Globalisation, Regionalisation
and
The History of International Relations

Abstracts
Globalisation, Regionalisation and the History of International Relations

Edited by Alfredo Canavero, Silvia Pizzetti and Lucio Valent
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Preliminary Note

Last year, the Bureau of the Commission on History of International Relations (look p. 7) singled out *Globalization, Regionalization and the History of International Relations* as the subject of the Oslo first scientific session by a broad majority.

The paper, which had been enclosed to the invitation for all the members to participate to the session, has outlined viable purposes for the meeting (look p. 10): it has suggested to relate the analysis of globalization's and regionalization's different sides - with their relationships - to the reassessment of a historical course that might be quite far-reaching in the past.

Different members of the Bureau and the Secretariat have cooperated by developing first paper's suggestions, by proposing subjects of study, by keeping in touch suitably with members and other interested scholars who have been invited on the way to take part to the initiative.

Plenty of replies have been received, as can be seen from this collection of abstracts, which we are delivering to foster the following stages of our work.

Drawing on the attitude and rules of the Commission, the basic purpose of the session goes on to be that Bureau's and Secretariat's members, associates and joining scholars could ponder and confront each other on so relevant subjects. This sheds light also on the difference of proposals and on the overall character the research has taken so far.

We also propose at the end a sorting-out by areas and topics that is only tentative: it is not to stick to the letter. Some abstracts in different areas deal a lot with subjects pertaining to the second part. On the contrary, some abstracts on topics take into remarkable consideration areas' subjects.

Nonetheless, two-part division, plus a special session on Latin America, goes on to be useful: a first, sketchy overview is permitted, which may be conducive to the discussion and the reassessment we will have at Oslo.
Some Information about the Commission of History of International Relations

The Commission of History of International Relations was established in Milan in October 1981 on the initiative of a group of scholars from various countries. In the same year the International Committee of Historical Sciences (I.C.H.S.) recognised it as an “internal” body devoted to foster and enhance the widest scientific collaboration among historians of ‘international life’, understood in its widest meaning.

The Commission, which is open to all the interested historians on an “individual membership” basis, according to its Statute has “the purpose... to develop the studies on the history of international relations, by several means:

a) organising periodical meetings among its members;

b) aiding the spread of scientific information concerning this domain of history;

c) publishing scientific documents useful for historical research in this field;

d) any other activity which may appear to be useful to widen the works of the Commission”.

The Institutions active in this field of studies may get membership in the Commission, but without voting rights. They may propose individuals for membership.

The Commission is co-ordinated by a Bureau, and assisted by a Secretariat which has its seat in Milan, as stated by statute, at the Centre for the Studies on Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.

In August 1997 the Commission was accepted as “associate” body of the ICHS with right to vote in General Assembly of that world organisation.

Since 1981 Commission has approved and supported the programmes of many International Congress that have been later enacted with the cooperation of Universities and Institutions from countries all over the world.

From 1981 up to 1999 congresses have taken place in Perugia, Tübingen, Helsinki, Bochum, Cluj, Moscow, Brasilia, Rome, Buenos Aires, and Tokio and they have been devoted to:

- **The History and Methodology of International Relations** (Perugia-Spoleto-Trevi, Italy, 20-23 September 1989) organized with the University of Perugia
- **Minor Powers/Majors Powers in the History of International Relations** (Tübingen, Germany, 11-13 April 1991) organized with the Eberhard-Karls-Universität
- **The History of Neutrality** (Helsinki, Finland, 9-12 September 1992) organized with the Finnish Historical Society and the University of Helsinki
- **East-West Relations: Confrontation and Détente 1945-1989** (Bochum, Germany, 22-25 September 1993) organized with the University of Bochum
- **The History of International Relations in East and Central Europe: Study Traditions and Research Perspectives** (Cluj-Napoca, Romania, 20-24 October 1993) organized with the Institute of Central-European History, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca.
- **World War I and the XX Century** (Moscow, Russia, 24-26 May, 1994) organized with the Russian Association of the WWI History and the Institute of Universal History of the Russian Academy of Sciences
- **State and Nation in the History of International Relations of American Countries** (Brasilia, Brazil, 31 August -2 September 1994) with University of Brasilia
- **The Historical Archives of the Great International Organisations: Conditions, Problems and Perspectives. International Seminar of Studies** (Rome, Italy, September 27-28, 1996), organized with International Council on Archives (ICA) and International Conference of the Round Table in Archives (CITTRA), the Ufficio Centrale per i Beni Archivistici, the Giunta Centrale per gli Studi Storici, the Istituto Nazionale di Storia Moderna e Contemporanea di Roma
The Origins of the World Wars of the XX Century. Comparative Analysis (Moscow, Russia, 15-16 October 1996) organized with the National Committee of Russian Historians, the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Association of the First World War Historians and the Association of the Second World War.

The Lessons of Yalta (Cluj-Napoca, Romania, May, 1997) organized with the Institute of Central-European History, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca.

Integration Processes and Regional Blocs in the History of International Economic, Politico-strategic and Cultural Relations (Buenos Aires, Argentina, 10-12 September 1997) organized with the Argentine Association of the History of International Relations and the Universities of Buenos Aires and Cordoba.

Political Interactions between Asia and Europe in the Twentieth Century (Tokyo, Japan, 10-12 September 1998) organized with the University of Tsukuba and the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.

Archives and History of International Organizations (Rome, Italy, 29-31 October 1998) organized with International Council on Archives (ICA), Ufficio Centrale per i Beni Archivistici and Giunta Centrale per gli Studi Storici.

The Commission on the occasion of the International Congresses of Historical Sciences, with ICHS had promoted at Stuttgart (1985), Madrid (1990), Montreal (1995), has held its General Assemblies that has entailed the set-up of specific sessions devoted to:

What’s History of International Relations? (Stuttgart, Germany, 29-30 August 1985, 16th International Congress of Historical Sciences)

Permanent Diplomacy in the XX Century (Stuttgart, ...)

Great and Small Powers in Modern and Contemporary Ages (Stuttgart, ...)

Les archives des organisations internationales. Le point de vue de l'historien et du chercheur (Madrid, Spain, 30-31 August 1990, 17th International Congress of Historical Sciences)

International Relations in the Pacific Area from the 18th Century to the Present. Colonisation, Decolonisation and Cultural Encounters (Montreal, Canada, 1-2 September 1995, 18th International Congress of Historical Sciences)

Multiculturalism and History of International Relations from 18th Century up to the Present (Montreal, ...)

In order to foster the widest spreading of information and to favour a closer relationship with its members, the Secretariat of the Commission publishes a Newsletter, 10 issues of which have come out by now.

All the information on the Commission its activities, issued publications and join-in procedure can be obtained by getting on to:

Commission of History of International Relations
Via Festa del Perdono 7 – 20122 Milano – Italy
Tel. 0039-0258304553
Fax.0039-0258306808
E-Mail: chir@unimi.it
Web Site: http://users.unimi.it/~polestra/centro

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The General Assembly of the CHIR, held in Montreal (Canada) in September 1995, has elected as members of its Bureau for the years 1995-2000:
For the same five-year period the Bureau appointed Brunello VIGEZZI as President, Manuel ESPADAS BURGOS as Secretary General, Robert FRANK as Secretary Treasurer, and Amado Luiz CERVO and Pompiliu TEODOR as Vice-Presidents.

A Secretariat - co-ordinated by Alfredo CANAVERO and Silvia PIZZETTI - assists the Commission in its activities.

The General Assembly of the CHIR in Montreal has nominated Donald C. WATT (London School of Economics) and René GIRAULT (Université de Paris-Sorbonne) as Honorary Presidents of the Commission.
Session Aims – Introductory Remarks

It is a very widespread notion that in recent times the world has been going through an ever more marked process of “globalisation”. At the same time, it has been observed, there is a parallel - more or less marked – movement towards “regionalisation”: “regions” in this context are to be seen either as internal divisions within existing states, or as larger areas than present states, extended on a more or less continental scale.

Studies on these topics are now legion, provoking an extraordinary variety of interpretations, discussions and controversies which in turn have given rise to ever more new studies.

These studies have emphasised how the process of “globalisation” involves a range of different spheres: from the economic to the political and social ones, but also including communications and institutions as well as cultural and religious issues. What is the substance and what are the manifestations of “globalisation” on these different levels? What is the thread that connects these various aspects? And what, in each of the various situations, is the real relationship that holds between “globalisation” and “regionalisation”?

“Globalisation” and “regionalisation”, according to comments various scholars made, are phenomena that form part of an historical process which they shape and enliven in their own turn. What possible link is there between, on the one hand, “globalisation” and “regionalisation”, and on the other, the history of the relations between states and, more broadly, the history of international relations?

While these studies have often emphasised the startling novelty of recent processes of “globalisation” and “regionalisation”, they have, however, also increasingly drawn attention to the importance of a longer-term perspective. Only with such a long-term perspective does it seem possible to provide an in-depth explanation of the character and impact of these new changes.

The very terms “globalisation” and “regionalisation” need to be examined more closely. Attention needs to be paid to when they are used and when not, to their meaning and to the use of other more or less similar terms. It would be interesting to consider from this point of view, for example, the age of modern “discoveries” and what some people see as the first “globalisation” and “regionalisation” of the world; aspects of the “industrial revolution”; the periods of imperialism and decolonialisation; the two World Wars; the Cold War; the end of the Cold War and so on.
Abstracts

in author’s alphabetical order
The End of the Century and the End of Employment.
East-West: A Reality

The following report shows the analysis of the labour reality, which affects immediately the actual world. In order to fulfil this analysis, it is important to have a retrospective view over the 80s and 90s in the Japanese business world, such as the business evolution and an accompanying problem with it, namely the unemployment. The European reality is explored according to answers that have been given by the UE to the labour problem and also the undertaking projects as unemployment alternatives. Even, the existence of new technologies and the opening of national economies show the way towards a global economy. That is to say, the double phenomenon of Globalization – with its direct corollary, that is the conformation of regional blocks - and the Third Industrial Revolution – with the technological developments that are connected to telecommunication and computer science- which engender an increasing unemployment in combination with liberalism.

This interaction impoverishes considerable masses, even in the most successful countries. According to what has been previously set-out, in the following report consists of three parts as follows:

1. towards a new concept of employment;
2. end of the century and end of employment;
3. graphics and statistics.

The transformation of the old concept of employment is analyzed in the first part. Such concept entails the controller principle of human life, which nowadays is being gradually and systematically removed from the production process because sophisticated communication and information technologies are progressively being applied to a wide variety of jobs.

This process is not strange to business and labour re-organization.

This happens because the unemployment and subemployment indexes increase every day in North America, Europe and Japan, arising an increasing technologic unemployment, in as much as transnational corporations have productive methods that are based on the most up to date technologies; this causing that million of workers not to be able to contend with the new automation production systems. Multicorrective team work, the employees' tuition in different skills to reduce and simplify production, distribution and administrative processes constitute a reality, according to what has been mentioned before.

After having appraised analysing the Taylorist and the Fordist systems as labour processes, able to transform the world, they are slowly falling through, because of the lack of possibilities in order to increase productivity. Team work in module or isle are appearing all of them as substitutes of assembly chains.

It's obvious that the Japanese pattern is in an all-out spreading and that an information society, which is almost short of employment is dawning, is third Industrial Revolution the third and last stage of a change in the economic paradigms?

Cybernetics, for instance: robots, computers with advanced software are invading the last available human spheres namely the realm of the mind.

In the second part, the end of the century and its correlation with the end of employment are analysed, either in the case of the East (such as Japan) or the West (such as the European Community).
In the case of Japan, not only the Japanese is business management is studied but also the internal and external pressures too: material satisfaction against spiritual wealth and free time or protectionism, which damages Japan, against moving the production abroad. There is also a tendency to a change in the organising structure of the Japanese company, that is to say the evolution towards a new Japanese business system. We can say that the Japanese business management will face awkward problems, especially in the administration of human resources next century. So, the concept of life-long employment is typical example: retirement in advance, removing of over employment, subcontracting, subsidiaries, the beginning of compulsory training programmes.

The Japanese demographical transition will be relevant, because at the beginning of the XXI century, Japan will have more old people than today, which will be dangerous for the financial structures of the country. It will arise a threat to the national interest that is the creation of wealth, which implies private savings, money to be given to Japanese manufacturers with low rate of interest and also the costs' advantages which are obtained with respect to rivals from abroad.

Nevertheless, there is a countermeasures by an old population, which is the technological progress in the production growing and the intensification of robot revolution in Japan. According to Paul Kennedy, we can say that the robot revolution increases more where labour costs are high, and where there is a stock of workers, that shows a deep demographical deceleration.

To sum up, slaves from abroad assembly plants (with low labour costs) are exceed by automation at home.

That is why, the unemployment reality of the Japanese labour world turns on “re-engineering” processes, that remove all kind of jobs in a greater number.

According to what has been explained, there is a model of management, that is known as the just-in time production: Toyotism. Japanese manufacturers have combined new rational production techniques, by using sophisticated information systems that are based on new technologies; this means the future factory: automation productive substructure plus a fewer number of workers. This factory has a relevant stress profile and shorter stints per days.

In the West, especially in the European Community, a comparative opinion is made regarding the labour problem and the importance of the European model of social welfare, that has been able to keep social peace in the last decades. This factor is one of the most important element in the integration process, although there are some pressures to reduce social expenses, which are imposed by the world rivalry. Such pressures have increased since a time of considerable increase of unemployment and also of the oldness’ rate of population. These factors imply important efforts, especially in the public budgets.

We have also analyzed how does the Community fight against unemployment. After analyzing community plans, the importance of the European Bank of Investments and its credit loans for substructure projects, as well as the importance of the European Fund of Investment is apparent. These institutions gives some help to companies, which ask for credits. The Cohesion Fund is also important to provide means of transport and environmental projects.

Employment policies are considered for 1998 and 1999, showing four basic elements to take into account: 1) To improve employment, 2) To develop enterprise attitude, 3) To encourage the company and employee’s acclimatisation and 4) To reinforce same-opportunity policy.

The E.U. has interests in developing some programmes to create new jobs, as well as education policies are studied in order to provide the same opportunities to men and women.

Graphs and statistics are included in the third part, which are about employment and unemployment in Japan and in the European Community as follows: rate of women and men activity from 15 to 64 years old in the U.E., women and men unemployment rate from 15 to 64 years old, women and men part-time job, full-time job in the U.E. and Japan, the annual growing rate in certain labour categories of some countries 1981-1996 transition to older groups in Japanese population, chart explaining the unemployment rate in the developed counties of the world and a chart indicating the growing rate of employment in the areas mentioned above.
Globalisation and Regionalisation

The superimposition of partial concepts on phenomena to general concepts on general phenomena has always been the cause (or effect) of the reality’s ideological manipulation. Historians such as Fernand Braudel and economists like Karl Marx and Karl Polanyi provide copious study material about these phenomena with their researches into “market”, “capitalism” and “development”.

This situation has again taken place in recent times due to the superimposition of the partial concept on the phenomenon of globalisation to the general concept on the phenomenon of internationalisation and by reducing to it partial phenomenon such as universalisation and regionalisation.

By this method, opposing phenomena such as globalisation and regionalisation are considered equal or, in some cases, the second is considered a lower stage of development than the first.

A recent but equally diverting and mystifying perspective is the one which places real phenomena such as globalisation, universalisation and regionalisation on the same level with virtual phenomena such as the “Global Village” or the “Network Society”.

This can be overcome by a more careful analysis which starts from the theoretical ground of the “meso-region” and “world-economy”, and from the study of the “authors” and “actors” that characterise the phenomena of globalisation, universalisation and regional integration. This will be able to restore the correct balance between real and virtual in the present knowledge.

It is the opinion of the author that globalisation represents the new form of capitalist accumulation in the 21st century, which is qualitatively different from all previous stages. Universalisation expresses trends and movements of resistance to such new forms, and regional integration is the political alternative to it.

Globalisation leaves aside market economies, dismantles national states and institutions, clones production systems by the rupture of any relation between “culture and production systems”, and, finally, it de-territorialises the basic existence of the communities.

The construction of process of regional integration rooted in the “meso-region” dimension appears to be the best alternative to globalisation and the adequate answer to the new demands on internationalisation in the 21st century.
In Austrian foreign policy since 1918, regionalization above the state level has been a recurrent, almost constant phenomenon though adopting different forms. There may be doubts whether the idea of a union with Germany (Anschluss), predominant in the first period of Austria’s existence as a little state, fits well in the concept of regionalization. However, this is certainly true for the concurring ideas of Mitteleuropa, of a Danubian federation, of Paneurope and other forms of more or less regionalized European co-operation. After its reestablishment at the end of World War II, selected traditional and new concepts of regionalization played a major role again, including the different forms of “European” co-operation in the OEEC, the Council of Europe, the ECSC and EEC, the failed Great Free Trade Area, the EFTA, and the CSCE.

From their origins, Austrian regionalization tendencies can be analysed as variables of two main identity problems: Austria's national and international identities. "Left over" from the Habsburg Monarchy, the new state was not nation. National allegiance went to Germany, supra-national allegiance went to the region formerly included in the Empire of Austria and its Hungarian counterpart. Small and weak, the new state didn't accept its international identity either. Regionalization tendencies in Austrian foreign policy took therefore a "post-imperial" mark. While to a certain extent, this "post-imperial" dimension holds on until our days, nation building in little Austria has been a success since its reestablishment in 1945 and the end of Allied occupation in 1955. Finally, regionalization took on more common functions. Among other things, it has been Austria’s answer to globalization when preparing to join the European Union in the late 1980s.

As a paradox, regionalization by joining the EU brought also about a sort of de-globalization in Austrian foreign policy as from the 1960s on, especially in the Kreisky era, it had largely concentrated on the United Nations. This out of deception from "Europe", already then the politically and economically most relevant form of regionalization above the state level. Globalization then was a sort of alternative to regionalization.

However, globalization of Austria's foreign policy had had a second reason as well: regionalization beneath the state level. In fact, the problem of South Tyrol had a great impact on internal policy and was one of the driving forces behind Austria’s active UN policy on a global scale (including Africa and the Middle East). As a largely federalized state, Austria’s foreign policy had and has to take strongly into account the regional interests of its provinces. The early years of the First Republic had sown examples of tentative foreign policy emancipation of individual provinces (notably Tyrol and Salzburg) with disintegrating implications for the state. Some seventy years later, when negotiating Austria’s adhesion to the European Union, the federal government had to strike a deal with the provinces which gave them a further bearing in certain domains of foreign policy.

In recent years, Austria has therefore become another example for the well known process in which regionalization – in both senses of the term, above and beneath the state level – is a twin of globalization. The history of the decades before, however, shows many particularities due to Austria’s long-lasting difficulties in coming to term with its existence as a separate, little state.
Globalisation has been an integral part of Australia's historical experience since white settlement in 1788. Earlier generations, of course, would not have used this term - and, if the word 'globalisation' had been in currency then, the meanings attached to it would not have been those that the term acquired in the late 20th century. But in the sense that Australians of European extraction have always been conscious of world outside their own national boundaries - to which they were profoundly attached emotionally, politically and economically - globalisation has been an ever-present reality. Of course the 'world' with which Australia engaged was, for a century or more, the imperial world of the British empire, but this imperial commitment drew Australia into much wider global conflicts. And from 1945, with an ever more diverse flow of immigrants from Europe and the dominance of the United States internationally, the world with which Australians engaged progressively widened. This history of constant exposure international cultural, economic and political influences, however, was in constant tension with Australia's geography. The 'region' has been problematic for Australia- at first a matter of anxiety strategically and racially; more latterly, a growing challenge economically. Only in the last two decades, under the pressure of economic globalisation, has Australia begun - and the operative world is 'begun' -to reconcile this conflict between its history and geography.
Religious radicalism is assumed at the same time as an innovating and deeply rooted solution on behalf of human groups' original identity to cope with globalization, or what is anyway appraised as a threat to such identity. It implies that religious radicalism should be understood preliminarily not as a theological answer to processes of modernization, rather as a religious-framed, ethnic-looking political philosophy, where theology is a sheer way of expression like a language or, maybe, a jargon. The religious purview defines through other words the political language of a frame which is aimed to the ethnic restoration of a historically established human group.

This re-definition gets on by two different processes: the first one consist in the removal of either explanatory and hermeneutic practices, which have been established since the last two century at least, to cope with modernization or the traditional holders of knowledge as well. The second one consists in the social mobilization that hinges upon devising new identity symbologies, which are, for the most part, framed on places, symbols and objects.

The Jewish case is emblematic from both point of view: as explanatory practice, the text-analyzing model becomes absolute, thereby opting out the historical dimension of explanation for a non-historical one. With respect to social mobilization, the early historical and cultural coherence co-exists with the emerging support to what is theological, reviving some aspects of the U.S. collective movements: it blends fascination for mystery and neo-Messianic redeeming dimension along with an ethnic-nationalistic one.

Gush Emunim case is enlightening: they belongs to Chabad movement in the version of immanent-type Messianism of the latter years, where the former refusal of the political-territorial dimension is now being phased out by an over-stressing of the Jewish geographical space. It is consistent with either a process of non-historical appraisal of the sacred or a social mobilization by neo-charismatic movements that follow the dynamics typical of, in accordance wit Gino Germani’s categories, authoritarian or populistic movements.
OMC: règles multilatérales stables et non-discriminatoires? Perspectives pour la libéralisation du secteur agricole

Is a More Globalized Church Bound To Be Less Universal?  
The 20th Century Internationalization of the Roman Curia.

Roman Curia’s progressive internationalization throughout the last century is an easily verifiable fact. Maybe even from Benedictus XV, for sure starting with Pius XII, the earlier Italian-controlled core executives of the Catholic Church have been increasingly employing staff from Europe and lately from the other parts of the world. Internationalization arose as much in the body of cardinals, which is attached with decisive duty regarding the succession of popes, as in major offices of Vatican departments. Some Italian dominance has been kept up only within apostolic nuntii, namely the diplomatic purview1. 

The question to be tackled is the following: does indeed internationalization of the Catholic Church’s top constitute a progress toward the universality she is inclined to? Otherwise does it entail her conversion into “a kind of United Nation Forum”2, where nearly every country must be represented? It has been appraised that such a modus operandi may lead, if it did not yet, to a lack of homogeneity in Vatican administration and to draw on “geopolitical” standard rather than effective skills or values. The Holy See is not a federation of local churches, unlikely the World Council of Churches (COE) and the Conference of European Churches (KEK), that are different bodies by their own very nature.

Another and more troubling issue has been underscored. The weakness of Italian nationality and the very circumstances of the national unification, which were characterized by a stout opposition against the Italian liberal state, allowed Italian hierarchy to hold out on stances that were not linked to their country’s interest. Instead, this was not clear-cut in connection with hierarchies from other countries, for example France and Austria-Hungary, as the veto at the 1904 conclave confirmed. In other words, a long-lasting tradition had assured to a “Roman” or an “Italian” a point of view that was maybe more universal than the one which was expressed by the mixture of different traditions. The paper is intended to verify this thesis through the analysis of some specific events during the course of the Church in the 20th century.

2 A.RICCARDI, Sant’Egidio, Roma e il mondo, interview with J.D. Durand and R. Ladous, San Paolo, Milan 1997, p. 184
Social Actors in History of International Relations: European Trade Unions from Internationalism to Global Society.

As in the second post-war period researches focusing on the economic dynamics’ role in the history of international relations were started, in the same way today it seems the time is ripe for the study of social dynamics. Renouvin’s mentions for the need of development is acknowledgements “pour étudier enfin les rapports possible entre l’appartenence à un groupe social et le comportement à l’égard des questions de politique extérieure” have been resumed.

Historiography begins to consider, in fact, the development not only of new political and economic institutions (how full of suggestions the business history is!), but also of the social actors aiming to assume an autonomous and aware role in international relations; referring in particular to European researches regarding complex collective actors such as the unions. In particular in the “young” history of the European post-war democratic Trade Union movement, it can be seen, in discontinuity with the former tradition, the progress towards greater emancipation of free and voluntary unionism from political parties, and the Trade Unions’ tendency to participate in a social economic order in non-corporative context.

Considering this record, one can retrace the whole path followed by the European trade union movement, from the earliest professional and unionist experiences of the international organisations, through the international diplomacy period, up to the deep-rooted transformations leading to the constitution of an international Trade Union confederation on the European level.

Already the researchers, who have studied the history of the 50’s, widening the horizon of subjects and of relationship to be studied in the Cold War period, have uncovered interventions of Trade Union movement that cannot be easily traced to the “Labour attaché”. The attentions of historiography observing the Trade Unions as social institutions (underlining with MacShane “their international links, policies, activities”) allow us to adequately appreciate both dynamic relations between the national Trade Unions and the international confederations, as the ICFTU, the CISC/CMT and the WFTU, and forms of their participation in organisations of intergovernmental or international co-operation. So, the study of the complex network of international relations within organised Labour, developed after 1950, sometimes originally, sometimes subordinately, more often interdependent from those of other actors, contributes to enrich the analysis of the international scenarios in contemporary history.

And it is here that the history of the international trade union movement inserts tout court in the history of international relations. In particular, in the context of the europeanisation process today the presence of different actors and social powers seems to ask, the meaning behind the process leading to economic and monetary union. The recent interest of studies on “dimension of the work”, connected to the inclusion of social policies in the Community agenda push us to read over again the steps of the European process related to the socio-economic actors’ dynamics and to their relation with the Commission and with the national governments, reopening the question of the weight the democratic deficit has on the same integration.

Besides, regarding European regional dynamics itself, and, at the same time, beyond it, the process begun in the ’50s is such to interfere with the perspective of a global society, in which the Trade Union movement tends towards a greater participation in the socio-economic order in which market development and social justice merge. In the final analysis, the formation of a new “trade Union Issue” seems to integrate with the same idea of citizenship and of democracy in the process of globalisation.
Globalisation, Regionalisation and the History of International Relations

Charles Cogan

Harvard University, Cambridge, USA

NATO, UE after the Cold War

Although by the logic of things, the end of the Cold War should have seen a return to peaceful institutions, and in particular the extension of the European Union to encompass the "common European house", to use the phrase of Mikhail Gorbachev, the opposite effect was produced: a military alliance (NATO), which was the West's defensive instrument during the Cold War, persisted in its existence and developed new roles outside the zone that was originally defined in the Washington Treaty of 1949 and which has never been amended per se. These roles include: peacekeeping; peace enforcement; crisis management, and outright military intervention for reasons related not to the common defence of Western Europe but to humanitarian ends (Bosnia, Kosovo). What is more, NATO came to be regarded, or regarded itself, as the instrument for the spread of democracy, moving its territorial domain to the east (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary).

Against all logic, the withering, or at the very least, the indefinite postponement of the European Union's avowed initial vocation of extending itself to all of Europe, on the one hand, the transformation of NATO's role to that of an expanding security community (an about face palpably reflected in the deliberations of the Clinton Administration itself) are events which should not be considered in isolation but rather in dialectical relationship to each other. The immensely complicated interaction between these two regional organizations that have only recently begun speaking to one another as institutions needs to be the subject of greater illumination, in order to assist in an understanding of the unforeseen events of the last decade - the first decade of the post-Cold War era. This decade has seen the former bipolar system of confrontation between two superpowers evolve into a new system, which Thomas L. Friedman, in a recent, widely commented book, has dubbed "globalization."

In seeking to illuminate this NATO-EU dialectic, this paper will present as a framework for analysis two templates, side by side, consisting mainly of decisions taken at the biennial European Council and NATO Council meetings. An analysis along such a time-line, to include also external factors and events, will be intended to demonstrate how the reluctance of certain powers, chiefly Great Britain and France, to extend the European Union to the Visegrad powers led ineluctably to an intensive look at NATO enlargement, which would have seemed quite improbable at the start of the 1990's. This look was also given impetus by the successive wars in Yugoslavia that broke out at the beginning of the decade and which demonstrated over time the impotence of the UN on the one hand and the potential effectiveness of NATO as an instrument of regional coercion on the other.

The events of 1989 in central and Eastern Europe left the principal western European allies, Britain and France, not only unprepared for, but wary of, a change in the status quo. With memories of the two World Wars still ingrained in the collective conscience, neither country was ready to accept with equanimity a reunified and resurgent Germany. As the Cold War was ending and the Soviet Union breaking up, anchoring Germany to the West retained the primordial importance it bad enjoyed since 1945. In this manner, deepening the European Union rather than enlarging it became the priority, culminating in the Treaty of Maastricht at the end of 1991 and the march toward the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Though the Euro, as it came to be known, predated in its conception the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was only at the end of 1989, in the European Council at Strasbourg, that the EMU process became engaged.

President Mitterrand's call on 31 December 1989 for a confederation of Europe, and the abortive Prague conference of 1991 to concretized the idea, came to be regarded by the former countries of the Soviet Bloc as a poor substitute for EU enlargement. It was additionally unacceptable to them because it excluded the USA and included the USSR. As these countries saw the prospect of their being denied entry into the European space (Mitterrand had said that it might take "decades and decades," and that the confederation could serve as a bridge during this indeterminate interim period), they began pressing for entry into NATO. They became more insistent as Russian public opinion turned away from
liberalism, as was evident in the Duma elections of late 1995 in which Communists and nationalists won a large majority of seats.

At first the Clinton Administration was reluctant to endorse NATO enlargement, in part, no doubt, because the USA and its principal allies had made a gentleman’s agreement with Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze, at the time it was agreed that Germany could be reunited and remain within NATO, that NATO would not be extended to the East.

France, which had long considered itself the "keeper of the temple" of the EU, both as the instrument of a strategy of peace in Europe and as a means of keeping a leading voice in European affairs, had through the Maastricht process managed to anchor Germany into the EMU. It had further managed to temper Germany’s ardour for an expansion of the EU into central Europe.

