

Pedagogical Research at the University of Oslo and Educational Policy in Post-war Norway ¹

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Introduction

In a recent and widely acknowledged work about modern Norwegian history, the sociologist and historian Rune Slagstad claims that pedagogical research at the University of Oslo was instrumental in developing educational policy in post-war Norway. Slagstad's main thesis about the classical period of the Labour Party, from the end of World War II to the mid-1960's, is that scientific rationality became the hegemonic ideology, and that both economic, health and educational policy developed strong technocratic tendencies.² Regarding the educational field, he maintains that "the instruments of objective measurement that was requested by the social democratic school technocrats" was worked out at the Pedagogical research institute (PRI) at the University of Oslo.³

In this paper I claim that the relations between science and politics within the educational area were more complicated than suggested by Slagstad. The naturalistic and individual-oriented pedagogy at the university was in many respects opposed to the overall goals of the educational policy of the Labour party. The latter aimed at increasing unified and compulsory education as a part of the nation building process at large, also motivated in macro-economic terms of maximising returns of the 'knowledge-reserve' in the population. Contact was in fact scarce and limited between science and politics within the field until the late 1960's. From this time on, the pedagogy at PRI came under attack from both politicians, bureaucrats and students, and from evolving and alternative pedagogical milieus. Eventually, this led to a schism within the institute, when a social pedagogical alternative was established in 1974. I further suggest that it was not before this development that pedagogy and educational policy became truly interconnected.

As such, this paper deals with the relations between science and politics within a central part of the Norwegian post-war social-democratic order. It also deals with how the university changed towards being an institution for mass education under increasing demands of immediate public and political utility from the late 1960's, and how this was experienced at an institute at the University of Oslo.

Johs. Sandven and pedagogical research at the University of Oslo.

PRI was established in 1938. The initial period of the institute, until about 1950, was marked by lack of funds, war and poor working conditions. From this time on, until about 1970, the institute experienced a considerable growth and the development of a reasonably coherent scientific practice and culture. In 1973 PRI was the largest institute at the Faculty of social science in number of students, and held a scientific staff of about 25. During all of this period, the institute was led by professor Johs. Sandven. In 1948 he had become functioning professor and director of the institute, and in 1950 he was appointed to these positions which he held until 1973. Sandven was the only professor at PRI until 1966, and a pivotal point in the relatively small Norwegian pedagogical milieu for nearly two decades.

Sandven resided within the contemporary psychometric tradition in pedagogy and psychology. When he became professor in 1950, pedagogues and psychologists alike had for some three decades measured psychological qualities that was conceived of as independent of the social environment, mainly focusing on intellectual abilities and the development of different IQ-tests. During the 1950's, Sandven widened his psychometric programme to also include emotions and social attitudes. In order to understand this characteristic of Sandven and the research at PRI, we have to follow him to the United States. During a research period at Teachers College at Columbia University in 1947, qualifying for his appointment as professor, he was deeply inspired by both the thoughts of John Dewey and the work of two American educational commissions.⁴ Sandven wanted to develop a pedagogical science that met the needs in a time of rapid change and which could support a democratic political development in the wake of WW II. The relation between education and democracy was precisely the focal point in the four reports that were presented by the *Educational Policies Commission* between 1937 and 1946: *The unique function of education in American democracy (1937)* – *The purposes of education in American democracy (1938)* – *The education of free men in American democracy (1941)* – *Policies for education in American democracy (1946)* and – in the Harvard Committee's *General education in a free society (1946)*. In order to support a democratic development these reports maintained that the school had to assure that the pupils developed: *Self-realisation, human relations, economic efficiency and civic responsibility*. In Sandven's words these goals were summarised as "functional capability in dealing with the problems of life."⁵

