the world there should be the opportunity to influence the allies’ decision.

The first effort of the Macmillan’s global policy was to restore the alliance with USA, imperilled by the facts occurred in Suez. Our opinion is that there were no dramatic facts in Egypt even if the strain for the alliance with the Americans was obvious573. Anyway, London accepted the evidence that the special relationship with the American ally was the core for every Foreign policy the country wanted to do, first of all if the main objective was the dialogue with the Soviet. During the 1957 and the first half of the 1958, Macmillan tributed long efforts to the reconstruction of the partnership with Washington; anyhow, it is possible to say that during the meeting held in October 1957 the relations between the two allies were strung together; in this way, Macmillan could obtain a very important outcome for the nation: the President availability (that became the availability of the USA in a year), to furnish an important help to the preservation of the British nuclear deterrent574.

Restored the friendship with the USA, Macmillan could start again the British main political activity: the search of the dialogue with the USSR, working on a double line. On one side, he felt the military need to reinforce the defensive structures of the NATO, when the Soviet Union seemed to be strengthened itself in the nuclear sector575. On the other side, thanks to the military pressure, it could be revived the political action, searching the distensive dialogue. In Macmillan’s strategy, the control of the political tension means the control of the continent, submitted to the two blocs mutual surveillance. Particularly, the Germany had to be sacrificed in her political hopes. There should have been the possibility for her to gain the unity of the country, but as a neutral nation only. With this solution Great


575 The Sputnik program, showed to the public the improvement of the Soviets in the missiles’ field. In this way, the American continent could be under the missiles threat: the reaction was the growing of the expenses for the intercontinental missiles and the deployment of the medium range ballistic missiles Thor and Jupiter in Europe.
Britain wanted to avoid two dangers: first, the return of Germany as an aggressive power; second the possibility that Germany could become the main American ally in case of a conflict with the communist bloc. Going forward with this strategy, during the 1958, Macmillan exposed a lot of hypothesis: the revival of the Eden's Plan, about a demilitarised zone in Central Europe; the agreement on the Bulganin's idea about a denuclearised Europe; the important trip to Moscow for a meeting with Krusciov. The Krusciov's ultimatum about the Berlin status and the following crisis in November 1958 reinforced the idea of a direct approach with the Soviets at the higher level. The facts came out from the Macmillan's activities (the visit in Moscow, the four Foreign Ministers' meeting in Geneva, the Camp David meeting between Eisenhower and Krusciov), were the consequence of Prime Minister's energy. Surely, the trip in Moscow was the core of the events: after a long period of misunderstandings between Americans and Soviets, the personal Prime Minister's intervention, held up with patience and firmness, convinced Krusciov to extend the deadline of his ultimatum, accepting the idea of a meeting between the Foreign Ministers on the Berlin problem. The consequences of the British initiative persuaded Eisenhower to meet Krusciov at Camp David in September 1959, starting a dialogue with Moscow that went on in time, even if there were again great difficulties that momentarily interrupted it (firstly, the unlucky days of May 1960, that brought the end of the Paris Conference between the four Heads of State). In this way, and this is a real paradox, Macmillan was creating the conditions for a progressive marginalisation of his country, that became evident when the two superpowers approached themselves again, carefully. The new entente between Washington and Moscow, in fact, took manoeuvring space away from the United Kingdom policy, undermining the bases of its political thought, prospecting for London the possibility to accept the junior-partners' role of United States only and giving up all her hopes to be a Big Power. This happened in the second half of the '60s, and maybe after, but the roots of it were posed at the end of the Eisenhower's administration. From Camp David meeting, there were only two alternatives for London: whether to booster its international policy and its military presence, both globally and regionally; or to accept the progressive decline of the nation.

Macmillan chose the first solution. He sought to maintain opened all the possibilities that he could, and after the negative outcome of the Paris meeting, he worked to stabilise the British international role in the extra-European areas. If United Kingdom wanted to carry out again the trait d'union role between the two superpowers, it should have been a complex of good relations, introducing itself as the spokesman of global and interrelated interests. For these reasons Macmillan paid a long travel in Africa between January and February 1960; or, he spoke in the United Nations Assembly in November 1960, showing the face of a Western State that desired to speak with the other parts and trying to find a solution for long-standings problems (like the economic distance between the Northern and Southern Countries of the world, or the under-development of many Nation). These were problems for all the Countries independently by their ideological and political side.

What's more: Macmillan started a revision of the British policy towards the EEC organisation, which seemed transforming itself from a simple economic structure in a relevant regional power. Getting into the Community, could give the opportunity to control again and better the continent at large, and the Western German in particular. In the same time, there could be the renewed possibility to present itself to the American ally as the main political subject of Europe.

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580 E.DI NOLFO, *Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali*, quoted, p. 1046. Anyway the level of the confrontation never exceeded certain level, because both the Superpowers feared the possibility to loose the control of the situation.
It was a very binding political project. Facing the risk to be expelled from a central area like Europe, the Great Britain relied upon a political initiative that embraced all the continent and spread the country activity around the globe in a 360° action, with the serious danger to overstretch the national resources. In particular, four were the pillars of Macmillan’s project:

1. Great Britain had to start again the dialogue with the EEC. The final aim was not to destroy the European Common Market, the goal of 1957-1959 period, but starting a long negotiation with the Six and the Commission. Along this way it should be possible to gain good solution for the economical needs arising from Great Britain and her allies (Commonwealth and EFTA states). The EEC had reached a very high level of unity, and it should be a great problem for Great Britain. It was difficult to think that the European country should be ready to upset their delicate tissue of relations and to reassemble it on the base of British interests: surely, there would be negative reaction from France, the power that had obtained, from her presence in the Community, the most positive outcomes (first of all, a close control on Germany and its economy).\footnote{B.OLIVI, L’Europa difficile. Storia politica della Comunità Europea, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1993, pp. 77-83.}

2. In the same time, the Prime Minister wanted to be always in touch with Krusciov. In the European sector, the relations with USSR had done not positive outcomes, until that moment, but they could help to start again the dialogue for the denuclearisation and the non-proliferation in the world. In this field, Macmillan worked very hard and obtain the premises for the Partial Test Ban Treaty, that was signed in the August 1963. This Treaty provided the end of the atmospheric nuclear test and it was the first step towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty signed in 1968.\footnote{B.WHITE, Britain, Détente and Changing East-West Relations, quoted, pp. 81-107.}

3. The dialogue with USSR could simplify the relations with the new nations grew up in Asia and Africa, which were now friends of Moscow. To be a pivotal element of the dialogue between North-South should transform the British role in front of the two superpowers, giving importance to the country.\footnote{H.MACMILLAN, Pointing the way, 1959/1961, Macmillan, London, 1972, pp. 275-279. The diplomatic effort to avoid the Laos war, prove the soundness of this position: London was able to stop the progressive moving towards a military confrontation, and obliged Washington to accept a discussion with the political party chosen by the Soviets. Obviously, the British position was backed in part by the Kennedy's disposition to the dialogue.}

4. In the same time, Great Britain had to defend the quality of the western military structures. After the new Berlin crisis in 1961, Great Britain continued to propose the dialogue, but she was determined, in the same time, to keep at the high level the military readiness, the second pillar of the western policy towards the Soviets. The country tried to improve her military forces and worked to persuade the allies to do the same. The better become the dialogue between USA and USSR, the higher had to be the British tribute to the western defence, if the country would like to maintain the political freedom of action in the world affairs.\footnote{H.MACMILLAN, Pointing the way, 1959/1961, Macmillan, London, 1972, pp. 105 e 114. It was evident that there were little possibility to find all the political sides ready to speak in the same time and procedures. So, the role of a catalyst would be important to foster the dialogue.}

On a national point of view, the Macmillan government never thought to forgo the national deterrent. The possession of a very up-to-date nuclear tool was useful, both into the wider Western bloc, and in the smaller context of the national security. It is easy to understand why Macmillan fought so hard to safeguard the existence of it, when American decisions seemed to put the deterrent under threat.\footnote{I.CLARK, Nuclear diplomacy and the special relationship, Britain’s deterrente and America, 1957-1962, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994. The negative American behaviour in front of the British needs raised many suspects in the Anglo-Saxon ministerial rooms. About the political and diplomatic clash between Kennedy Dan Macmillan on the Skybolt crisis, see, P.R.O., PREM 11-4229. Record of the meeting between Macmillan and Kennnedy, 18-22 December 1962, minute, s.rif.}
fact, the possession of a nuclear armament gave to the nation great power status and the government couldn’t give up it so easily, when France and Germany wanted to became nuclear powers\textsuperscript{588}.

Really, the German request of a nuclear deterrent introduced peculiar consideration. In Great Britain the French ambitions were accepted (the Cabinet and Foreign Office considered many times the possibility to co-operate with Paris, with the hope to obtain by this way a place in EEC organisation). On the contrary, London was afraid of the German intentions. If Bonn had obtained nuclear tools, the consequence for the dialogue with Moscow should have been very serious. The same, Germany should reach a particular weight into the Western bloc, marginalising United Kingdom. So, London taken a passive behaviour when Washington launched the MLF project during Macmillan’s and Wilson’s governments. Of course, it was impossible to dissatisfy the USA with a negative mood; notwithstanding, it was possible to be passive in all the tables where the project had to be discussed. According to Macmillan, the MLF was the best way to form a supranational organisation, to deny the freedom of action to the British politicians (transforming the country in a regional power\textsuperscript{589}) and to destroy the interdependence concept, which was the British answer to the globalisation of the international relations and conflicts\textsuperscript{590}.

The same importance had the relations with the countries that were born at the end of the old Empire. Strengthening of the Commonwealth (a group of peoples and nations so different each other) was a very difficult target, notwithstanding the organisation was really essential to nourish political ambition in international domain. The economic difficulties that afflicted the British government, forced it to reduce the hope that the Sterling Area, built up in 1940, could remain the gravitation centre for the most part of the old colony became independent\textsuperscript{591}. No Commonwealth, lesser chances to be the spokesman of a big group of nations united by the friendship between them and towards the western world. The American attempt to undermine the British action in Africa and Asia were perceived with trouble by the British politicians, as a new effort to compel Great Britain in a low-rate world position, stealing the economic interests that London had in the Middle and Far East\textsuperscript{592}. The American behaviour strengthened the determination of the Cabinet to act wherever it felt that was its duty to do so. In Jordan in 1958 or in Kuwait in 1961 United Kingdom decided to send expeditionary forces, defending local governments in difficult situation. It was a sacrifice that London was ready to pay, with the aim to defend western and British interests in central area for the world equilibrium, even if the American ally was afraid about the English action\textsuperscript{593}. Surely, the practical troubles on the field and the strain for the national economy warned the government and it didn’t engage the Country in long war, unless the national interests were under a serious threat (the practical difficulties showed that the logistic


\textsuperscript{590} P.R.O., CAB 128/36. Prime Minister, CC (62) 76th conclusion, 21 December 1962, minute n° 1. The Cabinet Office unanimously decided to reject the MLF project, unless Washington took the step to modify it. Next May, the British Government, without objection, opted for a dilatory tactic, refusing the American pressures. See, P.R.O., CAB 128/37. NATO Policy, CC (63) 34th conclusion, 23 May 1963, minute n° 4.


\textsuperscript{593} I.L.GENDZIER, Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945-1958, Columbia University Press, New York, 1997. Recent studies have showed the presence of American interests in the area, related to the oil production and the pipeline’s management. It is possible that Washington saw the Lebanon and Jordanian facts as a good occasion to act directly in the area, pushing out the British ally.
situation of the national forces was not the best for military action abroad)\textsuperscript{594}. In the same time, the government continued to consider its duty to act every time the military presence of the British forces was needed; on the contrary, the political vacuum could be filled up by other powers\textsuperscript{595}. The important decision to leave from strategic bases (for example, Cyprus) was taken when it was evident that the possession of them created economical or political problems to the country, giving, in the same time, no real advantages\textsuperscript{596}.

The formation of wide confederations of old colonial territories walked in the same direction. Theoretically, such a structures permitted to form homogeneous states, in which the economic relations between the different part of them should be facilitated by common desire of stability and friendship, not only into the confederations themselves, but also between them and United Kingdom. The Central African Confederation or the Malaysian Confederation wanted to respond to this purpose. It was possible, having identified the areas of influence and delimited the boundaries of the national interests, to make better use of the political, economical and military resources of the country\textsuperscript{597}. Macmillan and his staff believed that, using this strategy, they could stop every serious crisis in every part of the world. Truly, they controlled the American reaction during the crisis about Quemoy and Matsu Island. Equally, they had an important political part during the dangerous situation in Laos, when they were able to stop temporarily the risk of a war, forcing Washington to accept a negotiation with the communist opponent\textsuperscript{598}. But in the same time, the Macmillan’s strategy didn’t prevent the destruction of the Central African Confederation, nor the active intervention of the British forces in Malaysia to defend the security of the state assailed by the communist and Indonesian guerrilla-fighters. This showed the thin foundations on which the British policy was based in that period.

Wilson’s difficulties.

Wilson was compelled to work in a more complicated general situation than the Macmillan’s experience, since the economic situation of the country was deteriorated. If we see his experience in comparison with the other, we can say he was obliged to take decisions forced by the economic weakness of the country. In the same time, analysing the first years of his government it is possible to note that the Labours wanted to maintain all the commitments the country had spread around the world, maintaining untouched the British political and international system: the only way to avoid what was perceived as an unnatural choice for a nation used to act into the global complex of the international domain.

The relation with Europe are the best proof of this political trend. Publicly, in their first approaches to the Common Market, Wilson and his staff preferred to keep a careful behaviour, affirming they didn’t see the condition of a new negotiation with Brussels. Maybe, they wanted to divert the public attention to the problem. In reality, they worked to strengthen the position in front of the EEC organisation, aiming to keep a better position for the future negotiation. The Labours sought to define the better tools by which should be possible to put pressure upon the Community. The EFTA and the Commonwealth were the only means available in that moment, and the first one was the best solution for the moment. But the government didn’t succeeded in its intentions. The meeting held in May 1965 between the seven EFTA Heads of Governments (with the aim to find a common way against the Six) showed the

\textsuperscript{595} P.R.O., CAB 128/31. Defence Policy, CC (57) 21\textsuperscript{st} conclusion, 18 March 1957, minute n° 2; P.R.O., PREM 11-2946. Bishop to Macmillan, 8 luglio 1960, minute, s.rif.; and, P.R.O., CAB 128/37. Defence Policy, CC (63) 48\textsuperscript{th} conclusion, 25 luglio 1963, minute n° 3.
\textsuperscript{596} A.HORNE, Harold Macmillan, quoted, p. 101. Anyway, Great Britain secured for herself a strategic position in the island with two essential air bases, good fulcrums long the way to the Middle and Far East. See, P.R.O., CAB 128/34. Ciprus, CC (60) 30\textsuperscript{th} conclusion, 10 May 1960, minute n° 1.
\textsuperscript{598} B.WHITE, Britain, Détente and Changing East-West Relations, quoted, pp. 64-65.
difficulties to persuade the allies making a combined effort towards the EEC, maybe the only way to compel the Six to open themselves to the other countries\textsuperscript{599}. Since there were too much differences between the Seven, this move had no success. At this point, Wilson accepted the idea that it was better to hold the status quo unchanged, working instead to find out solutions able to avoid the destruction of the EFTA itself. In fact, the organisation was useless in approaching Europe, but it remain an important tool in the political domain and it could help Great Britain to define better the country place in the international relations\textsuperscript{600}. The final aim was of course to stay at the top international level, as a big power.

With this objective, the last resource, in that moment, was the nuclear deterrent, because with it United Kingdom could depict itself as a significative subject. So, contrasting with the electoral campaign program\textsuperscript{601}, the labour government decided to go on with the revivification of the national deterrent, completing the four submarines' program (carrying 16 Polaris missiles), which was scheduled by the Macmillan’s government as the core of the atomic defence\textsuperscript{602}. The Labours hoped to appease the public opinion's disappointment, providing an international arrangement: the revivification of an old project, the Atlantic Nuclear Force, outlined by the former conservative governments. The ANF was appreciated by the British government because it should have been formed by existing nuclear tools, excluding in this way new expenditures for the international relations doing so, for the better balance of payments. Besides, London could foresee withdrawal of conventional forces from Europe and the possibility to use the savings obtained for a renewed British military effort in extra-European areas\textsuperscript{603}. Moreover, the ANF’s deterrent should be an European half-independent tool: in case of particular national interests, there should be for United Kingdom the possibility to take back the full control and move it wherever it was required (to Far East, for example)\textsuperscript{604}. At the same time, with the ANF there should be the possibility to dodge a new diplomatic clash with the Eastern bloc: the British project drove away the proliferation danger that was inside the American idea of MLF\textsuperscript{605}.

The ANF didn’t become reality, but anyway with it United Kingdom could stop the German foolish ambitions of a national nuclear deterrent, which were so cherished by the German Chancellor, Erhard. The resolute attempt to obtain, through the MLF, an indirect control over a atomic instrument, was tackled firstly by the Soviet reaction, secondly by the perplexities in France and Europe at large, thirdly, as said, by the British diplomatic ability\textsuperscript{606}.

It was important for London to maintain the good relation with the Soviets, because Wilson thought like Macmillan, that United Kingdom had to give a significant contribution to the improving dialogue with the opposite side, mainly in the world denuclearisation, firstly because there were good international relations doing so, secondly, because the internal public opinion asked strongly for this

\textsuperscript{599} P.R.O., PREM 13-308. Record of the 18th meeting of the EFTA Organisation, Vienna, 24-25 maggio 1965.

\textsuperscript{600} D.SANDERS, Losing an Empire, finding a role: British Foreign Policy since 1945, Macmillan, London, 1990, pp. 150-156.


\textsuperscript{602} P.R.O., CAB 128/39. Defence Policy, CC (64) 11th conclusion, 26 November 1964, minute n°5.

\textsuperscript{603} P.R.O., PREM 13-103. Zuckerman to Wilson, 18 November 1964, minute n°SZ/793/64.

\textsuperscript{604} P.R.O.PREM 13-26. Burke Trend to Wilson, 25 November 1964, memorandum s.rif.

\textsuperscript{605} P.R.O., PREM 13-103. Zuckerman to Wilson, 1 December 1964, minute n°SZ/840/64.

\textsuperscript{606} When it was evident that neither the American project nor the British one had concrete possibility to become reality, West Germany tried to clasp to herself the USA, proposing a military and nuclear bilateral Treaty. It concerned a lot the Europeans, and Washington was forced to forsake Erhard to his destiny, disowning the project of NATO's nuclear armament. See, P.R.O., PREM 11-4817. Record record of the meeting between Douglas-Home and Erhard, 15-16 January 1964, minute, s.rif.; P.R.O., PREM 13-219. Walker to Wilson, 23 December 1964, minute, s.rif.; and, P.R.O., PREM 13-220. Dean to Foreign Office, 11 ottobre 1965, telegram n°2587.
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political manoeuvre\textsuperscript{607}. Along the Wilson’s experience, the role of the Great Britain fostering the superpowers’ dialogue was pivotal, thanks to the old tradition of contacts between London and Moscow. This negotiation led to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that was signed in 1968\textsuperscript{608}.

In the same time, however, with this behaviour Wilson’s government damaged seriously its chances to enter in EEC, blocking the German race to the semi-national atomic deterrent and to the status of first-rank ally in the American policy. Wilson, in fact, had recognised the Germany as the main interlocutor in the future, if he wanted to launch the new effort to enter in EEC. He and his staff had studied carefully the franco-german clash between 1965 and 1966, about the European Commission tasks and the agricultural settlement. They had reached the conclusion that the German had the skill to oppose itself to President de Gaulle and his wish to change the international domain building up an Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. It is true, but with the British behaviour didn’t help the national hopes. The labour government worked with a significative caution. The initiative started in February 1966\textsuperscript{609} and led the Prime Minister to pay an explorative tour in the Six capitals one year later. The political end of pro-British Erhard, however, and his substitution with Kiesinger, much more disposed to find a settlement with France, deprived the United Kingdom of a significative ally. Surely, United Kingdom had avoided ruinous risks for its regional security, when decided to take away support to Erhard’s bid for a personal success building up the MLF. Then, it found the way to Europe obstructed by the gaullist hostility and by the unavailability of Germany to support the British ally. De Gaulle’s decision to put a new veto on the British participation in EEC, didn’t find a particular echoes in the European and German circles, and put an end, in November 1967, to the second chapter of the “British-European saga”\textsuperscript{610}.

We can understand better the seriousness of the fact if we keep in mind that United Kingdom, in those years had improved a lot its economical relations with the continent, which had transformed itself from a simple regional element inside the British global policy, to the main point of reference for the country and its economy. During the second part of the ‘60s, in fact, economic difficulties prevented the United Kingdom to maintain a qualified presence in Middle and Far East. Until the end of the day, London sought to avert the retreat from the bases located East of Suez. Between the 1968 and the 1971 the labour government resigned itself to leave from the old bases, but after a long battle against the inward economic difficulties. In fact, Wilson knew that this decision underlined the end of the world-wide role of the nation, and could cause a regrettable tension with USA: Washington was aware of the British economic difficulties\textsuperscript{611}, but the American nourished the hope that the British government could make a new effort, maintaining unaltered its international commitments\textsuperscript{612}. United States apparently were ready to sustain the Anglo-Saxon ally and its economy, but in the same time, the American availability was limited by the economic strains that the Vietnam war put on the American economy. When London asked, at the end of the 1965, for a greater help, with the goal to dispel the danger of new cuts in the

\textsuperscript{607} J.P.G.FREEMAN, Britain’sn Nuclear Arms Control Policy in the Context of Anglo-American Relations, 1957-68. Macmillan, London, 1986. The United Kingdom was able to convince the Commonwealth nations to support, between 1966 and 1967, the Treaty, even if the underdeveloped countries would be interested to obtain the nuclear technology, improving their economy.

\textsuperscript{608} P.R.O., PREM 13-1715. Record of the meeting between Wilson e Kossygin, 6-12 February 1967, minute, s.rif.

\textsuperscript{609} P.R.O., CAB 128/41. EEC Policy, CC (66) 5\textsuperscript{th} conclusion, 3 February 1966, minute n° 2.

\textsuperscript{610} R.DUCCI/B.OLIVI, L’Europa incompiuta, CEDAM, Padova, 1970.

\textsuperscript{611} P.R.O., CAB 129/128. Economic Situation, C (66) 18 July 1966, part. 1. The economic situation worsened by the crisis in July 1966, compelled London to provide for savings in defensive field. Surely, this crisis was a key point in the British history, because convinced the labour government to go forward with cuts in the national military programmes, for example, ending the construction of a new class of Air Carriers, or maintaining the troops’ deployment East of Suez.

defence field\textsuperscript{613}, Washington preferred to wait. The African facts (where the Rhodesian rebellion was not restrained by the British government) and the Asian events (where London prefer to abstain from a direct involvement in Vietnam) contributed to dispel the American hopes about the British capability to maintain a global role and caused a pervasive coolness around the British needs\textsuperscript{614}. In 1966, the labour government, under the pressure of a new economic crisis, was forced to consider the opportunity of a new withdrawal of troops from the British Army of the Rhine. Moving this troops to the extra-European bases, there should be the possibility to satisfy the American desire of a stronger British presence in the Far East. In this way, however, the western defence line against the Soviet bloc could become too much thin, since Washington was forced to reduce its commitment in Europe also, in consequence of the Vietnamese war. Wilson and his staff sought to divert the American attention from the conventional side to the nuclear side of the British military engagement in the Asiatic area. Unfortunately, the hypothesis to transfer the core of the national deterrent (the 4 submarines with Polaris) to the Asian sector was not accepted. In reality, the idea intrigued the American State Secretary, McNamara, and perhaps the President Johnson himself, but it wasn't able to resolve the central problem of an active role for London, in the area\textsuperscript{615}. The British project needed a defence agreement between United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, and for this reason was rejected, because it opened the possibility to build up an exclusive white club distasteful for the Asian countries\textsuperscript{616}. It is possible to say, at the end, that, if the British government was really determined to cut its commitments East of Suez, there were no possibility to keep away tensions with the American ally. Every rediscussion of the British international role would cause a clash with the USA, which were interested on a concrete help in their war in Vietnam, only\textsuperscript{617}.

At the end of the ‘60s the Wilson’s attempts to develop, like Churchill or Macmillan, a mediation between the two blocs, suffered a tragic destiny, strictly interlocked with the lower level reached by the Anglo-American relations. The Prime Minister sought to find a solution to the Vietnamese war, with the only consequence to show a bright split with Johnson. Truly, there were some expectations about the English mediation, first of all, because London had a long standing tradition in the area. United Kingdom had been the Co-chairman during the Geneva Conference in 1954 (that ended the franco-vietnamese conflict), and the British troops were always fighting in Borneo, defending the Malaysia against the Indonesian aggression. Nevertheless, the situation was now changed and deteriorated: the USSR had lower political hold on China, and the Anglo-American relations (we have seen yet) were at the worst level from 1956. In this scenario, the Wilsonian diplomatic action, first between February and April 1965, then during the 1966, produce the only consequence to make even stiff the relations with Washington. This was a personal mistake of the Prime Minister\textsuperscript{618}. President Johnson had no intention to give him a free hand in a diplomatic action which could damage the American interests in the area. What's more, Johnson saw the British behaviour as an improper interference with other country’s facts\textsuperscript{619}. Wilson sought to contact directly the Northern Vietnamese, but they were not interested in the

\textsuperscript{613}P.R.O., PREM 13-215. Burke Trend to Wilson, 11 June 1965, minute, s.rif.; and, P.R.O., PREM 13-214. Stewart to Wilson, 16 May 1965, minute, n° PM/65/72.

\textsuperscript{614}P.R.O., CAB 128/41. Defence Policy, CC (66) 8\textsuperscript{th} conclusion, 14 February 1966, minute n° 8.

\textsuperscript{615}J.FIELDING, Copying with Decline, quoted, pp. 633-656. In this way, London would confirm her disposability to maintain a place in the area, if Australia and New Zealand were ready to give an economic help only. See, P.R.O., PREM 13-681. Record of the meeting between Wilson, McNamara e Ball, 26 November 1965, minute, s.rif. The deployment of the British submarines didn’t change the situation in the area. Much more interesting could be the presence of British troops and the presence in Singapore.

\textsuperscript{616}P.R.O., FO 371-190785. Minute del Foreign Office, s.d., minute, s.rif.

\textsuperscript{617}P.R.O., PREM 13-214. Record of the meeting between Healey and McNamara, 30 May 1965, minute, s.rif. This help could be direct in the field, or with an indirect action. For example, a stronger presence in European defence, or the continuous presence in the globe, so important in that moment, when the French were criticising strongly NATO, and were organising their withdrawal from the structure.


\textsuperscript{619}B.WHITE, Britain, Détente and Changing East-West Relations, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 110. London had decide to stay out from the war in Indochina, so there were no reasons for her to act and
British action\textsuperscript{620}. The approach to Moscow obtained a different outcome. The Soviets showed much more attention to the British initiative, having the opinion that London could be a good broker in the area, and, perhaps, hoping to divide the Western bloc. The British plan, ready during the 1966, was quite interesting, because it could be the starting point for a more detailed dialogue. The Johnson’s administration, suspecting both the Soviets and the British, changing substantially the plan and using different mediators, create difficulties and embarrassment to the British ally\textsuperscript{621}. Anyway, Wilson decided to go on with his initiatives, because, like Erhard during the MLF case, needed a success, for his and for the national authority. During the Kossygin’s visit to London (February 1967) he gave to the Soviet Foreign Minister, a peace plan, which was, Wilson thought, concertated with USA. The Johnson’s lack of skill, who modified the structure of the plan, made the mess. It showed the distance between United Kingdom and USA, aroused the Soviet’s suspicion, and closed the door in the face of a possible agreement, determined by the British diplomacy\textsuperscript{622}. Moreover this was the last significative diplomatic attempt coming from London: at the start of the negotiation in Paris, in 1968, United Kingdom was not a first rank subject, and this marked again the decline of the nation, not longer able to determine the political events in the globe\textsuperscript{623}.

Another example, it is the “Rhodesian Affair”. When Ian Smith’s government in November 1965 decided to proclaim the unilateral independence from London, Wilson, having consulted the neighbouring states (first of all, Zambia), preferred to charge the ONU of the problem, deciding not to act directly and calling for an international embargo. Even so, United Kingdom was compelled to ask for the American help\textsuperscript{624}, the only one able to guarantee an efficient boycott against the Smith’s government and, in the same time, to furnish a proper help to Zambia and the other neighbours, that feared the consequences of the embargo upon their economies\textsuperscript{625}. Day by day, United Kingdom lost its ability to influence the conflict in South Rhodesia, and when decide to stay out of it, London showed her inability to cast her military action abroad, contrasting the growing influence of the Soviet bloc in Africa\textsuperscript{626}.

Substantially, it is possible to say that, after the end of the confrontation with Indonesia for the defence of the Borneo under the Malaysian control (in August 1966), the British government realised that it couldn’t fight with expeditionary force in long distant areas\textsuperscript{627}. It sought to demure, maintaining a significative role East of Suez with a reduced number of troops and military resources, between 1966 and 1967, but it realised soon the practical impossibility of such a strategy. During the “Six-days War”, finding a diplomatic solution. Johnson gave no credit to the British commitments in Borneo, against the Indonesian guerrilla, that posed a serious threat against the life of the Malaysian Confederation.

\textsuperscript{620} P.R.O., PREM 13-681. Record of the meeting between Wilson and McNamara, 26 November 1965, minute, s.rif. Maybe, this was the consequence of the american coolness.

\textsuperscript{621} W.WILSON, The Labour Government, quoted, p. 329-330. This was a two-parts project: first, the end of the bombings on North Vietnam; then, to be developed in the same time, the end of the penetration of communist troops in the South.

\textsuperscript{622} P.R.O., PREM 13-1715. Record of the meeting between Wilson and Kossygin, 6-12 February 1967, minute, s.rif.


\textsuperscript{624} P.R.O., PREM 13-686. Record of the meeting between Wilson and Johnson, 16-17 December 1965, minute, s.rif.

\textsuperscript{625} P.R.O., PREM 13-1083. Record of the meeting between Wilson and Johnson, 28-30 July 1966, minute, s.rif.

\textsuperscript{626} W.WILSON, The Labour Government, quoted, pp. 156-163. The impression was that the white powers were always ready to fight the revolutions of the black and yellow peoples, but not so determined to act against white minorities. These critics were particular loud during the Meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of States hold in London in June 1965.

\textsuperscript{627} P.R.O., CAB 128/41. Indonesia, CC (66) 42\textsuperscript{nd} conclusion, 4 August 1966, minute n° 2
for example, London was not able to influence the events; at the start of the ‘70s it was compelled to accept the Arab’s policy on the oil production. Although the diplomatic action was always alive on British side, United Kingdom hadn’t a well organised military apparatus to sustain this effort: the Armed Forces only could allow to act as a global power with global interests\textsuperscript{628}. It is possible to say that the national withdrawal from the East of Suez bases emphasised publicly what was known in the diplomatic circles yet: the decline of the Nation. The labour government had sought to hide the fact, with the aim to avoid the trauma for the Country, but the reduction of the manoeuvring space in the diplomatic field, was the consequence of the British economical and political interests around the world.

\textsuperscript{628} P.R.O., CAB 128/42. Middle East, CC (67) 61\textsuperscript{st} conclusion, 26 October 1967, minute n° 3. The British government decide to act, in the future, into the ONU organisation only, trying to exclude deployment of troops abroad.
From Global Mediterranean to the Mediterranean in a Global World

Abstract:
In this paper we will briefly review the evolution of world-systems in the Mediterranean world between the second millennium B. C. and the 16th century A. D., and examine in more detail the integration of the Mediterranean world into the Euro-Atlantic world-system (16th-19th centuries) and the contemporary world system (19th-20th centuries). How far is the evolution of the modern world system similar to the evolution of previous Mediterranean world-systems? How important was the Mediterranean background to the way the different Mediterranean peoples were integrated into the contemporary world system? These are the main questions we will address.

1 Global Mediterranean

1.1 The first Mediterranean world system
The Mediterranean world was one of the earliest regions of the world in which a global world-society, that is to say, a complex society including different partial societies, developed.

The formation of the first Mediterranean world-system was a very protracted process, which occupied the whole second millennium and the first half of the first millennium B. C.. Four main phases are usually identified in the process of the building the first Mediterranean world-system (McNeil, 1963):

The Minoan thalassocracy, which set up the earliest attested regular trade routes in the Eastern Mediterranean between the 20th and the 15th centuries B. C..

The Achaean thalassocracy, which replaced the Minoan's in the Eastern Mediterranean between the 15th and the 12th centuries B. C..

The Phoenician thalassocracy, which mastered the Eastern Mediterranean between the 12th and 8th centuries B. C., and extended its network to the Western Mediterranean around the turn of the millennium.

The Greek thalassocracy, which replaced the Phoenician's in the Mediterranean as a whole after the 8th century B. C..

The main explanation for the very slow pace of the establishing of this first Mediterranean world-system may be the fact that most of the Mediterranean societies lacked the characteristics of civilized societies (sector specialisation of economic activities, social stratification, literacy and urban life) when the more dynamic Mediterranean societies first contacted them and the integration process set off. Of course, some Mediterranean societies, among them those which promoted the process of formation of the first Mediterranean world-system, were already civilized societies in this sense at the onset of the process, but more primitive conditions prevailed in most of the Mediterranean world, especially in its western half. Thus, being integrated into the Mediterranean world-system meant a very deep transformation for these less developed societies, which took much time to unfold.

Anyway, the first Mediterranean world-system reached maturity around the middle of the first millennium B. C.. By that time it took the form of what must be called a world-economy, that is to say, a world-system characterized by economic inter-dependence among its constituent societies, but absence
of political unification or cultural homogeneity. In other words, economic integration was the driving force that performed the process of erection of the first Mediterranean world-system, as local economies, which had previously been closed for all practical purposes, gradually became interdependent, exchanging commodities, luxury goods at first, an increasing proportion of basic goods as time went by.

The formation of the first Mediterranean world-system was accompanied by a significant population rise, which may be easily explained by the fact that the very process of economic integration pushed out the production possibility frontier. Estimates of the population of the Mediterranean world during the early stages of the formation of this world-system must be regarded as mere educated guesses. At the beginning of the second millennium B.C., before the whole process started, the figure was perhaps somewhat below 5 million. At the beginning of the first millennium B.C., when there existed already an Eastern Mediterranean world-economy, the figure was perhaps somewhat above 10 million. By the mid-first millennium B.C., when the Mediterranean world-economy reached its full extent, the figure was perhaps somewhat below 25 million. Population growth went on until a peak around 45 million by 200 A.D. By then, the expansion of the production possibility frontier seems to have ceased, and population stagnated. (McEvedy, Jones, 1978)

As soon as the first Mediterranean world-system reached maturity, attempts at political unification developed. During the first half of the first millennium B.C., the main Middle East empires (Assyria, Babilonia, Media and Persia) were able to control the bulk of the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, but failed whenever they attempted to go further and extend their power into the heart of the sea. During the 5th century B.C., Athens made the first bid for a purely Mediterranean empire, which was a clear failure. In the late 3rd century B.C., Macedonia had an ephemeral success in its efforts to subdue the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. But real success in the Mediterranean context would be achieved only by Rome. As a consequence, during the late first century B.C. and the early first millennium A.D. the Mediterranean world-system coincided with the (mostly Mediterranean) Roman Empire. Thus, the Mediterranean world-system became what may be called a world-empire, that is to say, a world-system characterized by economic inter-dependence and political unification among its constituent societies.

Meanwhile, economic integration set in motion an additional trend towards cultural homogeneity, which was later reinforced by political unification. The development of the Hellenistic high culture was the first significant result of this trend, already during the second half of the first millennium B.C. During the first half of the first millennium A.D., the process went deeper with the triumph of Christianity as a common religion of all Mediterranean peoples. Moreover, in the linguistic realm, the Western Mediterranean became a Latin speaking area. Linguistic homogenization did not go so far in the Eastern Mediterranean, in spite of the role of the Greek language as lingua franca. Thus, the Mediterranean world of the late first half of the first millennium A.D. may be considered a world-civilization, that is to say, a world-system characterized by economic inter-dependence, political unification and a high level of cultural homogeneity among its constituent societies.

To sum up, it is possible to say that the formation and evolution of the first Mediterranean world-system presented four characteristics that may be considered as standard trends of world-systems in general:

Economy was the driving force of the formation of the world-system.

The formation of the world-system was accompanied by a significant population rise.

As soon as the world-system reached maturity, there were attempts at political unification, which eventually succeeded.

There were also a significant trend towards cultural homogenization.

1.2 The collapse of the first Mediterranean world-system

The first Mediterranean world-system existed as a stable society for nearly one millennium, until the 4th century A.D. Then, it collapsed and split into several global societies.

The collapse of the first Mediterranean world-system affected all the aspects of social life mentioned above in the analysis of the tendential rules of the formation and evolution of a world-system. It involved:
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An increased degree of autarky of local economies.

A decrease in population.

A political division.

A cultural separation into three different civilizations: Western Christendom, Eastern Christendom and Islam, which have become permanent features of the Mediterranean world since then.

However, it should be stressed that the splitting of the Mediterranean world into several global societies did not imply the loss of the characteristics of civilization, as defined above, by any Mediterranean society.

The very idea of the collapse of a world-system may seem awkward in an era of globalization such as ours. Thus, it is important to go into some more detail about the causes of such a process, as a basis for some comparisons with the evolution of the modern world system.

Traditional explanations for the collapse of the first Mediterranean world-system include military defeat, demographic downturn and feudalization in a broad sense (that is to say, a trend towards increased de facto political autonomy of local authorities, usually without breaking de jure imperial structures).

Military defeat under the attack of neighbor peoples looking for extended lebensraum, is perhaps the most conspicuous element of the collapse of the first Mediterranean world-system. Although it is an apparent obvious explanation for the political division of the Roman Empire, it requires some explanation itself: how was it that the Roman military machine, which had been quite efficient for centuries, turned unable to tame the tide of barbarian onslaught? Three hypotheses have been put forward as a basis for explaining this process: demographic downturn, feudalization in a broad sense, and military innovations. The hypotheses of population downturn and feudalization underscore the other main explanations for the collapse. The hypothesis of military innovations present the saddle and the stirrup, which the barbarian foes of the Roman Empire are supposed to have adopted during the first half of the first millennium A. D., with clear improvement of their military might, as the main reason for the defeat of Roman armies. Concerning this last hypothesis, it may be pointed out that Roman armies also tended to adopt the same military innovations, although somewhat later than its opponents, what may explain the resilience of the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire during the Middle Ages.

The demographic downturn is also a quite conspicuous element of the collapse of the first Mediterranean world-system. It is possible to explain it as a consequence of new diseases, hitherto unknown to the Mediterranean world, which spread into it as a result of increased contacts within the whole Eurasian civilized and barbarian societies (McNeil, 1976). However, notwithstanding the military significance of barbarian demographic growth as against Mediterranean demographic downturn, it should be stressed that the demographic gradient still ran from the Mediterranean to the barbarian neighbors which were able to overthrow the Roman defences of the Mediterranean world.

Anyway, military defeat and demographic downturn appear as external explanations for the collapse of the Mediterranean world-system. Being a truly world system nowadays, the modern world-system cannot suffer from such kind of problems.

Feudalization in a broad sense may be considered as a more or less normal and inevitable process in the evolution of imperial structures (Hicks, 1969). Thus, it appears as the most significant traditional internal explanation for the collapse of the first Mediterranean world-system, in spite of the fact that the consolidation of classical feudal structures in the western part of the Mediterranean world took place clearly later than the collapse of the first Mediterranean world-system. However, it must be stressed that economic autarky does not follow necessarily political fragmentation, either caused by feudal pull or barbarian push. As a matter of fact, the Mediterranean world-system had existed for a long time before Roman political unification, and the modern world-system presents another conspicuous example of such a fact. Moreover, as the modern world-system is far from being a world-empire, feudalization in a broad sense cannot threaten its cohesion.

Yet, it is possible to suggest, as another internal explanation, that the very process of leveling off the degree of development of the various Mediterranean regions may have brought a spontaneous reduction of trade relations within the Mediterranean world.
It is important to elaborate a bit on this last endogenous explanation for the collapse of the first Mediterranean world-system, because it is the only one that might apply to the modern world-system. First, let us notice that reduction of trade connections among the various Mediterranean regions is an undoubted element of the process of the collapse of the first Mediterranean world-system, although one that appears as a consequence of the other elements of the process in traditional explanations. Second, let us notice also that it is quite plausible to tell the story in a way that reduction of trade connections among the various Mediterranean regions becomes the main trigger of the whole process. The main idea is that reduction of trade relations easily explains why it became more difficult for the central power to raise the same amount of tribute as before, and in turn this explains why the military machine lost efficiency as against neighbor peoples. Third, it is decisive to suggest how and why trade relations which were profitable for a while became unprofitable. Possible explanations might include technological regression (something that no one presented as a serious possibility) and institutional barriers (which are the main factor for the reduction of inter-regional trade according to traditional explanations, but are supposed to be built afterwards according to this revisionist perspective). The real basic explanation, according to this revisionist perspective, is a quite different one: the very process of leveling off the degree of development of the various Mediterranean regions, as mentioned above.

It may seem unplausible to say that the very process of leveling off the degree of development is a factor of reduction of inter-regional trade. However, this is quite easy to understand within the framework of classical theories of international trade. Comparative advantage may originate in natural resources or acquired knowledge. Natural resources of the various Mediterranean regions are similar enough to allow them to live without much inter-regional trade once the adequate diffusion of useful plants (such as the olive or the vine) and animals (such as the donkey or the dromedary) was achieved (something that happened during the Roman rule). Acquired knowledge becomes certainly more homogenous as a consequence of the very process of levelling off the degree of development (something that seems to have happened also during Roman rule). Thus, only further improvements in the technological basis of transportation and communication or significant economies of scale, which might allow a centralized production to undersell local production, could have ensured the permanence of incentives to trade. The first Mediterranean world-system lacked both elements.

How does this situation compare with the evolution of the modern world-system? The trend towards the levelling off of the degree of development is undoubted, although far from universal till nowadays, as the spread of modern economic growth and a large number of cases of successful catching up show. However, three elements have prevented this levelling off trend from triggering a reduction of inter-regional trade: (i) the heterogeneity of natural resources (which is much more pronounced in the context of the whole world than within the Mediterranean world); (ii) frequent improvements in the technological basis of transportation and communication; and (iii) the apparent existence of significant economies of scale in the production of many industrial goods and services.

1.3 The second Mediterranean world-system

The first half of the second millennium saw the formation (or at least some steps towards the formation) of a second Mediterranean world-system, which disappeared during the 16th century A. D. as a consequence of the formation of the modern world-system.

The development of this would-be second Mediterranean world-system proceeded according to the main tendential rules already stated concerning the first Mediterranean world-system:

Economy was the driving force. This time, it was Italy that played the role of leading region. However, it is possible to argue that the main impulse came from the demographic and economic expansion that characterized Western Christendom in general between the 11th and the 14th centuries.

There was a significant population rise. From a trough around 25 million by the 8th century, the population of the Mediterranean world reached a maximum around 60 million inhabitants by the mid-14th century. At that moment, plague struck hard, and there was a fall to a trough around 45 million inhabitants by the early 15th century. Recovery to the previous historical maximum took until the 16th century. (McEvedy, Jones, 1978)

As soon as the world-system reached maturity, there were attempts at political unification, which, in this case, did not succeed. Two great powers, the Western Hapsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire, were formed, but the fight between them seems to have reached a stalemate by the end of the 16th century. Later evolution proceeded already within the context of the modern world-system.
There were also trends towards cultural homogeneization, although the basic division into three
different civilizations – Western Christendom, Eastern Christendom and Islam – was not affected, as
noticed above.

External links of the Mediterranean world with other areas belonging to these civilizations are the
main reason which explains why these steps towards the formation of a second Mediterranean world-

system did not lead to the formation of a truly world-system. It must be stressed that those external
links were not only cultural, but included the economic and political aspects of social life. In a certain
sense, the problem is that many factors, including improved technology, made the Mediterranean too
small a space for the feasible size of a 16th century world-system. Thus, the formation of the much
larger modern world-system comes as no surprise. And, as we shall see below, although the
Mediterranean world was able to play some role in the building of this modern world system, it was
unable to establish itself as its core.

2. Global Mediterranean history as a key to a global world history

What may be called the modern world-system (Wallerstein, 1974-1990) was formed in the 16th century
as an Euro-Atlantic world-system and remained one among several global societies until the 18th
century (Braudel, 1979). During the 19th century there was a planetization process that transformed
the Euro-Atlantic world-system into the first world-system embracing the whole world in the history of
mankind. And during the 20th century, in spite of several upheavals (such as the world wars and the
attempts to build a socialist world system), it remained both a world system and a capitalist system, as
it had been since the 16th century.