France also regarded itself as the conscience of a Europe desirous of not being overwhelmed by the United States’ economic and military superiority. In this respect, Mitterand's opposition to the declaration of the June 1990 NATO summit at London, which sanctioned the use of NATO forces for out-of-area operations, was seen as a means of keeping the USA "on the reservation". However, the wars that broke out in the disintegrating Yugoslav federation made moot the issue of NATO involvement in interventions outside its defensive zone. Moreover, the attempted rapprochement of France with NATO in 1994-1995, initiated as a means of lessening France’s strategic isolation evident in the Gulf and Yugoslav wars, and which never came fully to fruition, was an additional reason for France not objecting to an expanded role for NATO.

As the decade of the 1990’s drew to a close, these two tendencies, that is, economic and monetary union in Western Europe, and a security community expanded into central Europe, came to fulfillment with the entry in force of the Euro on 1 January 1999 for a three-year transitional period, and the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO three months later, in March 1999.

As seen above, it was only partly because of the unrest in South-eastern Europe that the enlargement of NATO was given precedence over the enlargement of the EU, a development that had been hardly envisaged at the end of the Cold War. The enormous problems that NATO enlargement has caused in the West’s relations with Russia, and the new tensions that have arisen in NATO-Russian relations as a result of the Kosovo war, have given rise to a renewed impulsion in favour of EU enlargement, as a more benign way of uniting western and eastern Europe, and as an insurance policy against further unrest developing in the eastern European region. As a group of European intellectuals stated in a declaration in early August 1999, "The war in Kosovo should compel the European Union to rethink its future. [It should] redirect an institution that is introverted and wrapped up in its economic program towards a pan-European political plan... Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the vision of a reunified Europe seems to have disappeared."

At the same time, the Kosovo war has intensified the debate within the major countries of Western Europe, over their own military inadequacy, a debate that began to come into focus with the Anglo-French declaration of December 1998 at St. Malo, calling for greater European autonomy in defence matters, and to which the Germans later subscribed. As Stanley Hoffmann has put it, "Europe must not remain an economic Giant and a diplomatic and military dwarf, in the long run, its weakness in the latter domains will sap its force in other".

The paper will close with a consideration of the future prospects for the organization of the European space; and the relation of this European space to Russia, and most importantly to the USA.
Globalisation and the Crisis of International Society. Martin Wight and Carl Schmitt’s Reflections on the Cultural and Institutional Dimensions of International Relations

My paper will focus on Martin Wight’s and Carl Schmitt’s reflections on the expansion and crisis of international society – namely, about the challenge which they perceived in its globalisation.

The examination of so different a pair of authors may be surprising. In fact, the differences between them are much more apparent than their similarities: partially because of their cultural educations, partially because of their personal and political attitudes and, eventually, because of the lack of personal and scientific contacts between them as well as between their academic communities.

Nevertheless, in spite of their striking differences, Martin Wight and Carl Schmitt share almost four important peculiarities: a marginal position in respect to the mainstream of International Relations theory – outside Great Britain, as to Martin Wight, everywhere, as to Carl Schmitt; a common European perspective, different from the American one, and centred on two historical processes almost ignored in International Relations as an “American Science”, namely the end of European centrality and the recurrence of international civil wars; an ambivalent approach towards political realism or, more precisely, towards the kind of political realism which has dominated International Relations since World War II; above all, the awareness of the political and juridical crisis which the international society had been experiencing between the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century.

This relationship between globalization and crisis will be the topic of my paper. Martin Wight’s and Carl Schmitt’s reflections deserve consideration for almost three reasons. The first regards their temporal and spatial point of view. Instead of looking at globalisation as a very recent process, and a process which makes space indifferent, both of them take a larger historical perspective and focus on the relationship between Europe and the World.

The second aspect rests on their “realist” perspective. In fact, instead of considering the economic dimension of globalisation, both Wight and Schmitt stress its political dimension, according to their usual approach to international relations. Therefore, globalisation is viewed as the process through which the pre-global international systems have given way to a global one, missing the former division between Europe and the Rest.

The last issue regards the relationship between this political globalisation and the states-system as such – on the one hand, because of the European matrix of Martin Wight’s international society and Carl Schmitt’s *jus publicum europaeum*; on the other hand, because of the incompatibility that both Wight and Schmitt seem to recognize between the cosmopolitan ideal and the existence of any states-system.
About the Mystery and Misery of Regional Integration in Africa

Two trends are currently characterising international economic relations. On the one hand, there are processes of globalization, that is, an increasing integration of relatively free factor markets by international trade, financial, information and culture flows. On the other hand, we can observe, within the broader tendency of world-wide trade liberalization, a renewed interest in economic regionalism and the formation of trade blocs.

The African continent is largely by-passed by the first trend. Although generally forced to adopt more liberal trade regimes by structural adjustment policies, Africa was largely excluded from the dynamism of recent globalization and thus it is confronted by an even more dramatic marginalization in world trade. However, it seems that Africa is fully participating in the second trend in world economies, that is in regionalization. Observers point to what they identify as a “new regionalism” in Africa since the mid-1980s, a type of economic regionalism which is meant to differ substantially from its predecessors. In contrast to economic integration schemes of the 1960s, which were linked to import-substitution strategies of industrialization and, thus, inward-looking and highly market-protecting, the “new regionalism” would happen in an economic environment of trade liberalization and would make part of a set of outward-looking policies. But in contrast to more optimistic assessments which appeared in academic literature especially in the first half of the 1990s, it will be argued in this paper that this new phase of regional integration, like its predecessors, is doomed to failure. Indeed, it will be shown that more recently the question of economic integration in the two major groupings (ECOWAS and SADC) has been relegated to insignificance in the face of an intensified struggle for political (and military) subregional hegemony.

This paper, like many others before, aims at explaining this dramatic failure, and, to put it more modestly, to adding some elements to the common debate on the huge gap between policy declarations and realities of African integration. In contrast to contributions made by many economists, who have a major influence in this debate, this paper will not focus on the contrast between economic integration theory (which is, in our opinion, not really conclusive in the case of African countries) and African reality, that is, assessing the potential for integration, but on the political processes evolving the attempts of regional integration in a historical perspective. The paper will discuss the five phases of the fate of the idea of integration in Africa, that is: a) the colonial phase (SACU, East Africa, Central African Federation); b) the defeat of the idea of pan-africanist union during decolonization; c) the phase of "development regionalism" of the 1960s and 1970s; d) the "new regionalism" since the mid-1980s and e) the more recent trends towards a politization and militarization of integration schemes (optimists would call this the rise of African security regimes). The discussion of these historical and more recent experiences of regional integration in Africa will be influenced by Jackson’s and Rosberg’s ideas of juridical statehood, negative sovereignty, and international legitimacy, which Clapham successfully applied to the study of international relations in Africa. It will be argued that the notion of regional integration makes on the one hand renewed part of a developmentalist discourse, largely surrealistic and fictious, but necessary in the search for international legitimacy and influencing the flow of resources from the West to African States. This explains, in part, the widespread empty rhetoric in favour of regional integration. On the other hand, regional integration displays a very uneasy, if not contradictory, relationship to the patrimonial charter of political rule in Africa, leading to a thorough lack of enthusiasm in its implementation by the political elites.
Globalisation, Regionalisation and the Cost of Secession

Secession of localized, cultural-linguistic communities is commonly regarded (Mayal, 1998) as one possible result of the impact of globalization and regionalization on the nation-state. Globalization has reduced the barriers to trade and investment world-wide, thus allowing, according to this view, the small, secessionist entity to participate in all the benefits of commerce and economic efficiency enjoyed by the larger state of which it was earlier a part. Regionalism also is thought to contribute to secession by weakening the bonds of the state through open appeals to supranationalism (European Union) or by providing alternate frameworks for economic and social interaction (North American Free Trade Association) that cut across policies and institutions. Indeed some would argue that the purpose of regional integration, if not to weaken the bonds within the nation-state (starting perhaps with localized communities), is at least to decentralize power, so as to transfer sovereignty from the state to the supranational level.

Landes (1998), for example, asks whether globalization has put an end to “nationalist striving” and concludes that it has not. Secession is thus often believed to be a natural political outgrowth of the forces of globalization and regionalization operating together on a besieged nation-state no longer capable of offering a monopoly of benefits and services to a previously subordinate cultural-linguistic community.

Barro (1996), an economist, claims that there is no evidence that economic growth and the size of states measured in terms of GDP are correlated. Were this to be true, it would be an open door to secession, for the cost of governance is often large in the liberal state characterized by democratic pluralism, and if the cost of separation economically were nil, secession could become a wholesale obsession in many polities worldwide.

But how valid is this depiction of the impact of globalization and regionalization on local cultural-linguistic communities internal to the nation-state? Regardless of the claims some social scientists may offer to assure secessionist actors that political separation is economically costless, and regardless of what the leaders of secessionist movements may believe and promote, will globalization and regionalization guarantee the same level of growth and prosperity after separation as before? Conversely, will secession carry an economic and perhaps political burden, not just for the state from which the entity has recently separated, and not just for the international system that must now manage increasingly complicated external conflict relations (e.g. irredentism) involving diverse and more numerous independent governments, but perhaps most tellingly for the secessionist entity itself?

This paper first will articulate the theoretical reasons for believing that globalization and regionalization will be unable to provide certain advantages to the small, secessionist entity (or perhaps likewise to the corresponding state remnant) previously provided through the umbrella of association with the original state. What is the causal reasoning that justifies this conclusion about the superiority of some forms of association and geographical contiguity within the original state? How does such reasoning square with the mountain of theory and evidence about the merits of regional integration and its economic contributions that would seem to promote secession? For example, if regional integration provides economies of scale to the member states, then why would small states not be able to do as well as large states inside the bigger market of the regional grouping? Following a careful examination of these questions, the paper will turn to the essence of the thesis argument.

Notwithstanding possible involvement in various frameworks for regional integration, the small secessionist actor will pay a high trade and commercial price for separation, according to this paper, in terms of per capita income growth rate foregone. Why this conclusion is possible, and why the forces of globalization and regionalization fail to justify secession is a large and important discussion. Why the assumptions of the integration theorists and why the growth experience in the late twentieth century
actually justify state unity as far as the potentially secessionist actor is concerned is a carefully argued element of the paper.

The paper will next show that a size/growth threshold exists such that secessionist actors with a population of less than about 20 million inhabitants will forego an enhanced economic growth rate that otherwise would have been available to it inside the larger nation-state had it remained affiliated.

Empirically tested and buttressed in the paper, the argument about high economic costs associated with political separation will focus upon the reality that the degree of integration inside the nation-state is key for all communities within that state. Despite economies of scale available before and after secession, this high degree of integration inside the nation-state is not likely to be equalled by the lower degree of integration offered by economic union, common markets, or trade areas at least for a very long time. This conclusion is true even under the assumption that the secessionist entity is welcomed into the larger regional framework as a full-fledged partner.

By becoming a sovereign state within the European Union, Scotland will not be able to supplant all of the benefits of more intense union with the United Kingdom. By opting for separation as an independent member of the EU, Catalonia will not be able to replace the advantages of primary association with the rest of Spain. Even were it to become an official member of NAFTA, Quebec would forego substantial per capita income growth by separating from Canada.

History enters the analysis in a very interesting way. In Hobsbawm’s (1990) conceptualization of secession, the causal question is approached from the historicist perspective. He contrasts prior nationalisms with what he calls “divisive nationalism” today. Is divisive nationalism as he implies itself a product of the structural relations, cultural identities, social make-up, and political institutions of the early twenty-first century? Is secession a contemporary problem in contrast to past systems, because virtually the entire system is composed of states today, thus equating state division? Can new states today only emerge by breaking old states of the past?

History enters this theoretical analysis in another interesting way. The history of state economic development must be “controlled for” for the principal analysis and thesis argument of this paper to be made meaningful and viable. In other words, states cannot be compared to each other effectively when they are located in different historical stages of development. This is so because economic and political development itself is an historical process that interferes analytically with the attempt to look at the effect of secession on mature industrial democracies, especially on per capita income growth rates. Likewise the causes of secession are historical in nature and must be treated in the correct dynamic. Hence the problem of secession among advanced industrial democracies is itself a peculiar phenomenon that requires conscious assessment of what role history plays in the developmental experience.

Simplifying the argument somewhat, the task is to examine states all of which have attained a certain level of per capita income such that, regardless of when they may have achieved this level of development historically, they today can be regarded as mature industrial democracies. Yet the extraordinary reality is that though developed as they are, in both the economic and Wilsonian (Tocquevillean) senses, they are found to be by no means free of what Kissinger (1994) terms “the diffusion of power,” both at the sub-state and international systemic levels, such that the break-up of the nation state becomes a potential new source of disorder in world politics.

While regionalism through such entities as the European Union may soften the negative impact of secession on the coherence of world politics, simultaneous shocks to the integrity of the nation-state world wide cannot but be upsetting to world order. Countries in the Third World such as Indonesia and India are by implication more vulnerable. The prospect is even more troublesome when the secessionist entity discovers that its economic assumptions of a privileged rate of economic growth are likely to be proved incorrect.


Globalization, Regionalization, and Other Conceptions of Political Space: Past, Present, and Future

A central issue in the study of the contemporary world by both social science theorists and historians is the matter of assessing change, that is, the degree to which the present resembles the past or is so different as to constitute a difference in kind. This problem underlies some of the current debates regarding globalization, regionalization, world cities, and the sovereign state. For example, several leading analysts of globalization argue that, in many respects, the world today is actually less “integrated” economically than it was in the late nineteenth century heyday of the European state system and empires, that the speed of communication has hardly improved since the telegraph was invented, that the enlightenment had a cultural vision of “one world” and “the rights of man” at least as universal as any contemporary vision, and so on. Other analysts insist that civilizations or regions have always been the main actors on the global stage and remain so today, whether one speaks broadly of “the clash of civilizations” or more specifically about the European Union or “the Asian model”. Still others attempt to counter “decline of the state” arguments with assertions about the primacy of the use of armed force by states from past to present or an insistence that little has changed because both states and sovereignty have been highly varied in practice since Westphalia.

Proponents of different positions in debates such as these frequently are talking essentially past one another. Is the world more “globalized” today than ever before? It depends substantially upon one’s definition of “globalization”: Are we focusing upon political, economic, cultural, and/or environmental integration? If economic, do we refer to the relative intensity of countries’ “external” versus “internal” GDP with regard to trade in particular goods, services, investment and/or the organization and/or behaviour and/or location of firms and markets? What, indeed, do we mean by “civilization” or “region”? For instance, is Latin America a region? Many would insist that is really a collection of ill-defined subregions defined as much or more by political and economic relationships than geography (e.g., Mercosur, the Central American Common Market, the Andean region, CARICOM). But the “Western Hemisphere” as embodied in the Monroe Doctrine has played a prominent part in Latin American history, or perhaps equally or more important has been an Atlantic Triangle. In more recent times, of course, there are additional institutional ties such as the OAS and NAFTA, not to mention Latin America’s increasing integration in a global economy or the isolation of Cuba. Similarly, is there an “Asian model” of development that is equally applicable for Japan and China, Korea and Taiwan, and countries like Indonesia and Singapore? Finally, as our discussion above implied, whether we view the state today as more or less viable depends significantly on how “the state” is to be defined and what states we are considering. Many social scientists are increasingly inclined to treat “nation” separately from “state”, and many also hold that “states” existed long before Westphalia and the modern concept of sovereignty. For that matter, what exactly does the concept of “sovereignty” involve: absolute authority, control of selected domains, or simply a claim or claims to authority?

Given fundamental conceptual problems like these as well as the perception by many analysts that the sheer pace of events has continued to accelerate in recent years, this paper suggests that it is useful for those who are interested in global politics to think of the world as “political space”. Doing so invites us to re-map the world with few preconceptions, to break away from the traditional view of a world of sovereign states engaged in international relations, or at least to put that traditional map in perspective. We need to re-think the relationship between politics and territory, including the extent to which patterns of governance and the forces that shape politics actually transcend territory. Whether our concern is the past or the present or both, we should ask in as open-minded a fashion as possible: who or what controls or influences actual value outcomes (the distribution of values)--and why?

Were we to re-map the political map of the world today, what sorts of things would it need to show? Certainly the legal boundaries of states, but also those within states (e.g., states/provinces in federal regimes, cities), as well as various entities/actors that exist across state boundaries like global
international organizations (UN, IMF, World Bank), regional IOs such the European Union (and “regions” within the EU) and NAFTA, international nongovernmental actors like Amnesty International, transnational firms and banks (a few of which are headquartered “offshore”), and criminal networks. Each of these actors has a territorial “reach” of sorts, although what is possibly the most significant feature of them is that they overlap and layer without any clear hierarchy. In a sense, their relative significance shifts depending on the political issue involved, and so does the degree of anarchy order, that is, coexistence, cooperation, and conflict that prevails.

The world also looks somewhat different if one’s attention is focused on transactions rather than actors. If we were to trace transactions, their density would obviously vary depending upon what sorts we were looking for: currency markets, trade in cocaine, jet fighter sales, tourism, and so on. No less significant are subjective boundaries and frontiers: there are mental maps as well as other kinds. With whom or what do persons identify? Where do loyalties lie? And, always we must ask, why? Religions have their faithful, feminists are often concerned with women around the world, Russians with Slavs, Kurds perhaps with the vision of an independent Kurdistan, and so on.

Thought of in these ways, the world map becomes increasingly complex and, I argue, much more accurate than the familiar one of neat sovereign-state boxes. It also helps to place the contemporary discussions about globalization and regionalization in context. In the “polities” approach to global politics advanced by Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, similar to James Rosenau’s “postinternationalism”, globalization and regionalism are both exceedingly powerful processes, and they are related, as well, to fragmentation. Ferguson/ Mansbach stress the extent to which these processes have existed since ancient times. In their view, political space has always been inhabited by a variety of polities/authorities that layer, overlap, interact, and nest. Many types of polities like empires, regional polities (kingdoms), cities, artificial kinship groups like tribes or ethnic nations, firms, and families have persisted (as types) across the centuries, while the sovereign state assumed center stage only in a relatively brief “Westphalian” era in Europe. The complexity of present-day global politics perhaps resembles most of human history more than it does the state-centric period. Yet, Ferguson/ Mansbach also agree with Rosenau that global politics today is in some important respects unprecedented.
The Globalization Process from South to East Asia and Japan's Adhesion to the Colombo Plan in 1954

In September 1954 Japan adhered as a full member to the Colombo Plan at the Ottawa Conference of the British Commonwealth, the first one to be held in the Canadian capital. The recently published 19th volume in the series of the Canadian published diplomatic documents (Documents on Canadian External Relations), has included some material on the Canadian Government's standing in that occasion, which had not taken a clear cut position before and, given the place of the conference, could exert much importance on the ultimate outcome of the issue.

In addition to the above sources, the papers released few years ago at the Archive of the Japanese Foreign Ministry in Tokyo are shedding light as well on the connection between the decision of the Ottawa conference and the trip in the same months of the Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to Europe and North America, which led to the unsuccessful Marshall Plan for the Far East.

The Canadian papers make us able to link Japan's joining in GATT and Colombo Plan from the viewpoint of Canadian diplomacy in the frame of the latter's similarities and differences in respect to other Commonwealth countries, specially Australia, who played a central role in both cases.

Moreover the most interesting feature of that episode looks comparing the attitude of Canada and Britain, the country with which Yoshida had been dreaming of the old alliance terminated in 1922. I have tried to reconstruct the British position by making use of the documents kept at the Public Record Office in Kew and the outcoming picture has been that although both countries showed ready to accept Japan in the Colombo Plan with the same formula, motivations were basically different.

Even if like Britain, the Canadians demanded that Japan's adhesion be sponsored by an Asian country, they were not focusing attention on the possible danger of Japanese commercial competition (a problem inconsistent with them) or the fear of resurrection of Japanese prewar imperialism. The political care to keep Tokyo in the western camp, pending the Cold War and the need to face the menace of communist propaganda in the archipelago looks as if it were of minor importance as well. Less and less was Canada worried with the impact of Japan's economic rebirth on the sterling area, as shown indirectly by their benevolent attitude on the matter of GATT.

They had been realizing instead that if Japan were to enter the Colombo Plan the area covered by the latter would be enlarged from South to East Asia, by making possible the chance that both Chinese Governments of Beijing and Taiwan may apply in the same way as Tokyo. If that should happen however, all countries adhering to the Plan, specially the Asian ones, could be involved in a decision on the problem of formally recognizing one of the two Chinese regimes. A further consequence could be that the full structure of mutual collaboration created through the Plan could be imperilled.

Broadly speaking the above consideration made the Canadian attitude on this issue, with details to be discussed in the paper, by far more cautious and less pro-Japanese than in the case of GATT.

This is not however the most important side of our talk. The full episode seems to show in fact that the general framework created through the Cold War, the results of the Civil War in China, Japan's entry in the international community of the states and more broadly speaking, the relevance of international economic cooperation in Asia and in the Pacific after the Pacific War, were giving shape to a broad and interconnected area where traditional distinctions between the Indian subcontinent and the Far East as two well distinguished geopolitical spheres were fading, thus strongly enhancing the world scale trend for globalization, typical of the 1950s.
Globalization Versus Regionalization

After a certain period in which social description abjured material contextualization, that is to say, the necessary “geographization” of the social facts, we are taking part in an offensive toward desired cognitive-interpretive innovation, which involves an abusive use of the geographic phraseology.

Globalization is a sort of megac CONTEXT, a great background, indispensable for the understanding of any event which finds, in this way, a new meaning. However, globalization is supposed to be a declared impulse to the maximum reduction in distances, that sets with this, an uncontrollable tendency towards the dissolution of differences, which are an inevitable result of the tangible presence of the first ones.

In other terms, “globalization”, as a phenomenon, might possibly mean not taking into account the construction of reality as concrete, but in the abstract.

As a result, geographization ends up being the opposite, a denial of geography, which is understood as the concrete instance of the development of reality.

As far as the realm of uniformity is concerned, the appearance of the so-called Regionalization Phenomenon is particularly interesting, which would just be another consequence of globalization.

A priori this event, which seems to preside the evolution in the last decades and usually represents the tendency towards the conformation of the common trade, implies a certain relativization of the absolute preeminence of globalizing uniformity. However, even more than this, the regional phenomenon is an exceptional bludgeon with a view to criticizing ideological representations which constitute a new and dominant paradigm of the analysis of reality, namely globalization.
Between Decolonization and Globalization: 
The Catholic Church and the 20th Century Missions

The evolution of the Catholic Church's missionary strategy throughout the 20th Century seems to be of great interest in the purview of the "Churches and Globalization" issue. It is a long-term evolution, whose harbingers began to arise with Leo X yet, after the Berlin Congress, and more explicitly with Benedictus XV in the aftermath of World War I (Maximum illud in 1919, Rerum ecclesiae in 1926). In the context of the "approaching" among traditionally very far areas of the world, which European initiative was favouring most of all at the same time when European world hegemony was declining, the Catholic Church assumed growing leanings to "upgrade" non-European cultures.

Drawing on quite an ancient trend -yet established in the well-known "Istruzione" of Propaganda Fide in 1659- throughout the 20th century the Catholic Church increasingly moved away from European colonialism, first of all by favouring the development of local churches with their own hierarchy and clergy, than by upholding the independence's process of many former colonial countries (Evangelii praecones, 1952). This trend found its zenith in Council Vatican II, when the concept of evangelization of cultures took over that of "implantatio ecclesiae" (Evangelii nuntiandi by Paulus VI, 1975).

The spell after the Council conveyed a new stage in international relations where the "upgrade" leanings were not compelled to be forsaken rather to be integrated with other perspectives. Either growing world inter-dependence or migration processes have been bent on sapping the land-people-culture link almost everywhere. On the same land different peoples and cultures live together, meanwhile improvements of the means of communication have been making distances ever-less meaningful: the whole of this has changed at the roots the ways by which multiethnic living together and different national identities show themselves, as well as the relationship with the other and the dialogue with the unlike. In this context, even the Church is re-assessing her attitudes with respect to an ever-more globalized world.
Three main events have influenced the Italian economy over the recent years.

1. With year 1999, eleven European countries have adopted a common accounting monetary unit, the so-called Euro, and have decided to adopt it as a regular means of payment in year 2001. While the advanced countries of Western Europe tend to unify their monetary system, an increasing fragmentation prevails in the countries of Eastern Europe formerly belonging to the Soviet bloc. At present, some 28 different official currencies can be counted in Eastern Europe, where in the past only three main currencies prevailed, the Soviet rouble, the Czech crown and the Yugoslav dinar. The monetary fragmentation is only reduced by the fact that some countries have imposed a fixed exchange rate between the German mark and the national currency.

2. The Italian economy is not only increasingly integrated in the Western European context, but also strongly influenced by the so-called globalisation of the world economy. Two factors, the one mainly technical in nature, the other one clearly belonging to the sphere of economic policy (if not of sheer politics) work in this direction. The first factor acting for the globalisation of the world economy is the enormous progress in transportation and communication, a progress that has produced tremendous cost reductions. It is now possible and often convenient to locate the various phases of production in widely distant countries and then proceed to assembling and marketing the finished product. The second factor, mainly a political one, has been the decision, fully enacted for the last ten years, to allow free movements of financial capital all over the world. The two factors go hand in hand. Not only speculators, but big international concerns as well, the activity of which is scattered all over the world, need to move freely their financial capitals in order to be able to fully co-ordinate their industrial and commercial activities.

3. Finally, the Italian economy has resented the consequences of the international conflict emerged over the last ten years concerning the exploitation of the oil fields of the Caspian Sea. The controversy concerns mainly the route along which the oil and gas pipelines will be constructed, the substance of the divergence being whether the oil and gas supplies will be controlled by Russia or by Turkey (and through it by the Western countries). The Kosovo war, fought in the spring of 1999 and in which Italy was directly involved, is strictly connected to the controversy over the Caspian oil and to the possibility of bringing the oil supplies directly to the Adriatic coast.

Problems of the Italian Economy

The Italian economy has been confronted with two main problems. The highly controversial decision taken by Italian Government to enter the European Monetary Union at the first round and at any cost, has imposed a policy of severe austerity in terms of a reduction in Government expenditure coupled with an equally severe increase in taxation. At the same time, Italian industry has felt the consequences of increased competition and has been induced to acquire a higher competitiveness mainly by reducing the cost of labour.

The lines of industrial policy enacted by the Italian Governments have pointed to three main structural changes:

a) A reduction in the weight of big industry to make room to an increasing sector of small and medium-size firms. A similar line was inaugurated long ago, when in the late sixties and early seventies the first strong labour movements made themselves felt. But over the last years the same line was brought to its extreme consequences and has produced a further decline in the ability of Italian industry to produce technical innovations.
In some regions, the proliferation of medium-size firms has give rise to agglomerations reminding the Marshallian industrial district. Authoritative authors have described such districts as examples of economic competitiveness and social democracy. Doubts have been raised on a similar optimistic interpretation. The fact remains that the decline in the presence of large-size firms has consistently reduced the ability of Italian industry to perform research and to operate in an advanced line of technology.

b) The rationale for reducing the presence of State-owned firms has been twofold:

i) the first aim is of reducing the amount of Government debt (the rule is that any revenue coming from sales of State-owned firms cannot be spent otherwise and will be devoted to the reduction of the stock of debt);

ii) A second aim is of increasing the efficiency in management. It is in fact a widespread opinion that State-owned firms are bound to be managed regardless of any requirement of competitiveness and efficiency and often in the interest of single political parties. Well-founded as this diagnosis may have been in the past, it is of course debatable whether it would be more reasonable to reform State-owned industry rather than dismantling it altogether.

c) The presence of foreign capital in a number of industrial branches has been read as a proof of the confidence placed by foreign investors in the fundamental solidity of the Italian economy. In many cases however, it would be hard to deny that foreign capital has shown an interest in Italian firms just for the sake of entering the local market or of eliminating a competitor. As a proof is that while the marketing network has been preserved, many plants acquired by foreign firms have been closed.

Concluding remarks

The result of the whole set of measures just described has been a consistent weakening of the Italian industrial structure, both as a source of technologically advanced products as for its capacity of creating employment. Since the line of financial austerity has produced, among other things, the interruption of any policy tending to eliminate regional disparities, a further result is an increase in disparities between the North and the South of the country. Regional disparities had been consistently reduced in the seventies and early eighties. They are now increasing again.

In spite of such discouraging results, the leading circles insist on supporting the virtues of an uncontrolled free market system and on condemning any kind of Government intervention as a source of distortion in the use of productive resources.
Globalism and Regionalism in East-Central Europe: 
Nationality Problem and Regional Cooperation under the EU 
and NATO Enlargement

After the break up of the Socialist System in East Central Europe, the Nation State rebuilding began to start as well as the economic marketization and privatization, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU and NATO’s eastern enlargement also began under the globalization of the world.

Historically East European countries were put under the hinterland of the western european industrialization and modernization since the end of 18th century. According to the nurture of the Nationality awareness, the movements of regional autonomy and regional federalism began to grow like Danubian Federation and Balkan Federation after the 1848 revolution in Habsburg’s lands.

After the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1918, however, during the era between wars and through the Socialist System, Regions couldn’t play their own roles or tasks because of the strong centralization and the serious restriction on borders.

After the collapse of the Socialist System and the opening of the borders which was oppressed by Soviets Army, the importance of regions and the mutual communication between borders began to activate again. These structures existed originally and historically in these Regions, so the spontaneous communications began after the opening of borders. The PHARE programs and Euroregion development by the EU aid supported these historical and original communications and associations between borders. These are preparing the regional cooperation and communication between borders after the joining the EU.

But the problems are the followings.

The first problem is the nationality questions of the regional minorities in these area: especially Hungarian minorities in Romanian Transylvania, Yugoslavian Vojvodina, Slovakia, and Carpathian Ukraine. They were strengthened or changed by the NATO Kosovo bombing. The author investigates and compares with the nationality problems of Hungarian minorities in Romanian Transylvania and Vojvodina.