In 1953 Sandven reformulated these goals within a Norwegian context when he wrote; "one of our primary goals is to develop the children's *capability of living* (livsdyktighet)."⁶ The goal of developing the capability of living was centred around the concepts *efficiency* (the ability of intellectual problem solving), *consonance* (the development of a secure emotional life), and *character* (the development of a conscientious social attitude guided by reason). Because of this he engaged in developing instruments to measure both the intellectual, emotional and social functions of the individual, what he repeatedly referred to as 'the constitutional setting'.⁷ During Sandven's period, the institute also engaged in research projects to develop new techniques for evaluation, both in the school and in educating teachers, and in social pedagogical research focused on pupil reaction to different working methods in the school, and on what affected their motivation and well-being.⁸

All of these projects were elaborated from what I will call Sandven's fundamental thought regarding the relationship between pedagogical research and school development; that research should contribute to enable all pupils to develop their capability of living according to their personal abilities. According to Sandven, both the school and the rest of society focused too much on intellect on the expense of emotions and social attitudes. By developing instruments to measure also these functions, he hoped to contribute to a more holistic evaluation of the child that could pave the way for a more individually adjusted educational practice. Hence, he advocated the view that teachers should not only be educational *instructors* in a strict sense, but that they should also act as educational *guides* in a wider meaning, also taking into consideration the emotional and social aspects of the child. Because of this he wanted to reform the training of teachers and develop pedagogical guidance services at the schools.

Johs. Sandven was not only a pedagogue with clear opinions about school development, but also a successful institutional entrepreneur. He was so very much due to his position in the Norwegian Research Council (NRC) which had been created in 1949. From the start it was established a group C that should deal with research on *psychology and questions concerning education and youth*. During a period of twenty years, from 1950 to 1970, Sandven held central positions within this group. From 1953 to 1962 he was the leader, and the rest of the time he was one out of six members who made financial decisions about research within the area. From this position he could heavily influence on the research policy within his own field, and even more so because pedagogical research still was in a initial phase in Norway.

He was not alone holding a dual position as research politician while being director of a research institute, as this was more or less the rule within NRC in the beginning. Particularly within the relatively new social sciences, the small Norwegian milieu made it almost inevitable that many members of the groups funded their own research and/or their own institutions. However, Sandven was *particularly* good at taking advantage of this strategic position. One reason for this may be that the dual role in time was given a quite physical expression: In May 1958, both NRC and PRI moved into the same building in Wergelandsveien 15, in the centre of Oslo. From now on, Sandven did not even have to leave the building to change hats. In a recent interview he tells about how his positions within NRC and in the Faculty board at the university saved him “a lot of the previous effort he had to make in order to keep in contact with many of those who made decisions concerning the institute”, and that he became leader of the budget committee at the Faculty board because “I probably had a certain sense for such issues.”⁹ Until 1969, research within group C was funded with about 9 million Nkr. Sandven’s ‘sense’ and close contacts might explain why PRI directly received more than 2,5 millions, and as such was the single institution that was granted the largest funding during the whole period. Sandven was first and foremost a *research entrepreneur* who made sure that the institute at all times received money for long-range research projects, for recruiting research assistants and administrative assistance, and for instruments and publications.

Educational policy of the Labour party in the wake of WW II

Before WW II it had been developed a compulsory seven-year primary education for all children in Norway. After primary school one could chose between the practical ‘framhaldsskole’ (continuance school) or the more theoretically oriented ‘realskole’ or ‘gymnas’. In most other western European countries, schooling was differentiated even at the primary level, and the choice of school gave strong signals of social status and was in fact almost decisive for the course of later education. Nevertheless, the Norwegian system was not as egalitarian as it might seem at first glance. Particularly, there were huge differences between the primary school in the rural districts (landsfolkeskolen) and the schools in the towns (byfolkeskolen). Because of the low number of pupils, the classes in the rural primary school were often composed out of children of varying age. As a result, only 30% of the rural communities were able to offer courses in English by 1955. When we know that it was conceived of as necessary to know English in order to proceed beyond the primary school, it is quite obvious that even in Norway the system put clear limitations on later education.¹⁰ The

tendency was obvious: In the cities the vast majority of the pupils continued their education, mostly within prestigious theoretical studies. In the rural communities, on the other hand, the pupils went on to the practically oriented 'framhaldsskole', if they continued their education at all.¹¹

