Educational exchange between the United States and China began when American missionary schools were established in China in the early 1830s. In the next few decades, missionaries not only set up schools and colleges in China, but also sent a considerable number of Chinese students to the United States for further education. With missionaries playing the leading role, educational exchange between the two nations remained unofficial until the United States government got deeply involved at the beginning of the 20th century. Tapping to the excessive part of the Boxer Indemnity returned to China and special government funds, Washington was able to initiate and implemented many educational exchange programs with China. As a result, the United States government replaced the missionaries as the most active player in promoting, sponsoring, and regulating educational exchange with China in the first half of the 20th century.

Why did the United States government want to get so deeply involved in educational exchange? What did Washington want to achieve through those educational exchange programs?
Was it successful in achieving its goal? What lessons can be learned from Washington's early involvement in the development of cultural relations between the two nations? These important questions have not been well answered until since most studies on educational exchange and cultural relations have been devoted to American missionaries and other private institutions. Only few scholars like Wilma Fairbank have put emphasis on governments' role in educational exchange. Even in their studies, however, the scope and coverage are usually limited.

Through the examination of Washington's role in all major educational exchange programs in the first half of the century, this author attempts to provide some preliminary answers to the above questions. Putting the initiation and implementation of all major educational exchange programs in this period in the context of ups and downs in the U.S.-China relations, the author tries to argue that Washington began its active involvement in educational programs in China because of the lack of effectiveness of traditional approaches such as treaties, laws, and even the use of military forces in coping with conflicts and crises that frequently erupted in the relations between the two nations. Having realized the important role of Chinese students in their society, Washington saw the education of Chinese students in the United States

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as an effective way to gain their friendship and good feelings. The ultimate goal, the author wants to point out, was to alleviate and solve the tough problems and crises in U.S.-China relations. Despite the dramatic increase of Chinese students in the United States, educational exchange as a new crisis management approach failed to prevent or eliminate diplomatic crises in the relations between the two nations. The failure was not caused by educational exchange itself, but by Washington's misperception and misuse of educational exchange.

I. From Crisis-Free to Troubled Treaty Relations

The Americans and the Chinese began their contact right after the thirteen former British colonies won their independence. Like all other nations with increasing exchange of goods and people, the relations between the oldest imperial power and the youngest republic were never trouble free. However, despite minor clashes and complaints, there were no serious diplomatic crises in the first six decades since the arrival of the Empress of China at Guangzhou (Canton) in 1784. The crisis-free relations enjoyed by the two nations in those years were largely the result of the absence of formal diplomatic relations and the willingness of the American merchants and missionaries to follow Chinese laws in China.

Despite the fact the Confederation Congress appointed Samuel Shaw as the first American consul at Guangzhou as early as 1786, there was no formal diplomatic relations between the Untied States and China until the mid-19th century. Prior to 1844, no treaties were signed by the two governments, no official envoys were sent across the Pacific, no permanent diplomatic representatives stationed in each other's capitals. The American consul at Guangzhou was anything but "official" since the consul was usually selected from merchants and missionaries in China, receiving neither pay or instructions from the government especially in the
earlier years. With little resources and power at their hand, the consuls were unable to provide the type of protection expected by Americans in China. Therefore, American merchants in Guangzhou complained that "[t]he consul of the United States residing here has not the means of being sufficiently useful to his countrymen with their intercourse with the Chinese Government, and of supporting the dignity of the flag of which he had charge."  

Aware of the lack of strong protection from Washington, American merchants, sailors, and missionaries had little choice but to follow Chinese laws and regulations while they were in China in those years. Time and again, they assured Chinese officials that they came to China to pursue "honest commerce" and that their conduct had been "regulated by the strict regard and respect for the laws and usages of this Empire". Whenever there was real problem, they would negotiate with the Chinese officials and eventually accept the decisions made by the Chinese government. The best example was the Terranova Incident which took place in September 1821. When Chinese official demanded that Francis Terranova, an Italian sailor working on the American ship Emily, be turned over for a trial for his killing of a Chinese women, the Americans first resisted and then gave up. Terranova was finally handed over to the Chinese on October 23, and hung a few days later. The willingness of Americans to follow Chinese laws, even though with reluctance, helped them establish a better image among the Chinese and kept

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4 Ibid., p. 84.
the U.S.-China relations free from any serious crises.