To what extent did the formation and evolution of the modern world system follow the same patterns as
the formation and evolution of the Mediterranean world-systems? Let us briefly review the various
aspects dealt with in different points of section 1 above.

2.1 Economy as the driving force

Economy was the driving force of the formation of the modern world-system, exactly as in the case of
the Mediterranean world-systems. Movements of goods, people and capital transformed world-
economies and local economies, which previously had only exceptional contacts, into deeply inter-
dependent economies.

There are, however, significant differences between the modern world-system and the Mediterranean
world-systems: the scale of the movements and the degree of economic integration among the different
regions that belonged to the modern world-economy was (and is) much higher than the scale of the
movements and the degree of economic integration among the different regions that belonged to the
Mediterranean world-systems (and to all other world-systems which existed in the history of mankind).
As a matter of fact, it is likely that pre-modern world-systems never overcame the 10 % threshold of
supra-local economic exchange that Braudel suggested for 16th century Mediterranean (Braudel, 1966).
On the hand, the contemporary world-economy reached higher proportions of foreign trade in total
production (currently around 20 %).

Is this quantitative difference a qualitative one? It is reasonable to answer positively to this question
mainly for three reasons: (i) the heterogeneity of natural resources in the various regions of the world;
(ii) the development of transportation and communication technology; (iii) the presence of economies of
scale in many industrial and services productions. As already suggested above, it is possible to argue
that these factors played a decisive role in keeping the various regions that formed the modern world-
economy deeply linked in spite of the rapid spread of the process of modern economic growth. And it is
also possible to argue that the same factors played a decisive role in putting a brake to the trends
towards political unification, which did not (yet?) succeed in the context of the modern world-system
(more on this matter below).

2.2 Significant population rise

There can be no doubt that the formation and development of the modern world-system was
accompanied by a significant population rise. Europe (excluding Russia and the Balkans) had a
population around 60 million by 1500 and around 140 million by 1800 (to these some 20 million in
American outlyers of the Euro-Atlantic world-system should be added). The whole world had a
population around 900 million by 1800 and has a population around 6 000 million by 2000. (McEvedy, Jones, 1978)

Once more, the main significant difference from the cases of the Mediterranean world-systems are the exceptionally high rates of growth of population that may be found during the evolution of the modern world-system. These may be explained by the process of modern economic growth (Kuznets, 1966), which brought an ever expanding production possibility frontier.

2.3 Attempts at political unification

The failure of all attempts at political unification is a conspicuous feature of the political history of the modern world-system. (Wallerstein, 1974-1990) (Kennedy, 1988)

It is possible to argue that this was a consequence of the deep capitalist character of the modern world-system. In other words, the fact that the modern world-system presented a highly dynamic economic evolution, even when its geographical scope stabilized, is perhaps the main explanation for the absence of successful bids towards its political unification. Contemporary spread of modern economic growth in the world economy, allowing the rise of new would be great powers, such as the United States of America in the 19th century or China nowadays, is a clear example of this process.

However, during the 20th century, there have been clear trends towards higher political integration of the world, because of the development of international and supranational organizations. It is possible to speculate about the possibility that the need for a world governance resulting from global threats, such as the ecological problems triggered by population and economic growth, will increase the pressure towards political unification, following a path rather different from traditional great power conflicts.

2.4 Trends towards cultural homogeneization

It is hard to evaluate how much the trends towards cultural homogeneization have already changed the cultural landscape of the world. Perhaps the best synthesis is to underscore the similarity between the situation of the world as the second millennium A. D. comes to an end and the situation of the first Mediterranean world system at the mid-first millennium B. C.: there is an undoubted lingua franca (English now, Greek in the ancient Mediterranean) and significant aspects of high culture (what may be called the modern secular culture now, Hellenism in the ancient Mediterranean), which are shared by the elites from all over the world; however, traditional current languages and traditional universal religions still play a decisive role in the cultural background of the majority of the population of the world (as traditional current languages and traditional local religions were still the main cultural background of the majority of the population of the ancient Mediterranean).

It is possible to speculate about the possibility of an evolution similar to the one of the first Mediterranean world-system under the pressure of further deepening of economic and political links. The development of the so-called information society has been adding a powerful impulse to this trend. However, it is reasonable to predict that the cultural homogeneization of the whole world has still a long time to unfold until it may reach something similar to the uniformity under Christian religion, and near uniformity under Latin-Greek languages reached by the Mediterranean world during the late first half of the first millennium A. D.. (Castells, 1999)

2.5 Extension of civilized societies

As a last remark, it is interesting to notice that the expansion of the modern world-system was similar to the expansion of the first Mediterranean world-system also in the aspect of the extension of civilized societies. As a matter of fact, some parts of the world became civilized (in the technical sense of the world explained above in section 1) only when they became linked to the modern world-system.

3 The Mediterranean in a global world

3.1 Integration of the Mediterranean world into the modern world-system

Integration of the Mediterranean world into the modern world-system proceeded in two phases, which clearly correspond to the Euro-Atlantic and world phases of the evolution of the modern world-system (Braudel, 1979) (Ahmed, 1998):

The northwestern part of the Mediterranean world (roughly corresponding to the part of the Mediterranean world which belonged to Western Christendom) was integrated into the modern world-system already during the 16th century. At that epoch, the core of the modern world-system was located in northwestern Europe, and the northwestern part of the Mediterranean world was integrated as a
Globalisation, Regionalisation and the History of International Relations

semi-periphery area. Italy, which had been the core of the (would be) second Mediterranean world-system and remained for a while a producer of high quality manufactures and an important financial center, was unable to compete for a leading role in the Euro-Atlantic world-system for three reasons: (i) it lost its traditional role as the main direct or indirect link of the whole Western Christendom with the Moslem world, India and the Far East, as various European countries began to develop direct links with these overseas regions through the Atlantic, Indian and even Pacific oceans; (ii) political division into rather small states, brought political ineffectiveness and even foreign intervention in Italian affairs; and, last but not least, (iii) in spite of a promising start during the so-called Renaissance period (15th-16th centuries), Italy was unable to share in the cultural and economic developments which led northwestern Europe into early modern economic growth. The Iberian countries were the forerunners of the overseas endeavors of Western Christendom during the 15th and 16th centuries, playing a decisive role in the formation of the Euro-Atlantic world-economy, but backward agriculture, poor manufactures, and bad institutions (of which Inquisition courts are a striking example) thwarted the Iberian prospects in the competition for global hegemony (North, 1989). Southern France became integrated into one of the most powerful states of continental Europe, which for a while competed with the Hapsburg Empire, the Netherlands, and Great Britain, for a leading role in the Euro-Atlantic world-system, but neither was France able to achieve this leading role, in spite of the development of an important manufacturing sector and a significant colonial empire, nor was southern France a leading region within its kingdom, especially after the defeat of the protestant party, which was predominant in southern France, in the internal wars of religion of the late 16th century.

The rest of the Mediterranean world (roughly corresponding to the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Morocco) remained only lightly linked to the modern world-system until the 19th century. Then, this part of the Mediterranean world was integrated into what was becoming a truly world system. The main step of this process was perhaps the building of the Suez canal (1869), which linked the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and made the Mediterranean a fundamental internal route of the world economy. Also important was the use of the Mediterranean as a route for exports of Russian (Ukrainian to be precise) cereals to the core of the world-system. As agricultural staples were the only competitive exports that this part of the Mediterranean world had to offer, and technological and cultural bases for modern economic growth were lacking, the development of a periphery position within the modern world system was inevitable.

Anyway, two different processes must be considered:

The Balkans (roughly corresponding to the part of the Mediterranean world which belonged to Eastern Christendom) gradually slept out of Ottoman control as the so-called process of balkanization unfolded. This ensured that the national state became the typical political entity in this region already during the 19th century.

Most of the African and Asian parts of the Mediterranean world (roughly corresponding to the part of the Mediterranean world which belonged to Islam) were subject to political colonization by European powers during the 19th century and early 20th century. Thus, the consolidation of independent national states in these parts of the Mediterranean world had to wait until the second half of the 20th century.

3.2 Modern economic growth and democracy in the Mediterranean world.

To these three patterns of integration into the modern world-system corresponded three different situations concerning the ability of Mediterranean countries to take off into modern economic growth and to develop democratic political regimes (Valério, 1992) (Maddison, 1995) (Voltes, 1999):

The northwestern part of the Mediterranean world which includes today the national states of France, Italy, Spain and Portugal, the micro-states of Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and the Holly See, the former British colony of Malta and the British colony of Gibraltar was able to take off into modern economic growth and to develop democratic political regimes, although at different epochs in different countries. France belonged to the second wave of latecomers, which took off by the mid-19th century, Italy belonged to the third wave of latecomers, which took off around the turn of the century, and the Iberian countries belonged to the fourth wave of latecomers, which took off by the mid-20th century. Consolidation of democratic political regimes usually accompanied or followed take off into modern economic growth. As a consequence, the northwestern part of the Mediterranean world is nowadays a highly developed region with stable democratic political regimes.
The northeastern part of the Mediterranean world which includes today the national states of Greece, Cyprus, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Albania had a poor economic and political performance during the first half of the 20th century: no successful take off into modern economic growth; no stable democratic regime; and several wars, either of local character or European and world scope, plaguing the region. After the Second World War, while Greece and Cyprus remained market economies and were eventually able to build democratic regimes, the bulk of the Balkans became a set of communist countries with centrally planned economies, a situation that changed during the last decade of the 20th century, although attempts to develop market economies and democratic political regimes met with a rather uneven success. As a consequence, this part of the Mediterranean world shows today very different performances in terms of development and democracy, ranging from an almost complete convergence to the northwestern standard in the case of Greece, to an almost complete survival of a traditional economy and society in the case of Albania.

The African and Asian parts of the Mediterranean world which include today the national states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey, and the autonomous Palestinian authority (Gaza + Cisjordania) had an economic and political performance during the first half of the 20th century at least as poor as the Balkanic one: no modern economic growth; colonial status (except in Turkey); more or less involuntary participation in European and world wars. Between the 1940s and the 1960s, colonial rule ended without much struggle, except in Algeria (because of the attempt of France to keep colonial rule) and Palestine (because of the opposition of Palestinians to the creation of the state of Israel). There followed efforts to take off into modern economic growth, at first mostly designed according to socialist patterns, meaning state initiative and industrialization priority, later gradually evolving towards more liberal schemes. Mild success was the general rule. As a consequence, this part of the Mediterranean world shows development performances less heterogeneous than those of northeastern Mediterranean. As a rule, these development performances slightly exceed those of the poorest Balkanic countries. Israel (a highly developed country) and Libya (favored by low population density and high oil income) are exceptions to this rule. Development of democratic regimes has been at least as painful as economic development.

It is interesting to notice that to these three different situations concerning modern economic growth correspond three different situations concerning the relation between economic performance and human development performance (see table). As a matter of fact, when an overall comparison of per capita gross domestic product rank and human development index rank is made on a world basis:

Highly developed countries of the northwestern part of the Mediterranean world (and also Greece, Cyprus and Israel) have human development index ranks slightly better than per capita gross domestic product ranks.

Balkanic countries have human development index ranks clearly better than per capita gross domestic product ranks.

Moslem Mediterranean countries have human development index ranks clearly worse than per capita gross domestic product ranks.

3.3 Global spheres of influence within the Mediterranean world

As a consequence of its semi-peripheral or peripheral position within the modern world system, Mediterranean countries have been unable to develop a regional identity, and have been the subject of competition of great powers for spheres of influence (Kennedy, 1988). During the Euro-Atlantic phase of the modern world-system, Great Britain gradually imposed its hegemony in the Mediterranean world, in spite of the resistance of the Mediterranean members of the Euro-Atlantic world-economy, and the capacity of Morocco and the Ottoman Empire to stay aloof for a while. During the 19th century, British hegemony was undoubted, although intermediate powers, such as France, Austria, or Russia eventually built more or less stable spheres of influence of their own. British decline during the first half of the 20th century opened the way to competition for global hegemony. As the German bid (which touched the Mediterranean world only ephemerously) failed, the United States of America gradually emerged as the new global hegemonic power, and the Soviet Union became for a while its only significant rival. Most of the Mediterranean world fell under American influence, although the Soviet Union was able to retain a significant Balkanic sphere of influence until its collapse in the early 1990s. American influence, more or less sympathetically accepted, is the rule as the second millennium A. D. comes to an end.
Meanwhile, another actor, the European Union, came to the stage during the second half of the 20th century. Although far from being able to play a decisive political role, it became the main economic power and partner of the Mediterranean world. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the Mediterranean countries with the European Union presents some rough correspondence with the history of their integration into the modern world-economy and their development performance:

France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece are members of the European Union, although only the countries of the northwestern part of the Mediterranean world are full participants in the European economic and monetary union, at least for the moment.

Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey are candidates to membership of the European Union (and Croatia is likely to join this group soon), although only Slovenia (and perhaps Malta and Cyprus) are likely to become members during the first decade of the 21st century (and it is unlikely they will achieve full participation in the economic and monetary union soon).

The less developed countries of the Balkans, Arab Mediterranean countries and Israel have important practical and formal links with the European Union (Yugoslavia and Libya are exceptions to the formal links for the moment), but are unlikely to be accepted as candidates to membership for a long period to come.

It is possible to speculate about the chances for the European Union to play in the future a political role similar to the economic role it plays already in the Mediterranean world. Such a possibility depends on the capacity of the European Union to become a true political and economic union; and such an evolution would create a global power, perhaps able to challenge the American hegemony. This would certainly enhance the global role of the northwestern part of the Mediterranean world, but it is unlikely that it would change the peripheral (or semi-peripheral) position of most of the Mediterranean world.

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Table, Some indicators for the Mediterranean world 1997


[1] Difference between real gross domestic product per capita rank and human development index rank in a world context

[2] Real gross domestic product per capita (current dollars, purchasing power parity)


[4] Buget balance as percentage of gross domestic product

[5] Agriculture value added as percentage of gross domestic product

[6] Industry value added as percentage of gross domestic product

[7] Services value added as percentage of gross domestic product

[8] Population aged above 65 as percentage of total population

[9] Rate of growth of population 1975-1997 (%)

1996 figures

### Northwestern Mediterranean

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World 6332 7.9
The Feminist Movement between Globalization and Regionalization: the Human Rights Question

I.

Today the very definition of feminism is a controversial issue (Rupp-Taylor, 1999) because the various women's movements that have come into being at different moments and in different contexts have each expressed their own ideas, strategies and practices, at times divergent – when not actually conflicting – even though they have often attempted (with varying degrees of success) to communicate with each other across national and regional boundaries.

Women historians have proposed very different schemes and categorizations for defining feminism. One need only consider the distance between “rational feminism” which argued for equality of women within their traditional family roles of mother and wife and “individualist feminism” which placed more emphasis on human rights and individual autonomy (Offen, 1988).

Although the meaning of feminism has been called into question, and its nature has undergone profound changes in different times and places, recently many feminist scholars (especially historians and philosophers) have tried to establish interpretative models with which to identify features common to different women's movements. Taking their cue from the International Women’s Movement of the early twentieth century – founded upon universalistic principles – some women scholars have, therefore, used the term “collective identity” to describe the possible shape of feminism in the twenty-first century. A static vision of identity is rejected in favor of multiple identities capable of communicating with each other. In fact, the process of constructing a collective feminist identity suggests the possibility of overcoming national differences so as to achieve new forms of solidarity while respecting both similarities and differences.

Other women scholars (Benhabib, 1999) have argued that the enormous changes taking place at the economic, technological and political levels have stimulated a need for more security which has revived interest in those universalistic values that were rejected by feminism and its theorists in the nineteen-eighties. During those years, the hermeneutic mistrust of generalizations had led to the recognition of differences in race, class, culture and sexual orientation with the aim of combating the theoretical dominance of white, middle-class heterosexual women. Within the different women's movements today, on the other hand, there is a strong awareness of the interdependence existing among women of different classes, cultures, sexual orientations, religions and nationalities, and feminist theorists are being called upon to play the role of brokers in the ongoing renegotiation of new collective identities.

Other women scholars are investigating whether it is indeed possible to imagine a global feminist community, and what characteristics it would need to have in order to respond to the needs and objectives of western women and those from developing countries (Jaggar, 1998). One of the thorniest topics in this context is that of human rights whose definition often varies a great deal in different parts of the world.

Not until 1993, during the Second World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, was violence against women officially recognized as a violation of human rights. But at the basis of this determination there are still profound differences between the meaning of human rights for western women and for those in developing countries. The global system itself and the economic order accompanying it accentuate these differences although, in both areas, it is the poorer women who are most at risk.
II.

The long, complex and troubled history of human rights reflects the western experience, demonstrating the irreversibility of the process towards civilization, but the strong marginalization of human rights for women negates this linear process. Much has been done since the end of World War II to the present in order to eliminate discrimination against women (Tomasèvski, 1993 and 1998). But as of today many of the countries that signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, that went into effect in September 1981) deny women the most elementary political rights (Kuwait) or subject them to genital mutilation (Mali).

Starting from the beginning of the movement for human rights after World War II, women have been de-marginalized. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and many subsequent declarations have, in fact, proclaimed equal rights – political, civil, social, economic and cultural – for human beings without taking gender into account and using a gender-neutral language.

The priority established by the UN was that of guaranteeing women political rights in order to let them make their voices heard in political life. But the written law often conflicts – and especially for women – with custom and religious law.

Only in the past decade have we clearly seen the need for reconceptualizing human rights, and as the Vienna (1993) and Beijing (1995) conferences have shown, the problem is that of expanding the human rights agenda to include issues that are matters of life or death for women but that have been considered marginal in international legislation: rape, in the family as well, freedom of reproduction, consideration of domestic work as real work, unequal opportunities for women and girls in education, work, housing, credit and health.

Until today there has been but little acknowledgment of the particular vulnerability of women with regard to poverty and hence their rights to basic social services focused on reproductive health and, as in the case of many African countries, limiting the spread of HIV.

One of the significant reasons for the invisibility of gender-based violations is linked to the fact that the discourse on human rights has long ignored the private sphere. The situation concerning the violation of private rights has been exacerbated by the fact that respect for cultural differences has become more and more of a euphemism for restricting or denying human rights to women. All too often, religious or cultural factors are used in order that liberty and equality for women be considered clear symbols of western values in conflict with and in reaction to religious, conservative or nationalistic movements.

The Beijing Conferences and the platform it issued sanctioned recognition of women as fully entitled to rights and denounced the high level of poverty in relation to the increase in the number of women as heads-of-households (about 25% globally in 1995).

On the topics of human rights, starting from the recognition of the differences, the relationship between feminist scholars and women in developing countries was difficult throughout the eighties and the early nineties (Okin 1998). Western feminists were accused of essentialism, of having difficulty in acknowledging differences related to race, class, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation of often having considered ineluctable the fact that women and girls from different cultures are disadvantaged and oppressed by elements of their respective cultures.

The anti-universalistic climate among many feminist scholars has often led to a politicized form of cultural relativism that has not facilitated the identification of many women’s rights as human rights. Only by working intensively with the activists in developing countries have they conceptualized, - albeit abandoning their essentialist positions – the fact that women have much in common (patriarchal societies, sexual and economic exploitation, discrimination).

If, in the past ten years western feminism has accepted and elaborated the difference to the extent that many feminists have rejected all criteria tainted by universalism (Benhabib, 1999), others (Tripp 2000) have denounced the fact that the attempt to shatter universalistic trends has been translated into the theorization of the differences in a just as universalizing manner, without taking time and place differences into account.

The prevailing position within the feminist movement today seems to be that which, while not denying the differences, emphasizes the need for a policy of solidarity that unites the social forces against the tendency towards balkanization and that rejects identity politics that could lead paralyzing relativism.
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It also admits that the boundaries between races and ethnic groups are permeable and mechanisms of power are not uni-directional (Friedman 1995).

Differences, therefore, must not be universalized, but reconceptualized according to time and place parameters. Only in this way will western feminists be able to overcome the impasse that troubles the movement and permit the creation of transverse alliances.

In fact, there is a huge gap between the western feminist concept of difference and the manner in which the idea of difference has been articulated by women’s movements in Israel, Northern Ireland, the ex-Yugoslavia or India. In countries such as Uganda, the Sudan, Rwanda or South Africa, where the politicization of the difference has led to civil war or violent conflicts based on ethnic, racial or religious differences, the challenge for the women’s movements has been that of identifying a focus on the similarities among women to minimize the differences. In many African countries, at the national level, the common cause of women’s rights has brought together and united many women from different backgrounds. In South Africa a Women’s National Coalition (WNC) was established in 1991, comprising 81 organizations and 13 regional alliances of women’s organizations that held national and regional conferences and drafted a Women’s Charter that was endorsed by the national parliament and by 9 regional parliaments in 1994. The charter covers a large number of issues including equality, legal rights, economic matters, education, health, politics and violence against women. Women in Africa have often sought unity by choosing to suppress or minimize differences in order to contribute to the process of reconciliation.

Discussions on differences within the western feminist movement must therefore be contextualized and placed in a broader, comparative historical perspective, with case by case focused features.

Pressures brought by the international feminist movement and women who belong to non-governmental organizations on the local level were fundamental in preparing the groundwork for the Vienna and Beijing conferences where the rejection of cultural motivations as an excuse for violating women’s human rights was sustained with vigor.

And it was also the efforts by the women’s organizations that broadly extended the definition of human rights for women.

The Human Rights Watch on Women’s Human Rights in 1995 (Human Rights Watch Women’s Rights Project, 1995), the fruit of this extension, drafted a list of the various types of rights violations: sexual violence as an instrument of war (Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, India, Kashmir, Peru), sexual violence against women refugees (Bangladesh, Kenya), sexual violence against women in detention (police brutality in Pakistan, U.S.A., Egypt), the trade in women and girls for prostitution and forced marriages (Thailand, Nepal, Bangladesh), abuses against working women (Asian domestics in Kuwait, in Russia, in post-communist Poland), domestic violence (Brazil, Russia, South Africa), violation of sexual rights (forced examinations of virginity in Turkey, the debate on abortion in Ireland, abortion policies in post-communist Poland).

Feminist criticism of the discourse on human rights conflicts with the current dichotomization of political, civil, economic and cultural rights that characterize the last one as mere aspirations while women are often the first victims of collective rights that can contribute to depriving them of their own fundamental rights. Some liberties are, in fact, in conflict with each other: freedom of religion often conflicts with equal rights for women within the family. It was no coincidence that the African meeting in preparation for the Beijing Conference emphasized how often obstacles to the affirmation of women’s rights consist of custom and religious practices (Guzman Bouvard 1996).

In Asia the work of the organization for the defense of personal rights revealed that the affirmation of religious and ethnic identity can undermine women’s rights. It was no accident that these topics were at the fulcrum of the final document of the Vienna Conference that invited the states to take action to combat discriminatory practices against women which are often linked to religious intolerance.

While in all the major human rights organizations expertise has been attributed to the educated elite, in those fighting for women’s rights the work concentrated on collecting and sharing information as tools for empowering the victims of violence. Women who are working for human rights have tried to democratize knowledge and create decentralized, flexible associations that are capable of mobilizing people as soon as the problems arise.
Rather than adopting the conventional model of elitism, exclusivity and bureaucracy, women activists have opted for more fluid organizations that permit faster decision-making and emphasize cooperation. Often, motherhood is at the center of these organizations. Ever since it was established in 1979 the Madri di Piazza de Mayo have redefined the concept of motherhood to urge governments to guarantee justice. March 1994 marked the founding of the International Gathering of Mothers and Women in Struggle that comprises 14 organizations of political mothers: women against authoritarian governments, women against environmental disasters, women working for peace in Israel, Palestine and the republics of the former Yugoslavia, mothers against drugs in Spain, mothers of the desaparecidos in Brazil, Honduras, Guatemala and the Western Sahara, mothers against the Mafia in Italy, etc.

In more recent years, women's human rights have often been associated with the problems of development and of developing nations (Moon 1996).

The Gender Analysis Framework was developed primarily by scholars from the Harvard Institute for International Development and it is an approach that views women basically as under-utilized resources. It calls for women to take place their problems at the center of the development process, even as decision makers (Gender Planning Approach) claiming recognized gender roles (productive, reproductive and community management), a political approach to development programs (welfare, equity, anti-poverty, empowerment) and the development of their ability to negotiate with governments on the basis of rights education programs (successful campaigns in this area have been conducted in places such as Papua, New Guinea).

Women account for 70% of the world's poor, and two-thirds of the illiterate; they play a very minor role in the representative and decision-making bodies (only 11% are members of parliaments) and they continue to be paid less than men for the same work.

Economic theories, that are considered gender-neutral, are not. In a specific area of the Solomon Islands it is estimated that 5,000 women have recognized jobs, 8,000 unrecognized, and 67,000 work in subsistence sectors. By ignoring this sector we are neglecting an important segment of reality.

Women have the right to benefit from development, to have access to education, to better health-care and to decision-making roles.

The approaches linked to the women and development issue call for the implementation of welfare policies targeting women, mainly as mothers (nutrition programs, programs for improving family health, family planning) and anti-poverty programs (women must be made more productive and mainstreamed into development), stressing the equity approach (identifying the strategic needs of women) and the concept of empowerment (women must become protagonists in decision-making processes).

Human rights and development often go hand in hand and the Beijing document is probably the United Nations' paper that integrates the two most strongly.

However, there is still the open issue of the universality and indivisibility of human rights, an issue that goes back to the founding of the United Nations itself (Sanese 1997). Many countries in the southern part of the world, or developing nations, have maintained that human rights are not necessarily universal, that they are based on a very individualistic, western model and that community cultures place the good of the community over that of the individual.

One of the major questions that the western feminist movement is raising is whether it is indeed possible to discuss human rights on an international level in a world where there are so many cultural differences. The answer to this question is in the possibility of intertwining the actions of the feminist movements on the global level with those of the local women's movements.

III.

The challenge of the twenty-first century is linked to the manner in which international legislation on human rights can be applied to a multicultural world.

In this sense, the transformation of human rights from a feminist viewpoint, and hence their extension, is crucial to an understanding of the challenge of human rights in the new century since women are
assuming leading roles in the redefinition of concepts such as democracy, human rights and world and environmental security.

Many women's groups are starting to use human rights as a tool for the advancement of women's rights in general (in Pakistan human rights have become the basis for women who are organizing themselves for various reasons). The local dimension, that is tied to women's daily lives has no less political significance that the international dimension. The battle for environmental rights, for example, has demonstrated how neighborhood battles are related to those being conducted on the global level.

The difficult task of women's movements – and in particular of those struggling for human rights – would therefore seem to be to bridge this gap between universalism and cultural relativism by linking the local dimension to the global. It is an important task even today that the "Women 2000" Conference which, while reaffirming the principles of the 1995 Beijing Conference in its final document and integrating various points (domestic violence and the sex trade), has witnessed the denial of “sexual rights” (including the choice to reproduction), the terminology of which was contested by the Vatican and by Islamic fundamentalists.

References


The turn of the century is a suitable opportunity to reflect on long cycles of the international society in a long-cycle approach. Several authors have mastered this: Braudel (1975), Kennedy (1987), Arrighi (1994), Wallerstein (1991), among others. Our intention here, however, is not to discuss international relations long-term history cycles, but to have them in mind while reflecting on the rather more concrete scenery of the post-Cold War.

The issue is timely, for since 1989-1990, when the so-called Cold War or East-West conflict seemed to come to an end, available literature has not been sufficient to make up an adequate critical mass, neither has it pointed to grounded directives to guide the look on the emerging international scenery. Significant changes in the international system have been since taking place. This paper modestly addresses this issue, aiming at contributing to a better understanding of present and coming times by inquiring on history. In this turn of the century changes are world-wide, naturally also affecting Brazil. Our further goal here is to examine contemporary developments of the concept of security, in the light of the deep forces that drive mankind destiny, and occasionally draw inferences for a better understanding of Brazilian insertion in the international system.

International Society

A great number of authors — most of those who have addressed the issue — believe that the end of the Thirty-Year War leading to the Westphalia Peace in 1648, after separate treaties between Munster and Osnabruck, among emperor, Catholic and Protestant kings and princes, has a special significance for it settled the principle that European states should survive based on values of tolerance and coexistence, hence the concept of international society. Europe began to be recognised as an assemblage of independent states where a certain degree of religious tolerance should prevail, according to the principle that the sovereign over a territory would determine the religion to be followed therein. The idea of an authority external to temporal power, hitherto represented by the Pope or by the already symbolic figure of the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, was definitely buried. And so was the principle of one only religion, the search for supremacy on behalf of the legitimate religion. The peace agreement signed by winners and losers, like Austria, Spain, France, Sweden and others, signalled the onset of new times. Thus were laid the bases for the concept of sovereignty that so many had pleaded for, from Bodin to Hobbes. When applied to international relations, sovereignty, as defined by Russett and Starr (1992:99), means that “there is no authority to determine how a state should act; there is no actor with legitimate authority to tell a state what to do”.

From that moment on, then, a central issue has haunted us to this beginning of the twenty-first century: the relationship between a state of society within a country and the state of nature in the relations between states, following terms borrowed from natural law. Rousseau (1970: 610) had clearly called the attention to this: “The first thing I remark, when considering the standing of humankind, is a manifest contradiction in its ordering, that makes it ever hesitant: as men, we live in a civilian state, abiding by the laws; as peoples, each enjoys natural freedom; which ultimately makes our situation worse than if such differences were unknown”.

Could it be so that the post-Cold War world might bring forth new assumptions, based on which we might rethink Rousseau and anticipate the elimination of such differences?

According to Aron (1984), the system prevailing during the twentieth century was an interstate one, not because there could not be an international society, but because this was a specially bellicose century, even during its apparently peaceful moments. This approach, besides easing the task of characterising the post-Cold War era, introduces an idea of continuity for the understanding of this great
entanglement of international relations. These certainly existed before Westphalia, but were then pervaded by a strong attachment to the idea of a universal kingdom (Egyptian, Macedonian, Greek, Roman, Christian, Turk), to be settled over at least the known universe. Hence the authors’ stating that international relations can only be thought of after Westphalia, even though treaties, ambassadors, and other diplomatic instruments had long been in use. The very idea of international law, of peoples’ rights, stems from that Peace.

Still according to Aron (1984), the interstate system, that is, international relations seen as relations between states, is but part of what he calls international or world society. Conceptual assumptions allow for thinking international relations as occurring not only among states, but also among human beings. This is probably one among the vital questions to keep in mind concerning the effective novelty of the present and coming international scenery. The international society would thus be an assembling that includes the interstate system, the world economy — or the world market or economic system — and transnational or supranational phenomena: “To simplify, we define international society as the whole of relations between states and between people, which allows for dreaming of the unity of mankind” (Aron, 1984: 24).

**Common Rules And Goals**

A question pervades both the post-Westphalia and post-Cold War times, concerning the generic international system, be it named interstate system or international society: whether it must be considered a shared-goals association or a practical association.

Several jurists have pointed out that the international system cannot be considered an association based on shared goals. And in fact, to date, it has not been so. This kind of association implies — using an extreme metaphor — a shared *weltanschaung*, even if not thoroughly, whereas shared values in a practical association are only those necessary to maintain relations with no reference to common goals, in a situation where states are forced to interact led by concrete needs — even if through war. Values in a practical association can also be defined as those linked to generally accepted laws and rules. These ideas have prevailed since the post-Westphalia, through the eighteenth century and over the hundred-year period of The Concert of Europe after Napoleon’s defeat and the rise of the Holy Alliance. They have certainly played, and still play, an outstanding role in international order.

In a shared-goals association, values refer to co-operation concerning power, balance, wealth, world views, co-operation thus implying shared interests. It is, in a way, a transposition to international relations of the concept of nation which some early twentieth-century authors have developed, like the socialist Bauer. In a classical definition, “the nation is the assembling of men linked by a fate community in a character community” (Bauer 1987: 160). Thus co-operation, according to the concept of shared-goals association, can not be linked to the idea of constraint, neither to that of avoiding risks or losses, as suggested by the contemporary concept of international regime (Krasner 1982). To the liberal Meinecke (1975:13), who recognises the contradictions internal to the nation, “rather than seek to eliminate contrasts or level national culture, a modern national state’s task is to achieve general agreement on some fundamental concepts of mutual tolerance”.

A first line of reasoning can then be drawn. The post-Cold War world would tend to relations of the shared-goals association kind, but the continuous reproduction of realist values — even though updated to adapt to a constantly changing world — suggests that the practical association prevails. This applies even to those issues thought to be global, and repeatedly brought in as examples of an inevitable trend to co-operation, such as the environment, world trade, or human rights. When referring to this debate, Nardin (1987:27) takes the view that “it is common practice, rather than shared goals, that offer conditions for international association”. In Aron terms, then, we are dealing with the interstate system, not the international society. To Bull (1995:154), international law’s achievement in our times, rather than strengthening the element of order in international society, has been to “have helped to preserve the existing framework of international order in a period in which it has been subject to especially heavy stress”.

To consider the interstate system in this sense takes us back to the idea of anarchy, a key concept to study international relations. We do not intend to discuss it here in depth, but to place it where it belongs: as literature almost unanimously suggests, anarchy is a fact in as much as, since Westphalia, the value of state sovereignty has become ever more sound, to the point that nothing is hierarchically
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superior to it. Nevertheless, the history of international relations over the last three centuries has been one of a constant search for balance, either static or dynamic, either to maintain or to alter the *status quo*; it has been so with liberal, positivist, realist, marxist and other theories.

The international system, in its basic conceptual structure, follows no common rules. It is made up by a series of separate states, each seeking its own goals and only partially linked one to another. Increasingly through time those links have broadened and, especially from the end of the nineteenth century — but in several aspects even before that — got stiffener, making up a tissue of co-ordinating institutions whose normative role does not override, neither intends to, the value of state sovereignty (Red Cross, the League of Nations, the United Nations, and a score of other international bodies having in principle a universal character).

If this is true — predominance of state sovereignty, of egoistic interests, of the state of nature, hence of anarchy — then one must explain the trend to accept common rules, one of the elements of the international society. An answer can be found in the very logic of anarchy. If every state seeks to maximise its advantage, then it is its interest to have others, willingly or not, abide by rules it creates. In April 1793, Saint-Just (*apud* Saitta 1975: 389) submitted a project to the revolutionary Convention, stating that “the French people vote for freedom in the world”. It must be noticed that, although the idea of common rules stems from the strongest, it does not exclude the possibility to also suit the weakest in certain contexts.

There is no doubt a permanent tension between anarchy, on the one hand, and order based on rules and common government, on the other. If we were to examine how the international system has effectively been defined along the past three centuries, at least among the European states heirs to the Greco-Roman civilisation, we might find out that it defined itself through shared rules, although without a common government bearing legitimate power to impose them. According to realist thinking, within anarchic competition one may even need the other. Furthermore, the opposition between states encourages their uniformity in the search for successful practices; a clear example is that every state will seek the rivals’ military technology, if anything to wage them war. To Waltz (1987:242), “theory generates high expectations on behaviours and results. It allows foreseeing that states will have a balanced behaviour, whether or not their goal is the balance of power. Theory hence suggests a neat systemic trend toward balance”. Such a trend would thus be a further reason for accepting common rules within anarchy, besides the need to the other and the search for successful practices.

Within the field of international relations, several authors including Waltz, but above all Bull (1995), have attempted to show that it is possible to match rules and anarchy. The interstate system would then be more than this, it would be an almost international society in as much as shared rules prevailed, and in spite of there not being a common government legitimately obliging all states. Bull’s argument (1995: 307) “is an implicit defence of the states system, and more particularly of that element in it that has been called international society”.

Nevertheless, such view is insufficient to understand the post-Cold War world. Not that it may not be thought through these analytical tools: but the intense debate on the shared-goals association, albeit occasionally hiding non-shared, particular or even egoistic interests and world views, leads us to think about the new forms of system or international society.

In pre-Westphalia Europe, as recalled above, there was a perception of a states system having something in common, both concerning religion — Christian beliefs — and the temporal power, the relationship between sovereigns. After the religious wars both within and between states, that is after Westphalia, existing institutions such as diplomacy were renewed, there beginning a process of building new institutions: international law and the balance of power. The latter, as known, was so important and lasting that it became the Cold War main support. Along three centuries it was accepted and fostered both by absolutists and liberals.

Diplomacy, international law, and the balance of power have not developed by chance. The political structure previous to Westphalia, based on the figure of the prince — who, as Anderson (1985) points out, remained important until absolutism was replaced by the bourgeoisie — has gradually changed.

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629 It is worth remarking that when we say their normative role does not override state sovereignty, we do not deny the existence of certain common rules.
Since the previous structure associated state power to the governor, there was not even a draft of an interstate system, only reigning houses. The new institutions gained the status of pillars of international relations as far as the very states system was formed as such. Diplomacy, law, and balance began to mediate the relations between states — or powers — having a territory and a population who, at least ideally, was co-accountable for their governors' decisions. In as much as in every country the prince no longer embodied the state, the relations between sovereigns gave way to interstate relations.

Nowadays the interstate system key element — the idea of balance of power, the essentially political element within international relations — seems to have disappeared, at least in the shape it took between 1946 and 1989. If the logic of balance disappears, what will the political format of international order be? It is certainly a relevant issue to analyse the changes that take place in the system and inquiry whether absence of the system balance will or not lead to a shared-goals association. The answer has not come up yet, but the attempt to reach it takes us to the discussion of the meaning of values, of international security, and of the standing the various states will assume.

Rise Of The Interstate System

The reason for the lasting debate on the existence of a states system, an international society or, in a more general way, of trans-border relations, even by drawing on different concepts and values, is linked to the very essence of the human being. Although culturally separated into different fate communities by race, class, and national differences, humankind objectively share a common destiny. Since this is a controversial concept, it is worth putting forward some empirical examples. An illness affects, or in principle may affect, all men, even if its effects differ according to peoples or classes. Racism reaches both victims and oppressors, though in a reverse way. Environment deterioration and the risks of nuclear pollution affect all. Marx (1969: 105) spoke of the “universal human emancipation” as a condition to recognise all people as belonging to a universal community. In other words interstate and transnational relations, in a broad sense, have always existed in as much as there were relations among human beings, even in case of wars, closed borders, or mere reciprocal unacquaintance.

Along the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a states system gains shape, gradually establishing, armed or peaceful, coexistence rules. We have discussed above the reasons to and the concrete forms that system has taken. The principle of an interstate system or of a society of states came up along with the idea of an association of politically independent communities, when it became clear that such association was suitable for Europe, concerning both relations among states and relations with states alien to the system. This system was internally linked by diplomacy, by balance — however unstable or scarcely maintained — and also by a body of internationally validated laws.

The idea of sovereign state introduces another concept, still valid at present, that of the formal equality of sovereign states. Some authors, mainly constructivists, have in the 1990s dealt with the reasons for states having internalised the sovereignty value: “intersubjective understandings embodied in the institution of sovereignty (...) may redefine the meaning of others’ power for the security of the self” (Wendt 1992: 415). In other words, this became valid for all in as much as it was taken as a gauge of other states’ dependability.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, states equality had other explanations issued from natural law, based on a comparison to the equality among people living in a state of nature. The argument was valid both for those who accepted the prevalence of a former situation of all-against-all war and for those who claimed a former brotherhood situation. For those who put forward the droit des gens, the basic concept concerns equality of power, regardless of its dimension.

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630 At the time the Soviet Union cherished the principle of socialism in a sole country, Trotsky (1964: 6) insisted that “the regimes’ strength and stability is ultimately defined by the labor relative productivity”, thus recognizing the impossibility of isolation and the porosity of values in the framework of the discussion on the idea that productivity can not be considered in a isolated way.

631 Conversely, a state that overlooks another weak state’s sovereignty is likely to do the same to other, even stronger ones, when it has the means to do so.
The idea of formal equality of sovereign states is meaningful for the definition of the interstate system, reinforcing its feature as a practical, rather than a shared-goals, association. The interstate system is viewed as requiring minimal coexistence rules, though without common goals. In post-Cold War, recognition of sovereignty still prevails, but part of the debate turns around the understanding of how far state sovereignty is impaired by the relatively new but growing phenomenon of globalization. The latter, and following some authors also the weakening of sovereignty, would have definitely been encouraged by the end of the East-West conflict. Although this is true as a photograph of reality, it does not explain the structural and historical phenomena that led to weakening the idea of sovereignty — which, issued from Westphalia, from natural law, is the basic assumption of the very idea of interstate system, consolidated in the nineteenth (at least concerning the Western world) and the twentieth century. This system, at the root of the League of Nations and of the United Nations, has seen the expansion of sovereignty and of formal equality among all peoples.

Going back in time, Westphalia has helped create an European *modus vivendi*, a situation of relative balance. It is a situation where states, unable to impose on others, by force or other means, everything they wanted, have no choice but to accept the *modus vivendi* or *status quo*. In the second half of the seventeenth century, independent states began to gain autonomy and to decide on their own foreign policy, able to sign treaties and to wage wars. In this period it may be said that formerly prevailing religious references, and above all religious legitimacies, ceased to exist. Politics as an explicit issue of lay power became dominant. At the same time grew a certain idea of general interests of states that was certainly based on the same concept that supported the political and juridical construction of the modern state, the idea of *volonté générale* (Rousseau 1978). At states’ home policy level this was a necessary idea to give theoretical support to whatever interpretation of social contract or pact: a contract or pact would only have meaning if a minimum consensus on life in society could be reached, agreed upon by all.

The idea of *volonté générale* applied to international relations brings forth many consequences: the interstate system gains the notion that issues of specific interest for some but no all countries may have outcomes that affect all. It must be noticed that the *volonté générale* does not necessarily clash with that of the state of anarchy. In fact, both have coexisted during three and a half centuries (1648-1990), as will be seen below, when dealing with the refinement of the idea of *volonté générale* in post-Cold War times. In the beginning of the twenty-first century a subject will remain at the core of the debate: that of the clash between general will, that accepts the principle of order, and states’ individual will, that rejects hierarchy but re-introduces it, by not accepting constraints to its own sovereignty. The analysis of this confrontation may contribute to the answer on whether we remain in an interstate system of see the dawn of an international society.

The idea of a states system was first put forward by Pufendorf (1934) in 1675, having in mind those who still formally took part in the Holy Roman Empire, but later expanded to reach Europe as a whole. Beforehand, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, those who wrote about the right of folks (*jus gentium*) still had in mind a universal society made up of individuals; prior to Westphalia, then, law had not as its subject the state in relation to other states. Authors like Vitoria, Suarez, Grotius, Gentili, Wolff, Leibniz mention the *jus gentium*, which acquires the connotation of law of nations. Within the borders of natural law, sovereigns in their mutual relations are led to abide by the previously established rules (Grotius 1925). Especially for Grotius, the issue is the fulfilment of agreements between states in as much as they have, or tend to, a universal character; agreements of a private nature, even if made between modern states like Portugal and Spain, should be reviewed for their legitimacy is based on the Roman Church power and did not apply to all civilised states.

Relations among states only acquired a conceptual formulation several decades later when, in the eighteenth century, they gained a political connotation. Assumptions on the interstate system were settled in 1648, but its systematic formulations were brought in by the Enlightenment.

According to Nardin (1987: 70), “we must turn to the eighteenth century writings, if we are to find evidence on the onset of a clear and consistent conception of the society of states”. In fact, reading through the Enlightenment authors shows how the interstate system was gradually formed. For Montesquieu, war is a state’s defence tool, to be resorted to in order to avoid the risk of destruction; hence smaller states have a stronger right to wage war, for they are more often likely to fear being destroyed: “the right to war thus stems from the need and from the exact and the fair” (Montesquieu 1973: 143). Non-political principles, linked to the prince figure and very important prior to the
affirmation of the states, were thus rejected for not being legitimate arguments. With the Enlightenment, glory, convenience, or utility became meaningless in international relations.

In the relations between states, even in the case of war, civilisation laws must be obeyed: “the law of nature, following which all must tend to the conservation of the species; the law of natural knowledge, which tells us to do to others what we want them do to us; the law that forms the political societies, whose order is such that nature has limited their duration; and, finally the law deriving from the thing itself” (Montesquieu 1973: 144). During Enlightenment, convictions rose in Europe on that prisoners should not been made slaves, or that ambassadors should be respected. To Voltaire, the eighteenth century has seen the rise of the principle that it is the nations’ interest to maintain the balance of power among them — a principle that, as known, is particularly cherished by both historicist and systemic realists.