The second problem is how can they solve the increasing of the emigration and depopulation of the minority regions by opening of borders, due to reasons of economic factors (many young peoples or brain workers go out from regions to towns or to Western countries). The attraction of enterprises, the foreign capital investments, and reorganization of the educational system might solve the depopulated areas problems, revitalize the minorities regions, and develop the minorities’ language and education.
The Presence of Global Capital in Australia and the Debate over National Identity

The evolution of Australia from being a constituent part of the British empire to being an independent power within the geopolitical constellation of the Pacific basin has been the focal point of an oscillating national debate during the past few decades.

The sudden arrival of large volumes of Japanese investment capital during the 1980s boom became the flashpoint of this debate. For if, on the one hand, Japan had become the economic superpower of the region of which Australian increasingly felt it had to be part, on the other, Japan was also the most potent symbol of national insecurity in Australia's recent past. In essence this debate became one about Australia's national identity in the late 20th century.

It crystallised most sharply in the Gold Coast, a rapidly growing tourist centre on the north-east coast of the continent. (The Gold Coast had attracted about 40 per cent of all Japanese capital flowing into Australian land and property.) Local supporters of an unfettered flow of Japanese capital articulated a concept of Australian identity that saw the country being gradually integrated into the Asian region through capital flows such as that from Japan.

On the other hand, individuals and groups on the Gold Coast had another image of Australia: their vision of Australia saw globalisation as a diminution of national power, a facilitator of national division and an integrative force that would submerge Australia into a region of very different cultures.

The debate articulated two contradictory visions: one welcoming globalisation as a force for the liberalisation of Australia and its increasing integration into the region; the other seeing it as a threat to national integrity, if not identity, and a betrayal of its national traditions.
Globalization and Regionalization in the Baltic States and Finland in the 1920’s and 1930’s.

Globalization was a distant dream for the new states on the Eastern shore of the Baltic Sea. The foreign policy perspectives were rather limited. Small reminiscence of a globalization is probably to be seen in the sluggishness of the Baltic nations to separate themselves from Russia. The new states were also eager to get identified with the policy of the Great Powers, Finland and Lithuania with Germany first, then with the victorious Western Powers, Estonia only with the Entente. The League of Nations was also a somewhat distant organisation. It suited to the idealistic outlook of the small countries, but only Finland really oriented towards it at the end of the 1920’s.

So regionalization was the main issue in the policy of the Baltic States and Finland. Above all the Baltic Nations felt to be small. There were no traditions of independence in the region, and the former landlord country, Russia, even if momentarily weak, had not voluntarily abandoned the Baltic States and was expected to grow mighty again. Germany was another threat because of her closeness and traditional interests in the area. In this situation the Baltic nations strove after a common alliance in the area. Finland was interested in these endeavours, too. Actually the Finnish government had two options in the Summer 1919, the orientation towards Scandinavia or towards the Baltic States. Territorial disputes and different outlook of the necessities of the foreign policy prevented, however, the Scandinavian option. Only the orientation towards the Baltic States was left.

The negotiations for a closer cooperation started between the most pressed governments, the Lithuanian and Latvian. They decided to ask the Estonians and the Finns to join the common defence scheme. During the Autumn 1919 there were held altogether six conferences in the common defence and peace issues. Alliance negotiations were continued in three larger conferences, in Helsinki in January 1920, Riga, August-September 1920 and Warsaw, in March 1922. Poland took part in these conferences, too.

There were negotiated several draft treaties between Finland, the Baltic States and Poland. All were repudiated by the Finish Government or Finish Parliament, one draft treaty also by the Latvian government. The Finnish government and, in the last resort, Finnish Parliament, was avoiding binding commitments with the Baltic States and above all with Poland. The reason was also in this case the different understanding of the demands of the foreign policy situation. Nevertheless, Finland was interested in the cooperation with the Baltic States and Poland. The conferences settled also different kinds of practical and everyday problems between the states. So Finland took part in the Baltic conferences up to their end in 1926. From the various alliance schemes- despite the obvious necessity- was realised the smallest possible one, the defence treaty between Estonia and Latvia in November 1923.

So even the regionalization was a problematic issue between the Baltic States and Finland. The Baltic nations had different ethnic and cultural roots, and there were plenty of frontier and other disputes. Most severe was the Polish-Lithuanian controversy over Vilna, but there were frontier disputes between Estonia and Latvia and Latvia and Lithuania, too. Very revealing was the fact that the presidents of Finland and Estonia made several state and unofficial visits between themselves, but Estonian Head of state never visited Latvia or Lithuania.

In the 1930’s Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania tried to foster their cooperation with a new alliance treaty, so called Baltic Entente. It held several meetings of the foreign ministers, but in the crisis years 1938-1939 it failed completely to build a joint front of Baltic States.

This essay intends to clarify some conflictive socio-political and socio-cultural phenomena, within the current phase of capitalism, which take place in different geographical scenes, although they have similar identity problems in their origins. The aim is to analyze the historical, cultural and political conditions in two conflicts at the end of the century whose scenarios are India and Yugoslavia: this is the case of Kosovo and Kashmir.

Both situations are within the frame of complex historical contexts and nationalist or ultranationalist arguments which are distinguished by ethnic, linguistic and religious elements and woven in the case of Kosovo with old forms of "communalism", in a context which bristles with political violence and intolerant reactions. In another dimension, in the selected places, it is observed a territorial fragmentation in a two-way direction: on the one hand, the international political definition resulting from the post-war negotiations and on the other hand, the emergence of "localism" as political expression and reaffirmation of profound historical-cultural identities.

At the end of the century and millennium, we do observe a global tendency of the economy that moves toward the fulfillment of the utopia of a market at a worldwide scale. The Balkan suffered the consequences of a rapid change from communism to the market economy under the conditions imposed by the international financial institutions, which included even the process leading to "democracy". These situations would be difficult under the best circumstances and nearly impossible at a time when an excluding nationalism had been arising and the policy consisted in privileging the ethnic identity. So economic dispute was transformed into "national" dispute. In this way the globalization could foster the productive, jealous protectors of the national culture inside state-nation. The revitalized interethnic conflicts and the search of new way of relation between communities of various origins, was the result of a historical model of "real socialism".

The frustration of the economic model and self-imposed repression, which was due to many years of unsatisfied promises, generated an atmosphere propitious to expressions of intolerance between minorities which called back interpersonal bounds to situations similar to those existing before the Second World War. In the periods of economic uncertainty, the ethnic separatism is a frequent phenomenon. The nations are divided into racial or ethnic groups above any social class difference, when there is neither dominant internal ideology nor an external threat. These arguments have been legitimized by the "world economy", because in order to be successful it is not necessary to have great economy with a wide "inner market".

The identity is a form of affirmation that denies any expression of diversity, as "ultranationalism" in old Yugoslavia and India. In the latter, the "ethnicity" may appear as a counterhegemonic force acting as a source of solidarity in a moment of political conflict, when ethnic ties and economic and political subordination are related. In this sense, identity is a model of social conscience and a form of secular arrangement. Communal confrontations or disputes are said to be restricted to geographical regions or villages, which are understand also as regional autonomies associated to the political-geographical fragmentation. The aim of this proposal is to discuss the analysis of the category and concept definitions, in nowadays agenda of ethnic conflicts, ethnic nationalism, communal identity, collective identity and "communalism". In recent years, there has been a change in the meaning of the word "nationalism". Nowadays the ethnic culture is considered the basis of people's unification. The...
nationalism is impregnated by “ethnization” due to a mythical-symbolical formulation that defines an identity.

The formation the nation states were motivated and incentivized by western power. They were created and impulsed “from above”. As an answer, it generated the “communal identity” with root in the religious element as self-defence: The identity with exacerbated reactions in front of the another and the different. Foreign political values are considered as a means of western ideology’s invasion, which is de-humanizing and it avails to mobilize their community. In Kosovo and Kashmir the religious element is used in high dose. This peculiar characteristic is used by the powers for strategic interests, as well as economic and political. All these questions are considered true problems of international political.
The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Politics of European Command

Introduction

“Without a leader, an alliance system lacks a head; without an inner core of solidarity, it has no heart.” It is almost a truism that all alliances – and the wars that they fight – are essentially political. Is this always the case? Clausewitz’s dictum that wars are politics by other means (roughly adapted) is especially relevant to coalition warfare. As Professor George Liska observed: “...an Atlantic Alliance with an extended consultation regime would appear more than ever responsible for all actions of its members everywhere.” It is this necessity for consensus in regard to NATO’s responsibility for its treaty-prescribed Cold War area that makes it difficult for the Alliance to operate with the same unanimity in its post-Cold War “out-of-area” interventions. When we add that the politics of the greatest and most influential member of NATO is governed by shifting domestic political coalitions embedded in a divided system of government, then the entire situation becomes even less “military” and even more “political.” So what is NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) to do?

If the experience of General Lauris Norstad, NATO’s SACEUR during the height of the Cold War, is any guide, there is almost inevitably tension over decision-making in war between the SACEUR and his “political masters.” A good example can be found in Norstad’s desire, during the Berlin crises of the late 1950s, to adopt a more bellicose response toward Khrushchev’s threats, than either President Eisenhower or Secretary of State Dulles desired. In short, they were willing to posture militarily, but acted more cautiously diplomatically than Norstad preferred, in order to maintain Alliance political solidarity, and to reassure their domestic audience. The assumption (or hope) was that if the Alliance remained firm, the Soviet Union would give way, thus avoiding a “shootout” that would benefit no one.

A similar situation confronted General Wesley T. Clark, the SACEUR during the Bosnian and Kosovo interventions. On 24 March 1999 -- forty-eight hours after the air campaign began -- Clark had urgently requested permission from Washington to have the Army’s Apache attack helicopter made available to him so that he could pursue more effectively the Serb army and paramilitary forces that were cleansing Kosovo of Kosivar Albanians. After several weeks, he finally obtained authorization for their relocation to a staging airfield in Albania, but no permission was ever forthcoming either from the White House or the Pentagon for their employment in combat. As it was put: “The issue is that Clark is being aggressive, and there is some resistance to doing what he wants to do.”

Nonetheless, letting Norstad appear more willing to risk war, but at the same time searching for a diplomatic solution, proved an effective means for the U.S. to defuse the Berlin crises without appearing to “back down.” It worked in that case; but a similar tactic toward Serbia did not work. Clark’s last-minute direct diplomacy with Milosevic did not persuade him to “back down” and so NATO’s bluff was called - or perhaps NATO was forced to call Milosevic’s bluff. Norstad’s role in the Berlin crises was considered effective because he did not have to order his NATO forces into combat; Clark’s role in the Kosovo crisis ended up appearing at least partially ineffective because he was compelled to order his NATO air forces into combat after the failure to achieve an acceptable diplomatic solution.

Also, as with Norstad, Clark, as SACEUR, was restrained in his position as a NATO commander by his USCINCEUR “hat.” In both cases, although the SACEUR, always an American general, would have enjoyed full access to Washington’s highest political and military circles than would a non-American SACEUR, the other side of this coin has been that the American SACEUR must, if required, subordinate his SACEUR “hat” to his USCINCEUR “hat.” In this vital aspect, not much changed from NATO’s Cold War command posture to its post-Cold War posture.
Does this mean that today the SACEUR is less of a political general than a military general? The indications at this point are that today's SACEUR, as is discussed later in this chapter, must operate in a more complex political/military environment than did Norstad. But the central fact is that the overarching influence of the U.S. has remained unchanged.

Adding to this “two-hat” tension, the longer Norstad occupied his post, the more he became engaged in aligning himself with the European “pillar” of NATO, to the discomfiture and then the irritation of his national government. For example, Norstad listened carefully to President Charles de Gaulle's proposal for a two-tier definition of NATO membership, which de Gaulle termed a tripartite “directorate” – consisting of France, the U.K., and the U.S. -- whereas President Eisenhower virtually ignored the proposal. Another example is that Norstad desired that NATO played a greater role in the command and control of nuclear weapons based in NATO/Europe, than did the U.S. -- especially after the advent of the Kennedy Administration. The realities of power and the scale of national contribution, willy nilly, should have impelled Norstad to listen more carefully to some members (i.e. the U.S.) and, perhaps, less carefully to others (i.e. France). Put another way, European geopolitics became more important to Norstad than Atlantic geopolitics.

Can we discern a similar pattern in the experience of Clark? As the Kosovo intervention revealed, in coalition war, unanimity can be delegated to a “core” decision-making group without necessarily discrediting consensus. Just as in Norstad's case and the nerve-wracking Berlin crises, Clark may well have reluctantly concluded that: “Dreams of multilateral solutions to international conflicts are dying a nasty death over Yugoslavia.” Or he may have concluded : “Unified planning, centralised control, and a single point of responsibility are the very minimum requirements for a unity of effort which will offer success.” Certainly Norstad strived for both unified planning and centralized control, and he achieved only partial success in the two primary areas of his responsibility – nuclear weapons and Western access to Berlin. Clark, in actual war, found himself responding both to a “core” group of the NATO Council and to unilateral U.S. constraints.

In any event, for Norstad, the decision as to who or which authority would order the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, lay at the heart of his role as a “commander.” If NATO could not retaliate instantaneously (or even launch a pre-emptive strike) then there would be little or no hope that NATO could fulfil its dual mission of first, credible deterrence, and then, of offensive military operations. This is why Norstad kept pressing the political consultative organs of NATO as well as his own government to pre-delegate such authority to him. As he put it: “...as new weapons come into being -- those that related to the task of NATO directly -- it is planned that they will come under, they are coming under at the present time NATO direction. I am personally very strongly in favour of that.”

But in reality, as the level of crisis not only ratchets upward, but also is prolonged, the political pressure on the SACEUR also increases dramatically, and most directly from his own government. Norstad experienced this process during the extended crises over Berlin, and it appears to have taken place for Clark also, in the crisis over Kosovo. In Clark's case, of course, after prolonged negotiations failed to produce an acceptable political settlement over the status of Kosovo and its majority Muslim Albanian population, NATO reluctantly went to war.

As Oxford Professor Robert O’Neill observed:

The political context into which the Atlantic Alliance was born helped to ensure that its members had a sophisticated understanding of the international system. [The founders] knew that their creation had to be viable both in the eyes of the putative enemy in order to deter him and in those of Western voters in order to win their support for it....The Europeans had to satisfy themselves that in this new association they were not about to become harnessed to American policy without powerful means of influencing it, or to be placed at risk by their ally in some higher degree than he placed himself.

Clark was confronted by this dilemma at least as much as was Norstad. Whether NATO called Milosevic's bluff or the other way around, is still not clear. What is clear is that, as the intervention unfolded, the tension between Clark and NATO’s political consultative organs – and especially some of the larger European members as well as the U.S. – increased.
II. Locus of Decision-Making in Coalition Warfare.

In the case of Norstad, during the Berlin crises, he was accountable to the U.S. in his USCINCEUR “hat” and to NATO in his SACEUR “hat.” He also had a third “hat” because he was responsible for the LIVE OAK operation, which was a special planning unit that he established near SHAPE to deal with Berlin contingencies. But the LIVE OAK Planning Staff operated under the direct supervision of the Deputy USCINCEUR. Thus LIVE OAK was not formally a NATO organization; it consisted of France, the U.K., and the U.S., with the Canadians and the West Germans sharing some information. Another avenue of communication for Norstad was a direct channel to the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group, also consisting of France, the U.K., and the U.S., and located in Washington. He was, of course, accountable formally to the Military Committee (MC) and thence to the NATO Council, but the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group provided the conduit from the three major NATO members (and also from the State Department) to Norstad. Thus, for Norstad, in the discharge of his duties, political equality conferred by a common membership in NATO did not necessarily reflect the disparities of national power.

For Clark, in his USCINCEUR “hat,” the chain of command flowed from USCINCEUR to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), to a group within the Joint Staff designated J-2T, who worked closely with Clark’s planners. From the Joint Staff, decisions on major targets went through the Secretary of Defense, and if particularly sensitive, on to the White House and the National Security Council (NSC). Clark could communicate directly with the White House, although he was better advised to keep the Secretary of Defense and the Pentagon in the picture. For him more than for Norstad, who had easy and informal access to the Eisenhower White House, there was also the necessity to keep the Secretary of State and the State Department informed. Thus, Clark in his U.S. role was not by any means a free agent.

Put another way, even if war planning might best be done in a coalition framework, war execution has to be handled quite differently in order to take advantage of such elements as surprise, mobility, targeting, weapons employment, troop movements, etc. Both Norstad and Clark were quite aware that war consists of the unexpected and the unforeseen, and that to respond to these circumstances, NATO as a coalition had to collectively act and react quickly. Although this might make good political sense, it did not make good military sense, especially in the opinion of NATO’s leading member, the U.S. War by NATO committee meant, in practice, that the SACEUR was also required to keep his USCINCEUR “hat” firmly in place. If he neglected the latter in favour of the former, then he would find himself at risk, which is why both Norstad and Clark were placed on the retirement list by their national government sooner than they had planned.

A striking difference between Norstad and Clark is the fact that today there exists several forms of “European security architecture.” To enable the European members to play a collective role in their own security, and having in mind the challenges of NATO membership enlargement that embraced the Visegrad states of Central Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland), agreement was reached at the NATO summit of January 1994 on the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). As it was portrayed by Robert Hunter, then U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO:

> We proposed a deal at the 1994 Brussels Summit. In exchange for our European Allies not attempting through the ESDI [European Security and Defence Initiative] to duplicate a set of resources which, frankly, none of the European countries were going to build anyway – this is a matter of political will and resources – we declared we would be prepared to take the lead in gaining agreement at NATO for direct support of the WEU [Western European Union], based upon the concept of “separable but not separate” forces and assets. We also proposed at that time that the CJTFs could be a major instrument in making available to the WEU, under appropriate circumstances, assets that are uniquely available to NATO.

But Michael Brenner pointed out, drawing on observations of Willem van Eekelen: “We concentrated much more on the new possibilities of having NATO resources made available to WEU or to an ad hoc coalition’ than to simply making NATO more flexible.”

Sacrificing flexibility to maximize participation, as we have observed, is often a political imperative in an alliance, or in coalition warfare. The objective in this case was to maintain NATO as the chief European security organization in order to create a stable zone in Central Europe comprising a unified Germany alongside its former enemies to the East. For this, there had to be a continued, strong, and credible American military presence, which is afforded through NATO. In this respect, having an
American general as SACEUR in both the Cold War and post-Cold War variants of NATO, has made very good political/military sense. In contrast, Hunter observed: “With NATO-led operations in Bosnia [...] SACEUR has taken on a wide range of tasks that were never contemplated during the Cold War [...]. SACEUR’s role is thus not to focus on a single threat (however branches it might have had [...] but rather to lead a coalition force in day-to-day operations of great complexity...The ‘C’ in Saceur, in effect, has finally come into its own.” Doubtless Clark would wish it had been.

III. The Old NATO and the New NATO

Quite clearly, NATO during Norstad’s tenure was entirely different than NATO under Clark’s tenure – and not only in national composition. Under Norstad, the NATO military structure was designed primarily for planning purposes. This is why Norstad, the pre-eminent planner, was so successful in his role as SACEUR. The idea was to anticipate as much as possible the “scenarios” that might arise between the two Cold War hostile alliances. Elaborate plans were worked out to take care of these contingencies so that the element of surprise would be minimized. These arrangements included planning for pre-positioning of supplies, scheduling of troop movements, refining command and control procedures, creating time-lines for reinforcement and resupply, earmarking national forces, conducting both command and operational exercises and war gaming, arranging common codes and signals, etc.

All of these activities would enhance the capacity of NATO during the Cold War to react automatically to a threat considered unambiguous. In other words, once a hostile military movement in Eastern Europe threatened to cross the threshold of NATO/Europe, all of the planning that had taken place would render it relatively easy for NATO, under SHAPE and the SACEUR, to put into motion its war plans. National discretion would already have given way to multinational action.

The very act of military planning, by whittling down the element of surprise and unintended consequences, also ineluctably gave more and more authority to SACEUR, the chief planner, who when war broke out, presumably would assume responsibility for implementing NATO’s military response. Concomitantly, the capacity of individual NATO members to withhold consent would in effect be minimized. The mission had already been defined; the commitments to support that mission had already been put in place; the command arrangements (including national representation) had been worked out; the weapons and forces had been supplied or had been earmarked. In other words, during the Cold War the sum of NATO collective war-planning that would lead to war-making, gave the appearance of being greater than the sum of its individual nationalistic parts, especially if the U.S. nuclear strategic retaliatory component is included.

This is a situation which, perhaps, Clark might have envied, given the diametrically different situation in which he found himself. As it was bluntly put, referring to Kosovo and President Clinton: “When a president threatens a war he should plan for it.” The same can be applied to NATO. NATO’s “Strategic Concept” of April 1999 provided the following:

53.c. that NATO’s command structure will be able to undertake command and control of the full range of the Alliance’s military missions including through the use of deployable combined and joint HQs, in particular CJTF headquarters, to command and control multinational and multiservice forces. It will also be able to support operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, thereby contributing to the development of the ESDI within the Alliance, and to conduct NATO-led non-Article 5 crisis response operations in which Partners and other countries may participate.

Nonetheless, the Europeans are still committed to “strengthen the European pillar within the alliance.” How this will play itself out in practice remains to be seen and therefore it very likely will occur (if at all) beyond the tenure of Clark, but it will certainly be of great interest to the SACEUR of the time.

In any event, under such complicated current and possibly foreseeable circumstances, how could Clark’s command engage in contingency planning with anything near the specificity that Norstad could? In the ongoing Balkan crises, Clark’s complex NATO command relationships have necessitated direct input from, in particular, France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S. He can approach directly the Military Committee, and he can if he wishes go directly to the NATO Council.
Adding to the complexity, the admission of the three new Visegrad members altered the political landscape in NATO, and little time had elapsed for these changes to accommodate themselves before NATO was at war in the Balkans. Further, the elaborate quasi-consultative machinery in the form of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), although neither is a legal deterrent to NATO Council decision-making, makes clear-cut advance commitments more difficult to work out among the members. And the NATO-Russian Founding Agreement and Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which gives Russia a direct pipeline into NATO political discussions, could roil the waters further. Finally, increasingly, non-military and quasi-military factors must also be taken into account. This is not to suggest that these post-Cold War political/military accommodations are neither necessary nor desirable. They are both, if NATO is to be considered both a planning and an operational organization, with an agreed-upon mission, and possessing advance commitments from the members to fulfil that mission.

But in Kosovo, NATO was caught short in planning, with no firm advance commitments from the members to wage an unanticipated air war of attrition which the opponent initially dominated through surprise and flexibility (as well as ruthlessness). Initially, the war was to have been the NATO-U.S. concept of the AirLand battle, with an initial knock-out blow comprised of both air and ground forces acting together. As it was reported: “[NATO officials] have not said publicly,...[but] disclosed privately, that the alliance started with a battle plan designed for a summer offensive last year that was taken off the shelf without extensive rethinking when NATO started its war on March 24 -- with bad weather a statistical probability.”

When only the air war was implemented, it was clear that a “minimalist” rather than a “maximalist” strategy was the preferred option. This, according to the commander of NATO’s air war was not good doctrine: “Airmen would have liked to have gone after that target set [so-called leadership targets] on the first night and sent a clear signal that we were taking the gloves off from the very beginning, that we were not going to incrementalize, that we’re not going to try a little bit of this and see how you like it and try a little bit of that and see how you like it....Nineteen nations voting, competing pressures, that makes it very, very difficult to do that.” Furthermore, setting out unambiguous self-restraints such as no commitment of ground troops, and possessing insufficient air weaponry to deal with the changing situation on the ground in Kosovo, provided not a deterrent, but an incentive to the enemy to resist rather than to capitulate.

The unintended consequences of the NATO air intervention in Kosovo enabled Milosevic to continue to pursue his “war aims.” But the destruction of Serbia’s national infrastructure that was the consequence of NATO’s air campaign, and of Kosovo that was the consequence of Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing campaign, awarded Clark only a partial victory.

Yet through the experience of this unanticipated prolonged air campaign, SACEUR ultimately might accumulate more authority to act more quickly when other crises arose. In this respect, Clark was in a similar situation as was Norstad, for certainly one great bone of contention within NATO has been who should control targeting decisions. Very early in the Kosovo hostilities, by the end of March, Clark was able to obtain agreement from the NATO Council that he did not have to consult with all 19 NATO members for targeting decisions. Instead, he had only to deal with France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S. As it was optimistically observed: “Political considerations within each of these continue to restrain military actions, but the centralization of approval decisions within a core concert-within-the-alliance is independently significant.”

However, NATO’s political leadership could intervene at any point. Secretary of Defense Cohen acknowledged this in testimony before the Senate: “Each president of the NATO countries, at least the major players, are given the opportunity to at least express their judgement on the targets.” They can also object after an air strike, which Italy did after the destruction of the Serbian TV center in Belgrade. In this instance, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana helped to smooth things out, but it could also have been done through direct contacts between SACEUR and the national commander of the complaining member.

Another example of political constraints on SACEUR was Clark’s desire to enforce an oil blockade at sea against Yugoslavia. He submitted an enforcement plan that would allow NATO warships to fire on tankers that defied search requests. As it was put: “It really comes down to force [...] Do we ask them, ‘Do you mind if we board?’ Or do we ask them first but then say, ‘You’re not going to stop us.’ General Clark wanted to have more teeth in it.” Although Clark had the backing of the U.S., other NATO Allies,
including France and Germany, objected. They feared that forcibly rather than voluntarily implementing the blockade would result in confrontations with ships from non-NATO countries, especially Russia.

The abrupt announcement by the White House in July 1999 that Clark was to be replaced underscores the political fragility of the office of SACEUR. As it was observed at the time:

[...] despite [Clark's] claims of a smooth succession, a Washington Post editorial said his early removal ‘can only undermine the [U.S.’s] ostensible commitment to bring peace to the Balkans.’ It said Gen. Clark had been criticised for being ‘too political’ simply because he wanted to ‘use his authority to actually accomplish something’ [...]. Gen. Clark has repeatedly denied speculation that the decision for him to leave his post next April instead of next July was due to his handling of the alliance’s 11-week air war against Yugoslavia[...]. Correspondents say he consistently urged more aggressive tactics, including the possibility of a ground invasion of Kosovo if the air strikes failed [...]. In an interview published in The New Yorker magazine, Gen. Clark acknowledged his frustration with what he called ‘the only air campaign in history in which lovers strolled down riverbanks in the gathering twilight [...] to watch the fireworks.’

IV. Conclusions

Without the need for speed in wartime decision-making that characterized the Cold War and nuclear weaponry, today NATO’s out-of-area wartime decision-making is much more firmly under the control of the Alliance's political authorities. As it was said: “[... from the outset, the NATO Allies approached their engagement both in the Bosnia crisis and then in the Kosovo war air operations, with the most cautious concern to retain political control over all allied military activities.” In Norstad’s case, de facto if not de jure, if the alarm bells had gone off, there was a high probability that the SACEUR would have acted promptly, risking acting precipitously in spite of any Alliance misgivings (and especially those emanating from Washington). The fundamental contradiction for Norstad -- that of planning and preparing for a nuclear holocaust that if it occurred would have had disastrous consequences for all of the participating belligerents -- was not shared by Clark. But Clark had had less political leeway in his crisis decision-making dictated not only by diverging conceptions of how to deal with the threat posed by Milosovic and Serbia, but also because the Allies’ individual conceptions of their vital interests were not shared. Clark had no chance of turning toward a European “pillar” to offset the preponderance of the U.S. -- the nearest thing to such a pillar would have been the EU and WEU, and that possibility was still more of an idea than a reality, and in any event such a formation would not have rested directly within SACEUR's purview. The former Chairman of the Military Committee, General Klaus Naumann, openly referring to Clark’s situation, said: “We need to find a way to reconcile the conditions of a coalition war with the principle of military operations such as surprise and overwhelming force. We did not apply either in Operation Allied Force and this cost time, effort and potentially additional casualties. The net result is that the campaign is undoubtedly prolonged.” He was also quoted as asserting: “We need to think through our organization's structure in time of war.”

Nonetheless, the search for a diplomatic “exit strategy” must go on not only during hostilities, but also during post-hostilities peacekeeping or “nation-rebuilding” efforts, which is the political challenge still facing NATO in Kosovo, and with Serbia in general. This must involve close coordination between the SACEUR and the Secretary-General, the Alliance’s chief political officer. Sometimes this coordination can break down temporarily, but without it the overall posture of NATO is weakened.

It also requires close coordination with such non-NATO political organizations as the United Nations (UN), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). But as U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott cautioned: “...we must be careful not to subordinate NATO to any other international body or compromise the integrity of its command structure. We will try to act in concert with other organizations, and with respect for their principles and purposes. But the Alliance must reserve the right and the freedom to act when its members, by consensus, deem it necessary.” The search for a Clausewitzian diplomatic solution, in fact, has brought back into the picture the role of the Security Council, even though NATO embarked on its anti-Serbian hostilities without consulting the UN. Obviously, the negotiating field today for NATO and for Clark and for his designated successor, Air Force General Joseph Ralston, is much larger than it was for Norstad, with more national and multinational “layers” adding complexity both politically and militarily.
NATO's post-Cold War political ideology, which to a considerable extent defines its mission, as Clausewitz noted, is rooted in the advocacy of liberal democracy, which means a balancing of the principle of political equality (equal membership) with inequality in national power (unequal participation). As has been pointed out earlier, for this reason, NATO decision-making has consisted of several categories or modes of participation in an effort to accommodate this power/political conundrum. In this respect, NATO's post-Cold War emphasis that its members possess democratic political systems and embrace democratic values, conforms to what Professor Felix Oppenheim, a leading 20th century international law scholar claimed:

> The progress of International Law is intimately connected with the victory everywhere of constitutional government over autocratic government, or, what is the same thing, of democracy over autocracy. Autocratic government, not being responsible to the nation it dominates, has a tendency to base the external policy of the State, just as much as its internal policy, on brute force and intrigue; whereas constitutional government cannot help basing both its external and its internal policy ultimately on the consent of the governed. And although it is not at all to be taken for granted that democracy will always and everywhere stand for international right and justice, so much is certain, that it excludes a policy of personal aggrandisement and insatiable territorial expansion, which in the past has been the cause of many wars.