The time with neither diplomatic relations or crises came to an end in the mid-19th century. With the rise of American economic and military power, and the increasing competition with other powers in China, more Americans stronger presence and protection from Washington. In May 1839, a group of American merchants in Guangzhou wrote to Congress, asking the government to send trade representatives as well as warships to China to negotiate a trade treaty and to protect American interest. Washington did not send a treaty negotiation team as suggested, but it did send a fleet under Commodore Lawrence Kearny to China in 1842. During his one-year stay in China, Kearny not only showed off the American naval power, but also demanded that the Chinese government grant the Americans the same privileges as enjoyed by the English and the United States the most-favored-nation status.

Caleb Cushion, a former Congressman, was sent to China to start the negotiation of a treaty in 1843. As the first Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary ever sent to China, Cushion informed Chinese officials at Guangzhou of his intention immediately. Jucai Cheng, the Governor of Guangdong Province, responded that a trip to Beijing would be overwhelming to Cushion and that a treaty was not necessary since China had already decided to open the four ports to all foreign countries. He further explained that the United States and China did not need a treaty to do business since Americans always followed Chinese laws and caused no trouble in China. Unconvinced by Chen, Cushing continued to press the Chinese for a treaty. He ordered U.S.S. Brandywine to sail close to Guangzhou to show its power and threatened to lead a fleet to

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6 Ibid., p. 81.
7 Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, p. 128.
8 Li Dingyi. ZhongMei zaoqi waijiao shi, p. 103.
Tianjing if the Chinese refused to start the negotiation.  

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9 Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, p. 150.
The first treaty between the United States and China was finally signed at Wangxia, a small village in Guangdong Province on July 5, 1844. According to the Wangxia Treaty, the Americans not only obtained all the rights such as the access to the four new ports that the English had gained, but also received some new privileges. For instance, the Chinese lowered duties on American goods and had to gain American approval before changing the duties. American consul could meet with Chinese provincial officials and send letters to the Qing Court through them while free from the duty to collect taxes from American merchants for the Chinese government. American missionaries could build churches, hospitals, and cemeteries in open ports, buy Chinese books, and hire teachers teaching the missionaries Chinese. Above all, the Wangxia Treaty gave complete extraterritorial rights to Americans. They will be tried by the American consul court if they committed any crimes in China.10

The Wangxia Treaty marked the beginning of a new era in which diplomatic crises would be dealt with by following the provisions in a series of treaties. Despite Washington's strong belief that clear rules provided in treaties would help "establish firm, lasting, and sincere friendship between the two nations,"11 the establishment of formal diplomatic relations and the implementation of the treaties actually led to the deterioration of the bilateral relations. Washington had to face more confrontations and crises in its relations with China since the mid-19th century. Among all the problems that troubled the relations between the two nations in this period, the issue of American missionaries in China and Chinese immigrants in the United States were probably most noticeable and destructive.

11 Ibid., p. 677.
Taking advantage as the only group of Americans who could speak the Chinese language, American missionaries contributed to and benefited from the establishment of treaty relations with China in the 19th century. They managed to include protective provisions for missionaries in all major treaties and went deep into the inland, building churches and schools in cities as well as villages. Their activities not only forced the Chinese to face a completely different culture, but also presented a threat to the Chinese society. The resentment grew among the Chinese when they saw the American missionaries build their churches without considering local people's feelings, protect local thugs from the law enforcement, and act as if they were beyond and above the law. Some Chinese took action to remove the churches, drove missionaries away, and punished the Chinese converts under the missionary protection. The anti-missionary movement climaxed at the Boxer Uprising between 1899 and 1900, as dozens of Americans missionaries were killed or wounded by the Chinese peasants. Washington had to send about 3,000 troops as part of an international expedition force to China to rescue foreign diplomats under siege and punish the Boxers. The Boxer Uprising illustrated that the treaties could actually cause more severe problems in U.S.-China relations.