The idea of balance of power, a key one for the later (1815) Concert of Europe, implies similarities and differences. Not only the principle of sovereignty within the state is sought for, but that of balanced relations, even if involving different socio-political situations. The interstate system gains a meaning of its own; in a strict sense, it refers to relations between states rather than between governors. This implies the recognition of interfaces, of interdependence elements, of differences. In his criticism of the French Revolution, Burke (1982:109) is quite explicit: “However unwilling to, we are forced to get interested in French business, if only concerning our keeping away from its panacea and its plague”. The idea of practical association into the interstate system implies the acceptance of common rules, which were consolidated during the eighteenth century and the restless 1789-1815 years.

In the present pursuit of an answer to the question whether the states system as it was constituted from the second half of the seventeenth century is effectively in crisis, on the verge of being overridden in the beginning of the twenty-first century, we must examine the evolution of a core concept in international relations during the two centuries that preceded the French Revolution: the right of folks.

On his 1758 Droit des Gens, Vattel (1916) translates into juridical language what had been formulated by the Enlightenment. The law of nations, the new form of the droit des gens turned to universal values, typical of the Enlightenment, suggests a society that may include all. Universality now concerns states, and individuals are included only in as much as they are subordinate to these states: this is a basic characteristic of international relations that remains valid to date.

In order to discuss globalization, we must discuss the idea of association of goals. It is not a matter of looking for goals shared by all states, for historical experience shows that a community of interests has never existed; what can be sought for is common rules, the basis for coexistence. Both in Marx’s and in Weber’s formulation, the state has the monopoly of legitimate use of force, hence would seemingly be permanently concerned with its own power. The debate on the role of individuals and of social organisations in international relations, as suggested by globalization, may lead to renewing the discussion on the association of goals in a less instrumental form.

The state has always had to coexist with issues stemming from practical association. Hence the issue of balance, basic to the states system. Before dealing with the balance of power though, predominant in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we must take into account the stage of transition from predominance of natural law to that of explicit political relations stricto sensu.

Through the three last decades of the eighteenth century, both before and during the French Revolution there has been increasing doctrinal thought and debate on how relations between states are established. The law of nations connotes the study of treaties, declarations, diplomatic means, of the very power relations and balance among European states. The idea of international law as positive law, based on usage and habits, brought about by Moser (1959) and Martens (1829), marks the beginning of the decline of natural law as the source of state relations. Still during Napoleon, the idea of the law of nations clearly also implies the existence of a set of (European) states relating to one another, even though submitted to different laws. In other words, the concept of law of nations implies great diversity and different ways of coexistence; any state with a sovereign was believed to take part in the states system.

632 This, for some authors, who think international relations only as relations between states, means the end of the interstate system.
Once an international society nearly formally recognised, the issue of its governability becomes practically crucial. In the nineteenth century it was first systematised by means of the Holy Alliance, then by the Concert of Europe. Those were highly effective formats, as widely known, having assured a relative governability of international relations through a hundred years (from 1815 to 1914). According to systemic thinking, it has proved stable even when the values that supported it showed signs of exhaustion.

During the nineteenth century a concept gains relevance, that would remain important to date and must be taken into account when discussing a possible switch from the practical to the shared-goals association: the concept of civilisation. For some, it may be translated into the idea of globalization, in as much as the latter would coincide with civilisatory values taken as universal. An issue may thus be anticipated: the ability to seize the concept of civilisation implies strengthening one’s own values and has as a possible corollary the very ability to make them become universal.

The Concert Of Europe

The Concert of Europe coincides, according to Bull’s analysis (1995), with the evolution of the diplomatic system, which has become the core institution of international society. The Vienna Congress regularised this system and brought it into conformity with the doctrine of equality of sovereign states. From then on, “the preservation of a balance of power was elevated to the status of an objective consciously pursued by international society as a whole” (Bull 1995: 35). It must be noticed that the international society as referred by Bull is different from that of Aron’s definition, being closer to what the latter calls interstate system.

Napoleon and post-Napoleon times have seen the decline of natural law theories in the field of international relations; references to universalism and solidarism, inherited from medieval times, were suppressed in an apparently definitive way. The idea that such relations had characteristics of an anarchic society grew in importance. This is how Bull (1995:34) sees this evolution: “The term ‘law of nations’, droit des gens, Volkerrecht not only drove out the term ‘law of nature’, with which it had previously always been coupled; it came quite clearly to mean not law common to all nations, but law between nations. The transition was completed when the term ‘law of nations’ itself gave way to ‘international law’, the term coined by Bentham in 1789, in his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation”.

Though at the symbolic level, utilitarian values were highly emphasised in order to interpret and regulate relations between states. This evolution has not made impossible the coexistence among “civilised” nations. Following Bull, it may be said that anarchy has never prevailed undisputed, in spite of opposing views by some systemics (Waltz 1987).

Within interstate relations, co-operative forms have neatly accumulated during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. International law gained space and gradually the form of a set of rules, a doctrine clearly apart from philosophy or theology, eventually turning into “public international law”, while in international co-operation the central element became the diplomatic system, where in the states play a leading role. Co-operation and the possibility of coexistence among states required a balance of power, which became the focus of attention by all those involved in the relations among states, both in peace and wartime. The Concert of Europe issued from Waterloo clearly derives from this. And, though the concept of equality of sovereign states was maintained, relations among them were hierarchised, hence the expression “great power”.

Hierarchy and anarchy: an international relations paradigm, mainly after the second World War, is that they are based in one or the other of these fundamental principles. One or the other is implied in the concepts of interstate system and international society. This idea has been refinedly developed by several authors. As mentioned above, the radical separation between hierarchy and anarchy is not suitable to explain the concrete forms whereby international relations took place, even if it was useful for an important bias of realist theories. States can not be seen as homogenous actors. Their foreign actions are closely linked to their societies’ interests, at least to those of their dominant political and economic classes or groups; they refer to their domestic dynamics, even when the idea of systemic competition is accepted, that is, the idea that states’ foreign policy is also determined by phenomena of interstate competition stricto sensu.
A debate has developed since Westphalia, then, trying to explain how the international system albeit anarchic (where each nation is in position of resort to war against the other) could combine this characteristic with norms or rules that eventually led to consolidating public international law. Within an interstate system, rules, norms, institutions and procedures can be created that allow for what Aron calls a state of civilised war.\footnote{However, this format has not been historically inclusive, having not assembled all, but only civilized peoples. Externally, in concentric circles, there were the barbarians, the savages. Granted a definite context, the doctrine on sovereignty is one of the most solid bases for states’ security, but its applicability depends on peoples’ eligibility to civility. Ever since the Vienna Congress, it must be noticed that practically all existing or emerging states remained autonomous entities, reflecting how this doctrine is deepseated and has been assimilated by all.}

The Concert of Europe fits perfectly the case of a practical association (as opposed to a shared-goals one), having allowed for a hundred-year peace among the great states. The wars taking place in the period (Crimea 1856, Franco-Prussian 1870, and Hispano-American, 1898), even when involving great powers, have all been limited to a certain territory and certain specific, though relevant, goals. From the strict point of view of the international relations, the Concert of Europe is an example of how rules, agreements, institutions may well operate to assure states coexistence and meet the goals in as much as the relative order and stability they allow for serve the very interstate system’s perpetuation.

In the view taken here, a practical association may come up either from a hegemonic state, by the will of a polyarchy, or through voluntary agreement among various countries. Following the theory of international regimes, any of these situations can result in regimes. It may thus be said that the mere existence of shared rules, procedures, and values does not mean that the interstate system or the practical association has been overcome. Recalling Rousseau’s words, a community of values is not sufficient to characterise a shared-goals association, for the latter would require, besides the end of hierarchy, a sovereignty and legitimate laws decided by all and which all would abide by. This idea, certainly associated to that of change in international relations, might lead to accepting another idea, that the post-Cold War world would be turning a page, in the sense of overcoming the Westphalia system.

According to the various theories, the international system governability supposes authority and legitimacy. We can find presuppositions to this statement both in Machiavel and in Marx. Those who defend the realist idea that a durable peace requires order and hierarchy emphasise the role of the state. When discussing the market interdependence, Gilpin (1987:24) stresses the role of “international politics and in particular (...) the presence or absence of political leadership”. The theory of hegemonic stability attempts to demonstrate that, without an ultimate accountability instance, no international stability is possible, for the system’s anarchic logic would eventually prevail (Kindleberger, 1984). Holsti (1992) explains that some of the Concert of Europe basic principles have so long prevailed as a result of the balance of power, but also because agreement was reached concerning shared principles, rules, and values (which, it may be recalled, has little to do with the idea of shared-goals association).

During the nineteenth century European power distribution was polycentric. It is true that victory over Napoleon and the industrial revolution had turned Great Britain into a dominant naval and commercial power, owner of a vast colonial empire. But from the point of view of the strategic balance among the most important countries at that time, Russia was emerging as the biggest military power, shadowing western Europe through the century. At the properly political level, France and Austria have had leading roles. The Holy Alliance (and the previous Chatillon and Chaumont agreements in 1814) had established among the four allies the goal of achieving peace over the whole continent. The risk of a new French threat was avoided by installing an European peace.\footnote{After Bonaparte’s first capitulation in June, 1814, at the first Peace of Paris a secret article read that the new relations would give way to “a real and permanent balance of power in Europe (...) [in consonance] to the principles determined by the Allied Powers amongst themselves” (Webster 1934 apud Holsti 1992:36).}

International agreements, sharing hegemonic values, coincidence of interests, no matter how important, no matter how long they may prove to last, are not enough to create the necessary homogeneity for establishing an international society in Aron’s terms, or a fate community. In this sense it is worth
citing Holsti’s (1992: 36) reasons for the Concert of Europe. “The governors created the system on (1) an ideational consensus – a desire to avoid a replay of the Napoleonic drama, hegemony, and pan-European war; (2) a previous pattern of collaboration that had developed during the coalition wars against Napoleon; and (3) agreement that institutions, if not organisations, were necessary to carry out the tasks of governance”.

The Contemporary International System

In this section we intend to discuss contemporary changes in the international system that took place in the last decades of the twentieth century which will certainly go on in the twenty-first century.

As seen in the analysis of the European Concert, international hegemonic values have an increasing role in the system configuration. Institutionalisation of new values would derive from changes in the configuration of the international system tending to a unipolar form, though keeping significant traits of multipolarism. The values that once supported the bipolar balance (defence of western civilisation or anti-imperialist activism) do not adjust to the new configuration, which now depends on several pillars such as economic liberalism, human rights, environment protection, social rights and, equally important but under new forms, the military-strategical one.

The states’ formal voluntary acceptance of most new values is an attempt to make possible their insertion into the international system. In addition, they also derive from the pressure exerted by the so-called new actors. The emergence of the international regime of human rights, or the stronger emphasis on economic-financial regimes that are liberal and competitive, result from contemporary hegemonic values introduced and accepted as intrinsically universal and serving the common well-being. The success of new values draws from their positive connotation as moral assets that would correspond to historical human aspirations, but also from an increasing international activism by institutions or groups that explicitly foster them: NGOs (non-government organisations), multinational enterprises, international offices, epistemic communities, and so on. In most cases, these institutions or groups have quite different connotations, each searching to achieve goals of their own. Regimes result most often from a combination of private interests (even when drawn from universal premises) changed into public interests through some or many states’ actions. In some circumstances, those institutions or groups may serve as one or more states’ tools for the acceptance or institutionalisation of the new hegemonic values. A classical issue that gains new connotations is that of how each state and the corresponding population deal with the possibility of superimposing those universal values to their own.

Most of the changes in the international system configuration at the end of the twentieth century, particularly in the nineties, are relevant factors for the understanding of new issues. It is worth inquiring on how such changes took place through the twentieth century as well as on possible coming scenarios. The present scenery results from development processes of the modern international system. Ever since Westphalia the states have been reaffirming their national sovereignty. As this idea ripened, international security — especially the protection of the own sovereignty — has ceased to depend solely on each state’s individual capacities, all the more so with the rise of nuclear weapons, whose role in weakening each state’s security has not yet been fully appraised.

During Cold War times the basically bipolar system valued military balance and the spheres of influence reached by each of the two blocs. In general, strategies were aimed at consolidating the blocs, and if possible broadening them, which included checking the opponent bloc’s expansion even at the cost of one’s own. The late 1980s economic and political crisis that led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its bloc, the end of the arms race (at least in the terms it had hitherto been thought of) and its direct military consequences have shaken the bipolar system, hence in principle opening the possibility of unipolarism headed by the US — the only power having world-wide strategic capacity to do so.

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635 It is worth recalling that the trend to unipolarism does not necessarily mean that a sole power prevails, as it happened in other historical periods before Westphalia, such as Rome, the Holy Roman Empire, Charles V.

636 Which all authors agree upon placing between 1946 and 1989.
Unipolarism was however immediately mitigated, remaining a theoretical possibility, due to new facts ripened in the previous period. Conflict cycles have turned up in those countries where contradictions and antagonisms had been muffled by the Cold War logic determinations, such as the former Yugoslavia and Chechnya. Furthermore, regional, international or internal conflicts, some having emerged still during the Cold War, could not be adequately and promptly managed either by the international community or the US, in spite of the new context where East-West tensions seemed to have ended: such were the cases of Israel and Palestine, of Iraq, Somalia, India and Pakistan, Burundi, Angola etc.

Another reason for unipolarism fading is the densening of economic blocs, especially the European Union’s. Much frailer economic blocs searching for space seem to consolidate, like Mercosur. Also, some countries’ economic importance, like China’s, has significantly grown, even if the 1990’s Japanese crisis suggests the need to cautiously assess this trend’s ability to sustain itself in the long run.

These political, economic, and military factors have all contributed to the perception that a single state had no sufficient authority or power to determine the set of rules for international coexistence. The debate on the configuration of the international system is thus still open, both in military terms and from the more general point of view of international order. The twenty-first century begins with no definite answers though, according to some authors, there is evidence to support that this order is multipolar, though less balanced than the nineteenth-century European Concert.

Contrary to major neorealist authors’ views, like Waltz’s (1987), the organisation of the international system is dynamic, changing both structurally and systemically. But changes are not always the result of what neorealists call foundation moment. They believe changes are brought in basically by wars, considered the starting point for a new system configuration; only wars might transform the system: “Through modern history, only the Second World War has played such a role” (Waltz 1987: 362).

For other authors, there are different ways by which the world system is structured and changes. According to Waters (1996:23), there would be three main forms:

“World-empires, in which a multiplicity of cultures are unified under the domination of a single government; there have been many instances of world-empires (e.g. ancient Egypt, ancient Rome, ancient China, Moghul India, feudal Russia, Ottoman Turkey). World-economies, in which a multiplicity of political states, each typically focusing on a single culture (“nation states”), are integrated by a common economic system; there has been only one stable instance of a world-economy, the modern world system, integrated by a single capitalist economy. World-socialism, in which both the nation state and capitalism disappear in favor of a single, unified political-economic system which integrates a multiplicity of cultures; there is no instance of world-socialism and it remains construct.

Following this conception, international relations are dynamic and can change both structurally and systemically by means of processes linked to deep forces of mankind’s history, regardless of the relational structures, to which neorealists assign a conditional role.

In our days, at the juridical and, particularly, at the political level, the international system still draws mainly on the figure of the state, at least concerning the formal locus of legitimate power (Weber 1977). This sustains the trend to search for hegemonic countries and/or for power balance, and hinders the recognition of a relatively new fact, namely, that hegemony may not necessarily be exerted by one or more countries, but through other variables, like a key idea or a dominant value. From the 1980s some authors have partially associated this to the concept of international regime (Krasner 1986). The acceptance of there being new important variables in the international system configuration allows for perceiving the reasons for a minimal identification between relevant, both state and non-state, actors. It may be said that, in some cases, the key idea or dominant value grants stability to the international system, this being one of the main basis supporting the world-economy (in Waters’s terms). For instance, the apparently universal acceptance of economic liberalism is a dominant value with international configuration status; the idea that the world should be organised around the environmental issue can also have a structuring role in international relations. Anticipating possible criticism, we shall examine how, within a situation where the state prevails both juridically and politically, the place where key ideas or dominant values lie may precisely be the very state.

637 To Waters’s three forms we believe should be added the possibility of hybrid or transitional systems.
When discussing contemporary reasons for the reconfiguration of the international system, Martins (1998) points out to the fact that nuclear weapons had a paradoxical role. Issuing from scientific development applied to military technology, they assured the US in 1945, and the USSR in 1949, first a strategical supremacy and afterwards the power balance. It is obvious that in order to meet such goals the actual use of the bombs was eventually a concrete possibility. Martins underlines the fact that the new technology, contrary to what such possibility might suggest, ended up by introducing a qualitative rather than quantitative change in international relations, in as much as power conflicts could no longer be solved by military means. Whereas in principle there remained a possibility of conflict, the change consists in that scientific knowledge allowed foreseeing that a nuclear war would be fatal for the whole of mankind, let alone the powers in conflict. “It ensues that to have a higher military capacity as a requirement for a hegemonic or power standing played no longer the same role as before” (Martins 1998: 5), at least if we think in global terms. Hence power was tendentially dissociated from its military origin.

This reasoning also explains the increasing importance assigned to economics in international relations, a subject widely dealt with by several authors since the 1980s (Rosecrance 1986; Keohane 1986). However, this analysis may also lead to overestimating the economic field. The view taken here is that all fields are closely linked, even though their interrelations may lead to specific trends in certain circumstances. That is, one or other factor may outstand in fostering a given state's international role, even if it is not powerful in other aspects. In other words, there can be situations where each field — political, military, economic, cultural, or other — present different developments, follow different paths, each separately appearing as specifically relevant (Huntington 1994). A frequently cited example is the apparent anomaly of countries like Japan or Germany having great economic strength, but limited political and military power. Cuba might be another example, for its ideological and cultural influence, starting from the Castro revolution in 1959, has through decades been greater than its economic and politico-military relevance.

In a world where production is increasingly organised without fixed territorial basis, where economic exchanges are increasingly based on symbols or trade marks, so-called global values seem to prevail. According to Waters (1996:9), “material exchanges localize; political exchanges internationalize; and symbolic exchanges globalize”. The trend to globalization certainly originates in economy's growing importance within international organisation, but such organisation is defined over power fields that are not only economic in a narrow sense.

So far the discussion can take us to state that the international system configuration is not scientifically and definitely established. The idea of configuration is changing and draws on the very international system dynamic, which in turn is constantly changing, adapting itself to new situations, creating new hopes. Keohane (1986), even agreeing upon some points of Waltz's (1987) systemic theory — itself a remote heir to Carr (1981) and Morgenthau (1985) — criticises as inconsistent Waltz's theory on the balance of power (especially when applied in a structuralist way) as well as the concept's ambiguity, for neither theory or concept offer explanation for the system changes. Especially, he points out that actors' domestic attributes are taken as presuppositions, not as variables. Changes in the actors' behaviour and the ensuing changes in the international system configuration would thus be explained by drawing on the very change in system attributes, not on the variations in actors features, which leads to a vicious circle.

One conclusion so far is that adherence to a given theory or concept powerfully influences the determination of the configuration. This may be better understood if we consider Holsti’s (1992) view on polyarchy in the nineteenth century, from the Vienna Congress to the First World War: he opposes this concept by relying on the idea that through most — and certainly during the second half — of that period the pax britannica would have prevailed. The same could apply to the years between the two world wars: would the period configuration have been multipolar, bipolar, a polyarchy, or a power concert?

International society, according to Bull (1995), stems from states being persuaded that there are some shared values and interests. Defence of international law would be the basis for the society of states, where these would act according to its laws. From a pluralist point of view, states can agree upon some basic assumptions, among which those of national sovereignty and the non-intervention rule; order can be achieved even in a context where prevailing societies differ concerning various values. According to Linklater (1992), states may agree upon the need to order regardless of their views on justice. One of
the great difficulties with defining the international system in the present turn of the century (Lafer & Fonseca Jr 1994) may be the current, yet not consolidated, trend to changes in some of those basic assumptions, as shown by contemporary debate on the two central ones, national sovereignty and non-intervention (Archibugi, Held, & Kohler 1998), while precisely a universal view on justice seems to be coming up. The implicit risks are closely linked to the ways by which this view is being defined. In order for the powers to secure order, they should orderly establish their own relations by drawing on common principles, and by using the power difference to strengthen, not to weaken, the international system. The basic condition for the system strengthening is the existence of consolidated consensus, rather than consensus drawn on the assumption of hegemony. Only this might create conditions for an international society or even for a shared-goals association (Nardin 1987).

The available elements do not allow for discerning a single international system, all the more since its interacting dynamic shows a system in constant mutation. Nevertheless, its general lines can be inferred from the theory of international relations. The system configuration — unipolar, bipolar, multipolar or other — depends on the theoretical references used, as shown by Holsti (1992) in his analysis of the European Concert.

Globalization Within The System Configuration

The previous discussion shows the difficulties to define a single international system configuration. Still according to the analysis by Lafer and Fonseca Jr (1994), both centripetal and centrifugal forces act upon the system, each contributing in its own way to the phenomenon called globalization, beginning in the late 1980s.

Centrifugal forces would account for the fragmentation movements. Classifying which movements fit this definition is a complex task. Here could be included those who lead to regional markets like FTAA, NAFTA, Mercosur or even the European Union. Again, that depends on the approach taken, for these same movements might be considered stages previous to globalization. Another example is the NATO, of regional (limited number of member states), atlantic origin (in 1949): some of its members’ actions, especially the US’s, point to its turning into an international security agency (Malvinas/Falkland Islands, Irak, Yugoslavia). A further example would be the reappearance of subnational, provincial, cultural regionalisms within the European Union, like those in Scotland, Lombardia, Catalonia, among others, which may be interpreted — and in fact is interpreted by several authors — within the framework of movements towards the creation of a supranational state: the very security ensuing the insertion in such a state would give legitimacy to particularisms kept down for decades or centuries. It’s thus difficult to identify each movement’s direction.

Centripetal forces are those tending to bear universal value, with an intrinsic, positive connotation that is supposed to be the world’s interest. Deep-rooted in mankind history from the beginning of civilisation, they reflect human trends to association, to exchange. History itself would have a constant movement towards broadening spaces. The constitution of organisations like the World Trade Organisation, who self-assign the role of institutionalising this trend, would only be a recent outcome of a long-lasting process.

The discussion on practical and shared-goals associations has been dealt with through this same institutionalisation perspective. The European Concert, the League of Nations, the United Nations format, all reflect the recognition that international security must result from agreement between powers, or more generically between states. An interpretation of centripetal forces suggests that themes like security may be considered subject to international consolidated regimes, hence with the possibility of being automatically or self-applied. In the view taken here, the basic question of which agents have the legitimate power to implement the established rules remains unanswered.

The centripetal forces are linked to normative aspects that would make up the states’ collective will to turn global society into effect. They allow for the existence of any of the two predominant trends in international system configuration, the unipolar and the bipolar one. It must be remarked, however, that if unipolarism were to prevail, it would be especially easy for rules and values considered universal

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638 When reviewing Tucídide’s theory on wars, Gilpin (1987) points out that unbalance follows balance, that is, powers rise only to decline and be replaced by other powers.
to be imposed upon all mankind. An example of this is the ways by which international agenda has been defined: in most cases, it is recognised as long as it results from proposals by, or at least gain support from, the United States. Nevertheless, prevailing universal, consensual values may be also be achieved in a framework of a broadened multipolar system. The recent growing debate on the cosmopolitan public sphere (Kohler 1998) goes in the same direction.

Centrifugal forces in turn are linked to reality-related values. States’ joining in groups or blocs would be linked by a feeling of insecurity as to the future of international relations and to the globalization process. For every state, the prospect that cost-benefit relation be unfavourable opens the field for centrifugal actions that may take several forms.

The fact must be underlined that centripetal or centrifugal forces predominance, in itself, does not point to a certain kind of configuration, be it uni- or bipolar. By operating simultaneously at current times, the two kinds of forces enlarge the field of uncertainty. In present historical stage, in spite of the asymmetry caused by the US exceeding power, there have been situations in which international regimes obliging all states achieved results that in the long run may favour universal rules, procedures, and values. Such would be the case of European Union-backed WTO attitude of rejecting North American Helms-Burton Law, or the Rome 1998 Conference favouring the creation of an International Penal Court for crimes against mankind.

The international system present transitional situation may account for changes that touch every intervening state. According to Martins (1998), this implies considering three basic conditions: (1) the nature of world power geometry; (2) the economic internationalisation; and (3) the ability of local ruling elites to define strategic directives for international insertion. Each state’s ability to manage these conditions would determine its relative position and, also, the possibility of changing its relative position. Such possibilities though do not imply changes in the system configuration itself, which is a long-run objective of all states. If the deep history trend follows the path of value universalisation, by which every culture internalises such values, then the problem of international security will be of interest not only to all states, but to all of mankind.

At present post-Cold War times, international security issues refer especially to the system configuration, which has to do with the general aspirations for a model of international order — which, in turn, has to do not only with power, but also with the very world view. As some states seem to wish it, to take part in security maintenance may contribute to change their relative position (in terms of status, access to concert, legitimacy to take part in military operations)639. In order to achieve international order, or to lay down the assumptions for a cosmopolitan order, or even for world citizenship (Thompson 1998), it is imperative to deal with simultaneously with the issues of order and justice640 is needed. This would also strengthen the so far utopic prospect of an international society.

The post-Cold War international system has a multiple and paradoxical nature. It is more impermeable, since in this historical period the predominant system is hegemonic. Costs of non-insertion are high, as can be seen in the cases of Iraq, Iran, Yugoslavia or Cuba. There are apparently no feasible alternative models for the states. The idea of consensus has gained strength as relevant in international relations; such rule has generalised within institutions created after 1989, such as the WTO. While adherence by all countries becomes necessary for the institutions’ operation, great powers, especially the US, keep the prerogative of formulating the agenda and making decisions.

The world power geometry would also seem more impermeable due to the prevalence of certain paradigms. Thus, when considering the deep trends that result from the current technological revolution, we may be led to think that, apart from the issue of the relations between the states, hegemonic paradigms tend to necessarily reproduce power concentration.

While recognising the obstacles, complexity, and scarcity of opportunities for weak states (poor nations), we come upon another kind of displacements, some of which already existed, that now reach a new dimension and suggest an increasing permeability, hence the return of the non-hegemonic universalist perspective. These displacements suggest new opportunities. The understanding of these opportunities

639 This does not seem to be the case of Brazil, at least in the long run.

640 Order and justice or, in the particular case of Brazilian diplomatic language, order and development (Lafer 1998); concepts are related but not identical.
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is difficult since, oddly enough, they aren’t but the very result of the capacity of establishing a hegemony, even though they may, at the same time, acquire favourable connotations for poor states. These values refer to issues such as environment protection, or human and social rights. Even though this may seem contradictory, these values can favour both multipolarism and unipolarism. It is here important to underline Martins’s (1998) useful statement concerning the role of local ruling elites. There are many examples. The United States, for one, has repeatedly emphasised the need to democratise international decisions, making them more transparent and open to public opinion pressure. It counts on its own power of influence and wishes to use the weight of its own public opinion. The idea also corresponds, however, to long-time demands put forward by weak states and socially unfavoured sectors, such as the trade union movement. The great wave of international criticism to social inequity has its origins in the competitive goals of developed countries, but it may become an interesting negotiation tool for poor countries. The same analytical perspective can be applied to international security patterns. Using Kindleberger’s (1989) concept of “lender of last resort” in case of international safeguard, the United States is undoubtedly the only great power with this role. But the complexity of this scope — as one can learn from unsuccessful experiences such as the Somali or anti-terrorism reprisal actions — points to the need of a convergence by the majority of the states involved. It becomes thus understandable that both new and traditional themes, such as international trade, economy or even security, may be approached in ways to favour both unipolar and multipolar configurations.

The prevailing option on one or the other depends on the theoretical referential at stake, as well as societies and states’ ability to seize the adequate values to universalisation, hence to make more permeable the world power configuration. A multipolar situation would come out as the result of the role played by both states and societies. The idea of world citizenship may represent to mankind the path to more democratic political structures as well as the fruition of material and symbolic assets, now achievable through modern means, but it may also represent nothing but the illusion of this possibility, which would in fact remain in the hands of those states that already have a surplus of power. Those values may, nevertheless, favour a unipolar pattern, since they result from the hegemonic will of the societies represented by the system’s strong states. The issue of international security will be of major relevance, as it will prove whether or not the defence of values that justify peace maintenance — both morally and politically, and in different levels — will turn out to result from either unipolarism or multipolarism.

**Trends And Broadening Of The Concept Of Security**

The transitional feature of the international system is also modelled by the interpretation given to the deep forces in action. The end of the Cold War did not bring in itself a decrease of local conflicts, but it certainly stripped them off the global and systemic features that typified them until 1989, when whatever movement had a potential international echo, necessarily coming across the East-West conflict. It increased the available space for a tissue of economic relations to develop, including all states, from what might be inferred a decrease of the predominance of strategic military values and a boost of the importance of themes related to economy. However, this is not so: ten years after the collapse of the political system polarised by the Soviet Union, the international situation shows that strategic military power goes on as important as ever, and that to it, and on the same level, are added other elements of power — economic, cultural, civic, ecological, and social. This aggregating process would become a deep force, capable of modelling reality. One may, therefore, reappraise the concept of security including the trend to aggregate values other than the military. Needless to say, this is not actually new: in the mid-nineteenth century, the steel industry and the pile stock of coal and iron were symbols of power; before that, since Westphalia, territorial extension and demographic weight were thought to be the needing demands for the strengthening of king and country. The same can be said regarding the possession of gold. However, in the present turn of the century, the aggregation of other values gains new meaning.

Some of the liberal scholars do not hesitate to point out fundamental changes in international relations as a result of deep forces which would turn upside down the ideas of prevailing high politics, strategy, power, or diplomacy. “Trading states are beginning to emerge once again in world politics, and the erstwhile low politics of trade and growth is becoming high politics once again” (Rosecrance 1986: 227). According to this approach, if it were possible to, starting from the study of the deep forces in effect in
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Contemporary world, define which technology, which movements of capital and competitiveness would be the sole motors of the coming decades international configuration, then the thesis on the decline of strategic and military predominance and the secondary role of international security would become acceptable.

There are, however, no empirical or theoretical elements to allow for anticipations. On the empirical level, one can follow the debate on global economy. As discussions flow, at WTO level for example, concerning a new round of negotiations (the millennium round) to advance the issue of globalization, questions such as global rules concerning the flow of capitals or bonds for new investments face enormous difficulties to advance. As the debate for global economy carries on, the issues of creating or strengthening economic blocs remain a relevant theme for most states.

Likewise, the issue of international security is put forward, but not solved. While values issued from the Enlightenment seem to be redeemed, a minimum respect for elementary convivial rules seem to have difficulty to materialise. One could imagine these to be remains of the past, but this would definitely not be the case, as solid international regimes depend upon wide agreements and these do not seem to be made. One cannot even take for granted the existence of an international agreement on variable geometry, with a trend to enlarge its poles, pointed by Fonseca Jr (1998:34) as the kind of scenery that would favour a country like Brazil. Thus the complexity and diversity in defining security.

In Brazil, from the days of Araújo Castro (1982) and even well before that, we know that international security cannot be a synonym for power freezing or for status quo. Facing so many distinctions, a concrete risk exists: the definition, and, furthermore, the application of its consequences, may well be thrown into the responsibility of whoever detains more effective power and, therefore, will apply his own values to whatever situations come forward. On the other hand, from the wide gaps of these difficulties pop up free riders — nuclear experiments in India and Pakistan (Fonseca Jr 1998) — who underline the risks of the unforeseen, in view of the losses suffered by those who did not take this way. Fonseca Junior’s (1998:34) concepts of “preference of diplomacy and law” and “autonomy by participation” need, in order to favour the position of countries like Brazil, higher levels of homogeneity concerning security questions in international regimes.

Cox (1986: 247-8) insists that those who think current trends will inevitably lead to continuity are mislead:

“There are two opposed concepts of history, each of which is intellectually grounded in the separation of subject and object. One is a methodological separation wherein events are conceived as an infinite series of objectified data. This approach seeks universal laws of behavior. Structuralist realism, as noted, is one of its manifestations. The other sees the subjectivity of historical action as determined by an objectified historical process It seeks to discover the ‘laws of motion’ of history (...) Both of these concepts of history (...) remove the element of uncertainty inherent in the historicist expectation of dialectical development arising out of the contradictions of existing forces — a conception in which (...) subject and object are united.”

Wallerstein (1994), from a similar position, asserts that the world-economy brings as a result the emergence of new forces, which rise the level of uncertainty.

The international system may be said to be more dispersed than at Cold War times, when deep breaches separated the two dominant ideologies, the liberal and the communist ones. Current times are a privileged moment for the interference of new actors, who might act following non-national interests. This is a relevant theme for analysis for, if confirmed, the Westphalian assumption would lose meaning, as states would no longer be the sole legitimate actors in the international scenery – such as defined by Aron (1984), who then considered it utopic.

In such scenery, there are more actors playing an international role, and new interests are tentatively affirmed. According to some authors, these actors could become as strong, or even stronger, than the nation-state, which would make international order more permeable in some sectors, less so in others. To Bonanate (1989), if these interests result in international regimes, the latter would be in a position to dictate behaviour rules. In other words, a radical interpretation is that international system behaviour would be dictated less by the states and more by values: these would be the new sovereigns.

As already discussed, the issue on the regimes' capacity to impose their operating rules to states and societies remains open. Following Fonseca Jr (1998), in contemporary international system this capacity
is determined by the existence of a concert. The fact that the system’s values are consonant to Brazilian ones allows for accepting the regimes strengthening, secured by an international consensus explicitly supported by the great powers. Thus the coincidence of interests between the concert and countries like Brazil, concerning values such as democracy, human rights, free-trade markets, nuclear weapons non-proliferation etc., would prove the potentiality of increasingly stable rules for international security.

Also unanswered remains the question on how to assess international security in the case of disagreement concerning interests. Some interests, even if considered non-negotiable by some, may be included within the so-called civilised values. In another historical period — during Cold War — Aron (1979: 78) offered a vague answer: “In order that a dialogue, however diplomatic or bellicose, remains reasonable, both speakers must want it to”.

Realist theory can not therefore be neglected or thrown into the dustbin of History. However, when reading through the classical realists of the 1930s and 1940s, we realise there are new questions to which there were no answers in the past. Before the Second World War, Carr (1981:154) already recognised that “there is, in fact, a diffused supposition on the existence of a world community of which the states are units, and states’ moral obligations are closely linked to this supposition”.

The idea of world community introduces the abstract possibility of principles for international security: if there is a community, there are obligations, hence rules and principles to which all are subject; those who break them are subject to sanctions imposed by the community. Carr (1981) also pointed out the difficulties to reach a minimum standard of coherence, which would be the cause of imperfection in international morals: two principles would be missing, that of equality among community members, and that of the prevalence of the whole over the parts. Though the first principle is obviously still missing, the same cannot be said of the second. All contemporary theories, be it idealist, liberal, grotian or socialist, in the positive-sum logic of games theory, search ways for consolidating the idea of the prevalence of the well-being of all. In this sense we could say on the possibility of games with results positives, more than zero. In other sense there are reasons to accept the theoretical idea of win-win relationship. If the well-being of the whole precedes in fact the importance of the parts, then the premises for an effective international security policy would be laid. Most probably it may not be said, by the turning of the twenty-first century, that prevalence of the whole over the parts prevails. Nevertheless, it is already possible to note that, when used as instruments of power, some themes adapt themselves better to the well-being needs of all. Thus, as a matter of principle, it may be said we have overcome the period of the 1930s and the 1940s, when it was not possible to perceive any form of prevalence of the interest of the whole, when surely we couldn’t find any possibility of win-win relationship.

Nation-states are apparently losing part of their autonomous power of decision within the economic field, obviously important in current times. This trend has been repeatedly noted, becoming a common place. If we understand globalization as the expression of economy and accept that the latter is in fact organising international life in its fullness, we will be led to miss the fact that the state acquires other prerogatives. And these have a fundamental role in the reproduction of the state itself, as well as in the globalization process. When analysing the nation-state crisis, one tends to put the institutional structures under suspicion. There is also the tendency to question the efficiency of military power, which still plays an important political role. It is important to underline that we are not legally approving of this role, but simply admitting its objective status quo.

Going back to the 1960s, Deutsch (1978) used Parkinson’s law to discuss security, claiming that “a nation’s sense of insecurity increases in direct proportion to its power. The bigger and more powerful it is, more its leaders, its ruling class, and often its population increase their levels of aspiration in international politics” (Deutsch, 1978:118). The experience of the Cold War period and the years gone by since it ended allow the assumption that only part of Deutsch’s argument is still valid. In some countries, like the United States, but also China, and possibly Russia, the sense of insecurity is probably very present, since that is the argument they use to justify the need to safeguard their military power. On the other hand, many other important countries have searched to preserve their role without resorting to a military apparatus: apart from the already mentioned cases of Japan and Germany, there are the United Kingdom and France — once mighty military powers — as well as all Latin American countries, including Brazil. All this ends up with a meaning: in spite of the role that strategic power still has, the conviction that national goals or those of national societies can be reached even in the absence of that power increases in strength. Under these conditions, international security
could reach a situation where, in fact, the well-being of the whole would precede the well-being of the parts. That is, under such a situation, it would not be feasible to look for private advantages, where regimes are led to arrange ways of satisfying the interest of the parts. The current unevenness makes it difficult to reach this goal. Globalization has something to do with this perspective but it still is not its core issue.

Prevailing Unipolarism

The difficulties faced by the idea of building an agenda where the well-being of the whole prevails, discussed above, don’t do away with the need to understand the reasons for the strengthening trend to include themes of universal value — in a way the centripetal trend —, even if the geometry of international relations remains grossly unipolar.

There are two possible ways of finding an answer: (1) once again, the unipolar geometry of international relations — with the obvious strategic predominance of the United States, as well as its values — would encourage forms of collective security whose last safeguard would be the United States itself, hence its capacity to build agendas; and (2) in spite of the fact that geometry of international relations tend to unipolarism, the incorporation of themes of universal value occurs because, ever since Rousseau (1978), the conditions for prevalence of the whole over the parts have grown stronger. Or, in Nardin’s terms (1987), the association of goals overrides the practical association.

A relevant theme in contemporary international relations is to know whether the asymmetry of a state in relation to others coincides or not with a hybrid model which sums up the idea of empire-world and world-economy, if we bind to Waters’ propositions. As different authors have pointed out, this fundamental pole would act — not in an isolate way, but through a system of concentric circles whose first level would be the Group of Seven. Another relevant theme, following the perspective discussed in the previous item (reasons for the increasing trends favourable to peace missions), is to detect if unipolarism is the reflex of a new form of international relations currently being built in the end of the twentieth century. In other words, the crisis of the nation-state, which runs parallel to the rise of globalisation, would reach every state, hence enlarging the space for shared values. Being universal, these values give shelter to compatible diversities. Universalism would not be imposed, even if determined by a hegemony relying on consensus, but assumed by collective mankind will.

The fact that the international agenda is not always accepted by an expressive majority of states — even after previous approval by the United States — points to predominance of unipolarism as well as to the recognition of North-American authority. A similar form, if symmetrical, occurs when decisions taken without North-American approval do not reach recognition or the possibility of becoming effective unless the United States admits its adherence. Such is the case of the International Penal Court.

In the unipolarism perspective, it is important to emphasise that authors of quite different theoretical perspectives — realists, liberals, socialists — consider that the US play the basic role in preserving the existing order rather than that of primus inter pares.

“First, leadership is really an elegant word for power. To exercise leadership is to get others to do things that they would not otherwise do. It involves the ability to shape, directly or indirectly, the interests or actions of others. Leadership may involve the ability to not just ‘twist arms’ but also to get other states to conceive of their interests and policy goals in new ways. This suggests a second element of leadership, which involves not just the marshalling of power capabilities and material resources. It also involves the ability to project a set of political ideas or principles about the proper or effective ordering of politics. It suggests the ability to produce concertes or collaborative actions by several states or other actors. Leadership is the use of power to orchestrate the actions of a group toward a collective end”. (Ikenberry 1997: 4)

In this sense, North-American leadership would not seem to be challenged. The end of the Cold War reorganised the terms of the international debate, leaving behind it the great polemical discussions over North-American decline — at least as it was discussed in the 80s (Kennedy, 1987).

An issue to be addressed refers to the cost of leadership to the United States. It is known that the decline of great powers has not happened only due to military defeat — Napoleon’s France, the Austro-Hungarian empire — or to economic decline — the United Kingdom after World War II. It was also determined by the cost of maintaining power — over extension — such as was the case of the Soviet
Union in the 80s. The capacity shown by the United States so far to cope with the cost of leadership has different motives. One of them, quite important, is the end of the competition with the Soviet Union — at least in the terms previous to 1989 — which made possible allocating resources to different purposes. In spite of that, Kennedy (1999: D4), while reminding that the twentieth century might have been surnamed “America’s century”, such was the influence of the United States, who enters the twenty-first century as Number One power of the planet, admits that “no one can tell whether that will go on”. The shape of international relations, and particularly that of the concentric circles, could suggest a kind of unipolarism characterised not by hegemony, but by the US’s status of *primus inter pares*.

It is important to emphasise that leadership, as noted by Ikenberry (1997), is related to the capacity of projecting a format of political ideas and principles or values that are somehow connected to those shared by a reasonable number of states. The subject of values has always been important, but it becomes prominent by the end of the twentieth century. When hegemony tries to impose itself by the explicit demonstration of a surplus of power, it runs the risk of erosion. This would probably be a plausible explanation for the difficulties faced by the United States in outlining the Iraq crisis — difficulties that lasted throughout the 1990s.

**Definition Of International Agenda Terms**

According to Villa (1994), the contemporary economic agenda is basically made up of three major themes: the military, the technological and economic, and the environmental. He remarks that, due to this agenda, a displacement would be happening in the processing of international relations. The first two themes are traditional in promoting competition among states. They are effective in the logic of competition, and may lead to hostility and to war. In the international agenda, growingly from the 70’s new themes would be arising, particularly that of environment, where the fundamental question is no longer competition or threat between states, but the threat of non-state elements. These threats may carry in themselves elements of aggregation or disaggregation, but a favourable outcome will always depend on actions of cooperative type. Extra-state elements may be analysed in different ways by different states, but their common feature is that they require a new kind of appraisal, meaning they must be taken into account — which, however, may be done in an including or excluding way.

Traditional themes suppose that main actors’ arrangement is the necessary condition for the system operation. According to Villa, from the international regimes theory approach, in the case of global themes, on the contrary, that the arrangement of state actors, including the most important ones, may not suffice without the collaboration of weaker states and, especially, of non-state actors. There are several examples, but environment would be the most important, if we consider the need to inclusion by the bearers of this value, and, in practice, by all human groups.

Although security is the most traditional theme in international relations, there are new questions concerning many aspects related to it. New, non-state actors come to the stage; both centrifugal and centripetal forces play a role. The Israelo-Palestinian conflict has to do with states, or, in the Palestinian case, with societies wishing to create their own state — but non-state actors, Arab and Jewish fundamentalists, may have a decisive role. The war in Angola, linked to the East-West conflict since 1974, went on with few perspectives of solution after 1989, mostly because of its historic origins, which go back to cultural and tribal questions. The same can be said about the genocide in Rwanda and Burundi. Even so, one cannot say international community behaviour is homogeneous. Some conflicts barely mobilise the United Nations, such as the Tamil insurgence in Sri Lanka, the Chechnya war, or the Kurdistan issue.

It may be said there is a growing, even if not uniform, concern on these matters by public opinion and international organisations. On the centripetal forces field, opinion currents, organised movements, the media, non-governmental organisations etc. make up powerful forces of pressure, for example, on human rights, national rights, the rights of minorities, social rights. In other words, themes which were previously considered centrifugal in international relations — dealing with local situations, of interest to one or few countries — appear more and more as concerning the international community. At the same time, situations of centrifugal type repeat themselves. A translation movement would be taking place, of themes historically effective to the logic of competition and difference, to themes linked to cooperation, that is, that require co-operative shapes in order to be solved. Even so, not all nations’ rights are recognized. Poland has not existed as an independent state for almost 160 years, until 1918: a
similar national oppression would apparently no longer be possible. At the same time, items absent from the agenda must be recalled; Armenia and Kurdistan are two examples of peoples who maintain claims of national character, showing that the classical “reason of state” prevails as a reference. The news now is that “reason of state” is no longer the only one.

Within this discussion on international agenda one must take into account, as realists suggest, that it remains shaped by hegemonic values, even if they change through history, while at the same time its items are diversified. This has probably to do with the apparent unipolarity of the last decade of the twentieth century. Morgenthau (1985) believes national interest is the sole relevant in world politics; then international interests would be a pondered sum-total of those national interests. According to Villa (1997:254), present changes in the international system, differently from what realists suggest, point to that “international interest, unlike the national one, is an intellectual construct that reflects transnational processes whose outcomes do not depend, in some cases, on wilful action by the state”. Likewise, constructivists (Wendt 1994; Adler 1997; Checkel 1998) believe that, at the systemic level, “international institutions can transform state identities and interests” (Wendt 1994:384). This apparently brings us to a new paradox. The international system, for the first time since Westphalia (Holsti 1992), bears a unipolar configuration. A movement toward balance of power does not appear as the mainstream trend in international scenery, as structuralist neorealists (Waltz 1987) would expect. The paradox consists in that unipolarism rises at the same time as interaction persists at systemic level.