This situation was considered both socially and economically unacceptable by leading school ideologues in the Labour party, such as Birger Bergersen and Helge Sivertsen, both of whom were to become Minister of Church and Education: Bergersen, from 1953 to 1960, and Sivertsen, after being secretary of state within the ministry from 1947 to 1956, from 1960 to 1965. For one, they wanted the educational system to support an economically efficient use of the 'knowledge reserve' in the population. Sivertsen stated in 1956: "Even though the economic literature about the new situation is not abundant, all responsible governments today acts on the premises that it is education and refinement of human skills that decide the economic performance."¹² Furthermore, they wanted to make the educational system an instrument for national integration, both between the classes and between the rural and central parts of the country. Hence, they both perceived of a development of the existing division between 'framhaldsskole' and 'realskole' as highly irrational, and advocated the development of a nine-year unified and compulsory primary education. In this way, all children would be given equal opportunities for higher education, regardless of geographical setting and social standing. Even though the Labour party was divided in the question of school reform, the aspirations of Bergersen and Sivertsen was confirmed as the official line of the Labour party on the party congress in 1953.

In their planning for reform, both Bergersen and Sivertsen were deeply inspired by the school reforms of the Swedish Social democratic party. Sivertsen even referred to Sweden as "the most modern nation among the Nordic countries."¹³ Since 1948 the Swedes had been experimenting with nine-year compulsory primary school. Bergersen was ambassador in Stockholm before he was appointed minister, and Sivertsen was present during school debates in the Swedish parliament (Riksdagen) in 1950, thinking Norwegian: "How on earth are we to go on to develop the new school structure before the old system will be cemented by construction all over the country."¹⁴ The answer would be the creation in 1954 of a pseudo-scientific council for practical school experiments, *The Norwegian Council for Innovation in school* (NCIS)¹⁵ modelled after the Swedish *School directory*.¹⁶ The law which defined the purpose and responsibility of the new council told that; "it [shall] be possible, as experiments,

to make exceptions from the rules of the different school laws, when these experiments are *pedagogically well substantiated*, and in the interest of the school.”¹⁷ In this way the law opened up for a potentially very close relation between pedagogical science and educational policy. “Such a wide dispensation have never been given to the central school administration” wrote the school historian, Hans-Jørgen Dokka. The law has also been characterised as a *carte blanche* to the government.¹⁸

Hence, NCIS was created to introduce a nine-year unified and compulsory education for all children between the age of 7 and 16. One of the main objections the reformers had to face, was that a common school for all children would create a lot of school ‘losers’. A common contemporary notion held that you had *either* practical *or* theoretical skills. Anna Sethne, one of the most salient pedagogical pioneers in Norway, and a strong advocate for the creation of PRI, argued in 1957 that an undifferentiated school until the age of 15-16 would lead to a lot of shortcoming, as the division between the practical and theoretical schools “was dictated by life itself.”¹⁹ Hence, the differentiation within the system was a crucial problem for NCIS from the very start. The challenge can be put as this: How can the varying abilities of the different children be developed in an undifferentiated school? Would not this create a school that is too difficult for some, while others will not get the challenges they need? What criteria should guide the choice of lines during the last two years of primary school, and the choice of further education?