While the issue of the American missionaries brought the United States and China into a military confrontation, Washington's exclusion policy eventually led to a national boycott of American products in China in 1905. Chinese began to come to the United States in large number as gold-rushers in the 1850s. The rapid development in the West coast, including the construction of the first transcontinental railroad, attracted more Chinese to this country in the 1860s and 1870s. At first the Chinese immigrants were welcomed since capable laborers were in

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short supply. Blamed for the economic miseries suffered by the white workers in the West, they began to receive political and physical attacks from white laborers and politicians since the 1870s. Having forced the Chinese government to revise the *Burlingame Treaty*, Congress adopted the first Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, banning the admission of Chinese laborers for 10 years. Later, the exclusion was further expanded to include all Chinese except five classes: diplomats, merchants, students, teachers, and travelers. In practice, even those Chinese had difficulties in entering the United States. At the same time, life and property of Chinese immigrants in the United States were under constant threat. Hundreds of Chinese were murdered by white mobs in the last quarter of the 19th century. The protest from the Chinese immigrants and government failed to stop either the exclusion or the discrimination. Humiliated by the Chinese exclusion policy, Chinese merchants and students started a national boycott against American goods in 1905. They vowed to continue the boycott until all the Chinese exclusion laws were abolished.

The constant and aggravating conflict and crises took place since 1844 clearly demonstrated that the treaties could not bring more peaceful and friendly relations. Neither were they effective in solving diplomatic crises between the two nations. The key problem with the treaties was that most of them were unequal and irreciprocal. While Americans in China were enjoying a vast series of privileges, which put them beyond and above the Chinese law, the Chinese were almost banned from entering the United States and Chinese immigrants in the United States were subject to unfair and demeaning regulations and laws. As proud as the Americans, the Chinese people, especially those with modern education which emphasized equality, liberty, and freedom, could not tolerate such an unequal relations between the two
nations. As a result, the U.S.-China relations based on a series of unequal treaties were in deep 
trouble at the turn of the century.

II. Trying a New Approach: Educational Exchange from 1905 to 1950

Faced with old as well as new crises in its troubled relations with China, Washington, 
while continued to press the Chinese government to fulfil all its treaty obligations, was forced to 
try some new approaches to manage those crises. The most favorable new approach tried by the 
United States government in this period was educational exchange. Whenever there was a 
diplomatic crisis, Washington would initiate some new educational exchange programs with 
China as part of its effort to deal with the crisis. With such deep involvement of Washington and 
clear pragmatic goals, educational exchange was turned into crisis management instrument and 
China a testing ground for the use of such an instrument.

The first major crisis that Washington had to face in the first half of the 20th century was 
of course the nation-wide anti-American boycott organized by Chinese merchants and students in 
1905-06. As first of its kind in modern Chinese history, the boycott posed a serious threat to 
Washington's effort to keep China's door open. Deeply concerned with the possible loss of the 
China market, Washington responded vehemently to the boycott. It sent William Rockhill, a new 
Minister, to Beijing to put full pressure on the Qing government. Unwilling to completely 
antagonize the Untied States, the lesser evil among all Western powers, the Qing government 
issued strict orders to force students and merchants to end the boycott. In summer 1906, the 
boycott finally came to a stop.

Although the boycott was ended, American policy makers knew that strong anti-
American feelings, the real cause of the boycott, were still strong among Chinese students and
merchants. Another boycott could take place anytime in the future unless certain action was taken to effectively curtail the anti-American sentiment in China. Through numerous report sent back from China, President Theodore Roosevelt was fully aware of the situation and informed of the leading role played by Chinese students and scholars in the boycott. Determined to keep the China market open to American merchants, he first tried to persuade Congress to abolish the Chinese exclusion laws so as to remove one of the greatest obstacles in the U.S.-China relations. At the same time, he issued strict instructions to American consular officers in China and Immigration officers at all American ports in June 1905, ordering them to treat all Chinese students and merchants with respect and courtesy. If anyone dared to ignore the order and continue the mistreatment of those Chinese, he warned, that person would be fired.\footnote{13 Theodore Roosevelt to MetCalf, June 16, 1905, \textit{The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt}, Elting E. Morrison, ed., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), vol. 4, pp. 235-236.} When Congress killed the bill to repeal all Chinese exclusion laws, he accepted the recommendation and decided to return the excessive part of Boxer Indemnity to China. The only condition was that the Chinese government had to use the returned money to educate Chinese students in the United States.