The debate on international agenda, which is so strongly determined by the US, is certainly the terrain where we are confronted with the predicament of the twenty-first century international system configuration — wherein international security is one of the main themes. As already discussed, there is wide recognition that, in spite of apparent unipolarism, ill-definition persists. The current direction the debate takes may be interpreted as one of the by-products of an international agenda determined by the US. On the other hand, the fact that other states show interest in taking charge of international affairs when these involve the defence of widely accepted universal values suggests that a system of another kind might be in the process of building, where universal values, both in utopian and normative terms, may come out as dominant and disconnected to hegemony or to the need of an “lender of last resort” (Kindleberger 1989).

Dissociation Between Politics And Economics

Classical realist assumptions are state-centrism, rationalism, and the potential use of force. If they are taken as the basis for an analysis of international relations, then it may be said there is no disjunction between politics and economics, rather a subordination of the latter to the former. In a classical definition, Aron (1979:121) states that “the international system is made up by political units exchanging regular relations and liable to enter a general war. Full members of an international system are the political units that main states’ governors take into account when making their power estimations”. Thus politics prevails, though states are certainly taken into account for other reasons, among which economic ones.

History teaches us that the dissociation between politics and economics, as well as between each of them and other values, brings up unexpected results. Napoleon had Europe’s best army, was backed by rising bourgeoisies and peoples, but was defeated. The United Kingdom, winner of the two twentieth-century Great Wars, has renounced from being a great power in view of the over-extension costs. Kennedy (1999) reminds us that in 1917 the United States unbalanced the war without having previously a large army. At different occasions, the fact that politico-military power and economic power were not superimposed has not prevented attempts to make one prevail over the other. Japan attacked the US in December 1941, when its economy was ten times as smaller than the Americans’.

Along the twenty-first century, a relevant part of international security will be determined by the continuity of conjunction between politico-military and economic power. Such continuity has assured the US its outstanding position during the 90s, hence temporarily solving the 80s realists’ and liberals’ doubts about it (Gilpin 1987; Rosecrance 1986; Reich 1992; Kennedy 1987). From the military point of view, it apparently has no rival, in spite of some concern with China and Russia in North-American analyses. In the economic field, further integration of the European Union or positive performances in Asia might endanger North-American predominance.
Analyses do not allow to anticipate the direction international relations will take; they suggest that, if alternative poles come up, they will be economic, not politico-military ones. Thus the issue on the possibility of new polarities, leading to a bipolar or multipolar world rearrangement, remains unsolved; this has to do with the theoretical approach to the international system. When criticising realism and neorealism, liberals (Keohane 1986; Nye Jr. 1990) focus on structuralism which, according to them, would prevent perceiving the changes that took place in the 80s and specially in the 90s, with the end of the Cold War as it had developed since 1946.

In a concession to neorealist thought, useful for reasoning here, one must refine that criticism. Neorealists do not exclude the possibility of changes in the international system, but they believe the international system can be modified only if changes are systemic. If changes occur within the system, then structural reasons are not modified. Still according to them, ever since Westphalia there has never been unipolarism; an anarchical system always seeks a balance situation and, if this is broken, it will be re-established one way or the other. Balance has since been maintained (for the past 350 years) by systems having one or more great powers. In the view taken here, the possibility both of unipolarism and of democratic multipolarism (not limited to a concert) would depend on the collapse of the international system as it existed during Cold War, which has not been defined yet. In other words, the onset of unipolarism, or of democratic multipolarism, or of a non-state-centred international society depends on changes that have not yet taken place in the last years of the twentieth century.

For neorealists, structural change depends on three kinds of change: 1. in the principles on which the system is based (for instance, the change from an anarchical organisation into a hierarchical one); 2. in the way functions are defined or assigned, in the case of a hierarchical system; and 3. changes in the distribution of potentialities among the units (Waltz 1987). It is well known that the end of the Cold War has not produced deep changes in the system — save the WTO, no significant institutional change. This is true regardless of the theoretical framework adopted. All Cold War international organisations remain alike, including the UN format as settled in Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco. In spite of minor changes, the classical order prevails, where the ultimate source of legitimacy are national states. San Francisco and Bretton Woods are not suitable to absorb the new issues.

New Actors

Within international relations, the debate rises on the possibility of overcoming the state-centred conception, following which states are the sole relevant actors having the capacity to influence decision making processes. A contribution of liberal intergovernment thinking, in this case a heir to the liberal tradition in political philosophy, has been Moravcsik’s (1994) pointing to the state heterogeneity, made up as it is by different interests coming from social classes, economic groups, corporate or regional structures, and so on. The new actors, issued from this diversity, are so called not because they did not exist beforehand (in the shape of business enterprises, trade unions, parties), neither for their not having acted on an international level in the past, but because such action was exerted within or upon the national states, their international reach being thus indirect. Nowadays these actors are epistemically articulated; they have connections with the states, but do not directly depend on them.

As the theory on the modern state teaches us, between population, government, state, and nation there is in principle a corresponding relation. There is in principle some form of interaction between population demands and governments’ or states’ policies: there would be a self-governing community who determines its own future. Some early twentieth century socialists called it a “fate- community” (Bauer 1987); realists call it “of national interest”. To Held (1991:152), “this idea is basically countered by the nature of global interconnection standards and by the issues that must be faced by the modern state”.

Without going deeper into the issue, it may be said that the crisis of the state, even if it takes quite different forms, but above all the phenomenon called globalization have laid the grounds for non-government actors’ new roles, as already discussed. Besides their heterogeneous roles in national policies, they influence the definition of international agenda and have different weights onto different

641 This state of affairs is of immediate interest to Brazil, but does not take into consideration the new issues.
states’ policies, thus breaking the correspondence between civil society’s agenda and political decisions. Recent experience shows that powerful states may be led to change their goals when suffering high pressure from the public opinion, in turn encouraged by non-government organisations and the media, even if often linked to state’s interests. From 1996 on France has been led to stop its nuclear power tests program. The US were forced to adhere to the program of CO2 emission restraint after the Kyoto meeting in 1997.

Aron (1987) underlines the meaning of the new actors incorporation into what he calls “international society” or “world society”, which would include the interstate and economic systems, the transnational movements, exchanges, and supranational societies and institutions. Even realist authors, whose basic reference is the state, take into account the new actors. The latter, in some cases, have a twofold nature: they exert pressure within the state, but they keep their international dimension. They enter the debate on themes formerly limited to relations between states, like the environment issue, international trade, migrations, drug traffic, minorities or human rights etc., thus highlighting their role in international security. Known examples might be those of Amnesty International, Médecins sans Frontières, Green Peace. The experience of the United Nations (or other organisations’) peace operations in the 1990s (in Somalia, Angola, the former Yugoslavia or Haiti) clearly shows the increasing relevance of the role both of public opinion — which is obviously not an abstraction — and the non-government organisations.

Even if new actors have the state as their main reference for action, the latter is clearly loosing its former monopoly of carrying out international relations, especially the agenda definition. Such changes do not formally interfere in national sovereignty, but have certainly an increasing role in determining part of the home affairs agenda. Since it is not the aim of the present text, we will not discuss the role of financial, industrial, commercial, or agro-industrial corporations, just recall they are strong non-government actors.

States have the monopoly of representing people’s will. They define rules, policies and regulations to be enforced within their territories. This monopoly entitles them, legitimately in principle, to make decisions concerning international security.

So far new actors have not proposed to change the basic institutional framework of international relations, but they want to take part in decision-making. In the UN and the WTO they have been gaining status as observers. The space opened to them results from an incipient, new understanding of international relations among all actors. States’ foreign behaviour is not affected only by power relations, says Aron (1987). Constructivists sustain that historically built ideas and feelings also influence international actors’ decisions. Furthermore, ideologies and world views pleaded by epistemic groups (Adler 1997) have a relevant role therein. Granted this, it must be taken into account that, notwithstanding the actors’ new agenda items — and their new, positive or negative contrivances — their participation does not change the current international system asymmetry. States respond selectively to new actors’ interference and, according to their power, seek to use them to reproduce asymmetry or to change the status quo.

Rosenau (1990) identifies five important factors to understand current international relations: 1. post-industrialisation, leading to the development of electronic technologies that reduce global distances, thereby fastening the movement of people, products, and ideas throughout the planet; 2. the outbreak of planetary problems that exceed the states’ power to solve them; 3. the decline in states’ ability to solve problems even on a national basis; 4. the onset of new, more powerful subcollectivities within national societies; and 5. an increase in adult citizens’ level of education and knowledge, which would make an authoritarian state less feasible. Rosenau thus points to the need of taking into account the increasing importance of new actors in international relations, besides the traditional ones, the states. By observing that his five points refer to issues relative to social and economic life, we are taken back to the subject above discussed, that is, that actions legitimacy remains a state’s assignment. Which is logic, in view of the private nature of non-state actors (corporations, non-government organisations, trade unions, scientific associations), even when they are linked to values of strong universal content. And this brings us to the unsolved question on the institutions of the current times, which are barely being designed. For the time being, we remain anchored to Cold War institutions, except in the field of normative research (Archibugi, Held, & Kohler 1998).
Conclusion

In the past three and a half centuries, security has been achieved by international configurations of balance of powers, concert, or bipolarism. None of them has prevented wars. The state of nature, in Hobbes’s (1974) terms, has always prevailed, even if bipolarism and its threat of mutual total destruction has avoided a general war and was reversed into an apparently peaceful way. The debate on themes like eco-security (Jarrín 1990, Mathews 1990, Myers 1990), wherein the subject of environment is often waved as an instrument of power, suggests that international agenda will likely have to be adapted to a new institutional format — which is however uncertain, in view of other current debates, particularly that on the Security Council.

We have seen the reasons why global themes, including security, require co-responsibility; and that there is increasing acceptance that, in order to reach stability, the international system must be inclusive. Such inclusion may be achieved both through adherence to universal principles and by unipolar or concert hegemonic imposition. The principle of win-win relations (Nagel, 2000), strong the discussion on the way of an inclusive international system.

The growing debate on the right to ingerence (Lottenberg 1997), along with the benefits and risks it brings, shows how some of the assumptions that have for centuries guided mankind’s destiny would be changing. Principles like national sovereignt and peoples’ self-determination are in crisis overcome by resorting to the Chapter VII of United Nations Chart, that deals with violations to peace and international security.

By signing in decisions by the UN Security Council or the General Assembly, Brazil helps strengthen the new interpretation of international right and jurisprudence. In spite of the risks involved therein, it does probably so in the hope that this may contribute to the multipolarism above discussed. Doses of realism, leading to participation impulses, are combined to doses of co-operative utopia. The standing of powerful states may be favoured, for they have higher persuading capacity and more means to implement decisions. Or the prospect of a co-operative world may be favoured, where peace, justice, and the universalisation of rights be a fact. To recognise that values themselves are different and correspond to specific world views is a first step to identify possible interests and proposals.

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1. Introduction

This paper examines the activities and international perspectives of two Japanese diplomats, Sugimura Yootaroo and Satoo Naotake, who were active within the League of Nations from the 1920s till the 1930s. In particular, through an examination of the leading diplomatic officials' views of China, this paper seeks to elucidate the position of China in the midst of Japan's prewar diplomatic relations, as portrayed in the eyes of leading diplomatic officials well experienced within the international arena.

In general, Japan's diplomacy since the Meiji Era has been conceived in terms of a dichotomy between 'conciliatory views (international cooperative approach)' and 'hard-line views' towards Britain and the US. The former views were brought to submission with the emergence of military power, around which hard-line views were organised [1]. The reasons behind this theory, and the supporting evidence upon which its conclusions are founded need to be examined, needless to say, through a general and structural analysis of the processes involved in the decision making process of foreign policy in Japan. In addition, one cannot fail to analyse the views of foreign nations held by the diplomatic authorities, politicians and military personnel, who in both positive and negative senses of the word determined the course which Japan's diplomatic policy was to take [2].

As is generally known, a wealth of research has already been amassed with the last focus above, treating as subjects many representative figures in Japanese diplomatic history. However, with regards to the period prior to the Pacific War, much of the research has focused on people who directly led Japan into war, in other words those with 'hard-line views'. The fact that 'hard-line views' crushed 'conciliatory views (cooperative approach)' overwhelmingly and with considerable force is certainly a grim historical fact we need to come to terms with in humility. Nevertheless it behooves us in our time to also consider the limitations of those with conciliatory views who failed to deal a heavy blow to supporters of the hand-line view. Much light needs to be shed on the nature of their views of foreign nations, especially those of Asia.

This paper arose out of an interest in these issues. Sugimura and Satoo, representatives to the League of Nations, with their wealth of experience at the forefront of international politics, were presumably diplomats who were most able to observe Japan's diplomatic relations in a composed attitude. Just what impressions did they have of Japan's diplomatic actions, in the light of the Manchurian Incident?

2. Two representatives to the League of Nations. The background and profile of Sugimura Yootaroo and Satoo Naotake

We will begin with a brief sketch of the personal histories of the two diplomats.

Sugimura Yootaroo was born in 1884, son of the Meiji Era diplomat Sugimura Fukashi. After graduating from the Politics Department of the Law School in the Tokyo Imperial University, he entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He spent time studying at Lyon University, and from 1912 to 1917 worked in Paris as a probationary diplomat and secretary. In 1923 he was appointed to the post of assistant director general of the Imperial Secretariat to the League of Nations (League of Nations Representatives Department). In 1926 he became an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, and subsequently assumed the post of secretary general of the Imperial Secretariat. In 1927 he become the League of Nations under secretary general and concurrently director of political affairs. After
Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, Sugimura was appointed ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Italy and France. He died of illness in 1938.

Sugimura succeeded Nitobe Inazoo in the highly important post of under secretary general of the League of Nations (whilst holding the portfolio of director of political affairs). He worked under Drummond, the secretary general at the time, who was a major factor in Sugimura’s appointment. Sugimura was a diplomat well versed in European affairs. At the time, most international conflicts such as territorial disputes were centred around Europe, and Drummond wanted to commit European affairs to a representative from a non-European country with no direct involvement in the conflicts. Of the two seats held by France in the administrative division, Drummond wanted to relieve France of the post of director of political affairs. In the selection process on the Japanese side, Sugimura’s appointment was no doubt influenced by his other strengths. His physical robustness was evident, as seen in his successful sporting career during his student days. This fortitude and vigor was nevertheless balanced by an amicable and gentle personality. Sugimura was active in dealing with disputes in Haut-Silesia and Transilvania, and so on. His efforts contributed to the enhancement of Japan’s international position in the League of Nations, whilst winning enormous trust from Drummond.

Next, we will give a brief personal history of Satoo Naotake. Satoo was born in 1881. In 1905, whilst studying at the Consular Department of the Specialist Faculty at the Tokyo Higher Commercial College, Satoo passed the examination for becoming a diplomat and consular representative. He worked in Russia in the following year, and then in Harbin from 1914. In 1917 he became the consul general. In 1919 he worked in Switzerland as a first grade secretary, and in 1921 he worked in France as a councilor. In 1923 he resided in Poland as an ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary. In 1927 he was appointed director general of the Imperial Secretariat to the League of Nations, and in 1930 he became an ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Belgium. Satoo was the Imperial representative (together with Yoshizawa Kenkichi etc.) to the Twelfth General Assembly of the League of Nations in 1931. After the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations, Satoo became an ambassador to France, Foreign Minister in the cabinet of Hayashi Senjuuroo, and then diplomatic consultant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, making trips to Italy and Germany. In 1942 he was ambassador to the Soviet Union, and was detained in the country after the war. He returned to Japan in May, 1946, and was active after the war, serving as advisor to the Privy Council, member of the House of Councilors, President of the United Nations Association, and President of the House of Councilors. In 1956 Satoo was Japanese Government Representative to the Eleventh General Assembly of the United Nations (on the occasion of Japan’s admission to the United Nations). He died in 1971.

Satoo’s involvement with the League of Nations was considerable from the outset, beginning as an attendant to representatives at the Eleventh General Assembly in Geneva in 1920, and then serving at the Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth General Assemblies (at the Twelfth Assembly he was a representative). He stood in place of Yoshizawa as director of the Council from January to April in 1931, and was a representative during the Extraordinary General Meeting at the end of 1932, together with others such as Matsuoka. In addition, in the series of disarmament conferences held in the latter half of the 1920s (especially in Geneva in 1927 and again in London in 1929), Satoo ceased to be just a representative of Japan, but moved actively in the role of arbitration.

Satoo in the prewar era was a diplomat well versed in European affairs, beginning his career in Russia and then serving actively in the arena of the League of Nations[5]. The attitude which he brought to the negotiation table was such that he was called ‘a diplomat with the demeanor of an old-time samurai’ [6] He was always aware of the need to exalt the national prestige of Japan. One day, during a scene of entanglement at the League, as representatives of various countries fell silent for a moment, Satoo stood up resolutely and gave vent to his thoughts in a clear and astounding manner. This was a vivid portrait of his so-called ‘samurai-style’ diplomacy. On the 20th of July 1945, as Japan was facing imminent defeat, Satoo sent a telegraph to Foreign Minister Toogoo urging him to enter peace negotiations. This document has long been famous, not only for its daring advice, but also because it speaks much of Satoo’s determination in his approach to various issues [7].

From the discussion above, we find a common thread in the background and profile of the two diplomats under examination. As diplomatic officials, they were both professionals with actual practical experience (mostly overseas and in Europe), rather than just being diplomatic ‘statesmen’. Therefore, in comparison with a number of diplomatic officials who had tight connections to the military, political and
business circles in the 1930s, we may actually have doubts about the contribution of Sugimura and Satoo to the process of policy formation in Japanese diplomacy at the time. However, we can deduce that their judgments were the most level-headed and objective available in the field of Japanese diplomacy during this period, cultivated by hands-on experience in the vicissitude of international politics.

3. Conciliatory views in international politics

We now turn to the international perspectives of Sugimura and Satoo, two diplomats active at the forefront of the international arena. We will begin with an examination of Sugimura. Sugimura was already preaching the importance of a conciliatory approach during the First World War. Citing the abandonment of isolation policies by Britain, Sugimura says, 'Imprudent isolationism without any fixed principle is going to spell doom in the future world of international politics. I believe our fellow countrymen need to be extremely wary of this in the future.' This later developed into a kind of pacifism (conference diplomacy) centred around the League of Nations, of which he himself was the under secretary general. The League was positioned as 'the world's highest court of justice' and 'conference diplomacy' was seen as 'democratic diplomacy'. It is thought that this view of the international situation espoused by Sugimura owes much to a relationship with the German Stresemann and the Frenchman Briand, who were both Foreign Affairs Ministers of their respective countries at the time, during heyday of the League's activities.

Satoo's view of the international situation was grounded in severe criticism of 'brute force diplomacy'. In his autobiography, he severely censures Hitler's invasions using military force. In response to criticism of his own 'weak-kneed diplomacy', Satoo rebuts by saying that 'weak-kneed diplomacy' is actually 'a problem which requires the greatest courage, and is extremely difficult when one wants to promote the interests of one's country.' He points the finger at the spiritual fragility of the so-called 'hard-line diplomacy': 'hard-line diplomacy can be done by anyone with the slightest determination.' Further, he repudiates hard-liners because they 'don't take the slightest responsibility for their actions'. Satoo's pacifist view of the international scene was spelled out quite frankly in the 'four conditions' given on the occasion of appointment as Foreign Affairs Minister in the Hayashi cabinet. The four conditions were as follows. Firstly, that one should make the greatest effort to prevent war and to judge international relations on the basis of peace. Secondly, that Japan would stand on an equal footing with 'Shina' (China), solving diplomatic problems through peace negotiations. Thirdly, that relations with the Soviet Union should avoid military conflict, maintaining peaceful relations. And fourthly, that diplomacy with Britain would be re-adjusted whilst maintaining friendly relations with the US.

The conditions above were actually given after Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, but Satoo's initial hopes for League and his penetrating thought compared favourably with that of Sugimura. 'The League is not a supra-national institution;' says Satoo, 'it is a multi-national gathering body, comprised of nations which are equal in status, whether they be great or small.' According to Satoo, in this place where 'an uncanny force (of international opinion) presides', one would be 'decisively rejected if one makes utterances which are way out of accordance with common sense, or tries to force through selfish views which violate international ethics and ignore the well-being of others.' Therefore, he continues, 'dropouts from the League are also dropouts from the life of the international community.' If we follow this to its logical conclusion, Japan after the Manchurian Incident would have been a true 'dropout' in Satoo's eyes.

From the above, we see that both Satoo and Sugimura had international perspectives centred around the promotion of a conciliatory view(cooperative approach) of international politics, based on the foundation of peace diplomacy. The League of Nations was a key factor for both. However, we must not overlook the fact that their perspectives of the League were not just limited to pacifism and idealism; these were also rooted in an international view linked to the promotion of national interest. In the case of Sugimura, this was apparent in a kind of 'cooperative approach' or 'conciliatory view without overstraining oneself'. In essence, this was an economic conciliatory view, 'a principle of equality where there are open doors in the economy, industry and commerce; where both favoritism and discrimination are abolished, and where there are no differences based on race and nationality.' In other words, conditions which would make for easier economic development in Japan. Even though Satoo did not go as far as Sugimura, he nevertheless concedes that 'the League of Nations is both a shrine to peace and
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an epitome of the international fight for survival [16], indicating that he did not think of the League as an kind of utopia.

4. Withdrawal from the League of Nations and perspectives of Asia held by Ugimura and Satoo

As a result of the Manchurian Incident, which was in turn triggered by the Mukden Incident on the 18th of September 1931, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations. At first, the great Powers did not make a great issue of Japan's actions, but as Japan moved to bomb Jinchou on the 8th of October, attitudes towards Japan within the League were stiffened. This tendency was amplified by the Shanghai Incident on the 28th of January in the following year, and again on the 1st of March when Manchuria declared independence. When the Japanese-Manchurian Protocol was signed on the 15th of September, people were saying that Japan's withdrawal from the League would just be a matter of time, as rumours had been circling since the American invitation at the Council meeting on October 15th the previous year, and subsequently during the time of the resolution for Japan to withdraw troops. Finally on the 24th of February, 1933, in spite of efforts made by Sugimura and Drummond, as soon as the Lytton report was presented in the General Assembly Japanese representatives stood up and walked out of the meeting, under the watchful eyes of the other representatives. The withdrawal was formally announced on March 27th. The Japanese representatives at this time were Matsuoka Yoosuke (main and plenipotentiary representative), Nagaoka Harukazu and Satoo Naotake [17]

One can imagine the anguish the Japanese representatives at the League must have felt, since they had to give heed to the great Powers on the one hand, and protect the interests of their country on the other, while achieving all this under fickle Japanese government policy. The ambassador to France, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, who was a League representative at the time the Incident occurred, laid bare his heart when he said this time at the League was 'one of most difficult and painful experiences' in his sixty years as a diplomat. These emotions would have been shared by Sugimura and Satoo as well. Sugimura relates: 'For me, because I had stood between the two parties (the League and Japan) and tried honestly and constantly to maintain the good relationship somehow, it felt as if my heart had been torn to pieces... in the last moments all my strength and soul had been spent from the endless struggle day and night; it was almost a relief to receive the news of withdrawal [19]. Satoo laments over the plight of the Japanese representatives, who fought alone with foes on all sides: 'one stood completely isolated in the face of international opinion. It is probably impossible for others to understand exactly what it was like, unless you were there yourself [20]. And so in this atmosphere, the Japanese representatives, who had increasingly deepened their isolation, gradually come to accept the conclusion that withdrawal was inevitable.

The central point Japan claimed in the League was that Japan needed to protect her special interests in Manchuria. Yoshizawa insisted on the right to station troops 'for the purposes of protecting the railway and ensuring the safety of residents and foreign business enterprises on the attached lands' At the Council meeting of October, where five major points were at issue, he cited the occasion in 1927 when the Powers sent an expeditionary force to Shanghai, then asserted that since Japan was much more committed to the region of Manchuria than the Powers ever were to Shanghai, the situation at hand was far more serious than that of 1927. This perspective was not just limited to Yoshizawa himself; it was a common view held by Japanese diplomatic authorities at the time. In the final analysis, it all boils down to their perspectives of Asia.

Sugimura assumes that the situation in the East is different from that of the West, and says that 'the situation in China (Shina) is such that one feels helpless in protecting expatriates: mounted bandits are rife around the place, and anti-foreign feeling is rampant.' He declares 'it is a matter of common knowledge that the normal conventions of international law do not apply in China.' Japan's stance is therefore ethical and the League's argument legalistic and inappropriate for the conditions in Asia [22]. However, behind this lament over misunderstanding of Asia by the Euro-American Powers, there lay a hidden agenda: by gaining recognition of Japan's special rights in Asia, and by conceiving the Sino-Japanese conflicts as the necessary trend of the times, justification of Japan's treatment of China would be possible, as though one were chastising a stupid and obstinate old giant.

Satoo too, like Sugimura, justified Japan's treatment of the Manchurian Incident in the final analysis. To be sure, Satoo's view of China differed from that of Sugimura because he had experience of working in the country. He had great respect and even reverent fear for the ancient history of China, and is
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quoted as saying, ‘the world of the Chinese (Sina-jin) has monumental strength. Japan errs if she tries to go against the tide of that strength [23]’ However, these words only operate at a sentimental level; for the real world and its current developments he has the following to say, ‘I am by nature a man of peace, but as for Japan’s theory of a Coprosperity Sphere, I for one agree with it.....in the Orient the Orientals have their own zone of living, and Oriental people (i.e. the Japanese) must take rightful ownership of that land [24](brackets mine).’ This is in fact nothing less than an exposition on Asianism in the broad sense of the word, with Japan as the leader over a consolidation of Asian nations.

And so, for Sugimura, proud of his own achievements and being fully aware of the importance of Japan in the League, seeing what he termed ‘bias towards Europe and against Asia[25]’ in the League of Nations was an emotion impetus for support of withdrawal: ‘Even if we adopted a servile spirit and patched up affairs just to stay in the League, what good would come of it?’ And again: ‘As Japan walks the righteous path and takes the straight road, there need not be fear of falling into isolation. Even if we were to fall into isolation it would only be temporary, and not the least cause for concern[26].’

5. Conclusions

The tragedy of modern Japan which began with the Manchurian Incident and culminated in the Potsdam Declaration can in a sense be understood as the natural result of Modern Japan’s efforts since the Meiji Restoration to remain independent from the Great Powers whilst being ranked among them.

The two diplomats Sugimura and Satoo discussed in this paper were both officials whose careers were mostly spent overseas. Therefore, it is hard to determine just how much influence they had on the decision-making process of diplomatic policies at the time. Hasty conclusions need to be reserved before a careful examination of the special ‘dualistic’ nature of Japanese diplomacy. However, if anyone were able to resist the hard-liners, who promoted the invasion of China with self-righteous military might, one possibility would have been foreign affairs officials like Sugimura and Satoo, who had the necessary discernment gained from objective and practical analysis of the international situation, and would have been able to resist at least in principle.

Both diplomats contributed to the rise in prestige of Japan on the international stage, whilst having as their principle the conciliatory view in international politics. Of course, in the case of Sugimura and Satoo, the difference between one who stood in neutrality and one who represented the interests of a particular country could clearly be seen on the occasion of Japan’s withdrawal from the League. Nevertheless, in their advocacy of peace diplomacy disavowing violence (i.e. the conciliatory view), their ways of thinking were essentially the same. Many other foreign affairs officials shared in this view.

However, this conciliatory view held a snare in that it had an ineluctable economic cooperative posture, where promotion of Japan’s economic interests was viewed positively as the national policy [27]. This led to a two-layered view of China where the emotional level was split from the realistic level, as seen specifically in the case of Satoo. Accepting hard-line views as a necessary evil was but one small step away.

The history of modern Japan from the start has been one where modernisation meant westernisation. This was symbolised in the slogan ‘de-Asianism’ when Japan turned its attention on the surrounding countries of Asia. However, whilst this slogan nurtured in a more relative sense the superiority complex of Japanese people within the enclosed system of Asia itself, it also became a mere shell void of contents [28], and then resurfaced as an oppressive attitude towards the surrounding countries of Asia [29]. Because of this view of Asia, held subconsciously by many Japanese at the time, the ‘conciliatory view’ was unable to stand against the ‘hard-line view’ in any real way, and by ‘bowing down to the facts of reality [30], it failed to become a restraining force against the latter.

(Notes)


[2] The former corresponds to what is called ‘conciliatory approach to international politics’, ‘weak-kneed diplomacy’ and ‘peace diplomacy’, while the latter corresponds to what is called ‘international
cooperativism’ ‘militarist diplomacy,’ amongst other terms. Here we do not make such fine distinctions, but merely use the terms ‘cooperative’?conciliatory’ and ‘hard-line’.


[4] Refer to Sugimura, Yootaroo 1933, Kokusai Gaikoo-roku (Record of International Diplomacy) Chuuoo Kooron Sha (Publishers). His anguish over the Manchuria Incident is well expressed here.


[7] Refer to Kurihara Ken et al. (eds.) 1981, Satoo Naotake no Menboku (The Face of Satoo Naotake), Hara Shoboo Publishers. The words in Satoo’s telegraph rise like a flood tide, speaking much of his anguish: ‘I have come to the conclusion that we have no choice but to resolve to request for peace negotiations at the earliest possible time.....I have lost all hope of achieving our aims. I only pray that we would promptly stop the resistance, holding merely onto a past state of affairs, but instead preserve the lives of hundreds of thousands who are no longer fighting on equal terms and but stand on the threshold of the jaws of death. I pray that we would rescue our nation from annihilation just in time, together with seventy million of our countrymen from their grave distress. Thus we would ensure the survival of our race....I hasten to add that even if I were labeled a supporter for defeat, I would be willing to endure it humbly, together with all the responsibilities for which I may be held accountable. I cannot help but feel that the fate of our motherland rests on this one telegraph. As I finish writing I collapse onto my desk, washed in a stream of tears.’


[16] Refer to Satoo 1931 op.cit.

[17] Details of the events leading up to the withdrawal from the League and Japan's treatment of the issue, together with the anguish of the Japanese representatives are well described in Uchiyama Masakuma 1970,”the Manchurian Incident and Withdrawal from the League of Nations”, in Kokusai Seiji (International Politics) No.1, 1971 (the same essay is included in Uchiyama 1971 Gendai Nippon Gaikoo-shi-ron (On the Diplomatic History of Modern Japan) Keioo Gijuku Daigaku Hoogaku Kenkyuukai) In addition, refer to Umino, Yoshio 1972, Kokusai Renmei to Nippon, Haras Shoboo.


[22] Refer to Sugimura 1933, Kokusai Gaikoo-roku (op. cit.) p. 425.


[27] Included in Hashikawa Bunzoo 1973. "Fukuzawa Yukichi no Chuugoku Bunmei-ron (Fukuzawa Yukichi's Views on Chinese Civilisation)" and "Fukuzawa Yukichi to Okakura Tenshin (Fukuzawa Yukichi and Okakura Tenshin)" in Jungyaku no Shisoo (Theories on Loyalty and Treason) Keisoo Shoboo (Publishers) In this the author claims that 'the real intention in Datsuaron (Treatise on De-Asianisation) was to get others to arrive at a final assessment of the traditional relationship with China and Korea, both symbols of the old civilisation (p.48).’ However in due course 'the self-awareness needed in the definition of the problem in Datsuaron was forgotten, and a mere shell of natural emotions, that of contempt for China and Asia, remained (p.76).’

[28] Matsumoto Sannosuke 1974. Kindai Nippon no Chiteki Jookyoo (The Intellectual State of Modern Japan) Chuuoo Kooron (Publishers) p.103. In this the author claims that Japan, who turned towards consolidation with Asian countries as a result of external dangers, on the other hand ‘came to justify its own superiority together with its status and mission as “leader of Asia”.’ The author attributes this to the fact that ‘consolidation with Asia was originally an externally triggered idea, based on the logic of power.’

Globalisation and the Asian Economic Crisis

Summary

The relentless process of globalisation that characterises the world economy makes national economies increasingly interdependent. The chain effects of the Asian crisis are not confined only to a regional economic context. Besides leading to shifting competitive positions in a number of countries, the Asian crises seem to be strong enough to put into question geopolitical and strategic equilibria that formed after the end of the cold war. In its recent history, Asia has not produced security strategies of its own, having been dominated by colonial powers, and then by the juxtaposition of the superpowers. It is difficult to predict medium-term scenarios for the evolution of Asia with any certainty, as the end of the bipolar system has changed the global geopolitical equilibria, and created a particularly fluid and dynamic situation in Asia as well. The most important regional association, ASEAN, in dealing with the consequences of the economic and political crises, played a weak role to organise an effective regional and co-operative response. The lack of such a response raises a series of questions relating to the effectiveness of some of ASEAN's basic principles as well as the association's ability to overcome the challenges posed by the Asian crisis.

Asian Crisis and Globalization

The East Asian crisis began in Thailand, on July 1997, bringing in a swirl Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, and then Singapore and Hong Kong. Pressures on the Thai baht emerged in May 1997, forcing the Central Bank to intervene in the markets and to introduce capital and exchange controls. As the intervention failed to restore confidence, pressures continued in Thailand while diminishing in other ASEAN countries through the authorities' intervention in exchange markets and higher interest rates. Due to continued speculative attacks, Thailand on July 2nd 1997 abandoned its exchange rate peg against the dollar and allowed the baht to float. After having used most of the country's foreign exchange reserves in an effort to defend the currency, the Thai government was forced, on July 28, to turn to the IMF to raise funds needed for trade financing and foreign debt servicing.

The fall in the baht raised doubts about the viability of exchange rate arrangements in neighbouring countries. Spillover effects spread quickly to the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, where the authorities allowed the currencies to depreciate. The situation worsened in the following months, reflecting concerns about the effects of currency depreciation and higher interest rates on highly leveraged corporate and financial sector balance sheets, and about the commitment of the authorities to implement reform. The actual or only threatened imposition of capital controls further undermined investors' confidence. In October 1997 Indonesia was also forced to seek the IMF's support, in exchange for a commitment to close a certain number of ailing banks, cut government spending and balance the budget (Trivellato, 2000).

The beginning of 1998 was marked by a new round of devaluations, following Thailand's declared inability to satisfy IMF requirements. Confidence in regional markets was deeply hit by this announcement, prompting renewed speculative attacks on the currencies. By January 1998, the Indonesian rupiah had lost more than 60 per cent of its value in July 1997. The negative reaction of the IMF and the international markets to the 1998-99 budget presented by the government forced President Suharto to revise forecasts and to agree to give up new projects of industrial development as well as dismantle local monopolies, including those tied to his own family. This was not enough to restore investors' confidence and halt the currency's fall, and led to social tensions spreading across the country. The situation degenerated, causing violence particularly towards ethnic Chinese. Social conflict and economic crisis raised doubts about President Suharto's ability to stay in power, but this
did not prevent the People's Consultative Assembly from re-electing him, during the March 1997 meeting, for the seventh consecutive term. However, continued worsening of social and economic conditions led to renewed and deeper conflicts, which brought about Suharto's downfall in May 1998 and saw the appointment of his deputy, B.J. Habibie, as the new President.

The crisis has also caused an economic breakdown in South Korea. Japan, although able to cope with financial turmoil because of vast reserves, has been obliged to start structural reforms to adjust its economic management model. China, which has so far remained relatively undamaged, now faces major repercussions on its investment and trade flows.

The East Asian countries at the centre of the crisis were for years admired as some of the most successful emerging market economies, owing to their rapid growth and striking gains in their populations' living standards. With generally prudent fiscal policies and high rates of private savings, they were seen as models for many other countries with the so-called 'Asian development model' (World Bank, 1993). In particular, the crisis highlights some gaps in the role Asian governments have faced in the management of the economic miracle. It also portends important changes for relations among other powers in the global system, both from a political and economic standpoint.

The Asian crisis was initially seen as a merely economic crisis with negative effects on the world economy. The Western debate on the "Asian crisis" initially overlooked not only the political dimension of the crisis, the political push effect, but also the social dimension, i.e. the mobilization of forces of political discourse that operate across ethnic groups, parties and strata. At the time, it was said that the "Asian policy model" had failed while few words were lost on the chances for the creation of a new "model".

Asian crisis has enforced the common opinion that economic globalization produce a loose of control on domestic issues (Sideri, 2000). Political change in Indonesia (the fall of the Suharto régime) and Thailand (the passing of a new, democratic constitution) as well as the regional discussion on the political reasons for the Asian crisis (corruption, lack of democratic control and transparency) all provoked or at least facilitated another effect: a debate on the political reasons for the crisis and thus on the future of political structures and systems in East and Southeast Asia.

Regional Response to the Crisis: the Role of ASEAN

There is a common feature in South East Asia (SEA) countries' responses to the crisis: every country is going it's own way. With some exceptions, there has not been a concerted effort to exploit regional ties to overcome at least some of the effects of the crisis. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), one of the most important and long-lasting regional associations, has been unable to propose a solution to bail out this region. Its response to the crisis, including both immediate crisis management in unstable financial markets and the policy for longer-term adjustment and economy restructuring, seemed slow, inefficient and inadequate. This raises some questions about the role of regional co-operation frameworks, and of ASEAN in particular, as it has been in the recent past, and as it could be in the future.

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643 ASEAN was established in 1967 among five East-Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Singapore) with the aim of preserving national security and regional stability; unofficial but not less important was also the aim of defending the region from the threat of communism. ASEAN has now ten members (Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia have been admitted throughout the years), and after the end of the Cold War has shifted its focus also towards co-operation aimed at liberalising trade flows within the area (ASEAN Free Trade Area). An attempt to extend dialogue also at the security level has been made through the ASEAN Regional Forum, which allows participation also from non-ASEAN countries, like China, the US and the EU.
In the last few months, member countries reached several agreements in response to the chaotic situation on the basis of consensus. In brief, the response included:

- Agreeing to establish an ASEAN monitoring and surveillance mechanism within the general framework of the IMF with the assistance of the ADB. Yet getting past the planning stage has been difficult, as some countries have expressed reluctance about passing on market-sensitive details to their counterparts.

- Supporting the use of regional currencies to promote intra-ASEAN trade; endorsing the use of Bilateral Payment Arrangement (BPA). The approach would initially be implemented on a voluntary basis, with a view to developing this facility into a multilateral arrangement.

- Accelerating the implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area scheme, with a plan to increase the number of products that will carry zero tariffs by 2003. Establishment of an ASEAN Investment Area, to remove barriers to investment from ASEAN countries by 2010 and by 2020 for non-ASEAN nations.

All of these responses certainly can help to lessen the chaos in SEA, but it is still unclear how effective these responses are and to what extent these proposals could be implemented.

The ASEAN summit held in Vietnam, in December 1998, once again ended up without significant proposals for action. Members were divided on many issues, including the admission of Cambodia: after the deal between Hun Sen and Ranariddh, Cambodia claimed to have a legitimate government, but some members wanted to see more evidence of political stability before admission. Therefore, ASEAN declared that Cambodia was destined for membership, but would join at an unspecified date in the future.

The most worthwhile plan offered at the summit was the one proposed by Japan: a US$ 30 billion rescue fund for the region’s battered economies. Even if Japanese officials admit that a major goal of the plan is to help the Japanese economy, it represents nonetheless a firm commitment compared with ASEAN’s other endeavours.

The final Hanoi Declaration called for closer unity, dialogue and co-operation but avoided detailed calls for a new era of vigour and openness demanded by some of the bloc’s oldest members - Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore. Instead, official statements stayed within ASEAN’s tradition and played up the principles of consensus, consultation and non-interference in each others’ affairs. Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar made it clear that they will stand up for their principles and interests, however unpalatable they may be to outsiders.

Even if there has not been much progress, the situation does not appear completely bleak. The region’s prospects for recovery depend largely on reforms which will be implemented by individual countries, as well as on the quality of their fiscal policies. Therefore, the main issues are long-term: ASEAN countries may not have achieved much at the December 1998 meeting, but at least their leaders did not turn back.  

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ADB, Asia Responding to Crisis, (Asia Development Bank Institute: 1998)  

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Despite contingent reassurances that ASEAN leaders are at least showing a willingness to maintain their commitments, the lack of effective action has prompted criticism over ASEAN's structure and decision-making process. Two factors weigh heavily against the effectiveness of ASEAN's response to the financial crisis. One is that ASEAN is operated by consensus. This character has enabled ASEAN to survive in a rapidly changing environment, but after 30 years' operating on consultation and dialogue, ASEAN has fallen into a 'lowest-common-denominator' syndrome, which limits ASEAN's flexibility and initiative, because agreement has to be reached on the lowest consensus level. Limited by this syndrome, it is hard for ASEAN to find a rescue package on the basis of consensus in a time of urgency, such as the financial crisis.

Another factor is ‘non-interference’ in one another’s domestic affairs, one of ASEAN’s founding principles. Although there are several reasons for the crisis, the weaknesses in some individual ASEAN countries’ economic and political structures are believed to be fundamental to it. But under the prerequisite of ‘non-interference’ ASEAN cannot impose discipline on its members’ weakness that is rooted in their internal political and economic systems.

Apart from being largely ineffective in providing a co-operative and common response to the Asian crisis, ASEAN might lose a relevant characteristic. Without regional cohesion, ASEAN’s members might seek help individually from strategic powers in the neighbourhood. This would undermine one of the main features of ASEAN’s regional role, that is a balancing power in a region that has historically been at the crossroads of superpower rivalry. Some regional powers are already trying to exploit the association’s weakness to expand their influence. China, for instance, is widening its control on the disputed Spratly Islands and strengthening ties with Myanmar; Japan pledged a US$ 30 billion rescue plan for the region that seeks to remove the US dollar as the dominant currency. The problem is that ASEAN does not have the power, and now not even the unity, to formulate regional strategies to deal with the great powers.

J. Funston, ‘ASEAN: Out of its Depth?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 20, Number 1, (April 1998)
IMF, World Economic Outlook - Interim Assessment, (December 1997)
IMF, World Economic Outlook (1998)
The Asian crisis has produced deep changes: when the region was a hub of prosperity, ASEAN was treated with respect by major powers around the world. The crisis has forced member states to turn to their own individual problems, reducing ASEAN to the sum of its parts.

There is no doubt that differences between members mean greater difficulties in achieving co-operation. In June 1998, Thai foreign ministry officials proposed that ASEAN should adopt a ‘flexible’ engagement policy in its relations with members, replacing the principle of ‘non-interference’. The proposal, backed from the Philippines, was rejected because many members, including Indonesia and Myanmar, remained opposed to such a change in ASEAN’s operating procedures, although the need for ‘enhanced interaction’ was approved.

Individual member states developing ties with regional powers, like Thailand with Japan or Myanmar with China, offer a striking contrast to the region prior to the crisis. Before 1997, ASEAN enjoyed a more egalitarian relationship with the big powers; now, the association could become a means to obtain aid from developed countries more easily, and therefore, a centre for superpower rivalry.

The unstable political and security environment poses an important challenge to ASEAN. In the post-cold war period, ASEAN’s threats come from both external and internal factors. The collapse of the bipolar system and the declining capability of US power provide more occasions for conflict between regional powers, such as China, Japan, and India; therefore, ASEAN has to learn how to accommodate the changing relations among great powers. Inside ASEAN, the unstable regional regimes also threaten ASEAN’s future. The financial crisis has undermined the political stability of many ASEAN countries: in Thailand, the Chavalit government collapsed after it failed to cope with crisis and was replaced by the Chuan government, whose fate is also dependent on economy recovery; in Indonesia, President Suharto resigned, raising questions about who can control the country and how to restructure the deteriorating economy; in Malaysia, people have begun to question Mahathir’s leadership; in the Philippines, former actor Estrada has become the new President, but how well he understands the economy is a crucial question; the Vietnamese economy is caught in an impasse; Myanmar is still under a military regime that is under attack by the West for human rights abuses; Cambodia finally has a new government, but the problem of political stability cannot be considered resolved.

Throughout its history, ASEAN has tried to maintain relative peace and stability among its member countries as well as in the entire Asia-Pacific region. This helped to create a favourable environment where rapid and sustained economic growth became possible. Economic development, in turn, brought about social progress and human development. Therefore, ASEAN’s prosperity in the future will largely depend on whether it can go on consolidating the regional peace and stability.