In these respects, both Norstad and Clark share a common ideological commitment. Norstad was especially anxious to see a democratic Germany (perhaps not united immediately) rejoin the “family of nations,” and he was convinced that the means to bring this about was through NATO. Closer military integration throughout Western Europe, linked to the military power of the U.S., was what he strived for.

Certainly the NATO military intervention in Kosovo under Clark’s leadership fulfils Oppenheim’s criterion, even though it threatens the sacredness of the territorial imperative embodied in the international legal notion of sovereignty. The Kosovo intervention also appeals to the more recent international legal norm of humanitarian intervention.

The reintegration of a democratic Serbia (whether with or without Montenegro) into an international system of democratic states must surely have been the ultimate mission for Clark if he had remained SACEUR, and for NATO as a whole. If this were to be the case, then the SACEUR, as the pre-eminent military commander within the Alliance, will continue to play a leading role in assuring that this democratic political trend continues, is reinforced, and expands to all the corners of Europe.

For Clark as for all of his predecessors: “Regardless of the circumstances surrounding his appointment, it is clear [...] that each incumbent has had wide latitude in overcoming any initial liability and in setting his own mark on the office.” Clark was not one to suppress his view of his responsibilities to those of his own government, and in this important respect he and Norstad were alike, and both suffered the same fate.
Globalisation and European Society

This paper will try to compare global social trends with convergences of European societies and European social transfers rather than to treat the European discourse on globalization or the rising dependencies of Europe from non-European social and cultural forces and vanishing European social and cultural autonomy.

The paper is based on the assumption that for a long time Europe was and still is a global player rather than a victim of globalization, but this assumption is not dealt with in detail. The paper treats three aspects of globalization and European society.

First it explores to what degree international convergences between European societies after World War II are due to global trends or due to particular European convergences.

Secondly it tries to find out to what degree the opening of national and regional European societies since 1945 was due to international global transfers or due to particular European transfers and what degree it has to be seen as a global opening or a European opening.

Thirdly the paper will explore to what degree the change of European particularities since 1945, i.e. the shift from a particular European family, specific European social classes, specific European work, specific urban trends, a specific European welfare state, specific European consumption, makes a crucial difference for globalization and European society. These rather general, but badly explored topics will be treated by choosing particular fields of European societies as examples.
Globalisation, Regionalisation and the Military.
The Evolution of NATO as a Military Organization

The intention of this essay is to examine the evolution of a military organisation that was never tested in combat during the Cold War with Soviet empire. Initially, the Communist threat to Western Europe was to be contained by the promise of American involvement in the event of an attack on any member nation. The promise would be redeemed without recourse to a defence establishment, beyond the regional planning groups which were established without serious expectation of their activating armies, navies, or air forces. In 1949 simply the American break with its isolationist tradition was considered sufficient both to deter Soviet aggression and to guarantee European security.

The Korean War transformed the alliance into a military organisation, with a command structure that would undergird military forces in 1952 capable of matching the power of the Communist bloc. But since ground forces were too expensive and too difficult to put into place, NATO in the 1950s was dependent primarily on nuclear power and the doctrine of massive retaliation.

The Soviet launching of Sputnik in 1957 which seemed to make the United States vulnerable to intercontinental ballistic missiles raised questions about the credibility of massive retaliation as the primary response to aggression; the risk of a nuclear holocaust in the event of a minor incident seemed to require more sophisticated means of defence. The idea of flexible response served this purpose, but since this meant raising the nuclear threshold and the expansion of ground forces there was division within the organisation between Europe and America. With the Berlin crisis resolved by mid-1960s Europeans were less anxious about the Soviet threat. France's withdrawal from the organisation in 1966 and the search for détente with the Soviet bloc signalled retreat from the military build-up of the early 1960s.

The result in the 1970s was not the disbanding of the alliance; too many examples of Soviet hostility, such as the targeting of European cities with intermediate range missiles, kept the military alliance in place. Yet the pursuit of détente continued on both sides, though interrupted by the breakdown of negotiations in 1993 and the installation of NATO base missiles to cope with the Soviet counterparts. But by the mid-1980s the Soviet Union led by Mikhail Gorbachev took the initiative in reducing the size of both nuclear and conventional forces, and opened the way inadvertently for the dissolution of the Communist empire in 1990 and 1991. The end of the Cold War exposed Russia as a third power- world country economically even as it remained a superpower through its nuclear weaponry.

The 1990s found NATO seeking reasons for its survival and found them in the form of crisis management, and while the European allies spoke of their need to defend themselves and moved toward unification with a resolve not seen in earlier years, they failed to establish a credible military entity to replace American power. The United States was still needed not only to provide the military muscle for potential future conflicts with post Communist Russia but also to manage conflicts in such areas as the Balkans. As the century ended, NATO’s military was downsized command structure reorganized with the, perceived need for smaller rapid reaction forces to replace the largo-scale armies in Germany in maintaining stability in Europe. There was still some fear of a revived Russia possessing nuclear weapons and resentful if its reduced status as well as of NATO's eastward expansion. NATO has survived but with changes not anticipated 50 years before.

I intend to use the many communiqués issued by the North Atlantic Council to trace the evolution of the alliance as a military organisation. Inevitably, these communiqués put the best face on internal problems and deservedly earn the skepticism of NATO scholars. Nevertheless, a close examination of the language of the communiqués may yield insights into NATO problems that the authors of these documents carefully crafted to paper over differences did not intend to reveal. The result should be a picture of an organisation in which the military have played different roles in the first years of NATO’s history.
Security Regionalization in the new Europe

The purpose of this paper is to examine post cold war trends in European security. Specifically, the research will place Europe within the general trend toward regionalization in international security dynamics. Under the framework, the research will consider the prospects and implications for even deeper regionalization within the European context. The paper and presentation will be organized around several core components.

Theoretical framework

This section of the paper will address the issue of regionalization and international security orders. It begins with the premise that Europe is a distinct security region covering the “Atlantic to the Urals” area. Thus the notion of regional security dynamics and the implications for multilateral regional efforts to maintain or build security will be placed initially within the global context of trends toward regional security cooperation v. global security dynamics. As will be shown, the notion of prioritizing regional solutions to international security problems is not new. For example, beginning with the Rio Treaty in the Americas, extending to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and into similar formal or ad-hoc arrangements in Asia (ASEAN) and Africa (OAU) some cases have indicated a willingness of states to prioritize regional security relationship. The pluses and minuses of such developments will be considered at the general theoretical level and will be applied specifically to the implications for multilateral military planning. At the theoretical level, the discussion will draw from consideration of the debates over the prospects and role of international institutions in the light of realist criticisms of the role of institutions and why some variations in institutional forms may be preferable over the alternatives. A central argument to be tested in the paper will be that within regions, like Europe, overlapping institutional environments can cloud security trends taking place within the regional context. Specifically, it will assess the development of sub-regionalization within Europe that reflects an emerging split in Europe along both a North-South and East-West security division.

The Competing Institutional Context

The second section of the paper/presentation will survey the overlapping institutional context in European security. Ample literature already exists on this subject matter, including extensive review of the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Western European Union/European Union and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe. Thus, this section will review the major regional activities of these institutions and reflect how they factor into the theoretical considerations of the relationship, between such institutions, security challenger and military operations in Europe at the planning level.

Regional Trends within Regional Institutions.

The third section will undertake specific case studies to demonstrate evolving trends towards even more local cooperation underneath the regional security framework. The first case will focus on Scandinavian security and particularly draw on the priorities that Scandinavian countries have placed on outreach to the three Baltic countries. The second case will stress the priorities that Southern tier states in Europe have had on crisis management in the Southern tier with the emphasis placed in the Italian-led coalition of the willing in Operation Alba (Sunrise) of 1997. The third case will focus on the continued structural difference in security priorities between Western Europe and Eastern Europe with the specific example being the priorities that have been given to consideration of who to invite as new
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization v. resources and time spent on those who aspire to be members but who have not been invited to negotiate membership.

Conclusions

The fourth section of the paper will draw conclusions from the theoretical discussion and establish a continued framework for further analysis of the military implication of sub-regional division in Europe. One initial issue for consideration in this context will be whether or not sub-regionalization has the same general benefits or pitfalls that theory posits about global regionalization. At one level, regionalization within Europe as in the case of Operation Alba (Sunrise) helped to manage a crisis efficiently and effectively. Specifically, as lead-states within a region create centres of gravity or “strategic homes” for military organization and cooperation, specific security crisis may be more effectively managed by the interested countries. However, on another level, such trends may undermine the notion of a “Europe united, whole and free” with multiple tiers of security within the region. If some countries in Europe opt-out of security provision then some regions are likely to lag and not share in the benefits of a Europe at general peace. Moreover, there may be times when it is not appropriate for a lead-country within a region to lead military coalitions if it is too deeply involved in a particular crisis and cannot act as a neutral force for extending security. This section will also step back and look at Europe as a whole from the external perspective of the United States and assess what sub-regional trends in Europe might mean for the security interest and military planning of the United States.
Three World Wars: Australia and the Global Implications of Twentieth Century Wars

One of the strongest themes in survey histories of Australia’s international relations is the convergence of nationalism with a greater emphasis on relations with countries in Australia’s region. As the story often goes, it was only as Australians began to break the shackles of imperial ties that they began to devote sufficient attention to relations with Indonesia, Malaysia and other countries in the region.

This paper argues that such accounts tend either to obscure the impact of world wars in their nationalism/regionalisation stories, or to mistakenly lump them into their grand narratives as moments of awkward progress along the path towards regional awareness. I find that Australia’s involvement in the world wars - the first and second world wars and the Cold War of the late 1940s-early 1950s - constituted massive episodes of globalisation in Australia’s experience of international relations.

For approximately half of the twentieth century the prospect of a world war, or another world war, was the dominant force shaping Australian elites’ approaches to international relations. It was only when the Cold War began to resemble something much different from this expectation in the second half of the 1950s, that the idea of a more considered regional consciousness began to take hold.
India and China together account for about 40% of the world's population, a growing proportion of world trade and production, and increasing political weight in world councils. Their experiences impact on the rest of the world. At the same time, each faces serious internal problems, notably alleviating poverty and reconciling demands of different regions within each country. Nor do India and China co-ordinate their policies towards other countries or global trends; on the contrary, though some similarities can be observed.

This paper examines China’s and India’s responses and contributions to the processes of regionalism and globalization that have gathered momentum in recent years. The following questions are addressed. Are the regional designations “East Asia” and “South Asia” appropriate for subcontinental size countries with wide concerns such as China and India? To what “region” do China and India belong, in their respective self-perception and the perception of others? What conceptual and practical contributions have they made to regional cooperation, regional associations, and “Asian” identity? To what extent are China and India integrated into current patterns of cultural, economic and intellectual globalization originating in the West? How have their respective governments sought to reconcile the positive and negative effects of globalization in the 1990s? What broad comparisons can be made between the rather different policies and experiences of China and India with respect to regionalism and globalization?
The Concept of Globalisation

The concept of globalization has been defined in general terms and it has become a common place in the field of social sciences. Many scientists currently make reference to a global world or to the leaning to globalization. However, few scientists have made the attempt to define its meaning precisely. Therefore, globalization is a widespread concept with a considerable degree of ambiguity. It should be noted this ambiguity doesn't mean it remains unclear or ill-defined in the publications on the issue, although it is not clear enough to establish a solid foundation for the further (re) construction of the social sciences.

When social scientists speak about globalization, they usually use the term referring to different meanings. Since a standard definition has not been adopted, it is not always compatible. Therefore, the issue entails a problem closer to a linguistic neurosis than to the complexity of a scientific theory.

The first part of this contribution aims to characterize the usual approaches to the concept.

Three different although compatible notions emerge from the analysis.

One of the interpretations attempts to define it as a process of reinforcement and extension of the international flux of commerce capitals, technology and labour force.

The second interpretation refers to the institutional changes, which are brought about in the society by the increase of these flows, and the development of the transnational corporations. In this point of view it is stressed the weakening of the regulating function of the national states. In its stronger version, globalization implies the disappearance of the state in its economic dimension. A subtler version considers the globalization just as the lost of an important portion of the economic sovereignty.

The third interpretation refers to the growing homogenization of certain processes and behaviours, like the introduction of global standards in the production of goods. However, the most extended idea in this field is the existence of a convergence in the demands of goods and services, a homogenization in the regulation of the capital goods and the technology.

The result of these combined factors is the imposition of neoliberalism and the market upon old structures of political regulation, implying also the homogenization of regulating mechanism, political resources and the ideology.

The second part of this article deals with the confrontation of the different concepts of globalization with the empiric indicators. The goals of this section are:

To verify empirically the hypotheses about a globalized world.

To inquire to which extent the hypotheses corresponding with the facts imply a break with the past.

During the last quarter of the century, the prevailing tendencies have become more consistent with a process of regionalization than with one of globalization. On the other side, comparing the present-time data with those of the first quarter of the century, a major break is not observed.

In the last section, some theoretical issues, which are implied in the concept of globalization, are discussed. It is pointed out that the neoliberal interpretation shows a weak time-space conception. An alternative theoretical frame of reference introducing the notion of cyclical behaviour of the world economy is proposed. The causes and relationships of alternating periods of stability and crisis revalue the importance of the temporal conception and allow a better basis for the periodicity of the international relationships.
The introduction of the concept of “productive system”, as the space of accumulation and regulation in periods of stability, bestows the analysis a clear notion of space and allows a better characterization of the international relationships, of their temporal evolution and their specificities.
Globalisation, Regionalisation and the History of International Relations: the Case of Scandinavia and Finland

I intend to handle the theme above all as a historian and, instead of using the superficial and obscure concept of “globalisation”, dare to speak of interplay, cooperation and integration of the Nordic region with the outer world.

Historically, Scandinavia and Finland, closely knit together since prehistoric times, have not lacked interest in the outer world, but they have in fact cultivated it, along with their regional neighbours. We may quote as an example the age of the Vikings: although originating from Scandinavia, the Viking culture is in many respects shared by the Finns and the Balts, as well as the Russians. Consider also the role played by the Scandinavians, especially by Sweden along their largely Finnish armies, in interfering in the 17th century Central European affairs at the pretext of protecting Protestants.

We may similarly recall, from the century onwards, the trade and colonisation activities of the Danes and the Swedes which had the permanent result of extending Nordic influence to Iceland and Greenland as well as to the arctic islands now in Norwegian possession. And last but not least we may observe that the age of great discoveries, which is sometimes mentioned as an early example of globalisation, ended only in the last century, to the glory of many Scandinavians, especially Norwegian explorers.

The impact of Nordic culture on the world, in music as well as in literature, in arts and architecture, has been remarkable since the end of the 19th century. From this time onwards, Scandinavia has been cited as a global model for adult education and cooperatives, and Finland was the first European state to grant the franchise to women. Let us also add the world of sports, of great popular interest to all the Nordic countries for more than a century.

Returning to regionalisation, I prefer to concentrate only on its political and economic aspects. Because of controversies between the Scandinavian states, as well as Finland which had been subject to Russia since 1809, there was practically no Nordic cooperation before the end of the First World War. Having succeeded in maintaining together their neutrality during the Great War, Denmark, Norway and Sweden decided to continue it initially under the League of Nations security system. Finland, which had been independent since 1917, joined the same line, despite her territorial and linguistic differences with Sweden, and participated in the rising Nordic cooperation, e.g. in eliminating national passports between the four state in 1929. However, the main goal for Finns seeking Nordic cooperation, namely security, was never achieved. Attacked by the USSR in 1939 they were left isolated by their Scandinavian neighbours, who even refused to receive Allied troops which had been proposed to be send through Norway and Sweden, under a League of Nations mandate.

When after the Second World War the Scandinavian states together with Iceland, established the Nordic Council to co-ordinate their cooperation, Finland- by now under Soviet influence- was only able to join them three years later, in 1955. Even then, though being able to establish far-reaching cooperation in nearly all except military aspects, Finland’s treaty obligations with the Soviets forced her to renounce any kind of cooperation on the supranational level.

For all these reasons, Finland was unable to consider even economic integration with other European states, otherwise than as an associate or treaty partner of the then existing trade organisations. However, after the fall of the USSR in 1991, she joined the EU along with Sweden; Norway refused to join. Unlike the two Scandinavian countries, Finland became even a member of the European Monetary Union in 1998.

We may see already in the 1930’s an example of Nordic regional cooperation developing into global cooperation namely the group of the Oslo Treaty states, which had been established in order to
liberalize trade exchanges between them, that was joined not only by European neutrals, but also by
the United States.

After the Second World War, the Scandinavians and the Finns have got part in a remarkable way in the
activities of the United Nations by sending their assistance, rescue workers and peace-keepers, all over
the world. Finally, in business, even Finnish international companies -following the wake of Norwegian
shipping and of Danish and Swedish industrial empires- have made their break-through into
globalisation.
The Historical Construction of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region

The idea of a transnational region including the northern most parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia was launched by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry in 1992 to fill the vacuum that followed the termination of the Cold War.

Just as the EC cooperation was established in the 1950s in order to build confidence between the hereditary enemies Germany and France, so the idea behind the Barents Region was to establish a network of positive contacts across the East-West border in the North to promote growth and to make future conflicts less likely.

The establishment of the Barents Region has provided new materials for the debate on how modern regions evolve: are they basically political constructions, or do they grow spontaneously at grass root level, in order to meet particular needs of the area itself?

The Barents Region is undoubtedly first and foremost a political construction, which sprang from reassessments of the security policies of the Nordic countries after the breakdown of the bipolar world. At the same time it has been actively marketed as a historical region, deeply rooted in the past of the European Arctic area.

In this undertaking the initiators of the Barents Region have been assisted by professional historians, who have been accused of acting as "region-builders, in historical guise" and compared to the nation-builders” of the past.

The present paper analyses the constituent elements of the "historical construction" of the Barents Region, trying to separate historical realities from historical myth - and at the same time looking at the role of professional historians in this process (partly based on personal experiences).
Globalising and Regionalising Forces Affecting the Dependent World (19th and 20th Centuries)

Next to an approach from a macro-regional perspective, a cross-cutting and comparative conceptualization seems to be worth exploring.

By "dependent world" I mean all the peoples, regions and countries that were incorporated in a subordinate position into formal and informal empires. The empires to be considered should include not only the European oversea empires, but also the Japanese and the Russian/Soviet empires and the imperium Americanum.

Imperial projects in modern times have always been contradictory in themselves. The very idea of empire is a universalistic one. Empire as a far-flung network of rule and domination transcends the boundaries of pre-imperial territorial units, of individual ethnic groups and of traditional systems of production and trade. Getting incorporated by an empire results in an enormous augmentation of contacts with the outside world, at least for indigenous elites. Empires transgress cultural boundaries. They join together civilizations of the most diverse kind. Moreover, empires are usually sustained by universalist ideologies or cosmologies. They tend to claim a right and duty to carry out a mission civilisatrice vis-à-vis those who are considered "barbarian", "primitive" or just economically "backward".

This is one side of the problem. On the other side, imperial powers deliberately strengthen local orientations. They rule by the maxim of divide et impera. They monopolise the foreign relations of their subject states and communities. They tend to support certain forms of localized economic organization, and they encourage a kind of cultural identity formation that remains within traditional or traditionalist limits and does not aspire to national scope.

These tensions between universalising or globalizing tendencies and regionalizing or localising orientations deserve closer empirical scrutiny; abstract talk about "globalisation" is not particularly helpful. It is here suggested to consider them in their political, social, economic and cultural dimensions. Various aspects might be explored:

1. the opening or closure of indigenous communities and ways of life through the agency of the colonial state;
2. equivalent functions of the quasi-colonial state (under conditions of "informal empire") in countries like China, Siam, the Ottoman Empire, etc.;
3. the spatial aspects ("geopolitics") of the globalizing/regionalizing process, i.e. the emergence of a cosmopolitan culture in certain urban centres as opposed to relatively "closed" and remote interiors and hinterlands;
4. the universalism of some anti-colonial and anti-imperial movements (Panafricanism, the activities of the Comintern in Asia, etc.) seen in relation to attempts to revive or "invent" an indigenous and culture-bound political symbolism (Gandhi, for example, was a master of both strategies);
5. the transition to the post-imperial age: new challenges of globalization and new responses;
6. etc.

Obviously, most papers on topics like these will have to be particular case studies. However, comparative contributions would be especially welcome as would papers attempting a long-term overview.
Nikolaj Petersen

Aarhus University, Denmark

Denmark and Norden in the Post-War Period. Between Sub-Regionalism, Regionalism and Globalism.

Small states, who do not have the option of staying away from international politics, face difficult choices in their attempts to protect their interests. As bilateralism often implies dependency on greater powers, multilateralism, i.e. participating in broader cooperative forum, offers itself a solution. But what kind of multilateralism? Sub-regionalism, regionalism or globalism? In this paper on Danish foreign policy sub-regionalism will be exemplified by Nordic cooperation, regionalism will be exemplified by European and trans-Atlantic cooperation while the globalist perspective will be represented by the United Nations and North-South cooperation.

In the Danish foreign policy tradition sub-regionalism in the form of Scandinavism is the oldest one, dating back to the 19th century. With the League of Nations globalism became an additional option, while regionalism in the form of NATO, the European Union and the OSCE gradually offered themselves as forum for Danish foreign policy after the World War II. Until the end of the Cold war sub-regionalism, regionalisation and globalism formed an intricate pattern of sometimes supplementary and sometime conflicting orientations in Danish foreign policy. According to the official doctrine there was full harmony between the different trends, but reality was often one of conflict. After the Cold War these problems have largely been solved by a far going integration of sub-regionalism, regionalism and even globalism in Danish foreign policy.

Thus over time, the role of Nordism has been on the wane. It is a firm root in a joint history, geographic closeness, as well as cultural, political and societal affinities, which makes cooperation easy among the Nordic countries, both in the region and in forum like the United Nations. On the other hand, in concrete cases, interests often diverge, e.g. in the economic field. This explains why Nordic economic cooperation has never materialised, and why the three Nordic EU members cooperate so little. A further complication is that Nordic cooperation often cannot “deliver the goods” because of limitations of size. Nordic defence cooperation founded on this rock in 1949, and so did later attempts in the economic field, such as “Nordek” in the late 1960’s. In these circumstances the scope of Nordic cooperation has remained fairly limited and on the whole diminishing over the post-war period. But it has been and still is important in several respects:

1. there is a wide-ranging cooperation in the cultural and social field;

2. Nordic cooperation is still important in the United Nations (but “threatened” by the impact of CFSO);

3. Nordek has still an important identity function in giving the Nordic peoples a broader identity than the national one, and one that often feels more comfortable than a wider European or cosmopolitan identity.

My paper will follow these different strands of analysis in post-war Danish foreign policy. First, the historical background in 19th century Scandinavism and in inter-war cooperation will be followed with an emphasis on the role of World War II experiences in boosting Nordic feelings in Denmark.

Secondly, the abortive post-war attempts at expanding Nordic cooperation into the security and economic fields will be analysed. Denmark (and especially the governing Social Democrats) fought hard for a Nordic Defence Union in 1948-49 and only joined NATO as a second-best option. However, once in NATO the option of Nordic defence cooperation was shelved as official policy, even though Denmark eagerly joined Nordic cooperation over UN peace-keeping from the 1960’s. In the 1980’s the idea of a Nordic nuclear weapons free zone became hotly contested between government and opposition in Denmark.
In the economic field, Norden was never seen as a fully satisfactory setting, but despite this Denmark worked eagerly for Nordic cooperation, e.g. by taking the Nordek initiative in 1968. However, in the prevailing view, Denmark had no choice but joining the EEC, when than became possible in 1973. But opponents of this move continued to argue the case of Norden as an alternative to Europe, just as NATO critics continued to hanker back to the idea of Nordic defence cooperation.

Besides in the field of cultural and social affairs, Nordic cooperation in these years flourished at the United Nations where voting together with the Nordic countries was important and usually more important than voting with the members of the EPC (EC countries).

In this period, then, a certain official doctrine evolved which gave Nordic cooperation a limited, though not unimportant, place in Danish foreign policy, but against this the opposition, mostly from the left wing, argued for a broader role.

Finally, the Nordic dimension of present Danish foreign policy will be analysed. Among relevant developments are the accession of Sweden and Finland to the EU (which has opened up possibilities -so far largely unrealised- for Nordic cooperation within the EU) and creation of a “greater Norden” in the Baltic region with possibilities of both increased cooperation, e.g. in the Council of Baltic Sea States, and rivalry. Both have materialised, the latter mostly in the form of Danish-Swedish competition for Baltic leadership.
Inventing North America. The Evolution of Regionalism in a Globalized Political Economy

This paper will address the evolution of North America as a region within a global context. Inventing North America refers to a process of creating a shared set of rules, understandings, and practices about how the three states of North America will deal with common problems involving trade, investment, dispute settlement and the like. In other words, inventing North America means using state policy to encourage closer ties among three sovereign states and other actors (such as firms) vital to the functioning of the regional political economy.

The paper does several things. First, the development of regional integration agreements in North America is viewed within a particular historical and theoretical context. A distinction is made between regionalism and regionalization. Next, the evolution of the state and the trade policies among the states of North America are traced from nineteenth century efforts to preserve national independence despite economic interchange to the recent efforts to reduce barriers and harmonize some economic policies late in the twentieth century.

Second, the immediate historical antecedents of CUFTA (1988) and NAFTA (1994) are traced to global and regional factors. These became very influential during the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Third, pursuing the argument further, the paper goes on to argue that the evolution of North American regionalization is dependent upon global trends. Globalization and regionalization elsewhere in the global economy, especially in the Asia Pacific and Europe, were important for converting the United States in particular to a regional view of economic strategy. Globalization helped to trigger regionalization in North America.

Fourth, we must look within the region itself. As important as globalization is for explaining North America’s emergence in the late twentieth Century, the emergence of North America as a region is also the result of regional and sub-national factors. Three concepts are theoretically germane to the task of understanding the regional or subnational sources of North American regionalism: convergence, coalitions, and (regionalized) interdependence. These concepts are used to demonstrate that North American regionalism is partially due to emerging tendencies in public (or state) policy, domestic ruling coalitions, and complex interactions among states and other actors in the North American neighbourhood.

Finally, the paper addresses the nature of North America as a region. The United States and its two regional partners regard the invention of North America as an important but limited venture in which regionalism serves national interests. North America is not granted an independent status of its own. The goal of regionalization is not to “Europeanise” regional integration in North America. Rather, it is to create a free trade “plus” area. This will allow each to pursue its own national agendas by treating each other the same without according the same treatment to non-members. In other words, inventing North America is a strategy rather than a goal and it seeks to balance national, regional, and global priorities for all three states. Globalization and regionalization are both very much a part of inventing North America.
Globalization and Regionalization: An Historical Approach

Globalization is today a buzz word, even if studies regarding this issue from an historical point of view are still at a very early stage. I put this historiography lack down to the general trend, when speaking about globalization, to refer only to the contemporary age.

Economists, indeed, use to set the beginning of the globalization process in the eighties and nineties, and only a few of them consider the seventies as the starting period of this process.

The first reflection should be focused on the periodization.

I consider Ludwig Dehio’s statement as a reference. While before Second World War -Dehio said-nothing outside Europe was intelligible without referring to the European system, after that nothing, in Europe as well as all over the world, was intelligible without referring to the World States' system.

From an historiographical point of view, we can speak about globalization since the birth of the World States system. So, when? For sure, it is correct to consider Second World War as a turning point, marking the historical death of the European State system, being the European States turned into “dust without substance”, and the birth of the new World System of States, dominated by the USA and the USSR.

It is important to point out that this is nothing but the last act of a long process, that slowly crossed the whole eighteen century.

If the transition from the European to the World-States System can be considered achieved only after the Second World War, and if the period between the two wars recorded what Dehio describes as the “agony of European-States System”, this transition has been evident from the end of the eighteen century and the beginning of the nineteen century, and it has shown its warning signs since the end of the seventeenth century, with its two great revolutions - the French one and the Industrial one - which deeply modified the international context, establishing the basis for both horizontal integration - with the cancellation of barriers among social classes, and the rise of democracy - and vertical integration - with the abolition of physical entry-barriers among the States.

The last two centuries - as highlighted by Bairoch and Hobsbawm - have recorded an unsurpassed change in the human society. Yet in the last fifty years before the First World War, under the British flag of free-trade, it took place a unique (and surprisingly free) global system of economic transactions and goods exchange, together with a dramatic increase of cross border trade and emigration flows.

Although offset in 1914, this trend came to a new - and even stronger - life, after Second World War, under the US political and economic power of and the US currency steadiness.

After the two World Wars, new technologies, based on scientific research, transformed the speed and range of communications and transportation, allowing globalization and automation of the industrial processes.

A second point seems to emerge from the historical perspective: the duel between hegemony and balance of powers, between division and desire of union, was perpetuated within the World-wide organization of States. Nevertheless there is a relevant difference, which stiffens the system: inside the world system there are no more marginal States, but only States which are part of the system.

The current globalization process of the economy can be seen, from an historical standpoint, as the last evidence, in a political system enlarged to the whole globe, of the long-lasting process which, in the ages, is represented by the aim at unification.

If the first and fundamental law of the European-States system was to avoid the unification of the continent under the hegemony of one of them, with the consequent loss of sovereignty, -from there the coalition that defeated Charles V, Philip II and Luis XIV, Napoleon and Hitler- it seems to me that
moving to the field of the World-States System, the necessity to avoid hegemonic unification at a worldwide level is deeply felt. The danger of cultural, social, political hegemony implied by globalization, although different from the past, set us in front of the same queries and alternatives.