When the Chinese official gave up their own plans for the use of the returned money and completely accepted the American condition, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution to return about $10 million to China in 1908. Following the plan approved by the Rockhill, the Chinese government began to send large groups of students to the Untied States in 1909 and 1910, and established Qinghua Academy in 1911 to prepare students for American education. In order to make sure that all Chinese students could enter the United States without any trouble, Roosevelt
approved to grant the first group of Chinese students diplomat visa rather than regular student visa. With support from both government, the educational program funded with the returned Boxer Indemnity was up and running.

The rare opportunity to receive most advanced education first at Qinghua and then in American colleges and universities at government expense had great appeal to Chinese students. When Qinghua held its first entrance examination in 1910, over 8,000 students registered. Among those applicants only 143 were accepted. Qinghua continued to attract a large number of applicants in the later years. It is interesting to notice that most of the students enrolled at Qinghua in the early years came from open ports in coastal areas where the anti-American boycott received the strongest support in 1905. As Qinghua became the most attractive school in China, the Untied States became the most attractive country for Chinese students to seek higher education. By 1919, over 1,000 students were sent to the Untied States with the returned Indemnity funds. That was ten times more than the number of Chinese students enrolled in American schools prior to 1909.

The second crisis in U.S.-China relations in the first half of the 20th century was caused by Washington's approval of Japanese control of Shandong Province of China at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Having put a great hope on Woodrow Wilson, the strongest advocate for self-determination, Chinese, as an allied power, had expected to take back Shandong Province from Germany after the war. Therefore, when Chinese students and scholars heard the news that

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14 Qinghua Daxue Xiaoshi Yanjiushi. *Qinghua Daxue xiaoshi xuanbian* (Selected Historical Records of Qinghua University), (Beijing: Qinghua Daxue Chubanshe, 1991), vol. 1, pp. 143-144.

15 Ibid., pp. 50-71.
Shandong Province was given to Japan by the United States without even consulting the Chinese government, they felt betrayed and insulted. Students in Beijing organized a mass demonstration on May 4th, 1919, protesting the American policy. The students first marched to the American Legation at Beijing. Unable to find the American Minister, students handed a protest letter to an American diplomat and continued the march in the city. Under the pressure from students and scholars, the Chinese government refused to sign the Peace Treaty orchestrated mostly by Woodrow Wilson.

The rising anti-American sentiment among Chinese students and the decline of American influence in China disturbed many American policy makers. Once the political battle over the Peace Treaty came to an end in the United States, Henry Herbert Lodge, a Republican Senator, sent a letter to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes on May 25, 1921, urging him to return immediately to China the $2 million held back from the first Boxer Indemnity remission to cover further claims. He believed that the first remission had caused a better feeling toward the United States. He was certain that further remission would be "a very good political move, and would strengthen still further our hold in China." Lodge's proposal won hearty sympathy from Hughes and they worked together to push a resolution through Congress. While the resolution passed the Senate without any objection, it met strong opposition in the House. They had to wait for three years when the resolution finally went through Congress on May 12, 1924.

While continuing the tradition of using the money for educating Chinese students, the resolution for the second remission extended support to other cultural enterprises and gave more influence and control to Americans. Under the new rules, the China Foundation for Promotion of Education and Culture (CFPEC) was established in 1924 to handled the returned the money including the Qinghua Endowment funds. The Board of CFPEC had 15 members, 10 Chinese and 5 Americans. Only three of the Chinese members were government officials. American missionaries were intentionally kept out of the Board. With over $12 million paid back to China in 20 years, the CFPEC was able to offer a large number of grants to hundreds of scientists and scholars, provide subsidies for numerous universities, research institutes, and educational and cultural organizations, and cooperate with the Chinese government and institutions in establishing and maintaining the National Peking Library. Between 1928 and 1937, over 1,200 Chinese scholars applied for research grants and 447 received subsidies ranging from 250 to 4,000 yuan. The National Peking Library received over 4 million yuan from CFPEC from 1925-1936, about 1/4 of its total expense for the period. As a result, the CFPEC was able to reached a much larger group of Chinese scientists, scholars, and students, and at the same time build the largest and library in China.