Furthermore, the economic environment is not favourable to ASEAN. Continued access to developed market is becoming increasingly contingent on reciprocal access to ASEAN markets; trade and investment competition from China is arousing more and more concern. ASEAN is still too small to be effective in its external economic diplomacy: to increase its effectiveness, ASEAN needs to be part of a larger grouping within the pacific region such as APEC and act actively. But ASEAN is also too big to be effective for regional integration and co-operation: difficulties have already resulted from the processes of expansion and integration. ASEAN’s expansion will no doubt enhance the international status of the organisation, but it may strain its cohesion.

The proportion of trade with external partners, such as Greater China, Japan, South Korea, and the US is much larger than that of intra-ASEAN trade. In this sense, ASEAN should integrate itself in the wider regional economic grouping such as APEC to exploit its potential fully.

Despite the growing prominence and influence which ASEAN has displayed in the regional economy and as an important means for member countries to effectively interact with other parts of the world, ASEAN is facing a series of challenges: how to preserve cohesion as membership expands, how to maintain ASEAN’s purpose in the face of developing Asia-Pacific security and economic regionalism, and how to reconcile changing relations among the great powers. These challenges have to be met with the help of the world community through a rethink of the association and the economic role it plays.

Figure 1 - Asia Economic Growth Index pre-post-crisis and forecastes for 2000-01
### GDP Growth

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Protestantisme et globalisation : le développement international du protestantisme de conversion

Protestantisme évangélique et pentecôtisme représentent un christianisme de conversion qui insiste sur l'engagement religieux personnel de chacun et les conséquences concrètes et visibles de cet engagement dans la vie individuelle et sociale. Face au déclin relatif des Églises protestantes établies de tendance libérale, ce protestantisme militant, y compris sous la forme du pentecôtisme, s'est fortement développé depuis les années 1960. Une véritable internationale évangélique (evangelical) s'est ainsi créée qui représente une forme d'internationalisation du protestantisme qui est très présente aujourd'hui. Cette forme d'internationalisation a tiré partie des possibilités offertes par la mondialisation de la communication (cf. la retransmission par satellite des campagnes d'évangélisation du baptiste américain Billy Graham dans les années 1980-1990). L'internationalisation évangélique et pentecôtiste illustre bien le phénomène de la glocalisation, à savoir l'articulation du local et du global : enracinés dans des cultures locales très diverses et centrés sur l'église locale (congrégationalisme), cette sensibilité se déploie en un vaste réseau d'individus et d'associations à travers le monde. A côté de l'association mondiale d'Églises que constitue le Conseil Oecuménique des Églises de Genève (World Council of Churches), les réseaux d'individus convertis que les protestantismes évangéliques et pentecôtistes tissent à travers le monde représentent un des aspects de l'actuelle globalisation religieuse.

L'internationale évangélique

Tout chrétien se prétend « évangélique » et le fait de parler du protestantisme évangélique pour désigner un courant peut prêter à confusion. Ceci, d'autant plus que, dans certaines langues, protestant est rendu par « évangélique » (en allemand par exemple: evangelisch). En fait, il s'agit ici de l'orientation que les anglo-saxons appellent l'evangelicalism, les évangéliques étant des evangelicals.

Selon l'historien britannique David W. Bebbington (1989:3), la sensibilité évangélique se caractérise par les quatre traits suivants : 1) le conversionisme : le fait de considérer que devenir chrétien, c'est réorienter radicalement sa vie et renoncer effectivement au péché, la conversion étant une condition sine qua non pour recevoir le baptême (baptême d'adulte); 2) l'activisme, c'est-à-dire un fort investissement dans toutes les actions destinées à convertir les autres (zèle missionnaire); 3) le bibliclisme, c'est-à-dire la focalisation sur la Bible comme texte inspiré par Dieu et comme référence centrale pour la vie chrétienne (tant dans la pratique que pour la doctrine; 4) le crucicentrisme, c'est-à-dire l'insistance sur la crucifixion comme sacrifice expiatoire du Christ pour les péchés des hommes. L'orientation évangélique représente donc un christianisme de conversion à caractère militant, un christianisme soucieux de la rectitude doctrinale et morale de l'individu chrétien.

En France, ce texte de la revue évangélique Ichthus caractérisait ainsi, en 1970, la sensibilité particulière du protestantisme évangélique:


« Que veut dire « évangéliques. (...) Sont « évangéliques », pour nous, les chrétiens qui s'attachent sans défaillance aux grandes affirmations du Credo, qui prêchent la justification par la foi et la conversion personnelle, et qui affirment sans réserve l'autorité de l'Ecriture Sainte » (Ichthus, avril 1970, n°2).
Ce courant représente une réaction orthodoxe et revivaliste: fermeté sur les articles fondamentaux de la foi et délimitation précise de l'Eglise comme rassemblement de ceux qui « appartiennent » à Jésus-Christ, c'est-à-dire les convertis. « You must be born again » et « Back to the Bible » disent les protestants évangélistes américains. Le sens de cette réaction est clair: il s'agit de se mobiliser contre ce que l'on perçoit comme une dissolution de l'identité chrétienne et de l'Eglise dans le « monde » et de recentrer l'Eglise sur son message et ses fidèles, ceux qui ont véritablement l'expérience de la foi. Tout en insistant sur l'engagement de chaque croyant et l'expérience de la conversion, le protestantisme évangélique n'ignore pas pour autant la réflexion théologique et il y a une certaine production de théologiens évangéliques. Parmi les théologiens évangéliques les plus en vue, signalons notamment l'anglician calviniste James Innell Packer (1926-), le baptiste Donald A. Carson (1946-) et le méthodiste I. Howard Marshall (1934-). En France, le théologien évangélique le plus connu est le baptiste Henri Blocher (1937-), ancien doyen de la Faculté libre de théologie évangélique de Vaux-sur-Seine, faculté fondée en 1965 selon le voeu exprimé par l'Association des Eglises Evangéliques de Professants Francophones en vue de « dispenser une instruction théologique soumise à l'autorité de l'Écriture Sainte et communiquer une vision missionnaire du monde contemporain ».

Historiquement, on peut faire remonter l'orientation évangélique au moins jusqu'au XIXe siècle avec la fondation à Londres en 1846 de l'Alliance évangélique universelle qui se proposait de rassembler des chrétiens de différentes Eglises anglicanes et protestantes se réclamant du double héritage de la Réforme protestante et des Réveils (expérience personnelle de la conversion et sanctification). Cette alliance se reconstitua en 1951 sous le nom de World Evangelical Fellowship suite à la fondation, aux États-Unis en 1942, de la National Association of Evangelicals. Elle rassemble quelque soixante-dix associations évangéliques nationales - telle l'Alliance évangélique française - et représente une centaine de millions de chrétiens à travers le monde. Il existe aussi des alliances régionales comme l'Alliance évangélique européenne fondée en 1954. Les évangéliques forment un vaste réseau national et international d'individus qui unissent leurs efforts pour promouvoir les actions d'évangélisation et un œcuménisme évangélique interdénominationnel.

Riches de filiations historiques diverses (la Réforme radicale du XVIe siècle et les courants anabaptistes et mennonites, le puritanisme et la baptism, le méthodisme et les Réveils des XIXe siècle et XXe siècle, les oppositions au libéralisme, l'Alliance évangélique fondée à Londres en 1846...), le protestantisme évangélique désigne donc cette mouvance du protestantisme qui se caractérise par une orthodoxie biblique, l'importance accordée à la conversion personnelle, un mode d'organisation ecclésiastique privilégiant généralement le congrégationalisme (sauf chez les méthodistes) et une culture entrepreneuriale générant une attitude activiste soucieuse de mettre des moyens efficaces au service de l'évangélisation et de la vie des Eglises. Il s'agit d'une forme militante et prosélyte de protestantisme qui est interdénominationnelle et s'intéresse à la conversion des individus quelle que soit leur Eglise d'appartenance ou leur non-appartenance à une Eglise. L'aile la plus radicale de cette mouvance est constituée par les fondamentalistes. Si cette orientation s'incarne particulièrement dans diverses


647 Cette date est un point de repère utile, mais dans chaque configuration nationale et religieuse, les origines du mouvement évangélique peuvent remonter plus loin. Pour la Grande-Bretagne, D. W. Bebbington fait démarrer les débuts de l'évangelicalism dans les année 1730 : « Evangelical religion is a popular Protestant movement that has existed in Britain since the 1730s » (1989 :2).
dénominations, comme les Églises baptistes, les assemblées mennonites, diverses Églises dites « évangéliques », elle se manifeste aussi bien au sein même des Églises réformées et luthériennes comme une sensibilité particulière. De façon générale, les évangéliques désignent des protestants se voulant particulièrement pieux, orthodoxes et prosélytes, l’un ou l’autre de ces différents éléments étant plus ou moins accentué selon les sensibilités.


En raison même de l’importance accordée dans cette mouvance à la démarche de conversion personnelle, il n’est pas étonnant de constater que le souci de l’évangélisation (« gagner des âmes à Christ ») a toujours été très fort dans le protestantisme évangélique. Ainsi, en 1974, se tint à Lausanne une importante conférence internationale sur l’évangélisation mondiale sponsorisée par la Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. Cette conférence réunit 2500 participants de 150 pays. Les leaders évangéliques voulaient à cette occasion interpeller « toute l’Église pour apporter tout l’Évangile au monde entier ». A la fin de cette conférence, les participants adoptèrent un document connu sous le nom d’Alliance de Lausanne (Lausanne Covenant). En quinze articles, ce document expose la conception protestante évangélique de la mission, une conception qui proclame l’urgence de la tâche d’évangélisation et où l’on retrouve le biblicisme spécifique à cette sensibilité (la Bible conçue comme parole écrite de Dieu sans erreur et comme règle infaillible de la foi et de la pratique), mais une conception qui insiste aussi sur « la responsabilité sociale chrétienne » et déplore que l’on ait pu considérer l’évangélisation et les préoccupations sociales comme deux choses mutuellement exclusives.

En matière d’évangélisation, les campagnes organisées par le pasteur baptiste nord-américain Billy Graham (né en 1918) mérite attention. C’est en effet, un des exemples les plus significatifs, avec celui des télévangélistes nord-américains (Gutwirth, 1998), de la façon dont s’effectue l’évangélisation de masse dans le protestantisme évangélique contemporain. Depuis 1949, ce pasteur effectue des campagnes d’évangélisation qui utilisent les techniques les plus modernes de communication. La Billy Graham Evangelistic Association fonctionne aussi comme un organisme de « conseil spirituel » répondant chaque année à des centaines de milliers de lettres et d’appels téléphoniques. Elle a


649 Comme l’a bien vu Danièle HERVIEU-LEGER dans son ouvrage Le pélerin et le converti. La religion en mouvement (1999).
également des activités caritatives, sanitaires et éducatives, en particulier dans les pays du Tiers-Monde.

La théologie de Billy Graham est fondée sur les thèmes communs au courant protestant évangélique. Il demande à ses auditeurs de prendre une décision en faveur de l’Evangile et invitent ceux qui se convertissent à participer à un travail de suite, soit dans leur Eglises d’origine, soit sous la responsabilité de l’organisme ayant commandité sa venue (par exemple, en France, Mission France). Le coût financier des campagnes d’évangélisation, l’insistance mise sur le salut individuel suscitent toujours les réserves de certains protestants. Cependant, les prédications de Billy Graham attirent le plus souvent un public large, composé de différents types sociaux (classes populaires et moyennes tout particulièrement), sensible à sa force de conviction, à la simplicité de son message, à son sens de l’image et du concret. La retransmission par satellite des campagnes d’évangélisation de Billy Graham remonte à la campagne de Paris-Bercy en 1986, campagne relayée par l’Alliance Evangélique Francaise. Elle a été utilisée depuis à Essen (Allemagne) en 1993 et à Porto-Rico en 1995. Ces trois campagnes ont eu un retentissement international à travers plusieurs milliers de sites de réception à travers le monde. La campagne retransmise depuis le stade d’Essen du 17 au 21 mars 1993, qui s’inscrivait dans le cadre de l’opération intitulée « Mission Monde », a ainsi été diffusée dans 55 nations européennes et traduites en 43 langues. En France, les prédications de Essen ont été reçues sur plus de 170 sites - dans des temples, maisons de jeunes, salles communales, théâtres loués ou mis à disposition pour les quatre soirées - et environ 30 000 personnes les ont suivies chaque soir (par exemple, un millier de personnes à Metz et deux milliers à Mulhouse et environ). Dans certaines localités, la retransmission avait même été injectée dans le câble local, permettant ainsi à des gens de suivre cette campagne à leur domicile.


La scène protestante nord-américaine ne se réduit cependant pas aux évolutions respectives des Eglises libérales et évangéliques. Il y a un mouvement encore plus profond de restructuration dans lequel certains voient poindre un nouveau paradigme d’Eglise dessinant un christianisme postdénominationnel qui constituerait une « seconde réformation ». D.E. Miller au début de son ouvrage Reinventing American Protestantism (1997) déclare: «Je crois que nous sommes témoins d’une seconde réformation qui transforme la manière dont le christianisme sera vécu dans le nouveau millénaire »(Miller, 1997 : 11). Ce diagnostic, qui ne prend pas suffisamment en compte l’histoire650, il le fonde sur une enquête approfondie menée auprès de ce que les Américains appellent les « méga-

650 Dans une note critique, Sébastien Fath reproche à D.E. Miller d’oublier que « baptistes et méthodistes, au début du XIXe siècle, s’avéraient extrêmement proches » de ces Eglises « post-dénominationnelles » d’aujourd’hui, lesquelles, estiment S. Fath « paraissent fort bien s’insérer dans une large continuité historique revivaliste et anti-institutionnelle » (Fath, 1999 b : 22).
Eglises »651, des nouvelles Eglises comme Calvary Chapel, Vineyard Christian Fellowship et Hope Chapel qui sont nées à la fin des années 60 et se sont fortement développées dans la période même où les Eglises protestantes libérales déclinaient. Ces Eglises sont indépendantes ou se conduisent comme telles même si elles sont rattachées à une dénomination. Leur qualificatif de méga vient du fait que chaque dimanche, elles attirent un nombre considérable de personnes: par exemple 12 000 personnes chaque dimanche à Calvary Chapel à Santa Ana en Californie. L'apparition de ces Eglises représentent une évolution d'une fraction du protestantisme évangélique lui-même fraction qui, tout en gardant un message religieux traditionnel fondé sur la Bible, est moins doctrinaire et plus préoccupée du bien-être concret des gens; c'est « une nouvelle façon de se sentir évangélique » (Zimmerlin, 1997). Comme le dit très bien D. E. Miller, ces Eglises sont « radicalement empiriques, partant de l'expérience concrète que les gens font de Dieu plutôt que de déductions tirées de propositions diverses sur la nature de Dieu » (1998 : 203). Ces Eglises, impressionnantes par leur dimension, incarnent la modernité architecturale et médiatique. Mettant en œuvre un accueil à la fois chaleureux et professionnel des gens, elles constituent de véritables centres de méditation et de détente où chacun peut trouver chaussure spirituelle à son pied puisque l'essentiel est que chaque individu puisse satisfaire ses aspirations et trouver des réponses à ses préoccupations. Selon l'enquête de D. E. Miller menée en 1991, 46 % des fidèles qui fréquentent ces Eglises sont d'origine protestante, 11 % sont d'origine catholique, 15 % d'autres origines et 29 % ne font état d'aucune affiliation religieuse auparavant. Ces données confirment plusieurs choses: 1) que ces megachurches ont bien un caractère interdénominationnel au niveau de leur recrutement; en ce sens, elles représentent bien un christianisme interdénominationnel; 2) que ces megachurches ont un certain impact auprès des sans religion; 3) que, malgré ces deux premières caractéristiques, ces Eglises font bien partie de la mouvance du protestantisme évangélique en articulant, à leur façon, le principe congrégationaliste, le style de certains télévangélistes et l'ethos entrepreneurial de l'évangélisme. Ce qui change c'est que ces Eglises abandonnent la rigueur doctrinale au profit de l'impératif premier de la satisfaction de la « clientèle » religieuse. En cela, ces megachurches rejoignent le courant de « l'Evangile de la prospérité et du bonheur » qui prône un christianisme améliorant la vie quotidienne des gens et les rendant heureux. Reste que ces megachurches s'inscrivent incontestablement dans la continuité des réveils à caractère transdénominationnel qui ponctuent l'histoire religieuse des Etats-Unis.

La glocalisation pentecôtiste652:

Cette fin de millénaire est marquée par le développement assez spectaculaire d'un christianisme émotionnel d'inspiration protestante: le pentecôtisme. Il s'agit d'un monde religieux dont il n'est pas facile d'établir les contours car les Eglises et groupes religieux qui, dans les cinq continents, se réclament du pentecôtisme et/ou que l'on peut ranger sous ce vocable, sont d'une extrême variété. Comme l'a très bien vu Harvey Cox, « les pentecôtistes réussissent à être hautement syncrétistes alors que leurs dirigeants prêchent contre le syncrétisme » (Cox, 1995 : 221) : de fait, l'on constate que cette expression émotionnelle du christianisme parvient fort bien à se mouler dans toutes sortes de culture. Apparu au début du XXe siècle aux Etats-Unis, le pentecôtisme s'est particulièrement développé ces dernières décennies en Amérique Latine, en Afrique et en Asie. Insistant sur le pentecôtisme comme « phénomène religieux transnationalisé », Corten y voit même « la principale transnationalisation religieuse du XXe siècle » (Corten, 1995: 70). Cette caractéristique transnationale653, présente dès les

652 Sur le pentecôtisme, nous renvoyons à notre étude intitulée « Le pentecôtisme: contours et paradoxes d'un protestantisme émotionnel » (Willaime, 1999), étude dont nous reprenons ici quelques éléments. Cette étude s'insère dans un numéro spécial des Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions (tome 105) entièrement consacré au pentecôtisme. On se reporterà avec profit à l'ensemble des contributions de ce numéro.
origines du pentecôtisme, est d’autant plus effective aujourd’hui qu’elle s’inscrit dans un processus plus large « de globalisation et de transnationalisation qui affecte le religieux à l'échelle mondiale » (Bastian, 1997 : 6). Cette transnationalisation ne va pas seulement dans le sens Nord-Sud ou Ouest-Est, elle opère aussi dans une direction contraire, les Églises pentecôtistes d’Afrique, d’Amérique Latine et d’Asie envoyant des missionnaires vers d’autres continents, en particulier en Europe.

Le pentecôtisme se manifeste par une multitude de dénominations. Rien qu’aux États-Unis, W. Hollenweger (1972) en dénombre deux cents (si certaines de ces dénominations ont des effectifs réduits et sont peu répandues, d’autres, comme les Assemblées de Dieu sont au contraire quantitativement importantes et présentes sur tous les continents). Bien que différenciées en de nombreux courants et se présentant diversement selon les pays et les aires culturelles, le pentecôtisme se manifeste aussi par des structures internationales comme la *Pentecostal World Conference* qui se réunit pour la première fois à Zurich en 1947. La plupart des Églises pentecôtistes n’appartiennent pas au Conseil Ocuménique des Églises (*World Council of Churches*).

L’expérience émotionnelle de la présence divine et de son efficacité (à travers la glossolalie, la guérison, la prophétie), la référence privilégiée à la Bible et le caractère professant du groupement religieux - c’est-à-dire le type de la *Believer’s Church* qui n’admet comme membres que les convertis et attend de chacun qu’il soit un évangélisateur - nous paraissent les trois éléments fondamentaux de cette expression du christianisme que constitue le pentecôtisme. Une économie pragmatique du salut, un dieu de proximité et un dieu qui agit, voilà ce qu’offre le pentecôtisme au plan religieux. Un dieu qui agit dans l’instant, un dieu qui sauve et guérit chacun, on comprend que le culte pentecôtiste soit un culte-événement, un culte-spectacle où il se passe toujours quelque chose, chacun étant acteur et spectateur à la fois. Comme l’écrit Carmen Bernand dans sa préface à l’ouvrage de S. Pédron-Colombani (1998 : 10), le pentecôtisme «opère des reconstructions identitaires, à la fois modernes et religieuses, en utilisant, entre autres stratégies, la prise en charge des infortunes, les émotions partagées et le recours à la volonté individuelle, lorsque celle-ci est éclairée par le Verbe ». Les pentecôtistes s’insèrent dans la société à travers une intégration forte dans un groupe primaire d’appartenance et de référence qui leur permet de reconstruire une identité mise à mal par les désastres de toutes sortes qu’ils ont vécues. Sous l’enchantement d’autorités charismatiques qui canalisent leur émotion et l’orientent - qui peuvent la manipuler aussi-, ils s’affirment comme sujets en articulant une parole qui, même si c’est sous la forme chaotique de la glossolalie, est la leur.

Le pentecôtisme est moderne en légitimant la rupture avec des coutumes traditionnelles, il est postmoderne par sa capacité à gérer les fractures sociales et culturelles de la modernité, il est prémoderne en réenchantant le monde. De là sa formidable ambivalence. Mais on peut aussi se demander si le pentecôtisme n’est pas plus ultramoderne que moderne654. Si, en effet, on identifie la modernité avec ce grand mouvement d’émancipation de la tradition porté par des idéaux de progrès, donc par une représentation mobilisatrice de l’avenir, le pentecôtisme n’est pas moderne: s’il émancipe des traditions, il est plus tourné vers le présent que vers l’avenir. Le pentecôtisme est, en effet, une culture religieuse du présent, son émotion n’est pas celle de l’utopie, mais celle de l’efficacité immédiate de l’agir divin. Si l’ultramodernité, c’est la culture de l’instant, celle d’individus tellement enfermés dans le présent qu’ils en ont de la peine à se figurer tant le passé que l’avenir, alors le pentecôtisme pourrait être qualifié de religion ultramoderne. En tant que religion de l’émotion, il est en affinité avec la « démocratie de l’émotion » que suscitent les médias dans les sociétés contemporaines. En tant que religion de l’émotion développant des appartenances précaires et fluides, voire des multiappartenances, il est également en affinité avec une société contemporaine marquée par une certaine mobilité des appartenances et des références (dans le domaine politique comme dans le domaine religieux d’ailleurs). Le génie du pentecôtisme réside dans cette capacité à opérer des ruptures dans la continuité et à parler un langage global dans des langues et des cultures locales. Le pentecôtisme offre ainsi un exemple de ce que certains auteurs appellent la « glocalisation », c’est-à-dire la rencontre du global et du local.

654 Dans notre terminologie, si la modernité, c’est le mouvement porté par les certitudes modernistes, c’est-à-dire une modernité conquérante ayant démythologisé les traditions au nom du futur, l’ultramodernité, c’est le mouvement plus les incertitudes de la modernité désenchantée, c’est-à-dire une modernité aboutie ayant démythologisé aussi bien les traditions que les utopies. Le temps de l’ultramodernité, c’est le présent.
Le protestantisme de conversion : un christianisme militant au sein de sociétés sécularisées et pluralistes

Les évangéliques ne sont ni pour, ni contre la société sécularisée et pluraliste dans laquelle ils se trouvent: ils sont tout simplement dedans et s'y meuvent même aisément tout en s'en distinguant sur plusieurs points. Entre l'accommodation bienveillante des libéraux et le séparatisme hostile des fondamentalistes, les évangéliques constituent une sous-culture offrant à ses membres un sens leur permettant de s'orienter dans une société pluraliste. Christian Smith explique le succès relatif du courant évangélique par le fait qu'il obéit à une logique de distinction par rapport à l'environnement séculier et à d'autres groupes, une logique de distinction qui permet aux membres des groupes et réseaux évangéliques de s'identifier fortement à leur société religieuse comme à un groupe de référence qu'ils ont choisi individuellement.

« We would like to suggest, however, that in the modern world, religious does survive and can thrive, not in the form of « sacred canopies », but rather in the form of « sacred umbrellas ». Canopies are expansive, immobile and held up by props beyond the reach of those covered. Umbrellas on the other hand, are small, handheld and portable – like the faith sustaining religious worlds that modern people construct for themselves. (…). In the pluralistic, modern world, people don't need macro-encompassing sacred cosmoses to maintain their religious beliefs. They only need « sacred umbrellas » small, portable, accessible relational worlds – religious reference groups – « under » which their beliefs can make complete sense » (Smith, 1998 :106).

A vrai dire, plutôt que de parler de « parapluies sacrées », nous parlerions plus volontiers de « chapiteaux sacrés » ou de « tentes sacrées » pour mieux marquer le caractère communautaire et individuel à la fois de ces sous-cultures religieuses dans les sociétés pluralistes.

Une telle analyse permet de comprendre pourquoi, dans une société sécularisée et pluraliste, il y a une sorte de plus-value sociale accordée aux groupes minoritaires qui incarnent une différence culturelle quelle que soit la nature de cette différence d'ailleurs. Dans le domaine religieux - en France les juifs, musulmans, bouddhistes, protestants, orthodoxes, francs-maçons,... ou dans un autre domaine (les homosexuels, les corses, les végétariens,...). Comme si la société globale se nourrissait de ces différences et que celui qui est dans le mainstream se trouvait banalisé et devenait insignifiant. Face à la macdonalisation culturelle, il est devenu chic d'incarner sa différence alors qu'elle tendait à être taxée de « retard culturel » dans une période de modernité triomphante. Ainsi, autant les religions ont pu paraître comme des expressions traditionnelles résistant à une modernité conquérante qui tendait à les percevoir comme des réalités obsolètes en voie avancée de déliquescence, autant elles peuvent aujourd'hui apparaître comme des groupes de référence socialement signifiants dans le contexte d'une société ultramoderne tellement sécularisée qu'elle en est devenue impuissante à signifier un sens collectif au nom d'une mythologie mobilisatrice. Tant pour les groupes religieux majoritaires que minoritaires, le religieux se recompose comme sous la forme de sous-cultures identifiables dans un environnement pluraliste et ayant un aspect contre-culturel. Cette dimension contre-culturelle est plus ou moins prononcée selon les contextes et il ne faut jamais oublier la dialectique constante qui existe entre protestants libéraux et protestants évangéliques. Plus les premiers seront attestataires de la société séculière, plus les seconds accentueront leur dimension protestataire. Par contre, lorsque les libéraux deviennent plus contre-culturels – comme ce fut le cas dans les années soixante-dix aux États-Unis -, les évangéliques tendent alors à devenir attestataires en reprenant à leur profit une thématique conservatrice655.

Il se recompose également sous la forme de groupes militants auxquels les individus adhèrent par un choix personnel et non par héritage. Sous la forme donc d'une religion individuelle de convertis qui est moins liée à des territoires qu’à des réseaux transrégionaux et transnationaux de militants. Il y a une toile protestante évangélique et pentecôtiste tissée à travers le monde et qui est transversale aux territoires et aux régulations institutionnelles qui s'y déploient. Une toile qui s'internationalise d’autant

mieux qu’elle ne met pas prioritairement en relation des organisations devant chercher à articuler leurs différentes cultures d’entreprises (comme les Eglises régionales et nationales qui s’inscrivent dans une tradition confessionnelle), mais des individus qui, bien que de langues et de cultures, se reconnaissent comme « convertis » et animés d’un même zèle évangélisateur. Il est extrêmement significatif que le protestantisme évangélique comme le pentecôtisme ont été, dès le départ, caractérisés par l’importance des relations internationales sur le mode d’amicales d’individus partageant la même orientation et visant la conversion des personnes au-delà de toutes les frontières politiques et ecclésiastiques. Ce type de protestantisme refuse les frontières politiques, ecclésiastiques, culturelles, sociales et linguistiques en s’adressant à l’individu dans sa langue, dans son pays, voire dans son cadre ecclésiastique comme ses missionnaires américains qui viennent réévangéliser des catholiques français en les invitant à rester dans leur Eglise. C’est en ce sens que l’on peut parler de glocalisation, d’articulation du global et du local.

Dernier point et non des moindres. Le mainline Protestantism est lui aussi touché par ces sensibilités et il y a une certaine evangelicalisation – si l’on peut dire - du protestantisme luthérien et réformé qui est plus profonde et large que sa pentecôtisation qui existe aussi. C’est bien parce que ces sensibilités manifestent quelque chose des recompositions ultramodernes du christianisme qu’elles se manifestent aussi dans les Eglises réputées libérales. Elles aussi commencent à faire l’expérience que le religieux, en ultramodernité, s’atteste dans la différence et dans la militance de groupes minoritaires n’ayant plus aucune prétention par rapport à la société globale acceptée définitivement dans sa sécularité. Paradoxalement, ces protestantismes évangéliques et pentecôtistes manifestent le caractère radical de la sécularisation : ils se meuvent d’autant mieux dans cette société et utilisent d’autant mieux les moyens qu’ils ne visent aucunement la restauration d’une situation de chrétienté et s’intéressent surtout aux individus. Cela ne les empêche pas de s’engager pour des causes déterminées dans certaines circonstances : Martin Luther King est une des figures du protestantisme évangélique et c’est au nom de ses convictions qu’il s’engagea dans le mouvement des droits civils. Par rapport aux fondamentalistes qui délégitiment la société en cherchant à restaurer un ordre social chrétien, par rapport aux libéraux qui légitiment la société séculière et bénissent son libéralisme, les évangéliques et les pentecôtistes sont, contrairement à certaines apparences, radicalement laïques ; il ne s’agit ni de restaurer une quelconque forme de chrétienté ni d’offrir un dais sacré à une société sécularisée, il s’agit, tout en acceptant la société telle qu’elle est, de tout faire pour qu’elle soit le plus peuplée d’individus croyants et vertueux.

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When in 1972 the Organization of the United Nations objected and admonished about the activity of the transnational corporations, states were far to realize that in a short period of time the displacement of the political power by the economic one was starting.

In the year 1973 the Trilateral Commission was born and stated the position for all countries: to disengage from state’s protection and to look for different ways of self-protection.

Later the process, whose turning point consisted in the fall of the Berlin Wall, set out and the concept of state’s sovereignty became obsolete in front of a form of power that is not contained within the borders of a Nation.

This is the way how, in daily life, the classical conception of state, as well as the sovereignty exerted through the Democratic Powers, came to the end.
Globalisation, Regionalisation and the History of International Relations

Areas and Topics

Areas

Australia

- Beaumont Jean (Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria, Australia), Australia between regionalization and Globalization. Historical Perspective and recent trends.
- Hajdu Joe, (Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria, Australia), The Presence of Global Capital in Australia and the Debate over National Identity.
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- Shuto Motoko (Komazawa University, Tokio), Sovereignty, Regionalism and Globalization in South East Asia.
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- Tertrais Hugues (Pierre Renouvin Institute, University of Paris I, France), Entre mondialisation et régionalisation: les relations entre l'Europe et l'Asie du Sud-Est depuis la seconde guerre mondiale.
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Latin America

In fact many scholars from Argentina and Brazil will present in Oslo a collection of papers related to Latin America and the problems of Globalization and Regionalization. See pages 94-124. Rapoport will present in Oslo a preliminary paper to this collection.

**Africa**

- Döpcke Wolfgang, (Universidade de Brasilia), About the Mistery and Misery of Regional Integration in Africa.

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- Angerer Thomas (University of Vienna, Austria), Austria’s Foreign Policy since 1918: between Regionalization and Globalization.
- Graziani Augusto (Università “La Sapienza”, Roma), The Italian Economy in the International Context: the International Setting.
- Haba Kumiko, (Hosei University, Tokyo, Japan), Globalism and Regionalism in the East Central Europe: Nationality Problem and Regional Cooperation under the EU and NATO Enlargement.
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- Osterhammel Jurgen (University of Konstantz), Globalising and regionalising forces affecting the dependent World (19th and 20th centuries).
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- Jordan Robert S. (University of New Orleans, USA), Clausewitz and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR); do they have anything in common?
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- Bidussa David (Fondazione Feltrinelli, Milano), All-Reaching Answers to Globalization. Religious Radicalism as ”Tradition’s Figure” and ”Social Mobilization”. The Late 20th Century Jewish Case
- Canavero Alfredo (Università degli Studi di Milano), A more Globalized Church will be less Universal? The Internationalization of the Roman Curia in the 20th Century.
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Globalisation, Regionalisation and The History of International Relations in Latin America

With an Introductory Paper by Mario Rapoport
L’Amerique Latine entre Globalisation et Regionalisation. Perspectives Historique et Tendencies Recentes. 
Rapport General
The Relationship between Argentine and Western Europe. A Special Case: Relationship with Spain (1990-1999).

The political and economical relations between Argentine and Western Europe had been very important in the last two centuries. After some weakness which took place at the end of World War II and the 60’s, the relationship has been growing in importance until the last decade. In the 90’s the European Community Countries became very important to Argentine in fields such as investments or commerce. One of the most relevant case regards Spain, which became a great investor in the Argentine economic structure and basically widened the business connections with this country. The direct investments of Spanish industrial and financial groups, especially in Argentine privatisation of the last years, were the most significant facts which affected the relationship between these two countries. Investments of Spanish companies in our country -that until that time had been of less importance- grew so much that since 1994 they achieved a privileged position in the investments made in order to buy Argentine state companies.

In 5 years only, companies such as Telefónica, ENDESA, Gas Natural, Iberia, Aguas de Barcelona, REPSOL, Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa, just to mention some of them, went on to own many former state companies of our country. Besides, a new stage began in 1996 regarding this investment offensive of Spanish funds; it mainly focused on banks, expansion of previously acquired companies and also bounded to buy important private companies in Argentine. This second stage of Spanish investments was headed by important financial entities, all of them with different interests in the deal, such as Banco Bilbao-Vizcaya and Santander.

All of this has essentially changed the relationship between Argentine and Spain, bestowing a very special place in the Argentine economy and politics upon the last one. Nevertheless, the economic relationship with other members of the European Community became stronger.

This essay will consider the changes in the Hispanic-Argentine relationship, and it will try to analyze some of its causes.
The Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Beginning of the United States Hegemony in the Hemisphere (1906-12)

Vers la fin du XIXe siècle et pendant les premières décades du XXe, les États-Unis apparaurent comme un des nouveaux centres du pouvoir au concert mondial, en raison de leur développement démographique, leur croissante expansion agricole et industrielle, et de la concentration des capitaux. La nouvelle puissance américaine, après l'occupation du vaste hinterland, s'étendit hors de ses frontières et, depuis 1898, a rénoncée à l'isolationnisme et s'est engagée dans la politique mondiale.  

La formation d'autres nouveaux centres de pouvoir en dehors des États-Unis a eu pour résultat la mondialisation des relations internationales. Le système de pouvoirs qui avait pour foyer l'Europe s'est transformé en un système à l'échelle planétaire. Même le partage de l'Afrique, plus qu'une conséquence de l'expansion économique, appartient au jeu du pouvoir mondial étant donné que chaque puissance garda inaltéré, son poids relatif. Les partages et l'établissement de zones d'influence comptaient parmi les politiques pour assurer le maintien de l'équilibre qui, à cette époque-là, s'était déjà allé au-delà du continent européen. À la fin du dernier siècle, les différentes zones se sont unis en un tout.

Les États-Unis dès la fin du XIXe siècle ont réorienté leur politique extérieure vers l'Amérique latine, tout en ressuscitant la rhétorique du panaméricanisme, ce qui s'est traduit par la réactivation des conférences internationales américaines et la visite du Secrétaire d'État Elihu Root (1906) aux principaux pays du côte sud hémisphérique. L'invocation du sentiment panaméricain servait, ainsi, aux propos de la puissance du nord qui cherchait à élargir les marchés pour sa croissante production.

Le baron du Rio Branco, ministre des affaires étrangères pour près de dix ans (décembre 1902 – février 1912), en lisant de manière juste le nouveau partage du pouvoir mondial, ne contesta pas les prétentions nord-américaine et promut encore plus le rapprochement (déjà entamé par les fondateurs de la République) de son pays de la nouvelle puissance hégémonique de l'hémisphère. Ce rapprochement était soutenu par des fondements d'ordre économique (les États-Unis étaient les premiers importateurs du principal produit d'exportation brésilien, le café) et politique, en tenant compte des relations avec les autres pays du segment sud-américain, surtout celles qui concernaient la fixation et la délimitation des frontières nationales.

Le corollaire Roosevelt et la confluence de concepts

Dans l'optique du gouvernement nord-américaine, l'application des principes formulés par le président Monroe en 1823, selon lesquels le continent serait interdit à la conquête européenne, imposait aussi des responsabilités. Ainsi, les États-Unis devraient faire preuve de zèle en ce qui concerne l'ordre et la paix en Amérique. Selon les mots de Theodore Roosevelt, à l'occasion de sa communication présidentielle en Mai 1904, une nation qui “fait preuve de décence quand il s'agit des questions industrielles et politiques, si elle garde l'ordre et s'acquitte de ses devoirs ne doit pas craindre l'intervention des États-Unis (...) [Mais] le relâchement général des liens d'une société civilisée peut demander (...) l'intervention d'une quelconque nation civilisée, et à l'Hémisphère Occidental les États-Unis ne peuvent pas ignorer ce devoir”. Roosevelt déclara, ainsi, l'intention d'exercer une action de gendarme international à l'hémisphère, au nom de la doctrine Monroe. Le concept de protection de l'hémisphère contre les
agressions extra-continentales, qui était le noyau de la doctrine, fut remanié par le président nord-américain de façon à justifier la politique de contrainte envers les États latino-américains. Ce supplément à la doctrine Monre est connu comme “corollaire” Roosevelt.659

Rio Branco ne mit en discussion les termes du corollaire ni repoussa les méthodes d’action du président Roosevelt, d’autant plus qu’il ne voyait pas:

“(...) de raison pour que les trois principales nations de l’Amérique du Sud – le Brésil, le Chili et l’Argentine - s’inquiètent du langage du Président Roosevelt (...). Personne ne pourra dire sans leur rendre justice qu’elles soient au nombre des nations turbulentes qui subissent de mauvaises administrations, qui ne savent pas faire ‘bon usage de leur indépendance’, ou que les plus forte doivent appliquer le ‘droit d’expropriation contre les peuples incompétants’, droit proclamé il y a longtemps par le Président des États-Unis”.660

Rio Branco se faisait du souci surtout de futures situations révolutionnaires dans les républiques limitrophes qui puissent entraîner des bouleversements dans certaines régions frontalières et perturber la paix en Amérique du Sud. Tant il est vrai qu’il forma ensuite un projet d’un traité dans ce sens avec les deux autres nations plus importants du segment sud de l’hémisphère, l’Argentine et le Chili. Le calme institutionnel du Brésil de cette époque-là, et l’équilibre des ses comptes extérieures permirent à Rio Branco une action cohérente et une aisance qu’aucun d’autre ministre de la période républicaine en avait joui.

Un exemple concret de l’acceptation du corollaire Roosevelt de la part du ministre brésilien, peut être noté au moment de la guerre civile au Paraguay (1905), quand il remarqua, dans une lettre au ministre plénipotentiaire brésilien à Washington (Alfredo de Morais Gomes Ferreira), qu’il n’y avait pas de raison pour la “crainte que certains gouvernements sud-américains ont de prochaines interventions des États-Unis dans leurs affaires”.661 D’autant plus qu’il ne s’agissait pas d’intervention étrangère afin de contribuer pour qu’un parti supplanter un autre, mais de collaboration dans le sens d’arriver à un accord conciliateur sans aucune perte de prestige pour l’autorité légale. La diplomatie européenne avait déjà procédé de façon pareille au Prata. En 1864, également, les médiation brésilienne, argentine e britannique furent acceptées par les forces en conflit à l’Uruguay.662

L’attitude de Rio Branco ne pourrait pas avoir été plus claire:

“Je ne crois pas que la présence d’un ou deux vaisseaux américains au Paraguay, où pendant la révolution les Argentins en avaient quatre et nous trois, puisse donner lieu à des réparations injustes, vu que les États-Unis ont là aussi, comme du reste dans le monde entier, des intérêts commerciaux à défendre en cas de bouleversements politiques”.663

Dans l’année précédant, le ministre brésilien s’était déjà exprimé (encore à propos de la convulsion politique à l’Uruguay) qu’il était pour la démonstration de force au profit de la paix et, ainsi, il avait averti le chef de la légation à Washington dans le sens de suggérer au Secrétaire d’État Hay d’une manière discrète, qu’il était opportun la présence d’un ou deux navires de guerre nord-américains dans ce pays-là, puisque:

“(...) concurrât à sauvegarder le prestige du gouvernement, soutenir le consulat, empêcher les abus de la petite flotte des révolutionnaires contre les vaisseaux marchands et aussi faire les révolutionnaires accepter des conditions raisonnables de pacification. Nous apprécierions beaucoup une tele collaboration en vue de la paix”.664


661 AHI. Dépêche pour Washington, le 14 avr. 1905.

662 Idem.

663 Idem

664 AHI. Télégramme confirmé par lettre officielle confidentielle pour Washington, le 30 sept. 1904.
Dans cet aspect les concepts du Baron n’étaient pas en conflit avec les procédés interventionnistes de Roosevelt. Au-delà d’accepter l’intervention au nom des intérêts à défendre, il croyait à la possibilité des nations les plus puissantes jouer un rôle favorable à la paix à l’égard des nations les plus faibles. Pour cette raison, Rio Branco était d’avis que le gouvernement de Washington devait accréditer un ministre résident au Paraguay, pour : 

“(...), que ce diplomate puisse, au profit de la paix et du progrès de notre continent, exercer son action bénéfique que les États-Unis avec le Brésil et les autres puissances y représentées pouvaient exercer dans des situations difficiles telles que celles dont ce pay-là venait de subir.”

Preuve éloquente de similitude ressemblance de concepts entre Roosevelt et Rio Branco se trouve dans un long interview que celui-ci accorda en juillet 1906 au correspondant du journal argentin La Nación, à Rio de Janeiro. Parmi plusieurs choses, le ministre brésilien a déclaré que “le danger de l’expansion amérique n’existait pas”. En plus, en raison de la distance, les États-Unis ne pourraient exercer de l’influence direct qu’au Mer des Antilles. Dans un autre passage de l’interview, Rio Branco a fait preuve d’une telle franchise qu’on a été étonné au Prata : “(...) les pays qui ne savent pas gouverner, qui n’ont pas assez d’éléments pour éviter les révolutions et guerres civiles continues qui se succèdent sans interruption n’ont pas raison d’exister et doivent céder leur place à une autre nation plus forte, plus organisée, plus progressiste, plus virile”. Peu après, Rio Branco a nié les déclarations publiées par le correspondant d’autant plus que leur effet était très mauvais à ce moment-là quand on venait de faire l’ouverture de la Troisième Conférence Internationale Américaine à Rio de Janeiro. Cependant, La Nación a confirmé le reportage. Ceci, pour El Tiempo de Buenos Aires aussi, aurait été une indiscretion, mais de celles “calculées et bien pesées”.

L’avis de Rio Branco n’était pas isolée. Des journalistes à l’époque faisaient appel à des arguments semblables pour justifier le corollaire Roosevelt. Por Gil Vidal, par exemple, les États-Unis n’avaient pas l’intention d’exercer de l’hégémonie politique sur l’Amérique Latine. Pour expliquer son point de vue il rappelait la posture nord-américaine en face du blocus maritime anglo-italien-germanique imposé au Vénézuela en 1902. Puisque le gouvernement de Washington avait réussi à lever l’embargo en se portant garant, il en devint répondant face à la décision du Tribunal de La Haye. Les États-Unis devaient donc intervenir pour imposer au pays sud-américain l’accomplissement des son devoir. L’intervention dans ce cas-là était la possession de l’administration des douanes jusqu’au paiement des dettes. Les nations qui ne voulaient pas subir de telle humiliation n’avaient que se conduire de façon honnête, desait-il. La communication de Roosevelt revêtait, ainsi, de “conseil et avertissement prudents aux Républiques de l’Amérique Central et Sud de que fiées à la protection que leur assure la doctrine Monroe il ne leur sera licite violer les engagements, attenter au droit de transgresser et scandaliser le monde civilisé”.

De façon pareille Rocha Pombo a réprouvé l’attitude du Général Castro, président du Vénézuela, et s’est mis d’accord avec la punition que les États-Unis pouvaient imposer à ce pays. La doctrine Monroe ne pouvait pas “instituer en faveur des peuples américains le privilège de manquer impunément aux engagements d’honneur et en se moquant des créanciers”. D’autres journalistes encore, tels que Luís Raposo e Eunápio Deiró, considéraient la doctrine Monroe, même dans les termes de Roosevelt, comme un outil de protection de l’intégrité territoriale du continent vis-à-vis des agressions européennes. Ils ne soupçonnaient aucun danger, au cas où les nations de l’Amérique du Sud “accepteraient cette convention”. Ainsi, la doctrine, pour un certain secteur de l’opinion était vue comme “grand service”


666 (Nous avons fait la traduction). Pour plus d’éclaircissements voir La Nación, Buenos Aires, le 26 juil., le 9 et 10 août 1906; La Prensa, Buenos Aires, le 8 août 1906; El Tiempo, Buenos Aires, le 9 août 1906; et El País, Buenos Aires, le 10 août 1906.


au continent, car elle assurait la liberté pour le “développement de chaque nation américaine” en les sauvegardant de la convoitise et conquête européennes.670

La vue d'un système continental

Rio Branco et le premier ambassadeur du Brésil à Washington,671 Joaquim Nabuco, s’étaient mis d’accord, quoique chacun à sa manière et avec des langages différents, que les États-Unis étaient le centre d’un sousysthème international de pouvoir.