The Pedagogical research institute and The Norwegian Council for Innovation in School

The first NRC-supported project at PRI, in 1950, was the elaboration of tests to measure the relation between mental capacity and school progress among children between the age of 6 and 15. These tests could seemingly be quite relevant in relation to the problem of differentiation within the new primary school. Nevertheless, Sivertsen and Bergersen were not all too happy about the research that was going on at PRI. Kjell Eide was Bergersen’s personal secretary during the 1950’s. In retrospect he tells that:

By the creation of NRC, Sivertsen made a special initiative to establish a group for psychology, pedagogy and youth-questions. Nevertheless, he and the rest of the leadership of the ministry perceived this construction to work very poorly. It was not only a question of low financial priority of the research area, but also of lack of initiative and little relevance for practical school questions. This frustration about the helplessness of NRC when it came to organising applied research [...] was most likely one of the motives for the creation of the Norwegian Council for Innovation in School.²⁰

If Eide is correct, some of the motivation for the creation of NCIS was that the political leadership wanted to be free to make contacts with research institutions that would conduct what was perceived of as political relevant research, and that PRI was *not* such an institution. An undated and anonymous internal note in NCIS from the initial phase supports such an interpretation: First, the sender refers to Sweden as a model example where the *State* psychological-pedagogical institute had elaborated standard tests “to assure a fair recruitment to higher education.” The note continues:

According to my experience I do not believe that the tasks will be resolved as the work at present is organised at PI. [21] [...] It might be correct to give PI one or two assignments, but not more. Then one can see how much progress is being done at the institute and how long it will take until we can use the tests. [...] If it turns out that the co-operation is not satisfying, NCIS is by no means closed. The military have developed their own research institute for construction of tests for the recruits. There is a lot of skilful researchers on the area, and I believe I can assure that it would be no problem to create a test-service-centre under NCIS. [...] Deep inside I believe this to be the way to the goal, and the way for the future.²²

The discrepancies between NCIS and the Labour party school ideologues on the one side, and NRC and PRI on the other, also had a financial dimension: In the beginning of December 1954, the first leader of NCIS sent a letter to the director of NRC, to let him know that the council took interest in the financial means of the Research council.²³ The 19th of January, a little more than a month later, the directors of NCIS had a meeting with professor Sandven, who by now was the leader of group C. In the protocol of this meeting it says that “NCIS will *not* apply to NRC for projects that duplicate or will duplicate projects at the Pedagogical research institute. [...] It was pointed out that questions concerning issues on the border between practical experiments and pedagogical research ought to be resolved by group C in NRC.”²⁴

As previously noted, the NRC-money was crucial for the activity at PRI, and Sandven was anxious not to have to compete with the newly created council for this money. On the other hand, it is also clear that Sandven wanted his research *results* to be used in the practical school experiments, and that he saw the potential for this to generate research questions that could widen the activities at the institute and give working-conditions for new staff.²⁵ However, if PRI was to benefit from the practical school experiments, this could not be on the expense on the money that was transferred from group C. In the worst case, this would mean a decrease in the financial support of the institute, and in the best case – less freedom if the money had to go from NRC, via NCIS to PRI. As such, Sandven was positive to a co-operation with NCIS, but it was equally important for him to make sure that issues on the

border between practical experiments and research had to be decided by group C, where he himself was the leader.

Supported by Bergersen, NCIS kept applying for money from NRC for three years without much success.²⁶ Finally, in 1958, the council was granted 10.000,- Nkr., but it was made perfectly clear that this was an exception: “The council must emphasise that it normally does not find the support of deliberation and appropriation work as a part of its responsibility [...]. NRC has to be free to evaluate all applications, and make decisions based on the *scientific value* of the project [...].”²⁷ Bergersen was at all times concerned with the practical and political use of research, and this case represented a defeat both for himself and NCIS. The council did get money through the state budget, but the money in NRC was left to dispose for Sandven and his scientific colleagues. As such, Sandven would benefit from the conceptual division between research and practical experiments, a division he himself was instrumental in defining. In this way NCIS was excluded from getting grants from NRC, and excluded from becoming a financial competitor of PRI.