I wonder: can unlimited globalization become a new form of hegemony?

Certainly, the trend to unity is not positive or negative in itself: unity is hegemony as well as democratic federal State. The main issue is how this unit is realized, how globalization is affirmed. On one side, there is the great prospect of a world unification, which will put an end to the conflicts among states, realizing, according to Kant, the sovereignty of reason in history; but on the other side there is the danger of a discordant development.

I wonder: is it possible to affirm that today we are facing the same alternative - balance or hegemony, as in the past - transferred to a worldwide level?

Here I come to a third and last reflection concerning the role that, in this context, the continental integration processes may assume.

At a worldwide level, the historical decadence of national States which did not reach continental dimension, has shown its warning sign since the end of the nineteenth century, at the age of the late industrial revolution.

The outstanding States have been those provided with continental spaces, or great colonial empires (such as Great Britain).

After the age of colonialism the only alternative was the amplification of the States size, in a form neither national nor imperialistic nor hegemonic but democratic and federal. A unification which reconciles unity and differences, which makes possible the sharing of sovereignty at several degrees, and therefore pluralism.

Can regionalization be considered as an attempt to face an out-of-control process by single national State, which can no more oppose with efficacy to hegemonic trends?

Does not regionalization risk to bear in itself a conservative, defensive, potentially protectionistic, somehow nationalistic trend? Doesn’t it risk to create the same barriers which made the national State oppressive and despotic?

Moreover, can the opposition to political regionalization be considered as a tendency to maintain the economic supremacy of the industrialized States over the other ones?

Historically, we can point out some moments in which the two strategies of the construction of a new world system were opposed. Between the first and the second World War the Atlantic and the European alternatives compete everywhere it was possible, that’s to say at movements level.

In the second post-war period, during the consolidation phase of a new international order, we can single out two different trends. On one side the creation of international institutions and organizations (ONU, IMF, Bretton Woods, GATT, FAO, World Bank, UNICEF, ITO and linked entities), on the other side the creation of continental or regional institutions (OECE, CECA, MEC, COMECON, SEATO).

This dichotomy is peculiar to the second post-war period, during which regionalization projects are opposed to globalization. We can think to Roosevelt’s Grand Design, parallel with the projects of continental European integration. Besides, let’s think to the opposition between De Gaulle’s political community project and Kennedy’s project of a large area of free trade, in the sixties.

In November 1999, the Eisenhower Center (New Orleans) was host to a conference designed to consider the way prominent leaders of the post-World War II era responded to the phenomenon of "globalization." The conference focussed on the perceptions and policies of individuals who were particularly interested in or enthusiastic about transformations taking place in the world arena and an emphasis was placed on working toward comparative analysis of a full spectrum of perspectives and personalities.

(The New Orleans conference was the first in a projected series of collaborative meetings and research efforts, each designed to fit under the umbrella title "Growing the System: The Evolution of Global Management Efforts, 1945-2000.").

A report to the Oslo session organized by the Commission of History of International Relations would provide an overview of the preliminary findings of the New Orleans conference. Among other things, it would summarize some of the papers offered and some of the themes and conclusions which began to emerge during the comparative discussions.

Among the papers and presenters included in the New Orleans program were the following:

1. Thomas Watson, Paul Hoffman, Philip Reed: Jacqueline McGlade (Monmouth University)
2. Jean Monnet: John Gillingham (University of Missouri - St. Louis)
3. Winston Churchill: Klaus Larres (Queens University, Belfast)
4. John Foster Dulles: Ronald W. Pruessen (University of Toronto)
5. Charles de Gaulle: Robert Frank (Sorbonne)
6. Nikita Khrushchev: Andrei Edemsky (Institute of Slavic Studies, Moscow)
7. Mao Zedong: Jian Chen (Southern Illinois University)
8. Japanese Leaders of the 1950s-60s: Tatsuo Akaneya (University of Tsukuba)
9. Jawaharlal Nehru: Francene Frankel (University of Pennsylvania)
10. Gamal Abdel Nasser: Fawaz Gerges (Sarah Lawrence College/American University-Cairo)
11. Ludwig Erhard/Willy Brandt: Eckart Conze (University of Tuebingen, Germany)
12. Bruno Kreisky: Oliver Rathkolb (Stiftung Bruno Kreisky Archiv, Vienna)
13. J. William Fulbright: Randall Woods (University of Arkansas)
Post-1989 Central Europe. National Interests, European Integration and Globalisation

The starting assumption of this paper is related to the fact that “Central Europe” is a kind of sub-regional identity, based on cultural, economic and political ties, shared values and concerns. Its countries shared over time a common culture of risk and insecurity associated with its geopolitical position between the Western civilization and the Eurasian one, as the land between the Germans and Russians.

As one of the densest area of the world, a cluster of peoples of different languages, religions and historical experiences, Central Europe had a tradition of nationalisms (developed over the 18th and 19th Centuries), confounded during the 20th Century with national and ethnocentric interests. The main reason: after the dissolution of the multinational empires, the newly political identities (national state or federations) inherited the same centrifugal forces, under the realm of ethnic nationalism. Another variable, ideology, usually helped these corrosive forces, rather than prevented them. The internationalism initially predicated by some ideologies was doomed to fail and ethnic nationalism always grew stronger, usually backed by the totalitarian regimes, in order to self-legitimize themselves.

After the 1989 and the end of the Cold War in Europe, the concept of national security shifted in Central Europe from its classical formula (military security) to the one of cooperative security and the extensive modern concept, involving all societal fields, from military to economic, social, even environmental security. The new formula was conceived in relation with the process of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. In a world of globalization, the Central European states acknowledged that only in an integrative formula, they can express their own identity within the international system and in the different aspects of globalization.

A propositive view over the 21st Century should encompass this historical background as a testing variable. The future must be one of unity in diversity (as Rothschild would say), or one of acknowledged plurality. The way Central Europeans will know how to appease their national interests with the presumptive common interests of a single, united Europe will mark the future of the region.
L’Amerique Latine entre globalisation et regionalisation. Perseptives historiques et tendencies recentes.
Raport general
(see Latin America- Areas and Topics)
The New Leviathan: Globalisation and the Language of Apocalypse

At the turning point of the second and third millennium, public opinion has shown a renewed interest in interpreting current events and phenomena in theological, sacred and eschatological terms. The present event is deciphered in the light of future time while the very reading is linked to stories and figures of the past. And this is valid for many events having occurred in the past few years, but especially for one of them, one which might appears as being the most present and important, menacing and distressful: globalisation.

We know that man is a teleological animal, that when faced with a problem or an event, he will always try to discover the very nature lying within it. In consequence, he tends to carry his view on a finalistic vision that considers the historical course of events as directed by its origin to its completion, a telos. As the metaphor of «course» itself suggests, history is then perceived as a river, with its waters, surrounded by the riverbanks, flowing passively or forcefully down to the delta, not as water that chaotically runs over the land and is dispersed, without guidance or importance.

Globalisation, read in terms of a historical philosophy, that is given an origin in the past and a projection in the future, appears to be set at the end of history. Vladimir Solovjev, a Russian author, both spiritual and visionary, anticipated this with great clarity already at the end of the 19th century: at the end of time, the road to peace and well-being is open for the entire humanity, at the end of time the advent to universality is realised. And since in our time we have seen the Market substituting History of its symbolical value, we perceive the Global Market as an instance capable of granting us our claim for freedom, emancipation and self-determination let alone keeping alive values once significant in historical semantics: growth, production, development, consumption, profit, accumulation.

Globalisation nevertheless isn’t set only at the end of History, but also – and here stands the difference with others events situated in our imagination at the end of times, of history or of the world – at the end of space: beyond conquered land and the global market, beyond planet Earth, in fact lies nothing. All this confers to «un sentiment vif de la rondeur de la terre» (Ricoeur), but instils as well a vivid fear of space-time emptiness, opening the door to visions of the ultimate fate of a apocalyptic nature.

Fears of globalisation – which live close with a welcoming enthusiasm, full of liberating and «progressive» yearnings – are of various kind. The analysis of these fears, found in economical, political and sociological articles of the last few years, will make up the core of my interpretation. There are political fears of paving the way to the birth of totalitarian states, the decrease of local competence, subordination of national interest, abnormal growth of a political-economic-military power that by abstracting itself from the world disposes of the world. There are moral and psychological fears, of loss of local identity in the name of a universal condition not always perceived as desirable. There are cultural fears, a dismay in front of the loss of traditional culture in the name of a global «civilisation de pacotille».

Beside there are unidentifiable fears, anguish and anxiety with no name facing globalisation, such as those manifested by Thomas Mann’s leading character in Death in Venice. In the first pages of the story, Gustav Aschenbach, walking through the streets of Münich, passes nearby two animals of the Apocalypse – a premonition –guarding the outdoor stairs of a Byzantine building. Having reached Venice, he will be fascinated and at the same time totally disoriented by the cosmopolitan and polyglot atmosphere of the city and hotel in which he is staying. In this story the author’s anxiety is revealed completely in the final re-velation/apocalypse: the origin of cholera from exotic and distant lands that will finally take Aschenbach’s life in Venice.
Russian Orthodox Church and Globalization

In a contribution to the 1917-1918 Council, Sergej Bulgakov presented a broad vision of the role which the patriarchate could have played in the future of the Russian church: “Unlike the Rus’ of Moscow, where the patriarchate was an instrument of excessive national isolation, now for us the patriarchate is the organ of the universal awareness of the Orthodox Church, which the provincial college of the synod could not have been. The patriarchate is the head of the church, which raises itself above local limits, sees the other summits and is seen by them... We live in an age in which the narrow and provincial existence of the local church has become impossible, since a series of questions is arising which are not only international but also interconfessional in character”. Bulgakov’s conception of the patriarchal institution was integrated with the conviction that Orthodoxy, as a national church, should have a particular status of *primus inter pares* in the Russian state in that it was “thus organically joined to the people, its culture and its statehood, which it is no longer possible to separate from the social organism which is the national state”. The culture of the “national church” and aspiration to a “universal consciousness” are terms which have been integrated differently in the course of the history of Russian Orthodoxy, and which after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the birth of the new Russian state are continuing to have a central place in the Russian ecclesial awareness.

The opening of the Russian orthodox church to an international and interreligious dimension during the XX century, presented different stages along a tortuous itinerary, often marked by the dramatic difficulties that the Russian Church had to face. The essay wants to describe, even if briefly, this itinerary trying to place it in tendencies of long period of the Russian orthodoxy. The 1917-1918 council, the persecution of the twenties and thirties, the Second World War, the international opening under the aegis of Stalin after the conflict, the ecumenical activity beginning from the ‘60s are some of the stages of this historical run.

The changes of the international situation after 1989-1991 and those inside the former Soviet societies, and particularly in the Russian one, have set the Russian Church in front of new challenges, that originated from the impact with a modernity of western mould and with the secularization of the society. The processes of globalization have constituted a new and in many verses slippery ground for the Russian orthodoxy, whose reactions have often the tendency to defend a confessional and national identity that they feel threatened by the affirmation of cultural, religious and social models perceived as extraneous to the Russian tradition. The analysis of recently taken positions on the matter of globalization from authoritative Russian cleric would like to conclude the essay in the attempt to underline some problematic knots of the present of the Russian Church in relationship to the processes of globalization.
Latvia in the Process of Globalization and Regionalism During 1990’s

Processes of globalisation from the one side and regionalization from the other are growing more and more influential. Due to the development of the science, ways of communications are developing especially quickly. It is impossible to avoid that and to survive in “splendid isolation” for small state during late 20th century. The first question is: are there any tendencies towards regionalisation in Latvia? We should say convincing “yes”.

First of all I mean Baltic Region as the eastern shore of Baltic sea- Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Still from the 20’s and 30’s a lot of evidences have existed on more or less successful process of regionalisation among Baltic state and also Finland and Poland were included in some fields of common and quite close communication. Though there were not (until Baltic Entente Convention was signed in 1934) any formal agreement and official relations between states remained unresolved, consciousness of identifying themselves with certain region grew up gradually. Clear proof of that is the time spent under Soviet occupation. In order not to loose their own identities Baltic peoples put themselves and was put by occupants into one common “Baltic” community. It was even more characteristic for Latvians (as well as Estonians and Lithuanians) when Soviet Union collapsed and Baltic people regained their independence in 1991. During 1990’s there where a lot of agreements between those states, including political, military and economic ones. Though there were a lot of contradictions between Baltic states building a closely connected region during 1990’s (and it is still under construction), it is possible to conclude, in comparison with some other post-Soviet and post-communist regions, that peaceful - and one can say friendly - relations in general could produce good perspectives for common development and promotion of the region as well. Another, and for Latvia very promising, trend is aspiration towards building of the larger one-Baltic sea region. There are a lot of evidences demonstrating that not only Baltic states are interested in development of common regionalism. One of the best organised and developed Northern region (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Iceland) is looking, however traditionally very carefully, towards tightening relations. Eagerness of Latvians to develop such a kind of closer ties is connected with political support and investments for the recover of state's economic conditions as well desire to follow in building up of highly developed societies. Last but not the least consideration is based on historical roots, on positive image of Northern countries among Latvians even for centuries. It seems that ideas of building some kind of Baltic sea region are coming true through growing number of bilateral end- even more- already regional projects at all levels and fields from the political support to the international organisations to the cooperation between concrete institution and private organisations. In case of succeeding of that, Baltic could remain as subdivision.

Third level of possible regionalisation on a world scale is a common European identity. Belonging to European institutions, it is based in willingness of Latvia to try to secure her independence and in connection with both political and economical reasons, to draw Latvia in European economy as soon as possible. The best example is the painful and partly forced shift of Latvian industry from Russian markets to the European ones. Of great importance are geographical as well as cultural considerations. And we can safely add another immaterial condition- traditionally identity of Latvians as European in a wider sense of understanding.

Generally speaking, Latvia is included in the certain number of regions, which do not exclude each others. One could say, it is even some kind of supplement needed for further development. Regionalism has old roots in the history of Latvians and it has been accepted since long before 1990’s. Therefore the case of Latvia can clearly prove necessity of regionalisation for small nations to take part more actively in the process of globalization.
A Debate in Progress: Globalization and Time-Terming

Time-terming is likely to be one of the ways to tackle the globalization’s issue, at least for some of the several and different sides it implies -not regarding ideological aspects that are so often overwhelming in the nowadays endless bibliography on it.

From Wallerstein himself, scholars in world-system economy argue, for example, that the capitalistic production and trade system is organized on global bases by its own very nature from the origins. Who -like Robertson and Waters- the sheer economic nature of integration processes in world economy, he also questions the concept of a similarity between world economy and globalization, because in globalization process elements of economic nature take part as well as institutional, political, technological, cultural ones. From this standpoint, even people who consider the globalization process a long-term phenomenon should admit this process has got ultimate momentum during the last decades.

From this point of view a main originality of globalization would be the attuning -due to several elements that are differently inter-related: the Nation-State crises, "financialization" of the economy, technological breakthrough- of integration/fragmentation dynamics pertaining to economy and political circumstances respectively. Nevertheless we put in mind the globalization (or integration)/fragmentation poles, the very contemporary reality (XIX and XX centuries) looks complex and multiform indeed, as I. Clark has showed by resuming the issue of the siècle bref and of its time-terming once again.
Sovereignty, Regionalism and Globalization in Southeast Asian Politics

The purpose of this paper is to examine the change and continuity of the substance of sovereignty in relation to the development of regionalism and globalization in the Asia-Pacific region, especially focusing on Southeast Asian countries. The paper mainly discusses the following three points.

First, it is to clarify the gap between conceptual and political reality of sovereignty in many cases of nation-building process of Southeast Asian countries. As sovereignty is premised on territoriality which state power controls exclusively, conceptually it becomes a political agenda after the completion of national integration. In reality, however, the shared concept of a nation had not developed enough to bring about an idea of society to be expected to control the state power, both before and during the state-building process in Southeast Asian countries. This meant that the notions of state, nation, and society were not easily congruent, and sovereignty was almost solely undertaken by state power especially during the Cold War period.

In such political circumstances, a priority was put on national stability which meant the stability of the state power. The Cold War sustained these state-centric considerations on sovereignty through economic and military assistance given by major powers to these governments. Originally the core purpose of regionalism such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was to promote primarily development and political stability of the member countries, along with the principle of non-interference in domestic affair among the member states.

Second, now a decade after the end of the Cold War, both this state-led conception of sovereignty and the inward-looking nature of regionalism in Southeast Asia are obviously being challenged by globalization from outside and by the growing aspirations for democratization from within the societies. In terms of the changing pattern of regionalism, the function and prospect of inter-regional relations such as the APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) will be discussed.

Third, with regard to the change and continuity of the function of sovereignty and regionalism, this paper picks up some cases of essential challenges to the conventional state practices of sovereignty among the ASEAN countries, by examining the responses of ASEAN to the human rights issues and environmental crises due to the forest fires in Indonesia. In this context, a need of new approaches to effective regional cooperation will be discussed.

By referring to the emerging NGOs’ activities with increasing global linkages, the point of this paper is, that sovereignty and globalization is not a zero-sum relation, but globalization requires sovereignty both practically and conceptually. Also regionalism and globalization are not an either-or relation, but some initiatives can work well regionally in order to adjust to globalization. What matters now in the era of globalization is and will be the fresh substance of sovereignty, especially a new quality of politics and their relations with societies in Southeast Asian countries.
The last decade of the 20th century was marked by the process of restructuring of geopolitical environment from Gibraltar to the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and self-liquidation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization the countries of Eastern Europe found themselves in isolation. New centers of power have arisen, the character of marginal regions has changed and the restructuring of international relations began.

As one of the most important ties in this complex of problems the Balkans became extremely important. The Yugoslavian crisis of 1998-1999 resulted in instability of international relations in the region and created a threat to the European security in general. The process of multilateral Balkan cooperation which was developing successfully from the second half of 1970s was terribly affected.

Despite all the misfortunes of the crisis the main tendency of the regional development remained untouched. And here we are speaking about the process of integration into European structures through the Balkan economic integration.

The Pact on stability in South-Eastern Europe worked out and adopted at the international forum in Cologne and Sarajevo in summer 1999 has created a base for the implementation of concrete urgent programs. The programs are partly mentioned in the pact and partly they will be worked out on the base of this document in the period from January 1st, 2000 to January 1st, 2003. In particular, one of the programs - creation of transport and utility communications with Western Europe along North-South and East-West routs. In future it will lead to creation of subregional non-government centers aimed at regulation of relations in the regional energy system.

Despite the differences and contradictions between the countries (big and small, poor and rather wealthy, rich in natural resources and not, multinational and mononational) the construction of a zone of political and economic stability is seen as an urgent need. Regionalization which means mutual cooperation at national and subnational levels is a world development tendency and the form and the frame of this process are being created by modern practice.
Regionalism is rooted in India’s cultural and linguistic diversity. In fact, much of India’s known history is regional in between sub-continental empires. The regional, sub-regional movements based on language, religion, ethnicity or culture combine popular - grievances from below with elements of manipulation from the above. The leadership of such regional movements seek to institutionalise its own political authority. These movements are expressed as secessionist, communal, often nativist and parochial. One peels off Punjabi linguism and finds Sikh religious communalism; scratches Tamil regionalism and finds Anti-Brahmin socialism; views Bengal cultural arrogance from a slightly different angel and sees Greater Bengal patriotism. No general and uniform political solution to the problem of primordial discontent seems possible in such situations, only a loose assemblage of diverse, locally adapted ad hoc solutions, related to one another only incidentally and pragmatically.

Modernization tends to create awareness of separate identities. The model on which India is set is one of modernisation of an ancient and highly plural society in the context of an open polity with unevenness of economic development in different parts of the country as one of the most dramatic contributory causes of regionalism in India.

Regionalism may also manifest in the form of a movement for the special privileges for “the sons of the soil” against outsiders. Bombay, Bangalore, Chotanagpur in each of these instances, anti-migrant sentiment took a highly organised political form.

The process of state formation has since independence taken place for reasons of strategic security or administrative efficiency, but most frequently to accommodate a primordial demand. The centre in virtually every instance created states in response to pressure exerted by primordial groups that had the most to gain by acquiring statehood.

This paper seeks to trace the roots and forms of regionalism in India and also touches upon issues relating to regional disparities based on modernisation, socio-economic system, planning process, states reorganisation and separatist movements.
Entre mondialisation et régionalisation:
les relations entre l’Europe et l’Asie du Sud-Est depuis la seconde guerre mondiale

Les relations entre l’Europe et l'Asie du Sud-Est constituent peut-être un champ privilégié pour l'étude des interactions entre les processus de mondialisation et de régionalisation.


C’est cependant dans ce contexte que l’Union européenne et l’ASEAN, à laquelle d’autres pays asiatiques se joignent, se rapprochent dans une démarche intermédiaire entre mondialisation et régionalisation, comme si l’un des ex-puissances coloniales et ce regroupement de nations émancipées pouvaient encore quelque chose l’un pour l’autre: la mise sur pied de l’ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) en 1994, à l’initiative de la France et de Singapour, avait pour objectif d’ouvrir à l’Europe de nouveaux canaux en Asie et d’offrir à l’Asie une alternative européenne, en particulier face à l’APEC et

L’intégration régionale en Asie pacifique, si elle existe vraiment, reste bien fragile: l’Asie n’est pas l’Europe, loin s’en faut. Tout se passe pourtant comme si les processus de mondialisation - sous leurs différentes formes - et de régionalisation allaient de pair, l’un générant l’autre, qui lui-même ne peut se comprendre que par rapport au premier. L’exemple des relations entre l’Europe et l’Asie du Sud-Est illustre même l’idée que le réseau des régionalisations pourrait éventuellement contribuer à donner à la mondialisation une part de son architecture.
Between Wars and International Cooperation Processes. A Possible Reading of the History of International Relations in the 20th Century.

Despite two world wars, one can see in the development of international relations in the XX Century the emerging of a move toward an international community of free countries tending to join and become integrated in order to face the growing problems that development and modernization posed, in a global picture of international relations which witnesses a progressive involvement of all countries and their growing interdependence. The idea of resolving the problems of states and protecting their interests not through war, but through cooperation, integration and multilateral agreements, began to gain ground by means of a process that was not linear, rather it presented frequent interruptions or even regressions. In other words, a new type of international relations was being forged alongside the still prevalent, although declining, traditional force-based forms, the logic of power and war. To verify this assumption, it is necessary to stress some of the moments and problems in international relations normally considered less important, if for no other reason than because they appeared to have fewer immediate consequences.

International relations have always been dominated by the logic of power, even though it is possible to find examples over the centuries of an awareness of the existence of a sphere of common interests to be protected, and events marked by multilateralism and solidarity. The international community has certainly given the impression of being concerned above all with the relationships between states or, even more so, between monarchs or other potentates, but in the upheaval following great armed conflicts they were often used by the states as an opportunity to go beyond the level of searching purely for a formula for peace (peace treaties) and to transcend to the creation of a new post-war scenario. Generally, however, this rested on strong figures (monarchs or other) and not on impersonal politico-diplomatic institutions, to which recourse could be made to prevent or correct international crisis situations, such as the League of Nations or the United Nations would come to be.

Developing parallel to this, especially in the XIX Century, was a process of integration among states. One need only recall the various processes of national unification that can be seen, even when generated by wars or annexations, as processes of international integration based on ideal and cultural motivations, common sentiments and traditions, as well as on precise economic interests that preferred union to competition. National solidarity led to the overcoming of local, regional and class selfishness, and played a great role in history before degenerating into nationalism. In any event, it represented a fundamental moment in the development of democracy and in the overcoming of old political and economic institutions.

The development of pacifist movements from the late XIX to early in the XX Century had a favourable influence on the growing awareness of an active, operative international solidarity. Pacifist ideas then ceased being the appanage of a small number of isolated thinkers, as it had occurred in previous centuries, and acquired an increasingly larger following among political parties and the public in general. In the Catholic world, the values of peace and cooperation among countries became widespread, and internationalist and pacifist theories of a socialistic nature also became increasingly popular, as they emphasized the common interests of the proletariat of all countries. Furthermore, currents of opinion were developed that looked to international arbitration as an instrument to help peace. Nationalist ideology prevailed, however, over all of these currents, leading to World War I and crushing the first timid signs of a new way for nations to relate to each other.

The First World War was a turning point in the history of mankind as well as in the history of international relations. The war marked the definitive beginning of the contemporary model of international relations: the global involvement – in these relations – of the various protagonists of the international scene on a political, economic, social and cultural level. The war also brought about the
first attempt to create a model of international relations based on collective security as an alternative to
the logic of power; the League of Nations was born, which was supposed to mark the beginning of a new
stage of international relations characterized by peaceful solutions to international controversies.
Nonetheless, despite some promising developments in international cooperation on both political and
“technical” levels, in the period between the wars a number of totalitarian movements took shape and
became consolidated, such as Fascism, Nazism and Communism. These extreme and exasperated forms
of nationalism were at the same time a reaction to the many new things appearing in the world,
including the relations between nations.

The period of profound transformations set off by the First World War, with its contradictions between
the organizing of Europe into national states and the growing internationalization of the production
process, ended with World War II, which appeared at the same time as an extreme and stronger
attempt to reassert the logic of power. The Second World War was also a second and important moment
of development in a worldwide process of aggregation that did not come about, as it did in the past,
under the sign of imperialism, but rather through the conscious adhesion of various countries to a world
system.

Following the Second World War, the sovereign state entered a period of crisis. This form of political
organization continued to loose more and more of its self-sufficiency in regard to the controlling of
security, the protecting of the environment and the guiding of economic-social development. Despite the
defending of the principle of national sovereignty by the governments, this principle suffered a
continual, substantial erosion.

Once again at the foundation of the new course in world politics were the profound changes in the
method of production, to which were added the changes in the organization of security, due in large part
to the invention of nuclear weapons. The revolutions in science and in mass communications had also
made the world increasingly interdependent, and, as a consequence, a growing number of problems had
assumed worldwide importance. The passing from a “personal” to an “institutional” concept of security
was by now accepted by the international community, which had evolved from an “individualistic”
model to one that has been continuing to be broader and more “consociative,” characterized by
increasingly wider spheres of application. Thus bilateral agreements gave way to conventions,
instruments that by nature are multilateral and marked by an appearing, if not always substantial,
collectivity of positions.

The birth of the UN in the post-World War II period and of agencies and institutions connected with it
are evidence of the will to continue along the road of collective security, in the broadest sense of the
term. The new stage of international relations seemed to be interrupted quickly following the Cold War
and the dividing of the world into two blocs. Today these phenomena can be examined not only through
a traditional reading, but they can also be seen, especially as regards the Western bloc, as a difficult
time of transition from an atomized international situation to one that is more cohesive. There was the
awareness of acting toward a supposed common interest, toward goals that could not be reached other
than through the concerted action of all countries; and this did not mean strictly military exigencies.
The NATO was undoubtedly an instrument in order to satisfy military needs but, at least on paper, it
should also promoted economic, political, and social cooperation. In line with the trend that we are
attempting to characterize, the other experiment was more important and innovative instead which was
begun after the war, i.e. the process of European integration, which actualized the intuitions which had
emerged in the period between the two wars, although only on a regional scale. The European Union is
a free and voluntary union of democratic sovereign states that for the first time was created without
any imperious use of force. This union, which today definitely represents the highest manifestation of
international cooperation, developed at various moments along a long and rocky road, based on the
principle of gradual but continual evolution.

After World War II, the international horizon was expanded with the appearance of new protagonists
on the world scene, the colonies, which one by one achieved independence, especially in the second half
of the 1950s. The countries from the southern half of the world entered the international scene with
their backwardness and problems, but also with their cultures and wealth. The logic of the Cold War
was soon extended also to the newcomers, often with the complicity of their ruling classes, but there
gradually developed an awareness of the interdependence between the Northern and Southern
hemispheres, and new hypotheses for world development took shape alongside the birth of
organizations aimed at bringing together the developing countries, such as the Organization for African Unity, the movement of non-aligned countries, etc..

The UN is the privileged environment where the southern countries of the world attempt to assert their claims, first on a political and then on an economic level. It was primarily through this channel that the awareness of the importance of international cooperation slowly developed as an instrument to fight underdevelopment and hunger in the world, whose victims still number in the hundreds of thousands every year. Starting in 1961, the UN initiated the “decades of development,” which nevertheless have still not led to solutions for the problems of the southern countries of the world, whose imbalances have repercussions also on the northern countries, giving rise to recessions, emigration, environmental degradation, arms trafficking, and terrorism. For many countries development is still an open problem, and its solution is today one of the most important frontiers in the process of international cooperation and integration.

The fall of the Berlin Wall gave new vigour to the building of a new international order based on the free aggregation of various countries, and it made clear how the politics of power is not the sole moving force behind contemporary international relations. As in all stages of transition, however, it has had - and still has - moments of crisis, for which the UN has not been able to provide effective solutions. This is also because its structure has been subjected to tensions previously inconceivable, and while the states were struggling to organize a stable world political order, there have been episodes of an anachronistic re-emergence of nationalism.

Two historic events taking place in 1991, the Maastricht Treaty and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, symbolize the basic trends facing each other in the world today: the tendency toward integration and the tendency toward disgregation. The affirmation of these two tendencies is the consequence of the end of the bipolar world system. The surmounting of the East/West conflict and the end of the Cold War constitute a fundamental moment in the process of world integration, but at the same time they have created openings for the forces of nationalism, division and violence, which earlier had been contained and disciplined within the sphere of the blocs. On the one hand, there is the aspiration to create a new alternative order to the bipolar system, based on the growing role of the UN and of other regional organizations, such as the European Union, which are better suited to satisfy the cooperation and solidarity needs of a world that is increasingly interdependent. On the other hand, there is the desire for independence of those countries which have long been deprived of this and which bear grudges that unfortunately are not the most auspicious premises for a balanced foreign policy.