Le réalisme de Rio Branco lui permettait de s’apercevoir avec netteté le poids des États-Unis dans le nouveau partage du pouvoir mondial:

“La vérité c’est qu’il n’y avait de grandes puissance qu’en Europe et aujourd’hui celles-ci sont les premières à reconnaître qu’il y a au Nouveau Monde une grande et puissante nation sur laquelle elles doivent compter, et que a forcément sa part d’influence dans la politique internationale du monde entier”.672

En voyant son pays entouré des voisins ayant des préjugés, le ministre conférant un caractère stratégique à l’amitié nord-américaine dans un sens préventif puisqu’elle pourrait aider à neutraliser des machinations antibrésiliennes à Washington (ville qui, selon lui, était le foyer d’intrigues contre le Brésil). En outre, il n’entrevoit pas la possibilité de la formation, dans le continent américain d’un bloc de pouvoir capable de faire face aux États-Unis, en raison du manque de cohésion entre les pays hispaniques et de la faiblesse reconnu de ceux-ci. Telle pensée serait-elle simplement “ridicule”.673

Mais, en ce qui concerne l’amitié nord-américaine comme moyen de protection contre d’éventuelles pressions européennes, Rio Branco et Nabuco étaient presque d’accord, vu que la doctrina Monroe, d’après les deux, n’était pas restreinte aux États-Unis.674 Quand la presse argentine, à l’occasion de la conférence de 1906, s’opposa au “projet d’élargir la doctrine Monroe à l’Amérique du Sud”, sous le patronage d’une motion argentine-brésilienne-chilienne, le Baron se manifesta en ces termes:

“Les déclarations de Monroe le 2 décembre 1823 contre de possibles projets d’expansion coloniale européenne en l’Amérique et contre les interventions européennes déjà programmées dans la vie interne des nations du continent, n’avaient pas pour but seulement l’ Amérique du Nord, mais l’Amérique entière, celle du Nord et celle du Sud”.675

La idée d’un système continental était soutenue explicitement par le Secrétaire d’État Elihu Root, comme il l’a fait devant le colloque américain déjà mentionné, quand il a fait une proposition pour l’union de toutes des Amériques afin de rendre possible la formation d’une “opinion pan-américaine dont le pouvoir puisse influer sur la direction internationale”. Le rapprochement apporterait “la sécurité et le progrès, la production et le commerce, la richesse et le savoir, les arts et le bonheur pour nous tous”.676 Il vaut aussi enregistrer la manifestation du représentant péruvien qui a reconnu, à ce moment-là, l’existence d’un sousystème de pouvoir dont le leader étaient les États-Unis:

671 En 1905 le Brésil et les États-Unis élevèrent, par acte simultanée et réciproque, les légations de leurs pays à catégorie d’ambassade.
673 La ligue des Républiques hispano-américaines dont on parlait beaucoup pour faire face aux États-Unis c’est une pensée irréalisable par impossibilité d’accord entre les peuples en général séparés les uns des autres, et c’est encore ridicule, étant donné la faiblesse connue et le manque de moyens d’eux tous. (AHI. Dépêche pour Washington, le 31 jan. 1905).
674 AHI. Manuscrit de Rio Branco apposé à la lettre officielle de Buenos Aires (le 31 déc. 1905)
675 AHI.34.6/XXVI, A-7, g-3, m-1.
676 AHI.273/3/10, III Conferência Internacional Americana, acte de la séance de le 31 jul. 1906; O Estado de S. Paulo, le 1e. août 1906, p. 2.
"(...) est digne chef de la puissante République [les États-Unis], qui sert d'exemple, d'encouragement et de centre de gravitation pour le système politique et social de l'Amérique (...) Ces collègues, messieurs, sont le symbole de cette solidarité, qui, malgré les passions éphémères des hommes constituent, par la force invincible des choses, l'essence de notre système continental".677

Parmi les brésiliens, Joaquim Nabuco était le plus emphatique à reconnaître l'existence d'un système continental. En présentant ses lettres de créance comme ambassadeur à Theodore Roosevelt, il avait déjà formulé des voeux:

"(...) pour que l'on augmente l'immense action morale que les États-Unis exercent sur le cours de la civilisation et qui se manifeste par l'existence sur la carte du monde, et pour la première fois dans l'Histoire, d'une vaste zone neutre, de paix et de libre concurrence humaine".678

En l'année suivante (1906), Nabuco appofondit encore plus son discours quand il salua Root à Rio de Janeiro pendant la conférence panaméricaine: le continent américain constituait "un système politique différent de celui de l'Europe, une constellation avec son orbite à elle et distincte". Les Républiques américaines constituerait, ainsi, au monde, "une grande unité politique".679 Pour lui, les républiques américaines intégraient "un seul système politique et le concert international était partagé en deux systèmes: "L'Amérique grâce à la doctrine Monroe c'est le Continent de la Paix (...) un Hémisphère Neutre et contrebalance l'autre Hémisphère, que l'on pourrait appeler l'Hémisphère Beligérant".680

Encore selon Nabuco, les États-Unis étaient le leader de la création "d'un continent neutralisé pour la paix, libre et inaccessible aux compétences de la guerre qui font du reste du monde, de l'Europe, l'Asie, l'Afrique, aujourd'hui agglomérés, un vrai continent belligéré". La possibilité d'alliances européennes était pour lui écarter, puisque "depuis le jour où l'Amérique s'est constitué indépendant de l'Europe, s'est formé un système séparé, divers et distinct de celui de l'Europe", un orbite séparée, comme il se complaisait à dire. Pour l'ambassadeur brésilien la politique extérieure de son pays devrait converger sur le centre et non sur la périphérie de ce système: "La politique de rapprochement de l'Amérique latine, tout en se méfiant des États-Unis, serait-elle une politique insensée".681

Si Rio Branco, quoique sans la même énergie, était d'avis que les États-Unis devraient jouer le rôle de leadership du continent,682 tel que l'on a déjà remarqué ailleurs, Nabuco allait plus loin: la doctrine Monroe et le prestige nord-américain seraient le garant de l'intégrité de l'Amérique Latine.683 De cette façon on ne voyant que le caractère défensif de la doctrine, il ne pressentait que les avantages dans l'alliance Brésil-États-Unis.684 En constatant le nouveau partage du pouvoir mondial, il a été encore plus explicite en ce qui concernait la politique extérieure brésilienne:

"(...) Dans de telles conditions notre diplomatie doit être faite surtout à Washington. Cette politique vaudrait la plus large des armées, la plus large des marines, armée et marine que jamais nous en pourrions avoir. Nous avons besoin d'activité, clairvoyance, résolution et organisation d'un service diplomatique à Washington, où est la clé de nos relations diplomatiques".685

Rio Branco permettait à Nabuco de parler presque à l'aide au profit du rapprochement Brésil-États-Unis, mais sur le plan de négociations concrètes, il était intransigeant et empêchait que la rhétorique de

677 AHI. 273/3/10. III Conferência..., acte de la séance de le 31 juil. 1906.
678 AHI.34.6/XI, m-1, p-8 (manuscrit de Rio Branco).
679 AHI. 273/3/10. III Conferência..., acte de la séance solennelne (le 31 juil. 1906).
682 AHI. Dépêche pour Washington, le 29 dec. 1907.
683 NABUCO, s.d., p.132-3.
684 NABUCO, s.d., p.142-3; COSTA, 1968, p.106.
l'ambassadeur soit traduite avec exactitude vis-à-vis des faits. À l'occasion de la gestion de Nabuco auprès du Département d'État au sujet de l'incident Panther, le ministre s'est appliqué à sauvegarder, de façon à ne pas laisser aucun doute, l'image du Brésil, afin de ne pas donner apparence de chercher à l'étranger l'appui pour résoudre la question diplomatique avec l'Allemagne. Trop de précaution expliquait non seulement le zèle pour préserver la souveraineté et l'honneur nationaux; elle exprimait surtout la façon dont Rio Branco se servait pour montrer que la reconnaissance du poids international des États-Unis n'entrainait la sujétion du Brésil. En plus de cela, le ministre, contrairement à son ambassadeur, n'envisageait pas le continent américain comme un monde détaché de l'Europe.

L'idée d'un condominium oligarchique de nations

Le rapprochement des trois plus importants républiques sud-américains était une aspiration déjà exprimée par Rio Branco pendant les premières années de sa gestion. Et pourtant ce fut seulement en 1909 qu'apparut une proposition concrète dans ce sens, - et encore était-elle frustrée – au moment où le ministre brésilien reçut de l'ancien ministre des affaires étrangères du Chili, Puga Borne, de passage à Rio, en février, un projet de traité d'entente cordiale et arbitrage général connu comme ABC. Rio Branco refondit la proposition originale et l'a rendu au même diplomate, mais il préférait que la pièce soit présenter à l'Argentine par le Chili. Le pacte aurait uniquement un caractère politique et prévoyait des procédures destinées à prévenir la rupture de la paix entre les pays signataires, et aussi la neutralisation des insurgés dans les régions frontalières. En plus, il conseillait l'adoption de mesures pour empêcher les heurts ou mésententes entre les représentants des nations du ABC en cas d'émeuts ou soulèvements dans des pays limitrophes.

C'est important de signaler que le rapprochement Argentine-Brésil-Chili, de la façon dont on envisageait Rio Branco, n'était pas animé par l'idée de créer un contrepoids à l'influence nord-américaine, mais par celle d'un condominium oligarchique de nations, au profit de la paix en Amérique du Sud. En juillet 1906, Rio Branco, dans l'interview citée ci-dessus, et dont on a fait grand bruit, énonça son avis selon laquelle s'il y ait un accord, l'Argentine, le Chili et le Brésil, du fait qu'elles étaient les nations “les plus fortes et progressistes (...)” exerceraient une action sur les autres, pour prévenir les guerres si fréquentes dans certains pays. L'harmonie parmi les 21 républiques lui semblait impossible: “Nous croyons qu’un accord, dans l’intérêt général, pour être viable, ne doit être tenter que parmi les États-Unis d’Amérique, le Mexique, le Brésil, le Chili et l’Argentine. Ainsi serions-nous bien, les États-Unis et le Brésil”. Celui-ci, en particulier, selon lui, pourrait seulement exercer quelque influence sur l’Uruguay, le Paraguay et la Bolivie dès qu’il agisse en accord avec l’Argentine et le Chili. Des autres voisin, le Brésil est-il éloigné dû au manque de communications:

“Si l’on regarde la carte de l’Amérique du Sud, nous sommes voisins de beaucoup de pays, mais voisins à la manière de l’Amérique, comme le disait le Comte d’Aranda au XVIIIe siècle, des peuples séparés par d’immenses déserts. Il n’était que via Europa ou États-Unis que nous communiquons avec quelques-uns de nos voisins.”

L'idée selon laquelle le Brésil, l'Argentine et le Chili devaient s'appuyer réciproquement se trouve aussi dans un document de Joaquim Nabuco. Au même titre, l'influent Assis Brasil (qui connaissait bien le Prata, puisqu'il avait déjà été en charge de la légation du Brésil au Buenos Aires) ne prêtait aucun caractère antinord-américain à une éventuelle entente, qui, en plus d'augmenter le prestige de trois nations sud-américaines, aurait part à éloigner les tentatives impérialistes de l'Europe:

“(…) le simple fait de l’existence de telle entente – qui pourrait faire des progrès petit à petit jusqu’aux bords de la vraie alliance – ne pourrait qu’accroître la somme du prestige d’elles toutes par rapport à ce continent et au monde. Du risque que les États-Unis y voient des dessein

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690 AHI. Lettre de Joaquim Nabuco à Dr. Cardoso. Rome, le 20 mars 1904.
suspects? Ce ne serait pas naturel: d’abord par l’indiscutable supériorité dans laquelle, malgré tout, la République de Washington resterait par rapport à la ligne du Sud; ensuite, par l’assurance que la diplomatie de trois républiques lui donnerait que leurs forces ne pourraient pas opérer en ligne parallèle avec les nord-américaines, surtout à l’appui du principe selon lequel ce n’est pas tolérable l’extension du domaine ou système européen au Nouveau Monde (...)”.

Cette éventuelle alliance fut l’objet d’inquiétude de la part des nations dites plus petites de la région sud-américaine qui avaient des querelles avec un des pays de l’ABC. Surtout les péruviens en raison de la question de Tacna et Arica avec le Chili, et de la question des limites avec le Brésil.

L’idée d’un condominium oligarchique de nations associées à la doctrine Monroe peut aussi être trouvée dans la tentative brésilienne frustrée d’entente préalable parmi les nations de l’ABC pendant la période de préparation de la IVe. Conférence Internationale Américaine, qui eut lieu à Buenos Aires en 1910. Une formule modérée de résolution sur la doctrine Monroe rédigée par Joaquim Nabuco peu avant sa mort, fut discutée auparavant, en secret, parmi les représentants de ces nations. Le fait que le sujet se répandit et les réactions qu’il entraîna menèrent le Brésil et l’Argentine, soutenus par les États-Unis, à abandonner l’idée de proposer la résolution à la conférence pour être en débat.

Les années avant l’entrée du Brésil dans la Guerre

La connaissance de la politique extérieure brésilienne concernant les années de 1912 à 1917 est, d’après les conclusions préliminaires de l’étude que nous menons à présent, fondamental pour faire une analyse ample des relations internationales de la première période républicaine (1889-1930). L’orientation de la politique vers le contexte hémisphérique, entamé pour ceux qui ont institué la République et réaffirmé par Rio Branco, ont acquis des contours définitifs.


Ces deux personnages (Müller et Da Gama) représentent, en ce qui concerne les relations avec les États-Unis, deux tendances de la pensée diplomatique brésilienne affleurées tout de suite après l’avènement de la République, fortifiées pendant la période Rio Branco et présents jusque il y a peu de temps dans les discussions au sujet de la politique extérieure. Lauro Müller a été un des représentants plus achevés du courant qui plaidait pour une politique extérieure concertée avec celle de la puissance nord. Domício da Gama, disciple de Rio Branco, était réaliste. Il défendait l’adoption d’une politique extérieure autonome, au profit de l’intérêt national, sans peur de mécontenter les nord-américains d’autant plus que ceux-ci, d’après ce qu’il observait lui-même de son poste diplomatique, témoignaient du respect pour ceux qui étaient en désaccord avec eux mais présentant des arguments conséquents, et avaient du mépris pour les flatteurs.

De toute façon, en des termes généraux, les questions nouvelles, découlées de l’aggravation du quadre conjuncturel, ont mis le ministère brésilienne en dilemmes dont le solutions demandaient créativité et correction de buts. On voulait donner suite à l’éclat de la politique extérieure de Rio Branco, mais ce

691 AHI. Assis Brasil à Rio Branco (Buenos Aires, 19 avr. 1906).
693 AHI. Dépêche pour Washington, le 29 déc. 1907.

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n'était pas possible inférer comment aurait-il réagi vis-à-vis d'un contexte à peine préfiguré au début de sa gestion.

On peut conclure que le prestige international du Brésil (qui s'ensuivait en grand mesure de l'action de Rio Branco) l'illusion de son progrès\(^\text{695}\) (en raison du succès de l'agro-exportation, le café en particulier, qui, malgré les crises cycliques, avait des reflets positifs dans d'autres secteurs de l'économie) et le rapprochement avec la nouvelle puissance mondiale hémisphérique ont amené ceux qui formulent la politique extérieure à une vue surestimée du poids international du pays. Ce facteur a contribué pour que celui-ci prenne un attitude plus affirmante que d'habitude, principalement dans ses rapports avec les pays du sud du continent.

Pendant la période Rio Branco la politique de rapprochement avec les États-Unis a élargie, encore que cela semble paradoxale, les marges des mouvements du Brésil dans le context sous-régional. Ce même rapprochement a été approfondie par ses successeurs immédiats, mais avec un autre caractère et dans une autre conjuncture dans laquelle se sont posée les racines d'un vrai alignement sur la politique des États-Unis, malgré le débat intérieur intense à l'égard de la position brésilienne en face des blocs mondiaux qui se sont consolidés dans les premiers années de la Grande Guerre.

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\(^{695}\) ALMEIDA, 1999, informe que le PIB (production intérieure brute) per capita du Brésil en 1913 n'était que 839 dollars. À la veille de la Première Guerre, le pays continuait sous-développé, et suivait à peine l'accroissement des exportations mondiales. (p.22-3).


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Based on a particular interpretation of Argentine industrialization’s limits and the causes of Peronism’s downfall, Frondizi’s “developmentism” shaped a concept of the nation. This concept was deeply rooted on the trends that seemed to characterize international relations during the second half of the fifties: “pacific coexistence” between the superpowers and the development/underdevelopment dichotomy. Those features in the international scene were leading, according to Frondizi’s vision, to economic independence and the strengthening of national identities.

This paper examines relationships between economic and social change in Argentina, the international context in the second half of the fifties and Frondizi’s developmentalist discourse, including the ideas on nation.

The ‘Qué’ magazine in its second period, which used to be the weekly publication of Frondizi’s group, is used as the main source of reference, together with other essays and historical works.
La progresiva globalización del sistema económico mundial, haciendo inviable el aislamiento de las economías nacionales a partir del modelo de desarrollo hacia adentro, y la tendencia a la apertura económica sancionada por la conclusión de la Ronda de Uruguay y la creación de la OMC, han desembocado a nivel mundial en un renacimiento del fenómeno de integración regional.

De esta forma, el regionalismo parece constituir la alternativa a esta creciente integración de la economía internacional como consecuencia de la globalización de la producción de bienes y servicios, y los movimiento de capital.

En este sentido, el proceso de construcción del Mercosur es inseparable de la etapa de globalización del sistema capitalista y de la nueva estructura de poder mundial surgida tras el fin de la guerra fría. La primera impulsa los cambios internos en los países miembros (apertura económica, privatizaciones, desregulación, atracción de inversiones extranjeras directas) y la segunda obliga a la región a asumir responsabilidades políticas estratégicas internacionales.

A partir de las voluntades políticas de Brasil y Argentina, expresadas en diversos acuerdos conseguidos en el transcurso de la década de los 80’, ambas partes fueron desplazándose desde la frontera de la división a la frontera de la cooperación.

El proceso de acercamiento entre Brasil y la Argentina es un clásico de superación de algunos elementos hobbesianos en una relación entre vecinos, que refleja una vocación por la sociabilidad de la cooperación grociana, donde los elementos kantianos, la restauración de los gobiernos plenamentes democráticos, cumplieron una función escencial. De esta forma Brasil y Argentina constituyeron el núcleo duro de esta integración, similar a lo que sucedió entre Francia y Alemania en el proceso de la Unión Europea. A partir de este núcleo el proceso se dinamiza con la incorporación de Uruguay y Paraguay dando origen a partir del Tratado de Asunción de 1991 el Mercado Común del Sur, o más brevemente, Mercosur.

De esta forma el Mercosur constituye un acuerdo subregional, en el marco de la Asociación latinoamericana de Integración, que involucra la acción concertada de los Estados miembros para llevar a cabo la integración económica entre ellos. Surgió en primera instancia con el objetivo acelerar la liberalización del comercio intra zona y establecer de esta forma un Mercado Común, que se encuentra en la etapa de Unión Aduanera Imperfecta, porque ha establecido un período de adecuación para ciertos rubros en el arancel externo común.

No obstante el éxito con el que se ha desarrollado hasta el momento, el Mercosur se encuentra en una etapa de transición, prolongada por las dificultades que surgen del choque de intereses en la coordinación de medidas macroeconómicas. La devaluación de Brasil y la recepción económica que sufre la región, ha acentuado los problemas relacionados con el funcionamiento del libre comercio intrarregional que ya estaba siendo afectado por la imposición de barreras no arancelarias y por el uso de incentivos distorsivos en la venta intrazona.

Estos problemas comerciales, sumados a incumplimientos e indisciplinas de arrastre, llevaron a un resquebrajamiento de la confianza entre los socios, y como se sabe, este último elemento es fundamental en todo proceso de integración. Esta es, brevemente, la situación actual por la que atraviesa el Mercosur y la que trataremos de explicar más extensamente y en detalle, para poder elaborar escenarios futuros de lo que constituye la mejor opción estratégica de inserción de la región, frente a los desafíos del nuevo milenio.
Latin America: a Zone of Interest for European Union?

I. Introduction

This study aims to analyze the role of the European Union, the block that has started the regional integration among countries, having in mind the cooperative wave that took place in Latin America in the beginning of the 90’s, with emphasis to the Mercosul.

This study starts with an analysis of the external policy of the European Union, based in the terms of the Maastricht International Cooperation Treaty, established in 1993, on which devices are available to the State Members for the accomplishment of their proposals. In addition, the study analyses the European view regarding this technical and financial cooperation.

Following, the study will verify the European relationship with Latin America countries, its position regarding the possibilities of expanding the existing links, in particular in trade and investments, as well as regarding the terms of an associative inter-regional agreement between European Union and Mercosul (Inter –Institutional Cooperation Agreement between European Community and Mercosul – Santiago do Chile, March 29th, 1993, and Madrid, December 15th 1995), and the outstanding performance of Rio Group in those negotiation.

The conclusion of the analysis is about the Latin American position, and the expectations about the future of the relationship already established with the regional economic blocks, facing the movements of the regional integration against the multilateralism.

II. Common Foreign And Security Policy Of European Union

The international events have been a permanent challenge for European Union, in the sense of a determined and coherent performance of the economic block. Certainly, this is an expected attitude, when talking about a global institution with the demographic and economic dimension, as it is the European Union.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) should be seen as the successor to the activities pursued by Member States in the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC) under the Single European Act. With specific aims and means, the Common Foreign and Security Policy represents a more complex instrument that integrates the acquisitions of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and gives it greater potential, principally by means of joint action, an additional instrument which implies a strict discipline among Member States and enables the Union to make full use of the means at its disposal.

With the new phase, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) should contribute to ensuring that the Union’s external action is less reactive to events in the outside world, and more active in the pursuit of the interests of the Union and in the creation of a more favorable international environment. This will enable the European Union to have an improved capacity to tackle problems at their roots in order to anticipate the outbreak of crises. Furthermore, the Union will be able to make clearer to third countries its own aims and interests, and to match more closely those countries expectations of the Union.

For said purposes, the European Union Treaty (Maastricht Treaty), executed in November 1993, defined as goals of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in Title V the following:
1. The safeguard of the common values, main interests and independence of European Union;
2. The reinforcement of the Union’s security and its Members under all the circumstances;
3. The maintenance of peace and international security, according to the principles of the United Nations;
4. The foment of the international cooperation;
5. The development and reinforcement of the Democracy and the Rule of Law, as well as the respect to the Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties.

Since the beginning of seventies, the goals achieved in those fields are based on the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which established among the State Members important links of information’s interchange, consult and political coordination concerning the international relations policy.

In accordance with the Treaty on Union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) covers all areas of foreign and security policy and implies with the aim of achieving the following objectives: systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy on any matter of foreign or security policy of general interest; the gradual implementation of joint action in the areas in which the Member States have important interests in common.

For each area, the Union should define specific objectives in order to elect the most important issues. These specific objectives might be inter alia: strengthening democratic principles and institutions, and respect for human and minority rights; promoting regional political stability and contributing to the creation of political and or economic frameworks that encourage regional cooperation or moves towards regional or sub regional integration; contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts; contributing to more effective international coordination in dealing with emergency situations; strengthening existing cooperation on issues of international interest such as the fight against arms proliferation, terrorism and the traffic in illicit drugs; promoting and supporting good government.

With regard to the special importance of the North-South relations, the Union may want to develop gradually in a consistent and coordinated manner its external activities vis-à-vis the countries of Africa, Latin America and Caribbean and Asia in all aspects of its relations (e.g. foreign, security, economic and development policies) in order to contribute to the development of those regions within a context of full respect for human rights, and to the strengthening of their relations with the Union.

III. Latin America: A Zone Of Interest To European Union

Latin America´s cultural identity has been construed based on Europe´s character and history. Constitutions, legal principles and ideas of liberty and democracy found in Latin America are results from the body of philosophical and legal concepts that were Europe´s heritage.

III.1 The Great Economic Decade

The ninety decade has brought radical changes in Latin America. Courageous efforts promoted in most of the countries provoked the back of democracy. Rigorous and sustained economic policies marked the increasing liberalization and desire for greater integration into international markets.

At the same time we know that the economic policies applied in Latin America have been policies of economic adjustment, financial cleaning, rigid control of the credits, promotion of the foreign investments, privatization of public companies.

After many decades of state interventionism in the economy, with all the disadvantages that are inherent to the monopolistic structures, the dynamism of the free market economy has been rediscovered in Latin America, with the consequent search for competitiveness.

Whereas Latin America was at the forefront of world growth from the 1950s to the 1970s, the 1980s were a period of recession and great economic instability. With its stabilization and structural adjustment policies and its improving macroeconomic data, the 1990s have created the conditions for development and growth based on three key factors: the reduction in the external debt burden, the improvement of public finances and the return of foreign investors.
There are, however, persistent challenges in terms of job creation, fight against poverty and social inequalities that must be considered in this context. Given the endemic poverty and the marginalization of part of the population, much still needs to be done to ensure a better distribution of the income.

Integration in Latin America is racing ahead as a result of the revival or establishment of new regional groupings. This is a symptom of the opening-up of these countries and their return to competitiveness in the world economy, as a consequence of the concept of “open regionalism” developed by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA).

The process of market opening has been fully supported by the international community. On one hand, through initiatives of the own region, such as the Mercosur creation, the re-launching of the Andean Community, the Centroamerican Integration System, the Free Trade Area for the Americas (AFTA), the American States Organization and the NAFTA Agreement.

On the other hand, through initiatives of several institutions that has supported this evolution giving assistance and organizing conferences. Among them, we can mention the World Bank, the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

To mention, the European Union, which has established a series of quadruple agreements of cooperation with the Latin American countries. The most important of them, the Inter – Regional Cooperation Agreement with Mercosur, from December 1995 (ONEC nr. L69 from 1996) that, in a second phase, foresees the possibility of creating a Free Trade Area between both economic blocks.

The free trade between European Union and Latin America has also been developed through other quadruple agreements of cooperation: the Cartagena Agreement with its countries members, signed in June 26th. 1992, the Andean Agreement (ONEC nr. C25, 1992) and another agreement signed in February 22nd, 1993, among Costa Rica Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, known as Centroamerican Isthmus (ONEC nr. C77, 1993, pg. 30).

Increasing integration should enable the Latin American countries to be more consistent in their positions and to defend their common interests better in international forums since most of them are members of World Trade Organization (WTO).

The financial and technical cooperation with Latin America has raised in 1995 the amount of 20 million of dollars, which were invested in the development of projects oriented to solve macroeconomic and setorial problems. The economic cooperation also involved millions of dollars in order to better develop the region’s economical position in the globe, to expand the integration and to foment the economic growth.

By one hand, Latin America is seeking to diversify its outlets and sources of supply, technologies and capital, and to secure the cooperation of partners able to provide constructive assistance. European Union, for its part, is trying to consolidate and improve its trading and technological position in a region with strong growth potential.

For Latin America as a whole the European Union is the second biggest trading partner. In an average period, trade between them accounts for over 20% (twenty percent) of Latin America’s imports and exports. In contrast, Latin America occupies a relatively modest place in the European Union’s external trade (less than 5% of the total).

The structure of this trade shows the contrast between the two regions: industrial goods account for almost 90% (ninety percent) of the European Union’s exports to Latin America, and Latin America exports to the European Union are mainly made up of commodities, raw materials and fuel, with manufactures at present accounting for only 23% (twenty three percent) of the total.

By the end of 1995, the European Commission received the support of the Ministers Council related to the political orientation during the period 1996-2000. This support was based in the aid to the cooperation among the regional institutions, to the fight against poverty, to the economic reforms, to the competitive growth and to the formation and consolidation of “open market”.

The Latin America’s dynamism was not only noticed by the European Parliament, also the European leaders were aware of the importance of the commercial relations with this area. There is a long time that the European companies are being conscious of the necessity of improvement of the commercial exchanges with the Latin America.
1996 – Cochabamba – Bolivia) – Boletim Ue 4 - 1996

Considering that, during this last decade, Latin and Central America turned into one of the most
dynamic markets to the exported European products if compared to the global markets. And that by the
other hand, European Union became one of the most important investor in said region. There was a
performance of a new strategy toward the growth of commercial and technological exchanges, industry
development, fomenting the joint ventures of the private sectors between the two regions.

At this context, the members of the Cochabamba Declaration, with the participation European
countries (Belgian, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Pauces
Bails, Austricht, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and United Kingdom) and Rio Group (Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Equator, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad Tobago,
Uruguay and Venezuela) pointed out the following advances:

• The conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement between Mercosul and European Union signed em
Spain, Madrid, December 1995, which objective is the proximity of the relations and the creation of
a inter-regional association with politic and economic goals;

• The signature of a political declaration of understandings between the European Union and Chile
on December 1995.

• The adoption of a joint declaration to negotiate a cooperation agreement between European Union
and Mexico on May 02nd. 1995.

• The advance in the discussion of the “San José Dialogue” between European Union and Central
America, according to the meeting of San José XII dated on March 21st . 1996 in Florence, Italy.

• The evolution in the political and commercial dialogue between the European Union and the
Andean Community.

III.3. Year 1997 – Effective Relations With Latin American Countries

During the year 1997 the efforts for cooperation between European Union and Latin America were
continue, based on the orientations defined by the European Council on December 1995 (Boletim EU
12-1995, I.42 and I.77). For example, on July 1997 there was in Amsterdam the Meeting of Governants
from European Union, Latin America and Central America.

At a Resolution from January 16th 1997 (ONEC n. C 33 from 2.3.1997 and Boletim UE ½-1997, point
1.3.126.) the European Parliament was joyfully with the cooperation works between the areas and the
great perspectives to 1996 – 2000, however the Parliament requested best efforts from the civil society
in the international cooperation.

In this scenario, it was conducted in Haia, during February 25th . and 26th . 1997, the 13º  Ministerial
Conference of San José (Boletim UE ½-1997, point 1.3.127.) and the major point, besides the signature
of a Peace Agreement in Guatemala, was the enlargement of the cooperation between European Union
and Central America.

III.4. Year 1999 - Central America And Latin America Proposal For A Council For A Decision On A Community Position Within The
Eu-Mercosul Co-Operation Council

Considering that the Inter-regional Framework Co-operation Agreement between the European
Community and its Member States and the Southern Common Market and its Party States, which
entered into force on 1 July 1999, established a Co-operation Council, it was proposed some rules of
procedure to the meetings, for instance:

a) The Co-operation Council shall meet at ministerial level, at regular intervals and when
circumstances require if the Parties so agree.

b) A provisional agenda for each meeting shall be drawn up by the Secretaries of the Co-operation
Council on the basis of suggestions by the Parties.
c) The Co-operation Council shall make recommendations or proposals by common agreement between the Parties. During the inter-session period, the Co-operation Council may make recommendations or proposals by written procedure if both Parties so agree.

III.5. Year 2000 – The Vilamoura Declaration – IX Ministerial Meeting Between The Eu And The Rio Group (Pres/00/48)

The IXth Ministerial Meeting between the European Union and the Rio Group held in Vilamoura, Portugal, on 24 February 2000 reaffirmed the attachment to the principles of the Rio Declaration and the commitment to continuing to work jointly to follow up effectively the priorities for action laid down by the Heads of State and of Government, welcoming in particular the work of the Bi-regional Follow-up Group.

It was underlined the need to give particular importance to promoting equality between men and women and promoting and protecting the rights of the most vulnerable groups in society, in particular children, young people, the disabled, displaced persons, migrant workers and their families and indigenous populations and minorities.

Ministers rejected any extra-territorial application of national laws that infringe international law, and reaffirmed their desire to continue to work jointly to gradually develop national and international provisions concerning the criminal responsibility against humanity.

Likewise, Ministers reiterated their categorical rejection of all unilateral trade measures with extra-territorial effect as being contrary to international law and the rules of the World Trade Organization. They agreed that practices of this type posed a grave threat to multilateralism. The Ministers stressed the importance of keeping up momentum in favour of launching a new comprehensive round. This round must be directed at strengthening access to markets without excluding any sector, in order to develop and strengthen the rules and disciplines of the World Trade Organization.

Ministers welcomed the progress recently achieved in the negotiations with Mexico for the setting up of a free trade area and launching of the negotiation process for association agreements with Mercosul and Chile.

The Ministers emphasized the historic significance of the return of the Panama Canal to Panamanian hands and stressed the importance of ensuring the smooth functioning of that inter-oceanic thoroughfare for the benefit of world trade.

Ministers stressed the importance of the principles of joint and shared responsibility in combating the international problem of illicit drugs and drug-related crime, such as money laundering, trafficking and diversion of chemical precursors, contraband and trafficking in arms.

Ministers agreed to cooperate and exchange views on sustainable development, including the question of world conservation of forests and the rational use of forest resources.

It was also noted the importance of new civil society, players, partners and resources in consolidating economic and social development and encouraged civil society interchange and cooperation between Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union.

IV. Content Of Community Cooperation

One of the concerns of the European Council relates to the progressive incorporation of a global vision of the sustainable development, by establishing a link among the reinforcement of the social economic development of the peoples, the environmental defense, the fight against poverty – specially in the less assisted regions – the increase of the international competition and the respect for the cultural diversity.

Even if financial and technical assistance continues to play a predominant role under the general guidelines drawn up by the European Union institutions for the period 1996-2000, new areas of cooperation and improved methods have helped meet the needs of cooperation between the two regions.

The cooperation established has been developed especially in the following sectors:
• Humanitarian aid: Major operations have been conducted in the areas of food aid, emergency aid, aid to refugees and displaced persons in Central America and aid to non-governmental organizations;

• Rural development: crucial programmes in view of the impact of farming on economic and social development and the needs of small farmers;

• Democratization and human rights: promotion of the rule of law and the participation of civil society in the development of a culture of human rights;

• Financial and technical assistance: concentrated on urban projects and programmes, schemes to promote women’s fundamental rights and freedoms and their full integration into the development process, projects aimed at improving the living conditions of indigenous peoples;

• Education and training: besides a number of specific projects in the spheres of rural development and democratization, the European Union has been conducting ALFA, a major programme of support for national higher education systems;

• Environment: this matter must be taken into account in all cooperation policies in accordance with Agenda 21 and a special effort made to conserve tropical forest, with neglecting the problems of industrial and urban pollution (transport, water supply, waste disposal, etc.)

Rather than creating new instruments, the aim would be to consolidate the private-sector partnership programmes, ensuring their continuity and improving their performance. Cooperation between universities would be more directly and actively coordinated with industrial cooperation by the establishment of closer contacts between those receiving bursaries and the private sector.

The main issues will continue to be peace and regional stability, support for the democratic process and the defense and promotion of human rights. Political dialogue could, however, become wider issues, such as the development of inter-American relations (though NAFTA in particular, but also the continent’s leading player, the United States), the accession of Chile and Mexico to APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum).

V. Conclusion

If we go back to the primitive human’s history we are going to notice that the first human being used to survive from what the nature could offer to him. Only later our ancestral observed that he could transform and cultivate, and became to consume the fruits of his acknowledgement.

Following his development, the human being discovered that it would be more efficient to do only one task and acquire a specific technique to create a product with quality and improve its commercialization. Such specialized production and its consequently increase and development were able to accumulate excess and provoke the exchange of products.

At this time in the history, the human being started to split the work. Through the years, the excess, which before were only negotiated inside the villages, became to circulate around the region and through bigger fields, and finally then to the whole countries and the world.

So, we all know that the circulation of goods beyond the national frontiers is not a recent fact. However, what really signs our age is the enormous and fast development of efficient and creative techniques to make a feasible commerce.

Every day mechanisms are developed to speed the circulation of goods like creditors protection, new warranties, fast payments, tax and customs clearances and so on. Such mechanisms are being increased more and more with the regional integrations.

The international commerce has grown in a favourable context – the globalization. A lot has been commented about the globalization and its effects in the economic world. The globalization process, improved by the technological advances, was definitely performed linking the national markets, enlarging the regional spaces, and maybe is intended to form a unique market all over the world.
According to the European Communities Commission’s viewpoint, the South America and the Central America together take on great innovation in relation to the trade competition policy. As we know, since the beginning of the 90’s the area has been witnessing a consolidation of the democratic regimen; also, the economic policies of free trade market implementation to the international markets are continuous; and finally, the economic growth verified in this broad territory of more than 460 million inhabitants is notable.

The genesis of MERCOSUL was the Economic Cooperation and Integration Program (PICE) signed by the Presidents Raúl Alfonsin (Argentina) and José Sarney (Brazil) in 1986, when these countries left behind periods of authoritarian regimes, and intended to promote a bilateral cooperation based in the correction of the desequilibrium of their commercial flow.

According to said Program, Brazil and Argentina removed some non-tariff barriers, promoted the creation of binational corporations, and in long time incentive the possible intra-sectorial complements between the countries, demonstrating that, the union and cooperation are stronger and much more viable in the present situation than the maintenance of the historical differences built in the name of sovereignty and independence, which only could provoke obsolescence.

The broadly announced European aid, although, is still facing practical barriers that need to be overcome for creating a free trade area between European Union and Mercosul.

The subsidy system adopted for some products is a problem not only in Europe but also in the United States; there is no sense insubsiding certain kind of production, putting in disadvantage those who play the right game.

The former Brazilian Ambassador in the European Union, Jório Dauster, states that the globalization has produced two different planets, marked by disparity in the commercial practices; Brazil belongs to the first group – it has opened its economy, has reformed the State and has decontrolled commerce. The wealthy countries belong to the second group, where the protection against the products exported by the first group prevails.

If the United States and the European Union do not convince themselves that they must open their markets, it will be useless the initiative of the G-7 (Groupe of the Seven Wealthiest Countries) of taking preventive actions against the financial crisis that threatens to infect them (Interview to the newspaper “O Estado de São Paulo”, in November 8th .1998, page B-8).

At this incertain moment, we cannot comeback and wish an protectionism. We all know that there is no human life that exists by himself; all the men exist to the world, each one, even the most common man, aid in the creation of the infinite human history.

There is no independent man, all them live, inevitably, inter-related. We need to exchange experiences and learning, we need to create and to restore our developments, and we shall be challenged to overcome the success of the past generations. And for all these tasks we are facing now the benefits and prejudice that “regionalism” and “ multilateralism” can offer to us.

We shall be aware that the integration’s trajectory will not be only compound of great victories. However, we shall believe that MERCOSUL has serious goals to be achieved

In order to conclude this study, we shall observe that the present evolution has provoked the falling of the frontiers and a continuous economic integration; and this means that a new cultural revolution related to our dogmas, which recalls a new man’s generation not only worried about themselves and about their nation.

* Note: All contents of the presented article were based on the documents provided by the official site of European Union (http://europa.org/).
Terre (sol) et Territoire: Deux conceptions de l’espace dans les rapports Américains Latins internationaux

Le processus de formation des États nationaux a inclus, comme un de ses objectifs fondamentaux, spécifier les limites territoriales des nations. Dans ce sens, ils ont été formés les spécialistes qui ont été élevés des théories, principes et normes internationales dans vogue pour la délimitation des limites et les gouvernements ont assemblé des documents historiques et des techniciens pour confirmer leurs semblants dans la matière. Les conflits pour les questions levé ont occupé une bonne partie des administrations et activités des chancelleries et des corps diplomatiques faits référence aux rapports parmi les nations d’Amérique latine. Le territorialité a été constitué cette entrée l’élément fondamental de déclaration des souverainetés nationales. Par conséquent, le territoire et nation étaient deux éléments indissolublement liés dans les stratégies politiques.

Aussi long que, les régions ont été développées suivre d’autres principes et dynamique social, culturel et jusqu’à économique. La formation de régions a été basée sur l’usage des ressources qui ont fourni le sol et le sous-sol fondamentalement, par cela qui, bien qu’il y eût des points du contact avec les formations nationales comme pour l’exercice du domaine territorial différent pour les objectif et par conséquent dans les conceptions élaborées autour des espaces.

Par conséquent, le rapport fait référence à ces deux conceptions différentes de l’espace et ses implications dans les rapports Américains Latins internationaux.

Relations with various European states represent an essential aspect in the history of Argentina’s insertion in the world. Nevertheless, the analysis of other bilateral links has prevailed, whether due to their economic and/or political importance for Argentina. Though less significant, the neglected cases are not devoid of interest. It is interesting for instance the case of the Argentine-French connection. With few exceptions, historical analysis has been confined mostly to the relationship’s cultural dimension. Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, though, such a connection has also been politically and economically significant.

This paper is focused on the political dimension of a specific occasion, the 1960 encounter between presidents Arturo Frondizi and Charles de Gaulle. Against the background of a widely shared world view their respective governments’ foreign policy was an essential part of both rulers’ perceived mandate. Despite their countries’ indubitable differences in geographic location and socio-economic reality, both men stressed, above all, the national dimension as a starting point for a foreign policy projected on the world. In addition, there has been certain issues that are still relevant today. From the outset, the protectionist policies that came hand-in-hand with the process of European integration created serious problems for Latin America, as clearly noted during the talks between the presidents. Another crucial subject was Third World decolonization. With the Algerian case at the forefront, this remains a hitherto unresolved issue even if today this is due to the heavy burden the colonial experience imposed on Algeria and the hard realities of its post-independence experience.

During president Frondizi’s European tour of 1960, his meeting with De Gaulle, like that between officials of both governments, was exceptionally important, not only to assess past behaviour but also to identify the relationship’s potential and limits, as well as its future perspectives at the opening stage of the European Economic Community’s development. At the same time, the meeting paved the way for later research into not-so-well known aspects of both important rulers’ thought and international career in the political history of their respective countries.
The Crossroad of the American Foreign Policy in the Process of Argentine Integration and Latin America 1958 - 1962

The hemispheric relations between the United States and Latin America have been always historically difficult. The difficulties started with the failure of the Congress of Panama 1826. Then the United States was immersed in the tremendous fratricidal fight of the civil war and therefore, it could not be devoted to enhance the relationship with the rest of the continent. Only toward the end of the XIX century, Latin and North Americans met at the first Pan-American Conference predecessor of the OEA -the Organisation of the American States--although it was clear that the Northern country was the most powerful. This preponderance became more notorious with the war for Cuba that concluded with the absorption of the Island by Washington.

The presence of Roosevelt at the White House worsened the inter-american relations, because he didn’t hide that his favourite politics was to impose the North American presence by the use of force.

The First World War called the attention of the United States towards Europe and this situation continued with the negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles and the creation of the League of the Nation. Then it retired and during the 1920s decade they were isolated until the 1929 economic crack took place.

When Franklin Roosevelt took the presidency the country get again interest for American problems and with the politics of “good vicinity” in the 1930s it tried to impose itself in the hemispheric relations.

The Second World War set up the political outlines to a world scale, but it entailed a slight approach for the American continent with the creation of the United Nations. Washington was backed by the Latin American republics in forming a block in the new political system. But in fact since that moment that the relations with the continent have deteriorated. The bipolarity of the Cold War harmed the regional contacts in the ’50s especially during the years of Dwight Eisenhower presidency, a period when Nixon’s and Rockefeller’s trips were significative outcome for the time.

For Frondizi, Argentina was a Latin American country, part of the West and with continental commitments. He conceived the Argentine in foreign policy like a Nation with the conscience of unity and related with the world problems.

That’s why he thought that the Latin American integration was a great problem for Latin America in itself. The sovereignty and the independence of the Latin American countries depend on their ability of uniting. In fact, all isolated country loses its real independence progressively, still when its constitution and its leaders continue affirming its sovereignty. Limited in the political field, the sovereignty is diluted in economic, technique and scientific matters. The division among countries of the region accentuated its relative underdevelopment and the dominance of the foreign companies in the vital and more dynamic sectors of their economies. Indeed, in the 1960s, it can be considered a “gross way” that Latin American national companies expanded exclusively in the national environment.

According to Dr. Arturo Frondizi’s opinion, the development of Latin America demanded a series of measures from the economic and social field. A transformation of the structures and a modernisation of the economic methods was needed.