Nevertheless, PRI *did* operate as some sort of a test-service-centre in the 1950's. Five pedagogues from PRI was engaged in developing tests for differentiation in the experimental schools, but most of this work consisted in translating and adapting Swedish material to a Norwegian context.²⁸ Bergersen surely *did* need scientific legitimisation for his school reforms. As such, I agree with Rune Slagstad when he says that scientific pedagogy gave legitimisation to the new direction.²⁹ But it is equally important to note that the co-operation was limited, and that the pedagogical research at PRI barely affected neither curricula, didactics and the education of teachers, nor the overarching goals of the new direction.³⁰ Until 1969, 29 consultants were employed in NCIS. Out of these, eight were educated at PRI, but only four held their position for more than one year, and only one out of twenty-nine reports of frequent contact with scientific pedagogical milieus.³¹ Kjell Eide, the personal secretary of Bergersen during the 1950's and the leader of the Planning department in the ministry in the 1960's, says that by the mid 1960's “neither the school nor the ministry perceived of the research [at PRI] as much relevant for practical problems.”³² In 1958, Sandven complained that the school reform was all too much about organisational and structural reforms on the expense of “curriculum, goals, working-methods and working-spirit.”³³ In 1971 he would resignedly repeat: “A school system that mainly operates with the same structure and

working-patterns from the 1st to the 12th grade, can barely be said to be sufficiently adapted to the developmental differences among the pupils.”³⁴

The Educational research commission and the decline of Sandven's hegemony in the 1960's

In October of 1966, a commission for educational research was appointed. The commission was headed by Kjell Eide, by now the leader of the Planning committee in the ministry. As a former secretary of Bergersen and a central educational bureaucrat, he was the right man to lead the ‘re-match’ against PRI and the financial politics of NRC. His efforts was mainly directed towards the practice that had been developing in group C, where scientists as Johs. Sandven was able to define the distinction between research and practical experiments, and where this position to a strong degree was used to support the activity in their own institutions.

From the beginning of the 1960's, internationally it was all the more common to speak of the basic and practical aspects of research as parts of the one and same complex, as *Research and Development* (R&D). This was the perspective of the commission when they were to analyse “The need for research and development in relation to the Norwegian school.”³⁵ As Bergersen and Sivertsen before him, Eide got both inspiration and arguments to support his views from abroad, particularly from the US and Sweden. Eide himself spent two months in the US during the work of the commission, visiting different *Regional Educational Laboratories*. The commission also “had close contacts with the responsible authorities in this field, and the members of the commission have on several occasions been present at internal debates on problems related to educational research in Sweden.”³⁶

In the final report of the commission it was emphasised that it was necessary to make “a wide definition of the concept educational research” which also included “activities that have to be characterised as development or practical experiments.” Further the commission had “a wide perspective, based upon the notion that educational research must be said to include all research that might be relevant for the school, regardless of the research discipline in question.” This had created “a change in the position of educational research” that in some countries had led “to a completely new situation.” Apart from pedagogy and psychology, the educational research should now also include “contributions from sociologists and economists, and to some degree also from social anthropologists and political scientists.”

Compared to this, Sandven's pupil-oriented research was presented as remains of the past: "Subjects, pupils, educational methods and teachers were the four main items of *previous educational research* [...]. The methodological development [...] have nevertheless made it possible to address the problems from a broader perspective." This broader perspective included the school as a social system, the home, the pupils collective and the social environment in general.³⁷ These considerations led to a direct attack on the financial policy within the research area:

[It seems] obvious that the financial procedures regarding theoretical research are not appropriate when it comes to work of a more developmental character. The budgeting procedure at the universities can hardly be adjusted to suit the needs of an ever expanding developmental work. [...] Neither has the budgeting policy of the Norwegian research council found ways that seems appropriate for this kind of research [...].³⁸

The advice for the future was crystal clear; the financing of educational research had to be upgraded, but the increase in resources should not be controlled by the university or group C in NRC, but on the contrary, be granted directly from a research office in the ministry. By this, political and administrative control of the research would increase, and hence one had to;

develop the ministry's competence in evaluating support for research and development in the educational field. This will be an arrangement with certain similarities to what has been developed by the Swedes [...]. Similar arrangements are also to be found in the Netherlands, Great Britain and the US. [...] The administrative responsibility for the development of all of our educational system resides clearly in the Ministry of Church and Education, and the need for close contacts between the practical administrative work and research and development, is obvious.³⁹