The rebirth of nationalism nourishes international anarchy, disorder and economic stagnation, authoritarianism, and the oppression of minorities. The move toward cooperation and integration is not, however, simply an effect of goodwill; it is, above all, a consequence of the necessity to satisfy needs for which states are not able to find adequate solutions on their own. Widening the range of international cooperation in a way so as to satisfy fairly the interests of all countries thus appears to be the true challenge for the near future.
United Kingdom and the Global Foreign Policy in the '50s and '60s

Between the start of the '50s and the end of the '60s of this century, the United Kingdom was compelled to cope with an uncomfortable situation: undergone the war successfully, the country discovered a new situation in the international domain, profoundly changed if compared with the first half of the century. In the past, the sound economic strength, on one side, and the international division, on the other, permitted to the Great Britain to play with equilibrium of power and with the rivalry between the European Nations. After the end of the war the international situation was changed.

The first reaction was the attempt to build up the conditions to defend the third world power role: for example, in consequence of difficulties found in holding Greece and Turkey into the Western bloc, in the second half of the '40s the Labour Government tried to discover new political solutions for the national policy. One of them was the idea of the Euro-African bloc: leading by the United Kingdom, it should be able to face the Soviet bloc and the American preponderance in the West. The project failed, but its heritage was the deep conviction that Great Britain had to maintain the control over some pivotal areas (in the Mediterranean Sea, for example, Libya and Cyprus). Moving on this way British diplomacy subscribed to several regional Treaties, like SEATO in 1954 (with the American participation), the Baghdad Pact in 1955, and, obviously, the Treaties in Europe, like the Brussels Treaty, the NATO Treaty and the UEO.

Really, there were two reasons acting against the British attempt to maintain an autonomous role in the international domain: first, the economical inadequacy of the country to sustain such a strain; second, the radicalisation of the confrontation between the two blocs. The birth of a close bipolarization with the outbreak of the Cold War was tested with the “Suez affair”, when the sector of the British political world that had a strong yearning for the Imperial past, saw its hope for a new autonomy destroyed by the Soviet and American hostility. Bipolarization compelled London to make a choice of sphere, that should be natural if related with the international situation, but unnatural as regards the historical tradition of the country. Such a decision had deprived the country completely of its manoeuvring space, and this was the first care of the English governments in the period considered. The main scope in the second half of the '50s and in '60s was to regain this manoeuvring space; and the course of action chosen was to reject (unofficially) the American superiority in the relations with the Soviet enemy (even if Great Britain never discussed the pivotal function of the American economy and society). In the years between the 1948 to 1969 there was a great inter-systemic antagonism, but a certain intra-systemic stability. Into this situation the United Kingdom tried to transform, after the 1956, the western system in a fluid structure, with the hope to present himself like an essential partner for the United States and the Western bloc. Out of question to be the leading Country in the alliance, now the ambition of the Great Britain should be satisfied only if the Country accepted the role of the “brain” in the alliance. But this hope could be fulfilled entirely only with the possession of some basic tools in the political domain, like the atomic bomb. Moreover, the presence into international defensive institutions (NATO, UEO and CENTO) was propedeutical to influence the international life of the globe. The British political world was fully aware that they could realise this line only if they were able to limit the confrontation with the Soviet enemy on the diplomatic level. A radicalisation of the struggle would be a loss of freedom of action for a Country that need to identify itself with the Western bloc, depending on the American technological help also.3

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Trying to avoid a confrontation with the Communists in distant areas (after the experience of the Korean war), the United Kingdom hoped to restrain the aggressive positions in the American administration, when, for example, the Offshore Island's crisis broke out, bringing the two Chinese Government to the brink of a war. In this period, the British strategy was, first, to confirm the availability of the country to act when requested, accepting the globalization of the clash (good examples for the historians are the military engagement in Malaysia – between 1948 and 1957; the intervention in Jordan – 1958; and Kuwait – 1961; the action in Cyprus – between 1954 and 1960 and again, the presence in Aden - between the 1961 and 1967). Second, to urge a resolute dialogue with the Soviet bloc. So, we can say roughly but surely, that, facing a global confrontation, the United Kingdom accepted formally the struggle, but worked with the aim to limit it. The criteria had to be the evaluation of the event; the action should be considered only as the “extrema ratio”.

If we value by this scheme the Macmillan’s government we should comprehend the reasons that pushed the United Kingdom searching for the distension with the Soviet Union. Of course, Europe would be the core of the foreign policy of the Country, with the Commonwealth and the relations with the USA. For these reasons, London believed that better relations with the Soviet bloc would help to control the course of the events, firstly, and the new political solutions that the European Countries were testing in those years, secondly. The new role of the Western Germany, now not only an economic force, but also a political one (ratified with the participation in the NATO group), reintroduced the main reason of the tension in Europe; and gave to the USSR a good reason to continue to press the Western bloc, with some dangers for the security of the European Nations. In fact, to cope with the Soviet aggressiveness, would be necessary to rise the economic and military commitment (with serious consequences for the English economy, so strained yet). If the United Kingdom was not able to sustain the task, the USA should be interested to transform the first wall against the Communism (Germany), in their main ally in the world.

The British Government discovered an original way (that was followed by the US Administration in the ‘70s, with SALT, MBFR and CSCE Treaties): to institutionalise and strengthen the division of Europe in two blocks, with a mutual recognition. For London to hold up the dialogue would have a huge advantage: to resolve the difficulties of comprehension between the two Superpowers (Berlin and Cuba). On this way, it should be possible, at the same time, to contrast the European organisation, the European Economic Community, dangerous for the British trade with the continent: the ultimate aim of the European Countries was a European political union, a new form of Continental bloc that in the past was the English nightmare. For this reason also, the British Government’s action was devoted, firstly, to slow down the integrative process putting the EEC into a bigger and not close structure like the Free Trade Area proposed in the 1957; secondly, to participate in the EEC itself, trying to control the life of the structure from inside. The best way would be the “Interdependence” between the countries of the Western bloc. The “Interdependence” concept, new instrument of the global policy, could avoid the risk of the “multilateralism”, a serious danger for the United Kingdom, denying the national freedom of action and, at the same time, the national role of leader for UK (an example was the MLF saga –1963-65).

It would be a serious mistake to analyse the British policy concerning Europe, separating it from the global contest. The détente in Europe should have permitted a save of economical, military and psychological resources, giving the chance to move British attention to different areas of the world and reaffirming the U.K. international role. Significantly, the objective of the British policy in Africa and in Asia was to influence the decolonization in these areas. The idea to create very big confederations was rooted to two main reasons. First, to create homogeneous nations, primarily on the economical side, permitting an easier management of the relations between the new countries and the motherland (for example, the Central African Federation (1953-1963). Second, to permit the birth of structures useful in case of military action and political co-operation (for example, the Malaysian Confederation). With this policy it should have been possible identify areas of influence, marking the limits of national interest, assuring, into the global domain, an exact collocation of the political, economical and military resources, each time available for the action.

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5 Using pivotal bases like Aden, the Chagos Islands or Singapore. A bright example is, P.R.O., PREM 11-2946. Disposition of United Kingdom Units in 16 October 1960, map.
From Global Mediterranean to the Mediterranean in a Global World

The Mediterranean world is of great importance interesting regional perspective for the study of globalisation for two reasons: 1) it was one of the earliest regions of the world in which a global world-society, which is to say, a complex society including different partial societies developed; 2) it took part in a very deep way in the process of formation of the contemporary world society. Thus, we think it is very important that one or several papers on this region of the world should be presented at the session on “Globalisation, regionalisation and history of international relations” that the Commission of History of International Relations is organising at the Oslo Congress.

We are ready to present one paper, focusing on the phases of the integration of the Mediterranean world in the contemporary world economy and the spread of modern economic growth in the Mediterranean world. We think it would be very important to have other papers, especially on the following topics:

The demographic evolution of the Mediterranean world, including the spread of transitional and modern demographic behaviour and migrations (both intra-Mediterranean and to other regions of the world).

The political evolution of the Mediterranean world, including the development of liberal and democratic regimes, the colonization and decolonization processes and the role of socialism.

The cultural evolution of the Mediterranean world, including the development of secularism and the reaction and confrontation of traditional religious groups.
Today the very definition of feminism is a controversial issue (Rupp-Taylor, 1999) because the various women's movements which have come into being at different moments and in different contexts have each expressed their own ideas, strategies and practices, at times divergent - even though they have often attempted (with varying degrees of success) to communicate with each other across national and regional boundaries.

Women historians have proposed very different frames and categorisations for defining feminism: one needs only to consider the distance between "relational feminism" which argued for an equality of women within their traditional family role of mother and wife and "individualist feminism", which placed more emphasis on human rights and individual autonomy (Offen, 1988).

Although the meaning of feminism has been called into question, and its nature has undergone profound changes in different times and places, recently many feminist scholars (especially historians and philosophers) have tried to establish interpretative models with which to identify features common to different women's movements. Taking their cue from the International Women's Movement of the beginning of the twentieth century - founded upon universalistic principles - some women scholars have therefore used the term "collective identity" to describe the possible shape of feminism in the twenty-first century; a static vision of identity is rejected in favour of multiple identities capable of communicating each other. In fact, the process of constructing a collective feminist identity suggests the possibility of overcoming national differences so as to achieve new forms of solidarity respecting both similarities and differences.

Other women scholars (Benhabib, 1999) have argued that the enormous changes taking place at the economic, technological and political level have stimulated a need for more security which has revived interest in those universalistic values rejected by feminism and its theorists in the nineteen-eighties. During those years, the hermeneutic mistrust of generalisations had led to the recognition of differences in race, class, culture, and sexual orientation with the aim of combating the theoretical dominance of white middle-class heterosexual women. Today within the different women's movements today, on the other hand, there is a strong awareness of the interdependence existing between women of different classes, cultures, sexual orientations, religions and nationalities and feminist theorists are being called upon to play the role of brokers in the ongoing renegotiation of new collective identities.

Other women scholars are investigating whether it is indeed possible to imagine a global feminist community, and what characteristics it would need in order to respond to the needs and objectives both of western women and of those from developing countries (Jaggar, 1998). One of the thorniest topics in this context is that of human rights, whose definition often varies a great deal in different parts of the world.

Not until 1993, during the Second World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, violence against women was recognised officially as a violation of human rights. But at the basis of this determination there are still deep differences between the meaning of human rights for western women and for those in developing countries. The global system itself and the economic order accompanying it accentuate these differences, although in both areas it is the poorer women who are most at risk.

The difficult task of women's movements - and in particular of those struggling for human rights - would therefore seem to be to bridge this gap between universalism and cultural relativism by linking up local dimensions to the global one.
Long Cycles of the International Society And Their Contemporary Consequences

The end of the XX century and the beginning of the XXI century are an opportunity in the attempt to reflect on international relations through a perspective of long cycles. Various authors have been masters of this point of view: Braudel (1975), Kennedy (1989), Arrighi (1994), Wallerstein (1991) and many others. However, our objective will not be to reflect on cycles of history, not even of international relations, in its long periods, but of taking them in consideration, including past centuries, to think, more concretely and modestly, about the scenario that could arise in the post-Cold War period.

The question is pertinent because, since around 1989 or 1990, when the period called cold war or east-west conflict apparently ended, the existing literature and reflection neither have been sufficient to constitute an adequate critical mass, nor have presented widely based directives to draw the arising international scenario. Neither do we have the intention of doing so, we will only try to call for history to help comprehend the present and future. So being, we shall revive the historical debate about international society and society of states, about practical association and association of objectives, in order that we may later analyse contemporary international behaviour.

A great many authors, by far the majority that have dealt with the theme, consider that the end of the Thirty Years War, with the Peace of Westphalia concluded in 1648, after the separate treaties of Munster and Osnabruck, between the emperor, kings, catholic and protestant princes was of great consequence because it implanted the principle that the states of Europe should live together having the values of tolerance and coexistence as a mutual foundation. The concept of international society appears to have arisen after that. Europe was then acknowledgely a multiplicity of independent states where there would be a certain degree of religious liberty, maintaining the principle that a territory's sovereign would determine the religion in it. The idea of an external authority over temporal power, authority until then embodied in the Pope and the already symbolic figure of the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, was abandoned definitely.

The principle of one religion, the search for supremacy in name of the legitimate religion, was definitely buried. The peace treaty signed between the winning and defeated nations, like Austria, Spain, France, Sweden, and others, marked the arrival of new times. The basis for the concept of sovereignty were laid, which, from Bodin to Hobbes, many had worked for. Sovereignty, in the definition applied to international relations, from Russett and Star, is that “there is no authority whatsoever in conditions to determinate how the state to act; there is no actor with legitimate authority to say to a state what is should do (Russett and Star, 1992, pg. 99).

Since that moment the main question have appeared which torments us until the dawning of the XXI century: the relation between a state of society present inside a state and of the state of nature in the relations among states, according to the terms borrowed from jusnaturalism. Rosseau had clearly called attention to this fact. “The first thing that I observe, in considering the state of the human kind, is a contradiction that manifests itself in its order, that makes it always waver. As men, we live in a civil state, submitted to the laws; as people, each one enjoys natural liberty; something that makes our situation worse then if these differences were unknown” (Rousseau, 1970: pg. 610, free translation).

Does the post-Cold War world lay new precepts, that allow us to relive Rousseau and suppose the possibility of elimination of those differences?

Aron believes that what prevailed in the XX century was an interstate system, not because a international society could not have existed, but because the century was essentially belligerent, even in the seemingly peaceful moments. This approach helps us define a possible characterisation of the specificities of Post-Cold War time. Even more, it establishes a continuity for the comprehension of the great thread that international relations are. These certainly existed before Westphalia, but they were permanently intermeddled by the tendency for the idea of the universal kingdom (Egyptian, Macedonian, Greek, Roman, Christian, Turkish), to be implanted at least in the space of a known
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universe. According to this, the internationalists, in general, consider that international relations can only be thought after Westphalia, even if treaties, ambassadors and other diplomatic instruments have existed since long time earlier. The very idea of international law, the law of peoples, develops itself after that, taking its first tender steps.

For Aron, the inter state system, that is international relations as relations between states, is not but a part of what is called international society or a world society. Reiterating, this definition opens interesting possibilities of reflection about the Post-Cold War time. For Aron, there are conceptual precepts that enable us to think international relations not only as occurring between states, but also between human beings. Probably, this is one of the vital subjects to be studied in order to think on the effective novelties that appear in the present and future international scenario.

International society would be, therefore, a group that includes the interstate, world economy, or the world market or the world economic system, and the transnational and supranational phenomena. “We conveniently define international society as the group of all the relations between states and between people that allow us to dream the unity of the human species” (ARON, 1984: pg. 24, free translation).

The definition of international society, of the interstate system, and of its historical evolution takes us finally to the possibility of discussing contemporary scenarios. What are the possible equilibria, the theme of hegemony, and lastly, of security. This last one has been reached in the last three hundred and fifty years by international configurations of balance of power, of concert or bipolarity. Is true that none of them prevented wars. The State of Nature, in Hobbes language (1974), always prevailed, despite that bipolarity, the threat of mutual destruction has avoided a general war and has reconverted itself apparently in a peaceful way. The debate on themes like eco-security (Jarrín, Mathews and Myers, 1990), being used as an instrument of power many times are the theme of environment, indicates that the international agenda will have to increasingly adapt to a new institutional form. This, however, is not certain, as the current debates demonstrate, particularly the one on reform of the Security Council. The so-called global themes require co-responsibilisation. To obtain stability, the international system must be inclusive. At the same time, we shall discuss how this inclusion can be obtained by the adhesion to universal principals or also by the hegemonic imposition, unipolar or in concert.

The increasing debate on the right of intervention (Lottenberg, 1997), with all the benefits and all the implicit and explicit dangers that is carries, show that some of the precepts that governed the destiny of humanity over the last centuries are being changed. There is a crisis in the principle of sovereignty and in the principle of self determination of people, despite the fact that the search for grounds of legitimacy for its abolition are searched for in the VII Chapter of the United Nations Charter, that refer to violations of peace and to international security. Brazil, in association with decisions of the Security Council or the General Assembly, strengthens the new interpretation of international law, contributing to the creation of international law. Despite the risk, probably this must be, way in the expectation that it may contribute to multipolarity. Doses of reality, which leads one to want to participate, combine with doses of cooperative utopia. The position of the powerful countries may be strengthened, because they have more capability to convince and more means to enforce decisions. A perspective of a cooperative world, of peace, of justice, where the Universalisation of rights is a fact, may be strengthened. The recognition of the terrain, including the recognition that the proper values are differentiated and correspond to different world concepts, is an important step for the identification of interests and the possible proposals. This is the objective of this article.
Japanese-Asian Relations and Euro-Asian Relations.
Regionalism and Globalization in Asia in the first half of the 20th Century

This paper aims to survey the contradictions between Japan's regionalism in Asia on the one side and its adaptation to globalism in international society on the other side before the Pacific War with regard to some Japanese diplomats.

After the First World War, Japan was among the permanent members of the Council of the League of Nations. The League of Nations represented an order that presupposed the modern theory of state sovereignty and the principles of national self-determination. Japan officially accepted the Globalization of this European modernity.

Japan's regionalism in Asia came to be expressed on behalf of Japan's nationalistic expansion in China and South East Asia, that is the making of the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. Japan insisted that other Asian peoples could not adapt themselves to such aspects of modernization as state sovereignty and self-determination, on the ground that they had never been under the rule of law.

Japan’s regionalism tended to be incompatible with its acceptance of Modern Western globalism. I intend to conduct research on some Japanese diplomats who had a long experience in working for international society; among them Yotaro Sugimura, Japanese Ambassador to France and Vice-Secretary General of the League of Nations and Kenkichi Yoshizawa, Japanese Ambassador to France and President of the Association of the United Nations in Japan. Even though they theoretically supported Modern European globalism, they might have been limited by their own perceptions on Japan's regional interests in Asia.
Globalization and the Asian Economic Crisis

The relentless process of globalization that characterizes the world economy makes national economies increasingly interdependent. The chain effects of the Asian crises are not confined only to a regional economic context.

Besides leading to shifting competitive positions in a number of countries, the Asian crises seem to have been strong enough to put into question geopolitical and strategic equilibrium that had been struck after the end of the Cold War.

In its recent history, Asia has not produced security strategies of its own, having been dominated by colonial powers, and by the juxtaposition of the superpowers. It is difficult to predict medium-term scenarios for the evolution of Asia with any certainty, as the end of the bipolar system has changed the global geopolitical equilibrium, and created a particularly fluid and dynamic situation in Asia as well.

The most important regional association, ASEAN, in dealing with the consequences of the economic and political crises, played a weak role to organize an effective regional and co-operative response.

The lack of such a response raises a series of questions relating to the effectiveness of some ASEAN’s basic principles as well as the association’s ability to overcome the challenges posed by the Asian crisis.
Jean-Paul Willaime
Ecole Pratique d’Hautes Etudes, Paris, France

Protestantisme et globalisation

Profondément enracinées dans des cadres régionaux et nationaux, c’est essentiellement à travers l’action missionnaire et les collaborations œcuméniques que les Églises protestantes se sont ouvertes à l’international au cours du XXe siècle.

La formation du Conseil Œcuménique des Églises (World Council of Churches: WCC) en 1948 à Amsterdam a représenté une étape essentielle de ce processus. Confronté à la guerre froide et à l’intégration européenne, le Conseil Œcuménique des Églises qui, dès le départ, a inclus des Églises orthodoxes, a constamment cherché, au prix de tensions et de compromis dans les relations Est-Ouest et Nord-Sud, à sauvegarder coûte que coûte sa dimension globale, c’est-à-dire l’oikoumène (la terre habitéée).


Mais à côté de ces structures associant diverses Églises, on note une autre orientation à l’échelle internationale: celle incarnée par l’Alliance Évangélique Universelle, un mouvement interdénominationnel créé à Londres en 1846 et qui a voulu d’emblée rassembler des chrétiens de différentes Églises anglicanes et protestantes se réclamant du double héritage de la Réforme protestante et des Réveils (expérience personnelle de la conversion et insistance sur la sanctification). Le protestantisme évangélique représente un christianisme de conversion qui insiste sur l’engagement religieux personnel de chacun et les conséquences concrètes et visibles de cet engagement dans la vie individuelle et sociale. Face au déclin relatif des Églises protestantes établies de tendance libérale, ce protestantisme militant, y compris sous la forme du pentecôtisme, s’est fortement développé depuis les années 1960. Une véritable internationale évangélique (evangelical) s’est ainsi créée qui représente une autre forme de l’internationalisation du protestantisme qui est très présente aujourd’hui, une forme d’internationalisation qui a tiré partie des possibilités offertes par la mondialisation de la communication (cf. la retransmission par satellite des campagnes d’évangélisation du baptiste américain Billy Graham dans les années 1980-1990). Cette internationalisation évangélique illustre bien le phénomène de la glocalisation, à savoir l’articulation du local et du global: enracinés dans des cultures très diverses et centrés sur l’Église locale (congrégationalisme), cette sensibilité se déploie en un vaste réseau d’individus et d’associations à travers le monde.

C.O.E. et réseaux évangéliques, les deux principaux visages de l’internationalisation du protestantisme, permettent de bien analyser les caractéristiques et les tensions du protestantisme confronté à la globalisation: association mondiale d’Églises et réseau d’individus convertis cherchent, chacun à leur façon, à relever le défi de la globalisation.
Democracy/Capitalism, Debate Theme.
Notion of the State Today

When in 1972 the Organization of the United Nations objected and admonished about the activity of the transnational corporations, states were far to realize that in a short period of time the displacement of the political power by the economic one was starting.

In the year 1973 the Trilateral Commission was born and stated the position for all countries: to disengage from state’s protection and to look for different ways of self-protection.

Later the process, whose turning point consisted in the fall of the Berlin Wall, set out and the concept of state’s sovereignty became obsolete in front of a form of power that is not contained within the borders of a Nation.

This is the way how, in daily life, the classical conception of state, as well as the sovereignty exerted through the Democratic Powers, came to the end.
Globalisation, Regionalisation and the History of International Relations

Areas and Topics

Australia

- Beaumont Jean (Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria, Australia), Australia between regionalization and globalization. Historical Perspective and recent trends.
- Hajdu Joe, (Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria, Australia), The Presence of Global Capital in Australia and the Debate over National Identity.
- Lowe David (Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria, Australia), Three world wars: Australia and the Global Implications of Twentieth Century Wars.

Asia

- Ferretti Valdo, (Università "La Sapienza", Roma), The globalization Process from South to East Asia and Japan's Adhesion to the Colombo Plan in 1954.
- Mansingh Surjit (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India), India and China in Comparative Perspective: between Regionalism and Globalization.
- Shuto Motoko (Komazawa University, Tokio), Sovereignty, Regionalism and Globalization in South East Asia.
- Subhash Gupta (Maitreyi College, University of New Delhi, India), Regionalism in India.
- Tertrais Hugues (Pierre Renouvin Institute, University of Paris I, France), Entre mondialisation et régionalisation: les relations entre l'Europe et l'Asie du Sud-Est depuis la seconde guerre mondiale.
- Watanabe Hirotaka (Tokio University of Foreign studies, Japan), Japan, Asia and Euro-Asian Relations: Regionalism in Asia and Globalization in the First Half of the 20th Century.
- Weber Maria (Università Bocconi, Milano, Italia), Globalization and the Asian Economic Crisis.

North America

- Poitras Guy (Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas, USA), Inventing North America: the Evolution of Regionalism in a Globalized Political Economy.

Latin America

[In fact many scholars from Argentina and Brazil will present in Oslo a collection of papers related to Latin America and the problems of Globalization and Regionalization. See pages 94-124. Rapoport will present in Oslo a preliminary paper to this collection.]

Africa

- Döpcke Wolfgang, (Universidade de Brasilia), About the Mistery and Misery of Regional Integration in Africa.

Mediterranean Sea

- Valerio Nuno (University of Technics, Lisbon, Portugal), From Global Mediterranean to the Mediterranean in a Global World.

Europe

- Angerer Thomas (University of Vienna, Austria), Austria’s Foreign Policy since 1918: between Regionalization and Globalization.
- Graziani Augusto (Università “La Sapienza”, Roma), The Italian Economy in the International Context: the International Setting.
- Haba Kumiko, (Hosei University, Tokyo, Japan), Globalism and Regionalism in the East Central Europe: Nationality Problem and Regional Cooperation under the EU and NATO Enlargement.
- Hovi Kalervo (University of Turku, Finland), Globalization and Regionalization in the Baltic States and Finland in the 1920’s and 1930’s.
- Kaelble Hartmut, Globalization and European Society.
- Petersen Nikolaj (Aarhus University, Denmark), Denmark and Norden in the Post-War Period: Between Sub-Regionalism, Reginalism and Globalism.
- Puskas Vasile (Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania), Post-1989 Central Europe. National Interests, European Integration and Globalisation.
- Nevakivi Jukka (Helsingfors Universite Poliittisen Historian Laitos, Helsingin-Yliopisto-Finland), Globalization, Regionalization and the History of International Relations: the case of Scandinavia and Finland.
- Scerbinskis Valters (University of Latvia, Riga, Lettonia), Latvia in the process of Globalization and Regionalization during 90’s.
- Smirnova Nina D. (University of Moscow, Russia), Regionalization and Regional Integration. Balkan Tie.
- Valent Lucio (Centro per gli Studi di Politica Estera e opinione Pubblica, c/o Università degli Studi di Milano, United Kingdom and Globalization in the 1950’s and 1960’s.

TOPICS
Global Management


Globalization and Development

- Osterhammel Jurgen (University of Konstantanz), Globalising and regionalising forces affecting the dependent World (19th and 20th centuries).
- Aguirre, Rubén Mario y Gatti, Gustavo (Facultad de Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad de Buenos Aires), The End Of The Century And The End Of Employment. East-West: A Reality
- Breda dos Santos Norma, [Department of History, University of Brasilia], OMC: règles multilatérales stables et non-discriminatoires? Perspectives pour la libéralisation du secteur agricole
- Iuorno, Graciela y Alcira Trincheri (Departamento de Historia- Facultad de Humanidades – Universidad Nacional del Comahue), The Globalization and Latent Conflicts at the End of the Century. The Ethnic-Religious Nationalism in Kosovo and Cachemira. [See Europe]

Alleanze Military Partnerships

- Cogan Chuck (Harvard University, Cambridge, USA), NATO, UE, after the Cold War.
- Jordan Robert S. (University of New Orleans, USA), Clausewitz and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR); do they have anything in common?
- Kaplan Lawrence (Kent State University, Ohio), The evolution of NATO as a military organization.
- Kay Sean, (Ohio Wesleyan University, USA), Security regionalisation in the new Europe.

Churches

- Bidussa David (Fondazione Feltrinelli, Milano), All-Reaching Answers to Globalization. Religious Radicalism as “Tradition's Figure” and “Social Mobilization”. The Late 20th Century Jewish Case
- Canavero Alfredo (Università degli Studi di Milano), A more Globalized Church will be less Universal? The Internationalization of the Roman Curia in the 20th Century.
- Giovagnoli Agostino (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano), Between Decolonization and Globalization: the Catholic Church and the 20th Century Missions
- Roccucci Adriano (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano), Russian Orthodox Church and Globalization.
- Willaime Jean Paul (Ecole Pratique des Haute Etudes, IRESCO, Paris, Francia), Protestantism, the Church and the Globalization.

Socialism and Globalisation

- Amoroso Bruno Federico (Caffè Centre Roskilde, Danmark), Globalization and Regionalism.
- Ciampani Andrea (Dipartimento di Studi Internazionali, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, Università degli Studi di Padova) Social Actors in History of International Relations: European Trade Unions from Internationalism to Global Society.
Feminism

- Vezzosi Elisabetta (Università degli Studi di Trieste), The feminist Movement between Globalization and regionalization.

Theorists and Historians

- Colombo Alessandro, (Università degli Studi di Milano), Globalisation and the Crisis of international Society. Martin Wight and Carl Schmitt’s reflections on the cultural and Insitutttional Dimensions of International Relations.
- Doran Charles, (John Hopkins University, Washington D.C. USA) Will Globalization and Regionalization weaken the State and facilitate secession?
- Ferguson Yale (Rutgers University - Newark, (New Jersey), USA), Globalization, Regionalization, and other Conceptions of Political Space: Past, Present and Future.
- Gejo, Omar Horacio y Ana María Liberali (Centro de Estudios Alexander von Humboldt- Universidad de Buenos Aires), Globalización versus Regionalización.
- Preda Daniela (Università degli Studi di Genova), Globalization and Regionalization: An Historical Approach.
- Scirocco Giovanni (Istituto di Studi Mediterranei, c/o Università della Svizzera Italiana, Lugano - Centro per gli Studi di politica estera e Opinione pubblica, c/o Università degli Studi di Milano), A Debate in Progress: Globalization and Time-Termining.
- Tosi Luciano, (Università degli studi di Perugia), Between Wars and International Cooperation Processes. A Possible Reading of the History of International Relations in the 20th Century.
- Vigevani Tullo (State University of Rio de Janeiro, Cedec, Brazil), Long cycles of the International Society and their Contemporary Consequences.
Globalisation, Regionalisation and The History of International Relations in Latin America

With an Introductory Paper
by Mario Rapoport
The Relationship between Argentine and Western Europe. A Special Case: Relationaship with Spain (1990-1999).

The political and economical relations between Argentine and Western Europe had been very important in the last two centuries. After some weakness which took place at the end of World War II and the 60’s, the relationship has been growing in importance until the last decade. In the 90’s the European Community’ Countries became very important to Argentine in fields such as investments or commerce. One of the most relevant case regards Spain, which became a great investor in the Argentine economic structure and basically widened the business connections with this country. The direct investments of Spanish industrial and financial groups, especially in Argentine privatisation of the last years, were the most significant facts which affected the relationship between these two countries. Investments of Spanish companies in our country -that until that time had been of less importance- grew so much that since 1994 they achieved a privileged position in the investments made in order to buy Argentine state companies.