The efforts were unavoidable in the following areas:

- agriculture;
- transports;
- base industries and the general ones.
According to the desarrollista idea, integration is not a panacea in itself; it requires a common will, an all-out effort and a constructive action. The integration doesn't eliminate all the difficulties by charm, it doesn't solve all the problems. It is real that those Latin American countries don't take up the integration as a necessity for the current and future economy, they will remain in the underdevelopment. Therefore we wish to conclude saying that the integration presupposes important and appropriate means, and among them agile and elastic Latin American institutions. In fact in the sixties, Latin America was not prepared to carry out the integration project, for different international facts: Cuban Revolution and the fear of Communism produced certain inability by the States to manage with a wide international politics, trying to privilege their old international system with the aggravating circumstance of ever-recurring military coups, which limited, like in the case of Argentina, their international politics.
Argentine, Brézil et l´Intégration Regionale

A partir des temps coloniales le Rio de La Plata et le Brézil ont maintenu un active changement commercial lequel a continué pendant le temps de la consolidation de deux Etats nationaux, surtout, pour obtenir la spécialisation régionale de la production, et à travers l´espace de la frontière comuneaux deux pays. La production agricole différenciée et en nombreuses quantités, merci aux inversions étrangères dans l´infrastructure et les services appropriés, avec la réception de main d´oeuvre européenne, elles ont développé non seulement structures économiques orientées pour l´exportation de matières premières et aliments, à la même fois elles ont stimulé aussi le commerce réciproque. On comprend de cette façon que les productions agricoles différenciées et complémentaires et le rapprochement géographique et le volume de deux marchés les plus grands de l´Amérique du Sud, ont stimulé une plus grande convergence commerciale entre les deux pays. Cette perspective a encouragé la gestation, pendant le XX siècle, de différents idées et projets qui rendaient propice un progressif rapprochement économique entre l´Argentine et le Brésil. En ce sens, les tendences vers la conformation d´une unité douanière qu´incorporerait progressivement les pays du Cône Sud ont pris force. Cependant, ces propositions n´ont pas obtenu d´accords formels et on a dû attendre jusqu´à la critique année de 1930, moment où un increment du commerce entre les deux grands pays sudaméricains a commencé à être vérifié en permettant la signature de traités et conventions commercials entre Buenos Aires et Rio de Janeiro. L´éclatement de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale a ajouté de nouvelles difficultés économiques, stimulant le changement regional et en rendant possible la concretion d´un Traité de Libre Echange Progressif entre l´Argentine et le Brésil en 1941. Cependant, la différence de position entre les deux pays en face du conflit sous les pressions des Etats Unis, a fait échouer le traité en vigueur. Mais le gouvernement argentin a continué avec ses initiatives pour construire une unité douanière sudaméricaine, en faisant une active propagande de rapprochement politique et culturel vers les pays ibéromécaniens qui a abouti à une série de traités commercials entre les mêmes. Le “Acta de Santiago” signé entre l´Argentine et le Chili en 1953 a été la culmination de tous ces traités. Là on se proposait l´élimination de toute restriction commerciale entre les deux nations et permettait la possibilité de l´adhésion à ses principes des autres gouvernements ibéromécaniens. En ce sens, le gouvernement argentin voulait incorporer le Brésil à ce traité pour rétablir le Pacte du ABC, mais les difficultés internes de ce dernier pays ont empêché de concrétiser ce désir. Malgré cette situation, c´est à dire, les différentes perceptions internes et l´alignement opposé que l´ Argentine et le Brésil ont adopté en face de marchés et puissances différentes, périodiquement les deux nations ont essayé la légalisation de leur commerce à l´aide de nouveaux traités. En conséquence, en 1961 les présidents Frondizi et Quadros ont signé la “Declaraición de Uruguayan” à travers de laquelle on cherchait consolider les liens bilatéraux et coordiner une action internationale comune entre l´Argentine et le Brésil en face de grands centres mondiaux du pouvoir et des organisations internationales du crédit. Pour arriver à ce but, en février 1967, les ministres argentin et brésilien se sont réunis à Buenos Aires pour étudier l´inclusion progressive de différents secteurs économiques et la conformation postérieure d´une douane unique. Cependant, d´anciennes contestations politiques et stratégiques ont apparu, poussées par les gouvernements dictoriaux de la region. Une de ces difficultés était l´utilisation des recours hydriques du bassin du fleuve de la Plata mais la signature d´un traité en 1969 par Argentine, Brésil, Bolivie, Paraguay et Uruguay a apporté une solution transitoire. Parallèlement, maintes nations d´Amérique latine avaient signé en 1960 le Tratado de Montevideo lequel a abouti à la Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio (ALALC). Après une vingtaine d´années en vigueur et sans obtenir les résultats désirés, en 1980 l´ALALC a été remplacé par l´Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI). Sur ce point, et poussé par le conflit de Malvinas et la sévère situation provoquée par la dette externe, l´increment du commerce argentin-brésilien a accru son importance et permettait canaliser les attitudes de cooperation de deux nations face au besoin de répondre ensemble aux difficultés des années 80. En plus, le procès de redémocratisation commencé à l´Argentine et au Brésil a aidé pour que en
1985 les deux gouvernements initiaient un chemin hâté en vue d’obtenir la cooperation et l’intégration économiques, dont le succès attirait l’intérêt de l’Uruguay et le Paraguay, permettant que les quatre pays signent en 1991 le traité qui a établi le Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR). C’est celle-ci la première intention pour formaliser l’ “intégration cachée” que l’Argentine et le Brésil ont engendrée à partir d’un procès de longue durée historique, nuancée par un antagonisme prédominantement rhétorique, et qui à nos jours nous montre tant de défis comme d’opportunités pour nos deux pays dans un contexte mondial complexe et compétiteur.
Understanding the historical insertion of Latin America in the international economic system implicates the analysis of particular characteristics in this part of the continent. Political fragmentation became a hurdle on the way to reach the integration of the economic spaces of the area, objective faced by the Latin American national politics in several moments throughout their history. In many times, regional agreements came out from those efforts. These agreements may be reviewed through an integration framework, where Latin America’s position between the aspects proposed by this scientific meeting—regionalization and globalization—becomes debatable. The aim is to seek for backgrounds leading to a better interpretation of the Mercosur as a regional organization within the Latin-American and the continental frameworks.

The manufacture diversification at an international level, the demand of raw materials, the British decision of trading with its colonies and industrialized countries, the intention of Latin American countries of diversifying their production at the time when the United States and other nations were trying to expand their markets; these were starting points for the changes of the world’s economic relations at the end of the XIX century. The United States had annexed new territories from Mexico and assured markets, investments and international trade with the rest of the continent, specially in Central America and the Caribbean. The exports to Latin America had increased as well as the imports from that area between 1897 and 1914. As investments at an international level, Europe and North America accomplished their intentions of financial investment, in exchange of benefits and support from the receiving countries. The arrival of products and resources provoked the reorganization of economic politics and the increase of production in Latin American countries. This was an important step within national borders, but it didn’t produce regional integration nor technological renewal. Each country specialized in some raw materials allowing the intervention of foreign capitals. So internal markets of Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Cuba increased, as well as exports, manual labour and work market offer, specially in production activities free from international capital. This circumstance made flowered the complementary but not the basic industries. In countries with enclave economy the situation was different because development was based on supporting production connected to the exporting sector, removing manufacture industries’ autonomy and conditioning their situation in order to match the external trade needs.

In South America, Brazil and Argentina implemented different industrialization processes, although none of them was far from the following four aspects that characterized the region until 1930: 1) the merge of small and medium companies in order to create stock companies and get monopoly-type control in the correspondent production area; 2) organization of branch enterprises with headquarters in the Unites States or in Europe, which manufacture or assemble commodities; 3) implementation of modern industrial plants; 4) industrialization by import substitution. Where they took place, this aspects were the result of the political and social structure inherent to each country, urbanization process, the situation of work markets, revenue distribution and other factors. Since 1930 there were changes in the economic and political relations, with a staunch rivalry between Great Britain and the Unites States for the predominance in the Latin American markets. In Argentina, the interests of agricultural commodities export came back to government, renewing the relationship with England. According to a very interesting historical appraisal, president Peron tried to organize a political system based in the close relation between the military, urban middle class and working class, in order to achieve industrialization and national development, like Brazil after 1930. This country had started a process increasing the participation of craftsmen, industrial workers and carriers in the economy, connected to agricultural commodities exporting sector and with intervention of foreign capitals. After a
reaction against these elements, Brazil had an approach to the North American sphere of influence looking for another way to reach industrialization.

It is known that during the Second World War most of Latin American countries signed commercial agreements with the United States and offered their own harbours and military bases in the effort against the Axis supplying raw materials to the Allies. The result of the war let the United States implement a Pan-American looking expansion policy, by taking the place that Great Britain used to hold in the economic relations with the South Cone. Private investment of foreign capitals was encouraged by the US government, who provided economic aid with non-official Exim bank's loans only, resisting any nationalistic policy in this direction. This was the cause of the collapse of Romulo Gallego's government (Venezuela, 1947). The Unites States did not oppose to the resolutions of the Conference of Chapultepec (1945) or the military treaty of Rio de Janeiro (1947) which lied the foundations of the TIAR, neither to the creation of the OEA in the Conference of Bogota (1948), all of those were steps in order to consolidate the US dominance in the continent, while the main concern was in Europe and other parts of the world in order to apply the doctrine of blocking of the communism. The price for the political support to the military Latin American governments was of course their alignment with the United States, that assured a convenient economic policy and continued the opposition to all nationalist intention avoiding the independent action which would damage this influence in the region.

After the Second World War several countries signed bilateral agreements to stimulate commerce, creating blocks of international trade. However, no good result was achieved. The economies of the region were weak due to lack of integration between them and their relative isolation, which was revealed by the reduced regional commerce affecting their competitive production sectors. The ECLAC was born by this time, supporting growth of economic activities and integration of Latin America into the worldwide economy. As a way to encourage integration, the ECLAC proposed the organization of a custom union, considering as a necessity the pursuing of industrialization in the region through state protectionism in the macro and microeconomic regulation.

After the '50s, there were initiatives for regional markets and for free trade zones later: simpler structures than the former failed attempts. Prebisch called them “more limited agreements” than a common market. As a result, the ALALC was born in 1960. This association’s primary objective was to progressively free trade between the involved national markets. In 1953, Argentina had signed the “Santiago Act” creating a common central agency, the General Council of the Chilean-Argentine Economic Union, in order to fasten the trade between Argentina and Chile. Afterwards, an Economic Union Agreement was signed with Paraguay, as a first step towards custom union. Something similar happened with Ecuador and Bolivia.

Although there had been new flows of manufacture exports and an overturning of the economy concerning the internal markets of the region's countries due to the industrialization through imports substitution processes, external trade structure couldn't be organized in a better way. The resulting unbalanced situation came up from two main factors: 1) there was no dynamic manufacture trade between Latin American countries; 2) the absolute and relative industrialization were in the production of consumption assets and then, in some countries, intermediate assets, but hardly of capital assets. This characteristic, added to the little absorption of employment due to the limited expansion in activities of technological and scientific development that should have been generated, would produce limitations to the completion of the industrialization stages, as it happened in other parts of the world, not achieving modernization either. To sum up, dynamic demands did not take place intensifying the vulnerability of national economies. On the other hand, market size revealed its importance in that particular historical moment, and at the same time that the national markets were reaching their zenith, regional (and even sub-regional) economic integration projects were arising, trying to find complementary compensation of development lines and to increase the perspectives of market demands. So that from the idea of the continental integration supported by the United States since the 19th century and later by Latin American countries, with different basis and objectives, the concept of an organization upon free-trade delimited areas has been reached.

However, the region situation had not changed since 1970. Among the arising problems, some of the main ones were the situation of inequality of the international trade between Latin America and the central countries, the regional markets’ limitation due to the lack of purchasers for their industrial production, the failure of the regional systems of commercial associations to integrate a Latin American common market. Social troubles which were related to inflationary processes and deficit in balances of
payments, had an important bearing on changes of government; their hardness lead them to dismantle workers’ unions and to ban political parties’ free action. In order to stimulate investments by negotiating loans with international organizations, Brazil, Argentina and Chile’s foreign economic policies tried to connect international companies, real multinational corporations. This situation would lead to the opening of national markets by reducing tariffs and regulations. The tendency became deeper with the ending the internationalization process by the implementation of adjustment programs and the development of market mechanisms. Markets’ strength increase opposite to national states’ capacity and regulation. The recommendation of reducing national states size made by the “Consensus of Washington” by the middle of the 90's, may be pointed out as the top of this process.

Market economy, free of political and social control, rules the new world order. Carried-out transformations involve adaptations taking into account national states’ role, social control of economy, the incidence of technological improvements on research centers, universities, institutions and on culture— all of them as technological development agents—. Changes were not the same for all countries: while economic growth kept on increasing in some of them, this process was delayed in others in spite of all efforts made in that direction. Inequities and asymmetries between nations went deeper. The breakdown in the balance of payments and the troubles show us the weakness of the economic institutions and the failures of the worldwide economic organization. The necessity of reform points to structural and organizational matters, searching for the recovering of institutional credibility. Integration in the world becomes the primary objective, using the best methods for each country and looking for overcoming that asymmetry. Latin American countries seem to walk toward integration with a “continentalizing” tendency, as a response to a world economic scenario where globalization and regionalism live together, creating commercial blocks. These ones should take advantage of their natural resources, the expansion of the internal consumption of different products and the possibility of specialization in a wide market such as the Mercosur. The intention is to develop strategies which will link world economy and internal development through joint, coordinated and complementary efforts.
World Overview of the Milk Producing Countries at the End of the Millenium and the Effects on Mercosur

Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles y Comercio (GATT): perspectivas e implicancias sobre el mercado mundial de lácteos

El mercado internacional de lácteos se caracteriza por haber sufrido una serie de distorsiones en las últimas décadas, las que han llevado a los países exportadores a implementar diferentes estrategias que trataremos de sintetizar en este trabajo. Las dimensiones del mismo nos impiden hacer un análisis pormenorizado de todas ellos, por lo que hemos elegido como metodología la comparación de la región láctea de Oceanía y la Argentina en el marco del MERCOSUR.

Los años de la posguerra marcaron el comienzo de una política de protección y desarrollo de la producción de alimentos en Europa, principal destino de las exportaciones argentinas hasta entonces. Logrado el auto-abastecimiento y merced a los subsidios implementados, comenzaron a exportar a otros mercados, impidiendo la competencia de países que, como la Argentina, no subsidiaban los lácteos y sólo hacían pequeños reembolsos a la exportación.

Sin embargo, en octubre de 1947, veintitrés países firmaron el Acta de Fundación del Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles y Comercio (GATT). Su objetivo era promover el desarrollo económico de los países miembros mediante el establecimiento de acuerdos recíprocos y mutuamente ventajosos dirigidos a la reducción sustancial de aranceles y otras barreras al comercio así como la eliminación de tratamientos discriminatorios en el comercio internacional.

En diciembre de 1993, al finalizar la Ronda Uruguay del GATT quedaron establecidas nuevas condiciones del mercado mundial. Luego de siete años de negociaciones, 117 países acordaron establecer reducciones específicas en el uso de los subsidios a las exportaciones. Todos los participantes deberán, para el año 2000, reducir los volúmenes de exportación de productos agrícolas subsidiados en un monto del 21% en relación a los niveles promedio del período base (1986-1990), y reducir la ayuda monetaria que financiar esos subsidios en un 36%. Asimismo, deben liberalizar el acceso a sus mercados nacionales. Estos compromisos entraron en vigencia el 1° de junio de 1995 y se mantendrán hasta el 30 de junio del 2001 bajo el control de la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC), sucesora del GATT.

En este contexto, la agricultura y en particular los alimentos fueron objeto de un tratamiento discriminatorio; sólo se estableció una mínima apertura del 4% sobre el consumo interno que llegará al 5% al final del período, la cual ha sido obstaculizada con frecuencia por medidas no arancelarias, y más recientemente, por una reaparición del proteccionismo.

Por lo tanto, el debate se centra en los temas relacionados con los puntos definidos como barreras técnicas al comercio (TBT), y aspectos sanitarios y fitosanitarios (SPS), que obstaculizan el comercio.

En cuanto a los productos lácteos, las previsiones hechas sobre el final de la Ronda Uruguay afirmaban que el mayor impacto sería probablemente sobre los mercados internacionales de queso. Para el año 2000, los exportadores mundiales de queso, colectivamente, deberán disminuir sus exportaciones subsidiadas en alrededor de 150.000 tn por año. Se espera que los precios mundiales se incremen en

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10 o 20%, aunque es difícil decir qué países podrán expandir su participación en el mercado mundial de este producto.697

La transnacionalización de la industria de los alimentos se inició durante los años de posguerra en los EE.UU. y se expandió rápidamente a Europa. Paralelamente a esta "integración alimentaria", se produjo una modificación del mapa productivo de materias primas agropecuarias y un aumento de la producción agrícola en los países industrializados.

Entre los años sesenta y setenta Europa incrementó el tamaño de sus explotaciones y estimuló a los productores a encarar la reconversión mediante la Política Agrícola Común (PAC). Consecuentemente, Europa logró la autosuficiencia alimentaria y durante los años ochenta su balanza agrícola comercial tendría un saldo exportador neto. Japón también avanzaría en la producción agrícola, pero la falta de tierras disponibles lo obligó a diversificar sus exportaciones. Con el aumento de la producción y la reducción o desaparición de la dependencia alimentaria de Europa y Japón crecieron las disputas internacionales: EE.UU. buscó nuevos mercados de exportación en los países en desarrollo. Las inversiones agroalimentarias siguieron el camino de las exportaciones y el agro latinoamericano empezó a transnacionalizarse.

En los años ´90, el incremento de la inversión directa en el exterior hizo que un grupo de países en desarrollo captaran nuevas corrientes de capital y se convirtieran en mercados emergentes. Las cifras de la inversión indican que es un fenómeno de magnitud indudablemente asociado con la expansión del mercado mundial. La agroindustria encontró un terreno propicio para el desarrollo, sobre todo donde había un proceso de transformación agrícola, condiciones generales de apertura económica y pequeños y medianos productores integrados.

En 1994 se formó el Grupo Cairns, integrado por países en desarrollo, entre los que se encuentran la Argentina y Brasil, junto con Chile, Colombia, Uruguay y Paraguay, unidos a otros grandes productores agrarios como Canadá, Australia y Nueva Zelanda. Si bien el Grupo no alteró sustancialmente el curso de las negociaciones, ha mostrado intereses diferenciados con respecto a los países en desarrollo porque está constituido por grandes productores de alimentos, con una enorme potencialidad y creciente influencia en el mercado mundial de esos productos. La presencia en el grupo de los países del Mercosur y de Chile, señala también la significación que está adquiriendo esta subregión de América del Sur en el mercado mundial de alimentos.

La reconversión agrícola y la globalización tienden a diluir el frente común de los países en desarrollo, que fue una constante desde el inicio de la posguerra, hasta el fin de los años ´80. Su capacidad competitiva los convierte en partidarios de un mercado mundial más abierto y sin prácticas proteccionistas. Las discusiones durante la Ronda Uruguay o en la OMC los muestra más cerca de las demandas realizadas por EE.UU. en favor de una mayor apertura en el comercio agrícola698, por lo que su estrategia consiste en no enfrentar el proteccionismo en su totalidad, sino en utilizar las disputas entre EE.UU. y la UE, apoyando el interés estadounidense en conformar un mercado más abierto.

Fuera del Grupo de Cairns y particularmente en el Mercosur, en las reuniones preparatorias del Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas (ALCA) y en la discusión del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre el Mercosur y la Unión Europea, sus integrantes encaran las restricciones puntuales que aparecen en su relación comercial con EE.UU. y Europa, referidas siempre al proteccionismo agrícola en esos países.

Actualmente, se está cumpliendo con las limitaciones establecidas en cuanto a los montos máximos de subsidios. Tanto la Unión Europea (UE) como los EE.UU. han reducido los stocks de intervención a niveles bajos comparados con los volúmenes existentes en los años que se toman como base de cálculo, lo

697 Peter Vitaliano “EL Mercado Mundial de Lácteos Después de la Ronda Uruguay del GATT” en Edith Depteris de Guiguet, Compiladora Situación y Desafíos del Cooperativismo Lechero Argentino, Santa Fe, Centro de Publicaciones, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1995, p.84. De este autor se ha tomado las perspectivas del sector lechero luego de la Ronda Uruguay. El cree que si bien se implementarán cambios sustanciales en las políticas lecheras de los principales países proveedores, los mismos tendrán impacto selectivo sobre el mercado mundial, por lo que es muy difícil pronosticar quienes serán los que puedan aprovechar los nuevos nichos que se abren en commodities lecheros.

698 Eduardo Santos, La Internacionalización de la producción agrícola-alimentaria y el comercio agrícola mundial, 1992, Buenos Aires, GEL.
cual reduce ampliamente el presupuesto dedicado al sostén de la producción de ambas regiones. Las reglas de arancelización y de porcentajes de acceso a los mercados internos a tarifas bajas, también están siendo cumplidas.

La Unión Europea continúa siendo el mayor productor de los tres principales rubros lecheros, pero los compromisos del GATT limitan una mayor expansión, especialmente en queso. La producción en la ex-URSS siguió bajando, alcanzando una caída del 10% en 1995. EE.UU., el segundo mayor productor de queso y manteca, continuará su expansión después del 2000. Canadá con su producción subsidiada y un aumento de la cuota a 4.6 millones de toneladas, continuará aumentando a un 1% anual durante los próximos diez años. Sin embargo, los subsidios podrían ser revisados en el futuro.

Los mercados del sudeste asiático, suscitan interés a la EU por el impacto económico que pueden representar, pero están atentos a las tarifas, y saben que compiten con Australia y Nueva Zelanda.

América Latina ha realizado cambios significativos en la producción e industrialización que se pueden caracterizar en general del siguiente modo:

- Crecimiento sostenido de la producción y el comercio.
- Rápida reestructuración y modernización industrial.
- Fuertes inversiones locales y multinacionales.
- Creciente cooperación regional a través de Uniones Transitorias de Empresas (UTE).

La producción en América Latina ha crecido sostenidamente a un ritmo que, en algunos casos, alcanza al 5% anual.

La República Argentina, que probablemente sea quién lidera el crecimiento de la producción láctea, con una producción de 10 millones de toneladas de leche, que representan el 15% de sus exportaciones, quiere duplicarla en los próximos cinco años. En este momento, las principales empresas, nacionales y extranjeras, han tomado la iniciativa para aprovechar las ventajas del mercado: expandir sus inversiones en productos deshidratados (leche en polvo) y productos diferenciados como leche larga vida reforzada con hierro. Sin embargo, es un largo camino el que queda todavía por recorrer en la liberalización del comercio de los productos lácteos. Nuestro país deberá seguir luchando en la próxima ronda de negociaciones, y mientras tanto el sector productor lechero deberá profundizar su proceso de eficientización para sobrevivir como exportador en las condiciones que nos tocará enfrentar.

Por lo tanto, frente a la Ronda del Milenio no parece probable que Europa tenga interés en abrir mercados, sino que intentará buscar soluciones balanceadas donde el productor europeo se vea protegido a un nivel que esté de acuerdo con la situación actual y futura de la industria láctea. Europa va a mantener su posición contra de los libres mercados e insistiendo en que su principal mercado está en su propia región.

Aquellas regiones que ya tienen una tradición exportadora de larga data, como Oceanía y Europa van a defenderse, porque la balanza del mercado mundial es muy frágil. Además es una producción marginal la que se está exportando a los mercados mundiales, pero esos mercados marginales también son muy vulnerables ante comportamientos bruscos. Si se pusiera en marcha un dumping de precios, se producirían efectos nefastos. Para evitar esas posibles situaciones, es probable que, en los próximos años, se vea mucha cooperación entre las empresas lácteas y operadores americanos, sudamericanos y europeos respecto al manejo de los mercados mundiales.

A pesar de todas las previsiones, tanto optimistas como pesimistas, hoy se puede apreciar que, aunque los países están cumpliendo las limitaciones de volumen establecidas para las exportaciones subsidiadas, los efectos sobre los precios de exportación de los productos lácteos han sido menores a los esperados.

Lo que sí ha cambiado es la mezcla de productos, disminuyendo el volumen de la leche en polvo descremada y de la manteca, con un crecimiento de los quesos, manteniéndose prácticamente sin cambios la leche entera en polvo.

Asimismo, la participación relativa de las regiones exportadoras, con un crecimiento marcado en Oceanía a expensas de la Unión Europea y de los EE.UU., se ha modificado.
Luego de los fuertes aumentos ocurridos durante el año 1995, en su momento atribuidos en gran parte a las nuevas condiciones del mercado inauguradas por el Acuerdo del GATT, a partir de 1997 se ha iniciado un proceso de deterioro de los precios internacionales.

Esta caída de precios obedece a varios factores, entre los que se encuentran: reducción de la demanda global debido a crisis económicas en países importadores (México, Sudeste Asiático); la revaluación del dólar americano frente a las demás monedas competidoras, la cual permite reducir los precios de venta en esa moneda, incrementar la producción lechera mundial, aumentar la oferta exportadora (Nueva Zelanda, Australia, Argentina y Uruguay) y restringir la demanda importadora por sustitución (como ha ocurrido en Brasil).699

Por lo tanto, cabe concluir que el comercio internacional de lácteos en la actualidad enfrenta una gran dependencia de la demanda de países económicamente débiles; una oferta creciente y poco flexible y una alta sensibilidad de la producción a las fluctuaciones cambiarias, las cuales afectan directamente los precios internacionales en dólares.

La lucha actual por bajar los costos tiende a agrandar el tamaño de las explotaciones. Las unidades productivas no pueden menos que adaptarse a esta forma de producción y, cuando la extensión es menor a la óptima, aumenta la intensidad en el uso del capital, como en Europa, o se busca diversos tipos de asociación. Hay integración horizontal cuando los productores forman una asociación o una cooperativa que, a su vez, puede integrarse verticalmente. La subsistencia de unidades productivas de pequeño tamaño se explica porque, muchas veces, los productores combinan su trabajo agrícola con un empleo ajeno a la explotación, cuyos ingresos pueden utilizar para capitalizar el predio.

Oceanía700

Los países exportadores de Oceanía también han adecuado sus lecherías a las condiciones de distorsión del mercado mundial. En el caso de Australia, a través de un fondo autofinanciado por el mismo sector, destinado a subsidiar las exportaciones lácteas, contando con un sistema de doble precio: un precio interno que es casi el doble del precio de exportación. En el caso de Nueva Zelanda, a través de un manejo estatal y monopólico de las exportaciones lácteas701. Australia y Nueva Zelanda son competidores en Asia y es la industria Australiana la que está siguiendo a Nueva Zelanda en su avance para convertirse en un proveedor mundial de exportaciones lecheras en lugar de regional

Las producciones de Australia y Nueva Zelanda han crecido rápidamente en la década del ´90 debido a diversos factores:

- Las normas gubernamentales en materia de lechería en Oceanía han sido desreguladas y su foco apunta a la respuesta que recibe la industria de las señales que le envía el mercado.
- La competitividad de ambas industrias se basa en los bajos costos y en la producción de leche por medio de pasturas de alta calidad.
- La proximidad geográfica de los mercados de Asia.
- El fomento de nuevos mercados.
- El crecimiento continuo en mercados bien consolidados, como es el caso de Japón, por medio del desarrollo y la comercialización, para ayudar a crear y responder a una demanda de un consumidor más diversificado y exigente.


700 Gran parte de las opiniones sobre la situación de la lechería en Oceanía, pertenecen al Sr. Rob Petit, funcionario de la Corporación Australiana de Lechería (ADC), ente subvencionado por los productores dedicados al servicio y apoyo del desarrollo de la industria lechera australiana en los mercados nacionales e internacionales.

701 El Sector Lácteo Apuntes para... op.cit. p.22
La liberalización gradual del acceso a los mercados de consumo más grandes, tales como la Unión Europea y los EE.UU.

El uso agrícola de la tierra es también un dato importante para explicar el aumento de la producción lechera en Oceanía. El desarrollo del ganado vacuno y lanar en Nueva Zelanda y en la región sudeste de Australia, que es la región lechera de mayor importancia en ese país, sufrió una seria caída en la década del ´90, al tiempo que la lechería proporcionó una mejor fuente de ingresos y ha alentado la transformación hacia el tambo. En Nueva Zelanda no hay incentivos gubernamentales directos a la exportación. En Australia existe un programa, que durará sólo dos años más, se trata más que un incentivo a la exportación, de un impuesto que pagan los productores y que luego se recupera a través de precios más altos al consumidor.

Como resultado de lo expuesto, la producción de leche en Oceanía creció el 50%, entre 1989-90 y 1997-98. Las producciones de esta región, promediaron un crecimiento del 5% por estación. Dada la madurez de los mercados internos de ambos países, casi todo el aumento de la producción, que se estima en los 6,8 billones de litros, en el periodo comprendido entre 1989-90 y 1997-98, se dirigió hacia la exportación. En 1997-98 Australia ha exportado cerca del 50% del total de la leche enviada a la industria; mientras que, en este mismo contexto, las exportaciones de Nueva Zelanda representaron más del 90%. Por consiguiente, las industrias lecheras de Oceanía debieron convertirse en las más eficientes del mundo, para ser competitivas frente a las exportaciones lecheras subvencionadas del mundo. Durante ese período la participación de Oceanía en el mercado lechero mundial (tomada en base a equivalente en leche líquida), ha crecido del 25% en 1990, al 43% en 1997, en la que ambos países han aumentado sus participaciones respectivas. Durante este período el mercado mundial creció alrededor del 17%, o sea 5,2 billones de litros a 36,4 billones de litros.702

Se observa que el gran crecimiento exportador de Oceanía, que fue de 9% por año, en los años previos a 1997; se logró a expensas de otros países exportadores, entre los que se encuentra América Latina. Si bien no se espera que mantenga esta alta tasa, continuará creciendo a un ritmo menor debido a varios factores:

- El aumento continuo de la demanda, producto de los nuevos hábitos de consumo difundidos por la globalización de los mercados y los costos bajos de elaboración de leche que presenta esta región.
- Las inversiones en aumento de las compañías multinacionales en la producción, comercialización y distribución de productos lácteos a gran escala. Como consecuencia de ello, las cooperativas y compañías de Oceanía están estimulando la innovación de los productos, elevando las normas de atención al consumidor, mejorando la calidad y reduciendo los costos unitarios de producción.
- El crecimiento continuo de la demanda global de productos lácteos de selección, tales como el queso, el helado, la fórmula para bebés y los productos lácteos frescos como los yogures, los postres lácteos, el queso fresco, etc.
- La estrategia adoptada por las industrias y el sector exportador de Oceanía, de adaptarse a las fluctuaciones del cambiante entorno comercial.
- La decisión de ir paulatinamente dando marcha atrás en las medidas de apoyo a la lechería nacional.

Será seguramente Oceanía quien tendrá la mejor oportunidad de aprovechar el aumento de la demanda en los mercados mundiales. Pero también otros exportadores aparecerán en la escena, como algunos países sudamericanos.

Con respecto a la competencia de la Argentina con Oceanía, observamos que las posibilidades no son desdeñables: Australia y Nueva Zelanda se ubican con rindes similares a los argentinos por vaca, aunque con una carga por hectárea entre 2 y 3 veces mayor, lo que permite que estimemos que, teniendo la Argentina características climáticas y de calidad de la tierra similares a las de los países mencionados, la capacidad de crecimiento es todavía muy grande. En la etapa industrial se observa en la Argentina que, aunque se han desarrollado importantes esfuerzos, todavía se registra una productividad que podría crecer por falta de escala y de automatización en la elaboración de los productos lácteos.

702 Esto está tomado en base a la grasa de la leche. Tomando los sólidos sin grasa, se estima que el comercio mundial aumentó de 31,7 billones de litros a 38.8 billones de litros.
productos básicos -leche en polvo y quesos-. En leche en polvo los avances realizados en la industria local en el último año son mayores que en quesos.

**Australia**

Las similitudes estructurales existentes entre Australia y el sector productor lechero argentino son notables, por ejemplo, el hecho de estar representado por una mezcla de cooperativas, compañías privadas nacionales e internacionales, y la ausencia de un exportador único de ventas y, en el sector industrial, los cambios importantes en esta década. La producción australiana de leche ha crecido rápidamente en la década de los años 90, de 6.3 billones de litros en la estación de 1989-1990 (finaliza el 30 de junio) a una cifra estimada de 9.4 billones de litros en el período 1997-1998. En el ejercicio de 1996-1997 las cooperativas recibieron alrededor del 77% de la producción total. Las tres cooperativas más grandes, en orden, son: Murray Goulburn, Bonlac y Dairy Farmers Group, que en 1997-1998 representaron alrededor del 60% de las entregas totales. La participación de la leche entregada a las cooperativas ha ido creciendo constantemente del 71% en 1989-1990. El resto de la leche es enviada a las empresas privadas. En el caso de las empresas multinacionales la leche es enviada a Nestlé, Kraft y Parmalat, o en el caso de las empresas australianas de tamaño mediano, a National Foods y Pauls, o a las cooperativas de menor tamaño.

Entre 1989 y 1998 el número de cooperativas lecheras se redujo de 34 a 11, comparado con 328 en 1969. La concentración del número de cooperativas en los veinte años hasta 1989 se reflejó en el período comprendido entre 1973 y 1974 al incorporarse el Reino Unido a la Comunidad Europea, perdiendo Australia, como consecuencia, su mayor mercado de exportación. Las exportaciones de manteca promediaban entonces y en los cinco años anteriores alrededor 50.000 toneladas por año. Otros factores que contribuyeron a la reducción de las cooperativas fueron: la sequía, la inflación y las altas tasas de interés, y la pérdida de confianza en la viabilidad futura de la industria.

Sin embargo, a diferencia de las cooperativas, el número de empresas privadas que estaban recibiendo leche entre 1989 y 1998 se ha mantenido relativamente igual, o sea, entre 35 y 40. Además de las compañías mencionadas arriba, en la actualidad la mayoría de las empresas son elaboradoras especializadas de queso con entregas limitadas de leche. El mercado internacional condiciona las operaciones de los procesadores de lácteos, a nivel de cooperativa y privada. El 50% de la leche entregada a las fábricas en 1997-1998 fue exportada, comparado con el 30% en 1989-1990. Como en otros países productores, en Australia se produjo un descenso constante del número de productores de leche, mientras que la productividad ha aumentado.

Las fuerzas más importantes que están moldeando la consolidación del tambo y del sector de procesamiento, son los siguientes:

- desregulación por parte del gobierno de los sectores de elaboración y del mercado de los lácteos, oportunidades de mercado;
- racionalización de la industria (a nivel del tambo y de compañía); y
- desarrollos en la operatoria, como campos de mayor tamaño, transporte y técnicas eficientes en materia de procesado que permiten trabajar en economías de escala.

En este momento, el productor en Australia recibe del 4% al 5% de retorno sobre la inversión, que es bueno si se lo compara con otras industrias, pero está bastante por debajo del rendimiento que hubiera obtenido en acciones de capital. En los próximos años, va a haber una presión creciente sobre el producto lácteo australiano para que reduzca el costo de producción de la leche cruda, porque el mercado internacional será cada vez más competitivo. El gobierno federal de Australia es el responsable de las normas de elaboración de la leche, mientras que los seis gobiernos estatales determinan las normas concernientes a la leche fresca para beber.

En lo que hace a la elaboración industrial de la leche la introducción del Plan Kerin de 1986 por parte del gobierno federal, marcó una coyuntura crítica para la industria australiana de productos lácteos.

703 Entrega a las fábricas
704 Actualmente Pauls está sujeta a una oferta pública de compra por parte de Parmalat.
Antes de 1986, los precios internos de los productos elaborados regían por un sistema regulado desde el gobierno, y las ganancias resultantes de la exportación se prorrateaban entre las empresas. Este sistema desincentivaba a las empresas a investigar en el desarrollo de nuevos productos y a las innovaciones en la comercialización. El Plan Kerin eliminó toda regulación estatal, dejando a las empresas la responsabilidad directa de su rentabilidad. En el momento de introducirse el Plan Kerin, aproximadamente el 73% de la producción de leche -4.4 billones de litros-, era utilizada para la elaboración de productos. En 1997-1998, el porcentaje se elevó a una cifra estimada del 80% de la producción de leche, o sea, 7.5 billones de litros.

El **precio de la leche fresca** fue desregulado también a nivel estadual, si bien los gobiernos provinciales lo hicieron con mayor lentitud que el gobierno federal. Para fines de 1999, todos los controles sobre los precios de la leche fresca serán eliminados, salvo un mínimo garantizado al productor. El precio más alto que se pagaba por la leche fresca tenía el propósito inicial de promover una producción de todo el año de un alimento esencial para las zonas urbanas. El precio más alto de la leche fresca estaba apoyado por convenios de cupos y consorcios para uso común en los respectivos estados.

Sin embargo, el precio garantizado al productor está siendo evaluado progresivamente en cada estado debido a la creciente presión del gobierno federal para reducir la regulación de las empresas. Si bien no se puede adelantar el resultado de las revisiones de los estados, que se estima concluirá a lo largo de 1999, existe un fuerte impulso para desregular los precios totalmente, en otras palabras, el mercado sería el único responsable de fijar los precios de la leche fresca entre el productor y el procesador. El resultado de la desregulación ha alentado y continúa alentando aún el cambio gradual de la producción de la leche hacia los climas más frescos y cálidos del sudeste de Australia. Esta zona es la más adecuada para la producción que basada en pasturas de bajo costo.

El rápido crecimiento de la oferta de leche elaborada desde la introducción del Plan Kerin en 1986, aproximadamente 3.1 billones de litros, fue estimulado por el aumento de las oportunidades de exportación. En la década del ´80 las naciones del sudeste asiático, Taiwan y Japón han surgido como los mayores mercados de exportación. Este resurgir de la producción lechera y el cambio de rumbo hacia las regiones con mayores ventajas, en la mitad de los ´80, tuvo una influencia directa en el incremento de la eficiencia en materia de recolección, transporte y procesado de la leche, en un momento en que las cooperativas y las compañías estaban tratando de elevar su competitividad a nivel internacional. Como consecuencia de este proceso, surgieron tres cooperativas de gran tamaño, de las cuales dos de ellas, Murray Goulburn y Bonlac, procesan un gran porcentaje de las exportaciones australianas de productos lácteos.

La productividad en el tambo se elevó rápidamente, llegando a aumentar las entregas de leche por tambo en Victoria de 406.794 lts. en 1989-90 a 656.000 lts en 1996-97. La cantidad de tambos se ha reducido también en el mismo período en un 11%. Este incremento se debió a:

- mayor inversión de capital para aumentar la competitividad;
- aumento del número de ganado, en Victoria -el estado dominante en materia de exportación, el número de vacas se elevó en un 35%;
- incremento del rendimiento -una suba del 24 por ciento a 4.670 litros- en el mismo período;
- mayor utilización de alimentos suplementarios;
- una actitud más profesional en el sector productor, que se manifiesta en la participación del productor en el mejoramiento y mayor uso de pasturas y programas ambientales (Landcare);
- capacitación especializada fuera del tambo;

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705 La leche fresca excluye la leche de larga vida.

706 Vacas en lactancia y vacas secas.

707 El aumento de la productividad, especialmente en el rendimiento de las vacas, ha sido mucho mayor en el estado de Victoria donde se origina la mayor exportación de lácteos de Australia.
mayor uso de laboreo especializado, incorporación de expertos en nutrición, y computarización del trabajo en el tambo.

La estructura de las cooperativas ha sufrido cambios mucho más radicales que las empresas privadas en la industria lechera australiana, sobre todo a causa de la eliminación de la regulación de precios de la leche elaborada, que proporcionaba un cierto grado de certeza en materia de flujo de fondos. Las cooperativas se vieron forzadas a organizar sus estructuras operativas a la par de las líneas comerciales. El último punto se vio reforzado por un fuerte crecimiento en las ventas de las cooperativas, con una facturación -por parte de las tres cooperativas más grandes- que superó el billón de dólares australianos durante el período 1997-1998.

Los componentes claves para la prosperidad futura de las cooperativas australianas son:

- flexibilidad para elevar y crear la fuerza financiera necesaria para competir en el mercado;
- tratamiento imparcial de los gobiernos a las cooperativas y las empresas públicas;
- una visión y estrategia claras para obtener crecimiento en las ventas y ganancias en las acciones;
- afiliación de productores bien informados capaces de entender y responder a la necesidad de cambio;
- un directorio orientado hacia el comercio, capaz de proporcionar los conocimientos técnicos para tratar asuntos tales como el desarrollo del mercado, comercialización a los niveles minoristas, institucionales e internacionales, finanzas a nivel de corporación, recursos humanos, sociedades conjuntas, y
- el deseo de tomar riesgos en la creación de nuevos negocios.

La estructura de las empresas privadas también se transformó, básicamente debido a tres causas:

- el surgimiento de los mercados de quesos especializados,
- las actividades de Parmalat desde el comienzo de las operaciones comerciales en 1996, y
- la desaparición de pequeñas empresas abocadas a la elaboración de leche fresca.

Como país productor, Australia necesita todavía lograr mejoras considerables de productividad a nivel tambo y fábrica. Actualmente este camino ya se ha iniciado con una mejora en el nivel profesional, reducción gradual del número de productores, mayor nivel de inversión de capital, aumento de ganado, mayor uso de alimentos suplementarios, prácticas agrícolas sustentables que no dañan el medio ambiente, mayor disponibilidad de personal especializado y computarización de muchos procedimientos del tambo.

Las exportaciones lecheras australianas, pese a que la Ronda Uruguay ha abierto nuevas oportunidades de mercados, en un futuro cercano continuará siendo Asia. En 1997, los mercados asiáticos representaron el 72% de las ventas de exportación de lácteos, comparadas con el 77% en 1990 y el máximo de 81% en 1995. Las empresas australianas están avanzando rápidamente para establecer una mayor presencia en los productos lácteos frescos de Asia, pero todavía sufren la competencia de las firmas establecidas hace tiempo.

Australia cuenta con una empresa formada por los mismos productores lácteos, la Australian Dairy Corporation (ADC) que representa los intereses de la industria australiana y juega un rol de apoyo en el desarrollo del sector de exportaciones australianas a través de la promoción genérica de actividades. La ADC está formada por un conjunto de productores de tamberos y financiada por un fondo que se usa para promover el consumo diario de productos domésticos e internacionales. En el orden interno la ADC ha llevado adelante un gran número de campañas de promoción exitosas basadas en los beneficios del consumo de lácteos para la salud y la nutrición. Esto incluye comerciales televisivos, avisos a través de multimedia y revistas de difusión masiva, publicidad entre los profesionales de la salud y en las escuelas a través de posters, programas de leche en las escuelas y avisos coordinados con programas nacionales. Destacan las ventajas en la prevención de la osteoporosis y otras enfermedades. En los mercados internacionales, dado los recursos limitados y la extensión de los mismos, los esfuerzos en la promoción genérica resultan más difíciles.

Otra importante vía de promoción de la lechería australiana es a través de publicidad directa. La ACD distribuye folletos en Australia y mercados internacionales y documentos que destacan el conocimiento, la eficiencia técnica y la capacidad productiva de la industria australiana. La ADC también explora...
otros modos de extender la promoción genérica en algunas naciones asiáticas seleccionadas especialmente. Realiza amplias campañas en países donde la leche no es un producto deseable o son desconocidas sus cualidades para la salud y su versatilidad.

Durante los últimos diez años la demanda de lácteos por parte de Asia ha aumentado en todos los rubros. A lo largo de toda la década del ’90, Asia ha sido el factor más importante del crecimiento del mercado internacional, pero a pesar de este crecimiento, esa demanda se ha mantenido sensible a los movimientos internacionales de los precios de los lácteos. La mayoría de los consumidores asiáticos no percibe los lácteos como un alimento de primera necesidad o tradicional y les resulta caro en relación a los sustitutos de comida tradicional.

Esta demanda asiática volátil debido a la fluctuación de los precios internacionales, ha causado efectos negativos en países que, como Australia, realizó un gran esfuerzo exportador hacia esa región, aumentando mucho su producción nacional. Si a esto le sumamos la crisis asiática, no es extraño que la Corporación Australiana de Lechería (ADC) anticipe que, a mediano plazo, el crecimiento de las importaciones de Asia, reflejará sólo un pequeño incremento con respecto a 1997.

Este negativo pronóstico obedece a la caída del ingreso real disponible en las familias causada por un creciente desempleo e inflación; una reducción de las salidas a comer afuera y al pronóstico de un nuevo incremento de la inflación, debido a que las tasas de cambio están más débiles que de costumbre, lo que aumenta los costos de los bienes importados. Crecieron mucho los volúmenes de exportación fuera de Asia, llegando a un promedio de 16% por año. Las exportaciones de 1997 a regiones no asiáticas representaron el 28% del total de las exportaciones australianas. Si se excluyen las actividades de las multinacionales, los mayores esfuerzos en Australia los han realizado las cooperativas y las empresas locales para aumentar su perfil en el mercado.