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The U.S.-China relations faced yet another crisis when the United States failed to provide adequate military and economic support for China in its war against Japan even after the United States officially entered World War II. Having been fighting the Japanese mostly alone since 1937, the Chinese government was happy to see the United States become an official ally in the war and expected increasing financial and economic aid from Washington. Despite Washington's promise of fullest support, China did not see substantial increase of military aid from the United States in the first half of 1942 because of Washington's Europe first strategy and distrust over the Nationalist government. In June 1942, Jiang Jieshi (Jiang Kai-shek), the Nationalist leader, sent a note to President Franklin Roosevelt, listing the minimum supplies needed for China to maintain the China Theatre. His requests, however, were mostly turned down by Washington. Jiang was so furious that he ordered General Joseph Stilwell, his Chief of Staff appointed by President Roosevelt, to radio Washington asking for "Yes or no on the question 'Is the U.S. interested in maintaining the China Theater'?" When the supplies promised by Washington failed to come in again, Jiang blamed Stilwell and insisted on his removal. He even threatened, on several occasions, to make a separate peace with Japan if he could not get adequate aid for his country.

Washington, especially the Department of State, took Jiang's threat seriously. While unable to change American war strategy or increase American military aid dramatically, the State Department looked at other means to improve wartime relations with China. One of the earliest steps taken by the State Department was to establish a China cultural relations program in July

20 Yin Zhou, "Ma Xieer jiangjun shi Hua" (General Marshall's Mission to China), Lishi Dangan (Historical Archives), February 1991, p. 129.
1942 to implement the cultural program that the Department had planned for some time.\footnote{In 1943, the United States signed another treaty with China terminating the extraterritorial rights enjoyed by Americans in China. In the same year, U.S. Congress passed an act to repeal all Chinese exclusion laws.}

Accepting suggestions from Clarence Gauss, the American Ambassador to Chongqing, the State Department kept the focus of the China cultural program on maintaining China's "educational front" during the war. The Department agreed with Gauss that focusing on education was the best way to "bolster morale amongst a class of Chinese whose influence in the present and for the future is important both to China and the United States."\footnote{Gauss to the Secretary of State, March 27, 1942, the Department of State, Decimal Files, 1911-1949, 811.42793/572, RG 59, National Archives, Washington D.C.}
Financed with the President Emergency Funds, the China cultural program included many different projects. The first project was to provide grant in aid for Chinese students stranded in the Untied Stated during the war. The State Department mailed out the first checks to Chinese students in mid-1942. By May 1, 1944, the number of Chinese who received grants from the Department reached 376.\textsuperscript{23} The State Department also sponsored Chinese exchange scholars to visit the United States beginning in October 1942. Many famous Chinese scholars and university administrators came to the Untied States during the war despite the overwhelming difficulties in transportation. While offering support for the Chinese students and scholars in the United States, Washington tried every means to provide help for universities, scholars, and students in unoccupied China. Besides funds funneled through private institutions, the States Department managed give several universities the newly invented microfilm reading machines and over one million pages of microfilmed journals and magazines.\textsuperscript{24} These programs helped Chinese scholars and students maintain intellectual ties with outside world and continue their research and study during the war.

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{24} Wilma Fairbank, \textit{America's Cultural Experiments in China}, pp. 47-49.
\end{quote}
The last but not least crisis in U.S.-China relations during this period took place right after World War II. At the end of the war, over 100,000 American soldiers were stationed in China. Many of them involved in numerous incidents like traffic accidents, killing, beating, and raping in China. The rape of Shen Cong, a Chinese female university student in Beijing, on December 24, 1946, led to a nation-wide student movement demanding the punishment of the soldiers, protesting American support for the Nationalist government in its civil war effort, and calling for the withdraw of the American troops from China.\(^{25}\) Having personal experience in China and failed to mediate a peace between the Nationalists and Communists, General George Marshall strongly advocated limited and conditioned aid to the Untied States. When he became Secretary of State upon returning to the Untied States, Marshall decided to withdraw most of American forces from China and provide limited amount of aid to the Nationalist government with some conditions attached. This policy of limited and conditioned aid caused diplomatic and political crises for the Truman Administration. The Nationalist government openly criticized Washington for the lack of support and even organized mass anti-American demonstrations. Chinese students and scholars protested Washington's support for Jiang which prolonged the civil war in China. At the same time, the Truman Administration had to face the strong pressure from Congress and demand from some of its top officials for stronger support for Jiang Jieshi and deeper involvement in China's war against communism.