In 5 years only, companies such as Telefónica, ENDESA, Gas Natural, Iberia, Aguas de Barcelona, REPSOL, Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa, just to mention some of them, went on to own many former state companies of our country. Besides, a new stage began in 1996 regarding this investment offensive of Spanish funds; it mainly focused on banks, expansion of previously acquired companies and also bounded to buy important private companies in Argentine. This second stage of Spanish investments was headed by important financial entities, all of them with different interests in the deal, such as Banco Bilbao-Vizcaya and Santander.

All of this has essentially changed the relationship between Argentine and Spain, bestowing a very special place in the Argentine economy and politics upon the last one. Nevertheless, the economic relationship with other members of the European Community became stronger.

This essay will consider the changes in the Hispanic-Argentine relationship, and it will try to analyze some of its causes.
The Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Beginning of the United States Hegemony in the Hemisphere (1906-12)

At the end of the nineteenth century, the United States reoriented -under the rhetoric of Pan-Americanism- its foreign policy for the Latin America, through the reactivation of the American international conferences and the visit, to the most important countries in the American hemisphere South cone by the Secretary of State, Elihu Root (1906).

Rio Branco, who used to be the head of the Brazilian Chancellery for over ten years (from December, 1902 to February, 1912) realised a new distribution of the worldwide power. He did not question the American claims and showed the desire of seeing the leadership of the United States throughout the Continent.

In fact, the Brazilian Chancellor had no reason to be afraid of the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine portrayed in 1904. His country was in a period of institutional stability, was brought up to date with its international financial commitment, hence had not been included among the “bad governed and turbulent” republics.

Rio Branco tried to make use of the American friendship in a pragmatic way, having in mind the Brazilian aims in the under-regional context. He practised a diplomacy of prestige, he went after a status of a South-American first power for his country and was frequently called “imperialist” like Theodore Roosevelt was.

The United States friendship, in spite of the apparent paradox in the Brazilian Chancellor’s concept, enlarged the range of Brazilian movements in the South-American area. The friendship toward to the United States was also established on the tradition and on economic reasons, since the still growing wide market of this country, had been fundamental for the Brazilian economy whose most dynamic sectors were based especially on coffee, rubber, sugar and tobacco sales.

Especially in the following years up to I W.W the Brazilian Chancellery was also well-disposed towards Argentina and Chile, not in order to offset the American influence but with the aim to act with its backing, and it should be built into the idea of a South entente in benefit of the peace in the region. This fortuitous agreement was a concern for the minor countries. Some of those, especially Peru, had some dispute with one of the ABC members, because of the Taena and Arica matter against Chile, and the boundary question with Brazil.

A good relationship among the three largest countries of the continent was to be ruled by the intention of an oligarchy condominium, as the North Power Agreement showed for instance during the preparation of the IV American International Conference (Buenos Aires, 1910) when the Brazilian initiative about a previous understanding - which consisted in a resolution in support to Monroe Doctrine - was frustrated among the ABC representatives.
Jorge Hugo Carrizo

Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia Económica y Social
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires, Argentina


Based on a particular interpretation of Argentine industrialization’s limits and the causes of Peronism’s downfall, Frondizi’s “developmentism” shaped a concept of the nation. This concept was deeply rooted on the trends that seemed to characterize international relations during the second half of the fifties: “pacific coexistence” between the superpowers and the development/underdevelopment dichotomy. Those features in the international scene were leading, according to Frondizi’s vision, to economic independence and the strengthening of national identities.

This paper examines relationships between economic and social change in Argentina, the international context in the second half of the fifties and Frondizi’s developmentalist discourse, including the ideas on nation.

The ‘Qué’ magazine in its second period, which used to be the weekly publication of Frondizi’s group, is used as the main source of reference, together with other essays and historical works.
La progresiva globalización del sistema económico mundial, haciendo inviable el aislamiento de las economías nacionales a partir del modelo de desarrollo hacia adentro, y la tendencia a la apertura económica sancionada por la conclusión de la Ronda de Uruguay y la creación de la OMC, han desembocado a nivel mundial en un renacimiento del fenómeno de integración regional.

De esta forma, el regionalismo parece constituir la alternativa a esta creciente integración de la economía internacional como consecuencia de la globalización de la producción de bienes y servicios, y los movimientos de capital.

En este sentido, el proceso de construcción del Mercosur es inseparable de la etapa de globalización del sistema capitalista y de la nueva estructura de poder mundial surgida tras el fin de la guerra fría. La primera impulsa los cambios internos en los países miembros (apertura económica, privatizaciones, desregulación, atracción de inversiones extranjeras directas) y la segunda obliga a la región a asumir responsabilidades políticas estratégicas internacionales.

A partir de las voluntades políticas de Brasil y Argentina, expresadas en diversos acuerdos conseguidos en el transcurso de la década de los 80’, ambas partes fueron desplazándose desde la frontera de la división a la frontera de la cooperación.

El proceso de acercamiento entre Brasil y la Argentina es un clásico de superación de algunos elementos hobbesianos en una relación entre vecinos, que refleja una vocación por la sociabilidad de la cooperación grociana, donde los elementos kantianos, la restauración de los gobiernos plenamentemente democráticos, cumplieron una función escencial. De esta forma Brasil y Argentina constituiron el núcleo duro de esta integración, similar a lo que sucedió entre Francia y Alemania en el proceso de la Unión Europea. A partir de este núcleo el proceso se dinamiza con la incorporación de Uruguay y Paraguay dando origen a partir del Tratado de Asunción de 1991 el Mercado Común del Sur, o, más brevemente, Mercosur.

De esta forma el Mercosur constituye un acuerdo subregional, en el marco de la Asociación latinoamericana de Integración, que involucra la acción concertada de los Estados miembros para llevar a cabo la integración económica entre ellos. Surgió en primera instancia con el objetivo acelerar la liberalización del comercio intra zona y establecer de esta forma un Mercado Común, que se encuentra en la etapa de Unión Aduanera Imperfecta, porque ha establecido un período de adecuación para ciertos rubros en el arancel externo común.

No obstante el éxito con el que se ha desarrollado hasta el momento, el Mercosur se encuentra en una etapa de transición, prolongada por las dificultades que surgen del choque de intereses en la coordinación de medidas macroeconómicas. La devaluación de Brasil y la recesión económica que sufre la región, ha acentuado los problemas relacionados con el funcionamiento del libre comercio intrarregional que ya estaba siendo afectado por la imposición de barreras no arancelarias y por el uso de incentivos distorsivos en la venta intrazona.

Estos problemas comerciales, sumados a incumplimientos e indisciplinas de arrastre, llevaron a un resquebrajamiento de la confianza entre los socios, y como se sabe, este último elemento es fundamental en todo proceso de integración. Esta es, brevemente, la situación actual por la que atraviesa el Mercosur y la que trataremos de explicar más extensamente y en detalle, para poder elaborar escenarios futuros de lo que constituye la mejor opción estratégica de inserción de la región, frente a los desafíos del nuevo milenio.
Latin America: a Zone of Interest for European Union?

This study aims to analyse the role of the European Union, which is the block that has started the regional integration among countries, so it will consider the cooperative wave that took place in Latin America at the beginning of the 90's.

The study starts with an analysis of the foreign economy of the European Union, based on the terms of 1993 Maastricht International Cooperation Treaty, in which devices are available to the State members for the accomplishment of their proposals. In addition, the study analyses the European view regarding this technical and financial cooperation.

Afterwards, the study will consider the relationship between the E.U. and Latin American countries, its position regarding the possibilities of fastening existing links, in particular those which are related to trade and investments, as well as regarding the terms of an associative inter-regional agreement between European Union and Mercosul (Inter-Institutional Cooperation Agreement between European Community and Mercosul, Santiago do Chile, March 29th. 1993, and Madrid, December 15th. 1995) and the outstanding performance of “Grupo do Rio” (Rio’s Group) in those negotiations.

The conclusion of the analysis concerns the Latin American position and in the expectations about the future of the relationship already established with the regional economic blocks.

This study was made because the international events have been a permanent challenge for the European Union, to achieve a determined and coherent performance. This is expected when we consider a global institution such as the E.U. which is both demographically and economically well developed.

At the same time, we know that the economic policies applied in Latin America have been policies of economic adjustment, financial cleaning, rigid control of the credits, promotion of the foreign investments, privatization of public companies and development of regional economic integration.

After many decades of state interventionism in the economy, with all the disadvantages that are inherent to the monopolist structures, the dynamism of the free market economy has been rediscovered in Latin America, with the consequent search for competition in the companies.

There are, however, persistent challenges in terms of job creation and fight against poverty that must be considered in this context.

This process of market opening has been fully supported by the international community. On one hand, through initiatives from the region itself, such as the Mercosul creation, we have the re-launching of Andean Community, the Centroamerican Integration System, the Free Trade Area for the Americas (AFTA), the American States Organization and the Nafta Agreement.

On the other hand, there have been initiatives of several institutions that have supported this evolution by giving assistance and organizing conferences. Among them, we can mention the World Bank, the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (Unctad), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Economic Development Cooperation Organization (DCO). The European Union then has established a series of quadruple agreements of cooperation with the Latin American countries. The most important of them, the Inter-Regional Cooperation Agreement with Mercosul, from December 1995 (ONEC⁶ nr. L69 from 1996) that, in a second phase, foresees the possibility of creating a Free Trade Area between both economic blocks.

Free trade between European Union and Latin America has also been developed through other quadruple agreements of cooperation: the Cartagena Agreement signed in June 26th. 1992, the Andean Agreement (ONEC nr. C25, 1992) and another agreement signed in February 22nd. 1993, among the

⁶ Official newspaper of the European Communities.
Republic of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama which is known as Centroamerican Isthmus (ONEC nr.C77, 1993, pg. 30).

Besides this, one of the concerns of the European Council relates to the progressive incorporation of a global vision of the sustainable development, by establishing a link among the reinforcement of the social economic development of the peoples, the environmental defence, the fight against poverty - specially in the less assisted regions -, the increase of the international competition and the respect for the cultural diversity.

According to the E.U. Commission’s viewpoint, South and Central America together have taken on great innovation in relation to trade competition policy. As we know, since the beginning of the 90’s the area has been witnessing a consolidation of the democratic regimes; also, the economic policies of free-trade-market implementation to the international markets continue to happen; finally, the economic growth which occurred in this broad territory of more than 460 million inhabitants is notable.

The broadly announced European aid, although, is still facing practical barriers that need to be overcome to provide a greater comprehension of the process with a view to create a free trade area between European Union and Mercosul.

The subsidy system which is adopted for some products is a problem not only in Europe but also in the United States; there is no sense in subsiding certain kind of production, putting in disadvantage those who play the right game.

The former Brazilian Ambassador in the European Union, Jório Dauster, states that the globalization has produced two different planets, marked by disparity in the commercial practices; Brazil belongs to the first group: it has opened its economy, has reformed the State and has unshackled trade. The wealthy countries belong to the second group, among which prevails the protection against the products that are exported by the first group.

If the United States and the European Union do not convince themselves that they must open their markets, it will be useless the initiative of the G-7 (Group of the Seven wealthiest countries) of taking preventive actions against the financial crisis that threatens to affect them.

\footnote{Interview to the newspaper “O Estado de São Paulo”, in November 8th. 1998, page B-8.}
Terre (sol) et Territoire: Deux conceptions de l'espace dans les rapports Américains Latins internationaux

Le processus de formation des États nationaux a inclus, comme un de ses objectifs fondamentaux, spécifier les limites territoriales des nations. Dans ce sens, ils ont été formés les spécialistes qui ont été élevés des théories, principes et normes internationales dans vogue pour la démarcation des limites et les gouvernements ont assemblé des documents historiques et des techniciens pour confirmer leurs semblants dans la matière. Les conflits pour les questions levé ont occupé une bonne partie des administrations et activités des chancelleries et des corps diplomatiques faits référence aux rapports parmi les nations d’Amérique latine. Le territorialité a été constitué cette entrée l’élément fondamental de déclaration des souverainetés nationales. Par conséquent, le territoire et nation étaient deux éléments indissolublement liés dans les stratégies politiques.

Aussi long que, les régions ont été développées suivre d'autres principes et dynamique social, culturel et jusqu'à économique. La formation de régions a été basée sur l’usage des ressources qui ont fourni le sol et le sous-sol fondamentalement, par cela qui, bien qu'il y eût des points du contact avec les formations nationales comme pour l'exercice du domaine territorial différent pour les objectif et par conséquent dans les conceptions élaborées autour des espaces.

Par conséquence, le rapport fait référence à ces deux conceptions différentes de l'espace et ses implications dans les rapports Américains Latins internationaux.

Relations with various European states represent an essential aspect in the history of Argentina’s insertion in the world. Nevertheless, the analysis of other bilateral links has prevailed, whether due to their economic and/or political importance for Argentina. Though less significant, the neglected cases are not devoid of interest. It is interesting for instance the case of the Argentine-French connection. With few exceptions, historical analysis has been confined mostly to the relationship’s cultural dimension. Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, though, such a connection has also been politically and economically significant.

This paper is focused on the political dimension of a specific occasion, the 1960 encounter between presidents Arturo Frondizi and Charles de Gaulle. Against the background of a widely shared world view their respective governments’ foreign policy was an essential part of both rulers’ perceived mandate. Despite their countries’ indubitable differences in geographic location and socio-economic reality, both men stressed, above all, the national dimension as a starting point for a foreign policy projected on the world. In addition, there has been certain issues that are still relevant today. From the outset, the protectionist policies that came hand-in-hand with the process of European integration created serious problems for Latin America, as clearly noted during the talks between the presidents. Another crucial subject was Third World decolonization. With the Algerian case at the forefront, this remains a hitherto unresolved issue even if today this is due to the heavy burden the colonial experience imposed on Algeria and the hard realities of its post-independence experience.

During president Frondizi’s European tour of 1960, his meeting with De Gaulle, like that between officials of both governments, was exceptionally important, not only to assess past behaviour but also to identify the relationship’s potential and limits, as well as its future perspectives at the opening stage of the European Economic Community’s development. At the same time, the meeting paved the way for later research into not-so-well known aspects of both important rulers’ thought and international career in the political history of their respective countries.
The Crossroad of the American Foreign Policy in the Process of Argentine Integration and Latin America 1958 - 1962

The hemispheric relations between the United States and Latin America have been always historically difficult. The difficulties started with the failure of the Congress of Panama 1826. Then the United States was immersed in the tremendous fratricidal fight of the civil war and therefore, it could not be devoted to enhance the relationship with the rest of the continent. Only toward the end of the XIX century, Latin and North Americans met at the first Pan-American Conference predecessor of the OEA -the Organisation of the American States–although it was clear that the Northern country was the most powerful. This preponderance became more notorious with the war for Cuba that concluded with the absorption of the Island by Washington.

The presence of Roosevelt at the White House worsened the inter-american relations, because he didn’t hide that his favourite politics was to impose the North American presence by the use of force.

The First World War called the attention of the United States towards Europe and this situation continued with the negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles and the creation of the League of the Nation. Then it retired and during the 1920s decade they were isolated until the 1929economic crack took place.

When Franklin Roosevelt took the presidency the country get again interest for American problems and with the politics of “good vicinity” in the 1930s it tried to impose itself in the hemispheric relations.

The Second World War set up the political outlines to a world scale, but it entailed a slight approach for the American continent with the creation of the United Nations. Washington was backed by the Latin American republics in forming a block in the new political system. But in fact since that moment that the relations with the continent have deteriorated. The bipolarity of the Cold War harmed the regional contacts in the ‘50s especially during the years of Dwight Eisenhower presidency, a period when Nixon’s and Rockefeller’s trips were significative outcome for the time.

For Frondizi, Argentina was a Latin American country, part of the West and with continental commitments. He conceived the Argentine in foreign policy like a Nation with the conscience of unity and related with the world problems.

That’s why he thought that the Latin American integration was a great problem for Latin America in itself. The sovereignty and the independence of the Latin American countries depend on their ability of uniting. In fact, all isolated country loses its real independence progressively, still when its constitution and its leaders continue affirming its sovereignty. Limited in the political field, the sovereignty is diluted in economic, technique and scientific matters. The division among countries of the region accentuated its relative underdevelopment and the dominance of the foreign companies in the vital and more dynamic sectors of their economies. Indeed, in the 1960s, it can be considered a “gross way” that Latin American national companies expanded exclusively in the national environment.

According to Dr. Arturo Frondizi’s opinion, the development of Latin America demanded a series of measures from the economic and social field. A transformation of the structures and a modernisation of the economic methods was needed.

The efforts were unavoidable in the following areas:

- agriculture;
- transports;
- base industries and the general ones.
According to the desarrollista idea, integration is not a panacea in itself; it requires a common will, an all-out effort and a constructive action. The integration doesn't eliminate all the difficulties by charm, it doesn't solve all the problems. It is real that those Latin American countries don't take up the integration as a necessity for the current and future economy, they will remain in the underdevelopment. Therefore we wish to conclude saying that the integration presupposes important and appropriate means, and among them agile and elastic Latin American institutions. In fact in the sixties, Latin America was not prepared to carry out the integration project, for different international facts: Cuban Revolution and the fear of Communism produced certain inability by the States to manage with a wide international politics, trying to privilege their old international system with the aggravating circumstance of ever-recurring military coups, which limited, like in the case of Argentina, their international politics.
Argentine, Brézil et l´Intégration Regionale

A partir des temps coloniales le Rio de La Plata et le Brézil ont maintenu un active changement commercial lequel a continué pendant le temps de la consolidation de deux Etats nationaux, surtout, pour obtenir la spécialisation regionale de la production, et à travers l´espace de la frontière comuneaux deux pays. La production agricole différenciée et en nombreuses quantités, merci aux inversions étrangères dans l´infrastructure et les services appropriés, avec la réception de main d´oeuvre européenne, elles ont développé non seulement structures économiques orientées pour l´exportation de matières premières et aliments, à la même fois elles ont stimulé aussi le commerce réciproque. On comprend de cette façon que les productions agricoles différenciées et complémentaires et le rapprochement géographique et le volume de deux marchés les plus grands de l´Amérique du Sud, ont stimulé une plus grande convergence commerciale entre les deux pays. Cette perspective a encouragé la gestation, pendant le XX siècle, de différents idées et projets qui rendaient propice un progressif rapprochement économique entre l´Argentine et le Brésil. En ce sens, les tendences vers la conformation d´une unité douanière qu´incorporerait progressivement les pays du Cône Sud ont pris force. Cependant, ces propositions n´ont pas obtenu d´accords formels et on a dû attendre jusqu´à la critique année de 1930, moment où un increment du commerce entre les deux grands pays sudaméricains a commencé à être vérifié en permettant la signature de traités et conventions commercials entre Buenos Aires et Rio de Janeiro. L´éclatement de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale a ajouté de nouvelles difficultés économiques, stimulant le changement regional et en rendant possible la concretion d´un Traité de Libre Echange Progressif entre l´Argentine et le Brésil en 1941. Cependant, la différence de position entre les deux pays en face du conflit sous les pressions des Etats Unis, a fait échouer le traité en vigueur. Mais le gouvernement argentin a continué avec ses initiatives pour construire une unité douanière sudaméricaine, en faisant une active propagande de rapprochement politique et culturel vers les pays ibéraméricains qui a abouti à une série de traités commercials entre les mêmes. Le “Acta de Santiago” signé entre l´Argentine et le Chili en 1953 a été la culmination de tous ces traités. Là on se proposait l´élimination de toute restriction commerciale entre les deux nations et permettait la possibilité de l´adhésion à ses principes des autres gouvernements ibéraméricains. En ce sens, le gouvernement argentin voulait incorporer le Brésil à ce traité pour rétablir le Pacte du ABC, mais les difficultés internes de ce dernier pays ont empêché de concrétiser ce désir. Malgré cette situation, c´est à dire, les différentes perceptions internes et l´alignement opposé que l´Argentine et le Brésil ont adopté en face de marchés et puissances différentes, périodiquement les deux nations ont essayé la légalisation de leur commerce à l’aide de nouveaux traités. En conséquence, en 1961 les présidents Frondizi et Quadros ont signé la “Declaración de Uruguayan” à travers de laquelle on cherchait consolider les liens bilatéraux et coordiner une action internationale comune entre l´Argentine et le Brésil en face de grands centres mondiaux du pouvoir et des organisations internationales du crédit. Pour arriver à ce but, en février 1967, les ministres argentin et brésilien se sont réunis à Buenos Aires pour étudier l’inclusion progressive de différents secteurs économiques et la conformation postérieure d´une douane unique. Cependant, d´anciennes contestations politiques et stratégiques ont apparu, poussées par les gouvernements dictoriaux de la region. Une de ces difficultés était l’utilisation des recours hydriques du bassin du fleuve de la Plata mais la signature d´un traité en 1969 par Argentine, Brésil, Bolivie, Paraguay et Uruguay a apporté une solution transitoire. Parallèlement, maintes nations d´Amérique latine avaient signé en 1960 le Tratado de Montevideo lequel a abouti à la Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio (ALALC). Après une vingtaine d´années en vigueur et sans obtenir les résultats désirés, en 1980 l´ALALC a été remplacé par l´Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI). Sur ce point, et poussé par le conflit de Malvinas et la sévère situation provoquée par la dette externe, l´increment du commerce argentin-brésilien a accru son importance et permettait canaliser les attitudes de cooperation de deux nations face au besoin de répondre ensemble aux difficultés des années 80. En plus, le procès de redémocratisation commencé à l´Argentine et au Brésil a aidé pour que en
1985 les deux gouvernements initiaient un chemin hâté en vue d’obtenir la cooperation et l’intégration économiques, dont le succès attirait l’intérêt de l’Uruguay et le Paraguay, permettant que les quatre pays signent en 1991 le traité qui a établi le Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR). C’est celle-ci la première intention pour formaliser l’“intégration cachée” que l’Argentine et le Brésil ont engendrée à partir d’un procès de longue durée historique, nuancée par un antagonisme prédominamment rhétorique, et qui à nos jours nous montre tant de défis comme d’opportunités pour nos deux pays dans un contexte mondial complexe et compétiteur.
Understanding the historical insertion of Latin America in the international economic system implicates the analysis of particular characteristics in this part of the continent. Political fragmentation became a hurdle on the way to reach the integration of the economic spaces of the area, objective faced by the Latin American national politics in several moments through out their history. In many times, regional agreements came out from those efforts. These agreements may be reviewed through an integration framework, where Latin America’s position between the aspects proposed by this scientific meeting –regionalization and globalization– becomes debatable. The aim is to seek for backgrounds leading to a better interpretation of the Mercosur as a regional organization within the Latin-American and the continental frameworks.

The manufacture diversification at an international level, the demand of raw materials, the British decision of trading with its colonies and industrialized countries, the intention of Latin American countries of diversifying their production at the time when the United States and other nations were trying to expand their markets; these were starting points for the changes of the world’s economic relations at the end of the XIX century. The United States had annexed new territories from Mexico and assured markets, investments and international trade with the rest of the continent, specially in Central America and the Caribbean. The exports to Latin America had increased as well as the imports from that area between 1897 and 1914. As investments at an international level, Europe and North America accomplished their intentions of financial investment, in exchange of benefits and support from the receiving countries. The arrival of products and resources provoked the reorganization of economic politics and the increase of production in Latin American countries. This was an important step within national borders, but it didn’t produce regional integration nor technological renewal. Each country specialized in some raw materials allowing the intervention of foreign capitals. So internal markets of Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Cuba increased, as well as exports, manual labour and work market offer, specially in production activities free from international capital. This circumstance made flowered the complementary but not the basic industries. In countries with enclave economy the situation was different because development was based on supporting production connected to the exporting sector, removing manufacture industries’ autonomy and conditioning their situation in order to match the external trade needs.

In South America, Brazil and Argentina implemented different industrialization processes, although none of them was far from the following four aspects that characterized the region until 1930: 1) the merge of small and medium companies in order to create stock companies and get monopoly-type control in the correspondent production area; 2) organization of branch enterprises with headquarters in the United States or in Europe, which manufacture or assemble commodities; 3) implementation of modern industrial plants; 4) industrialization by import substitution. Where they took place, this aspects were the result of the political and social structure inherent to each country, urbanization process, the situation of work markets, revenue distribution and other factors. Since 1930 there were changes in the economic and political relations, with a staunch rivalry between Great Britain and the United States for the predominance in the Latin American markets. In Argentina, the interests of agricultural commodities export came back to government, renewing the relationship with England. According to a very interesting historical appraisal, president Peron tried to organize a political system based in the close relation between the military, urban middle class and working class, in order to achieve industrialization and national development, like Brazil after 1930. This country had started a process increasing the participation of craftsmen, industrial workers and carriers in the economy, connected to agricultural commodities exporting sector and with intervention of foreign capitals. After a
reaction against these elements, Brazil had an approach to the North American sphere of influence looking for another way to reach industrialization.

It is known that during the Second World War most of Latin American countries signed commercial agreements with the United States and offered their own harbours and military bases in the effort against the Axis supplying raw materials to the Allies. The result of the war let the United States implement a Pan-American looking expansion policy, by taking the place that Great Britain used to hold in the economic relations with the South Cone. Private investment of foreign capitals was encouraged by the US government, who provided economic aid with non-official Exim bank's loans only, resisting any nationalistic policy in this direction. This was the cause of the collapse of Romulo Gallego's government (Venezuela, 1947). The United States did not oppose to the resolutions of the Conference of Chapultepec (1945) or the military treaty of Rio de Janeiro (1947) which lied the foundations of the TIAR, neither to the creation of the OEA in the Conference of Bogota (1948), all of those were steps in order to consolidate the US dominance in the continent, while the main concern was in Europe and other parts of the world in order to apply the doctrine of blocking of the communism. The price for the political support to the military Latin American governments was of course their alignment with the United States, that assured a convenient economic policy and continued the opposition to all nationalist intention avoiding the independent action which would damage this influence in the region.

After the Second World War several countries signed bilateral agreements to stimulate commerce, creating blocks of international trade. However, no good result was achieved. The economies of the region were weak due to lack of integration between them and their relative isolation, which was revealed by the reduced regional commerce affecting their competitive production sectors. The ECLAC was born by this time, supporting growth of economic activities and integration of Latin America into the worldwide economy. As a way to encourage integration, the ECLAC proposed the organization of a custom union, considering as a necessity the pursuing of industrialization in the region through state protectionism in the macro and microeconomic regulation.

After the '50s, there were initiatives for regional markets and for free trade zones later: simpler structures than the former failed attempts. Prebisch called them “more limited agreements” than a common market. As a result, the ALALC was born in 1960. This association’s primary objective was to progressively free trade between the involved national markets. In 1953, Argentina had signed the “Santiago Act” creating a common central agency, the General Council of the Chilean-Argentine Economic Union, in order to fasten the trade between Argentina and Chile. Afterwards, an Economic Union Agreement was signed with Paraguay, as a first step towards custom union. Something similar happened with Ecuador and Bolivia.

Although there had been new flows of manufacture exports and an overturning of the economy concerning the internal markets of the region’s countries due to the industrialization through imports substitution processes, external trade structure couldn’t be organized in a better way. The resulting unbalanced situation came up from two main factors: 1) there was no dynamic manufacture trade between Latin American countries; 2) the absolute and relative industrialization were in the production of consumption assets and then, in some countries, intermediate assets, but hardly of capital assets. This characteristic, added to the little absorption of employment due to the limited expansion in activities of technological and scientific development that should have been generated, would produce limitations to the completion of the industrialization stages, as it happened in other parts of the world, not achieving modernization either. To sum up, dynamic demands did not take place intensifying the vulnerability of national economies. On the other hand, market size revealed its importance in that particular historical moment, and at the same time that the national markets were reaching their zenith, regional (and even sub-regional) economic integration projects were arising, trying to find complementary compensation of development lines and to increase the perspectives of market demands. So that from the idea of the continental integration supported by the United States since the 19th century and later by Latin American countries, with different basis and objectives, the concept of an organization upon free-trade delimited areas has been reached.

However, the region situation had not changed since 1970. Among the arising problems, some of the main ones were the situation of inequality of the international trade between Latin America and the central countries, the regional markets’ limitation due to the lack of purchasers for their industrial production, the failure of the regional systems of commercial associations to integrate a Latin American common market. Social troubles which were related to inflationary processes and deficit in balances of
payments, had an important bearing on changes of government; their hardness lead them to dismantle workers' unions and to ban political parties' free action. In order to stimulate investments by negotiating loans with international organizations, Brazil, Argentina and Chile's foreign economic policies tried to connect international companies, real multinational corporations. This situation would lead to the opening of national markets by reducing tariffs and regulations. The tendency became deeper with the ending the internationalization process by the implementation of adjustment programs and the development of market mechanisms. Markets' strength increase opposite to national states' capacity and regulation. The recommendation of reducing national states size made by the "Consensus of Washington" by the middle of the 90's, may be pointed out as the top of this process.

Market economy, free of political and social control, rules the new world order. Carried-out transformations involve adaptations taking into account national states' role, social control of economy, the incidence of technological improvements on research centers, universities, institutions and on culture –all of them as technological development agents–. Changes were not the same for all countries: while economic growth kept on increasing in some of them, this process was delayed in others in spite of all efforts made in that direction. Inequities and asymmetries between nations went deeper. The break down in the balance of payments and the troubles show us the weakness of the economic institutions and the failures of the worldwide economic organization. The necessity of reform points to structural and organizational matters, searching for the recovering of institutional credibility. Integration in the world becomes the primary objective, using the best methods for each country and looking for overcoming that asymmetry. Latin American countries seem to walk toward integration with a "continentalizing" tendency, as a response to a world economic scenario where globalization and regionalism live together, creating commercial blocks. These ones should take advantage of their natural resources, the expansion of the internal consumption of different products and the possibility of specialization in a wide market such as the Mercosur. The intention is to develop strategies which will link world economy and internal development through joint, coordinated and complementary efforts.
World Overview of the Milk Producing Countries at the End of the Millenium and the Effects on Mercosur

The milk international market is characterized by a series of distortions suffered on the last decades. This has driven the exporting countries to implement strategies that we will try to synthesize in this work.