This work should be co-ordinated in close relations with the Planning department in the ministry, which was led by Eide. The money should then be granted to NRC, exclusively for educational research, to NCIS after budget proposals, and as "developmental assignments to research institutions and research groups, at or outside the universities." It was also suggested that there should be developed educational research centres at the universities of Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim.⁴⁰

This wide and inter-disciplinary R&D-approach undermined the sharp distinction between research and practical experiments that was held by NRC and Sandven, the distinction which in many ways legitimised the almost autonomous practice in group C. The research area was now opened towards other social sciences, primarily towards sociology. From 1970 on, group C was put down and the research area was transferred to group B for social sciences in general, and there was established a chapter for educational research in the ministry.

The report from the Educational research commission was presented in 1968, a crucial year in the history of modern universities. The anti-authoritarian student movement in Norway also converged with a local variant of the so called 'positivismusstreit' within the social sciences. Within PRI this struggle was particularly fierce, and eventually led to a schism in 1974, when a social pedagogical alternative was established. The opposition against Sandven was directed by some of the ever increasing number of students who was little content with the heavy research orientation at the institute, an orientation which to some degree had occurred on the expense of the development of pedagogy as an academic study.⁴¹ The critique against PRI could also be supported, for different reasons, by Christian, humanistic and Marxist pedagogues of various shades, who for a long time had been opposed to the naturalistic and non-social profile of Sandven's research.

The creation of the social pedagogical study at the University of Oslo is a story of its own, and in this paper I will not dig too deep into its causes and effects. However, on a general level it was characterised by the urge to break down the disciplinary borders that surrounded the traditional pedagogical discipline. The social pedagogues were in addition oriented towards pedagogical practice as opposed to pedagogical theory, and conceived of this as something thoroughly interconnected with the surrounding and ever-changing society. As such, the new study clearly represented a *politicisation and a sociological turn*. In these aspects, their aspirations converged with those of Eide and his Educational policy commission. It may also be suggested that from this time on, the relation between pedagogy and educational policy became closer. About the turn of the decade there was established social pedagogical milieus both at the University of Tromsø and at Lillehammer College. Together with the social pedagogical alternative at the University of Oslo, these institutions could function as something close to what Eide thought of when he wanted to establish educational research centres at the universities. During the 1970's the work of NCIS was very much inspired by the social pedagogical turn,⁴² and various educational commissions was headed and strongly influenced by the professor at the social pedagogical study, Eva Nordland. For example, from 1971 to 1977, she was the leader in two governmental commissions dealing with social conditions for growing up in Norway. The final report included 67 studies, out of which 37 was conducted at PRI, mostly by students at the social pedagogical alternative.⁴³ However, I would like to stress that these are primary suggestions,

and that further studies have to be conducted in order to establish firmer hypotheses about the relationship between pedagogy and educational policy in the 1970's.

Conclusion

During the 1950's and 1960's, there existed at least two fairly distinct visions concerning the relation between pedagogical research and educational policy in Norway; at PRI and in the Ministry of Church and Education. At PRI, under the direction of Johs. Sandven, pedagogical research was meant to pave the way for a more individually adjusted educational practice according to varying personal abilities. In this project Sandven claimed the primacy of research over politics. In the Ministry of Church and Education, politicians as Birger Bergersen and Helge Sivertsen and administrators as Kjell Eide wanted to support politically relevant research that could help maximise the output of the 'knowledge reserve' in the population, as well as make the educational system an instrument for national integration. As such, they claimed the primacy of politics over research. In addition, whereas Sandven was a spokesman for a more differentiated school system, the Labour party ideologue was in favour of educational integration. Until the late 1960's, Sandven controlled much of the research policy within the field because of his position in NRC, while the Labour party was in charge of school development through NCIS. Interests could nevertheless converge. Sandven conceived of co-operation with NCIS as a means to develop the activities at the institute. As such, from the mid 1950's, PRI functioned for some years as a sort of a test-service-centre that gave scientific legitimisation to the Labour Party's school reforms in a crucial phase.