\(^{25}\) Nan Sui, Meidi qinhua shilu (The Historical Records of American Imperialists' Invasion of China), (Hong Kong: Chaoyang Chubanshe, 1971), pp. 121-146.
In order to appease the Nationalist government, regain the good feelings from the Chinese students and scholars, and protect itself from political attacks, the Truman Administration desperately needed to find a way to show its sympathy and support for the Nationalist government while steering clear of China's civil war. It finally found the way in resuming educational exchange under the Fulbright Program. The Fulbright Act was signed into law by President Truman on August 1, 1946. It authorized the Secretary of State to sell U.S. surplus property overseas, to receive payment in foreign currencies, credit, and any other way deemed proper by him, and to enter agreement with foreign governments to use part of their payments to finance educational and cultural exchanges between the United States and those countries.\footnote{“Foreign Educational Benefits and Surplus Property", \textit{Senate Report}, No. 1039, 79th Congress, 2nd sess., March 12, 1946, p. 1.} Although the new law provided a new source of funding for educational exchange, the Truman Administration pushed it aside until April 1947 when Marshall instructed to negotiate the first Fulbright Agreement with China. After six-month negotiation, the Agreement was signed on November 10, 1947.
Once the agreement was signed, the State Department began to implement it with urgency. Within a month, the Board of Directors of the United States Educational Foundation in China (USEFC) was established with Leighton Stuart, the American Ambassador, as its chairman. Soon President Truman appointed members to the Board of Foreign Scholarships to select American scholars and students to be sent abroad under the Fulbright Program. The first Fulbright fellow, Derk Bodes, was selected in March 1948. His arrival at Beijing in August marked the formal beginning of the Fulbright Program. The USEFC planned to offer grants to 20 American professors and 20 American students to work and study in China, to 100 Chinese students to attend American colleges and universities in China, and to 10 Chinese scholars to do research in the United States in 1948. However, by the end of 1948, only 41 Americans were awarded Fulbright grants and 21 were able to accept them, including 4 visiting professors, 7 research scholars, and 16 undergraduate students.27 The military situation in China shortened the life of the first Fulbright program considerably. As the Communist army got close to Beijing, the State Department had to send a chartered plane to Beijing to pick up any Fulbright scholars and students who desired to leave. On August 31, 1949, the USEFC suspended its operation in China due to the exhaustion of funds and inability of the Nationalist government to continue its support.

Through this brief examination of American educational exchange programs in the first half of the 20th century, it is not difficult to notice that all the major programs were initiated and sponsored by the United States government. As the initiator and sponsor, Washington had direct or indirect control over all the educational exchange programs. However, Washington did not promote educational exchange with China for the sake of education. Instead, it tried to use

educational exchange as a new approach in its effort to cope with all kinds of diplomatic crises in its relations with China. That's why all educational exchange programs were initiated when U.S.-China relations were in deep trouble. As a result, the deep involvement of Washington, while effectively enlarging educational exchange between the two nations, added a new dimension to it.

III. An Irrelevant Success: Assessing Educational Exchange

As the new sponsor, promoter, and regulator for educational exchange between the Untied States and China, Washington had a high hope for the exchange programs. With strong confidence in American educational system, Washington believed that it could win over a large number of Chinese students and scholars after putting them through American colleges and universities. It was confident that all the problems and crises between the two nations could be prevented and solved after the those friendly students returned to China and became leaders there. There is no doubt that Washington succeeded in getting an unprecedentedly large number of Chinese students into American colleges and universities, but it was not successful in obtaining their friendly feelings toward the Untied States, especially its China policy, or effectively solving diplomatic crises between the two nations through those exchange programs. As a result, the U.S.-China relations entered the most severe crises in 1950 when American troops confronted the Chinese Volunteers in Korea. Although the war came to a stop in three years, the diplomatic relations as well as educational exchange between the two nations were cut off for over two decades.