Se puede concluir que la industria australiana se dirige a agregar valor a sus exportaciones; pero los métodos elegidos ya sea por proveedores de ingredientes específicos o vendedores individuales de marca o una combinación de los dos, dependen de un gran número de factores entre los que las relaciones con el cliente no son un problema menor. Si el cliente es una subsidiaria o una multinacional con base en Australia o una relación de largo tiempo, plantea una situación diferente que la de una cooperativa que intenta abrir un nuevo mercado. Otro factor de importancia es el tamaño y estructura de la empresa vendedora, cuál es su disponibilidad de capital de giro, la difusión que en el mundo tenga la empresa y sus posibilidades de aumentar el capital. Tampoco se puede desestimar como factor de éxito la experiencia de la empresa en actividades exportadoras.

La ADC está financiada por un impuesto sobre la producción láctea de los tamberos, es un impuesto muy pequeño, un décimo de centavo para cada uno de los tamberos, por kilo de grasa butirosa, y además, los productores pagan una cantidad por la promoción, tanto para la promoción nacional como internacional que cuenta con un fuerte apoyo entre los productores. Los productores también pagan un pequeño impuesto para investigación en mejorar tanto la productividad en el campo, como la productividad industrial. A estos impuestos, el promocional que es de 5 cts de dólar australiano por kilo de grasa, y el de investigación y desarrollo que es la mitad de ese nivel, se le suma el aporte del gobierno de un dólar por cada dólar que dan los productores para la investigación a través de este impuesto.

Nueva Zelanda

A principios de los ‘80 el apoyo a la ganadería de pasturas en Nueva Zelanda contaba con una gran variedad de programas de asistencia tanto directa como indirecta. En la actualidad no existe ningún subsidio a la exportación.

Las restricciones cuantitativas han sido eliminadas y las tarifas agrícolas se pautaron en bajos niveles, con muchos productos libres de impuestos. Para el año 2000 todas las tarifas agrícolas estarán entre 0 y 5% siendo eliminadas en el 2001.

En promedio, las tarifas agrícolas son mucho más altas que las tarifas para productos industriales y muchos mercados están sujetos a complicados regímenes de cuota tarifaria.

Los resultados de su reforma agrícola han permitido que Nueva Zelanda:

- mejore considerablemente la administración de los negocios ganaderos;
• los productores privilegiaron la calidad de su producción y se adaptaron a las demandas de los consumidores;
• mejoró su eficiencia y competitividad internacional de su sector agrícola, al reformar su sector agrícola según los lineamientos del mercado internacional.

Ahora bien, el uso de la tierra en Nueva Zelanda está destinado principalmente a pasturas. De los 16.55 millones de hectáreas ocupadas a junio de 1996, 76% era utilizado como pasturas, 4% era arable, 1% para horticultura, 10% plantaciones forestales y 9% a otros propósitos.

Las tierra destinadas a pasturas han sido distribuidas de la siguiente manera: 52% a ovejas, 23% a ganado para consumo, 21% para ganado lechero y 4% para alimentar ciervos.

La agricultura y el comercio agrícola son de vital importancia para el comercio de Nueva Zelanda. Alrededor del 80% de su producción agrícola es exportada, representado el 50% de las exportaciones totales de mercaderías de Nueva Zelanda.

Nueva Zelanda es un actor significativo de los mercados agrícolas mundiales: es el mayor exportador individual de productos lácteos del mundo con un 31% del comercio.

En cuanto a los mayores exportadores de lácteos son: la UE; Nueva Zelanda; Australia; y en menor medida los EE.UU. y Canadá. Estos cinco exportadores proveen entre el 90-95% de los productos lácteos comerciados en el mercado internacional. Cantidades relativamente más pequeñas son exportadas por los Países Nórdicos y por Europa del Este.

Las exportaciones de productos lácteos constituyen un 20% de las facturas de comercio total neozelandés, y con excepción de la leche y otros productos lácteos de consumo local, la industria está orientada principalmente hacia los mercados extranjeros, los que dan cuenta del 80-90% de toda la leche producida. En 1993, Las exportaciones de productos lácteos de Nueva Zelanda alcanzaron un total de NZ$ 3.390 mil millones, lo que representa el 33% de sus exportaciones agrícolas.

Los tres mayores mercados para la producción láctea de Nueva Zelanda son la UE, Japón y los EE.UU., los cuales dan cuenta del 30% del valor total de las exportaciones lácteas de Nueva Zelanda en 1993. Estos tres países poseen industrias lácteas protegidas, y precios domésticos mucho más altos que los precios mundiales.

Existen cuatro grandes grupos de productos fabricados a partir de la leche entera líquida por las fábricas de lácteos neozelandesas: leche en polvo, leche en polvo entera, y productos cremosos, como la manteca y el queso; y productos proteicos como la caseína.

Los mercados de leche en polvo y de queso deberían responder relativamente rápido a las disminuciones de la producción subsidiada. Este hecho, sumado a las nuevas oportunidades de acceso al mercado, debería significar una mayor estabilidad en los precios obtenidos por los tamberos. Sin embargo, las nuevas las tendencias tanto de la demanda como del consumo, continuarán influyendo sobre el precio de año a año.

Más de dos tercios de los productos lácteos comercializados en los mercados mundiales en 1993 fueron exportaciones subsidiadas, en su mayoría provenientes de EE.UU. y de la UE.

Ha habido una reducción del acceso tanto al mercado de manteca del Reino Unido y la UE, como al mercado de lácteos en Japón.

La UE, EE.UU. y Japón son importadores sustanciales de caseína neozelandesa. Nueva Zelanda es el más grande exportador de caseína. Aún así, estos productos no enfrentan las mismas barreras importadoras que otros productos lácteos.

Los mercados más importantes de leche en polvo están en América Central y Sudamérica (México) así como el Sudeste Asiático (Malasia y Filipinas), pero ha habido también un crecimiento en las exportaciones de leche en polvo al Medio Oriente (Argelia e Irán).

El resultado de la Ronda Uruguay en relación a la agricultura la colocó bajo las normas de la disciplina internacional y representó un inicio significativo del proceso de liberalización del comercio agrícola mundial.

La industria láctea será probablemente la mayor beneficiaria por las eliminaciones de subsidios a las exportaciones, negociadas en la Ronda Uruguay. En los últimos años los mercados de terceros países se
han distorsionado cada vez más, mientras que los EE.UU. y la UE en particular han utilizado sus mecanismos de subsidios para capturar nichos del mercado.

En este contexto, el sector lácteo de Nueva Zelanda se ha beneficiado de los acuerdos alcanzados, principalmente debido a los recortes impuestos a las exportaciones subsidiadas, las mejores condiciones de acceso a los mercados y las garantías para permitir mantener el acceso a los niveles existentes. El comercio internacional de lácteos también debería beneficiarse indirectamente por las medidas sanitarias y fitosanitarias más estrictas, así como por las reglas más firmes con relación a las barreras técnicas al comercio. Estos resultados no esperan impactar instantáneamente sobre los precios de los productos lácteos, pero proveerán beneficios a mediano plazo en un medio ambiente comercial internacional más seguro.

Frente a la “Ronda del Milenio” Nueva Zelanda apoya el objetivo de una completa liberalización del mercado agrícola mundial, procurando: 1) una mayor expansión en las oportunidades de acceso al mercado mediante profundos recortes en las tarifas y mayores volúmenes de cuota tarifaria; 2) la eliminación inmediata de todas las formas de subsidios a la exportación aplicada a los productos agrícolas; 3) el mejoramiento de las normas y recortes profundos en las medidas de apoyo doméstico, dirigidas a la eliminación de toda forma de apoyo que distorsione el mercado.

Por lo tanto, el sector lácteo de Oceanía está bien ubicado para hacer frente a los desafíos que presenta la próxima década. Tanto su sector productor como industrial están capacitados para hacer frente a la competitividad en los mercados internacionales, poseen los conocimientos técnicos, las habilidades de comercialización y calidad y diversidad de productos. Todo esto se integra a un complejo contexto que obliga a todas las industrias lácteas del mundo a ajustarse a una realidad mucho más competitiva y un mercado más preocupado por el medio ambiente, como resultado de la desregulación doméstica, el tratamiento de los productos y el crecimiento de la globalización productiva.

**Argentina**

El sector de exportaciones e importaciones lácteas no ha tenido una gran relevancia histórica para la Argentina, pues los niveles de exportación evolucionaron en función de los excedentes del consumo interno y generalmente con niveles de rentabilidad muy bajos o negativos. La política exportadora ha sido muy errática, saltando de un récord de exportaciones, en 1990, a una ausencia casi total en los mercados mundiales en el año 1992.

A partir de 1993 las exportaciones argentinas se incrementaron en forma marcada y sostenida; llegando en 1996 a representar el 12,6% de la producción y un valor de 288,9 millones de dólares, con un crecimiento en toneladas, sobre las de 1995 de 6% y 149% con respecto al promedio 91/95.708. La participación relativa de los principales productos en el total exportado también ha mostrado variaciones en los últimos años, principalmente se observa el incremento de la participación de la leche en polvo y bajas en la de quesos y leche fluida.

Con la fuerte apertura producida en el sector hacia los mercados internacionales, a partir del Plan de Convertibilidad y apertura económica, posicionando los productos lácteos al nivel de protección arancelaria equivalente a la del grupo de materia prima, y en coincidencia con cierta escasez coyuntural de lácteos en el mercado interno, se produjeron fuertes importaciones, sobre todo en 1991 y 1992.

En este sentido ya hemos visto el daño que puede causar al sector productor, que está realizando un gran esfuerzo de tecnificación, la política de apertura sin un adecuado nivel de protección arancelaria, para que no surja un daño desleal motivado por la importación de productos lácteos subsidiados de la Unión Europea, como ocurrió durante 1997. En este sentido el papel del sector gremial y cooperativo es muy importante. La Junta Intercooperativa de Productores de Leche, ha iniciado denuncias por dumping.

La balanza comercial del sector lácteo arroja la situación siguiente en el período 1989 a 1994, el que se pueden observar las bruscas inversiones del sentido de la misma experimentadas: En el análisis de los

Los últimos años han incorporado también el total de las exportaciones/importaciones y balanza comercial Argentina y el porcentaje que los lácteos representaron en el mismo.

La promoción de productos agropecuarios no es nueva en la Argentina, ha habido antecedentes en lo que fueron las juntas reguladoras de las diferentes áreas de la producción primaria, que surgieron en la década del ’30 como consecuencia de la paralización de la demanda internacional originada por la crisis de los años ’30, y también hay un antecedente muy cercano en el tema específicamente lechero que fue el FOPAL, el Fondo de Promoción a la Actividad Lechera. Todas estas instituciones vieron su fin con todo el proceso de desregulación económica que vivió la Argentina a partir de la década de los ’90. Es una economía de mercado, una economía desregulada y el cumplimiento y respeto a las normas de la Organización Mundial de Comercio; lo que conforma el marco en el que hay que moverse actualmente.

En teoría, esa economía de mercado asignará del mejor modo posible los recursos, y los consumidores, destinarán sus ingresos del modo más eficiente posible a sus gastos de consumo. Pero esto no siempre es así, y, aunque la Argentina sea un productor eficiente de lácteos, no se desprende necesariamente de ello que vaya a crecer mucho la demanda. La promoción se justifica entonces a partir, no tanto de la eficiencia en la producción que tiene Argentina, si no de la expresión o la mejor expresión de esa eficiencia y de esa competitividad, ya no es el único país con estas características en el mundo.

Aceptado el principio de la promoción, el primer punto a considerar es si se debería promocionar del lado de la oferta o del lado de la demanda. Desde el lado de la oferta, en la actualidad es casi imposible plantear una promoción al estilo de la experiencia anterior del FOPAL, en cuya concepción había estímulos a la demanda, pero también un correlato muy claro de estímulos a la oferta. Es necesario pensar en promocionar desde la demanda.

Si se analiza el comportamiento de la producción lechera en la Argentina durante la década de los ’90, en particular los últimos 5 ó 6 años, aparece un crecimiento de la producción de alrededor de un 50% en ese período. Este crecimiento se explica por incrementos de productividad, que se dieron en medio de la economía desregulada y abierta, y en un mercado internacional sujeto a las distorsiones que plantean los subsidios, atenuadas, en parte, a partir de 1995, por las nuevas reglas establecidas al finalizar la Ronda Uruguay del GATT.

La caracterización de la lechería argentina, ha cambiado tanto, que ya no se la puede definir como una lechería de producción para el mercado interno y exportadora eventual de algunos saldos o importadora ocasional de algún faltante. Actualmente se encamina hacia una producción lechera claramente excedentaria respecto de las necesidades de consumo interno, y con un componente importante de exportaciones estables. Acciones concretas de promoción se justifican por las expectativas de aumento de producción que existen, y que indican que lo hará a una tasa probablemente superior al crecimiento de la población. Un techo a este aumento podría ser la evolución de los precios relativos, que se comportaron en forma favorable a la lechería, prácticamente desde la convertibilidad hasta los años 1995, 1996, y que ahora manifiestan una reversión notable.

En cuanto al crecimiento poblacional, no se puede esperar un aumento en la Argentina, que se encuentra más o menos estancada en una tasa del orden del 1,4, 1,5% anual. Por lo tanto, tampoco aumentará el consumo por esa vía. Con un consumo global de lácteos del orden de un equivalente en leche a 230 y 240 lts/hab/año, la Argentina se acerca a los valores más altos a nivel internacional, un crecimiento autónomo es muy improbable, salvo algún cambio muy importante en la distribución del ingreso o con algún fuerte estímulo al consumo. Es en este punto en el que la promoción o publicidad institucional se justifica.

La otra alternativa para colocar los excedentes de leche es el mercado regional, particularmente Brasil, que mantiene un consumo bajo por habitante. El país vecino constituye un mercado atrayente al que hay que estimular y desarrollar, permitiendo pensar en campañas de promoción. Y finalmente, se encuentra el mercado internacional exterior a la región. La Argentina espera que la próxima ronda de la Organización Mundial de Comercio empiece a negociar desde la ronda a Uruguay en adelante, es decir, manteniendo a ésta como referencia, evitando así posibles retrocesos.

709 Alguna de las opiniones pertenecen al Sr. Rob Petit, funcionario de la Corporación Australiana de Lechería (ADC), ente subvencionado por los productores dedicados al servicio y apoyo del desarrollo de la industria lechera australiana en los mercados nacionales e internacionales.
Sin embargo, aún en el mejor de los casos queda todavía un cierto tiempo, durante el cual hay que aceptar mercados con algún grado de distorsión por subsidios a la exportación, ya que pasarán varios años desde el inicio de la nueva ronda, hasta que se concluirán los acuerdos, años durante los cuales nuestra producción continuará creciendo, no será suficiente el mercado interno sumado al regional para equilibrar nuestra creciente oferta, y será necesario penetrar en un mercado internacional con crecientes distorsiones y con un nivel de precios sensiblemente más bajos.

Por todas estas son las razones, es interesante reavivar un debate que ya ha dado comienzo en forma incipiente, acerca de la mejor práctica de estímulo a la demanda. Si se observa la experiencia en este sentido de los EE.UU. y de Australia, aparece la idea de pensar en un estímulo global de las distintas demandas y en todos los frentes; no sólo la de exportación (regional e internacional), sino también del mercado interno.

Cada uno de los destinatarios de la publicidad requerirá acciones diferenciadas. En el mercado interno, campañas que tiendan a una promoción de tipo genérico, quizá no solo de leche fluida sino de lácteos en general, tratando de que el consumidor perciba la calidad y la variedad de lácteos que Argentina tiene y las disponibilidades que están al alcance del consumidor. En el mercado regional, una buena estrategia sería quizás la de armar campañas destinadas a promover productos de mayor valor unitario o mayor valor agregado, es decir, promover productos más especializados.

Corresponde entonces analizar quién financiaría una campaña de promoción en la Argentina. Hay oficinas de gobierno en distintos países del mundo que llevan adelante campañas de promoción comercial de productos agropecuarios. Son campañas eficientes, buenas en la etapa de plantearse el ingreso de algún producto alimenticio nuevo al mercado. En la Argentina, el sector público ha comenzado, en alguna medida las ha empezado a desarrollar, pero no son en modo alguno suficientes. Si hablamos de penetrar al mundo con alimentos en cualquier país del mundo podrá haber una campaña del sector público, pero si hablamos de penetrar con lácteos, o ya más específicamente, leche en polvo o queso de la calidad A, o manteca de la calidad B, surge claramente el espacio del sector privado. En la medida en que se desciende hacia la especificidad de un producto o de un mercado en particular o de un segmento del mercado, entonces empieza a cobrar importancia el rol del sector privado.

De los dos sectores que conforman la lechería es poco sostenible en el tiempo un financiamiento solidario de parte de la industria, por lo menos si se pretende hacer una campaña para promover un producto determinado, porque lo que es el beneficio directo de una empresa, lo es forma muy directa o licuada para otra. Cuando una empresa promociona un producto, lo está haciendo de su marca en detrimento de otras y termina generando un juego de suma cero, porque todo lo que esa promoción le puede redundar en incremento de ventas es la menor venta del resto, por lo tanto todo termina en cero para el sector. Es decir, está sustituyendo lácteos con lácteos.

Al encarar una campaña general, de tipo genérico, la ganancia es del conjunto, y lo que se está disputando es la expansión de la demanda de otros sectores de la producción de alimentos y bebidas, es decir, puede generarse un juego que no sea de suma cero. Las campañas de tipo genérico cuando salen a disputar espacios de mercado a otros sectores de la producción de alimentos y bebidas, pueden generar un juego de suma positiva.

Si se analizan los costos de una promoción financiada por los productores, se llega a que con una contribución del orden del 0,5 al 0,7% del valor actual de leche, se conseguiría recaudar un fondo del orden de los 10 millones de pesos. Esta no es más que una cifra como para tomar dimensión de costos, ya que las necesidades deben determinar cuál es la ideal para desarrollar una campaña. La dirección de la campaña estaría entonces bajo la dirección del sector primario, a través de algún organismo o instituto y sería quién establecería el nivel de participación necesaria del sector industrial.

El financiamiento directamente a cargo del sector productor, evita que el mismo se incorpore a las estructuras de costos de la industria y termine en un menor precio para la materia prima. En cuanto al beneficio generado para el sector, hay que advertir que es bastante difícil medir, salvo al final de la campaña. No existe otra manera que observar con detalle lo que ya se ha realizado en otras regiones del mundo. Lo único real es la una situación de oferta creciente y sostenida en la que se encuentra la Argentina, frente a una demanda que tiene fuertes posibilidades de disminuir, al menos de la demanda interna. Puede no ser el caso del mercado regional, pero el mercado regional tarde o temprano va a tener un límite también. Y lo que sí tenemos es un resto del mundo, que por ahora y quizás por un buen
tiempo vaya a tener niveles de precio sensiblemente inferiores a los del mercado interno o al mercado regional.

Finalmente el Estado tiene también su espacio de participación, ya que deberá sancionar alguna legislación que obligue a los diferentes sectores a hacer los aportes necesarios y le corresponde un rol de control sobre el destino final de los recursos. Para que el nuevo organismo no crezca desmesuradamente y se quede con todos los recursos recaudados, el mismo no tendría que poder realizar acciones de promoción por sí, sino asignar los recursos para acciones de promoción delegadas, concursadas, licitadas, entre los distintos ejecutores posibles. Esto debería tener una definición muy clara, para no caer en la sospecha de que pueda transformarse en un organismo que finalmente revierta contra los intereses iniciales. Este tipo de actividades de promoción, tendría además un rol interesante de complementación con el sector público, sobre todo en lo que hace a apertura de nuevos mercados, donde en muchos casos la participación del sector público es necesaria. Además, se podría, supletoriamente y complementariamente, sin ser esto su actividad principal, brindar algunos beneficios extras, algunas externalidades, para la mejor competitividad dentro de Argentina, sobre todo en materia de información, tratando de que esta información trate de acotar al mínimo posible todos los problemas de irregularidad impositiva, que son uno de los problemas de competitividad que tienen muchos sectores, de la industria sobre todo.

Todo esto podría coadyuvar a una mejor información que sea soporte para un mejor contralor de este tipo de actividades, y lo mismo en materia de calidad y sanidad en materia de producción de leche y lácteos. Creo que también a través de este tipo de mecanismos de promoción puede supletoriamente o complementariamente apoyarse a la competitividad de Argentina en materia de mejor contralor sanitario y de calidad de producción.

La Argentina debería encarar inicialmente una campaña hacia el mercado interno, porque es muy importante contar con una fuerte base de consumidores en el propio país, dado que ya consume el 88% de la producción láctea argentina. Es posible aumentar ese nivel, aunque sin duda significará fuertes esfuerzos coordinados por parte de los principales participantes de la industria.

**El Mercosur: avances y perspectivas a mediano plazo**

El Mercosur es una unión aduanera incompleta, asentada sobre una zona de libre comercio limitada, con vistas a un futuro mercado común. La unión aduanera incompleta se evidencia en que hubo que establecer programas de convergencia para las diferencias nacionales inicialmente existentes sobre el arancel externo común. La limitación de la zona de libre comercio se expresa en las estructuras diferentes de precios -aunque tengan tendencia a converger-, en los tratamientos discriminatorios, en la falta de armonización de políticas y en lo incipiente de la inversión común710.

El Mercosur fue presentado ante la OMC como una unión aduanera, según el art. XXIV del GATT 94. Pero los países desarrollados, atentos a la pérdida de mercados, observan con desconfianza la posible sustitución de importaciones dentro de la región, que vendría a ser un desvío de comercio en favor del Mercosur y que se manifestaría en el aumento de los flujos de comercio intrazona, especialmente en la Argentina y Brasil.

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International and Interregional Relations in the Area of Misiones or Palmas.

The formation of the internal space of Misiones constitutes an illustrative example of the interweaving of the international and interregional relations that took place in many Latin American frontier regions.

Such a space, which functioned as a totality capable of occupation and shifting, is linked to the history of the area that currently includes the south of Brazil, the Argentine and Uruguayan Mesopotamia, as well as a large part of the former Spanish governorship of Asuncion.

With the aim to develop this perspective of analysis, we take as a starting point the concept of region, taking into account its character of methodological tool with its corresponding tie to reality, that is to say, the relation between the space and the political economic and sociocultural phenomena that take place there.

In other words, this concept is being built in relation to the subject of study, which shows its temporal and spatial dynamism.

To this respect, we consider the frontier as a specific case of region. That is to say, as "plurinational spaces", subjected to appropriation and control by more than one State which implemented power strategies in order to impose their authorities and they squabbled among themselves for their ruling; and as regional spaces with a dynamic of their own, which generated answers to the politics of each of the state entities in which they were incorporated.

The existence of these interactions between what we can call "opposing complementaries" allows the broadening of the horizon of analysis through the observation of the inter-influence between the "international relations" and the "interregional relations”, applied in this study to the specific case of the region of Misiones.
Diplomatic and Commercial Relations between Argentina and Iran from 1940 to 1950

The main point of the work is to try to appraise better the diplomatic and commercial relations between Iran and Argentina, since the beginning in 1947 up to 1953, looking for the relationship that could have existed between commercial changes and the ebbs and flows in the diplomatic relations between both of them, by turning on documents and statistics from that time.

Beginning with May 26th of 1947 Argentine-Iranian diplomatic relations were improved since those countries had had good negotiations in the 1930s: Iran tried to draw a good deal and to guarantee the links with our country choosing a diplomatic representative, but Argentina had not any interest in it, so Iran took it back.

In spite of the cautious diplomatic policy followed by our country, in the period of 1944–1945 trade balance had been in favour of Argentina. That situation changed in 1946, when the war ended and our trade balance's situation went worse, as it happened during 1946 and 1947.

There was another important commercial change between Iran and Argentina: first purchases of fuel and lubricants took place and the price in dollars was very cheap in comparison to that of the property importation coming from USA, Venezuela and Holland Possessions in Central America.

In 1950 the commercial relations were in their best moment, although Argentina had a deficit in exportation balance, the change would be in the importation purchases, namely fuel and lubricants increasing.

In 1951 and 1952 Iranian situation worsened with Great Britain, because of the nationalisation of the oil industry, since industry has been handled by British-Iranian Oil Company.

It was the worst moment in Iran: the political situation was awful as the nationalists politics had been fighting all the time, meanwhile other countries like Italy, Brazil, and Argentina had been seeing the possibility of buying fuel at cheap prices, inasmuch fuel products were essential to develop their industries.

On the other hand our historic alineation with the United Kingdom made even more difficult that the government would take a risk because of fuel purchases to a country that had broken dangerously with the new international order since that time.

If we read over documents and statistics of that time, we can see that the diplomatic relations between those countries were in contradiction with the economic situation in the 30s and at the beginning of the 40s. Argentina had a favourable balance of trade so that Iran didn’t take interest in diplomatic relations, she had a representative in our country instead of them.

On the other hand the beginning of diplomatic relations, and the opening of Iranian Legation occurred at the moment in which our balance of trade was deficietary.

In the 1950s there were negotiations for buying fuel, but they were not carried through although both of the countries would like to do it.
The United States vis-a-vis Argentina and Brazil: the Military Coups of the 1960s

Relations between Brazil and Argentina on the one hand, and the U.S.A. on the other hand, are of particular interest, not only because of both former states' import on the Latin American economic and political scene, but also because of the historically decisive role their links with the great powers have had in the region.

The study of politically significant events in both countries, that occurred in similar circumstances and at about the same time, can shed light on similarities and differences in context, in particular on the tangle of domestic interests present at a crucial point in time, and on the incidence of U.S. foreign policy priorities on such events. One such juncture gave rise to the military coups against the governments of presidents Joao Goulart (1964) in Brazil, and Arturo Illia in Argentina (1966).

In the global context of the Cold War of the mid-1960s, Washington’s main concern in the region was to counteract rising social effervescence and the tendency of some Latin American governments toward economic nationalism. Superficially ascribed to Soviet penetration, both phenomena were identified with the “Communist threat”, especially after the Cuban revolution’s triumph in 1959.

Such a state of convulsion in Latin America was seen by U.S. diplomacy and intelligence as pregnant with threats for that superpower’s general interests. President Kennedy’s hemispheric policy, in particular the creation of the Agency for International Development (AID), represented “preventive reformism,” without a complete abandonment of the usual diplomatic and financial pressures. He even supported Cuban exiles in their efforts to restore pre-revolutionary conditions on the island. When Kennedy was succeeded by Lyndon. Johnson, U.S. policy increasingly shifted towards a strategic-military approach, in the context of “ideological borders,” by way of bilateral agreements of assistance, covert “operations” to promote coups (Brazil, Argentina), and through unilateral military intervention. Witnessed in Santo Domingo, the U.S. sought to legitimize such military interventionism by means of the “collective umbrella” provided by an Organization of American States’ “inter-American force.”

The AID’s failure also caused the decline of the prevailing “social” approach (developmentalism) among Latin America’s political leadership of the day, and the reinforcement of tendencies toward military-repressive solutions. Against the background of sharp bipolar confrontation, explicitly manifested in U.S. military intervention in Vietnam, Latin America became fully involved in the Cold War.

Were such options the expression of divergent points of view between the State Department and the Pentagon? Although this is what emerges from U.S. diplomatic and military records, the differences were more apparent than real. Brazilian president Goulart was considered by American diplomacy and intelligence as having a degree of affinity with Communism. The civilian-military coup that overthrew him enjoyed not only Washington sympathy but also U.S. planned material support, including arms and a “task force” that was already sailing towards the South Atlantic by the end of March.

Although the American attitude was more cautious in Argentina’s case, State Department records reveal that since Illia’s inauguration U.S. decision-makers were closely monitoring his government’s political evolution. This became particularly evident following the annulment of contracts with U.S. oil companies that were signed by Illia’s predecessor (Arturo Frondizi), and the adoption of other policies deemed to be nationalist or even leaning towards the left.

In different degrees, and always seeking to preserve U.S. economic and strategic interests, the “manifest goals” of American diplomacy in both episodes - defense of democracy, and promotion of free
enterprise - were but the rhetorical dimension of the quest for secure allies in a regional scenario coloured by bipolar rivalry.
The Latin American Student Movements, from Their Formation until the Age of the Technological Capital. A Compared Analysis of the FUA, the UNE and the FEUU.\textsuperscript{711}

Presentation.

The process of regional integration, which the country that make up the Mercosur are living, arised a broad academic bibliography of investigations that try to analyze the process. Generally, the most part turns on the study of the commercial relationships, and superficially they are works that approach the international or cultural relationships of the member countries. From another standpoint, this work intends to analyze the new tendencies that are spreading in the current capitalism, focusing the analysis on the new role the University assumes in the era of the Technological Capital, to understand the new social relationships that are derived from it. In this sense, you may widen the study by the historical comparison among student movements in the countries of the Mercosur, understanding them as a related social key in this new stage.

New tendencies in the University.

A few years from the third millennium, the so-call Industrial Society entered in a deep mutation. Along with it, Social Sciences are facing a severe crisis in their subject. In the ‘60s, the humanistic disciplines faced the challenge of looking for answers to the political manifestation of new social characters that didn’t respond to the traditional pattern of social class. The juvenile radicalization asserted itself as one of the analysis’ variants. During the post-war period, the increment in the literacy rates and the formation of university groups in different cities caused the entries in bulk and the irruption of vigorous student movements in all the world. The juvenile rising in the Universities of Berkeley (USA-1964), Tlatelolco (Mexico-1968), Rome (Italy-1968), Praga (Czechoslovakia-1968), Paris (France-1968) and, of course, Córdoba (Argentina-1969) express the synthesis of this period.

These student mobilizations closed a phase of economic growth in the capitalist economies, characterized by full employment and massive consumption. Starting from the crisis of accumulation, which took place in the central countries in the ‘70s, the fall of productivity and the consequent low in earnings rate, it would cause the questioning, on the part of the capital, of the institutional ways of Welfare-State. The Welfare-State was accused to hamper investments because of the tax-burden, and to discourage the productivity of the work, because of the pressure the Unions exercised. At the same time, the capital claimed economic areas that were in state orbit and that are now profitable. It would begin by this way a process of alteration of the Capital, thought as a social relationship that, in answer to the oil shock, it led up to the so-called Third Industrial Revolution, where the informatization of the productive processes includes the technological and scientific creation, in the same development of the Capital.

In the current capitalism, the capital-work relationship assumes a new form that can be understood with the concept of technological capital, elaborated by the Dr. Pablo Levin in the one renovated contribution to his Ph. D. dissertation\textsuperscript{712}. The new relationship of the Capital assumes a “differentiated”

\textsuperscript{711} FUA (Federación Universitaria Argentina), UNE (Unión Nacional de Estudiantes, Brasil) y FEUU (Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios del Uruguay).

\textsuperscript{712} Levin, Pablo, El capital tecnológico, Catálogos, FCE, UBA, Bs.As., 1997.
form, unlike that analyzed by Marx, where the human work took a “not differentiated” form. This Capital generates extraordinary earnings under the exploitation of highly specialized work force, arising a mutation in the classic social character and a new relationship with the Higher Education.

The new forms of this capitalism re-mould the capital accumulation, demanding a high specialization of the working force. In this context Higher Education will be defined by a reformulation of its relationship with the State and because of a growing demand of scientific-technological transfer on the part of the Capital; it will be defined by an argument against the welfare state educational policy. State politics that assert the education, health or housing rights, as an indelegable responsibility of the State, is deeply questioned by the vicars of the market that stress that in the environment of the free concurrence the distribution of goods and services is optimized, they would like Education to be commercialized and reduced to the concept of Human Capital.

Expansion in Latin America.

In Latin America the crisis of the traditional populist thought gives way to a new concept of development strategies and it incentivates the setting in march of a deep reform of the State, accompanied by political leanings to privatize public companies, to liberalize foreign trade, unregulated financial markets and to make flexible the work markets. The peak of the neoliberalism involves unfailingly the politicians for the public education. An official speech arises, which is presented as sole and totalizing trying to ignore all possibility to build logical discursive alternative. The educational restructuring is managed as an administration problem, where competition approaches should be introduced, like meritocracy, effectiveness and efficiency for the quality increase through the evaluation of results.

With regard to the Higher Education, the academic assessments of some intellectuals were given straight. They focus on the overcrowded situation that affects national universities, questioning their academic level and outlining a situation of uncontrol of the system. Brünner, for example, observes that although the production of graduates in Latin America is higher than in the countries of the OECD, it is not reflected in the growth of the PBI, because formation of human resources is dedicated in greater proportion to social sciences than to basic ones. He proposes a redistribution of the budget, precisely in favour of the second area; and that the Benevolent State, which finances them, without any analysis neither critical assessment on the use of the received public funds, is replaced by a Evaluating State that guarantees this process.

With these advice, the reform of the Higher Education begin to be developed; the situation is eased by the reconstructing tendency that set up the scenario to put through a transformation of the university teaching. As well as the CEPAL worked, in the times of the ISI and the National and Popular State, a key role in devising political economics for the region, starting from the programs of stabilization of the beginning of the decade, it will be the World Bank the organism in charge of designing politics for the economic growth and the transformation of the State.

Dealing with modernization, the World Bank wishes to present education like one of the fundamental pillars of development strategies; it is asserted that access to the teaching contributes not only to a macroeconomic growth, rather it gives to individuals chances to encrease their earnings. These

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717 Idem, pp. 171-175.
718 Dabat, Alejandro, El mundo y las naciones, UNAM, 1993, cap.IV, p. 75 y ss.
“Teorías del Capital Humano” replace the “Teoría del Derrame”, making clear that inequality is a by-product of economic growth, due to the combination of a growth in the population and a faulty and unequal access to the education. The neo-classical interpretation intends to diversify Higher Education’s sources of financing with the purpose of linking them to the productive process and of earning funds for basic formation, so commercializing education under an economicism that robs her of all social character or intrinsic value. Promoted by the Ministries of Education, also by specific programs as the FOMEC in Argentina, this plan of “modernization” meet with an University that has an ideological-political wealth that is incompatible with the new tendencies expressed by this manifestation of the capital.

Description of the Student Movement: Fua, Unites and Feuu.

The Latin American student movement celebrated in 1998 the 80th anniversary of the University Reformation. A fact that marked deeply the history of the Higher Education of the continent. In 1918 the mobilization of the Cordovan youths turned against the scholasticism and prevalent obscurantism in the university teaching. This is present in the pages of the history of this century. Eighty years later, the student movement continues claiming in favour of reformation legacy for an University that envisages the principles that marked the birth of the University Federation Argentina, on April the 11th 1918, and that along its history have constituted a factor of cohesion of the student movement in its political fight. The reformist principles find their roots in the 1st American Congress, which took place in Montevideo in 1908, that gave origin to the FEU, which would defend the principles until their break-up in the ‘20s. After an inconsistent performance in the well-known “Arielismo” current, the student movement would form the FEUU on April 26th 1929, that would fight for the reformist ideals until consummating them in the Organic Law of 1959 that as regulated them until present time. On the part of Brazil, although the União Nacional dos Estudantes was founded on August 11th 1937, almost two decades after the Cordovan epic deeds, in a context marked by the fight against Nazism in the Universities, Brazilian student movement called for the reformist legacy, participating then to the FUA in the OCLAE for the defence of the principles of Autonomy, Co-government, Extension, Plurality and Freedom in Higher Education.

During the whole century, the democratic life of the continent had been developing with interruptions, which limited the viability of the reformist principles. This forced the student movement to be a social key character in the fight for the Democracy in the region. The University Reformation contained in its breast the political concepts in favour of the institutional opening of the continent. Even in countries like Peru and Venezuela, the student movement was constituted in a political force that reached the responsibility of driving those States. In other countries, the reformism contributed with outstanding leaders to the Latin American scenario, from Haya de la Torre in Peru or Betancourt in Venezuela, and by now at the moment Robaina in Cuba, Dirceu in Brazil or Storani in Argentina.

This historical wealth will be analyzed for the student organizations of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Establishing a comparison among their evolution, observing the ties in ideological identity and policy and the differences in their formation and structuring. Leaving their origins, for the case of the FUA and the FEUU in the University Reformation, getting through the fight against the Fascism, the formation of UNITES, joining the juvenile radicalization of the ’60s until disembarking in the years ’90.

At present time the student movement has organization potentialities, ideological identity and a mobilization capability that transform it into an excellent social character in this stage of the capitalism. But it is necessary to ponder, and this it is the central hypothesis of investigation, that the viability of a Reformist University rests in great measure on two very important axes. On one hand, the
reformism is essentially free and transforming, it needs to act in a democratic society and, finally, it faces conservative and authoritarian sectors. On the other hand, to achieve the integration of different social sectors, the reformism calls for an economic structure that facilitates, to most of the society, the access to the Higher Education. Without this, the freedom of speech is channelled by the material lacks generated by the neoliberalism. In this sense, reformism must figure out a political alternative in order to challenge the tendency opened up by the Technological Capital.
Las relaciones entre América Latina y Canadá
en un nuevo marco regional
(1950-1995)

La ubicación estratégica de Canadá entre Estados Unidos y el Reino Unido han alejado históricamente a dicho país de América Latina. Este paper comienza en los años cuarenta, cuando se producen los primeros acercamientos de Canadá hacia Argentina y Brasil en que se realizó el primer intercambio de diplomáticos. Diversos factores de orden internacional dificultaban dichas relaciones. En primer lugar, Canadá tenía una economía competitiva en relación a dichos países productores de materias primas y alimentos además Estados Unidos rechazaba todo acercamiento de Canadá hacia América Latina pues lo consideraba un miembro del Commonwealth más que un país americano.

Terminada la segunda guerra mundial Canadá focaliza sus intereses en las Naciones Unidas y en la OTAN y pierde interés en la OEA/OAS – formada en 1948 bajo la indiscutida influencia norteamericana-

Canadá por su espectacular crecimiento industrial pasa a pertenecer al “club del norte”, es así como se convirtió en el destino de gran cantidad de inmigrantes. Las primeras oleadas fueron de origen europeo, para luego incluir asiáticos, caribeños, latinoamericanos, hindúes, etc. Las leyes del multiculturalismo que surgen para balancear las culturas francesa e inglesa sirvieron de marco para la inserción social y económica de todos estos diversos grupos étnicos que le dieron al país un perfil singular

A medida que el Reino Unido disminuye su influencia como gran potencia, Canadá se acerca cada vez más en lo económico a Estados Unidos pero con una actitud crítica en lo político e ideológico.

En efecto, en el marco de la guerra fría Canadá tuvo cordiales relaciones con la Unión Soviética y con China, nunca cortó relaciones con Cuba y asumió una actitud contraria a la guerra de Vietnam y al golpe de Estado de 1973 en Chile. Robusteció su posición de “potencia media” en la OEA/OAS – donde ingresa como miembro observador en los años setenta- en el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo y en el grupo andino.

El problema internacional que significan los refugiados, como consecuencia de la intolerancia de las guerras en diferentes partes del mundo, ubican a Canadá en una posición de amparo a los mismos y de recibimiento en su territorio. En este sentido durante el último gobierno de Trudeau –1980/84- Canadá tuvo especial interés en toda la problemática de la guerra en América Central y tuvo una activa participación en el proceso de paz en la región, en las relaciones económicas con el CARICOM y con el recibimiento dado a los refugiados de dicha guerra en su sociedad.

En los años noventa el fin de la guerra fría, marca el comienzo de un importante acercamiento de Canadá hacia América Latina.

Su incorporación como miembro pleno de la OEA/OAS y la regionalización económica que significan la formación del NAFTA/TLCAN y el MERCOSUR implican un nuevo y renovado interés de Canadá por la región latinoamericana.

Petróleo, minería, gas, actividades bancarias, son algunos de los rubros donde las empresas canadienses se incorporaron al mercado del sur. Una diversidad de actividades conjuntas algunas efectivas y otras en proyecto, en lo cultural, científico, médico, etc. generan las mejores expectativas de colaboración de cara al nuevo milenio.
Les transformations politiques et économiques des dernières années, profondes et accélérées en raison du système international de plus en plus complexe et dans lequel s'observent le renforcement du système global et la progression dans l'intégration et la coopération régionales, ont fait revivre l'idée selon laquelle il est nécessaire de réacheminer les relations entre pays en voie de développement. Certains suggèrent donc de relancer la coopération interrégionale entre l'Amérique latine, l'Asie et l'Afrique. Toutefois, la coopération entre des régions aussi différentes n'est pas si facile; les précédents sont presque inexistant et le commerce bilatéral entre ces pays, bien qu'il ait augmenté ces derniers temps, est encore très réduit. De plus, parmi les difficultés et les problèmes non encore résolus auxquels un projet de telle envergure se confronte, se trouve le problème d’une méconnaissance mutuelle enracinée, et cela malgré le fait que, dans les décennies antérieures, des deux régions aient été intégrées dans la stratégie de coopération Sud-Sud dont la mise en marche a permis le rapprochement entre les pays du Tiers Monde qui cherchaient à résoudre leurs problèmes communs avec le Nord. Pour ce qui est de l'Argentine, sa méconnaissance des autres pays d'Amérique est similaire. Les pays afroasiatiques n'ont jamais été un sujet prioritaire dans le domaine de la politique extérieure argentine; tout au contraire, ils en ont été totalement absents et, pendant de nombreuses années, l'Argentine a fait étalage de sa préférence atlantique en la matière. Mais actuellement, l'une des préoccupations essentielles de la politique extérieure argentine est, d'une part, de s'efforcer à ce que le pays trouve sa place dans le système international et, d'autre part, de diversifier le plus possible ses relations avec le monde entier. De ce fait, les pays d'Asie et d'Afrique se sont constitués en pôle d'attraction. L'objectif de cet exposé est de décrire, de façon rétrospective, le trajet de la politique extérieure argentine de la moitié du XIXème siècle jusqu'à la fin du XXème siècle. Notre but est d'analyser la politique extérieure argentine en connexion avec les continents asiatique et africain, afin de déterminer quelle a été la place occupée par ces pays à ce propos. Pour ce faire, nous tiendrons en compte aussi bien les aspects politico-diplomatiques que les aspects commerciaux pour déterminer s'il existe déjà des ébauches de rapports capables de rendre propice un rapprochement entre ces pays et l'Argentine.
The Relationship Between European Union and Mercosur

 Shortly after the integration was achieved, Mercosur Countries had the first Meeting with the European Union Members and also signed an Agreement of Cooperation (05/29/1992). The European Union financial aid to Easter Countries, while MERCOSUR was stroken by the international financial crisis, weakened the relationship with the European Union.

 However, drawing on the historical background, some European Countries developed new commercial, scientific and cultural relationships, mainly with Argentina and Brazil.

 In order to improve the trade between the MERCOSUR and the European Union, it is necessary to establish similar rules for both sides in different fields (i.e. Biotechnology).

 To attain this, Members of MERCOSUR will have to adapt to the rules already settled by the European Union. On the other hand, these Countries will have to cooperate during such process.

 Our group of research, suggests that this is the best way to fulfill the need of international rules in fields such as the Biotechnology trade.
The International Insertion of Argentina: the Relationship with the USA and Europe and the Regional Integration\textsuperscript{725}.

The analysis of the Argentine external trade, from a historical standpoint, shows that periodical imbalances –linked to a particular point in time and subsequently, to the circumstances of the insertion of the country in the global economy-, immediately following World War 1, acquired long lasting characteristics. Those imbalances remained coupled to the commercial development of Argentina, as well as to the pattern of specialization of its economy, and to international transfers of capital.

From that period on, the successive governments implemented policies devoted to neutralize the external sector by different means.

The bilateral treaties of compensation seeking the balance of the external trade, and the impossibility of signing a similar treaty with the U.S.A. left unresolved the issue of the Argentine deficit with that country.

In spite of the 1941 treaty, with few exceptions, the deficit problem extended along the entire commercial history of Argentina.

The foundation of military factories had also the goal of providing to the Argentine industry with the necessary inputs that would assure independence from imports, and trying to avoid in this way a tax increase on the external sector.

The regional integration was also attempted as a solution of the external sector problem. From Alejandro Bunge, through his project of a Southern Customs (Union Aduanera del Sur) to the Mercosur, these attempts showed alternating motivations in the search of political and economic solutions. The presence of the USA was a key factor in all these attempts.

A project by Federico Pinedo became relevant as it aimed, through a Customs Union with Brazil, to broaden the market in an attempt to reduce costs and turn the Argentine industry more competitive in order to reach the American market. Argentine developed along its history different triangular schemes regarding the international trade. They replaced each other as they became out dated.

A new international scheme of insertion is currently under development-The Mercosur-, resembling the mentioned Pinedo triangulation project, conceived more than 50 years ago to replace the old and outdated triangle between Argentina, the United Kingdom and USA.

The ALCA opens new possibilities. It should be noted and taken into account that the secular problem of Argentina still exists, on the side of the American demand. This is due to the imposed limitations to the Argentine products to that market, and the competition of the agricultural exports of that country to the markets in the rest of the world.

\textsuperscript{725} Profesora e investigadora del Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia Económica y Social - Facultad de Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad de Buenos Aires.