By the mid-1960's, the preconditions for Sandven's dominance of pedagogical research in Norway had almost disappeared. His position was based on the central role of psychology within pedagogical theory, and on the fact that the Norwegian psychological-pedagogical milieu was so small. By now, the pedagogical landscape had grown in a double sense. Not only had there in time been educated many new pedagogues who claimed their own territory, but the discipline could also find inspiration from a considerable development within Norwegian sociology. As such, and after the work of the Educational research commission, Sandven's leading position in the development of the field through a period of nearly twenty years, was seriously challenged. The research field was redefined to also include the school as a social system, the home, the pupils collective and the social environment in general. Group C disappeared and much of the financing of the field was put under direct control of the ministry. In this way the pedagogical research was politicised.

Even if this is not the only explanation, this fact must be taken into consideration when we are to understand the schism within the pedagogical discipline at the University of Oslo in 1974. As such, this case also illustrates how the more universal trend of increasing demands of immediate public and political utility from the late 1960's, was experienced at an institute at the University of Oslo.

Notes

¹ I am working on a doctoral thesis about the relation between pedagogical science and educational policy in post-war Norway. This paper is a synthesis of two articles that I have previously written in relation to this work: "Reform av den norske skolen i etterkrigstiden – Pedagogisk forskningsinstitutt og Forsøksrådet for skoleverket" in Knut Jordheim (ed), *Skolen 1999-2000. Årbok for norsk utdanningshistorie*, Skolen – Årbok for norsk utdanningshistorie, April 2000, and *Utvikling av pedagogikk som vitenskap ved Universitetet i Oslo - Pedagogisk forskningsinstitutt og Norges almenvitenskapelige forskningsråd 1949-69*, not published.

² Slagstad, Rune (1998), *De nasjonale strateger*, Pax Forlag A/S.

³ Op.cit., p.330.

⁴ When coming home to Norway, he wrote *Pedagogisk idébrytning i U.S.A. - En studie over utviklingen og de rådende synsmåter i dag*, Fabritius og Sønners Forlag, Oslo, 1949. This book remained on the curriculum at PRI for more than two decades.

⁵ Sandven, Johs (1949), *Pedagogisk idébrytning i U.S.A. - En studie over utviklingen og de rådende synsmåter i dag*, Fabritius og Sønners Forlag, Oslo, p.114.

⁶ Sandven, Johs (1953), *Målsetningen i folkeskolen*, Særtrykk av "Skole og samfunn" nr.3, 1953, p.2.

⁷ Helsvig, Kim (2000), "Reform av den norske skolen i etterkrigstiden – Pedagogisk forskningsinstitutt og NCIS for skoleverket" i Knut Jordheim (red), *Skolen 1999-2000. Årbok for norsk utdanningshistorie*. Stiftelsen Skolen – Årbok for norsk utdanningshistorie, pp.81-84.

⁸ Dale, Erling Lars (1999), *De strategiske pedagoger - Pedagogikkens vitenskapshistorie i Norge*, Ad Notam Gyldendal, pp. 192-216.

⁹ Jarning, Harald (2000), "Mellom forskning og skoleutvikling" i Knut Jordheim (red), *Skolen 1999-2000. Årbok for norsk utdanningshistorie*. Stiftelsen Skolen – Årbok for norsk utdanningshistorie, p.131.

¹⁰ Dokka, Hans-Jørgen (1986), *Reformarbeid i norsk skole*, NKS-Forlaget, p.13 and 16.