The rapid growth of Chinese students studying in the United States is strongest testimony to the success of educational exchange sponsored and regulated by the United States government
in the first half of the 20th century. Before Washington was involved in educational exchange, the number of Chinese students studying in the United States was always small. During most years between 1882 and 1908, less than ten Chinese students came to the United States each year. The number rose steadily and sharply since the first remission of the excessive part of the Boxer Indemnity to China in 1909. About 100 Chinese students came to the United States each year between 1909 and 1919. Since 1924, the number climbed to above 300. During World War II, the China cultural programs did not bring a large number of Chinese students to the United States, but they helped hundreds of Chinese students stranded in this country and paved the road for thousands of Chinese students to pursue their education in the United States after the war. As a result, over 1,000 Chinese students entered the United States each year between 1946 and 1950. In 1950, there were over 4,000 Chinese students in the United States, the largest group overseas.

The success in educational exchange did not prevent or eliminate diplomatic crises in U.S.-China relations. Educational experience in the United States might help many Chinese students and scholars become experts and leaders in their fields and make some American friends. However, their educational experience and friendship with individual Americans did not turn them into blind supporters for American policy toward China. Therefore, Chinese students and scholars, including those returned from the United States, continued to play leading roles in all anti-American movements in the first half of the 20th century. Because of that, Washington had to adopt educational exchange programs time and again as part of its effort to handle the

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crises in U.S.-China relations until its diplomatic relations with Chian came to an end in 1950.

The breach of U.S.-China relations marked the ultimate failure of Washington's attempt to use educational exchange as a new instrument in its dealing with diplomatic crises in its relations with China. There are many factors leading to that failure. First of all, the nature of educational exchange largely determined that it could not be an effective instrument in dealing with diplomatic crisis. There is no doubt that educational exchange will increase mutual understanding between the two peoples and that better understanding can improve relations between two nations. However, education is a rather long process and it takes a rather long time to see its effect. Educational exchange may help the development of a stable and friendly relations between the two nations in the long run, but it can not be a quick fix to any diplomatic crisis.

Secondly, Washington was unwilling to make any changes to its China policy that had caused tension and crises between the two nations while trying to gain friendly feelings from Chinese students and scholars through educational exchange. It continued to carry out the Chinese exclusion laws, to enjoy all the uneqaul treaty rights, to provide minimum military and economic aid to China, and to support the Nationalist government in its civil war effort, as it initiated and implemented educational exchange programs with China. Most Chinese, especially Chinese students and scholars, hated those American laws and policies. As long as those laws and policies were not changed, it is impossible to win over Chinese students no matter how many educational exchange programs were implemented. Educational exchange alone could not prevent or eliminate crises in U.S.-China relations.

Thirdly, the positive and long-term effect of educational exchange was drastically
reduced by Washington's mishandling of exchange programs. Educational exchange can be most effective in the long run if it is conducted with mutual respect, reciprocity, and continuity. However, educational exchange programs between the United States and China in the first half of the 20th century were anything but that. Americans, including the policy makers, usually had little respect for the Chinese culture or the Chinese people. To them, the purpose of educational exchange was to teach the Chinese rather than learn from each other, and to change China rather than appreciate and accept China and Chinese culture as it is. Therefore, Washington did not sponsor any Americans to study in China until the end of World War II. Educational exchange between the two nations remained mostly a one-way street with Washington in control throughout this period. It would stop educational exchange when crisis was no longer in sight. This lack of respect, reciprocity, and continuity caused strong resentment among the Chinese and led to misunderstanding among the Americans.

Washington's effort to use educational exchange as a new approach in coping with diplomatic crises in U.S.-China relations failed because of its misperception and mishandling. However, its experiment did add a new dimension to the U.S.-China diplomatic relations. The expanded educational exchange at least helped a large number of Chinese students obtain personal experience in the Untied States and enhance their understanding of the American people and culture. With all unequal treaties and Chinese exclusion laws long being abolished, there is a better opportunity now for the Americans and the Chinese to improve their mutual understanding through lasting and massive educational exchange conducted with mutual respect and reciprocity. The deeper and better understanding reached by the two peoples will help reduce if not prevent diplomatic crisis between the United States and China in the long run. Therefore, educational
exchange between the two nations should be further enlarged and perpetuated.