Argentina, a traditional milk and derived products producing country, went through transformations which lead in the last years to an even-increasing excedent production and to the consequent search for markets to place its milk products.

The post-war years marked the beginning of a protecting and developing food production policy in Europe, main target of Argentine exportations up to that moment. Once self-supplying was reached and thanks to the implemented subsidies, the Europeans started to export to other markets, blocking the competition of countries, which, like Argentina, did not subside their milk products and only gave some small reimbursements to exportations. In a moment when the world is getting ready to finish a century and begin another one, some economic, social and environment tendencies, at world as well as at MERCOSUR levels, seem to be well defined.

There practically exists consensus among agricultural producers and consumers in analyzing the effects in their economies of the stage –already finished- of State intervention. The tendency that can be foreseen for the following years is the consolidation of a market oriented model.

With the signature of the GATT, Uruguay Round, the integration of the world markets acquired a new impulse and now all the countries feel the effects of the growing market liberalization; the increasing goods, world services' flow and the international capital movement.

Facing the market globalization, the MERCOSUR countries decided to consolidate the opening of their economy through the regional integration option. MERCOSUR has acquired strengths that grant it credentials inside and outside the region. Its production and commerce are not very relevant in relation to the world market, it participates with 4.2% and 4.3% respectively, but it is of great significance at Latin American level, where it contributes with 40% of the region commerce.

Undoubtedly, there was a great expansion in the internal trade, but that with the rest of the world grew as well, at a rate of 20% per year. This percentage is, nevertheless, smaller than the trade that took place in other blocks, like the European Union or the NAFTA. Also direct foreign investment has shown positive evolution, proving that MERCOSUR is an attractive emerging market for foreign investments. Important investments are being done in infrastructure, by way of international, national and regional projects. On the other hand, the sub-region presents, today, important inequalities in the economic, social and cultural fields.

The idea or the proposal for the creation of a hemispheric free-trade zone, (which was agreed by the hemispheric Heads of States and Governments in the Miami Summit, in December 1994 and ratified in the recent Santiago de Chile Summit in 1998), is characterised by the fact of trying to accompany, along with the States agreements and political actions, the acceleration of the globalization process.

Regarding the world milk production, 95% of it is consumed in the same countries and only 5% is bound for the international market, where commodities characterized by their wholesale distribution without trademark distinctions predominate. Milk powder and butter are the best examples. Commodity prices can vary under any circumstance that may affect directly or indirectly market expectations. Milk products domestic prices have always been severely higher than international ones, so that the sector profits are strongly influenced by sales destinations' composition of each country.
So it happens that New Zealand producers had to become the most efficient ones worldwide, because they face the challenge of producing milk in a country that exports more than 85% of its production to that world which is plagued by distortions and subsidies. Milk production is not price forming, so that costs must be adapted to the market conditions imposed by the sales mix.

The Argentine situation is absolutely the opposite, since the local market consumes 85% of the production and from the remainder 15%, 70% goes to Brazil, which behaves as an extended internal market. Summing up, more than 90% of Argentine milk is consumed in the region; this is a most excellent condition that has reinforced the sector growth. The domestic pro capita consuming has exceeded the 220 lts. per year, in a continuous ascending curve since 1992.

The Brazilian pro capita consuming has an enormous growing capability, its evolution will depend on the country policies and economic circumstances. The consuming growth in both countries has been developing unevenly, according to regions and to the different population acquiring power, reinforced by the improvement in the variety and quality of the offer, and in Brazil, specially, it is based on the impossibility of its internal market self-supply, the intra-MERCOSUR tariff (duty) elimination, the quality of the products, the high level of milking cows production, the geographic proximity, the elimination of pararancelarias barriers and the partner countries insufficient volume of milk supply. The MERCOSUR common external duty are between 14 and 16%, which the milk producers consider low, but if we look at them in relative terms with other goods with equal or more aggregated value, it would seem that milk is a relatively privileged line in MERCOSUR, since the level 14 to 16% is the same than capital goods have.

At the moment, the EU accepted not to exclude the agricultural chapter in the Latin American negotiations, but starting to negotiate in July 2001 facing the duty measures immediately. Yet, they also stipulated that everything will be subdued to the Millennium Round of the Geneva World Commerce Organization conclusions, a multilateral issue that has not even a starting date yet.

Latin America presents favourable perspectives after having made significant changes in production and industrialization, which can be generally characterized as follows:

**Trade and production sustained growth**

**Quick industrial restructuring and modernization**

**Strong domestic and transnational investments**

**Growing regional cooperation through Uniones Transitorias de Empresas (UTE)**

As far as MERCOSUR competitors in Oceania, we observe that possibilities are quite acceptable: Australia and New Zealand have similar yields per cow to Argentina, though they have a charge per hectare between 2 and 3 times greater, which allows to estimate that, having Argentina climate characteristics and earth qualities similar to those in the mentioned countries, the growing potential is still quite big. In the industrial stage, it can be observed that in Argentina, though important efforts have been undertaken, growing productivity can still be foreseen because of scarcity in the scale production and in automation of the basic products elaboration – milk powder and cheese. As far as milk powder, the advances by local industries in the last year have been greater than in cheese.

Undoubtedly, the positive fact concerns the growth, but with a price system that does not allow to sell outside MERCOSUR. If we add the excellent aptitude that the region has for milk production, we can reach the conclusion that it could be a leader in the international market, but if it had competitive prices in the international market, since the subsidy issue can not be thought of in the region.

The production cost will weigh ever more strongly in the international market after the accorded changes in GATT Uruguay Round. For this reason, the productive systems with a high energy consuming level and a strong environment aggression will be being replaced in the world by those of greater pasturing participation, independent from subsidy reductions that, in many cases, have made them "viable" during this half of the century which is coming to an end.

The world food demand, whilst great population sectors better their life conditions, as the Asia-Pacific zone (China and South East Asia) and Latin America (Mexico and Venezuela) opens new possibilities to countries and regions, which like MERCOSUR, have growing potentialities.
International and Interregional Relations in the Area of Misiones or Palmas.

The formation of the internal space of Misiones constitutes an illustrative example of the interweaving of the international and interregional relations that took place in many Latin American frontier regions.

Such a space, which functioned as a totality capable of occupation and shifting, is linked to the history of the area that currently includes the south of Brazil, the Argentine and Uruguayan Mesopotamia, as well as a large part of the former Spanish governorship of Asuncion.

With the aim to develop this perspective of analysis, we take as a starting point the concept of region, taking into account its character of methodological tool with its corresponding tie to reality, that is to say, the relation between the space and the political economic and sociocultural phenomena that take place there.

In other words, this concept is being built in relation to the subject of study, which shows its temporal and spatial dynamism.

To this respect, we consider the frontier as a specific case of region. That is to say, as "plurinational spaces", subjected to appropriation and control by more than one State which implemented power strategies in order to impose their authorities and they squabbled among themselves for their ruling; and as regional spaces with a dynamic of their own, which generated answers to the politics of each of the state entities in which they were incorporated.

The existence of these interactions between what we can call "opposing complementaries" allows the broadening of the horizon of analysis through the observation of the inter- influence between the "international relations" and the "interregional relations", applied in this study to the specific case of the region of Misiones.
The main point of the work is to try to appraise better the diplomatic and commercial relations between Iran and Argentina, since the beginning in 1947 up to 1953, looking for the relationship that could have existed between commercial changes and the ebbs and flows in the diplomatic relations between both of them, by turning on documents and statistics from that time.

Beginning with May 26th of 1947 Argentine-Iranian diplomatic relations were improved since those countries had had good negotiations in the 1930s: Iran tried to draw a good deal and to guarantee the links with our country choosing a diplomatic representative, but Argentina had not any interest in it, so Iran took it back.

In spite of the cautions diplomatic policy followed by our country, in the period of 1944–1945 trade balance had been in favour of Argentina. That situation changed in 1946, when the war ended and our trade balance’s situation went worse, as it happened during 1946 and 1947.

There was another important commercial change between Iran and Argentina: first purchases of fuel and lubricants took place and the price in dollars was very cheap in comparison to that of the property importation coming from USA, Venezuela and Holland Possessions in Central America.

In 1950 the commercial relations were in their best moment, although Argentina had a deficit in exportation balance, the change would be in the importation purchases, namely fuel and lubricants increasing.

In 1951 and 1952 Iranian situation worsened with Great Britain, because of the nationalisation of the oil industry, since industry has been handled by British-Iranian Oil Company.

It was the worst moment in Iran: the political situation was awful as the nationalists politics had been fighting all the time, meanwhile other countries like Italy, Brazil, and Argentina had been seeing the possibility of buying fuel at cheap prices, inasmuch fuel products were essential to develop their industries.

On the other hand our historic alineation with the United Kingdom made even more difficult that the government would take a risk because of fuel purchases to a country that had broken dangerously with the new international order since that time.

If we read over documents and statistics of that time, we can see that the diplomatic relations between those countries were in contradiction with the economic situation in the 30s and at the beginning of the 40s. Argentina had a favourable balance of trade so that Iran didn’t take interest in diplomatic relations, she had a representative in our country instead of them.

On the other hand the beginning of diplomatic relations, and the opening of Iranian Legation occurred at the moment in which our balance of trade was deficitary.

In the 1950s there were negotiations for buying fuel, but they were not carried through although both of the countries would like to do it.
The United States vis-a-vis Argentina and Brazil: the Military Coups of the 1960s

Relations between Brazil and Argentina on the one hand, and the U.S.A. on the other hand, are of particular interest, not only because of both former states' import on the Latin American economic and political scene, but also because of the historically decisive role their links with the great powers have had in the region.

The study of politically significant events in both countries, that occurred in similar circumstances and at about the same time, can shed light on similarities and differences in context, in particular on the tangle of domestic interests present at a crucial point in time, and on the incidence of U.S. foreign policy priorities on such events. One such juncture gave rise to the military coups against the governments of presidents Joao Goulart (1964) in Brazil, and Arturo Illia in Argentina (1966).

In the global context of the Cold War of the mid-1960s, Washington's main concern in the region was to counteract rising social effervescence and the tendency of some Latin American governments toward economic nationalism. Superficially ascribed to Soviet penetration, both phenomena were identified with the “Communist threat”, especially after the Cuban revolution's triumph in 1959.

Such a state of convulsion in Latin America was seen by U.S. diplomacy and intelligence as pregnant with threats for that superpower's general interests. President Kennedy's hemispheric policy, in particular the creation of the Agency for International Development (AID), represented “preventive reformism,” without a complete abandonment of the usual diplomatic and financial pressures. He even supported Cuban exiles in their efforts to restore pre-revolutionary conditions on the island. When Kennedy was succeeded by Lyndon. Johnson, U.S. policy increasingly shifted towards a strategic-military approach, in the context of “ideological borders,” by way of bilateral agreements of assistance, covert “operations” to promote coups (Brazil, Argentina), and through unilateral military intervention. Witnessed in Santo Domingo, the U.S. sought to legitimize such military interventionism by means of the “collective umbrella” provided by an Organization of American States' “inter-American force.”

The AID's failure also caused the decline of the prevailing “social” approach (developmentalism) among Latin America's political leadership of the day, and the reinforcement of tendencies toward military-repressive solutions. Against the background of sharp bipolar confrontation, explicitly manifested in U.S. military intervention in Vietnam, Latin America became fully involved in the Cold War.

Were such options the expression of divergent points of view between the State Department and the Pentagon? Although this is what emerges from U.S. diplomatic and military records, the differences were more apparent than real. Brazilian president Goulart was considered by American diplomacy and intelligence as having a degree of affinity with Communism. The civilian-military coup that overthrew him enjoyed not only Washington sympathy but also U.S. planned material support, including arms and a “task force” that was already sailing towards the South Atlantic by the end of March.

Although the American attitude was more cautious in Argentina’s case, State Department records reveal that since Illia’s inauguration U.S. decision-makers were closely monitoring his government's political evolution. This became particularly evident following the annulment of contracts with U.S. oil companies that were signed by Illia's predecessor (Arturo Frondizi), and the adoption of other policies deemed to be nationalist or even leaning towards the left.

In different degrees, and always seeking to preserve U.S. economic and strategic interests, the “manifest goals” of American diplomacy in both episodes - defense of democracy, and promotion of free
enterprise - were but the rhetorical dimension of the quest for secure allies in a regional scenario coloured by bipolar rivalry.
The Latin American Student Movements, from Their Formation until the Age of the Technological Capital. A Compared Analysis of the FUA, the UNE and the FEUU. 8

Presentation.

The process of regional integration, which the country that make up the Mercosur are living, arised a broad academic bibliography of investigations that try to analyze the process. Generally, the most part turns on the study of the commercial relationships, and superficially they are works that approach the international or cultural relationships of the member countries. From another standpoint, this work intends to analyze the new tendencies that are spreading in the current capitalism, focusing the analysis on the new role the University assumes in the era of the Technological Capital, to understand the new social relationships that are derived from it. In this sense, you may widen the study by the historical comparison among student movements in the countries of the Mercosur, understanding them as a related social key in this new stage.

New tendencies in the University.

A few years from the third millennium, the so-call Industrial Society entered in a deep mutation. Along with it, Social Sciences are facing a severe crisis in their subject. In the ‘60s, the humanistic disciplines faced the challenge of looking for answers to the political manifestation of new social characters that didn’t respond to the traditional pattern of social class. The juvenile radicalization asserted itself as one of the analysis’ variants. During the post-war period, the increment in the literacy rates and the formation of university groups in different cities caused the entries in bulk and the irruption of vigorous student movements in all the world. The juvenile rising in the Universities of Berkeley (USA-1964), Tlatelolco (Mexico-1968), Rome (Italy-1968), Praga (Czechoslovakia-1968), Paris (France-1968) and, of course, Córdoba (Argentina-1969) express the synthesis of this period.

These student mobilizations closed a phase of economic growth in the capitalist economies, characterized by full employment and massive consumption. Starting from the crisis of accumulation, which took place in the central countries in the ‘70s, the fall of productivity and the consequent low in earnings rate, it would cause the questioning, on the part of the capital, of the institutional ways of Welfare-State. The Welfare-State was accused to hamper investments because of the tax-burden, and to discourage the productivity of the work, because of the pressure the Unions exercized. At the same time, the capital claimed economic areas that were in state orbit and that are now profitable. It would begin by this way a process of alteration of the Capital, thought as a social relationship that, in answer to the oil shock, it led up to the so-called Third Industrial Revolution, where the informatization of the productive processes includes the technological and scientific creation, in the same development of the Capital.

In the current capitalism, the capital-work relationship assumes a new form that can be understood with the concept of technological capital, elaborated by the Dr. Pablo Leán in the one renovated contribution to his Ph. D. dissertation. The new relationship of the Capital assumes a “differentiated”

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8 FUA (Federación Universitaria Argentina), UNE (Unión Nacional de Estudiantes, Brasil) y FEUU (Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios del Uruguay).
9 Leán, Pablo, El capital tecnológico, Catálogos, FCE, UBA, Bs.As., 1997.
form, unlike that analyzed by Marx, where the human work took a “not differentiated” form. This Capital generates extraordinary earnings under the exploitation of highly specialized work force, arising a mutation in the classic social character and a new relationship with the Higher Education.

The new forms of this capitalism re-mould the capital accumulation, demanding a high specialization of the working force. In this context Higher Education will be defined by a reformulation of its relationship with the State and because of a growing demand of scientific-technological transfer on the part of the Capital; it will be defined by an argument against the welfare state educational policy10. State politics’ that assert the education, health or housing rights, as an indelegable responsibility of the State, is deeply questioned by the vicars of the market that stress that in the environment of the free concurrence the distribution of goods and services is optimized, they would like Education to be commercialized and reduced to the concept of Human Capital.

Expansion in Latin America.

In Latin America the crisis of the traditional populist thought gives way to a new concept of development strategies and it incentivates the setting in march of a deep reform of the State, accompanied by political leanings to privatize public companies, to liberalize foreign trade, unregulated financial markets and to make flexible the work markets11. The peak of the neoliberalism involves unfaillingly the politicians for the public education. An official speech arises, which is presented as sole and totalizing trying to ignore all possibility to build logical discursive alternative. The educational restructuring is managed as an administration problem, where competition approaches should be introduced, like meritocracy, effectiveness and efficiency for the quality increase through the evaluation of results12.

With regard to the Higher Education, the academic assessments of some intellectuals were given straight. They focus on the overcrowded situation that affects national universities, questioning their academic level and outlining a situation of uncontrol of the system. Brünner, for example, observes that although the production of graduates in Latin America is higher than in the countries of the OECD, it is not reflected in the growth of the PBI, because formation of human resources is dedicated in greater proportion to social sciences than to basic ones13. He proposes a redistribution of the budget, precisely in favour of the second area; and that the Benevolent State, which finances them, without any analysis neither critical assessment on the use of the received public funds, is replaced by a Evaluating State that guarantees this process 14

With these advice, the reform of the Higher Education begin to be developed; the situation is eased by the reconstructing tendency that set up the scenario to put through a transformation of the university teaching. As well as the CEPAL worked, in the times of the ISI and the National and Popular State, a key role in devising political economics for the region15, starting from the programs of stabilization of the beginning of the decade, it will be the World Bank the organism in charge of designing politics for the economic growth and the transformation of the State.

Dealing with modernization, the World Bank wishes to present education like one of the fundamental pillars of development strategies; it is asserted that access to the teaching contributes not only to a macroeconomic growth, rather it gives to individuals chances to encrease their earnings16. These

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14 Idem, pp. 171-175.
15 Dabat, Alejandro, El mundo y las naciones, UNAM, 1993, cap.IV, p. 75 y ss.
“Teorias del Capital Humano” replace the “Teoria del Derrame”, making clear that inequality is a by-product of economic growth, due to the combination of a growth in the population and a faulty and unequal access to the education. The neo-classical interpretation intends to diversify Higher Education’s sources of financing with the purpose of linking them to the productive process and of earning funds for basic formation, so commercializing education under an economicism that robs her of all social character or intrinsic value. Promoted by the Ministries of Education, also by specific programs as the FOMEC in Argentina, this plan of “modernization” meet with an University that has an ideological-political wealth that is incompatible with the new tendencies expressed by this manifestation of the capital.

Description of the Student Movement: Fua, Unites and Feuu.

The Latin American student movement celebrated in 1998 the 80th anniversary of the University Reformation. A fact that marked deeply the history of the Higher Education of the continent. In 1918 the mobilization of the Cordovan youths turned against the scholasticism and prevalent obscurantism in the university teaching. This is present in the pages of the history of this century. Eighty years later, the student movement continues claiming in favour of reformation legacy for an University that envisages the principles that marked the birth of the University Federation Argentina, on April the 11th 1918, and that along its history have constituted a factor of cohesion of the student movement in its political fight. The reformist principles find their roots in the 1st American Congress, which took place in Montevideo in 1908, that gave origin to the FEU, which would defend the principles until their break-up in the '20s. After an inconsistent performance in the well-known “Arielismo” current, the student movement would form the FEUU on April 26th 1929, that would fight for the reformist ideals until consummating them in the Organic Law of 1959 that as regulated them until present time. On the part of Brazil, although the União Nacional dos Estudantes was founded on August 11th 1937, almost two decades after the Cordovan epic deeds, in a context marked by the fight against Nazism in the Universities, Brazilian student movement called for the reformist legacy, participating then to the FUA in the OCLAE for the defence of the principles of Autonomy, Co-government, Extension, Plurality and Freedom in Higher Education.

During the whole century, the democratic life of the continent had been developing with interruptions, which limited the viability of the reformist principles. This forced the student movement to be a social key character in the fight for the Democracy in the region. The University Reformation contained in its breast the political concepts in favour of the institutional opening of the continent. Even in countries like Peru and Venezuela, the student movement was constituted in a political force that reached the responsibility of driving those States. In other countries, the reformism contributed with outstanding leaders to the Latin American scenario, from Haya de la Torre in Peru or Betancourt in Venezuela, and by now at the moment Robaina in Cuba, Dirceu in Brazil or Storani in Argentina.

This historical wealth will be analyzed for the student organizations of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Establishing a comparison among their evolution, observing the ties in ideological identity and policy and the differences in their formation and structuring. Leaving their origins, for the case of the FUA and the FEUU in the University Reformation, getting through the fight against the Fascism, the formation of UNITES, joining the juvenile radicalization of the '60s until disembarking in the years '90.

At present time the student movement has organization potentialities, ideological identity and a mobilization capability that transform it into an excellent social character in this stage of the capitalism. But it is necessary to ponder, and this it is the central hypothesis of investigation, that the viability of a Reformist University rests in great measure on two very important axes. On one hand, the

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18 FOMEC: Fondo para el Mejoramiento de la Calidad Educativa.
20 OCLAE: Organización Latinoamericana y Caribeña de Estudiantes.
21 UNE, UNE, 60 años a favor do Brasil, ANC, Río de Janeiro, 1997.
reformism is essentially free and transforming, it needs to act in a democratic society and, finally, it faces conservative and authoritarian sectors. On the other hand, to achieve the integration of different social sectors, the reformism calls for an economic structure that facilitates, to most of the society, the access to the Higher Education. Without this, the freedom of speech is channelled by the material lacks generated by the neoliberalism. In this sense, reformism must figure out a political alternative in order to challenge the tendency opened up by the Technological Capital.
Ofelia Beatriz Scher

Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires, Argentina

Las relaciones entre América Latina y Canadá en un nuevo marco regional (1950-1995)

La ubicación estratégica de Canadá entre Estados Unidos y el Reino Unido han alejado históricamente a dicho país de América Latina. Este paper comienza en los años cuarenta, cuando se producen los primeros acercamientos de Canadá hacia Argentina y Brasil en que se realizó el primer intercambio de diplomáticos. Diversos factores de orden internacional dificultaban dichas relaciones. En primer lugar, Canadá tenía una economía competitiva en relación a dichos países-productores de materias primas y alimentos Además Estados Unidos rechazaba todo acercamiento de Canadá hacia América Latina pues lo consideraba un miembro del Commonwealth más que un país americano.

Terminada la segunda guerra mundial Canadá focaliza sus intereses en las Naciones Unidas y en la OTAN y pierde interés en la OEA/OAS – formada en 1948 bajo la indiscutida influencia morteamericana-

Canadá por su espectacular crecimiento industrial pasa a pertenecer al “club del norte”, es así como se convirtió en el destino de gran cantidad de inmigrantes. Las primeras oleadas fueron de origen europeo, para luego incluir asiáticos, caribeños, latinoamericanos, hindús, etc. Las leyes del multiculturalismo que surgen para balancear las culturas francesa e inglesa sirvieron de marco para la inserción social y económica de todos estos diversos grupos étnicos que le dieron al país un perfil singular

A medida que el Reino Unido disminuye su influencia como gran potencia, Canadá se acerca cada vez más en lo económico a Estados Unidos pero con una actitud crítica en lo político e ideológico.

En efecto, en el marco de la guerra fría Canadá tuvo cordiales relaciones con la Unión Soviética y con China, nunca cortó relaciones con Cuba y asumió una actitud contraria a la guerra de Vietnam y al golpe de Estado de 1973 en Chile. Robusteció su posición de

“potencia media” en la OEA/OAS – donde ingresa como miembro observador en los años setenta- en el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo y en el grupo andino.

El problema internacional que significan los refugiados, como consecuencia de la intolerancia de las guerras en diferentes partes del mundo, ubican a Canadá en una posición de amparo a los mismos y de recibimiento en su territorio. En este sentido durante el último gobierno de Trudeau – 1980/84- Canadá tuvo especial interés en toda la problemática de la guerra en América Central y tuvo una activa participación en el proceso de paz en la región, en las relaciones económicas con el CARICOM y con el recibimiento dado a los refugiados de dicha guerra en su sociedad.

En los años noventa el fin de la guerra fría, marca el comienzo de un importante acercamiento de Canadá hacia América Latina.

Su incorporación como miembro pleno de la OEA/OAS y la regionalización económica que significan la formación del NAFTA/TLCAN y el MERCOSUR implican un nuevo y renovado interés de Canadá por la región latinoamericana.

Petróleo, minería, gas, actividades bancarias, son algunos de los rubros donde las empresas canadienses se incorporaron al mercado del sur. Una diversidad de actividades conjuntas algunas efectivas y otras en proyecto, en lo cultural, científico, médico, etc. generan las mejores expectativas de colaboración de cara al nuevo milenio.
Les transformations politiques et économiques des dernières années, profondes et accélérées en raison du système international de plus en plus complexe et dans lequel s’observent le renforcement du système global et la progression dans l'intégration et la coopération régionales, ont fait revivre l'idée selon laquelle il est nécessaire de réacheminer les relations entre pays en voie de développement. Certains suggèrent donc de relancer la coopération interrégionale entre l'Amérique latine, l'Asie et l'Afrique. Toutefois, la coopération entre des régions aussi différentes n’est pas si facile; les précédents sont presque inexistants et le commerce bilatéral entre ces pays, bien qu’il ait augmenté ces derniers temps, est encore très réduit. De plus, parmi les difficultés et les problèmes non encore résolus auxquels un projet de telle envergure se confronte, se trouve le problème d’une méconnaissance mutuelle enracinée, et cela malgré le fait que, dans les décennies antérieures, des deux régions aient été incluses dans la stratégie de coopération Sud-Sud dont la mise en marche a permis le rapprochement entre les pays du Tiers Monde qui cherchaient à résoudre leurs problèmes communs avec le Nord. Pour ce qui est de l’Argentine, sa méconnaissance des autres pays d’Amérique est similaire. Les pays afroasiatiques n’ont jamais été un sujet prioritaire dans le domaine de la politique extérieure argentine; tout au contraire, ils en ont été totalement absents et, pendant de nombreuses années, l’Argentine a fait étalage de sa préférence atlantique en la matière. Mais actuellement, l’une des préoccupations essentielles de la politique extérieure argentine est, d’une part, de s’efforcer à ce que le pays trouve sa place dans le système international et, d’autre part, de diversifier le plus possible ses relations avec le monde entier. De ce fait, les pays d’Asie et d’Afrique se sont constitués en pôle d’attraction. L’objectif de cet exposé est de décrire, de façon rétrospective, le trajet de la politique extérieure argentine de la moitié du XIXème siècle jusqu’à la fin du XXème. Notre but est d’analyser la politique extérieure argentine en connexion avec les continents asiatique et africain, afin de déterminer quelle a été la place occupée par ces pays à ce propos. Pour ce faire, nous tiendrons en compte aussi bien les aspects politico-diplomatiques que les aspects commerciaux pour déterminer s’il existe déjà des ébauches de rapports capables de rendre propice un rapprochement entre ces pays et l’Argentine.
The Relationship Between European Union and Mercosur

Shortly after the integration was achieved, Mercosur Countries had the first Meeting with the European Union Members and also signed an Agreement of Cooperation (05/29/1992). The European Union financial aid to Easter Countries, while MERCOSUR was stroken by the international financial crisis, weakened the relationship with the European Union.

However, drawing on the historical background, some European Countries developed new commercial, scientific and cultural relationships, mainly with Argentina and Brazil.

In order to improve the trade between the MERCOSUR and the European Union, it is necessary to establish similar rules for both sides in different fields (i.e. Biotechnology).

To attain this, Members of MERCOSUR will have to adapt to the rules already settled by the European Union. On the other hand, these Countries will have to cooperate during such process.

Our group of research, suggests that this is the best way to fulfil the need of international rules in fields such as the Biotechnology trade.
The International Insertion of Argentina: the Relationship with the USA and Europe and the Regional Integration

The analysis of the Argentine external trade, from a historical standpoint, shows that periodical imbalances—linked to a particular point in time and subsequently, to the circumstances of the insertion of the country in the global economy—, immediately following World War 1, acquired long lasting characteristics. Those imbalances remained coupled to the commercial development of Argentina, as well as to the pattern of specialization of its economy, and to international transfers of capital.

From that period on, the successive governments implemented policies devoted to neutralize the external sector by different means.

The bilateral treaties of compensation seeking the balance of the external trade, and the impossibility of signing a similar treaty with the U.S.A. left unresolved the issue of the Argentine deficit with that country.

In spite of the 1941 treaty, with few exceptions, the deficit problem extended along the entire commercial history of Argentina.

The foundation of military factories had also the goal of providing to the Argentine industry with the necessary inputs that would assure independence from imports, and trying to avoid in this way a tax increase on the external sector.

The regional integration was also attempted as a solution of the external sector problem. From Alejandro Bunge, through his project of a Southern Customs (Union Aduanera del Sur) to the Mercosur, these attempts showed alternating motivations in the search of political and economic solutions. The presence of the USA was a key factor in all these attempts.

A project by Federico Pinedo became relevant as it aimed, through a Customs Union with Brazil, to broaden the market in an attempt to reduce costs and turn the Argentine industry more competitive in order to reach the American market. Argentine developed along its history different triangular schemes regarding the international trade. They replaced each other as they became out dated.

A new international scheme of insertion is currently under development-The Mercosur-, resembling the mentioned Pinedo triangulation project, conceived more than 50 years ago to replace the old and outdated triangle between Argentina, the United Kingdom and USA.

The ALCA opens new possibilities. It should be noted and taken into account that the secular problem of Argentina still exists, on the side of the American demand. This is due to the imposed limitations to the Argentine products to that market, and the competition of the agricultural exports of that country to the markets in the rest of the world.