¹¹ In 1958, 75% of the pupils in the primary school in Oslo continued their education, while only 12% of the pupils in the rural Sogn og Fjordane did likewise. About 40% of the Norwegian population then lived in communities where there did not exist any institutions for higher education. (Myhre, Reidar (1998), *Den norske skoles utvikling*, Ad Notam Gyldendal, p.124)

¹² Sivertsen, Helge (1956), "Norsk skolereform" i *Forsøk og reform*, p.15.

¹³ Op.cit.

¹⁴ Jordheim, Knut (2000), "Okkupasjonsårene 1940-1945 som 'epoke' i norsk skoles utvikling" in Knut Jordheim (red), *Skolen 1999-2000. Årbok for norsk utdanningshistorie*. Stiftelsen Skolen – Årbok for norsk utdaningshistorie, p.74.

¹⁵ Forsøksrådet for skoleverket.

¹⁶ Skolöverstyrelsen.

¹⁷ Helsvig, p.79.

¹⁸ See Oftedal Telhaug, Alfred (1990), *Forsøksrådet for skoleverket (1954-1984)*, Universitetsforlaget, p.14.

¹⁹ Dale, p.190.

²⁰ Kjell Eide in a letter to Alfred Oftedal Telhaug. See Oftedal Telhaug, note 60, p.169. NAVF: Debd – 0739, C.181-1.

²¹ Pedagogical institute.

²² Helsvig, p.86. The note was titled: 'Note on tasks for the pedagogical institute. (Only for personal orientation). The air of the note gives the impression that the sender has got a lot of authority and confidence in own arguments. The references to the Swedish experience, the language style and dialect, and the fact that the leader of NCIS at this period was frequently corresponding with the minister, gives me reasons to believe that the note was written by Birger Bergersen. This has yet to be confirmed.

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- ²³ The leader of NCIS, Tønnes Sirevåg in a letter to NRC, the 8th of December 1954. (NAVF: Debd – 0739, C.181-1.)
- ²⁴ Sirevåg in a letter to Sandven, the 28th of January 1955. (NAVF: Debd – 0739, C.181-1.)
- ²⁵ See Helsvig, pp.87-88.
- ²⁶ NAVF: Debd – 0739, C.181-1.
- ²⁷ The director of NRC, Fjellbirkeland, to Sirevåg the 28th of October 1957. (NAVF: Debd – 0739, C.181-1.) (my italics).
- ²⁸ See Helsvig, pp.88-89.
- ²⁹ Slagstad, p.324.
- ³⁰ Helsvig, pp.90-93.
- ³¹ Oftedal Telhaug, Alfred/ Aasen, Petter (1988), *Forsøksrådet - Aktører og organisasjon*, Tapir Forlag, p.198. See also Helsvig, p.91.
- ³² Eide, Kjell (1985), *Departementets lille kanarifugl, eller kulturpolitikk blir til*, NIFU, p.199.
- ³³ Sandven, Johs (1958), "Fremtidens skole under pedagogisk-psykologisk synsvinkel" in *Pedagogisk forskning. Nordisk tidsskrift for pedagogikk*, p.134.
- ³⁴ Sandven, Johs (1971), "Årsaker til manglende skoletrivsel" in *Forskning med relation til utbildning för åldersklasserna 16-19 år*, Nordisk Komité for Pedagogisk Forskning, p.104.
- ³⁵ *The development of Norwegian educational research*. Report delivered the 28th of December 1967 and accepted by the council the 25th of January 1968. Universitetsforlaget, p.9.
- ³⁶ Op.cit., p.10.
- ³⁷ Op.cit., pp. 10-12. (my italics)
- ³⁸ Op.cit., p.19.
- ³⁹ Op.cit., p.22.
- ⁴⁰ Op.cit., p.35.
- ⁴¹ In a recent interview, Sandven said: "The development of a research institute and the creation of a pedagogical study had to be done simultaneously, and for a small personnel it was not possible to find enough time for all tasks." (Jarning, p.131.)
- ⁴² Oftedal Telhaug, p.123 ff.
- ⁴³ NOU 1978:1, *Om lov om oppvekstmiljø*, pp. 85-88.